

THE PARADOXES OF PARTITION

(1937-47)

Volume I

1937-39



Edited by
S.A.I. TIRMIZI

The present volume, first in a three-volume study, objectively documents the critical factors that led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The 579 original documents included in this volume were collected mainly from the private and public archives in India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. These documents delve into the five paradoxical questions concerning partition: (1) What led to the reversal of the British Colonial Policy from a well-celebrated "divide and rule" to "divide and quit?" (2) Why did Jinnah, known to be a liberal secular nationalist till 1930s, become a staunch advocate of Muslim separatist movement? (3) Which factors led the Muslim League into political prominence? (4) Why did the Congress accept, with seeming alacrity, the Mountbatten Plan, relinquishing its vaunted principle of national unity and integrity? (5) Lastly, why did the *bhadralok*, which once opposed the Partition of Bengal in 1905, spearhead the agitation for the second partition of Bengal in 1947?

The story of partition generally revolves round the political activities of two organizations—the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. What is usually overlooked is the separatist role played by the rightist and bourgeois sections of Hindus and Muslims. The book, besides documenting the significant activities of the Congress and the League, also modestly tries to enlist the activities of different rightist and separatist organizations.

These documents account the events that occurred between 1937 and 1939. Least to mention, this was the period in which Hindu-Muslim relations were ultimately put to a litmus test, but most unfortunately, leading to the formation of two separate nations. An integrated study of the selected original documents of this period, together with a comprehensive editorial introduction, exhaustive *apparatus criticus* and a detailed bibliography, would surely help the historians to shape their own objective assessment of the partition of the Indian sub-continent. It is this aspect which makes the present volume a different and illuminating book on Indian history.



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**Volume I
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HAMDARD INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH

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
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To
Hakeem Abdul Hameed
As a token of
Esteem for the *visionary*
and
Admiration for the *philanthropist*



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PREFACE

India is celebrating the golden jubilee of its independence. Homages are paid to the freedom fighters. Gandhiji's services are recalled. Jawaharlal Nehru's midnight speech 'Tryst with Destiny' is being replayed, but what is ignored is the candid realisation which Nehru expressed in the speech he delivered at the last banquet given to Mountbatten in June 1948. He said, "It is difficult for me or anyone to judge what we have done during the last one year or so. We are too near to it and too intimately connected with the events. May be we have made mistakes, you and we. Historians, a generation or two hence, will perhaps be able to judge what we have done right and what we have done wrong."

In fact the tragic finale to the freedom struggle was the partition of the subcontinent into twin dominions of India and Pakistan within the British Commonwealth, resulting in the unfortunate fragmentation of the composite intellectual tradition, shattering the dreams of the people on both the sides of the fence. Their anguish was captured by the great poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz in his *Subh-e-Azadi* (Dawn of Independence). He sang :

*Yeh daghdar ujala yeh shab gazida sahr
Woh intizar tha jiska woh yeh sahr to nabin*

(This stain-covered day-break, this night-bitten dawn
This dawn is not that dawn we craved for)

Partition represented success of the aims and strategies of the British and failure of those of the Congress as well as the Muslim League. The Congress dream of united India was frustrated, while the League could get what Jinnah described as "truncated" and "moth-eaten Pakistan." The Congress held the view that no settlement was possible with the League because Jinnah negated each and every plan for settlement on the basis of united India,

Do people get what they want, simply because they demand it?

The partition was brought about by a strange configuration of national and international forces at a particular point of time. The British decision to divide India was precipitated by the political and economic unrest in India soon after the Second World War. The British strategy to divide the subcontinent into twin dominations within the British Commonwealth was concretised in the shape of the Mountbatten Plan. The question is posed : How is it that in the crucial Congress Working Committee meeting on 3rd July 1947 even Mahatma Gandhi, in the words of his grandson, Raj Mohan Gandhi, "stopped well short of obstructing a leadership united for acceptance."

The story of partition is, in fact, the story of opportunities missed and dreams shattered. The debate on partition raises a number of questions. Should partition be analysed only in terms of Congress-League strategies as is often done, or should the

debate not be deepened by investigating the causes of the uneven socio-economic development of the bourgeois of the two sister communities? Did the Hindu bourgeois, having close links with the Congress—Right and the Hindu Mahasabha, support a strong unitary Centre, while the Muslim bourgeois favour a weak federal Centre with autonomous provinces? How far the interests of the Hindu and the Muslim bourgeois converge on the question of partition? It is true that the Congress, as an umbrella party, aspired to be a national organisation but was it not at every cross-road of constitutional dealings with the Muslims and other minorities not influenced by clever manoeuvring of communal elements inside and outside? The result was that the Muslims and other minorities lost faith in its national character. How did the Muslim League, which was in wilderness since the Khilafat days, rise from the ashes during the last decade preceding partition under the leadership of Jinnah, who, though tutored in the liberal and secular traditions of Dadabhai Naoroji and G.K. Gokhale, now totally transformed, propounded the untenable two-nation theory in total opposition to the composite cultural nationalism of the Congress? Jinnah's task was facilitated by the Hindu Mahasabha's strident advocacy of the Hindu *Rashtra*.

In order to analyse these problems the Hamdard Institute of Historical Research launched an ambitious project on partition studies in 1990 and succeeded in identifying and acquiring xerox copies of the relevant documents from public and private collections in India, Pakistan and the U.K. within a relatively short period of five years and built up a unique collection of more than 4000 documents covering the crucial decade leading to partition. Selected documents from this collection are proposed to be published in a series of three volumes under the title "The Paradoxes of Partition."

The first volume in the series comprising of as many as 579 original documents pertaining to the period 1937-39 was completed on 31 April 1996. These documents have been placed in a chronological sequence with a view to juxtapose different evidences at a particular point of time. Heavy annotation provides the requisite contextual and biographical information, essential in interpreting the text of the documents. A comprehensive bibliography at the end of the book will help the readers in pursuing further research on the subject. Somewhat lengthy Introduction provides the requisite historical back-drop, particularly to the first volume in the series. It appears justified to endow some degree of coherence to this otherwise heterogeneous collection of documents emanating from diverse provenances. At the end of the Introduction I have attempted a coherent resume of the documents and drawn relatively few conclusions leaving the documents to speak for themselves.

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Every effort has been made to contact copyright owners. Apologies, however, are expressed for inadvertent omissions, if any.

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S.A.I. TIRMIZI

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315 George Cunningham to Laithwaite	21	Communicates the waning popularity of the Congress and growing strength of the League in N.W.F.P.	514
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323	Bose to Jinnah	16	Communicates regrets of the Congress Working Committee which do not find it possible to agree with the League Council's basis of negotiations.	526
324	Congress Resolution	16	The Muslim Mass Contact campaign must not divide the masses on communal lines but must stress the basic economic and political unity of the toiling masses.	527
325	Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah	16	Direct representation of the princely states on the Federal Legislature as suggested by Aga Khan will result in the Congress establishing a full Hindu majority at the centre.	528
326	Muslims of Nagpur to League's Secretary	16	Protest against Vidya Mandir Scheme.	529
327	Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah	16	Protests against Nawab Ismail Khan's meeting with Maulana Azad at Anand Bhawan notwithstanding demonstrations against his (Azad's) Calcutta Maidan <i>Imamat</i> .	532
328	Brabourne to Linlithgow	19	Anticipating communal cleavage over Calcutta Corporation Bill and Licencing of Private Market Bill, Bose asks Brabourne to advise Fazlul Huq to form coalition with the Congress.	533
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333	Linlithgow to Zetland	26	Suspects that the Congress are beginning to take the Pakistan Movement a little more seriously than in the past.	539
334	Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League	26/29	"The Congress has now killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement".	539
335	G.V. Ketkar submits report to the President of Hindu Mahasabha	27	Review of activities of Hindu Satyagraha Mandal.	544
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338	E.V. Ramaswami Naicker's Presidential Address to XIV session of the Justice Party Conference at Madras	29	Pointing out inapplicability of the term Nation to Indian conditions, Naicker opposes imposition of Hindi and Wardha Scheme.	573
339	Jinnah's Opening Speech at the All India Muslim Students Conference	29	India is not a nation yet but a country of nationalities.	575
340	Gandhiji's interview with H.V. Hodson	31	Solution of Hindu-Muslim Tangle.	576
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342	K.M. Ashraf's Presidential Address to All India Students Conference	1	Allied to Fascism internationally communalism is an imperialist conspiracy to disrupt democratic and national movement in India.	579
343	J.B. Kripalani to Rajagopalachari	2	Forwards Gandhiji's draft on Communal Policy.	581
344	Report on political events in Bihar during the second half of Dec. 1938	6	The subject of several speakers speeches is that the nationalism of Congress is Hinduism and that their "Swaraj is Hindu Raj".	583
345	Nehru to Gangaram Wazir	6	Accepting the ideal of full responsible government in every	585

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		princely state, the popular movement in Kashmir must inevitably be predominantly Muslim just as in Hyderabad a popular movement must largely be Hindu.	
346 Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow	6	Jinnah will be satisfied if Muslims get one-third of the Federal Cabinet posts and if the princely states nominate their representatives with Military, Foreign Affairs and Finance under the Federation.	586
347 C. Rajagopalachari to Sardar Patel,	7	Comments on Gandhiji's confidential draft note on the subject of Hindu-Muslim Problem.	590
348 Venkatesh Tiwary to Sardar Patel	7	Communicates statistical data in respect of communal representation in Government services in U.P. for consideration at Bardoli.	591
349 Pant to Nehru	8	Conveys views on Gandhiji's draft on Hindu-Muslim Problem.	595
350 Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	10	Muslims are losing patience and temper while the Congress is not prepared to enter into an alliance with the League though Pant, when he took office, was very definitely in favour of this line.	596
351 Ramazanali to Jinnah	11	Comments on Hindu-Muslim relations.	597
352 F.K. Khan Durrani to Jinnah	13	Requests a brief note stating conditions on which League would be prepared to enter into a settlement with Congress.	600
353 Raghīb Ahsan to Jinnah	14	Muslim League against caste representation to Muslims in principle.	601
354 Linlithgow to Maurice Hallett	15	Linlithgow does not think that "the Pakistan proposition, though a thoroughly unsound one, can be as easily put aside as Congress would like to suggest".	604
355 Fortnightly Report on the Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of January, 1939	15	Political and communal situation in Central Provinces.	605
356 Nehru to Pant	16	Steps to be taken to meet Jinnah's challenge.	607

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Jan. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
357	Nehru to Stafford Cripps	21	League objects to democracy in India because it means dominance of the majority.	608
358	Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	24	Gandhiji's attempts to reassure Muslims against unjust treatment will have no effect because what the League wants is to have their representatives on the Government in U.P.	609
359	<i>The Times</i> Correspondent's Assessment	28	Muslim Reaction to the Congress Rule.	609
360	Akbar Hydari to Moonje [January, 1939.]		"The state does not recognise the right of any organization or individual not owing allegiance to the state or functioning beyond its borders, to represent the people of the state or deal with Government in respect of matters concerning the state or its subjects".	610
<i>February</i>				
361	Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri to Jinnah	2	Proposes a scheme envisaging "a Free Muslim Nation with a Free National Home."	611
362	Francis Wylie to Linlithgow	8	Muslims of Nagpur started anti-Vidya Mandir <i>Satyagraha</i> against the advice of Muslim League.	615
363	Sikander Hayat Khan to Nehru	14	"It has been and still is my greatest mission in life to bring about harmony and good-will between the various communities in this great country".	616
364	Nehru's Presidential Address to the All India States People's Conference	15/16	The states have learnt from the British Imperialism the art of utilising communal differences to check popular movements.	616
365	Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	25	Hindu-Muslim antagonism would continue until the Congress made up their minds to admit the Muslims to some real share of power.	619
366	Nehru to Mohammed Azizur Rahman	25	Replies to the objections against Bande Matram and National Flag.	620
367	Report on the political situation in Bengal for the second half of February, 1939	28	Hindu Mahasabha wholeheartedly supports the Federal Scheme.	621
368	Jinnah's Press Statement	1	Jamiat-ul-Ulama "Obstacle" to Hindu-Muslim "understanding".	621

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date</i> <i>March, '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
369	Fortnightly Report on Madras for the second half of February 1939	4	Moonje observes that Hindu Muslim unity is not necessary for Swaraj.	622
370	Resolutions adopted at Jamiat-ul-Ulama's Conference	3/6	Comments on Muslim grievances.	622
371	Resolutions adopted by Jamiat ul Ulama's Central Committee in Delhi	7	Recommends rejection of Federal Scheme and abolition of Assam Line System.	628
372	Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow	20	Federation schemes to be deliberated upon at League's Working Committee meet at Meerut.	629
373	Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah	22	Criticising Abdul Latif's Scheme, observes that to think of a cultural basis alone and to ignore geographical, historical and economic considerations, is not vouchsafed by practical politics.	630
374	Proceedings of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League	25	Draft Schemes on Constitutional Reforms.	632
375	Liaqat Ali Khan's speech	25	Propounds partition of India.	638
376	Zetland to Linlithgow	28	Khaliquzzaman proposes separation of the Muslim areas from the rest of India.	639
377	Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the second half of March, 1939	31	Political and communal situation in the Punjab.	640
		<i>April</i>		
378	Zetland to Linlithgow	4	Hindu-Muslim tension will continue to grow until the issue of Federation is settled.	641
379	Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	6	The temper of the Muslims since Congress assumption of office has become not only anti-Hindu but increasingly anti-British.	642
380	Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	10	The root cause is that the Muslims look upon the present government as Hindu <i>raj</i> , and to a very large extent the Hindus also have the same feeling.	643
381	Linlithgow to Zetland	12	The Pakistan Schemes ventilated at Meerut give evidence of the increasing uneasiness of mind of the Muslims.	644
382	Linlithgow to Maurice Hallett	14	Invites suggestions in connection	645

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		with reassuring of responsible Muslim opinion and the removal of the misapprehensions under which that community seems to labour.	
383 Tej Bahadur Sapru to D.G. Dalve	15	The Provincial Autonomy has not helped us to compose our differences but widened them.	647
384 Linlithgow to Zetland	17	The demerits of Home Rule from the Muslim point of view substantially outweigh its merits.	647
385 Francis Wylie to Linlithgow	18	Ravi Shankar Shukla admits that he would be better off with a Muslim in the Council but he has failed to persuade any of his Muslim colleagues to take the Congress pledge.	649
386 Jinnah to Hassan Isphani	20	There should be only one party and that is the Muslim League Party so far as the Mussalmans are concerned.	652
387 Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah	22	Various schemes received should be discussed at the Sub-Committee meeting so that at this psychological moment one definite goal is fixed before the Mussalmans.	653
388 Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	24	Objecting to admitting League representatives in the Ministry, Nehru concedes that some prominent Leaguer's in U.P. are strongly nationalists in their views but points out that it is really an All India problem.	653
	<i>May</i>		
389 Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow	8	Comments on Muslim League allegations.	654
390 Zetland to Linlithgow	9	"While it is very desirable to carry them (Congress) with us so far as we can, we have also to be wary of creating in the minds of the Muslims and others the idea that they have us in their pockets".	657
391 Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	10	"In essence the [Muslim] grievance is not a religious one though it assumes an intensely communal	659

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		form but it is political and is due to the fact that the community is in opposition and would largely cease to exist if the Muslim League has a share in the Government".	
392 Maulana Hasrat Mohani to Abdullah Haroon [Urdu]	16	Zetland was impressed by the argument of Maulana Hasrat Mohani that religion-based unalterable majority will not work in India.	662
393 Rajendra Prasad to Nehru	16	Points out political implications of the Shia-Sunni dispute.	663
394 Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Puckle	16/17	Comments on Ahrar and Jamiatul Ulama Conference and Hindu Mahasabha Satyagraha in Hyderabad State.	664
395 Robert Reid to Linlithgow	17	Communal percentage in services.	665
396 Linlithgow to Zetland	19	Comments on Muslim uneasiness as regards the Federation and the Provincial Autonomy as operated in Muslim majority provinces.	667
397 Robert Reid to Linlithgow	22	Political situation in Bengal.	670
398 Abdullah Haroon to Maulana Hasrat Mohani	23	"Asks Maulana Hasrat Mohani to put up to Zetland the Pakistan plan as it is the only scheme which can safeguard Muslim interests".	672
399 Linlithgow to Zetland	26	Comments on Maulana Hasrat Mohani's views on Federation and Muslim representation in Congress Ministries.	672
	<i>June</i>		
400 Linlithgow to Henry Duffield Craik	3/5	Rajendra Prasad's offer to Sikandar Hayat for an arrangement between Congress and League based on an agreed programme of moderate nationalism.	673
401 Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow	3	"The primary grievance of the majority party among Muslims is not that they do not get their fair share of Government appointments but that they have no part or lot in the Ministry".	674
402 Robert Reid to Linlithgow	6	Hindu deputation for communal percentage in services in Bengal.	679

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date June '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
403	Zetland to Linlithgow	6	Pant's mind moving in the direction of genuine coalition in U.P.	681
404	Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow	15	Hindu-Muslim tension is largely due to political jealousy and if the Congress would take into their Ministries representatives of the Muslim League, the situation might be improved.	683
405	Linlithgow to Zetland	16	Overtures for Hindu-Muslim rapprochement being conducted between Sikandar Hayat and Rajendra Prasad.	686
406	Liaquat Ali Khan to Jinnah	16	The Left Wing of the Congress most anxious for an honourable Congress-League settlement.	687
407	Roger Lumley to Linlithgow	17	Jinnah proposes Minorities League which would work in coalition with the Muslims and present a united front to the Congress.	688
408	Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow	19	Comments on various forms of Pakistan schemes as also on increasing Muslim hostility to Federation.	691
409	John Woodhead to Linlithgow	19/20	Parity between Muslims and non-Muslims in services aimed at in Bengal.	694
410	Malik Barkat Ali to Jinnah	21	The Muslim League Working Committee should clarify its attitude to the question of Muslim India and Hindu India.	697
411	Zetland to Linlithgow	27	Attempts to form 'a genuine coalition of Muslims with the Congress in Bengal'.	698
412	M.K. Syed Ahmed to Rajendra Prasad	27	Seeks clarifications in respect of Flag, Bande Matram, Hindustani and Bharat Mata with numberless hands.	699
413	Sir William Barton's article [June, 1939].		The root causes of Muslim intransigence.	700
		<i>July</i>		
414	"A Punjabi's" scheme	2	Quinquenpartite Confederacy of India.	

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415 Resolutions adopted at the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League held on the 2nd and 3rd July 1939, at Bombay	2-3	Resolutions relate to (a) appointment of Muslim Minister in C.P.; (b) Maltreatment of Muslims in Indian States; (c) Arya Samajist agitation in Hyderabad and (d) Wardha Scheme.	705
416 Nehru to Rajendra Prasad	7	In view of the grave crisis of the War threatening the country, Nehru asks the Congress President to write to Jinnah inviting League's co-operation in evolving a common programme of non-participation in the War.	706
417 Nehru to Rajendra Prasad	7	Points out that "there is more general ill-will among the Muslim masses towards the Congress than there has been at any time in the past" and adds that the Mass Contact Committees have been replaced by Minorities Committee.	707
418 Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow	10	Sikandar Hayat places his alternative Federation Scheme before League Executive which authorises him to conduct preliminary negotiations for understanding with the Congress leaders.	709
419 Rajendra Prasad to Nehru	11	Co-option experiment to ensure Muslim representation in the Congress Committees.	711
420 Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bombay to J. M. Sladen	11	Reports anti-Muslim speeches of Pandit Ramchundra Sharma of Hindu Mahasabha.	712
421 Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the first half of July, 1939	15	Political situation in the Punjab.	714
422 Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad	17	Bose meets Jinnah and settles the Bengal problem with him while Jinnah points out that the individous taxation policy of the Bombay Government is intended to hit the Muslim community hard.	715
423 Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah	17	In view of considerable public opinion aroused in respect of partition schemes, Abdullah Haroon would like the League to give lead regarding its ideal.	716

<i>Name and Number</i>	<i>Date July'39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
424 Sikandar Hayat's Scheme	17	Alternative Homogeneous Zonal Scheme.	717
425 Linlithgow to Zetland	21	Jinnah is reported to have told Bose that "so long as the Mahatma dominates the Congress, he (Jinnah) will have nothing to do with anybody connected with it".	721
426 Gandhiji to Sikander Hayat	24	Agreeing to refer Sikandar Hayat's suggestions to the Congress Working Committee, Gandhiji observes, "it is one thing to have separate electorates for Muslims but wholly different to have such divisions among the same community".	722
427 Sikander Hayat to Gandhiji	29	Sikandar Hayat's Scheme was conceived with the intention of providing a solution of communal and political problems.	722
<i>August</i>			
428 Tej Bahadur Sapru to Akbar Hydari	2	Appreciating the novel 'functional representation' introduced in Hyderabad, Sapru thinks that "the worsening Hindu-Muslim position is a curious comment on our pretension of nationalism".	725
429 Satyamurti to Gandhiji	4	Communal unity can be ensured by substituting joint electorate for separate electorate with reservation of seats for minorities.	726
430 Usman Ahmad to Liaquat Ali Khan	7	Forwarding various partition schemes observes that the solution of Hindu-Muslim question lies in the direction of a partition.	727
431 Gandhiji to Sikander Hayat	14	Sikandar's scheme can not be entertained by the Congress Working Committee because it contemplates British connection.	727
432 Mirza Ismail to Sikander Hayat	14	Frank reactions to Sikandar Hayat's Scheme.	728
433 Jinnah's Public Speech	16	"Instead of accepting the hand of co-operation extended by the Muslim League, the Congress demands its liquidation and complete subordination".	729
434 John Woodhead to Linlithgow	20	Failure of the Congress Right	731

<i>Name and Number</i>	<i>Date Aug. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
		Wing to do business with Sikandar Hayat and Nazimuddin will result in Jinnah and others coming to terms with Bose.	
435 Resolution of the Council of the All India Muslim League dopted on 27th and 28th August, 1939, at Delhi		The Council resolves that "if the British Government desires to enlist Muslim support in future contingencies, it must meet their demands without further delay".	734
436 Linlithgow to Zetland	31	Realising the failure to excercise special powers to protect Muslim interests, Linlithgow feels that "they should move into a stage wherein the value of our continued association with the government in this country is fully realised by them".	734
437 Zafarul Hasan and Afzal Husain Qadri's Joint Scheme		Proposes division of British India into three sovereign states.	736
<i>September</i>			
438 John Woodhead to Linlithgow	5	Disapproving the League Council's indeterminate attitude, Bengal Ministry feels that Muslims should not bargain for their support to the War.	740
439 Linlithgow to Zetland	5	While Gandhiji "profoundly impressed" the Viceroy with his emotions and "breadth of vision", Jinnah in his talks characteristically suggested that in order to secure his support the Congress Ministries should be driven out of office.	740
440 Resolution passed at the Hindu Maha Sabha Working Committee held at Bombay under the Presidentship of Savarkar	10	Congress does not represent the Hindus.	742
441 Jayakar to Ganpat Rai	12	In his parleys with political leaders the Viceroy should not have "left out of account prominent Hindu Sabha leaders like Mr. Savarkar".	742
442 Resolution of the Working Committee of the Muslim League, adopted at Delhi	17/18	League's attitude towards Federation and the War efforts.	743
443 Zetland to Linlithgow	19/20	While the Congress Ministers views on War oscillate between optimism and passimism,	744

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		the Muslim dislike of the Congress Ministries "is a thing which has to be taken into account in a highly complex situation".	
444 B. Shiva Rao to Rajendra Prasad	21	The Muslim League should be asked whether they would be prepared to have a committee of two or three High Court Judges to investigate the charges made in the Pirpur Report.	746
445 Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow	25	Sikandar Hayat's message to the Viceroy on the eve of his proposed meeting with Jinnah.	747
446 Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet	25	The Muslim demands may be regarded as almost the converse of those of the Congress namely that Federation should be definitely dropped and that the Provincial Governors should forthwith exercise the powers they possess.	748
447 Akbar Hydari to Tej Bahadur Sapru	26	The Congress Working Committee Manifesto is an attempt of the Right Wing to pacify the Left Wing.	748
448 Jinnah's speech at the annual dinner of the Old Boys Association of the Osmania University	28	"I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim Pact and I still remain a Nationalist".	749
<i>October</i>			
449 Telegram from Chimanlal H. Setalvad, Couwasji Jehangir, V.N. Chandavarkar (Liberals); V.D. Savarkar (Hindu Mahasabha); N.C. Kelkar, Jamnadas M. Mehta (Democratic Swarajya Party); B.R. Ambedkar (Depressed Classes and Independent Labour Party)	3	Warn the Viceroy not to regard the Congress and the League as representing the whole or even the bulk of India.	
450 Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet	5	There is no real desire on the part of the Congress to break, they may find themselves driven into doing so by Nehru's pressure.	
451 Rajendra Prasad to Jinnah	5	Offers to get Muslim League's charges inquired into by Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of the Federal Court.	752

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Oct. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
452	Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon	6	"Jinnah is exceedingly backward and reactionary--And yet he is more advanced than many of his colleagues in the Muslim League—As he stands at present, we have to give up every principle of nationalism and democracy in order to meet his wishes".	753
453	Jinnah to Rajendra Prasad	6	Instead of accepting adjudication by the Federal Court, Jinnah referred Muslim grievances to the Viceroy who alongwith the Governors "have been expressly authorised under the Constitution and are entrusted with the responsibility to protect the rights and the interests of minorities".	754
454	George S. Arundale to Sardar Patel	9	"Not through bargaining will any substantial results accrue but through noble gestures on the part of the majorities".	754
455	Nehru to Maulana Azad	13	Sikandar Hayat has directly suggested Congress-League consultation regarding communal question.	756
456	Maulana Azad to Jinnah	16	Suggests <i>modus vivendi</i> for negotiating a decent agreement between the Congress and the League.	756
457	Raghunandan Saran to Jawaharlal Nehru	17	Disappointed as he was on receiving advance news of the Viceregal pronouncement, Jinnah appeared in a proper mood to forge an understanding with Nehru.	757
458	Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajendra Prasad	17	The Congress and the League should appoint representatives to discuss the actual matter in dispute.	759
459	The Viceroy's Statement	17	The British Government will consult communities, interests and Princes while modifying the Federal Scheme at the end of the War.	761
460	Nehru to Jinnah	18	"It is a tragedy that the Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way".	761
461	Maulana Azad to Jinnah	19	The time is ripe for Nehru-Jinnah talks to settle the Hindu-Muslim problem.	763

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Oct. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
462	Nehru's article in the <i>National Herald</i>	20	"As the popular movement has grown and nationalism has become a force, the communal problem has ever been intensified by British Policy".	764
463	Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah	21	It trickles down from the Viceroy's announcement that the British while inclined to 'take in' seem averse to 'give in'.	765
464	Raza Ali to Jinnah	22	Congress Right's claim to represent all communities is a dangerous claim.	767
465	Resolution passed at the Emergency Meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee, New Delhi	22	Authorises the President "to secure complete clarifications of His Excellency's Statement and empowers him to give assurances of co-operation and support on behalf of the Mussalmans of India to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the War".	768
466	Rajendra Prasad to Linlithgow	23	Forward's Congress Working Committee Resolution.	769
467	Zetland to War Cabinet	23	"In the light of the Viceroy's telegram on the Congress and the League Working Committees demands, the Secretary of State feels that while the League will give us general support the Congress challenge leaves no option but to take over the government in eight provinces".	770
468	Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet	24	Places before the War Cabinet the Viceroy's telegram containing a proposal to invite Gandhiji with Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah with Sikandar Hayat and ask them (a) to come to some working arrangement in respect of the provincial field and (b) to give reasonable scheme for the centre in respect of the War period.	773
469	Nehru to Krishna Menon	25	No common ground left after the Viceroy's statement and Zetland's speech.	775
470	Jinnah's Statement made to the <i>Manchester Guardian</i>	26	Explains the implications of his recent declaration that the British Parliamentary democracy	776

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		is unsuited to India in view of authoritarian organisation in Congress Provincial Governments.	
471 <i>The Sind Observer</i>	28	In order to entrench the British vested interests the Viceroy is using the minorities as stalking horse to deprive the whole country of its birth-right of Swaraj.	778
472 A.M.K. Delhvi's telegram to Jinnah	29	Anticipating resignation of the Congress Ministries, the leader of opposition in Bombay Legislative Assembly authorises Jinnah 'to accept Ministry' provided he is satisfied that in 'future constitution statutory provisions will be made to safeguard Muslim interest'.	780
473 Abdul Qaiyum Ansari to Rajendra Prasad	30	Constituting fifty percent of Muslim population, the Momins have no faith in the <i>ashraf</i> dominated Muslim League and calls upon the Congress to implement their six point programme of amelioration.	781
474 Gandhiji's article in <i>Harijan</i>	30	Hindu-Muslim Unity.	785
<i>November</i>			
475 Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad	1	"Separate electorates have produced an ever increasing gulf between the two equally matched communities and an impatient desire at this stage to solve the problem by inclusion of League Ministers in the Congress Cabinet would lead to a complete abandonment of the prospect of joint responsibility".	786
476 Linlithgow to Jinnah	2	Forwards in a concrete form the proposition that the Viceroy put to Jinnah, Gandhiji and Rajendra Prasad on 1 November, 1939.	787
477 Zetland to Linlithgow	2	In the context of the renewed activity of the Conciliation Group on the Congress decision to call out the Ministries, points out that Jinnah's Statement to the <i>Manchester Guardian</i> makes it clear that "the profound difference, which is not of our making," between the view point of the Congress and the League.	789

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Nov. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
478	Rajendra Prasad to Linlithgow	3	The Congress earnestly desires to settle the communal question but it should not prevent the British Government to enunciate its War aims and to declare India an independent country.	790
479	Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah	3	In view of renewed attempts for the Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, states that Muslims will not agree to any settlement which is not based on the principle of separation.	792
480	Ziaud Din Ahmad to Jinnah	3	Agreement is always welcome but there should be some guarantee that the protection of minorities may not be alterable by the votes of the majority community.	793
481	Nehru's Speech	4	Explains the standpoint of the Congress on the Communal problem and Constituent Assembly.	793
482	Jinnah to Linlithgow	4	Met the Congress leaders as desired by the Viceroy but was informed finally that they could not discuss the Viceroy's proposals until the British Government complied with their demand as embodied in their Working Committee Resolution.	795
483	Nehru's Speech	5	Though in his talks with Jinnah, Nehru found nothing big in the way of settlement of the communal problem, the British Government deliberately put it to the fore in their declaration.	796
484	Zetland to Linlithgow	5	In view of the failure of the Congress-League talks and the possibility of All Parties Conference falling into the background, Zetland would like to proceed with the establishment of a consultative body to which Jinnah, Ambedkar and others be invited to nominate panels.	797
485	Jinnah to Linlithgow	5	Submits Four Points for consideration in pursuance of the League Working Committee Resolution.	797
486	Jinnah's reply to Gandhiji's article on Hindu-Muslim Unity	6	Dubbing the article as 'travesty of justice' and 'a libel on the whole Muslim community', Jinnah observes,	798

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		"we are determined to fight and fight to the last ditch for rights to which we are entitled in spite of the British or the Congress".	
487 Viceroy's (Linlithgow) Announcement	6	"Complex as the problems are, I refuse to regard them as insoluble".	799
488 Jinnah's Speech	7	Maintaining that Parliamentary Democracy has failed in India, Jinnah states that he has no ill-will towards the Hindus but there is little hope of settlement with the present Congress High Command which can not foist a constitution on Muslims.	802
489 Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah	8	Seeking the support of Jinnah and Congress leaders for the cause of the Majlis-i-Kabir (Grand Council) of Pakistan, pleads that division is not some thing to be abhorred by the nationalists because it is a division not of a country but of a sub-continent into natural homogeneous wholes based on geographical, cultural and economic considerations.	803
490 Nehru to Krishna Menon	8	The British Government has foisted the communal issue though the Congress enjoys the support of Ahrars, Momins, Shias and Jamiatul Ulama.	807
491 Gandhiji's Statement	8	Commenting on the Viceregal Statement Gandhiji's observes that the minorities are entitled to protection, not in stages but to the fullest extent and in one single step.	807
492 Zetland's Interview with American journalists	10	Dwelling on the Indian Problem, Zetland points out that the British Government has offered to bring into the Central Government, leaders of Indian political parties on <i>ad hoc</i> basis provided they compose their differences and thereby "assist India by such means as are in our power to reach without delay the position in the British commonwealth of Nations to which we are pledged".	809

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date</i> <i>Nov. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
493	Nehru to Edward Thompson	11	Constituent Assembly elected on widest mass franchise to draw up a Constitution.	810
494	Arthur Parsons to Laithwaite	12	Jinnah and Sikandar Hayat press Aurangzeb Khan to form League Ministry in N.W.F.P. at any cost.	812
495	Carl Heath to Gandhiji, Nehru and Rajendra Prasad	12	"While it is no more true deduction that the Hindu-Muslim tension is being raised as a mere means to divide and rule than it is to suggest that the Congress seeks to profit by the British Government's War embarrassments, the British people feel that Great Britain needs to carry the Muslim World with her at this time of immense struggle."	813
496	Nehru to Fazlul Huq	13	Charge-sheet against former Congress Ministries be framed before getting them investigated.	815
497	Nehru to Rajendra Prasad	14	With the Congress Ministries resignation Jinnah awaits political developments before any talks with the Congress leaders, while Nehru suggests dialogue with the Jamiatul Ulama and Akali Dal.	816
498	Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah	14	Proposal to start an independent Muslim English Daily.	817
499	Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the first half of November, 1939	15	Political public opinion in Bengal after termination of talks with the Viceroy.	819
500	Fazlul Huq to Nehru	16	There can not be any lasting peace in the country unless the two major communities learn to trust each other and remove all suspicions lurking in their minds.	821
501	Chief Secretary to the Government Bombay to Puckle	17	Appealing to the Congress leaders to face realities, Jinnah in his speech on 7 November, 1939 observes that he is always ready for Hindu-Muslim unity provided it is based as between equals.	822
502	Nehru to Fazlul Huq	18	The question of inquiry relates to the behaviour of Congress Ministers and not local officials.	822
503	Fortnightly Report on Bihar during	18	While the Hindu Mahasabha	823

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date</i> <i>Nov. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
the first half of November, 1939			talks of India for the Hindus, a large section of public believes that Nehru-Jinnah talks will result in coalition Ministries in Congress provinces.	
504	Proceedings of the Congress Working Committee	19-23	Congress stand on minorities problem and Constituent Assembly.	823
505	Reginald Maxwell to Laithwaite	20	Commenting on Jinnah's Five Points observes that "the policy of His Majesty's Government will be determined not solely by agreement or disagreement but also by the merits of the case, including of course world factors after the War, which are not within the cognizance of politicians in India".	825
506	Fazlul Huq to Jinnah	22	"No amount of efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity can succeed unless there has been clear and distinct understanding of what one community expects from the other and this cannot be achieved unless it is settled whether the grievances are genuine or not".	832
507	Roger Lumley to Linlithgow	25	Describing his interview with Gandhiji at Delhi to Francis Low, Jinnah points out that "Gandhi's attitude simply amounted to this, that, unless he [Jinnah] accepted everything that the Congress wanted about a Constituent Assembly, they [Muslims] would be charged with obstructing the national cause".	833
508	Liaqat Ali Khan to Jinnah	27	Supporting Jinnah's proposal for observing the Day of Deliverance, points out that it will show to the people in India and abroad that the return of Congress Ministries without a settlement with the Mussalmans will lead to great trouble.	834
509	Linlithgow to Zetland	28	Comments on the background of the questions raised and apprehensions entertained by Jinnah.	836
510	Zetland to Linlithgow	29	Stafford Cripps discusses with Zetland his scheme for solving the Indian Problem on the model of	848

<i>Name and Number</i>	<i>Date Nov. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
		the settlement with Southern Ireland.	
511 Statement of President, Jamiatul Ulama, Bihar, [November, 1939]		Points out the errors committed by the Congress.	849
512 Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of November, 1939		While the Hindu Mahasabha contends that the repudiation of the Federal Scheme and resignations of the Congress Ministries betrayed Hindu interests, the Forward Block condemns the Allahabad Resolution of the Congress Working Committee as 'licking the feet that kick'.	863
513 Maulana Azad's Statement [November, 1939.]		The real difficulty is not communal but political.	865
<i>December</i>			
514 Roger Lumley to Linlithgow	1	C. Rajagopalachari feels that if a declaration is made that a constituent assembly would be held at the end of the War "it would then become increasingly difficult, as time went on, for the Muslims to maintain the attitude that they would remain aloof from it".	867
515 Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Puckle	4	Any settlement made by the Congress with the British Government in consultation with the League would not be binding on the Hindu Mahasabha which claims "the Congress does not represent the Hindus".	867
516 Jinnah's Statement	6	Appeals for the observance of a Deliverance Day to mark the end of the Congress rule.	868
517 Ahmad Bashir to Nehru	6	Referring to the first proposal to partition India into Hindu and Muslim zones put forward by Bhai Parmanand in 1904 points out that the "aim of the Pakistan Movement is to reincorporate Islamic States in those parts of the Indian Continent where the Muslims form the bulk of the population".	869
518 Zetland to Linlithgow	6	Sceptical of the possibility of getting together a Constituent Assembly, Zetland doubts the	873

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Dec. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
			Congress claims to settle the communal problem without British interference.	
519	Roger Lumley to Linlithgow	7	Publicity to the Day of Deliverance call in the 'Home Press' will disprove the Congress contention that the communal bogey has been manufactured by the British.	874
520	D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru	7	The best plan for all parties outside the Congress would be to combine and challenge Congress High Command's authority to speak for the Indian nation as the British Government would allow the situation to drift into a confused state and then watching the situation on the War-front in Europe, shape their course as to conciliating or crushing the Congress.	874
521	Nehru to Ahmed	8	Finding their position threatened by the masses the old semi-feudal Muslim League leaders largely traded on anti-Hindu sentiments which kept political and economic issues in the background.	876
522	Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's Statement	8	The backward Momins trust the Congress and the Jamiatul Ulama more than the League mainly manned by the upper class Muslims.	877
523	Abdur Rahman Siddiqui's Statement	8	Pointing out that both the League and the Congress are drifting towards the totalitarian methods of work, observes that "deliverance from Congress inhumanities-yes-but into the hands of the civilian ridden Government-no".	879
524	Linlithgow to Roger Lumley	9	Conversation with Birla convinced him of the indignation and despair caused in the Congress circles by the tactics of Jinnah whose importance in political negotiations will immensely increase if he could hold his team together behind him.	881
525	Jinnah's Press Interview	9	While opposing Constituent Assembly proposal, Jinnah is anxious	881

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		to bring about a settlement honourable to both the Congress and the League.	
526 Nehru to Jinnah	9	Reacting to Jinnah's announcement of the Day of Deliverance; Nehru wonders what purpose would be served by discussing the problems confronting them as the 'gulf appears wider than ever'.	882
527 Nehru to Mahadev Desai	9	Does not agree with Zakir Husain's suggestion to accept League in a particular way as it means complete disruption of the Congress.	883
528 Syed Mahmud to Nehru	9	Rampant with provincialism, caste prejudices and revivalism, the Congress has failed to win the confidence of minorities not only Muslims but Christians and others as well.	884
529 Linlithgow to Henry Duffield Craik	10	Jinnah's stiff attitude profoundly disturbs the Congress Right Wing which feels that the 'civil disobedience plays into the hands of the Left Wing which deprives the Right Wing of reconsolidation of their control over the Congress.	885
530 Rajendra Prasad to Nehru	10	Talks with Jinnah would be misunderstood after the announcement of the Day of Deliverance.	886
531 Liaquat Ali to Jinnah	11	Tells Cripps that the Muslim opinion has recently become very strong for the partition of India into Muslim India and Hindu India as they feel that that is the best solution for every one concerned.	886
532 Hassan Ispahani to Jinnah	12	Rudely shocked by the announcement of the Day of Deliverance, Ispahani feels that the League's policy in general is being based on the dictation of 'reactionaries' like Sikandar Hayat and Fazlul Haq.	888
533 Nehru to Syed Mahmud	12	Objects to Congress sharing power with Muslim League.	889

<i>Name and Number</i>		<i>Date Dec. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
534	Jinnah to Nehru	13	Wants the Congress to treat the League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India and thereby pave the way for the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question leading to the evolution of an agreed formula for a demand of a declaration by His Majesty's Government that would satisfy both the Congress and the League.	889
535	D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru	13	The proposed Muslim League Day of Deliverance is throwing the non-Congress Hindus into the arms of the Congress.	890
536	Moonje to Raja Saheb (Sic)	13	Maintaining that extra concessions to Muslims will whet up their hunger for more and suggests acceptance of the rules of the League of Nations for minority protection.	891
537	Jinnah's Statement	13	Tracing the events that led to, and the reasons that prompted the appeal for observance of a day of deliverance to express "our relief and to show its intensity in a manner that would force ears that had hitherto been deaf to listen to us".	892
538	Nehru to Jinnah	14	Constitutionally having a national basis the Congress can not give up its national character by acknowledging Muslim League as sole representative organisation of Muslim.	896
539	Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad	14	Jinnah does not want any settlement but propaganda against the Congress.	898
540	Zetland to Linlithgow	14	"Jinnah has been exploding like a machine gun".	899
541	Jinnah's rejoinder	14	Commenting on articles in <i>London Scouts</i> and <i>London-Times</i> Jinnah observes that it is not a question of Muslims cutting away from their Hindu and Christian bretheren but it is a	900

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542 Mohammed Dawjis Didabhoy to Jinnah	14	problem of making them understand that Muslims are entitled to a proper place under the Sun. Appeal to find some <i>via media</i> and postpone the demonstration to some opportune moment.	901
543 Zetland's statement in the House of Lords	14	What stands in the way of Congress-League understanding.	902
544 Roger Lumley to Linlithgow	15	Jinnah's appeal for the Deliverance Day has made his followers uneasy and the Congress indignant with the result that the projected renewal of conversation between Nehru and Jinnah has been cancelled.	904
545 Jinnah to Nehru	15	Muslim League can endorse Congress demand for a declaration from the British Government provided (a) the Congress resolution is modified as suggested by the League and (b) the League is treated as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India.	904
546 Nehru's Statement	15	Commenting on Zetland's Statement Nehru observes that the question of minorities within the context of democracy and unity of India can be solved through Constituent Assembly.	905
547 Hassan Ispahani to Jinnah	16	The Deliverance <i>farman</i> dropped like a bolt from the blue and upset many a mental equilibrium.	906
548 Nehru to Jinnah	16	Recognising the authority, influence and importance of the League, the Congress has been eager to discuss problems with it but conditions-precedent continue to obstruct all progress and fresh hurdles are added in the form of demonstration on 22nd which creates psychological barrier to mutual approach.	907
549 K.N. (Dakoar) to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur	17	In the progressive worsening	908

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		situation Zetland has seized upon 'Deliverance Day' and observed that the Hindus were not behind the Congress citing the Hindu Mahasabha and a section of the Depressed Classes as examples.	
550 Jinnah's Statement	17	Maintaining that the Deliverance Day is intended to express relief from the Congress regime and is not directed against the Hindus, appeals for support of all his fellow countrymen who believe that the conditions in India necessitate popular rather than irremovable majority government.	909
551 Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. to Conran-Smith	18	Political and communal situation in U.P.	910
552 Linlithgow to Zetland	18	While Zetland's said that Muslims were anxious to hear from His Majesty's Government" Linlithgow maintained that "protection for the minorities could come only from Cabinet Government with collective responsibility".	911
553 Fortnightly Report on Bihar during the first half of December, 1939	19	Jinnah's appeal has come as a surprise to many Muslims.	913
554 Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Conran Smith	19	While Jinnah's appeal evokes sheer criticism from all sides including some members of the League, Sardar Patel is amazed at the 'conspiracy of silence' on the part of the Viceroy and the Governors in not refuting the allegations as Jinnah's attack was as much against them as against the Congress.	914
555 M.A. Bari to Jinnah	19	Accomplishing the object of calling attention to the problem, Jinnah should now gracefully call off the proposed demonstration and help in bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity.	915
556 Dastur Noshervan Kaikubad to S. Jan Mohammed	19	Parsis regard the outgoing of the Congress Ministries as a deliverance.	916

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557 S.R. Narayana Ayyar to Jinnah	19	Points out that 22nd December is a sacred day for the Hindus as it happens to be not only a Vaikunta Ekadasi Day but also Gita Day.	916
558 Dwarkadas Jethabhai Dani to Jinnah	20	All communities were invited to participate in the Deliverance Day.	917
559 Linlithgow to Zetland	21	While the Congress insists on the English democratic principle of consent by all parties in the rule of the majority implying that it is His Majesty's Government duty to act as guarantor for the observance of that principle, the Muslims on the other hand refuse to accept that principle, and they imply that it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to act as guarantor of their rights should they consider those rights to be prejudicially affected by the majority decisions.	918
560 M.M. Banaji to Jinnah	21	Parsis convey greetings to Muslims on observing the Day of Deliverance.	920
561 Fazlul Huq's Statement	22	Muslim sufferings under the Congress rule.	921
562 Thomas Steward to Linlithgow	22	Unhappy with Fazlul Haq's appeal for instances of atrocities, Sir Sultan Ahmad thought that the proposed Day of Deliverance "has lowered the stock of the Muslim League".	923
563 Linlithgow to Jinnah	22	Replying to Jinnah's five questions Linlithgow assures him that "His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India".	924
564 John Herbert to Linlithgow	23	League leaders were very anxious to secure as many meetings as possible all over the country on the Day of	925

<i>Name and Number</i>	<i>Date Dec. '39</i>	<i>Main Subject/Subjects</i>	<i>Page</i>
565 George Cunningham to Laithwaite	23	<p>Deliverance so that the number and unanimity of the resolutions passed could be splashed in their own press with a view to sending numerous copies to England.</p> <p>The Day of Deliverance has not only fallen flat in NWFP but has provoked the leaders of the Hindu Sikh Nationalist Party to counter the scheme by submitting a resolution at the Hindu Mahasabha Conference proposing that a committee should tour India to enquire into the difficulties and injustices suffered by them as a result of pro-Muslim policy of the Congress and non-Congress Ministries.</p>	926
566 R.N. Banerjee to Laithwaite	23	<p>Forwards a copy of the agreement dated 10 Feb, 1939 between Ravi Shankar Shukla and Liaqat Ali Khan resolving the grievances of the Muslims of C.P. and Berar.</p>	926
567 D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru	24	<p>The Day of Deliverance has been a partial success owing to divided opinion among the Muslim community but the untouchables joined the demonstration because taking advantage of this move, Dr. Ambedkar wanted to get out of the Poona Pact and secure separate electorate for the depressed classes.</p>	930
568 Jinnah's Statement	25	<p>Claims support of other minorities and non-Congress Hindus to the Deliverance Day observed through out the country in an orderly and disciplined manner and claims "Complete Success".</p>	931
569 Nawab of Chhatari to Jinnah	26	<p>Reacting to the Congress Working Committee Resolution, Nawab of Chhatari points out that the most important question</p>	932

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			before the country to-day is the settlement of the communal problem which is not of the creation of the Secretary of State or any Viceroy but it is the result of our own mistakes and it is for us to solve it.	
570	Presidential Address of R.P. Pranipye to XXI Session of National Liberal Front, Allahabad	27-29	Pointing out the growing totalitarianism in the Congress as well as the League, poses great danger to democracy, Pranipye appeals for broadening of Congress Cabinet.	934
571	Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad	29	Allabux seeks Congress help against League's "intrigues" to bring about the downfall of the Sind Ministry.	937
572	Manmatha Nath Mookerjee's Welcome Address to XXI session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta,	28-30	Criticizes Muslim schemes of division of India	938
573	Savarkar's Presidential Address to the XXI session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta	28-30	Explaining the basic tenets of <i>Hindutva</i> ideology, Savarkar sets out the national and political ideals of the Hindu Sanghathan Movement.	945
574	Linlithgow to Roger Lumley	30	The Day of Deliverance passed off quietly but the relations between the two communities got more tense.	966
575	Resolutions adopted at XXI session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta	30	Resolutions deal with (a) the Bengal Ministry; (b) the Hindu Militia; (c) Defence of India and World; (d) League Demand of Royal Commission and (e) Hindu Sanghathan and Shuddhi.	967
576	Nehru's Press Interview	31	Dubbing Sikandar Hayat's Scheme as entirely unworkable, Nehru observes that the Congress should co-operate on political issues with all parties such as Majlis-i-Ahrar.	970
577	Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of December, 1939		Cripps visit is looked upon in the nature of a feeler with a view to some settlement with the Congress.	971
578	Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the second half of December, 1939		The restrained way in which feelings were voiced on the Deliverance Day served to emphasise the depth of feelings.	972
579	C.R. Reddy's Statement, [December, 1939]		The intolerant character of the Congress rule.	973

INTRODUCTION

India's partition in 1947 poses to historians a number of paradoxical problems. Firstly, what led to the reversal of the British colonial policy from 'divide and rule' to 'divide and quit.' Secondly, why did Jinnah, liberal, secular and nationalist till 1930s, turned a staunch advocate of separatist movement. Thirdly, which factors caused a sudden rise of the Muslim League from wilderness in the pre-1937 period? Fourthly, why did the Congress accept, with seeming alacrity, the Mountbatten Partition Plan, relinquishing its vaunted principle of national unity? And fifthly, why did the *bhadralok*, opposing the first partition of Bengal in 1905, spearhead the agitation for the second partition of Bengal in 1947? These paradoxes make some sense only if studied in the context of representational politics—involving mainly the two sister communities of Hindus and Muslims in colonial India.

In order to properly understand the genesis of the Hindu-Muslim alienation, it is necessary to trace its socio-economic roots. It would, however, be wrong to consider religion as the main causative factor, as it has often been done. Religion had no doubt the status of a means, no less, no more. This phenomenon emerges in the socio-economic conflicts in the post-1857 period and is not found in this form in the pre-colonial period.¹ It is true that the various revivalist and reform movements during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were manifestations of religious community consciousness among the various segments of the Indian society.² This, however, cannot be taken as a full-fledged statement of the communalistic view of Indian society.

Though Sadashiv Rao Bhau, cousin of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, lost the battle of Panipat, Ibrahim Khan Gardi, a Muslim Maratha artillery commander, had wrought havoc in the army of the Afghan invader. Subsequently when Ghulam Qadir Rohilla blinded the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II (1759-1806), it was Mahadji Sindhia, who killed the Rohilla chief and felt honoured when the title of *Naib Wakil-i-Mutlaq* or Deputy Vicegerent of the Empire was conferred on him by the blind Mughal *raifonient*. The society was, thus, status ridden, wherein stress was laid on nobility of descent and loyalty to the salt. It was divided more by caste and status, rather than by religion.

Mahadji Sindhia did avenge the outrage, but the death of the Rohilla chief could neither restore the eyesight of the Mughal *raifonient*, nor the prestige of his House. The vacuum thus created was gradually filled up by the East India Company, which, turning its factories into forts, combined commerce with conquest.

II

The colonial rule that followed, unleashed powerful socio-economic forces that brought about phenomenal alienation of the Hindus and the Muslims. Occupying

Bengal after the battle of Plassey in 1757, the aggression of East India Company spread over a century, resulted in subjugation and creation of hundreds of States, big and small, on whom it conferred different powers. After Lord Lake's forces entered Delhi in 1803, Shah Abdul Aziz issued a *fatwa* declaring all land under British occupation as *darul harb* or war territory.³

In the pre-Plassey days, the public services were designed such that they blended diverse elements working in perfect harmony with each other. After the Company's takeover, the situation sharply changed. Almost till the late eighteenth century, the power in the Indian society was divided among landlords, traders and Government servants. Three avenues of employment were open to the Muslim elite—army, revenue administration and judiciary. Initially the Muslims held high-ranking positions in the revenue administration, but by 1785, they were replaced by European Collectors, while the Kayasthas and Brahmins—best suited for collecting revenue—were retained in traditional positions. Most of them acquired rights of land that was under Muslim ownership. There is almost a unanimous view that the Company's land policy, culminating in the Permanent Settlement, sowed the seeds of religious animosity in Bengal⁴ (which then included Bihar, Orissa and Assam). The Settlement, a "caricature" of English, largely brought in a new class of sharks and rapacious businessmen in place of more considerate *zamindars* most of whom were reduced to destitution. The public auctions required cash security but, as Muslim *zamindars* could not afford it, they had to surrender their land to the highest bidder who was generally a Hindu *Bania* or money-lender. The new owners imposed a variety of cesses, some having a communal complexion. There were levies for Hindu rituals and offering e.g. *Kali Vritti*, *Durga Vritti*⁵ etc. The defiance by Muslim peasants discredited them in the eyes of the Hindu population.

What deepened this alienation further was the colonial judicial and educational system. In 1772, Warren Hastings superimposed British overseers while continuing with Muslim *Qazis* and *Muftis*.⁶ The preservationist measures such as the codification of Hindu and Muslim laws, patronising religious orthodoxy, acceptance of personal laws concerning marriage and inheritance and encouragement of orthodoxy—all embittered relations between the two communities.⁷ The encouragement of orthodoxy was a retrogressive step as it negated and blocked the composite cultural tendencies that had been strongly emerging prior to the colonial takeover. Because of the Company's pressure, the anglicization of judiciary gained momentum and by 1820s Cornwallis dismissed Muslim judges and appointed European district judges.⁸ English thus became a pre-requisite of Government service. Initially there was some opposition from the orthodox Hindus, yet their over-all response was overwhelming. The Muslims lagged far behind. Some attributed it to their fear of Christian proselytisation.⁹ In striking contrast to Bengal, the Muslims of North-Western Provinces and Oudh (U.P.) were more advanced than the Hindus and constituted the administrative and cultural elite. NWP had been a centre of Muslim power since the end of the 12th century. A large proportion of the community lived in towns and they, as well as those who lived in the countryside, were mainly landlords.¹⁰ The British policy of continuing Persian and then Urdu as the language of administration and recruitment of subordinates from the traditional bureaucratic elite of Persian origin also benefited U.P. Muslims.¹¹

Bereft of political and economic power and having failed to adjust to the colonial agrarian, judicial and educational policies, the Muslims started looking inward and sought solace in their religion. It was in this context that the revivalist movements arose. The Faraizi Movement was started by Shariatullah (d. 1840 A.D.), who worked among labourers and peasants and infused in them spirit of opposition to an alien rule. When Shariatullah passed away, the Faraizi Movement, under his son Muhammad Muhsin *alias* Dadu Miyan, aimed at the liquidation of *zamindars* who enjoyed the British support. A contemporary of Dadu Miyan was Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (b 1831) who attempted to enlist the support of Raja Hindu Rao for his struggle against the British.¹² These reform movements were, no doubt, based on a rejection of the syncretic medieval Islam in India in favour of the puritan early Islam of Arabia but the political *jihad* waged by them emphasised the necessity of cooperation between Muslims and Hindus. Nursing with passion their injured pride at being ousted from the position of power, with their hatred of the alien rule and embittered by socio-economic grievances, the followers of these movements fought gallantly against the British, but with pre-bourgeois weapons and were naturally derailed.

Even in their heyday, Muslims were rarely engaged in trade or non-military professions. The banking concerns were Hindu-owned, with the result that the Muslims had little share in the wealth pouring through new mercantile activities promoted by the colonial merchant-rulers. The growing dependency of the Muslim aristocracy on Hindu merchant-financiers further fuelled animosities against the Hindus in general. All these factors delayed the emergence of Muslim bourgeoisie.

The British colonial rule attempted in the beginning to suppress the Muslims, who were hostile to the Company rule. Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India (1842-44 A.D.) wrote to the Duke of Wellington in a dispatch dated 18th June, 1843, "I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race (i.e. the Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us and our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus." He advocated the policy of Divide and Rule. In the aftermath of the tragic Afghan War, when the retreating British troops brought to India a gate from Mahmud of Ghazni's tomb, allegedly to have been taken by the latter from Somnath, Lord Ellenborough made the following ostentatious proclamation to the princes and people of India, "Our victorious army bears the gate of the temple of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan. The insult of 800 years is avenged." The religious implications of this proclamation were regarded as disturbing even in England.¹³

This policy is further illustrated by Sir Henry Elliot, who misrepresented the Muslims to the Hindus and the Hindus to the Muslims. He assumed the Hindus as a nation, distinct from the Muslims, who were also presumed as a nation on their own part. The Indian Muslims, descended beyond doubt from Hindu ancestors, were dressed up in the garb of foreign barbarians and declared to be military colonialists in the land where they had lived for several centuries. The example of Elliot was followed by subsequent British historians, whose authority was used by the Education Department to instil these vicious doctrines in the minds of the rising generations of Hindus, who started looking upon medieval India as a period of foreign tyrannical rule and the colonial British rule as *Pax Britannica*.

Imbibing the post-Enlightenment rationalist spirit of the West, the new litterateur

tried to reinterpret Hindu traditions in the light of new learning, as manifested in Raja Ram Mohan Roy's Brahmo Samaj, Vidyasagar's social reform campaign and Keshab Chandra's spiritual experimentation. They were no doubt exhilarated by the winds that blew in 1857, but in view of the ruthless repression by the British Government, they generally preferred discretion to valour. It was a revolt of unprecedented nature. Hindus and Muslims unitedly challenged British imperialism and fought against it unitedly and heroically. In order to fight foreign domination, both Hindus and Muslims respected each others sentiments. It is, therefore, not surprising if we find even V.D. Savarkar calling it "a war of independence." The unsuccessful culmination of this united fight resulted in the drifting away of the dominant sections of the Hindus and the Muslims from each other because of three main reasons. Firstly, different reactions of the Hindu and Muslim elites to the new situation arising from the challenges of the Western civilization. Secondly, the British policy of divide and rule and thirdly, new competitive forces generated by the introduction of representational politics.

III

The elites among Hindus and Muslims, interested as they were in safeguarding their personal or class interests, were struggling hard to outdo each other in securing favour from the newly established foreign Government. These elements attempted to exploit the unrest created among both the communities in the aftermath of 1857, by giving a twist of separation to the problems of their respective communities. This tended to divert the zeal and fervour for social reforms, which had been created by the challenge of Western civilization, into the channel of communal politics. The colonial British rulers generally encouraged— and in some cases inspired and guided—these efforts.¹⁴

Soon after the suppression of the 1857 Revolt, Elphinstone observed in his minute dated 1 May 1859, that *divide et impera* was the old Roman motto and it should be brought into operation in India. This was the time when India was witnessing transition from feudalistic society, based on social bonds of sectarian sentiments to a modernist society built on neighbourliness, cooperation in material interests and nationalism. India possessed all the basic conditions for national unity *viz.*, geographical individuality, historical continuity and a unique cultural amalgam. What it needed was the fostering care of the state to strengthen national consciousness of the emerging middle class intellectuals and to overcome the atavistic instincts of traditional social forces and medieval-minded groups. In India, however, the British colonial rule, instead of promoting social solidarity, lent its influence to the growth of fissiparous tendencies. It is true that the indirect effects of the British rule and the unforeseen consequences of British administration materially advanced the physical unification of the country, and a certain degree of modernisation. However, the underlying policy of the British Government was based on the doctrine of "divide and rule".¹⁵

It was under these adverse conditions that the forces let loose by the colonial rule, working in conjunction with the new spirit in India, inevitably led to the emergence of Indian nationalism. The traditional Hindus in Bengal sought to rejuvenate their

religion, so that it might provide substance and meaning to the nascent Indian nationalism. Towards this end they predicated nationalism with religion, redefining ancient Hindu traditions. They preached the doctrine of “back to the scriptures” and the ideas of *Aryavarta* or *Bharatvarsha* as the motherland. Even some of the apparently “modernistic” and “secular” movements in the nineteenth century Bengal reinforced Hindu revivalism.¹⁶ These movements emphasised the colonial theory of alleged “Muslim tyranny” in medieval India, which was supposed to have ended only by *Pax Britannica*. Only a decade after the Revolt of 1857, Rajnarain Bose, Nabagopal Mitra and several members of the Tagore family took initiative in organising what was called the Hindu *Mela* (fair). It was, however, Rajnarain Basu’s lecture, *Hindu Dharmer Shresthata* (Superiority of Hinduism), delivered in September, 1872, which was taken to mark the birth of Hindu revivalism.¹⁷ In this Hindu revivalist milieu, the new literati began to gradually acquire a pan-Hindu identity and started using the Muslim as a convenient whipping boy. The high priest of such revivalism was Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-94) who, in his *Rajsimha* and *Anandmath*, posited the Muslim as the historical adversary of the Hindu.

Bankim Chandra had clearly perceived that nationalism as an ideology was something that Indians had clearly derived from the West, to which he frankly acknowledged India’s debt. In his days as also for long afterwards, Indian patriotism was not necessarily inconsistent with the idea of ‘tutelage’ under the British rule. Bankim’s social conservatism, combined with his love of provincial life, led him to identify himself with the *bhadralok* neo-Hindu ideology.¹⁸ More passionate than that of Bankim was the identification of Swami Vivekanand with neo-Hinduism. However, Muslim public opinion was less hostile to him. It was through the Bhartiya Aryadharm Pracharni Sabha and its sister organisations, the Dharma Mandal, Harisabha and Sri Bhagwat Kirtan Samaj, that, perhaps, a large scale institutionalisation of the Hindu revivalist sentiments took place. The ideas of Hindu resurrection were popularised by the Hindu *mela*, as also, Sanskritising movements.

Of wider appeal were the teachings of Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-83), who founded the Arya Samaj in 1875. Its watch-words were “back to the Vedas” and “*Aryasthan* for the Aryans.” The Arya Samaj also devoted itself to aggressive proselytisation and reconversion of Hindus, who had converted to Islam and Christianity. In 1882, Dayanand founded the Gauraksha Sabha and published *Gokarunanidhi*, which aroused Hindus against the beef-eating Muslims and Christians and prompted them to petition the Government to ban cow-slaughter.¹⁹ It was in this communal atmosphere, that a spate of rioting took place at Ludhiana, Ambala District, Ferozpur and Delhi and in 1889 there was a severe outbreak at Rohtak immediately after the establishment of the Arya Samaj there. The Punjab Government officials accused the Arya Samaj of exploiting the cow-killing issue in order to gain an audience for its doctrines of reform, which was hitherto above the heads of Hindu masses.²⁰

Equally strong was the revivalist movement in Maharashtra, which found an upsurge of a Maratha pride in the exploits of Shivaji against Aurangzeb. The Marathi journal *Kavyetibhas Samgrah Patra Yadi*, which made its appearance in 1878, popularised the study of the old Marathi *bakhars*. The Maratha historians such as Rajwade, Ranade and Sardesai fired the Maratha pride in the past. All these forays into the past went a

long way in fostering the feeling that the Hindus and the Muslims were two separate political, monolithic communities "divided by memories of masterhood and subjecthood and by the pride of the one humiliating the other."²¹

Closely connected with Hindu revivalism was the demand for the use of Devanagri script in courts and Government offices in the North-West Provinces and Oudh (U.P.). In 1837, Persian was replaced by English and Urdu, written in Persian script, as the court language. The development of Urdu owed its real impetus to the emphasis laid on the teaching of the vernacular by the NWP Education Department. In the 1840s, opinion was divided in the department over whether Urdu should be encouraged, partly because it was vernacular at least in Oudh and partly on the ground that the Government did not want to cause Muslim disaffection.²² This gave a great fillip to Urdu and by 1863, out of twenty-three newspapers in the Province, seventeen were in Urdu and only four in Hindi.²³ Babu Shiva Prasad, a Hindu revivalist, lamented, "Urdu is now becoming our mother-tongue."²⁴ The Muslims of North-West Provinces and Oudh (U.P.) were thus a privileged minority and their leaders were determined to maintain their privileges.

In the 1860s, a movement in favour of Hindi, written in the Devanagri script and with vocabulary drawn more from Sanskrit, originated in Benares. Many Hindus thought that Urdu, with Arabic and Persian accretions, was a symbol of Muslim power and influence, while the Devanagri script had a religious significance, as its characters were used by Brahmins in writing Sanskrit. It was argued that Urdu was the language of an urban minority and its use for purposes of legal and official contact with the Indian masses discriminated against Hindus in favour of Muslims. It also gave Muslims obvious advantage in entering the Government service. A number of Hindus readily equated the fate of the Hindi language with that of the Hindu nationality. In 1868, a Hindu wrote : "It is not... too much to conjecture that with the extinction of Hindi, the death-knell of Hindu nationality will begin to ring."²⁵

The Hindi movement received significant encouragement, when it was adopted as the language of the lower courts, first in the Central Provinces (1873) and then in Bihar (1881). Benares was the main centre of the Hindi activists, prominent among them were the Maharaja of Benares and Babu Shiva Prasad. The protagonists of Hindi from cities all over the province submitted 118 memoranda signed by some 67,000 persons.²⁶ Urdu was described as 'surcharged with Arabic, Persian and Turki terms, which made it an altogether foreign tongue to the Hindu population in villages and hamlets' and its script as uncouth and outlandish. In contrast, it was said that Hindi was written in characters ancient, well-known and regarded with feelings akin to reverence.²⁷

What is perhaps relevant to our subject is the fact that the business communities were closely connected with the various movements seeking to 'purify' and bring about some homogenization of beliefs and practices among their respective diverse and heterogeneous religious community. Recent studies have pointed to the contribution of some of the Hindu and Muslim merchants to the revivalist movements of their respective religious community.²⁸

In striking contrast to the Hindus, the Muslim response was different to the establishment of the British rule for obvious reasons. In the aftermath of 1857, the

British believed that the Muslims were the real motivating force behind the uprising. They were singled out as the main target of retribution. After the collapse of the Indian resistance, "the English turned fiercely on the Mohammadans as their real enemies." It was however, W.W. Hunter who publicized the conditions of Muslims in Bengal in 1871. He argued that Muslims had kept aloof from English education because it was "opposed to the traditions, unsuited to the requirements and hateful of their religion."²⁹

It is also pertinent to note that while the Muslim revivalist movements in the nineteenth century India, in a way, developed along class-lines espousing the cause of the poor and downtrodden, like the Fraizi Movement of Bengal, the Hindu revivalist movements remained primarily a middle class affair and, with the exception of Brahmo Samaj of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, developed anti-Muslim bias, which often got intensified and caused communal conflict.

The Muslim response to the socio-economic and political issues raised by the establishment of the British rule was not uniform as a community. The attitude of the trading classes in the western and southern India towards the new rulers and the Western civilization was that of cautious compromise. In northern India, on the part of the feudal, higher and middle classes, it was one of forced submission and on the part of the *ulama* and the masses, one of bitter resentment and hostility.³⁰

In Bengal, Muslim feudal classes thought the future to be bleak. In order to pull them out of their pitiable plight, Nawab Abdul Latif founded the Mohammadan Literary Society in Calcutta in 1863, so as to enable the higher and middle class Muslims to secure substantial share in Government services and to draw them closer to the British.

The northern Indian Muslims were obviously sullen over the loss of political power to the British. They found it very difficult to tear themselves away from the past. Though they had ceased to be the governing class, they continued to be so much obsessed with their vanishing glory and privileged status that they considered themselves comprising the aristocratic class of the country.³¹ Pointing to this tendency, Sir Syed wrote in 1869 that "the fatal shroud of complacent self-esteem is wrapt around the Muhammadan community."³²

Like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Sir Syed had imbibed the post-Enlightenment rationalist spirit of the West. He realised that armed struggle against the British who were trained in the new methods of warfare and had the potential of the Industrial Revolution at their command, was bound to prove futile. Pragmatic considerations demanded that the struggle had to be constitutional rather than militant. His main concern was for the spread of English education among the Muslims. With this end in view, he worked hard for a reconciliation between the British Government and the Muslims. That is why Sir Syed in his *Asbab-i-Baghawat-i-Hind* and *The Loyal Mubammadans of India*, attempted to exonerate his co-religionists from the blame for fomenting the Revolt. His grim political realism convinced him that the Muslim elite lagged far behind the Hindu elite in responding to the Western education, which was absolutely essential for achieving political rights and objectives, as also to understand the dynamics of constitutional battles.³³ Sir Syed's efforts yielded results.

In the Provinces where Muslims were engaged in trade and commerce as in Bombay or in professions as in U.P., they showed keenness to go in for English education. In Bengal, however, being largely in agriculture, they lagged behind the Hindus in Western professional education.³⁴

In the meanwhile, there was a shift in the policy of the British Government. What brought about this shift is a moot question. The new rulers rejected the feudal economic structure and initiated the process that turned India's economy into a colonial economy, which started commercial exploitation of colonies. Moreover, the economic depressions caused immeasurable distress, aggravated by famines and scarcities. The economic crisis had seriously limited the opportunities for the 'middle classes' (professionals and merchants). This led to the rise of political agitation, mainly by the Hindu middle class. Confronted with the rising opposition, the British turned towards the Muslims as their potential ally. Moreover, certain world economic forces also influenced this policy-orientation. By 1870s the British had started coveting the strategic region of the Middle East. This made it necessary for them to reconcile with the Muslims of India, because they had close cultural and religious relationship with them.³⁵ Mayo (1822-72) and Northbrook (1872-76) had initiated reconciliation and by 1888, for Dufferin (1884-88), Muslims had become 'one of the two mighty political communities of our Indian cosmos.'³⁶ Thus the changed British imperialist and colonial interests were perhaps responsible for shift in the official policy towards the Muslim middle class.

It was against this backdrop that Sir Syed looked at the situation in his time from the point of view of his class and wanted English education only for *ashraf* (upper classes) and not for *ajlaf* (lower classes). Delivering a speech at the foundation laying ceremony of Anjuman-i-Islamiyah at Bareilly he said "to teach English in the *madrassa* set up by you, is not proper. It is a mistake. No doubt English education is highly necessary for our community. It is necessary for the nobles and *sardars* of our community to impart higher education to their children. It would be more suitable for you to arrange for some elementary education for these boys (poor Muslim children) so that they can read and write. Give them simple booklets so that they can learn *namaz* (prayers) and *roza* (fasting) and other principles of Islamic religion."³⁷

What aggravated the separatist tendency in India was the introduction of Census in 1872, leading to the awareness of the demographic changes in the population. The upper caste Hindus in Bengal were showing signs of decline in their numbers, while Muslims were swelling continuously due to various reasons. Analysing the trends in the population growth, C.J.O. Donnel observed that in 1871, the Hindus outnumbered the Muslims in Bengal.³⁸ With this demographic change, the Muslims and the Hindus became self-conscious of their separate identities.

Separatist tendencies were accentuated also by widening educational gulf between the two communities. By ignoring English, Muslims had missed to move with the times and had thus lagged behind the Hindus, who had already taken to Western education. The Muslim service families could no longer afford to cock a snook at English schools. Their fortunes depended on employment in Government. Towards the end of the century, Government jobs became increasingly hard to get for those who had not excelled in English. By the 1870s the locus of Hindu-Muslim struggle

turned to Government employment. The overall Muslim position in the services and professional class was declining.³⁹ In Bengal and the Punjab they were facing elimination. There were determined attempts by Hindu officials to block the entry of Muslims and to turn the existing Muslim employees out.⁴⁰ Even in the NWP where their position was proportionately better, Muslim middle class encountered increasing competition from the Hindus, particularly the Bengali middle class, who were well-versed in English.

In the NWP, which was backward in English education, Urdu educated elite, both Hindus and Muslims, had started fearing that they will soon be overwhelmed by the English-educated Bengali elite. Speaking on "the present state of Indian politics" at Lucknow in December 1887, Sir Syed said "Now, I take Mohammadans and the Hindus of our Province together, and ask whether they are able to compete with the Bengalis or not? Most certainly not. When this is the case, how can competitive examination be introduced in our country?" This speech clearly indicates the feudal gentry's⁴¹ prejudice against the newly emergent middle classes. In keeping with their class prejudices, the very idea of the middle classes gaining an upper hand or ruling over them was repugnant to them.

The colonial challenge to the Indian psyche was not only political but also cultural. Macaulay's challenge to the entire Indian literature in 1835 evoked strong reaction compelling different Indian communities to reinterpret their values in such a way as to provide an answer to the colonial challenge and to discover redeeming features in the treasures of their remote past leading to revivalist tendencies. It is indeed a paradox to note that it was the English and a few other Western historians, who, by rediscovering the rich heritage of India, helped the growth of national consciousness, which was conditioned by revivalism. Soon, however, the controversy on switching over from Urdu to Hindi as the language of court and administration aroused such passions in both the communities that its repercussions were far-reaching.

Sir Syed was terribly perturbed when he found his close friend Raja Jai Kishen Das spousing the cause of Hindi language and Nagri script most vigorously. Urdu was the language of the common culture that had developed during the later Mughal period through close social intercourse between Hindus and Muslims. Sir Syed realised that the agitation for replacement of Urdu by Hindi was part of both the powerful movement of renaissance and revivalism through which the Hindus of northern India were meeting the challenges of the new age. He took an emotional approach to the question which caused him great distress. Maulana Hali has recorded Sir Syed's reaction in the latter's biography. He quotes him : "When the agitation spread in Benaras, one day I was talking to Mr. Shakespeare, the Commissioner of Benaras, about the education of Muslims. He was surprised to listen to me. At last he said it is first time that I heard you speaking about the well-being of Muslims in particular. Before this you always talked about the well-being of Indians in general. I said I am now convinced that these two communities cannot come together with heart and soul on any issue. It (conflict) is still much less. In coming days I clearly see more confrontation and animosity between those who call themselves educated."⁴²

IV

What further aggravated the separatist tendency was the introduction of a wholly new element into colonial discourse on the return of the liberals under Gladstone in the spring of 1880. According to Farzana Shaikh, "The tenor of official debates on Indian representation suggests that there was a widely held belief that the practices common to Western systems of representation, particularly popular elections, were unsuited to India. The argument was that the creation of representative institutions assumed a homogeneous society and that, as such it was unlikely to succeed. In India, considerations of caste and creed set men radically apart and determined their political choices."⁴³

In December, 1883 while in Calcutta, W.S. Blunt developed his earlier self-managed provincial plan into a momentous suggestion, according to which, India had to be partitioned on religious lines. All the northern Provinces, which were Muslim, should be brought under one Government, and all the southern Provinces, which were Hindu, should be assembled under another Government. The imperial authority would, however, be maintained through British soldiers maintained in each area.⁴⁴

Many Indians, however, came to believe that the spread of Western education had substantially contributed to a degree of solidarity among the Indian middle classes. It entitled them to Western political institutions, organised on European models. The English-educated predominantly Hindu intelligentsia was eager to demonstrate its skill in managing European political representational institutions. The Muslim attitudes to the question of representation was shaped mainly, though by no means exclusively, by their quest for self-preservation. Lord Ripon's decision to extend the basis of Indian representation by introducing elections to local councils led Indian Muslims to seriously reassess the implications of the Western representational model on their political conduct.

By the 1880s, the growing concern about the trend of liberal reform in India forced a public debate among Indian Muslims. In its memorandum presented to Lord Ripon, the National Mahommedan Association demanded preferential treatment for Indian Muslims on the grounds that they were backward, but nevertheless a politically important community.⁴⁵ It was claimed by the followers of Sir Syed and Amir Ali that the application of strictly numerical criteria in determining claims to representation and power was grossly unfair to Muslims, whose historical importance in India's political life had been considerable."

These views on representation were not, however, peculiar to Muslim middle class. The contemporary Hindu middle classes also denied notions of popular representation as they believed that the illiterate masses were unable to speak for themselves.⁴⁶ Surendranath Banerjee, leader of the predominantly India Association, contended that representation should be confined to the Indian middle classes.⁴⁷ Similarly Ramesh Chunder Dutt felt that *zamindars*, native Princes and spokesmen of native associations were India's natural leaders.⁴⁸

The colonial model of representation had communitarian basis, which was later to assume an overwhelming importance in the debate on communal representation. Ripon recommended that elections should be 'by caste or occupation' as these 'would

be more consonant with the feelings of the people.' It is, however, strange to note that the Viceroy had nothing to say about the fairly well established practice of communal and caste representation that had been in existence in some municipalities since the 1870s.⁴⁹ The Western-educated Indians came increasingly to question the colonial assumption that caste and creed constrained their capacity for representational institutions. Some of them pointed to the Indian National Congress founded in 1885 as evidence of a burgeoning Indian political consensus that transcended traditional social barriers.⁵⁰

The inauguration of the Indian National Congress was initially resented by the Hindu and Muslim elites. Important Hindu landlords such as the Raja of Binge, Raja Shiv Prasad and Munshi Naval Kishore, were hostile to the Congress. They were averse to a representational form of Government, because that would nullify the system of special favours and nomination. Similarly Muslim elite resented the rise of the Congress, which brought to surface all the pent-up doubts and apprehensions of Sir Syed. What aroused a sense of real danger in his mind was the joining of Muslims at the third session of the Congress held at Madras in 1887, not only from western, southern India and Bengal but also from North-West Provinces (U.P.). In those days Sir Syed was very much under the influence of Theodore Beck, who was appointed Principal of the Aligarh College in 1886. Beck employed all his persuasive powers to instil in the youth of the College, feelings of hatred towards the Hindus and loyalty to the British Government.⁵¹ In his famous Lucknow speech of 1887 Sir Syed argued, "Whatever system of elections be adopted, there will be four times as many Hindus as Mohammadans and all their demands will be gratified." He, therefore, advocated that the power of appointing members to local boards and district councils should be in the hands of the Government, which would ensure that 'due and just balance in the various sections of the Indian population which the system of elections, pure and simple, would fail to achieve.'⁵²

Nawab Abdul Latif, founder of Muhammadan Literary Society and Amir Ali, Secretary, Central National Muhammadan Association from Bengal, as also Mian Mohammad Shafi (who later became President of the Muslim League) also challenged the representative character of the Congress. However, Muslims from Bombay and Madras joined the Congress in considerable numbers. Badruddin Tayyibji (1844-1906), one of the early Congress Presidents, invited Sir Syed to join the Congress, but the latter declined stating that he did not wish to stand in the way of national progress but it did not necessarily mean that 'we would run with those whom it does not seem possible to beat in the race.'⁵³

The Aligarh Movement undoubtedly was that of the higher and middle class Muslims in northern India. The response, however, of the orthodox was different. They launched a counter movement against Sir Syed, but the latter got public support. Akbar Allahabadi sang :

Syed showed the Gazette and gathered heaps of money,
The Shaikh went abegging with the Quran and collected not a penny.

The Deoband seminary, established in 1860, supported the Congress. In 1885 a *fatwa* was issued declaring that in worldly matters cooperation with Hindus was

permissible. Maulana Gangohvi, Rector of Deoband, warned the Muslims not to co-operate with the activities of Sir Syed.⁵⁴

Notwithstanding the advocacy of Sir Syed, Muslims continued to be swayed by the nationalism of the Congress. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, the emergence of communal consciousness among the Hindus, as expressed through the Arya Samaj and Hindi Movement in north India, as also Anti-Cow Killing Association, created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among the Muslims.⁵⁵

In, 1890s the militancy of the Arya Samajists grew manyfold and they attacked Muslims with increasing intensity. Pandit Lekh Ram (1858-97), leader of the crusade, condemned all forms of Islam and demanded conversion of Muslims to Aryanism or their expulsion from India.⁵⁶ Simultaneously the cow protection committees were set up in important cities and towns, from where the Arya Samaj activists fanned out through North-Western Province and Bihar, indulging in vicious communal propaganda. The movement reached its climax in 1893 when extensive rioting broke out in rural areas where Muslim villagers were mercilessly massacred by frenzied bands of Hindus.

The revivalist movement in Maharashtra gained further momentum with the political recruitment of Hindu God Ganapati by Balgangadhar Tilak, (1854-1920), the veteran Congress leader. In 1893, the year following the outbreak of communal violence in Bombay city, Tilak reorganised the Ganapati festival with a view to protest against the alleged Government partiality for Muslims.⁵⁷ In order to mobilise the Hindu masses he introduced a number of innovations in the celebrations of the customary festival. Large public images installed in each street, *vadas* (compounds) and *peths* which became objects of collective worship.⁵⁸ The congregational aspect of the festival was consolidated by immersing the images in rivers or the sea in a united ceremony.⁵⁹

Another instrument of Hindu mass mobilisation was the *mela* movement of singing parties dressed in the garb of Shivaji's soldiers armed with bamboo sticks and other paraphernalia of Hinduism.⁶⁰ These innovations were not entirely novel, but what distinguished these *melas* from their prototypes was their 'better organisation and impromptu songs.' Yet another innovation was insertion of topical political songs.⁶¹ The verses of these songs exhorted Hindus to boycott the Muslim Muharram tazia processions, in which they had been participating for several years. A typical communal song runs as follows :

Oh, why have you abandoned to-day the Hindu religion ?
 How have you forgotten Ganapati, Shiva and Maruti ?
 What have you gained by worshipping the *tabuts* ?
 What boons has Allah conferred upon you;
 That you have become Musalmans today ?
 Do not be friendly to a religion which is alien.
 Do not give up your own religion and befallen.
 Do not at all venerate the *tabuts*.⁶²

Following the example of Poona, other cities in Maharashtra also initiated their own Ganapati Movement. "The Ganapati Movement is spreading" noted a police officer in Ahmednagar district in 1896.⁶³ Communal clashes followed, when the *melas* marched through the Muslim quarters chanting objectionable verses.

From this communal revival it was Tilak who benefited most rather than Ganapati, the deity. This veteran leader had no compunction in using religion for political purposes though the Congress, to which he belonged, was wedded to secularism. The Ganapati no doubt proved to be an effective vehicle for disseminating ideas of Congress among the hitherto untapped urban and peasant masses. Thus the development of 'vicarious nationalism' in Bengal, the Ganapati and Anti-Cow Killing Movements in the Deccan and Arya Samaj and Hindi Movements in north India contributed to the creation of militant Hindu consciousness causing Muslim alienation.

V

It was against this backdrop that the British Parliament, enacting the Indian Council Act of 1892, introduced the principle of election and conceded many demands of the Congress such as enlargement of councils, discussion of financial statements and right of interpellation.⁶⁴ Fearing that the Government had succumbed to the Congress pressure, a draft scheme was prepared by Sir Syed and other leaders in December 1896, dealing with Muslim representation in the Legislative Councils and municipalities and was presented to the Government by the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association. The scheme envisaged that the Hindus and Muslims should get equal number of seats in the Legislative Councils because if the Hindus had 'numerical superiority,' the Muslims' "historical position" was equally important.⁶⁵

Sir Syed and his Aligarh Movement catered for a Muslim middle class which was just emerging on account of the expansion of commercial and bureaucratic framework of imperialism in northern India. The emerging Muslim middle class, compared to its Hindu counterpart, suffered from significant time lag. Sir Syed, therefore, devoted himself to the welfare of Muslim community in its new bourgeois adventure. He deliberately followed a policy of friendship with the British Government in order to consolidate Muslim stricken interests.

Sir Syed was opposed to the anti-imperialist Pan-Islamic Movement launched by Jamaluddin Afghani (1839-97) though some of his adherents, like poet Altaf Husain Hali and Maulana Shibli, were dedicated to reviving pride in the grandeur of Islam. Hali and Shibli came under the spell of Pan-Islamism which gained momentum in 1890s.⁶⁶ Contrary to common belief, Afghani advocated inter-communal unity and common front against the alien imperial rule. Just as he helped awaken Egyptian nationalism by alluding to the ancient glories of the Egyptian past, in India he harped on the glory of India's ancient past.

By the close of the nineteenth century, while the Hindu middle class, older and larger, had come into collision with colonialism, the Muslim middle class was as yet not advanced enough to join the militant movement launched by their Hindu counterparts. The gospel of Swadeshi was first preached in Maharashtra by Lokahitawadi through the columns of *Prabhakar*. In Bengal, the Hindu Mela provided a platform to advocate replacement of foreign goods by indigenous ones. This movement received a great impetus in 1896, caused by the imposition of countervailing

excise duties on Indian cotton goods at the behest of Manchester. In Punjab, the Arya Samaj strongly supported the economic and political resurgence of India, as also its cultural revival.

Lala Lajpat Rai became wedded to the idea of Hindu nationality, because of the Hindi-Urdu controversy, as is borne out by his very revealing autobiography. Through articles in the *Kayastha Samachar* of 1901, Lajpat Rai advocated that the Congress should openly and boldly base itself on the Hindus alone.⁶⁷ Another Arya Samajist Bhai Parmanand tells us in his autobiography that "the police searched his house in 1912 and seized some of his private papers, which included the rough draft of a letter addressed to Lajpat Rai, containing a blue-print of a Constitution for free India with a proposal to push Muslims across the river Indus."⁶⁸ In Bengal by the beginning of the twentieth century, Swami Vivekananda's message was being given a more direct political colour by his disciple, sister Nivedita (Margaret Nobel) with her experience of Irish and other European revolutionary movements. About this time Aurobindo Ghosh had started criticising Congress mendicancy and it was under his inspiration that Anushilan Samiti was launched in Calcutta. The soil of Bengal was becoming ripe for Extremism.

In order to break the force of Bengali *Bhadralok* militants who formed the vanguard of the freedom movement, Curzon partitioned Bengal though ostensibly for administrative reasons. It was also intended to create a rift between the Hindus and Muslims, as is borne out by Curzon's much quoted speech at Dhaka in February, 1904 offering East Bengal Muslims a prospect of "unity which they had not enjoyed since the days of old Mussalman Viceroys and Kings." Thus by dangling before the Muslims of East Bengal the bait of professional advancement, the imperialist strategy sought to turn the anti-partition agitation into an inter-communal contest.

Soon the anti-partition agitation assumed an alarming tone. Taking a cue from the Chinese boycott of British goods, the agitationists adopted that strategy to bring pressure on the Government to abandon the partition plan. Muslim shopkeepers, but not Muslim weavers, were often opposed to the boycott of British goods. A few private companies represented Muslim Swadeshi entrepreneurship.⁶⁹ Apart from its economic overtones, the political movement came to be associated with religious fervour. In order to stir the Hindus of the countryside, *pujas* were offered to solemnise the occasion.⁷⁰ The chanting of *Bande Mataram* during processions was unpopular with some Muslims by reasons of its association with the Hindu Goddess Kali.⁷¹

Imbibing the ardent spirit of the freedom struggle, some young educated Muslims were ready to share with their compatriots the new creed of nationalism. They regarded Sir Syed's policy of loyalism as obsolete under the changed circumstances. In May, 1906 the Aligarh students union passed a resolution advocating Hindu-Muslim political cooperation.⁷² In fact, the younger generation among the Muslims had even started thinking in terms of throwing in their lot with the Congress. Three months later, on 23 September 1906, Hindu and Muslim students of Calcutta marched hand in hand to a strong rally at Raja Bagan, where Hindus and Muslims embraced each other amid strains of *Bande Matram* mingled with *Allaho Akbar*. Simultaneously a section of students also advocated cooperation with the Congress on the ground that Muslims were to encounter two kinds of *Jehad* (struggle) : *Jehadi asghar* (small struggle) in

defence of religious rights and liberty and *Jehadi akbar* (great struggle) involving redressal of grievances and sufferings of the subjects. The Congress, they claimed, could expect the support of all Muslims in regard to *Jehadi akbar*.⁷³ Impressed by the revolutionary activities of his compatriots against the partition of Bengal, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad decided to join the agitationists in counteracting the British imperialist designs. But he had hard time to gain the confidence of the members of the Secret Societies which were suspicious of Muslims. It was through the mediation of Shyam Sunder Chakraverty, an associate of Aurobindo Ghosh, that the young Azad was able to convince them that active hostility or even indifference on the part of Muslims would make India's struggle for freedom much more difficult. He, thus, succeeded in finding a place in the secret parleys of the anti-partition agitationists in about 1906.⁷⁴

Besides the Hindus, the English-educated younger generation among the Muslim middle class had also started thinking in terms of throwing in their lot with the Congress. This change in attitude among a substantial section of the Muslims resulted in participation of 50 Muslim delegates at the 22nd Congress session, which included prominent youngmen like Wazir Hasan, Abbas Tyabjee and M.A. Jinnah. It was at this session that Jinnah moved an amendment for the deletion of the clause which had made provision for reservation of seats in the legislatures and services for the educationally backward classes.⁷⁵

More significant is the fact that the Aligarh Students Union had passed a resolution in May, 1906 advocating Hindu-Muslim political cooperation. The Muslim leadership was, however, still in the hands of landed aristocracy. Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, political heir of Sir Syed, wrote to Principal Archibald on 4th August, 1906 : "You are aware that the Mohammadans feel a little disappointed and young educated Mohammadans seem to have a sympathy for the Congress.... I have got several letters drawing attention particularly to the new proposal of elected representatives in the Legislative Councils. They say that the existing rules confer no rights on Mohammadans and no Mohammadans get into the Councils by elections."⁷⁶ Six days after, Archibald wrote to Mohsinul Mulk, "The Viceroy agrees to receive a deputation of Muslims. The address to be presented to the Viceroy should be signed by important Muslim leaders from all Provinces. While expressing gratefulness for the new policy, it should represent that the system of nomination, and not election, should be adopted.... It is necessary that the opinion of *zamindars* should be given due weight. Time is short, and if we want to build up a movement, we must hurry up."⁷⁷ Five days after, on 15th August, 1906 Minto wrote to Morley : "I have always had great hopes of the Mohammadan population... and now that they are becoming somewhat alarmed at what they consider Bengali success, the justice of our safeguarding their interests will become all the more apparent."⁷⁸

The Muslim deputation, comprising nobles, *jagirdars*, *zamindars*, *taluqdars*, lawyers, merchants and retired officials, led by Agha Khan, waited on the Viceroy and in full compliance with the line adopted by the late Sir Syed, submitted that the number of seats to be allotted to the Muslims in the Legislatures should be estimated not only on the basis of their numerical strength, but also on that of their political importance and their service to the defence of the empire. It was stressed that the system of

election or nomination to the legislative chambers, so far in practice, had failed to give them proper representation. They, therefore, insisted that they should send their own representatives through separate electorates.⁷⁹ In his reply Minto said, "Any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent." He assured the deputationists that Muslim "political rights and interests will be safeguarded in any administration with which I am concerned."⁸⁰ Minto was convinced of the middle class character of the nationalist movement in India. On 4th November, 1906 he wrote to Morley, "There is no popular movement from below. The movement, such as it is, impelled by the leaders of a class very small indeed in comparison with the population of India."⁸¹ Fearful of the consequences of accentuating middle class discontent, he lent support to moves culminating in the organisation of Muslim League at Dhaka in the same way as Dufferin had engineered the inauguration of the Congress twenty-one years earlier, seeking to distract attention from the growing middle class discontent in the country. The Muslim delegates to the All India Muhammadan Conference held at Dhaka on 30th December 1906, decided to form All India Muslim League. Nawab Samiullah of Dhaka moved the first resolution defining the following aims and objects : (1) to promote among the Muslims of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government, and to remove any misconception that might arise as to the intention of the Government with regard to any of its measures, (2) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India, and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government, and (3) to prevent the rise among the Muslims of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.⁸²

Three years later the provision of separate electorates under the Indian Councils Act of 1909 was considered a victory for the Muslim League founded by landed gentry and educated middle class with aspirations for jobs in the civil services and seats in Legislatures.

In evaluating separatist politics among the Muslims it should not be ignored that unlike the Hindus, Muslims did not develop a modern capitalist class without which modern industrial development was impossible. The weak Muslim mercantile capitalists of the West coast were easily supplanted by the powerful separatist forces represented by the feudal classes who had the added advantage of playing with the minority psychosis of the Muslims. The uneven development of Hindus and Muslims thus created the right climate for the forces of communalism to thrive. "Communalism," according to W.C. Smith, "would not have been so effective a divisive force, nor could the upper class Muslims have been so effectively repressed, had the Muslim and Hindu section of the classes concerned been at the same economic level, but they were not. Economic development within the British imperialist system benefited a group of Indians of whom a larger proportion were Hindus than Muslims."⁸³

VI

Nevertheless the Muslim opinion began to be influenced by new voices representing certain new trends of thought. Among these radicals were Maulana Azad, Maulana Muhammad Ali, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Maulana Hasrat Mohani, who had just entered public life. They found no contradictions in Islam and nationalism. While supporting socio-religious movement of Sir Syed, they repudiated his pro-British policy of loyalism and separatism. Maulana Azad represented a powerful current in the Muslim politics of the time. He travelled in 1908 through Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, where he met Pan-Islamist followers of Jamaluddin Afghani who advocated solidarity between Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots in Egypt and India. In Cairo he came into contact with some followers of Mustafa Kamil (1847-1908) who had founded under the influence of Afghani in 1907 his *Hizbul Watan* or Nationalist Party, which preached that there was no conflict between the spheres of religion and national life.⁸⁴ Cutting short his travels because of his father's illness, Maulana Azad returned to Calcutta convinced of the fact that the anti-imperialist fervour of the Egyptian revolutionaries was of the same order as that of the Bengal revolutionaries.⁸⁵

The growing militancy in the country forced the British Government to annul in 1911 the partition of Bengal which proved to be a turning point. A section of the Muslims was convinced that their policy of loyalty to the Government would not pay them in the long run. In utter despondency some of them even suggested winding, of Muslim League so that all Muslims could join the Congress.⁸⁶

At this juncture the international developments also compelled Indian Muslims to reorient their policy towards the British Government. The Balkan War of 1912 and the British policy towards Turkey were factors, among others, for arousing Pan-Islamic feelings and encouraging increasingly hostile attitude towards the British imperialism. Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Azad and Zafar Ali Khan started rallying the support of Muslim masses by writing inflammatory articles in favour of Turkey in their respective Urdu weeklies, with the result that the traditional policy of loyalty towards the Government seemed no longer tenable. By 1912 almost the entire Muslim middle class turned anti-British and a new phase of the united struggle for freedom began.

The Muslim League adopted a new Constitution at its Lucknow session on 22nd March, 1913. The most important change was adoption of Self-Government as its aim and acceptance of the need for periodical meetings between leaders of both communities to find out the *modus operandi* for joint action. The aim of the League was laid down as "attainment under the aegis of the British Crown of a system of Self-Government suitable to India through constitutional means."⁸⁷ This change was hailed by the advanced sections of Muslim middle class. It was to serve two purposes : (1) to bring League politics in conformity with the nationalist movement and (2) to compel the British Government to revise its policy towards Turkey, the seat of Khilafat.

The outbreak of the World War I in August 1914 brought the Muslim League closer to the Congress. "During 1915" observes Uma Kaura, "the movement for Hindu-Muslim reconciliation was accelerated through the efforts of M.A. Jinnah, Wazir Hasan

and other nationalist Muslims.”⁸⁸ Simultaneously, among the Congressmen Annie Besant was advocating co-ordination of activities between the Congress and the League so as to draw up a mutually acceptable scheme of constitutional reforms. It was perhaps for this purpose that she wanted the Congress not to make an issue of separate electorates. In her Presidential Address to the U.P. Provincial Conference in April 1915, she stressed that “it would probably cause too much friction to withdraw separate electorates at present.”

Echoing similar sentiments Jinnah, as President of the Bombay Provincial Conference held at Ahmedabad in October 1916, warned his fellow Congressmen, “Rightly or wrongly the Muslim community is absolutely determined for the present to insist upon separate electorates.... I would, therefore, appeal to my Hindu brethren that.. they should try to win the confidence and trust of the Muslims.”⁸⁹ After joining the league, Jinnah’s significant achievement was to secure at the joint meetings of the Congress and the League reforms committees at Lucknow in the months of November-December, 1916 a scheme of constitutional reforms known as the Lucknow Pact. The Congress agreed to accept separate electorates and weightage for minorities. In U.P., Bihar, Central Provinces, Bombay and Madras Muslim minority got weightage. Similarly in the Punjab and Bengal Hindu minority secured weightage. The Pact was the high watermark of Congress rapprochement with League and marked a great success of the educated Indians in striking a remarkable understanding of the realities of the middle class dominated politics. It signified victory of Bombay school of liberal thought.

While the Hindus of U.P. and the Punjab had misgivings regarding the Lucknow Pact, it failed to stir the Muslim masses, whose attention was more focussed on events in Turkey, considered the bastion of Khilafat. On October 18, 1918, Turkey was overcome by Allies and soon after, Constantinople was occupied. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was signed which degenerated the *Khalifa* (Caliph) to the status of a British puppet. The Indian Muslims held in April-May 1919 Khilafat Conference, which then gave birth to All India Khilafat Committee. The Khilafat Movement brought on the political scene a new leadership, dynamic, militant and uninhibited in challenging the British Imperialism. Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, better known as Ali brothers, were in the forefront of this new leadership, which thought that the passionate sympathy for the Khilafat would bring all the sections of the Muslim community on one platform and even bridge the gulf between the English-educated class and the *Ulama* thus lead to a general political awakening among the Muslims.⁹⁰ Drawn out from their cloisters, the *Ulama* of Deoband and Firangi Mahal founded Jamiatul Ulama-i-Hind which held its first meeting at Amritsar in November, 1919 along with the Khilafat Conference and agreed on the demand for national freedom. The newly emergent North Indian Muslim leadership joined hands with the *Ulama* and jumped into the Khilafat Movement. The class interests of the Muslim merchants and professionals, however, did not permit them to accept anything which was ‘unconstitutional.’ They found it extremely difficult to toe the line of the Khilafatists.

The Khilafat Movement raised the important question of deeper motives in the arena of Indian politics. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate its role in the history of India, specially as it has been a subject of great controversy among historians and politicians. The Young Party of the Muslims, in collaboration with the Jamiatul Ulama,

piloted the Khilafat campaign-inspired by Afghani's Pan-Islamic Movement, which advocated intercommunal oneness and defied any breach in the anti-imperialist front. Afghani's attempt to reconcile Pan-Islamism with nationalism carried conviction with Khilafatists. Maulana Muhammad Ali advised Indian Muslims to fight for *Swaraj* (Self-Rule) along with their non-Muslim brethren, for only in this way would it be possible to achieve the Khilafat aim.⁹¹ Another Khilafatist Dr. M.A. Ansari, linked up India's freedom with the liberation of Asia. India, according to him, was "the keystone of the arch of imperialism. Once India is free, the whole edifice will collapse. The best guarantee for the freedom of Asia and the peace of the world is a free self-governing India."⁹² Maulana Azad thought that Khilafatism and nationalism were organically related as the avowed twin objects of the entire country. Jawaharlal Nehru maintained that "Pan-Islamism in 1914 and later was an anti-imperialist force. It weakened the British people in their war effort and it coloured the background of the Khilafat Movement in India."⁹³ Gandhi ji called Khilafat "*the Kamdbenu*" as it was for him "an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Musalmans, which would not arise in a hundred years."⁹⁴ Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, however, was of the opinion that the Indian Muslims "who were carrying on the Khilafat Movement, actually went to the length of inviting the Ameer of Afghanistan to invade India."⁹⁵

Ambedkar's verdict does not apply to all the Khilafatists. It is true that the extremist Khilafatist leader Maulana Hasrat Mohani did make an emotional and unrealistic announcement in 1920 that "if the Afghan army invades India to end the British rule, he would join the Afghan army." He was supported in this claim by other extremists like Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Azad Subhani.⁹⁶ In making this emotional claim, these extremist Khilafatists were obviously motivated by their anti-imperialist feelings and zeal to liberate their country. It is pertinent to note in this connection that the All India Khilafat Conference held on July 8, 1921, passed a resolution that, "it is unlawful for any faithful Muslim to serve from that date in the army or help or acquiesce in their recruitment."⁹⁷ The Muslim merchants from Bombay were, however, horrified at the illegality of this proposal. They had no option but to resign from the Central Khilafat Committee in May, 1920 when it adopted the Non-Cooperation programme. This explains why Jinnah hailing from the business community of Bombay abstained from the Khilafat Movement.

The Khilafat movement has been denounced as based on extra-Indian loyalties, which gave rise to the debate centring round the contradiction between Indian nationalism and Khilafatism. The implications of this debate were hardly discernible in the political trends of the early 1920s.⁹⁹ It is true that the extremist section of the Khilafatists, like the extremists of the Congress, wanted to make religion a tool for political purposes. Maulana Muhammad Ali, like Balgangadhar Tilak, used religion to provide a mass base to the Indian politics. In fact he acknowledged Tilak as his political *Guru*.¹⁰⁰ Similarly Maulana Hasrat Mohani too came under the spell of the Congress Extremists. In his *Urdu-i-Mualla* he observes : "In politics we are the followers of Mr. Tilak, leader of the patriots and Babu Aurobindo Ghosh. That is why our hatred towards liberal Congress and Muslim League is inevitable."¹⁰¹

The Khilafat Movement enthused the Hindus and the Muslim masses for the first time and forged unparalleled unity between them. "The two years that followed the

War," observes Robinson, "were to bring changes that were no less notable, became much more than useful agitational tools to be deployed by Western-educated politicians, indeed from time to time. They took the lead in Muslim politics. The Muslim League, the home of Muslim politics, disappeared from view completely, being overwhelmed by the new All India Khilafat organisation. Hindus began to play much bigger part in Muslim affairs. Arya Samajists such as Swami Shraddhanand and Pandit Neki Ram were to be found addressing Muslim meetings, while for a time the overall direction of Muslim politics, once in the charge of Sir Syed, Muhsinul Mulk and Vaqarul Mulk, lay in the hands of a Hindu Bania Mahatma Gandhi."¹⁰² In this milieu of communal harmony, the existing disputes over cow-slaughter and music before mosques were settled amicably. The spirit of the time was captured by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan in his verse :

*Aae hain asman se chal kar woh quwwaten;
Jo Muslim-o-Hunood ko sheero shakar karen.
(Heavenly forces have forged friendly bonds;
Between Muslims and Hindus).*

The Khilafatists thought that the question of Khilafat would not be solved without complete independence of India. At the Ahmedabad Session of the Congress, Maulana Hasrat Mohani moved a resolution for complete independence but Gandhiji opposed it because he thought that the political climate was not yet favourable for complete independence. In spite of Gandhiji's opposition, one third of the delegates at the plenary session of the Congress voted for Hasrat's resolution.¹⁰³

Whatever be its contradictions, the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements succeeded in mobilising the Indian masses to a degree unparalleled in the history of the freedom struggle. The Muslim leadership of this movement, according to Asghar Ali Engineer, was partly in the hands of newly emergent Young Party and partly in the hands of the 'old party', mainly representing feudal interests, never got involved into it for its militant anti-British character.¹⁰⁴

The October Revolution of 1917 had given some impetus to the unrest in the Indian peasantry which was exploited by the *ryotwari* and revenue settlement systems. First World War, on the other hand, had given stimulation to native industry for the development of capitalism in India, which now began to penetrate into villages not only as a usurious capital but also initiated a process of throwing up a thin layer of rich peasantry, at least in some parts of the country.¹⁰⁵ This development brought greater awareness of nationalism in the widening circle of Indian people. In striking contrast to the Hindus, Muslims had not developed indigenous capitalist interests of their own, clashing with those of the British imperialists. The interests of a weak mercantile class along the West coast did not necessarily clash with those of the British. The issues like Khilafat had much greater appeal for them than awareness of national economic interests. Appreciating this situation, Gandhiji supported the Khilafat movement with an obvious anti-British thrust.

It is a little known fact of India's anti-colonial struggle that the Khilafat Committees in some parts of India were often indetical with local Congress bodies and Kisan Sabhas which attempted to establish a definite link between the demands of the

peasantry with the Khilafatists on the one hand and the attainment of *Swaraj* on the other. Summing up such aspirations Muhammad Haider sang :

Let the respect for the nation be restored;
And the trumpet of the faith heralded;
Follow Muhammad (Ali), Shaukat and Gandhi;
Adopt all that is *Swadeshi* and shun that which is from
outside;
In order to remove poverty and achieve self-reliance.¹⁰⁶

VII

The Muslims, once turned against the British on the issue of Khilafat, remained hostile to them. The rightist leadership of the Congress, on the other hand, did not want the Non-Cooperation movement to get out of hand as they feared that it could lead to uprising of the peasantry and urban workers against the landlords and capitalists. Gandhiji, therefore, on hearing the news of burning alive of 22 policemen by angry peasantry at Chauri Chaura in U.P. abruptly called off the Non-Cooperation movement while it was at its peak. The masses were disillusioned as the *Swaraj* did not come within a year as promised by Gandhiji. The whole of India was petrified. The middle classes felt frustrated and turned their energies to the unsavoury competition for loaves and fishes of office and puny power. There was, indeed, a feeling of frustration among both the Hindus and the Muslim masses whose roused passions were exploited by the religious demagogues to further their communal ends. The Moplah riots on the west coast had already frayed the tempers. As the euphoria created during the Khilafat movement steadily weaned, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, in his Presidential Address to the Muslim League on December 30, 1921, exhorted Muslims to act upon their power as a political majority in the north-west and east of India and to demand their right to self-determination. This alone, he emphasised, would ensure that Muslims live their lives as Muslims.¹⁰⁷

As a result of Gandhiji's failure to bring about the promised *Swaraj*, as also alarmed by Pan-Islamic aims of some of the Khilafatists and the communal frenzy in the wake of the Moplah riots, the Hindu Mahasabha formed in 1915 as a forum for a variety of Hindu interests, was revitalised. While at Ratnagiri jail in 1922 V.D. Savarkar advocated *Hindutva* which advanced the thesis that the Hindus, as the indigenous inhabitants of India, constituted a distinct nation. He defined a Hindu as a person who feels united by blood ties with all those whose ancestry can be traced back to Hindu antiquity and who accepts India—from the Indus river in the north, to the Indian Ocean in the south as his *Pitrubhumi* or Fatherland and *Punyabhumi* or Divineland.¹⁰⁸

Another protagonist of militant Hindu nationalism was Bhai Parmanand, who in his *Arya Samaj aur Hindu Sangathan* published in 1923 observes. "It struck me a long time ago that the only satisfactory avenue to unity is to effect complete severance between the two peoples, India could be partitioned in such a manner as to secure

the supremacy of Islam in one zone and that of Hinduism in the other.”¹⁰⁹ This was perhaps the first clear proposal for a partition of India on religious lines made by one of the founders of the Hindu Mahasabha.

The Hindu revivalist leaders called at Benares in August, 1923 a national conference attended by a broad spectrum of Hindu community. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, in his Presidential Address said, “If the Hindus made themselves strong, and the rowdy section among the Mohammadans were convinced they could not safely rob and dishonour Hindus, unity would be established on a stable basis.”¹¹⁰ Malaviya’s active participation in the *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* movements annoyed Maulana Muhammad Ali who believed, and Motilal Nehru agreed with him, that Malaviya was “out to defeat Gandhism and to become the leader of the Hindus only since he could not be a leader of both the Hindus and Muslims.”¹¹¹

The Hindu Mahasabha joined hands with the Arya Samaj and launched *Shuddhi* (purification) and *Sangathan* (solidarity) movements. As a reaction, Dr. Saifud Din Kitchlew and some extremist Khilafatists started *Tanzim* (solidarity) and *Tabligh* (propagation) movements. The extremist wing of the Khilafat leadership is reported to have said that “if you put an obstacle in the path of our *Tanzim* and do not give us our rights, we shall make common cause with Afghanistan or some other Musalman power and establish our rule in the country.”¹¹² This was perhaps one of the important, though unintended, result of extremist Muslim leaders view of nationalism and Islam.¹¹³ Maulana Muhammad Ali, however, disclaimed, any personal responsibility of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to act as the liberator of India. In 1923, he said : “If India ever needs an humble soldier to resist an aggressor, be he Muslim or non-Muslim, your comrade . . . will fill his place in the ranks. He certainly will be no deserter.”¹¹⁴

Notwithstanding this assurance, the fear psychosis in the two frustrated communities led to communal riots on an unprecedented scale. The Muslim League at its annual session at Lucknow in March, 1923 passed a resolution urging establishment of a national pact and appointed a committee to collaborate with similar bodies to be set up by other organisations.¹¹⁵ Simultaneously, Congress leaders including Chit Ranjan Das, Motilal Nehru, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Maulana Azad and Sarojini Naidu toured the affected areas and recommended intercommunal national pact in their joint statement of 4th May, 1923.¹¹⁶ Consequently a report of the Indian National Pact Committee was signed by Dr. M.A. Ansari and Lala Lajpat Rai and was presented at the Congress Cocanada Session presided over by Maulana Muhammad Ali in December, 1923. Alongwith this report was submitted the Bengal Pact prepared under the direct inspiration of C.R. Das and welcomed by Bengal Muslims, but was thrown out by the Congress by 678 votes against 458, presumably because it had sought separate electorates. The Ansari-Lajpat Rai Pact was referred back to the AICC and practically nothing was done.¹¹⁷ These pacts were disapproved by the next session of the Congress held in 1924.¹¹⁸

The disapproval of these pacts by the Congress synchronised with the abolition of the institution of the Khilafat on 5 March, 1924 by the Young Turks, led by Kamal Ata Turk, leaving the Indian Khilafatists high and dry. This proved devastating to the Khilafatist like Maulana Muhammad Ali, but Maulana Azad’s enthusiasm for Indian freedom movement remained unimpaired as he felt that the matters closer at home

now deserved greater attention.¹¹⁹ Subsequently, Maulana Azad collaborated with Motilal Nehru in combating the communal frenzy that had set ablaze the entire country. The Kohat riots grieved Gandhiji, who wrote in *Young India* on June 19, 1924, "The Musalman being generally in a minority has as a class developed into a bully.... The thirteen hundred years of imperialist expansion have made the Musalmans fighters as a body. The Hindu has an age old civilization. He is essentially non-violent I would restore the spritual culture. The best and lasting self-defence is self purification."¹²⁰

In order to resolve the communal tangle, Maulana Hasrat Mohani put forward a scheme in 1924, which rejected the idea of Dominion Status and advocated complete independence for India and promised Muslim cooperation in achieving it, provided the caste Hindus would agree to his following proposals :

- (a) to recognise the bi-communal (Hindu-Muslim) basis of the future independent state,
- (b) to convert the Muslim majority Provinces into Muslim States and the Hindu majority provinces into Hindu States, and
- (c) to create an Indian Federation of these States and place it under a supreme National Government, composed of Hindus and Muslims.¹²¹

It seems that, in advocating the scheme, he envisaged an Indian Republic on the lines of the United States of America.

Towards the end of 1924, Lala Lajpat Rai wrote a series of articles on Hindu-Muslim problem, outlining his scheme wherein he proposed that the Muslims will have four Muslim States : (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West Frontier; (2) Western Punjab; (3) Sind; and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India sufficiently large to form a Province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India."¹²²

While Bhai Parmanand and Lala Lajpat Rai were advocating India's partition on communal lines, the All Parties Conference of the representatives of the Congress, Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha, Liberal Federation and Justice Party convened by Gandhiji in January, 1925 appointed a committee of 40 members to (a) frame such recommendations as would enable all parties to join the Congress and (b) to frame a scheme for the representation of all communities on the legislative and other elective bodies and to frame a scheme of *Swaraj*. The Committee was split up into two small sub-committees. While the first sub-committee, asked to frame a report on the Constitution, submitted its report, the second sub-committee, asked to devise a scheme of communal representation, met only once and adjourned *sine die* without coming to any conclusion. Lajpat Rai and other Hindu Mahasabha representatives were not prepared to attend its meetings as they were too skeptical and suspicious of the Congress desire to arrive at some understanding with the Muslims.¹²³ The Congress, in which, according to Jawaharlal Nehru, "many a Congressman was a communalist under his national cloak"¹²⁴ genuinely aspired to be a national organisation, but at the crossroad of every constitutional dealing with the Muslims the Government, was

pulled back and influenced by the Hindu communal element inside and outside the Congress.

Gandhiji, according to Jawaharlal Nehru, "was essentially a man of religion, a Hindu to the innermost depths of his being."¹²⁵ There was nothing wrong in his being a Hindu, but he talked with a Hindu frame of reference such as *Ramaraj*, which other communities, particularly Muslims could not understand and appreciate. Though Gandhiji had much in common with the Hindu revivalists many of whom came to oppose him for his ascetic non-*Kshatriya* non-violence and his assimilationist conception of the Indian nation, which he saw as a confederation of communities. They maintained that *ahimsa* or passive non-resisting sufferance was a Christian and non-Aryan principle. It undermined Hindu self-respect and encouraged the Muslims to dominate the Hindus; what triggered their departure from the Congress was its conciliatory approach towards Muslims, which they described as appeasement.¹²⁶

It was against this background of emerging Hindu militancy that Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (d. 1940) launched at Nagpur in September, 1925 the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) as a kind of educational body to train a group of Hindu men who would work to unite the Hindus so that India could again become an independent creative society. Its founder felt that the Indian National Congress, an umbrella organisation of diverse interests, had adopted the consensual strategy and by extension the principle of territorial nationalism, had failed to protect the interests of the Hindus.¹²⁷ The Hindu revivalist leaders thought that the Muslims were not sufficiently interested in the affairs of their motherland because of their extra-territorial sympathies with their co-religionists abroad. This sympathy, however, was no different in its nature to the sympathy which some Christian nations showed towards other Christian nations in their troubles. Rebutting the theory that Muslims desired to introduce Muslim rule in India with the help of neighbouring Muslim Princes, Shaikh Abdul Qadir, presiding over the Muslim League session in 1926, observed : "This theory seems to be the product of the heated brains of a few faddists and is propagated in order to wean Hindus from nationalism and to work upon their fears for party purposes. This tendency should be deprecated with all the emphasis at our command and I hope all sensible Hindus will refuse to be misled by such mischievous propaganda."¹²⁸

The relations between the two communities were further strained at the time of the 1926 general elections to the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils. On the eve of the elections, the Swaraj Party merged itself with the Congress and Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lajpat Rai formed the Nationalist Party with the object of defeating the new entrant Swarajists programme. Initially Malaviya stood for the Central Assembly against Motilal Nehru, but afterwards withdrew and a *mahant* contested the election instead. Motilal Nehru was defeated because of the malicious propaganda against him, as he was denounced as a "beef-eater and destroyer of cows, an opponent of music before the mosque and one man responsible for stoppage of the Ramlila procession in Allahabad."¹²⁹ It was in this context that attempts were made in 1927 to solve the communal problem, which now came to revolve itself into a controversy over the question of doing away with the communal electorates and redistribution of India into homogeneous Provinces with as few Central subjects as circumstances permitted.

Prominent Muslim leaders of various groups met in Delhi on March 20, 1927 under the Presidentship of Jinnah and unanimously made the following proposals: (1) Muslim representation in Central Legislature not to be less than one-third; (2) Sind to be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a separate Province; (3) reforms to be introduced in North-West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as in any other Provinces in India; (4) in the Punjab and Bengal, the proportion of representation to be made in accordance with the population. If all these demands were accepted, the Muslims would be prepared to accept joint electorates in all the Provinces so constituted and to make to Hindu minorities in Bengal, Punjab and NWFP the same concessions that the Hindu majorities in other Provinces were prepared to make to the Muslim minorities.¹³⁰

The Congress at its Bombay session on May 15, 1927 unanimously accepted all these proposals with a minor alteration that Sind should not be separated on communal grounds but on general grounds applicable to all Provinces. The Madras session of the Congress held in December, 1927 under the Presidentship of M.A. Ansari gave full assurance to the Muslims that "their legitimate interests should be secured...by the reservation of seats in joint electorates on the basis of population in every Province and in the Central Legislature...."

Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant characterized the Madras Congress resolution "as the best and most suitable arrangement which carried with it the largest amount of support from both the communities."¹³¹ He also stated that even though reservation of seats was not "compatible with the complete independence," it had been accepted by the Hindus at a meeting of the All India Committee with the full concurrence of M.R. Jayakar and Madan Mohan Malaviya, both of whom had been Presidents of the Hindu Mahasabha.¹³²

The Delhi Proposals were also accepted by the Muslim League at its Calcutta session on December 30, 1927, which also decided to cooperate with the rest of the country in boycotting all-white Simon Commission. This was the result of the lead given by Jinnah, but Muslim League's solidarity was broken by the Punjab landlord section led by Muhammad Shafi, which was against boycott of the Simon Commission.

By boycotting the Simon Commission India had accepted the challenge of Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, to produce a Constitution acceptable to various elements in India. In accordance with the Madras Congress resolution a committee representing various political parties was constituted to draft a *Swaraj* Constitution with Motilal Nehru as Chairman. The Muslims had already been offended by the attitude of the representatives of Hindu Mahasabha who had categorically rejected the principle of reservation of seats in favour of any majority community in any Province. Shuaib Qureshi argued that the Muslims in Punjab and Bengal though in majority, were handicapped by poverty and lack of education, while the Hindus were wealthy, well educated and in control of commerce and banking with the result that the Muslim majority was reduced to a minority in the legislatures of the two Provinces.¹³³ The Hindu Mahasabha also opposed creation of new Muslim majority Provinces. They obviously considered separate electorates as lesser evil than the creation of new Muslim majority provinces.¹³⁴ The same intransigence was displayed by Hindu Mahasabha at the subsequent meetings of the All Parties Conference with

regard to the Muslim demands. The report of the Nehru Committee (published in August, 1928) recommended Dominion Status and joint electorates with reservation of seats for Muslims only where they were in minority. The All Parties Conference held at Lucknow in the same month accepted the recommendations of the Nehru Report with some amendments.

The vested interests launched a virulent agitation, particularly in Sind where the dominant Hindu mercantile community feared Muslim domination, were it to be separated from the Bombay Presidency. The Congress buckled under the pressure of Hindu Mahasabha and other communal groups and revised its decision on safeguards to be provided to Muslims. The results of the meetings of the All Parties Conference were not encouraging. Gandhiji, who did not participate in its meetings, was grieved and disapproved of the Congress resiling from its stand and exhorted its leaders that once they had 'committed' themselves to reservation of seats, they must adhere to it until they were able to evolve another formula which completely satisfied the Muslims.¹³⁵ But unfortunately his views remained unheeded.

A section of Muslim opinion though held on to the Nehru Report, there was no doubt that Muslim estrangement was growing worse than ever. The Muslim League and the Jamiatul Ulama united to oppose the Nehru Report. As decided at the Lucknow Conference, the Nehru Report was placed before All Parties National Convention held in Calcutta on December 28, 1928. Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim League and Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani on behalf of the Central Khilafat Committee put forward six amendments to the report. The Convention adopted two and rejected the remaining four. Even the Muslim leaders belonging to the Congress favoured such amendments like the desirability of residuary powers being vested in the Provinces and one third representation of Muslims in the Central Legislature. Tej Bahadur Sapru representing Liberal Federation, supported Jinnah with regard to the reservation of seats for Muslims in the Central Legislature. He told his fellow delegates, "We must, as practical statesmen, try to solve the problem and not be misled by arithmetical figures." In striking contrast to Sapru, M.R. Jayakar, speaking on behalf of Hindu Mahasabha, adopted a purely negative attitude and insisted that Jinnah represented only a small section of Muslims. Warning the fellow members he said, "If you accede to Mr. Jinnah's demands, the (Nehru) Report will be torn to pieces." Notwithstanding provocation, Jinnah, adopting a conciliatory attitude, observed, "If you do not settle this question today, we shall have to settle it tomorrow, but in the meantime our national interests are bound to suffer. We are all sons of this land....If we cannot agree, let us any rate agree to differ but let us part as friends. I once more repeat, believe me, there is no progress for India until the Musalmans and Hindus are united and let no logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of our coming to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy than to see the Hindu-Muslim union."¹³⁶

Although Provincial 'balance' was assumed to be acquired, the Nehru Report was more unitary than federal in character. The Muslim League, therefore, declined to support it. Failing to secure the Muslim League's concurrence, the convention was adjourned *sine die*. The failure of the convention was regretted even by the Congress Muslims who blamed the Hindu Mahasabha for its uncompromising attitude. Tasadduq

Sherwani deplored the 'stingy' way in which Muslim demands were dealt with at the Calcutta Convention. The failure of the Convention was attributed to the inability of the Congress leadership to stand up firmly against the pressure of the Hindu Mahasabha. Maulana Azad is reported to have written the epitaph of the Calcutta convention as follows : "The Muslims were fools to ask for safeguards and the Hindus were greater fools to refuse them."¹³⁷ Failure of the convention convinced Jinnah that the disorganised condition of the Muslims had encouraged the Congress to ignore their demands which they had once accepted. He, therefore, started emphasising the supreme need for Muslim solidarity to extract concessions from the Hindus.¹³⁸

The Nehru Report postulated Dominion Status in spite of the Madras Congress resolution of the goal of complete independence. As against this postulation of Dominion Status, All Parties Muslim Conference of U.P. meeting in November, 1928 declared that Muslims stood for the goal of complete independence, which shall necessarily take the form of a federal republic.¹³⁹ The complex constitutional negotiations were now carried on by the All India Muslim Conference established at Delhi in December, 1928. Jinnah did not attend the Muslim Conference but in March, 1929, after meeting the Conference representatives, he formulated his famous Fourteen Points which were virtually identical to the Conference demands of January 1, 1929. Technically he remained open to negotiations on the question of electorates provided the Fourteen Points were accepted. Motilal Nehru thought that Jinnah's offer did not belong to the realm of practical politics. He wrote to Gandhiji : "He (Jinnah) is simply trying to reinstate himself with his followers, by making preposterous demands. I am quite clear in my own mind that the only way to reach a compromise with the truly nationalist Muslims is to ignore Mr. Jinnah and the Ali Brothers altogether."¹⁴⁰

VIII

Jinnah's association with the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress was based on the assumption that the interests of the Hindu and Muslim bourgeoisie were identical and they could be promoted through constitutional methods. Moreover in the post-1914 period the competitive struggle between different groups of the same class was confused with religion and caste differences. While the Hindu bourgeoisie started having a say in crucial political matters, Muslim bourgeoisie were politically weak. This made Jinnah's position in Muslim politics ineffective. He, therefore, resorted to his early liberalism more and more. In the twenties he wanted to revive the spirit of the Lucknow Pact but miserably failed. He, therefore, left India and settled down in London in 1930.

The executive board of the All India Muslim Conference meeting at Simla on July 5, 1930 demanded that the community be guaranteed (1) 'a clear majority in Bengal and Punjab, (2) Sind be separated, (3) the Frontier and Baluchistan be given equal status, (4) the community be guaranteed 'adequate and effective representation in the Cabinets and public services of the country, (5) election to the Federal Assembly be by separate electorates, (6) the army and navy be speedily Indianised, and (7) the element of responsibility be introduced in the federal government.'¹⁴¹

Inspired by the resolution of the All Parties Muslim Conference held at Delhi, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal had submitted a proposal for the amalgamation of the Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind to the Nehru Committee but the same was rejected on the plea that it would lead to the creation of an unwieldy Province. Subsequently in his Presidential address to the Allahabad session of All India Muslim League held on December 29, 1930 Dr. Iqbal emphasised : "And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-land is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India."¹⁴² Iqbal thus suggested amalgam of certain North-Western Provinces with a view to provide full opportunity of cultural development to the Muslims in the coming Indian federation. He thus proposed Muslim India within federal India.¹⁴³ When Iqbal presented his address, the meeting failed to muster the requisite quorum of 75 members.¹⁴⁴ Iqbal had echoed a concept expressed by Maulana Hasrat Mohani a decade earlier at the Muslim League session on December 30, 1921.

Iqbal's vision of a consolidated North Western Muslim state stemmed in the first instance from a desire to obtain a territorial solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. He, however, expressed a concern for 'the life of Islam as a cultural force. Whilst Iqbal was willing to recognise that the survival of Islams depended upon its centralization in a specified area, he was not prepared to accept, in principle, a nationalism predicated upon territorial boundaries. Muslims, he contended, were a nation not because they occupied a particular territory but because they were bound by a common religious ideal. Thus while rejecting European nationalism, then in vogue in Turkey, as inherently incompatible with Islam universalist impulse, Iqbal was apparently prepared to set it aside in the interests of Muslims in India by advocating a form of territorial nationalism.¹⁴⁵ Six months after Iqbal's address Tofail Ahmad, an alumnus of Aligarh Muslim University, in his Tract dated 9 August, 1931, pointed out that "separate electorates which do not sit square with self-governing principle...tend to make the majority wholly independent of the minority... can never be inherent in the Constitution of a country."¹⁴⁶ So far as the protection of minorities was concerned, he suggested that "the only guarantee which can be depended upon in the future Constitution of India are those which will work automatically and without the intervention or aid of an outside agency. To my mind the real safeguards will be provided by correct redistribution of India into compact homogeneous zones autonomous in character and with a few central subjects as circumstances permit." He, therefore, proposed redistribution of linguistically homogeneous Provinces into Hindu and Muslim zones.

With the communal tangle remaining unsolved, Gandhiji launched his Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930, with the result that the British Government turned to other non-Congress parties and shifted the focus of political attention from India to Britain by holding three sessions of the Round Table Conference in London. The Congress being engaged in the Civil Disobedience, did not send any representative to the first session of the Round Table Conference held from November 12, 1930 to January 19, 1931. Among the key persons who attended the Round Table Conference

were Tej Bahadur Sapru, V.S. Srinivasa Shastri, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, Chimanlal Setalvad, Ramaswami Mudaliar, Moonje, Jayakar, Maulana Muhammad Ali, M.A. Jinnah, Muhammad Shafi, Zafarullah Khan and Agha Khan.¹⁴⁷ The Muslim attitude at the Conference revealed that the crux of the whole problem was not joint electorates or separate electorates but the reservation of seats in the majority Provinces. The argument of the Muslim leaders was that while the Hindus enjoyed power and influence in eight Provinces, the Muslims should have the same position in at least four. Once again, the Hindu-Muslim settlement was within the reach of Indian leaders, had the Hindu Mahasabha been prepared to accommodate the Muslim wishes. But Moonje had come to attend the conference fully determined to maintain his opposition to the Muslim demands until the end. Taking a cue from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs in the Punjab insisted that their interests should be protected on lines similar to those given to the Muslim minorities in other Provinces.¹⁴⁸ The first session of the Conference thus ended without the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.

On January 1, 1931 Maulana Muhammad Ali dictated from his sick-bed a letter to Ramsay MacDonald, the then Prime Minister of England, wherein he pointed out : "The real problem before us is to give full power to Musalmans in such Provinces as those in which they are in a majority, whether small or large, and protection to them in such Provinces as those in which they are in a minority, and in order to be absolutely fair to the Hindu community also, precisely the same thing must be done with the Hindus.... Unless in these few provinces Muslim majorities are established by the new Constitution, I submit, not as a threat, but as a very humble and friendly warning, there will be civil war."¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, as a result of the Gandhi-Irwin truce, the Congress withdrew the Civil Disobedience Movement and agreed to participate in the second session of the Round Table Conference held on 30 November—1 December, 1931, which too was deadlocked by the Hindu-Muslim problem. When the Indian delegates to the Conference failed to resolve the Hindu-Muslim problem among themselves, Madan Mohan Malaviya prepared a memorandum requesting the then Prime Minister of England to arbitrate and solemnly affirmed that the signatories would unquestioningly accept his award. Aware of Ramsay MacDonald's fear of creation of Muslim bloc in north India, Hindu Mahasabha delegates readily signed the memorandum as they were certain of the award going in their favour. Malaviya's memorandum was followed by Gandhiji's letter to the same effect. The Sikh and Muslim delegates refused to sign Malaviya's memorandum.¹⁵⁰ The third session of the Round Table Conference (November-December, 1932) formulated new reform proposals. The calculations of the Hindu Mahasabha delegates were upset when Ramsay MacDonald announced on August 16, 1932 the Communal Award allocating separate electorates for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans, other falling under general constituency. Separate electorates and distribution of seats were made on the lines of the Lucknow Pact of 1916. It retained weightage given to Muslims in minority Provinces. The depressed classes were assured separate constituency. Gandhiji's reaction was one of bitter opposition. He went on fast unto death on September 20, 1932. Four days later leaders of depressed classes including Dr. B.R. Ambedkar agreed *inter alia* to an

accord called the Poona Pact which provided for reservation of seats for the depressed classes in the general (Hindu) constituencies.

The communal issue still remained unresolved. As to the character of the proposed Central Government, the Hindu leaders favoured strong and unitary centre based on direct election, the minorities insisting on federal system with the maximum of provincial autonomy and indirect election to the Centre on provincial footing.

While the delegates to the Round Table Conference were deliberating over a federal Constitution, Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a post-graduate at Cambridge, who, like Iqbal, believed that the ultimate destiny of Islam as a universal principle could not be realised without the 'Islamic' dispensation of power. He issued a declaration entitled "Now or Never" on January 28, 1933 appealing "in the name of our common heritage, and on behalf of our thirty million Muslim brethren who live in PAKISTAN—by which we mean the five northern units of India viz., Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. And we ask for our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and national annihilation."¹⁵¹ Rahmat Ali pointed out that his demand was "basically different" from that of Iqbal who wanted an amalgamation of these Provinces into a single Province forming a unit of the Indian federation but his own plan for these Provinces was to have a separate federation of their own.¹⁵² This scheme was, however, dismissed as 'chimerical' and 'impractical'.¹⁵³

It was against this background that the Government of India Act 1935 was passed envisaging, Federal Executive, comprising of Councillors as well as Ministers, but they were not responsible to the Legislature, the Governor-General having the authority to ignore their advice. The federation, consisting of both British India and the Princely States, was to come into being when States, with at least half of their population, had agreed to join it. However, the princes, in spite of their weighted representation in the Council of States as well as the Assembly, were reluctant to join the federation. In the case of Provinces, the scope of autonomy was greatly expanded inasmuch as the administration was to be carried on by Indian Ministers responsible to the legislature, although in some cases the Governors had overriding powers.

While defining its policy towards the Government of India Act, 1935, the Congress had also defined its policy towards the Communal Award, which antedated the new Constitution by three years and eventually formed a part of that Constitution. The British Government had said that they would accept a substitute for any part of the Award, provided the principal parties concerned in India could devise an agreed formula. The Congress Working Committee, on 12-13 June, 1934 resolved "to explore ways and means of arriving at an agreed solution." Thereafter notwithstanding Congress disparagement of one-sided agitation against the Award, the Congress Nationalist Party, led by Madan Mohan Malaviya, continued an active campaign against the Award. The All India Muslim Conference and the Bengal Muslim Youth Conference protested against the anti-Award agitation.¹⁵⁴

In the meanwhile Jinnah, who had settled down in London, was elected unopposed in absentia to the Indian Legislative Assembly from his Bombay Urban Mohammadan constituency in the autumn of 1934. Persuaded by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, he returned to India and resumed his seat in Delhi in January, 1935 and committed to

liberalism as he was, he wanted to repeat his performance and revive the spirit of the Lucknow Pact. Jinnah, therefore, readily responded to Rajendra Prasad's initiative and held talks with him at M.A. Ansari's house in Delhi in late January and throughout February, 1935. The Congress and the League Presidents evolved a compromise formula for which Muslims voting in joint electorates would be guaranteed through reservation the same number of seats that the Communal Award gave them.¹⁵⁵ Before asking their respective organisations to ratify the compromise formula, Jinnah insisted that Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya should also approve this settlement on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha. Jinnah thought that unless the Hindu Mahasabha, the powerful Hindu organisation, accepted it, the Prasad-Jinnah formula, would fail to serve the intended purpose, since the British Government would reject it as no alternative to those provisions of the Communal Award dealing with the Hindu and Muslim representation. Malaviya rebuffed the Prasad-Jinnah formula, not only as the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, but also as the founder of the Congress Nationalist Party, which, according to Satyapal, President of the Punjab PCC, was "an euphemism for the Hindu Mahasabha reactionaries."¹⁵⁶

Jinnah, even after his talks with Rajendra Prasad had failed, was still keen on a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem. He wanted Gandhiji to show the same spirit to the Muslims as displayed by him to the depressed classes through the Poona Pact.¹⁵⁷ During 1934 and the first half of 1935, the Congress, under pressure from M.A. Ansari, Asaf Ali and some other Congress Muslims, maintained an uneasy posture of neither accepting nor rejecting the Communal Award. During the spring of 1935, a movement developed within the Congress to push it a little further on the Award by getting it to ratify the Prasad-Jinnah formula. In a letter to Bhulabhai Desai, Asaf Ali suggested; "We have missed many splendid opportunities in the past by too nice an assessment of the ideal and the real, and insisting on what can come only by actual experience. Even now we are late, too late for immediate and larger gains by our decisions, but a better understanding is sure to pave the way for substantial steps in the right direction."¹⁵⁸ All the discussion of the Congress, ratifying the Prasad-Jinnah formula, came to an end and within a few months, the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed.

This was the situation when Jawaharlal Nehru returned to India in March, 1936. Privately meeting in Europe, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose had agreed to prevent the Congress from returning to the Legislatures. Coming back to India, the Congress socialists theoretically laid more radical a foundation for Congress work. The Lucknow Congress formed committees on mass contacts and agrarian problems in April, 1936. This radical trend found reflection in the literature subsequently produced under the inspiration of the Progressive Writers Association founded in 1935 by Munshi Prem Chand. While the Congress Socialists were against contesting the elections, the Congress Nationalists meeting in mid-April, 1936 decided to contest the elections.¹⁵⁹ Khaliquzzaman, Member of the Congress Parliamentary Board, organised a Muslim Unity Front. Govind Ballabh Pant wrote to Khaliquzzaman after the Central Assembly elections of 1934, "The credit for securing the return of a good number of Nationalists to the Assembly from among the progressive Muslims belongs to you."¹⁶⁰ Subsequently Khaliquzzaman wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru, "No one can deny the Congress the right

to contest Muslim seats even during the existence of the Communal Award and separate electorates. But in the larger interests of the country, I think it would be preferable to leave the Muslims to send their representatives from their own platform. Unfortunately, I have not been able to persuade you to agree with this view."¹⁶¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, according to Asaf Ali, was naively optimistic that what he called the economic approach would solve the Hindu-Muslim problem.¹⁶² Bedrocks of Nehru's thesis were two related Marxian ideas: the real and fundamental cause of events is economic and the struggle between classes for the possession of economic strength is the motive power of history. Applying these hypotheses to the communal conflicts in India, Nehru discerned that the upper classes desire to perpetuate its own interests as all their demands related to the loaves and fishes that the British could distribute. Notwithstanding his aversion to communal organisations, Madan Mohan Malaviya always remained a special person for Nehru. Their friendship was bound together by mutual respect and sincere affection, though Malaviya was founder of the Congress Nationalist Party about which Satyapal harshly complained to Rajendra Prasad: "Under the cloak of 'unalloyed nationalism' he (Malaviya) and his supporters are digging the grave of nationalism."¹⁶³

While the Congress, with Nehru as its President, appeared to lean towards its Socialist comrades, the Muslim League was seen in some quarters as its political adversary out to destroy India's liberation struggle. Nehru thought it right to expose Muslim League's predominantly feudal character, its links with obscurantist and reactionary social classes and its close connections with the colonialist-imperialist British Government. Having been in the wilderness during the Khilafat agitation, the Muslim League was a little more than a paper organisation dominated by pro-British feudal classes in the mid-thirties. In 1935, a visiting Turkish writer rightly commented that no one talked of the Muslim League as an arbiter of Muslim destiny.¹⁶⁴

As President of Muslim League, still gasping for breath, Jinnah backed, proposal to break the communal impasse. On October 20, 1936, he observed, "If out of 80 million Muslims I can produce a patriotic and liberal-minded nationalist block, who will be able to march hand in hand with the progressive elements in other communities, I will have rendered a great service to my community." This was a reaffirmation of the Congress political creed and explains why Viceroy Willingdon thought Jinnah as 'more Congress than Congress'¹⁶⁵ and why others regarded him as an 'arch enemy' of colonialism and a rallying symbol of secularism."¹⁶⁶

In more or less, similar mould were cast Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Muhammad Ismail, for whom Jawaharlal Nehru had a warm corner. In 1936, H. Haig, the Governor of U.P., was of the view that the 'great majority of U.P. Muslims' had serious reservations about running a communal party and were keen to wrest control of the Provincial League 'so as to render the All India Muslim League nugatory.'¹⁶⁷

It was against this political scenario that the Congress and the League, berating the Act of 1935, entered the electoral arena. Despite the perceived ideological rhetoric, their electoral manifestoes had much in common. The Hindu Mahasabha's manifesto significantly decried the pro-Muslim policy of the Congress and gave a call to emulate

the examples of Afghans and Germans. (15)* The Raja of Mahmudabad recalled that "the Congress and the League were like two parts of the same army fighting a common enemy on two fronts."¹⁶⁸ In constituencies where the two were not rivals, observed the Governor of U.P., some propaganda was done for the League through the Congress organs.¹⁶⁹ A number of U.P. Muslims contested the elections on the Muslim League ticket under the vague impression that it was much the same thing as the Congress. In some places, the two parties cooperated with each other against the National Agriculturist Party of Nawab of Chhatari.¹⁷⁰

The League wanted that "Hindus and Muslims should present a united front. They must stand together for... the freedom of our motherland.... Their desire was to send best representatives to the new legislatures, who would cooperate with other progressive groups for the uplift, progress and freedom of the motherland. Jinnah felt Hindus and Muslims could settle their differences in the spirit of the Lucknow Pact and maintained that 'in spite of, separate electorate and in spite of the difficulty that faced the country, the Hindus and Muslims could join hands and form one party, provided they could agree upon a common policy and programme according to which they could work together both inside the Legislature and outside'.(1)

To the Congress, the elections provided an opportunity to intensify the struggle against imperialism. Emphasising this, Nehru is reported to have said in Calcutta on September 18, 1936, that there were only two Parties in the country, namely the Congress and the British Government and others should line up with the Congress.¹⁷¹ What Nehru intended to emphasise was that the contest in India was between two forces—the Congress as representing the will to free the nation and the British Government in India and its supporters, who opposed this urge and tried to suppress it. Although it was not aimed at the Muslim League, Jinnah, who was doing his utmost to revive the dormant Muslim League, contested Nehru's statement and said, "there is a third party in this country and that is the Muslims" (2) while Jinnah offered to cooperate with the United Congress Front but perceived "Nehru torn between Benares and Moscow. (3)" When Jinnah objected to the Congress interfering with Muslim affairs in Bengal and called upon the Congress "to let Muslims alone". Nehru retorted: "This objection and demand bear a strong family likeness to what Bhai Parmanand has often said on behalf of the Hindu communalists." (6) Jinnah clarified, "Bhai Parmanand stands for Hindu *Raj*, whereas I stand for a fully democratic responsible government for the people of India."¹⁷²

IX

The results of the elections were revealing both to the Congress and the Muslim League, but in different ways. The Congress commanded a majority in six Legislative Assemblies out of eleven and emerged as the largest party in three other Provinces, while the Muslim League, winning 109 out of 482 seats contested, failed to secure a

* Figures given in brackets refer to the number of documents published in this volume.

clear majority in any of the four Muslim majority Provinces, in spite of separate electorates and the Communal Award.¹⁷³ Except in the NWFP, the Congress was not popular with the Muslim masses. It failed to secure a single Muslim seat in Bengal, Punjab, U.P. and C.P.¹⁷⁴ The Congress, however, felt elated on its performance in the general constituencies. Cautioning Nehru, Maulana Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi, President of Majlis-i-Ahrar said, "I believe 90 per cent of the nationalist Hindus in the heart of their hearts don't want the Muslims to join the Congress, though they would not say so publicly.... They openly canvassed against Diwan Chaman Lal, who fought the Punjab Assembly election against Bhai Parmanand. The success of the Congress in, few Provinces has caused an opaque haughtiness in the Congress leadership. Now they treat others as the children of lesser gods... such things would be pernicious to the national interest. With such an insignificant victory, we have begun to think that the British have been driven out and we have become masters. You have picked up a quarrel with Mr. Jinnah on a non-issue.... The Nehru Report failed merely because of a rather unbecoming treatment meted out to Mr. Jinnah in the Lucknow Convention and today we are repeating the same mistake.... After so many years the environment is becoming amiable once again.... Ideologically Mr. Jinnah is near to you. He is a moderate. None is better than him. Please try to bring him closer to you (18)."

Maulana Habibur Rahman's criticism of the Congress euphoria over its electoral victory found support from Herbert William Emerson, Governor of Punjab, who in his letter of May 22, 1937 to Linlithgow commented : "Congress arrogance is increasing the apprehension among Muslim of Hindu domination, and communal feelings will soon reach a dangerous level. Congress may be able to get a few adherents among Muslims, but every success in this direction will strengthen the feeling of Muslims as a community against them (75)."

The Ahrar leader obviously wanted Nehru to appreciate the feelings of an estranged suave, eclectic and secular Jinnah, tutored in the liberal traditions of Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale and bring him back to the Congress fold. As a Legislator, a role suited to his style and temperament, Jinnah generally initiated and backed proposals to break communal impasse and acted in unison with the Congress. The League under Jinnah was then not considered a counter-force to the Congress by the veteran Ahrar leader.¹⁷⁵

Maulana Habibur Rahman was obviously hinting at the impressive performance of the Congress as against the dismal show of the Muslim League in the assembly elections. Of the 1585 seats allocated to the Provincial Assemblies, Congress won 716, while the Muslim League won only 109 out of 482 seats reserved for Muslims and represented no more than 4.8 per cent of the total Muslim electorate. This clearly demonstrated that Sikandar Hayat Khan's Unionist Party in the Punjab, Fazlul Haq's Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars in NWFP were determined to continue their traditions of inter-communal co-operation which had tended, on the whole, to benefit them immensely. In the faction-ridden Sind, Muslim notables found it difficult to rally round a political party as feeble as the Muslim League.¹⁷⁶

The election results also proved that neither the Congress nor the League could

claim to represent Muslims. The Congress failed to secure a single Muslim seat in Bengal, Punjab, C.P. and U.P. The Muslim League was also not in a position to form a government on its own in any Muslim majority Province.

In these circumstances the only option open for the Muslim League was to co-operate with other like-minded political parties. In a Press interview on February 28, 1937 Jinnah said, "Muslims have every reason to be congratulated on this achievement after a work of only a few months. It is upto them now to organise throughout India and to take their proper place and share in the administration and governance of the Provinces and the country. The constitution and policy of the League do not prevent us. On the contrary, it is part and parcel of our basic principles that we are free and ready to cooperate with any group or party from the very inception or inside the Legislature, if the basic principles are determined by common consent(26)."

Overwhelmed by 'big' and 'enormous' Congress electoral victory, Nehru in his letter of February 22, 1937 to Stafford Cripps, pointed out that the poor performance of the Congress in the special Muslim electorate was "partly due to our own timidity as we ran few Muslim candidates. (24)" Analysing the electoral results, Nehru observed on March 19, 1937, "We have too long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them. That is a discredited policy and I trust that we shall not revert to it. And yet some people still talk of the Muslims as a group dealing with Hindus or others as a group, a medieval conception which has no place in modern world. We deal with economic groups to-day and the problems of poverty and unemployment and national freedom are common for the Hindus, the Muslims, the Sikhs and the Christians. (36)" It is a strange coincidence that on the following day (20 March) Jinnah congratulated the Right wing Congress leaders for having carried the Congress with them : "They have adopted a formula which is practically the same as adopted by the All India Muslim League—Now, struggling as we are for national Self-Government, perhaps it will be easier for the All India Muslim League Party to cooperate with other progressive Parties as the Congress is also lined up. It is no use encouraging an individual Musalman to come into the fold of the Congress for the sake of a prize. (38)" Iqbal reacted to Nehru's statement in a different way. He advised Jinnah to convene an All India Muslim convention of Muslim MLA's and other prominent Muslims in Delhi and re-state clearly the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country... "From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem. (37)" Jinnah was not moved by Iqbal's advice. Jinnah had done nothing during the last week of March, 1937 to change his anti-British, pro-nationalist posture in the eyes of moderate and Right wing Congress leaders, whose ascendancy in the AICC resolution of March 17, 1937, moved by Rajendra Prasad and seconded by Sardar Patel, recommending conditional acceptance of office to fight the new Constitution, had assured Jayaprakash Narayan's amendment, advising non-acceptance of office, was defeated by 78 votes to 127.¹⁷⁷ It also decided against Congress-League Coalitions. The Formula devised by Gandhiji was, adopted authorising formation of Congress Ministries on condition that "the Governor will not use his special powers of interference, or set aside the office of Ministers in regard to their constitutional activities."

The Governors pleaded inability to divest themselves of "certain obligations" which the Parliament had conferred upon them. Linlithgow, in his letter of March 8, 1937 to the Governor of Madras, stressed the special responsibility of Governors to safeguard minorities interests. (32) There ensued a constitutional deadlock, and to "conceal" this "breakdown," interim Ministries were set up on the inauguration of the new Constitution on April 1, 1937. Nawab of Chhatari agreed to form an interim Ministry in U.P and the Bihar Muslim Independent Party's working committee offered support to M. Yunus to form a Ministry in Bihar. But Jinnah did not permit A.M.K. Dehlavi, League leader, to form Ministry in Bombay. Khaliquzzaman, former Congressman, who had been elected leader of Muslim League, refused office in U.P. Before declining the offer, Khaliquzzaman had consulted Pant.¹⁷⁸

The Hindu Mahasabha was deadly opposed to any Congress-League rapprochement since the days of the Lucknow Pact. It acted purposefully and effectively through some of the Congress leaders, who themselves were firmly anchored in the Hindu revivalist traditions and were deeply suspicious of the Congress-League entente. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and other Right wing Congressmen constantly urged B.S. Moonje, the architect of the Hindu Mahasabha, to stand firm on a variety of points in the interest of Hinduism,¹⁷⁹ Sardar Patel, as Chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Committee, was against any coalition with the Muslim League: His experience of Ahmedabad Municipality election had convinced him that the Muslims, elected by separate electorates, would join the Congress at the time of Ministry-formation.¹⁸⁰ Moderates like Rajendra Prasad also thought in early March, 1937, that coalition was not possible, because the object of the Congress was to 'wreck' the Constitution, while the League was committed to working it.¹⁸¹

Equally opposed were the Congress Socialists to any cooperation between the Congress and Muslim League. Jayaprakash Narayan considered the Congress apathy in fighting the Muslim seats "one of the major mistakes in the election,"¹⁸² Z.A. Ahmad of the Political and Economic Information Department of the AICC took U.P. Congressmen to task for supporting a thoroughly communal organisation such as the Muslim League. K.M. Ashraf and Syed Abdullah Brelvi felt that Congressmen should wash their hands of pacts and alliances with Jinnah and others.¹⁸³

Abdul Wali of Barabanki, in his letter of March 28, 1937, apprised Jawaharlal Nehru that during the course of conversation between him and Khaliquzzaman it transpired that "a scheme is being hatched with the help of Pantji (Govind Ballabh Pant) and Mohanlal (Saksena) to bring about a coalition between the Congress and the League in the Assembly. To tell you the truth I am deadly against it. (39)" Concurring with Abdul Wali, Nehru observed, "I am entirely opposed to this, as I am opposed to all pacts and coalitions with small groups at the top. So far as I know, my colleagues of the Congress Working Committee are also opposed to it. Abul Kalam Azad, who is here at present, also definitely opposes it. (41)" Pulling up Pandit Pant, Nehru wrote, "I am personally convinced that any kind of pact or coalition between us and the Muslim League will be highly injurious. (43)"

Encouraged by the amicable manner in which the elections had been contested by both the Congress and Muslim League, Pandit Pant, Premier-designate of the Congress in U.P., and Khaliquzzaman, leader of the Provincial Muslim League

Parliamentary Board, started discussions for the formation of Ministry in U.P.¹⁸⁴ When the Nawab of Chhatari constituted the Interim Ministry in April, 1937, H.G. Haig, Governor of U.P., commented "The Premier tried to secure the adhesion of the Muslim League, whose leader is Khaliquzzaman, a man very anxious for office, and who has been in close negotiation recently with the Congress, from whose views he is not very far apart. Khaliq refused to join Chhatari, his reason being that the new Ministry could not last more than four months and that any who joined it would be politically discredited. (45)" It was in this context that clarifying his position Pandit Pant replied to Nehru, "I saw him (Khaliq) on the evening of the 29th, after the acceptance of office by the Congress had been finally ruled out. I did not like the idea of the Muslim League cooperating with any Ministry and got the desired assurance from Khaliq. I had a long talk with him and stressed the need and the advisability of the nationalist Musalmans merging themselves in the Congress... He has well nigh agreed to do so but wanted to examine the matter further before taking an irrevocable decision. The matter was discussed orally and some letters were also exchanged between Mohanlal (Saksena) and Khaliq. I think this was done to avoid a conflict with the Muslim League at Bahraich and to prepare the ground for future action." (48) Nehru however, resented any pact with the Muslim League. This is confirmed by Minoo Masani who tells us that he was having a breakfast with Nehru in Allahabad when Sayed Mahmood came in from Lucknow and reported on the discussions some of the Congress Muslims had had with Khaliquzzaman, who had suggested that a couple of Muslim leaders be taken into the cabinet to be nominated, so that Muslims of the United Provinces might not be left out of the administration of the provinces." At this point, Jawaharlal lost his temper and in "somewhat choice and colourful Hindustani, he swore not only at the Muslim League leader, (Khaliq), but also at poor Sayed Mahmood for having carried such an outrageous message."¹⁸⁵

In the post-election scenario, the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, was anxious to arrive at a long-range political settlement like the Lucknow Pact, but the Congress wanted a merger and not coalition. This had been implied as early as January 1937 and explicitly from March onwards. Jinnah and other League leaders were not prepared to merge their organisation with the Congress. They criticised the Congress attempts to divide Muslim ranks. In a statement to the Press on April 19, 1937 Jinnah said, "This sort of game of dividing the two great sister communities by such methods has been the historical misfortune of India, with the result that we are now saddled with the foreign domination; further efforts by the Congress in the same direction to divide and rule Muslims will only lead to an indefinite stay of that domination.... We are prepared to cooperate as equals, but we will not submit to dictation or subjugation. (53)"

In a rejoinder on May 2, 1937 Nehru said, "In so far as religious and cultural and linguistic rights are concerned (and these are generally considered to be the basic minority rights), these have been amply safeguarded by the Congress as far as solemn declarations can safeguard them. There may be other questions which require consideration and certainly occasions have arisen in the past and will arise in future in this imperfect world, when political adjustments are desirable with regard to minorities. The Congress is fully alive to this and is always ready, when such occasions

offer themselves, to help bringing about such an adjustment. But political adjustments must be in consonance with a basic political policy. (68)”

Maulana Shaukat Ali advised Nehru to get in touch with ‘the people who count’ and ‘talk things over with Jinnah’ and follow the example of Sikandar Hayat Khan who, with his party in an overwhelming majority in the Punjab, offered men like Raja Narendranath (Hindu Mahasabha leader), Choudhary Chhotu Ram (Unionist Party) and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia (Khalsa National Party) seats in his Cabinet—men who really count in their respective communities. (54)”

Even when Congress-League relations were rapidly deteriorating during the summer of 1937, Maulana Shaukat Ali and A.M.K. Dehlavi in Bombay and Khaliquzzaman in U.P. wanted to cooperate with the Congress in coalition Ministries. The U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board even passed a resolution on April 26, 1937 to the effect that “it is not possible for the Muslim League Parliamentary Board or the members elected on its ticket to join the Congress in its policy of wrecking the Constitution, but can cooperate with the Congress or any other progressive party in the Legislature, whose policy and programme are approximately the same as those of this Board. (62)” The organisers of the U.P. Muslim Congressmen meeting at Allahabad and the U.P. Provincial Ahrar Conference assembling at Lucknow on April 26, 1937, asked the Muslims to join the Congress in order to ameliorate the condition of the Muslim masses. They pointed out that “Mr. Jinnah refused to see or acknowledge the revived urge of the Muslims of India for freedom and national struggle. In fact he characterises all such tendencies as betrayal of Muslim interests. (65-66)”

Alarmed by these decisions of Muslim Congressmen and Ahrars, Jinnah warned the Muslims against “taking a leap in the dark by joining the Congress.” (69) As a rejoinder to Nehru on May 2, 1937 Jinnah said : “Some Congress leaders have been asserting that there is no Hindu-Muslim question and that the minorities problem does not exist in India. He (Nehru) says, ‘Personally I find it difficult to think of any question on communal lines.’ That may be so, but 99 per cent of the people who surround him not only think on communal lines but their words and their deeds speak eloquently. I am glad that the (Congress) President, to put it in his own words, attaches the greatest importance to the building up of a united India and of resolving differences and suspicions which unfortunately separate sometime various religious groups.” I have repeatedly said that if the Congress or any other party is willing to cooperate, our hand is there to the extent that we can agree for the better mind of Hindus and say that proceeding on the lines of alliances and honourable settlement as equals is a surer course and a path towards a united front, which will alone win freedom for India. (70)” In another statement Jinnah said, “Democratic full-responsible Government means the rule of the majority and before a stable Government is possible, the minorities problem should be adjusted... Congressmen say that the question before the country is economic, namely poverty and hunger. It seems to me that this is putting the cart before the horse. This policy and a plea of hunger and poverty may succeed temporarily for the reasons are obvious. The Muslim League is justified in its demand from the majority community, for what is the position of the 60 million of depressed classes in India today, who have been refused even their elementary rights. (71)” Jinnah wanted to make the Hindus realise that without

the cooperation of the Muslims the fight for freedom would be futile. His idea was to form a progressive, independent, nationalist group to work with the Congress for the common good of the country. He had always been prepared for an honourable settlement, but finding no way to further that objective, he decided to strengthen the Muslim League. (76)”

The Muslim League, in fact, had offered to cooperate with the Congress in Bombay, provided two of its nominees were included in B.G. Kher cabinet. It was suggested to Jinnah that the League’s nominees would have to accept the Congress discipline so long as they were Ministers and also accept the principle of joint responsibility.¹⁸⁶ Jinnah wanted Congress-League coalition in Bombay Legislative Assembly, where Muslim League had secured 18 seats, with the Congress winning 85 and Independent Muslims 12. It was only in Bombay that there was a discussion for forming a real coalition Government. Jinnah had made in July 1937 by a direct and indirect approach to B.G. Kher, K.M. Munshi, Sardar Patel, and Maulana Azad and even Gandhiji.¹⁸⁷ He did not speak to Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad and Gandhiji direct. He sent that ubiquitous intermediary, Sir Cowasjee Jehangir to see Sardar Patel and to Maulana Azad and ask B.G. Kher to talk to Gandhiji. Sardar Patel and K.M. Munshi evidently, thought that Congress-League coalition was undesirable. B.G. Kher may well have been anxious to oblige Jinnah. But was obviously overruled.¹⁸⁸ He then acted as an intermediary between Jinnah and Gandhiji, but the latter regreted his inability to intervene. Gandhiji wrote to Jinnah on May 22, 1937 : “Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever, only I see no light out of the impenetrable darkness, and in such distress I cry out to God for light. (74)” In the meanwhile, the Interim Ministry in Bombay was likely to be defeated on the budget proposals and an alternative Ministry was to be formed. Muslim League offered to Brabourne, Governor of Bombay, to form a Ministry with the help of B.R. Ambedkar and his Party, but Brabourne thought that the alternative lay between Congress or Section 93, under which the Governor could assume power. Jinnah subsequently apprised Brabourne of his plans for consolidating the Muslim League throughout India... and to teach Muhammadans... to stand on their own feet and make themselves independent of the Hindus.” Jinnah assured Brabourne that he was as keen as ever to work for provincial autonomy and more firmly than ever against Federation. (85)

Gandhiji’s helplessness to intervene, as communicated to Jinnah, was due to the policy he was following at that time. Criticising this policy, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Unionist leader, pointed out on June 11, 1937, “He (Gandhiji) devises a formula which, if accepted and rigidly applied, would have the effect of giving the Right Wing of the Congress the power to deal with the minorities as it likes. This Right Wing of the Congress represented by Rajagopalachari, Babu Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and others stands for a certain culture no less than for a certain political policy. This school of thought has no use for those Godless ideals of Bolshevism, which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and his comrades have borrowed from Russia. Yet Mahatma Gandhi prevents his real party, which commands an overwhelming majority in the Congress, from repudiating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and allows the Pandit to strut on the platform of the Congress as its

President and impose upon it his slogans. Here is threefold policy consisting of (1) an offer on behalf of the Right Wing of the Congress to the British Government to work the Constitution; (2) an attempt to keep Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in prominence and to allow him to go ahead with his extremist slogans of wrecking the Constitution and combating British Imperialism; and (3) a formula which is calculated to turn the minorities in the Congress-dominated Provinces into political *shudras*. (89)"

Apprehending the increasing influence of the Congress Right Wing, the Muslims in the Punjab suggested holding of North-West India Muslim Conference in order to discuss the redistribution of the country. In his letter of June 21, 1937 Iqbal wrote to Jinnah : "The Congress President (Nehru) has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, i.e. the Mahasabha, who I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus, had declared more than once that a united Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to peaceful India is redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities.... A separate federation of Muslim Provinces re-formed on the lines I have suggested above is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination, just as other nations in India and outside India are? Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought, at present, to ignore Muslim minority Provinces. (92)"

Jinnah was aware of the ground realities, cognizant as he was of the fact that Muslim League's position in the Muslim majority Provinces of North-West India and Bengal was weaker than that in the Muslim minority Provinces. He was obviously keen to form Congress-League coalitions in Bombay and U.P. His attempts in this direction were frustrated by the Congress Right Wing. Jinnah encouraged formation of Congress-League coalition in U.P., but some U.P. Congress leaders, including Pandit Pant and Mohanlal Saxena, were anxious for the League to merge with the Congress. Pandit Pant had, in fact, got a firm promise from Khaliquzzaman that he would join the Congress.¹⁸⁹ He hoped other "Nationalist Muslims," in the Muslim League would do likewise, but all the Congress leaders were not in favour of Muslim League's merger with the Congress. Muslim Congress leaders opposed the merger because that would lessen their chances of becoming Ministers.

In order to make his own policy on the question of League-Congress alliance clear, Jinnah went to Lucknow sometime early in May 1937. He attended the meeting of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, which decided not to amalgamate their organization with the Congress (73) and to launch a Muslim mass contact campaign. He hoped that the Congressite Muslims meeting at Allahabad would not decide to approach the Muslims direct. The Allahabad Conference of U.P. Muslims on 15 May, 1937 unanimously decided that the only right and correct attitude for Muslims to act upon and adopt was to unconditionally join the Congress and participate in the struggle for freedom. Khwaja Abdul Majid of Aligarh and Syed Wazir Hasan, President of Muslim League Bombay Session of 1936, decided to join hands with them. On 20 June, 1937 Syed Wazir Hasan in a statement said, "I have insisted all along upon joining the Congress and have not suggested cooperation.... A bare cooperation

must always leave crevices through which adverse influences may creep in and either kill cooperation altogether, or make it so weak as to render it of no value whatsoever. Another reason is that for the purpose of carrying on political and constitutional agitation to a successful end, it is always of immense advantage that there should be one united front and one platform, which is presented by such a powerful well-organised and disciplined body as the Indian National Congress. (91)" Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani and Khaliquzzaman found it impossible to dominate the League and so they decided to work in the Congress. On 25 May, 1937 Syud Hussain wrote to Jinnah : "You must have read what Mr. Khaliq & Co., did in the Congress meeting at Lucknow. It is disgraceful. (78)"

Towards the end of June, 1937 a little before the Congress Working Committee meeting, when the chances of forming Congress Ministry had increased, Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan made an approach to the Congress and pointed out that their Parliamentary Board had offered cooperation to the U.P. Congress Party in March, 1937 on the basis of the Wardha Programme, as laid down by the Congress Working Committee. Nehru and Maulana Azad knew nothing about this till it was vaguely hinted by Pandit Pant at Wardha early in July, 1937. Subsequently, when Maulana Azad went to Lucknow, he saw Khaliquzzaman, who told him that he was practically prepared to give him a blank cheque provided two of their members were included in the Ministry—himself and Nawab Ismail Khan, President of the U.P. Board. Maulana Azad felt attracted by the possibility of the whole Muslim League being practically absorbed by the Congress. (106)

In the meanwhile, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Mohan Lal Saxena wanted to know from Khaliquzzaman what would happen if the Muslim League Party refused to accept his leadership. Khaliquzzaman told them that "in that event the League would certainly go against the declared policy of the Parliamentary Board as contained in its manifesto and I will have no hesitation fighting another election on that issue, though I am confident that I shall be able to carry the Party (with me) on this matter. (95)" Alluding to the struggle going on in his mind, Khaliquzzaman confided to Nehru on June 29, 1937, "I am torn between two loyalties. I have not yet been able to find a solution. (95)" Subsequently when Maulana Azad went to Lucknow early in July, 1937, he met Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan and offered terms for agreeing to be subjected to Congress discipline. They were required to dissolve the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and not to put up League candidates to oppose the Congress candidates. (116) In a note added to the Congress Party's terms, Maulana Azad expressed the hope that if these terms were agreed to and the Muslim League group of members joined the Congress Party as full members, that group would cease to exist as a separate one. In the formation of the Provincial Cabinet, it was considered proper that they should have representatives. (117)" Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan assured Maulana Azad that they would not only cooperate with the Congress, but would fully support the Congress programme. They naturally expected that the Muslim League would have some share in the new Government. The local position was such that neither of them could enter the Government alone. Either both would have to be taken, or none. Maulana Azad, therefore, held out hopes that both would be taken into the Government.¹⁹⁰ What Maulana Azad meant

was that the Muslim League group, while joining the Congress and agreeing to be subjected to its discipline, might still remain members of the Muslim League just as Congressmen were sometimes Mahasabhaites.

Nehru disliked bargaining for seats in the Ministry. Moreover, he feared adverse reaction among the Congressmen in general and Congress Muslims in particular and yet the alternative was worth having if it could be secured. This was the winding up of the Muslim League group in U.P. and its absorption in the Congress. After discussion with Acharya Narendra Deo and Acharya Kripalani, Member of Congress Working Committee, it was decided that stringent conditions should be offered and if they were accepted *in toto*, then the Congress should agree to two Ministers from their group. Meanwhile rumours had spread that the Congress was having talks with the League. There was consternation among Congressmen in general and Congress Muslims in particular. Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani of Jamiatul Ulama, who had recently resigned from the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, sent a special messenger opposing the move. (106) When Maulana Azad returned to Allahabad, he found that Nehru had already written to Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan that only one of them could be taken into the Ministry. The decision as to who should be taken rested with the Muslim League Party, but neither was in a position to join alone. They, therefore, declined Nehru's offer. Purshottamdas Tandon according to Maulana Azad, had taken a leading part in the whole affair. Maulana Azad's attempts to persuade Nehru and Gandhiji to modify the decision were in vain. He told Nehru that his action would give a new lease of life to the Muslim League. Nehru argued that with a strength of only 26, the Muslim League could not claim more than one seat in the Cabinet.¹⁹¹ This finds confirmation from Maulana Ahmad Said's letter of August 19, 1937 to Khaliquzzaman stating "the Congress was ready to give one seat, but you were not prepared to leave Nawab Ismail Khan behind and there was no room for him."¹⁹²

In fact, by July 1937, the political scenario had completely changed. The League section in the Muslim League Parliamentary Board favourable to the Congress had changed. Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Jamiatul Ulama spokesman on the League Parliamentary Board, had already deserted the Muslim League as stated above. Of its remaining six members, the Raja of Salimpur had resigned and joined the minority Interim Ministry of Nawab of Chhatari. Both Maulana Shaukat Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad, who were faithful to Jinnah, Nehru and others in the Congress became less and less certain that the proposed semi-merger was desirable or could last, they allowed the negotiations with Khaliquzzaman to peter out. On July 19, 1937 Pandit Pant wrote to Nehru : "The Muslim League being practically out of the field now, we have to find out a competent and dependable member from that community." Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani sent a letter to Pandit Pant strongly recommending the name of Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim. (103)

These moves of the Congress further embittered Jinnah. In a statement on July 28, 1937 he said : "Those few waverers who are ready or about to betray us for jobs need not seek excuses or loopholes to justify their threatened secession from the All India Muslim League. They may go, but those members of the League, if they have a shred of conscience left, should tender their resignations and contest the seats again on

Congress ticket. To those who suffer from defeatist mentality I say, have courage and faith, *Delhi dur ast*; and I say to all Musalmans of India to organise, consolidate and establish solidarity and unity. Service, suffering and sacrifice are absolutely essential conditions before we can achieve anything big and secure our rightful place in the national life of our country." (114)

Pandit Pant was somewhat reluctant to include Hafiz Ibrahim in his Cabinet. On July 20, 1937 he wrote to Nehru, "He is so far the solitary member of the Congress who has deserted the League, on whose ticket he was elected and his selection as a Minister can be easily connected with the breach of the Muslim ticket, which alone has enabled him to transfer his allegiance from the League to the Congress." (104)

By disdaining political pacts with the Muslim League the Congress contributed to widening communal cleavage. When the Congress refused to form Ministries in March 1937, the British Government stressed in a review to the newspapers the rejection of office in the six Hindu Provinces and its acceptance in the other five Muslim ones.¹⁹³ The dicotomy received its greatest publicity in the broadcast speech during late March 1937, of Lord Lothian who said he feared "an estrangement between Muslim India, which was willing to accept the responsibility (of office) and Hindu India, which is not."¹⁹⁴ Such actions of the British Government naturally exacerbated communal feelings. What further widened the communal divide was the attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha, which was quick to note, as an unsavoury by-product of the Congress refusal of office, the appointment of two Muslims and one Parsi as chief Ministers.¹⁹⁵ Congress demand for assurance was depicted by Linlithgow as a first step towards Hindu domination over the minorities.¹⁹⁶ This was certainly unjust to Gandhiji and the Left Wing of the Congress, as they had not foreseen the communal implications of their Wardha resolution, nor had they been able to control during April to July 1937, many events that widened the communal divide. Discussing this political impasse with the Bombay newspaper correspondents, Gandhiji on June 2, 1937 said that the Congress was awaiting a gesture from the Government. This was described as a 'climb-down' by K.V. Reddi. Linlithgow responded by issuing on June 21, 1937 a statement interpreting the Constitution on special powers of the Governors. Thereafter the Congress Working Committee meeting at Wardha on July 5-8, 1937, resolved to assume office. In July 1937, therefore, on the basis of the 'gentleman's agreement' Congress Ministries were formed in six Provinces where it held absolute majority. Soon after, the accession of eight non-Congress members enabled the formation of a Congress Ministry in the NWFP and later still, Congress coalition Governments were formed in Assam and Sind. While in the remaining British Indian Provinces of Punjab the Unionist Ministry and in Bengal the Proja Party-League coalition had come into existence in March 1937.

X

The Congress succeeded in forming Ministries in Provinces including U.P. but the coalition issue cast an ugly shadow. The Bundelkhand by-election held in July 1937 served as a morale booster to the League, as it succeeded in defeating the

Congress candidate. In fact, it had been a trial of strength between the Congress and the League. Nehru took personal interest in this contest. On July 13, 1937, he wrote to Gandhiji, "Then there is the cry of 'Islam in danger' and this is being exploited to the utmost by Shaukat Ali and some others." (102) In this election, communal colour was introduced when Muslims were exhorted to vote for the Muslim League candidate in the name of Islam and for its honour. The Congress was also accused of using only Muslim volunteers to campaign for its candidate, who happened to be a Muslim.¹⁹⁷ Finding itself unable to effect much through Legislatures, the Muslim League was tempted to create unrest and disturbances outside the Legislatures and there was no doubt that the Muslim League had set itself deliberately to this policy.¹⁹⁸ Maulana Shaukat Ali, addressing a mass meeting of Muslims on July 22, 1937, after Friday prayers at Delhi Jama Masjid, reiterated that what Muslims wanted was an honourable understanding with the majority community, not political slavery. They could only achieve an honourable understanding by closing their own ranks.... He appealed to the Muslims to join the League in their thousands and to revive the Khilafat Committee." (111).

The President of the Congress, Nehru, admitted that in the recent elections "only in regard to the Muslim seats did we lack success...we failed because we had long neglected working among Muslim masses and we could not reach them in time."¹⁹⁹ They were beginning to get out of the rut of communalism and were thinking along economic lines. (24) Z.A. Ahmad and K.M. Ashraf also believed that the Congress must emphasise on the economic interests.²⁰⁰ This campaign received an impetus from the Jamatul Ulama, Majlis-i-Ahrar, Jamiatul Ansar, Jamatul Quresh and All-India Shia Political Conference.²⁰¹ Congress campaign to contact the Muslim masses over his head seriously alarmed Jinnah, who felt that the Congress move was calculated to divide, weaken and break the Muslims and was an effort "to detach them from their accredited leaders."²⁰²

Speaking at Ahmedabad on September 19, 1937, Nehru said : "The Hindu-Muslim question is a question of the upper classes and not of the masses. Both Hindu and Muslim masses are steeped in poverty, which can be removed from both simultaneously and not separately." (125) The campaign launched by the Congress secured a fair measure of success in some parts of U.P., Bihar, Bengal and the Punjab, but it failed to have any significant impact in rural areas. This was due to limited nature of Congress mobilization. In mid-1938, K.M. Ashraf conceded that the campaign in various Provinces was totally disorganized and that no substantial effort was made for coming in direct contact with the Muslim masses.²⁰³ The chief protagonists of the campaign in U.P., Bihar and NWFP were Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Syed Mahmud, N.A.K. Sherwani, Abdul Majid Khwaja, K.M. Ashraf, Zakir Husain, Ansar Harvani, Ali Sardar Jafari and Hayatullah Ansari, all of whom were either alumini of the Aligarh Muslim University or connected with it. While the *ulama* of Deoband and the Jamiatul Ulama joined forces with the Congress, the *ulama* of the Barelvi and Firangi Mahal Schools mounted the band wagon of the Muslim League, which had by this time already won over to its side Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani—two distinguished colleagues of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani of the Deoband Seminary. Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi, theologian-politician and founder of Jamiat-i-

Islami, indited the Jamiatul Ulama for its acquiescence in the mass contact campaign that was directed towards the 'total disintegration' of the Muslim community and was intended to subvert the faith of the Muslim masses and to convert them to Marxism.²⁰⁴

Equally bitter criticism of the Muslim mass contact campaign came from the Congress Right Wing leaders. Pandit Pant, Chief Minister of U.P., argued that it was not necessary to lay emphasis on the Muslim mass contact and advised Nehru that Congress should stick to its old policy and creed of representing the masses of India, regardless of caste and creed."²⁰⁵ Morarji Desai, in his letter of 26 June, 1937 to K.M. Ashraf, pointed out that it was neither 'expedient' nor 'prudent' to implement the Muslim mass contact scheme in Gujarat, on the plea that there were no Muslim workers through whom the work could be done.²⁰⁶ Acharya J.B. Kripalani, General Secretary of the Congress, in his letter of 7 January, 1939, pulled up Riyazul Mustafa of Bulandshahr for subscribing himself as 'the Secretary of the Muslim Mass Contact Committee' as 'there was no such thing in the Congress' and instructed the U.P. Pradesh Congress Committee to ensure that 'such committees are disbanded.'²⁰⁷ The entire campaign was allowed to peter out when Nehru ceased to be the Congress President, as it was considered to be his brainchild. On 7 July, 1939, Nehru wrote to Rajendra Prasad, "The Mass Contact Committees have been replaced by Minorities Committee." (417) The opposition emanating from the Right Wing of the Congress was symptomatic of the ideological cleavage with Nehru and his emerging Left Wing supporters. The Right Wing apprehended that the success of the Muslim mass contact would further bolster Socialist Nehru's image and provide him with solid base among the Muslim masses, as was the case with Gandhiji during the Khilafat Movement.

While the Muslim Mass Contact campaign ended in whimper, Nehru continued to doubt Muslim League's capability to function on a political plane. He "considered it to be only a religious body and stressed that the time had past when religious groups as such could take part in the political and economic struggle. That may have been so in medieval times; it is inconceivable to-day." (68) Nehru also refused to accept the Muslim League as the representative organisation of the Muslims. In his letter of July 1, 1937 to Khaliquzzaman he said : "Why should I accept it as the representative of the Muslims of India when I know it represents the handful of Muslims at the top who deliberately seek refuge in the name of religion in order to avoid discussing mass problems?... Do you not see that this communal policy, which the Muslim League here has fathered, is a policy more injurious to the Muslims of India than anything that a majority could do would be." (98)

This attitude of the Congress President (Nehru) was not unjustified at that point of time, when Muslim League was weak and disorganised, as reflected in the results of recent elections. Jinnah's influence was also at a low ebb. After his first meeting with the Indian leaders, in mid-August, 1937 Linlithgow had gathered the impression that Jinnah did not command the full allegiance of his followers. Jinnah had himself mentioned to the Viceroy the risk of Muslims being driven into the 'arms' of the Congress because of the weak position of the League.²⁰⁸ This assessment of the Viceroy was not inconsistency with the ground realities. Apart from the Congress Muslims, the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Jamiatul Ulama were cooperating with the Congress. The youth of Aligarh Muslim University was exasperated with the Muslim League. The Shia

Conference also supported the Congress. On June 20, 1937, Syed Wazir Hasan pleaded for a united front of all anti-imperialist forces. (91)

Addressing a huge meeting of Bareilly citizens on July 30, 1937, Syed Wazir Hasan said, "No other organisation except the Indian National Congress can speak on behalf of eight crores Musalmans. And no amount of mud-throwing by the liberals and Muslim Leaguers and Mahasabhaitees can snatch from it its great representative character." Presiding over All India Shia Political Conference at Lucknow on October 11-12, 1937, Syed Wazir Hasan pointed out, "I am convinced that the so-called problem of the minorities is a creation of British imperialists and it is always used as a weapon to impede the progress of nationalism in this country...." The communalists amongst the Hindus were as much obstructive as communalists amongst the Muslims. The Congress had thus to fight the battle of freedom on three fronts viz., British imperialists, Hindu communalists and Muslim communalists." (135)

XI

Jinnah did realise that the Muslim League did not represent the entire Muslim community and was a preserved conclave of titled and conservative people. He employed his consummate political skill to establish the political identity for his community by widening its mass base. In an appeal on June 5, 1937 he said, "For the upliftment and advancement of Musalmans and working for their welfare, much work remains to be done in the political, economic and social spheres of life by establishing different centres in India for supplying up-to-date information and knowledge and establishing relief centres to aid and assist Muslims in different parts of India.²⁰⁹

Jinnah wanted the Muslim League to mobilise Muslim masses so as to enable it to fight for freedom with the Congress as equals. On September 18, 1937 at Simla he said, "There is no difference between the ideal of the Muslim League and that of the Congress...the ideal being complete freedom for India... but at the same time I hold that the realities must be faced. There can be no solution if people continue to believe in the principle of 'acquisition first and distribution afterwards,' or in the latest dictum 'possession first and apportion afterwards.' What is required is to evolve a mentality by which our people can think only in terms of citizenship... I may add our country is not alone in this problem, other countries had to face similar problems. England had its Roman Catholics and Protestants and Canada its British and French. But they ultimately solved this problem and I make bold to say that we can also solve it. I, therefore, appeal to every patriotic Indian that, instead of fighting for a distant ideal, to mould the whole of India into mere citizens when the Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Musalmans, Musalmans politically. Let us first solve this problem of the minorities." (126)

Neglect of the minority problem led to the alienation of Muslims from the Congress. Muhammad Ismail, Member Bihar Legislative Council, complained to Rajendra Prasad ... "what was not popular in Bihar last year is most popular today, namely the influence of the All India Muslim League.... The Congress has much to gain by meeting the

wishes of the minority, but on account of their mentality of the numerical strength, they are adamant." (140)

This attitude of the Congress was severely criticized at the Lucknow Session of the League held on 15-18 October in 1937. Raja of Mahmudabad, Chairman of the Reception Committee said, "A delicate political situation has been created in our country. The majority community refuses to recognise even the existence of the Muslim community as such, and it refuses to work in cooperation with our leaders for national advancement... It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented." (136) In his Presidential Address, Jinnah exhorted the Muslims to organise themselves and be united. He observed, "No settlement with the majority community is possible, as no Hindu leader, speaking with any authority, shows any concern or genuine desire for it. An honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no ground for settlement." (137)

It was at the Lucknow session that the Muslim League changed its creed and decided to demand full independence and resolved to reject federation as detrimental to the interest of the people of India generally and to those of the Muslims particularly. It was for the first time that the League became a mass organization and opened its membership to all Muslims who had attained the age of eighteen. Soon afterwards League's lead came to be acknowledged by the Muslim majority Provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab entered into a pact with Jinnah and Fazlul Huq of Bengal acknowledged Jinnah's leadership. Instead of pleading for a Hindu-Muslim unity as he often used to do at the earlier League sessions, Jinnah now started insisting that the League should be treated as its equal by the Congress. What Jinnah had perhaps in mind was that sufficient pressure exerted by a solid Muslim front might result in the Congress relenting its rigid attitude towards the League.

Jinnah now turned to Gandhiji to formulate some proposals for Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhiji had already drafted his proposals in this regard and had circulated the same among the Congress leaders for alterations and additions (115), but in the changed scenario he did not seem to be very keen on arriving at an understanding with Jinnah. In his letter of October 19, 1937 to Jinnah, he said : "I carefully went through your speech at Lucknow...the whole of your speech is a declaration of war. Only I had hoped you would reserve poor me as a bridge between the two. I see that you want no bridge. I am sorry." (142)

Communicating to Linlithgow an appreciation of League's feelings at Lucknow, conveyed to him by Sikandar Hayat Khan, H.W. Emerson, Governor of Punjab, stated in his letter dated 21st October, 1937, that in the "Muslim view of the Congress regime, in the Congress Provinces, has been characterised by the spirit of arrogance and domination... particular causes of offence are the non-inclusion of representative Muslims in Congress cabinets, the flaunting of the Congress flag, the prominence given to *Bande Mataram* and the attempt to make Hindi the universal language. To Muslims these are the outward and visible signs of the intention of the Congress to create a Hindu *Raj*." (146) Sikandar Hayat Khan's assessment found support from Henry Graham Haig, Governor of U.P., who in his letter of October 24, 1937 to

Linlithgow pointed out, "Muslims have now been given a very strong and definite communal lead, which seems to have inspired great enthusiasm and will obviously have a most important bearing on political developments in the near future. War has been declared unmistakably between the Congress and the Muslim League." (148) Alluding to Emerson's assessment, Linlithgow wrote to Zetland on October 27, 1937, "From our point of view, desirable as agreement between all parties (Unionist and League) may be in principle, I am not sure that such a consummation is entirely to be welcomed. But the alternative-absorption be equally undesirable." (149)

The League could not challenge the Congress on political issues publicly to any great extent, perhaps because recent elections had proved the appeal of the Congress stand on those issues. Instead, the League sought to embarrass the Congress Government by alleging that they were unwilling to safeguard the rights of minorities. In order to widen its political base, the League attempted to identify the minority rights of the Muslims with those of the Depressed Classes. Addressing a meeting at Patna on October 27, 1937 Jinnah said : "My heart beats as strongly for the Depressed Classes as for the Muslims. The Depressed Classes in this country live in shameful serfdom. Sixty millions of them had no political franchise or municipal franchise. Can they live within the limits of a village? Can they draw water from the same well? They are looked upon as pariahs. Such a state of affairs exists today in this country. Therefore, remember, this : If you are not strong, if you are not united, if you do not build up your organisation, by system and method, you will be submerged by the Hindus in this country and reduced to a class of *Shudras* and pariahs of the future.... The Muslim heart is throbbing for a fight for freedom of the country. If you want their cooperation, then change your policy. No arrogance, no bullying from above. Come down to earth and take your proper place. And then we will march with you in the battle for independence." (150) When separate electorates were provided to the untouchables at their own request and the Muslims backed up their claims, the Hindu leaders were most vehement in their denunciation of the Muslim attitude towards the question. They were charged with breaking up the solidarity of the Hindu community. (182)" In order to mollify the minority feeling the Congress Working Committee declared in a resolution at Haripura that "it regards it as its primary duty and fundamental policy to protect the religious, linguistic, cultural and other rights of the minorities in India so as to ensure for them in any scheme of Government to which the Congress is a party, the widest scope for their development and their participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation." (151)

Not moved by such resolutions, the League continued to establish separate Muslim organisations. Inaugurating All India Muslim Students Federation at Calcutta on December 27, 1937, Jinnah pointed out that in the previous year he had presided over the Lucknow session of the All India Students Federation, which was opened by Jawaharlal Nehru, who hoped that "the task of bringing the Hindus and Muslims on a common platform, which the elders had failed to accomplish, will be effected by the youth of India." But Jinnah was soon disillusioned. All business was carried out while he was in the chair, but the election of the office bearers was held only when he had left the Conference. Next morning he was informed by the Muslim students that

the Hindu students had managed to totally exclude the Muslim students from the posts of office-bearers. (170) Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana of the Unionist Party complained of the Congress choosing Muslims who were not the real representatives of Muslims and observed, "Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in the Punjab had shown India the method of taking real representatives of minority communities in the Cabinet without jeopardising, in any way, the principle of joint Ministerial responsibility or Ministerial homogeneity." (171) The League, however, was upset by the alleged arrogance of the Congress leadership. Addressing a meeting at Calcutta on January 7, 1938 Jinnah said, "He was not fighting the Hindus, He was not fighting the Congress, He was fighting the Congress leadership which had got intoxicated and had consequently taken leave of reason. It was his patriotic duty to bring that leadership to senses. He was fighting for the freedom of all and equal justice to all. He stood for the principle of "equality," without which liberty was worthless and meaningless. The Congress had a peculiar dictionary of its own in which "nationalism" meant, "Hinduism" and "*Swaraj*" meant "Hindu *Raj*." (176)

The task of the League's propagandists was undoubtedly facilitated by the Congress Right Wing's Hindu idiom. This was akin to that of the Hindu Mahasabha, which was gaining strength in late thirties under its new President V.D. Savarkar, who at the 19th session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Ahmedabad on December 30, 1937 talked of Hindu *Sangathan* and Hindudom. (172) Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay on January 11, 1938 reported to Maxwell that the Presidential speech of Savarkar was very communal. By one of the resolutions the constitution of the Hindu Mahasabha was altered to read as : "Maintenance, protection and promotion of the Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilization and advancement and the glory of the Hindu *rashtra* (nation) and with a view to secure them to attain *Poorna Swarajya* (Complete Freedom). (173)" At the Nagpur session of Hindu Mahasabha in December, 1938 Savarkar declared, "We Hindus are a nation by ourselves."

This idiomatic affinity was perhaps due to the fact that some of the Right Wing Congressite Hindus like Madan Mohan Malaviya were also prominent Hindu Mahasabhaite. In the vital Bundelkhand and Amritsar by-elections, the Congress Right Wing joined hands with the Hindu Mahasabhaite in getting two Congressite Muslims of long standing, Nisar Ahmad Khan Sherwani and Saifuddin Kitchlew, defeated.²¹⁰ Maulana Azad complained that C.P. (Central Provinces) Congressmen could not join the League, but were often to be found active in the Hindu Mahasabha.²¹¹ It was only between 11-16 December in 1938 that the Congress Working Committee, probably at the initiative of K.M. Ashraf and his Congress Socialist comrades, debarred the elected members of Congress committees from serving on similar committees in the Hindu Mahasabha. Acharya J.B. Kripalani, General Secretary of the Congress, interpreting this resolution said, "Article V(c) in the constitution refers not to primary member of any communal organisation, but to member of elected committees. There is, therefore, nothing in the Congress constitution, even if the Congress Working Committee named some organisations as communal in the sense contemplated by Article V(c), to prevent ordinary primary members of such organizations from being office holders in the Congress organizations."²¹² This interpretation defeated the very purpose of the Congress Working Committee

resolution and gave free hand to the Hindu Mahasabha to move in and out of the Congress.

While criticising the affinity between the Congress Right Wing and the Hindu Mahasabha, Jinnah had yet not given up all hope for a settlement with the Congress. Nehru too wanted to bridge the gulf. On January 1, 1938 Nehru said in a Press statement at Bombay "I welcome the recent reorientation of the Muslim League and some of its resolutions which have brought it much nearer, in theory at least, to the Congress." (174) Speaking at Allahabad on January 5, 1938, Jinnah urged settlement of minorities problem as the first step essential for establishing communal harmony, but on January 17, 1938 Moonje warned that the Hindu Mahasabha must be consulted before any Pact was made with the League. Notwithstanding Moonje's warning, Jinnah wrote to Nehru on January 25, 1938 that the minority problem could be solved neither through the Press nor correspondence, (184) and expecting to hold a meeting with Nehru on February 1, 1938, Jinnah jotted down points for discussion (187) but as fate would have it, the meeting could not take place, for Nehru was soon to relinquish the Congress Presidentship. He, however, did admit in his letter of 4th February, 1938 to Jinnah "It is always helpful to discuss problems face to face." (189) Jinnah, as stated above, had already written to Gandhiji to formulate some proposals for Hindu-Muslim unity. But Gandhiji sent a curt reply on February 3, 1938, "What proposals can I make except to ask you on bended knees to be what I had thought you were. But the proposal, to form a basis of unity between the two communities, has surely got to come from you." (188)

XII

Disillusioned by Gandhiji's curt reply, Jinnah turned to Aligarh where addressing the students of the University on February 5, 1938, he said, "To a very great extent the Muslim League has freed the Musalmans from the clutches of the British Government. But now there is another power which claims to be the successor of the British Government, call it by whatever name you like, but it is Hindu and Hindu Government.... The Constitution foisted on us is also modelled more or less on the British pattern. But there is an essential difference between the body politic of this country and that of Britain. The majority and minority parities in Britain are alterable. But such is not the case with India. Here we have permanent Hindu majority. The majority can afford to assume a non-communal label, but it remains exclusively Hindu in spirit and action. The only hope for minorities is to organise themselves and secure a definite share in power to safeguard their rights and interests. (192)" Jinnah's perception was shared by Haig, Governor of U.P., who in his letter of March 23, 1938 to Linlithgow said, "Hindus are elated by the popular feelings in the name of religion. (217)" Soon afterwards the Aligarh Muslim University, once a politically benign campus, turned into the arsenal of Muslim League.

Winning over the prized trophy of Aligarh Muslim University, Jinnah turned to the Muslim business class, to which he himself belonged. He found that the Indian business world was fragmented along lines of caste and kin rather than creed. He

found that Hindu-Muslim business partnerships²¹³ were not totally unknown in the principal commercial and industrial cities of India. What impressed him, however, was the contrast between a relatively advanced Hindu bourgeoisie and a retarded Muslim capitalist class. In the wake of separate electorates, Muslim League started advancing its claim to represent a specific Muslim interest in politics but not in business. Since one seat was reserved in the Provincial Legislature for Muslim commercial association a few prominent Muslim businessmen of Calcutta such as M.A.H. Ispahani and Adamji Haji Dawood formed the Muslim Chamber of Commerce in 1932 in order to claim the reserved seat in the Bengal Legislature. When Jinnah visited the Muslim Chamber of Commerce on August 18, 1936 M.A.H. Ispahani, President of the Chamber, pointed out that though the Chamber controlled a very high percentage of trade and commerce, adequate representation had not been given to it in the Federal Assembly. Jinnah promised to watch the interests of the Chamber in the Federal Assembly.²¹⁴ Though agitated over representation in the Legislatures, the capitalist class was concerned more with their class rather than with communal interests on the eve of the inauguration of provincial autonomy.

While G.D. Birla was overwhelmed with joy upon hearing of the Congress acceptance of office, the leading industrialists, presumably all Hindus, based in the Congress-ruled Provinces, got together and decided to finance Jinnah and the Muslim League, as also the Hindu Mahasabha to oppose the Congress, who they feared might threaten their financial interests.²¹⁵ Soon afterwards, however, the capitalists, realised that 'socialistic planned structure,' 'State ownership' and 'control over key industries' were empty phrases. They judged the Congress more by the quite unsocialistic performance of its Ministries and soon established contacts with Gandhiji, Sardar Patel, Rajagopalachari and other Congress leaders. Similarly M.A.H. Ispahani, Adamji Haji Dawood and other Muslim capitalists came closer to Jinnah and Muslim League. It was under the influence of Jinnah and his Muslim League that the Muslim Chamber of Commerce, under the Presidentship of Ispahani, lodged a complaint on May 28, 1937, with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) that the principle of proportional representation was overlooked in the recruitment of Muslims. (79) The RBI in its letter of June 25, 1937 assured the Muslim Chamber of Commerce that the Muslims' representation in the Bank's services would receive due and fair consideration, but when nothing tangible was done, the Chamber in its letter of September 20, 1938 pointed out that the situation had deteriorated and observed: "There are only two Muslim officers against 34 non-Muslims. My committee members are not prepared to believe that no Muslim can be found fit enough to hold the post of a Senior Superintendent nor can it admit that only one Muslim has so far been found fit to be promoted to Junior Superintendent, (284)" The Muslim Chamber of Commerce was created to gain political advantage, but once that kind of movement was launched, it acquired the dynamics of its own. The creation of separate Muslim commercial bodies did contribute to dividing the business world along communal lines at all India level, though the idiom of communal politics hitherto was steeped in the preoccupations of the landed elite and of the non-capitalist middle classes clamouring for reservations in legislatures and scarce jobs in the Government and the service sector.²¹⁶

Jinnah was no doubt aware of the fact that in 1937 elections the League had

mustered greater support among the commercially oriented Muslim communities of the Bombay and Madras Provinces than in the predominantly rural and agrarian communities of other Provinces. Muslim business communities of western and southern India, richest in the country, supported the League which while claiming to represent a specific Muslim interest still advocated a unitary India, wherein they conceived their future. Jinnah advocated their cause. In July, 1939 he told Subhas Chandra Bose, that the individious taxation policy of the Congress Government in Bombay was intended to hit the Muslim community hard. (422) Businessmen did not figure prominently in U.P. where the League derived support mainly from landed gentry, urban professionals and Government servants. In the Muslim majority Province of the Punjab, the urban-rural divide was given a communal twist. Muslim landholders occupied a dominant position in the rural areas, while the Arya Samajist Hindu traders and money-lenders were spokesmen of the Hindu interests. In another Muslim majority Province of Bengal, while the Hindu *bhadralok* of Calcutta and the Muslim *jotedars* of eastern Bengal dominated the provincial politics, increasingly important role was played by the Hindu Marwaris, and non Bengali Muslim businessmen of various origins. While M.A.H. Ispahani of Persian origin became friend of Jinnah and financier of the League, G.D. Birla, follower of Gandhiji and financier of the Congress had close links with Madan Mohan Malaviya and Hindu Mahasabha. In the two Muslim majority Provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, there developed divergent appreciation of Centre-Province relations. "Given their close links with the provincial Governments, observes Markovits, "Muslim businessmen favoured greater provincial autonomy, especially in financial and economic matters, while their Hindu colleagues put their hopes in a strong Central Government, because Muslims would necessarily wield less influence with it than Hindus."²¹⁷ This stand of the Hindu businessmen tallied with that of the Congress Right Wing and the Hindu Mahasabha.

In order to ensure a strong unitary Central Government, Birla, a close associate of Gandhiji, was prepared even to concede a federation of north-western States to the Muslims. In an interview with Linlithgow at New Delhi on February 7, 1938 Birla told him that "the communal position in India was growing rapidly worse. Congress was well aware of this and its leaders were deeply apprehensive as to the future. Might it not take the sting out of the communal position if the Muslims were given their federation of the north-west?" For a moment Linlithgow thought that Birla must be teasing him but when his countenance portrayed no such design Linlithgow was convinced that for the time being Birla meant what he said. Thereupon Linlithgow asked him "whether in contemplating such an arrangement he envisaged the perpetuation for an indefinite period of time of British military power in India sufficient to guarantee that no collision should be allowed to take place between the Muslim Federation and its Hindu counterpart. If so, Linlithgow recommended him to pursue his reflections a little further." (193)

A new communal conflict arose by the dichotomous approach adopted by the Congress Ministries in introducing land reforms. In U.P., Muslim League capitalised upon the class fears of Muslim landed gentry. The elections of 1937 had demolished Nawab of Chhatari's Agriculturist Party and landlords were confronted with the prospect of Congress-inspired tenancy legislation. In 1938, the Governor-General disallowed

such a bill passed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly.²¹⁸ In U.P. the Avadh talukdars had a strong Muslim component. The Congress leadership in Bengal, however, seldom espoused agrarian reforms, even for purposes of rhetoric, perhaps partly because unlike in U.P., *zamindars* in Bengal tended to be overwhelmingly Hindus and Fazlul Huq's Krishak Proja Party had adopted an election programme calling for abolition of zamindari without compensation.²¹⁹ Muslim League fully exploited somewhat conservative attitude of the Congress to tenancy legislation in Bengal and Bihar in striking contrast to its radical stance in U.P. The Hindu landlords of Bihar opposed the Bihar Tenancy Bill introduced in July, 1938. Maulana Azad had to intervene in order to resolve the controversy. (264) In the NWFP, the only Muslim majority Province under Congress rule, Dr. Khan Saheb's Ministry's Debtors Relief Bill, controlling mortgages and usurious loans, was opposed by the Hindus. (260) The Congress Ministry lost support among Muslim peasants because of its failure to reduce rural indebtedness on account of opposition of Hindu and Sikh traders and money-lenders.²²⁰ Similarly in the Punjab, the Land Alienation Bill introduced by Sikandar Hayat Khan's Unionist Party in August, 1938, was supported mostly by Muslim agriculturists, but the Hindu money-lending classes were up in arms. When the Congress Working Committee adopted somewhat neutral attitude, the Punjab Provincial Congress was unhappy in as much as they did not want to lose the support of the business classes who financed their party. (268)

Equally embittered was the middle class over the communal quotas in public services. In the Punjab the population of various communities and their recruitment to public services was in the following proportion :

<i>Community</i>	<i>Population (in per cent)</i>	<i>Proportion in Services (in per cent)</i>
Muslims	56	3
Hindus	28	2
Sikhs	11	1
Others	5	1

A few posts were thrown open to competition, but there was always a provision for adjusting inequalities by means of nomination. (311) In the other Muslim majority Province of Bengal when Fazlul Huq circulated a note making out a case for an all-round reservation of 55 per cent for Muslims, 15 per cent for the Scheduled Castes and leaving 30 per cent for caste Hindus in public services, Hindu leaders met at the residence of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and formed a deputation, which met Robert Reid, Governor of Bengal, on May 27, 1939 and claimed that "no arbitrary restrictions should be imposed on them and the field should be left open to free and fair competition."²²¹ The Governor in his letter of June 6, 1939 to Linlithgow pointed out, "The principal stumbling block being the difficulty arising from the fact that for some years to come Hindus are likely to predominate in that element of the services which is filled by promotion; it has so far proved impossible to hit on a formula which would remedy this disparity without creating others. (402)" On 19-20 June, 1939 John Woodhead, temporary Governor, informed Linlithgow that "the one hopeful

feature that emerged was that both sides eventually seemed prepared to agree to parity between Muslims and non-Muslims in the services as an object to be aimed at." (409)

The dichotomous approach to agrarian legislation and reservation in public services, adopted by the provincial Governments, combined with the fact that big business and banking continued to remain in the hands of Hindu upper classes, further intensified the emerging separate identities of the two communities. This was fully exploited by the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha for their political ends. In his letter dated 8th April, 1938 to Linlithgow, Haig, Governor of U.P. observed : "He (Savarkar) has been attacking the Congress for neglecting the interests of the Hindus and has been trying to rouse Hindu feelings in just the same way as the Muslim League has been rousing Muslim feelings... the idea of Hindu *Raj* appeals strongly to the Hindus." (219) The Hindu Mahasabha claimed to represent the Hindu interests in the same way as the Muslim League claimed to represent those of the Muslims. Moonje thought that Hindu-Muslim unity was not necessary for *Swaraj* (369) and Savarkar had evolved the following formula for the solution of Hindu-Muslim problem. "If you come, with you, if you don't, without you; but if you oppose, in spite of you, we Hindus will fight out the good battle of achieving the independence of India and herald the rebirth of a free and mighty Hindu Nation in near future." (336) Claiming to represent Hindus, the Hindu Mahasabha never missed any opportunity to oppose attempts at Congress-League entente.

Claiming to represent Muslims, the Muslim League wanted to be recognised as the representative organisation of Muslims. In his letter of 3rd March, 1938 to Gandhiji, Jinnah said, "In your letter I missed the note of response, first whether you are of opinion that you see light now and the moment has come and secondly if so, whether you are prepared to take the matter up in right earnest... we have reached a stage when no doubt should be left. You recognise the All India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India and on the other hand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country... of course I shall be glad to see you, although I shall be equally glad to see Pandit Jawaharlal or Mr. Bose as you may desire; the matter as you know will not be clinched without reference again to you by either of them. Therefore, I will prefer to see you first." (206) When Jayakar came to know about the proposed parleys, he wrote to Ganpat Rai that Hindu Mahasabha should provide against one-sided compromise at the proposed Gandhi-Jinnah talks. (226)

At Gandhi-Jinnah meeting held on April 28, 1938 it was agreed that (i) the Communal Award would stand till a substitute was found; (ii) there should be a pact between the Congress and Muslim League which would include a solution of all the questions outstanding; (iii) Jinnah and Subhas Bose should formally meet to set up a machinery consisting of representatives of the Congress and Muslim League to devise ways and means of cooperation between the two. (230) Jinnah's subsequent talks with Subhas Chandra Bose on May 11-15 and with Gandhiji on May 20, 1938 broke down because Jinnah insisted mainly that (i) separate electorates to remain where they existed in local bodies and restored where they might be demanded and (ii) Muslim League should be recognised as the authoritative and representative

organisation of the Muslims of India and the Congress representing the Hindus. (235, 241) As far as the demand for reservation in the local bodies was concerned, the Congress Ministry in Bihar announced in the summer of 1938 that it proposed to bring a bill in the winter session of the Assembly to amend the Local Self-Government Act, so as to reserve seats for Muslims, but the election would be joint. (263)

The Congress was not prepared to accept the Muslim League as the representative organisation of the Muslims. Nehru refused to consider the demand, and stressed the economic rather than the communal issues. In his letter of April 6, 1938 to Jinnah he said, "I find that there is nothing in them which refers to or touches the economic demands of the masses or affects the all important question of poverty and unemployment." (218) Nehru maintained that the old semi-feudal Muslim League leaders finding their position threatened by the masses, largely traded on anti-Hindu sentiments which kept political and economic issues in the background. (521) He was supported by Abdus Salam Khurshid who in his letter of August 29, 1938 to Jinnah objected to the presence of title-holders in Muslim League's Working Committee and suggested that popularisation of League's programme should be entrusted to progressive elements. (280)

Claiming to constitute 50 per cent of backward Muslim population, the Momins had no faith in the *ashraf* (elite) dominated Muslim League. (473) They trusted the Congress and the Jamiatul Ulama more than the League mainly manned by the upper class Muslims. (522) The Congress and particularly Nehru was thus justified in not accepting the representational credentials of the Muslim League. Moreover constitutionally secular, the Congress could not forego its claim to represent Muslims as well. What agitated Jinnah was the refusal of the Congress to accept the representational credentials of the Muslim League which were duly recognised by the Congress by entering into the Lucknow Pact of which he himself was the architect. He attributed this attitudinal change in the Congress to the change in its leadership particularly after the entry of Gandhiji, soon after the death of Gokhale whose disciple Jinnah claimed to be. Jinnah said, "It is Mr. Gandhi who is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism. His ideal is to revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu *Raj* in this country and he is utilizing the Congress to further this object." (334) "The Congress has now killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement." Jinnah is reported to have told Subhas Bose that "so long as the Mahatma dominates the Congress, he will have nothing to do with anybody connected with it." (425) Jinnah's perception was shared by Lothian who said, "They (Muslims) had become acutely aware of the rising tide of Hindu rule, and that produced a consolidation of political opinion and political organisation in India." (227)

XIII

While the Congress controlled eight provincial Ministries, the Muslim League did not have a voice in a single provincial Government. It was in opposition everywhere. At the Centre, the picture seemed still more dismal if the proposed

Federation of the British Indian Provinces and the princely States, as embodied in the 1935 Act, was to come into being. When it came to implementation, the federal negotiations ran into difficulties. Right from the start, Linlithgow had made clear his intention to push ahead with the Federation. The princes, faced with what appeared to be a high level pressure, were apparently frightened and deferred accession under the plea of their peculiar relationship with the British Crown.⁶

Bhai Parmanand thought that Federation was the only means by which the unity of India could be preserved. (213) At the Bengal Provincial Hindu Conference presided over by Savarkar, Dr. Moonje sponsored a motion recording the whole-hearted support of the conference to the Federation. (367) Similarly the Congress Right Wing and the Congress financier Birla supported the Federation. (256, 331) The Congress insistence on elected representatives from the princely States frightened the Muslim League, which feared that the preponderance of Hindu element in the princely States would swamp the Muslims. (242) Moreover, the Muslim League apprehended that the Congress might exclude it from a share of power at the Centre, as it had one in the Provinces by insisting on one party cabinet. In view of their practical experience at the provincial level, Muslim League feared that the Central Government as envisaged in the Act of 1935 would be Hindu-dominated. The Congress leaders failed to dispel Muslim misapprehensions. The consequent rallying of Muslims to the Muslim League and the doubts which they began to voice against submission to the Hindu majority at the Centre were obvious straws in the wind. The Congress unfortunately failed to take heed.

The Congress insistence on the elected representatives of the princely States to the federal Legislature and the Haripura Session (February, 1938) declaration that the *Purna Swaraj* ideal would cover the States as much as British India, frightened the princes, some of whom played the communal card to suppress popular movements. Delivering the Presidential Address to the All India States People's Conference on 15-16 February, 1939 Nehru said, "The States have learnt from the British imperialism the art of utilizing communal differences to check popular movements." (364) Early in 1939 when a movement was launched for responsible Government in Rajkot (Gujarat) the Hindu ruler found it convenient to cite the fears of the Muslim minority while turning down the demand for popular Government. Intervening on that occasion Gandhiji offered to safeguard the special interests of the Muslims and is reported to have said, "If they (Muslims) wanted separate electorates in Rajkot with reservation of seats, I would see to it that they got them."²²² In the Hindu majority State of Hyderabad with a Muslim ruler, as also in the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir with a Hindu ruler, the representational politics assumed communal undertones. Muslim elite in Hyderabad and Pandits and Dogras in Jammu and Kashmir dominated Government services. There was a total absence of elementary civil and political rights in both these States. While the Hindu Mahasabha denounced Congress interference under the plausible slogan of responsible Government in States under Hindu princes,²²³ it did not hesitate to launch, in league with the Arya Samaj, a *Satyagraha* of Hindus in Hyderabad, mainly from the Marathwada region on October 11, 1938. One batch of Satyagrahis was led by Nathuram Godse from Poona. (335) The idiom of this agitation was Hinduised.

To quote Swami Ramananda Tirth, the architect of the Congress movement in Hyderabad, "Resistance to suppression in the first instance took a religious turn and Arya Samaj came to the vanguard."²²⁴ The idiom lasted sufficiently long to give birth to two rival communal populist forces. The mental reservations among the two communities fanned communal tensions which resulted in communal flareups and institutionalisation of communalism. Hyderabad's much vaunted communal accord was shattered. The Majlis-i-Ittihadul Muslimeen, hitherto mainly a sleepy religious body, was revived and added a political clause to its constitution under the leadership of Bahadur Yar Jung, who subsequently became a legend.²²⁵

The pivotal issue in Hyderabad politics down to the 1930s was probably the *Mulki* (indigenous) and non-*Mulki* (non-indigenous) schism, which, though it had cultural overtones, was primarily a dispute about jobs. This *Mulki*-non-*Mulki* dichotomy was converted into Hindu-Muslim schism by the Hindu Mahasabha *Satyagraha* which fully exploited the situation in view of Congress neutrality in State politics. In pursuance of the Haripura Congress session decision, Gandhiji tried his specific technique of controlled mass struggle in princely States in order to pacify the Congress Left Wing. In his letter of September 26, 1939 to Tej Bahadur Sapru, Akbar Hydari, Prime Minister of Hyderabad State, said, "The Congress Working Committee manifesto is an attempt of the Right Wing to pacify the Left Wing." (447) Soon after the Haripura Session, State Congress was founded in October, 1938 by Swami Ramananda Tirtha on a secular basis. It launched a more effective *Satyagraha* from October 24, 1938, demanding its own legalization and responsible Government. When Jamnalal Bajaj, a close adjutant of Gandhiji, sought to resolve the crisis, Akbar Hydari politely dissuaded him from visiting Hyderabad as "it may create controversies and be used by either Party for the adoption of an extremism. This may prevent the attainment of a solution of the communal problem on the only possible basis of mutual agreement and compromise... we believe—a belief to which I gave expression when I met you—that, apart from the *Mulki* (indigenous native) sentiment and pride, which is hurt by any suggestion of mediation or interference in the internal affairs of the State by persons or bodies owing no allegiance to the State, there is a still more fundamental objection, namely that it is inconsistent with the basic idea of the sovereignty of the State that such persons or bodies should come between the Ruler and his subjects." (313) The unity talks initiated by the Nizam's Government with the State Congress was opposed by the Hindu Mahasabha. On November 25, 1938 Savarkar asked the Nizam's Government to approach the Hindu Sangathanists and not the Congress if it wanted to come to terms. (316) Clarifying his Government's stand in respect of external agencies, Akbar Hydari wrote to Dr. Moonje, "The State does not recognise the right of any organisation or individual not owing allegiance to the State or functioning beyond its borders to represent the people of the State or deal with the Government in respect of matters concerning the State or its subjects." (360) The Hindu Mahasabha's patronage of the democratic movement in the Hyderabad state saw in the largely Hindu population a reservoir of votes in the federal centre. It supported the Federation for the very reasons which were opposed by the Muslim League, which believed that its best hope of survival lay in the creation of a separate federation of Muslim majority Provinces and Muslim Native States as

envisaged in Sind Muslim League Conference resolution adopted on October 7, 1938. (291) Subsequently Jinnah made it clear that his concept of 'Muslim native States' included States ruled by Muslims. This definition conveniently opened the door to the entry of Hyderabad and in 1939 Jinnah took advantage of an invitation to the Nizam's birthday celebrations to do some lobbying along these lines.²²⁶ The Congress Satyagraha was called off in December, 1938, ostensibly on the ground that it could get mixed up with Hindu Mahasabha's communal agitation, which too petered off by the summer of 1939. In his letter of August 2, 1939 to Akbar Hydari, Sapru appreciated 'the novel functional representational politics introduced in Hyderabad.' (128)

Entirely different was the case of Jammu and Kashmir, where the overwhelming Muslim majority's anti-feudal confrontation with the Hindu Dogra ruling dynasty at times acquired certain communal tinge. An agitation started in 1931 by a group of Muslim graduates including Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah culminated in a mass attack on Srinagar jail when 21 persons were killed in police firing. Repressive measures led to attacks on police rather than Hindus and the situation soon required British military intervention to help the Maharaja. Subsequently the concessions offered by the Grievances Enquiry Commission in April, 1932, failed to satisfy a growing anti-feudal movement and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was launched in October, 1932. Delivering the Presidential Address, Sheikh Abdullah said, "We have repeatedly declared that the Kashmir movement is not communal; it is a platform to address the grievances of every section of people."²²⁷ Sheikh Abdullah had already started to develop close contacts with anti-autocratic Jammu Hindus under P.N. Bazaz.²²⁸ Addressing the Muslim Conference on June 9, 1936 at Srinagar Jinnah said, "I am glad to find that the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir are awake... I want you to understand that your struggle for freedom and my struggle for freedom in British India stand on the same footing...I will, however, urge one thing upon you and the leaders, that is to make the minorities—Hindus—always feel that they will receive justice and fairplay in the State."²²⁹ Subsequently, when the State's People Conference was founded with Nehru as its President and the people of the State wanted support of the Congress, the Muslim Conference was converted into National Conference on 24 June, 1938. Some young Kashmiri Pandits like P.N. Dhar joined the National Conference, while others objected to Sheikh Abdullah's alleged religious orientation and complained to Nehru, who turned it down "with contempt it deserved."²³⁰

Ganga Ram Wazir, leader of Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and President, Dogra Sabha, complained to Rajendra Prasad and Jawaharlal Nehru that the conversion of the Muslim Conference into National Conference would not solve the problem of Hindu and Sikh minorities in the State. Professor Gulshan Rai, journalist, wrote a number of articles dubbing the leadership of the National Conference as communal. He pointed out, "It is impossible for the minorities to accept the position of permanent subservience and servility." (329) Nehru's response was very rational. In his reply of January 6, 1939 to Ganga Ram Wazir he observed, "In a State like Kashmir, a popular movement must inevitably be predominantly Muslim, just as in Hyderabad a popular movement must largely be Hindu. It is curious that in both these States the popular movements are dubbed communal by the respective

Governments. The right way to strengthen nationalism in Kashmir is for the Hindus to ally themselves with the popular movement.” (345)

The Congress insistence on responsible Governments in the States and their elected representatives in the federal centre resulted in the virtual withdrawal of the earlier acceptance of Federation by the princes. The Hindu Mahasabha supported the Federation, which, with elected representatives of the State solid ensure Hindu majority in the Federal Legislature, while the Muslim League was determined to keep out of the Hindu-dominated Centre. It was, however, prepared to accept the Federation if the princely States nominated their representatives as envisaged in the Act of 1935. In his letter dated January 6, 1939 to Linlithgow, Maurice Hallet said, “Jinnah will be satisfied if Muslims got one third of the federal cabinet posts and if the princely States nominate their representatives with military, foreign affairs and finance under the Federation.” (346)

Muslim League’s fears of the Hindu domination at the future federal Centre were rooted in its perceived image of the Hindu *Raj* under twenty seven months of Congress rule in the Provinces, as borne out by the Muslim League’s propaganda barrage, climaxed by the Pirpur Report on U.P. November 15, 1938 (310) the Shareef Report on Bihar, March, 1939 and Fazlul Huq’s *Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule* published in December, 1939. The charges included (i) failure to prevent communal riots, (ii) singing of the *Bande Mataram* song with ‘idolatrous’ passages on public occasions, (iii) Bharat Mata with numberless hands, (iv) local bans on Bakr Id cow slaughter, (v) encouragement of Hindi in Devanagiri script at the cost of Urdu, and (vi) Wardha Scheme. Imposition of Hindi and the Wardha Scheme, were opposed also by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, President of the Justice Party. (338)

Much in these grievances was clearly exaggerated, as is evident from the reports of the Governors of U.P., Bihar, C.P. and Bombay.²³¹ It is significant that when Rajendra Prasad offered to get the charges investigated (451), Jinnah, instead of accepting adjudication by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, referred the charges to the Viceroy under the plea that the Viceroy along with the Governors “are entrusted with the responsibility to protect the rights and the interests of minorities under the Constitution.” (453)

XIV

The representational politics in the Indian context was unfortunately responsible for dividing the two major communities on communal lines. In his letter of May 28, 1937, Iqbal advised Jinnah to convert Muslim League into a mass Party (81) Shankar Rao Deo, Member of the Congress Working Committee, in his letter of November 6, 1938 intimated to the Congress President that “the growing democratisation of the Congress is driving out a small portion of the sophisticated middle classes...I am, of course, aware that we must not allow the young men to join the RSS... which has a fairly well organised volunteer corps throughout Maharashtra and C.P. and it is also true that it is predominantly under the influence of Hindu Mahasabha. As a consequence, they are strongly anti-Muslim and anti-Congress.” (307) It was, in fact,

a militant front organisation of Hindu revivalism founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925 with the object of uniting the Hindus by propagating that Hinduism was in a state of siege from within and without. It attempted to win over young middle class Hindus by glorifying Hindu rulers like Shivaji, Rana Pratap and Guru Govind Singh who waged wars against the Mughal rulers. It was in this context that Savarkar, in his Presidential Address to the Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur on 28 December, 1938, elaborated his concept of *Hindutva* and advanced the theory of Hindu *Rashtra* or Hindu Nation. He said, "It will be clear from this hurried peep into our history that ever since the Vedic ages, for some 5000 years ago, at least in the past, our forefathers had been shaping the formation of our people into a religious, racial and cultural and political unit. As a consequence of it all growing organically, the Sindhus of the Vedic times have grown today into a Hindu nation, extending over India and holding India in common as their Fatherland and their Holyland." (336)

Perceiving linkages between communalism, fascism and imperialism, Dr. Ashraf naturally warned the All India Students Conference at Calcutta on January 1, 1939 "suffice it to say that communalism as a whole is nothing more or less than imperialist conspiracy to disrupt our democratic and national movement. Internationally, communalism is allied today with Fascism. Only recently the representative of the Muslim League met General Franco (Spanish Dictator) and gave him his blessings. We know only too well that Savarkar and Bhai Parmanand are working in India in the interest of Japanese imperialism." (342)

These events were taking place not in a vacuum. The votaries of *Hindutva* had outright rejected the concept of territorial nationalism adopted by the Congress. They propagated the concept of a Hindu nation rooted in Hindu religion, Aryan race and Vedic culture. Their influence, however, was confined, mainly to the cow belt in northern India.

In southern India, the anti-Brahmin Justice Party had already launched a tirade against *Varna Ashram* or Hindu hierarchical caste system. It opposed imposition of Hindi as *lingua franca*. With the election of E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, popularly called Periyar, in 1938 Justice Party was converted into Dravida Kazhagam which became a virulent movement of social justice for the backwards and propagated a nationalism of sort rooted in Dravidian race and Adi-Dravida culture. It supported separate electorates. The Adi-Dravidian Conference held at Melapalayam on October 7, 1938 adopted resolutions criticising Gandhiji "for doing" irreparable injury to the cause of the Depressed Classes by depriving them of the separate electorate conferred on them by His Majesty's Government," and appreciating the "unmitigating labours of Jinnah in the cause of the poor people apart from the Muslims, earnestly requests him not to enter into a pact with the Congress, unless and until the Poona Pact is abrogated and separate electorate is restored to the Scheduled Classes." (290) Delivering the Presidential Address at the Justice Party Conference at Madras on December 29, 1938 Naicker analyzed the meaning of the word, "nation" and pointed out its inapplicability to Indian conditions. As things stand at present, the centrifugal tendencies are greater than the centripetal ones. Burmanese raised the cry "Burma for Burmanese" and cut themselves off from India—why should the demand of Tamilians "Tamil Nad for Tamilians," be considered to be against nationalism? If

Tamilians, who cannot tolerate their being exploited by Aryans, ask whether it is just or fair that there should be such exploitation, they are accused of class-hatred, sedition, and treason to the “nation.” (338) Naicker’s logic was akin to the theory of “Prison of Nationalities” within which the nationalities living in various territories viz., Tamils, Malayalis, Telugus, Kanaras, Marathas, Gujaratis, Punjabis, Oriyas, Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans, Kashmiris, etc. were historically oppressed by aliens in the manner of Central Asia and Black Sea regions under the *Tzars*.

While Naicker was expounding the theory of “nationalities” in southern India, in northern India, the profound appreciation of the political dimension of Islamic universalism led Dr. Iqbal to expound upon the philosophical unity of the *quam* or nation and *umma* or universal community of Islam—a unity that lay at the heart of claim to parity. Shortly before his death in March, 1938 he was engaged in a debate with Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, a leading figure among the nationalist *ulama* of Deoband, who had already expounded his theory of *‘muttabida quamiyat* or composite nationalism, maintaining that Muslims were pre-eminently a *millat* or religious fellowship, which could co-exist with other religious communities as a *quam* or nation in the Quranic sense.²³² It recalled a fairly established tradition of composite nationalism that Maulana Azad had already done much to promote, and reaffirmed common definitions of both ‘nation’ and the nature of Muslim communal organisation.’²³³

Iqbal reacted vehemently against Maulana Madani’s thesis that in modern times nations were formed by lands and that the Indian Muslims should accept this view. His poem *‘Husain Ahmad’* in *Armughani Hijaz* started a heated controversy in which the nationalist Muslims and adherents of Millatism or Islamic nationalism both participated with equal frenzy,²³⁴ but ultimately Iqbal had to yield to Maulana Madani. But the poetic dream of Islamic nationalism dreamt by Iqbal caught the imagination of some of the Muslim League leaders, who were at that time frantically searching a theoretical basis for claiming parity for their community with the Hindus. Subsequently, when the Jamiatul Ulama invited some prominent members of the Muslim League to its Conference at Delhi, Jinnah in his statement of March 1, 1939 said, “These few individuals who are using the name of Jamiatul Ulama are, in my opinion, doing the greatest possible harm not only to their community but to the country at large. They are one of the causes of the tension and bitterness that exists between the Hindus and Musalmans today and in no small degree are the obstacles in the way of the achievement of an honourable understanding between the two communities.” (368) As a shrewd strategist, Jinnah started to create fissures in the ranks of the *ulama*. A small section of the Deoband *ulama*, lead by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1863-1943) was against the Congress. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (1887-1949), a well-known disciple of *Shaikhul Hind* also deflected from Jamiatul Ulama and was won over by the Muslim League.²³⁵ Jinnah, who consistently opposed mixing of religion with politics, and for that reason remained on the fringes of Indian politics during the massive Khilafat Movement, now did not hesitate to press the *ulama* into service.

Soon afterwards Jinnah used the word ‘nation’ in emphatic terms perhaps for the first time²³⁶ in relation to Indian Muslims. While addressing the students of Aligarh

Muslim University on April 12, 1939 he said, "I make no secret of the fact that Muslims and Hindus are two nations and the Muslims cannot maintain their status as such unless they acquire national self-consciousness and national self-determination... we are going to live as a nation and play our part as a nation."²³⁷ However speaking at the Old Boys Association of the Osmania University at Hyderabad on September 29, 1939 he pointed out, "I yield to none in the determination to safeguard the interests of my country, nor would I yield to anybody in striving for attainment of freedom for my country. I am essentially a practical man. I have been in practical politics for over a quarter of a century. The words 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' have undergone many changes in their definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own, but within the honest meaning of the term I still remain a nationalist. I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact. But such a pact can only be an honourable one and not a pact which will mean the destruction of one and survival of the other. The Congress high command unfortunately are not prepared to grasp the hand of friendship but would like to destroy the very hand which offered friendship. One does not see much light at present but you never can say when the two communities would unite... I say to every Musalman that Islam expects you one and all to do your duty and stand by your people as one nation." (448)

XV

The Congress leadership was divided in their assessment of the Hindu-Muslim question. Gandhiji in his interview with H.V. Hodson, Editor, *Round Table*, on December 25, 1938 said, "Absorption is inevitable when a country is engaged in a struggle to wrest power from foreign hands; it cannot afford to have separate rival political organizations... you may try to damn it by calling it totalitarian."²³⁸ Harry Graham Haig, Governor of U.P. wrote to Linlithgow on January 21, 1939, "Gandhi's attempts to reassure Muslims against unjust treatment will have no effect because what the League wants is to have their representatives on the Government in U.P." (358) Reacting to Gandhiji's article on Hindu-Muslim unity, Satyamurti observed that communal unity could be ensured by substituting joint electorate for separate electorates with reservation of seats for minorities. (429) Rajendra Prasad thought that Muslims would not have been alienated had the Congress not been engaged in breaking or discrediting Muslim ministries in the non-Congress Provinces. (294) Sardar Patel was, however, of the opinion that, Muslims as a body are alienated because they feel, and rightly feel, that in spite of the Communal Award, the Congress formed Ministries in seven Provinces without or in spite of them. (299) Subhas Bose thought that the Muslim League was violently angry with the Congress because of the activities of the Congressmen and Congress Ministries in the majority Provinces. (304) This perception was shared by M.N. Roy who even advised the Congress high command to concede Muslim demands unconditionally and maintained that it was for the majority community to allay the apprehensions of the minority community. (194)

This was not a voice in wilderness. By the summer of 1939, the Left Wing of the Congress was quite anxious to come to terms with the Muslim League. Mian

Iftikharuddin, the veteran leftist leader of Punjab, Dr. S. Husain Zaheer, son of Sir Wazir Hasan and his younger brother Sajjad Zaheer, founder member of the Progressive Writers Association had talks with Liaquat Ali Khan, Secretary of the Muslim League. All of them were anxious to have a settlement between the Congress and the League as they felt that the country could not progress any further without such a settlement. In his letter of June 16, 1939 Liaquat Ali Khan informed Jinnah, "They say that they will force the hands of the Congress high command to acknowledge the League as the only representative organisation of the Musalmans, but desire that some face-saving device be found. I told them that the League was always willing for an honourable settlement and the responsibility of the present situation rested entirely on the Congress. Some of these young men were anxious to have a talk with you... I was given to understand that the Hindus of the Left Wing of the Congress also were most anxious for a settlement." (406) Concurring with the Congress Left Wing, Dr. Zakir Husain seems to have made a similar suggestion, but Nehru did not agree to accept the Muslim League in "a particular way as it means complete disruption of the Congress." (538) Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Liberal Party leader, thought, "The provincial autonomy has not helped us to compose our differences, but widened them." (383)

More astonishing was the alienation of the Congress allies like Majlis-i Ahrar, the Jamiatul Ulama, and the Momins. In his letter of May 24, 1938 Maulana Ahmad Saeed of (Jamiatul Ulama) wrote to Maulana Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi (Ahrar), "You have rightly observed that the League indeed is the remedy for the Congress. This is absolutely true." (243) Even Sultan Ahmad warned Rajendra Prasad that "Muslims in general were up in arms against the Congress Ministry in Bihar." (312) In his letter of 3rd November, 1938 to Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel confided, "Working of the Congress Ministries veers a patriotic Indian like Sultan Ahmad to the view that the apprehensions of Muslims are justified." (299) Maulana Azad too was growing critical of the Congress attitude towards the Muslims. In his letter of August 15, 1938 to Rajendra Prasad, he made a critical evaluation of the Congress policy on the Hindu-Muslim question since 1928 and concluded that the Congress had delayed the solution of this question. That was the reason why it had taken such a complicated turn now. His contention was that had the Congress conceded to Jinnah's demand in 1928 for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal in case adult franchise was not established, the whole misunderstanding between the Congress and Muslims would have disappeared for ever.²³⁹

Muslim League exploited the disillusionment among the Muslims, as it was denied a share in the cake of provincial autonomy in spite of the separate electorate and Communal Award. Analyzing the causes of this disillusionment, Henry Graham Haig in his letter of May 10, 1939 to Linlithgow observed, "In essence, the (Muslim), grievance is not a religious one, though it assumes an intensely communal form but it is political and is due to the fact that the community is in opposition and would largely cease to exist if the Muslim League has a share in the Government." (391) By the summer of 1939, even Pandit Pant's mind was moving in the direction of 'genuine coalition' in U.P., as observed by Zetland in his letter of June 6, 1939 to Linlithgow. (403) Nehru, however, objected to admitting Muslim League representatives in the

Congress Ministry. He did, however, concede that some prominent Muslim League leaders in U.P. were strongly nationalist in their views, but maintained that it was not a provincial but an all India problem. (388) Nehru no doubt was obsessed with the idea of joint responsibility in the Congress cabinets, S. Sardar Singh of Punjab in his letter of April 21, 1938 to Gandhiji argued, "Is it not a negation of representative Government when, as in Bombay or U.P., Congress could not in the first instance, win even a single seat, when, forming Ministries, ignored the Muslim League altogether?" (224)

There, however, came about a change in the perception of Nehru, who, in his letter of 7 July, 1939 to Rajendra Prasad stated, there is more general ill-will among the Muslim masses towards the Congress than there has been at any time in the past." (417)

XVI

This realisation among the Congress leaders came quite late. The commutative effect of the aggravation of Muslim fears increased their determination to reject any advance towards an all India Federation as planned under the Act of 1935. Muslim leaders now began to look for some alternative schemes. When they were contemplating such schemes Marquess of Lothian, Chairman, Indian Franchise Committee, in an article in the *Sunday Observer* of April 24, 1938 observed, "Whatever the non-communal professions and the real desires of enlightened Congressmen may be, the vast majority of Congress members are Hindus, who look forward, after many centuries of British and Muslim rule, to the re-establishment of Hindu *Raj*... In essence the position of the Muslims in India is not unlike that of Ulster in Ireland. Difference in religion is the real basis of their organisation as a political minority, and unless all European experience is falsified, it will be long before the communal factor disappears from the Indian scene." (226)

In August, 1938 Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, noted that Sikandar Hayat was just as hostile to a federation under the Act of 1935, as Jinnah and he himself, could not resist a steadily growing conviction that the dominant factor in determining the future form of the Government of India would prove to be the All India Muslim League.²⁴⁰

In the meanwhile, by mid-summer of 1938, some young men established in Lahore a society under the name of Majlis-i-Pakistan and its central body Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan to propagate the idea of Pakistan, aiming at separating the Provinces of the Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Kashmir and Baluchistan from India and uniting them under a free and independent Government. Its letter form carried on its forehead a map of visualised Pakistan copied from Rahmat Ali's pamphlet. Its founder Secretary was Mian Bashir Ahmad.²⁴¹

From the Punjab, the movement spread to Sind, which, in spite of the opposition of the Hindu businessmen and Hindu Mahasabha, was carved out of the Bombay Presidency as a Muslim majority Province under the Act of 1935. With the introduction of provincial autonomy, Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah and Allah Bakhsh were

able to form Governments with the help of Hindu members. The Sind Hindu Conference held at Sukkar, under the Presidentship of Savarkar, early in September, 1938, asked Hindus to organise “a stronghold of Hindus to save their hearths, homes and interests in the near future.”²⁴² Subsequently when Jinnah went to Karachi to preside over the Sind provincial Muslim League Conference on 7-8 October, 1938, his efforts to convert Allah Bakhsh Government into a Muslim League Government failed because of Allah Bakhsh's repudiation of the pledge he had taken. (301) It is pertinent to note in this connections that on the question of the Congress support to the Allah Bukhsh Ministry Maulana Azad differed with Sardar Patel. (308) Similarly M.A. Khuhro also indicted the Congress policy on the Ministerial tangle in Sind. (320) The resolution adopted at the Sind Provincial Muslim League on 7 October, 1938 considered it absolutely essential, in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent, in that of an unhampered cultural development, and the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations viz., the Federation of Muslim States and the Federation of non-Muslim States.” (291)

Apart from Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference resolution, a number of schemes were put forward by individuals. In 1938, Dr. Saiyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad (Deccan) published his first scheme of a minimal federation of 11 Hindu majority and four Muslim majority homogeneous cultural zones, but this would have required the migration of the Muslim and Hindu population and the north-central Muslim zone was eventually to be a permanent home for all the Muslims then living in U.P. and Bihar. (374) Criticising this scheme, Mian Ahmad Bashir of Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, in his letter of March 22, 1939 to Jinnah observed, “To think of a cultural basis alone and to ignore geographical, historical and economic considerations is not vouchsafed by practical politics.” (373) Somewhat different was the scheme proposed by Professor Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh in his letter of February 2, 1939 to Jinnah, envisaging a Free Muslim Nation with a Free National Home. (361) These schemes were presented before the Muslim League Working Committee held on March 25, 1939 at Meerut. (361) Speaking candidly at the Meerut meeting, Liaquat Ali said, “Muslims do not favour the pseudo nationalism that the Hindus have borrowed from Europe. If Hindus and Muslims could not now live together amicably in India—and it has become almost impossible for them to co-exist under the same regime—then they might be able to do so by dividing the country on a religious and cultural basis.” (375) This is probably the first occasion when a candid proposal for India's partition on religious basis was made by no less a Muslim League functionary than its Secretary. Subsequently Abdullah Haroon in his letter of April 22, 1939 to Jinnah proposed that all these schemes be discussed at a sub-committee meeting so that “a definitive goal was fixed before the Muslims at this psychological moment.” (387) The schemes propounded at Meerut convinced Linlithgow that “the Pakistan proposition, though a thoroughly unsound one, could not be put aside as the Congress would like to suggest.” (354) On April 12, 1939, he intimated Zetland that these schemes “gave evidence of the uneasiness of the mind of Muslims.” (381) In the meanwhile, Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, met Zetland in London on March 20, 1939,

and proposed "a federation of Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India : a further federation of Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the east and one further federation of the other Provinces and States in the remaining part of India." These federations would be coordinated by a small central body, the object of this scheme being to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the Centre as the Hindus. (376) On their return to Bombay on May 12, 1939, Khaliqzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui met Jinnah and gave him the impression that the British would ultimately concede to a partition. Khaliqzaman also explained his view to Jinnah as to why he was opposed to the use of the word Pakistan for the scheme. Jinnah carefully heard every word of the talk and said, "Have you weighed the consequences?" Khaliqzaman replied, "There being no alternative open to us, we cannot go on talking on the old basis without any result." Jinnah is reported to have assured them that he was not opposed to it, but it had to be examined for all its consequences.²⁴³

Khaliqzaman's impression of the changing attitude of Zetland was not unfounded. Maulana Hasrat Mohani met him in London on 12 May, 1939 and pointed out, "The minorities can accept the supremacy of the majority only when it hopes that the same principle will also be applied in their case when they would be in majority and the present majority would turn into a minority and would accept the decision to be taken by the then majority. But according to the Government of India Act, the Muslim minority can never be turned into majority. In such circumstances to make it (Muslim minority) subject to the Hindu majority is against justice and beyond comprehension..., Lord Zetland is reported to have been impressed with this conversation." (392) In his letter of May 19, 1939 Zetland informed Linlithgow, "The deep-seated dislike and fear of Hindu domination on the part of 90 million Muslims is a thing which we cannot possibly brush aside."²⁴⁴ Subsequently speaking at the Empire Day Banquet in London he said, "I have no hesitation in saying that on this issue, the present generation of Indians has it within its power to make or mar the future of their country. Only if minorities in the country, be they princes or Muslims, feel assured that they collaborate as equal partners in a common enterprise without a haunting fear of their rights constantly overborne or disregarded, can we hope for a sure and steady progress towards the goal. Whether or not this condition is to be fulfilled, must depend in the main on the attitude of Hindus towards minorities. Much is at stake. Is it too much to ask the leaders of Congress as politically organised representing broadly speaking Hindu India should take this aspect of the matter seriously into account."²⁴⁵

XVII

It was in this critical context that Rajendra Prasad made an offer to Sikandar Hayat to work out an arrangement between Congress and the League on an agreed programme of the moderate nationalism. (400) Subsequently Linlithgow, in his letter of June 16, 1939 informed Zetland of the overtures for Hindu-Muslim rapprochement being conducted between Sikandar Hayat and Rajendra Prasad. (405) Sikandar Hayat,

therefore, finalised his alternative Homogeneous Zonal Scheme and placed it before the Muslim League Executive Council, which authorised him to conduct preliminary negotiations for understanding with the Congress. (418) This scheme envisaged a kind of a three-tier structure with autonomous Provinces grouped into seven zones having their own regional Legislatures together, constituting a loosest confederation with the Centre having charge only over common subjects like Defence, External Affairs, Communication, Customs and currency. (424) This scheme appears to have anticipated the subsequent Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946. In his letter of July 29, 1939, Sikandar Hayat informed Gandhiji that his 'scheme was conceived with the intention of providing a solution of communal and political problems.' (427) but Gandhiji's in his letter of August 14, 1939 intimated Sikandar Hayat that his scheme was placed before the Congress Working Committee." Every one of the members felt that it could not be entertained, if only because it contemplates a 'British Connection.' (431) Commenting on the scheme, Mirza Ismail, *Diwan* of Mysore, pointed out "The autonomous Provinces will not and cannot be forced into an alliance with the (princely) States which, in their opinion, would mean putting back the clock." (432)

Another alternative confederal scheme also emanating from the Punjab in July, 1939 and published by Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, Nawab of Mamdot, has been pseudonymously attributed to 'A Punjabi' who has been identified by some as Mian Kifayat Ali. According to this scheme, India was proposed to be divided into five autonomous units each with a federal Government and all coming together in a confederal association with undefined common links. (414) The original scheme of Kifayat Ali, who was closely associated with the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, is reported to have elaborated the idea of Pakistan. When the book was set to print, the Nawab of Mamdot thought it wise to send an advance copy to Jinnah, who sent him a telegram saying that he did not want the book to be called *Pakistan*. Consequently the author prepared an outline of a confederal constitutional scheme for the sub-continent and incorporated the same in the Introduction to the book which was subsequently called *Confederacy of India*.²⁴⁶ Whatever might be the truth, it would not be wrong to surmise that Jinnah, in the heart of his hearts, as yet did not want partition. This finds confirmation from Malik Barkat Ali's (Member, Muslim League Working Committee) letter of 21st June, 1939 to Jinnah asking him, "The Muslim League Working Committee should clarify its attitude towards the question of Muslim India and Hindu India." (410) In striking contrast to the two confederal schemes from the Punjab, Zafarul Hasan and Afzal Husain Qadri's alternative scheme of the Aligarh dons envisaged division of British India into three independent units of North-West, Bengal and Hindustan, with a sovereign State of Hyderabad, and was published around August, 1939. (437)

XVIII

These developments were not without their impact on Linlithgow, who, in his letter of August 31, 1939 wrote to Zetland, "Realising the failure to exercise special powers to protect Muslim interests, they should move into a stage wherein the value

of our continued association with the Government in this country is fully realised by them." (436) Such a stage did not take long to come. The outbreak of World War II on September 3, 1939 rapidly changed the situation in India which was dragged into the War by the Viceroy without consulting the Indian leaders. This irked the Congress, which wanted Linlithgow to declare the British War aims but the Viceroy was in no hurry to terminate the British Raj. This rapidly raised the bargaining power of the Muslim League as a useful counterweight to the Congress. The British naturally wanted an effective Indian contribution to the War. The Punjab was a major army recruiting area and it was a Muslim-majority Province. As a shrewd politician and tactician, Jinnah realised that the British Government desperately stood in need of Muslim support to maintain a *status quo* and resist the Congress demand. Soon he found himself seeing the Viceroy on September 4, 1939 on a footing of equality with Gandhiji. On the following day, Linlithgow wrote to Zetland, "Jinnah in his talks characteristically suggested that in order to secure his support, the Congress Ministries should be driven out of office." (439) During the talks Linlithgow also tried to probe Jinnah's mind about the statement made by him that he did not believe in democratic Government in India and raised the question that "if a democratic Government was unsuitable to this country, how was she to obtain her goal of Self-Government? Was such a policy not to condemn India to a perpetual condition of communal strife?" This elicited from Jinnah the reply that "an escape from the impasse... lay in the adoption of partition." This was perhaps the first occasion when Jinnah specifically talked of partition as an alternative.

At the Working Committee meeting on 17-18 September, 1939 Muslim League passed a resolution on the outbreak of the War and demanded that the federal scheme, instead of being suspended by the Viceroy, should be abandoned completely without further delay and asked for an assurance that "no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League, nor any Constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval." (442)

Nehru's reaction was naturally hostile. In his letter dated 6th October, 1939 he confided to Krishna Menon, "Anything more objectionable than their resolution on War I cannot imagine.... They have gone so far as to repudiate democracy for India... I had a long interview with Jinnah. It was a friendly talk and at least it removed certain tension that existed between us. But I fear that we are far apart so far as ideas are concerned. Jinnah is exceedingly backward and reactionary and has opinions and thinks in terms of twenty-five years ago. And yet he is more advanced than many of his colleagues in the Muslim League." (452)

What further complicated the situation was the refusal of other political parties to accept the representative credentials of the Congress and the League. On October 3, 1939 the leaders of the following political parties in their telegram "warned the Viceroy not to regard the Congress and the League as representing the whole or even the bulk of India." :

(a) *Liberal Party* : (i) Chimanlal H. Setalvad, (ii) Couwasji Jehangir, (iii) V.N. Chandavarkar. (b) *Hindu Mahasabha* : V.D. Savarkar. (c) *Democratic Swarajya Party* :

(i) N.C. Kelkar, and (ii) Jamnadas M. Mehta : (d) *Depressed Classes and Independent Labour Party* : B.R. Ambedkar. (449)

The Congress and the League now realised the dangers of the developing situation. It was in this milieu that on October 11, 1939 Sikandar Hayat announced that both the Congress and the Muslim League were anxious to settle their differences...if an informal invitation was extended to Jinnah, he would be willing to cooperate with the Congress. Immediately, Nehru intimated Maulana Azad that Sikandar Hayat had directly suggested a Congress-League consultation. (455) Soon after on October 15, 1939 Maulana Azad wired Jinnah from Lucknow and followed it up by a letter stating, "My only wish and attempt is centred round the idea that a decent agreement may be reached between the Congress and the League, as, I am sure, it is urgently needed for the Muslims and the country. Delay is detrimental to the interests of both.... The situation created by the Delhi talks has progressed no further and the matter is at a standstill after reaching a certain point. It should proceed on immediately. But what should be the proper procedure in this respect? Should the Congress President write to you? Or should some such other method be adopted?" (456)

In the meanwhile, Nehru wrote to his friend Raghunandan Saran to get in touch with Jinnah. Saran promptly contacted Liaquat Ali, who informed him that Jinnah would like to talk over the matter with him. Reporting his talk with Jinnah, Saran wrote to Nehru on October 17, 1939, "It was in connection with the talks with the Viceroy that he (Jinnah) told you that if necessary, he would contact you after the interview. He fully expected a further contact with you to discuss the Hindu-Muslim problem after you had consulted your colleagues. It is a tragedy that the matter could not be settled in a friendly spirit, said he. He went on to say that "we were very much closer than we thought we were." He said he would indeed welcome resumption of conversation with you... Contrasted with other important members of the League, I have not the slightest hesitation in opining that he is altogether superior to them all in every way... I venture to submit that now is the time to forge an understanding. Mr. Jinnah is in a proper mood. Why not write and arrange a meeting with him? Surely any settlement that you two could arrive at would be acceptable to the two organisations." (457)

Nehru promptly wrote to Jinnah from Lucknow on October 18, 1939 "Nandan (Saran) has written to me about his meeting with you yesterday and his conversation with you... I shall be glad to meet you again. If I had time now, I would have come up to Delhi, but I fear this is difficult as I have to go to Allahabad tomorrow and, after a few hours stay there to Wardha for the Congress Working Committee... I entirely agree with you that it is a tragedy that the Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way. I feel terribly distressed about it and ashamed of myself in as far as I have not been able to contribute anything substantial towards its solution. I must confess to you that in this matter I have lost confidence in myself." (460)

While these political parleys were going on in Delhi, George Arundale, President of Theosophical Society, wrote to Sardar Patel, "I am one of those who is of opinion that both Gandhi and the Congress have so far failed India in the great hour of her need for emphatic leadership.... And Gandhi's love for the Musalmans must express itself in exhortations to his Hindu followers to show their true greatness by acceding

to the fullest possible extent to the demands of all minorities. Not through bargaining will any substantial results accrue, but through noble gestures on the part of the majorities." (454)

XIX

The entire political scenario was altered by the declaration of the Viceroy on October 17, 1939 that "I am authorised by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the War, they will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable." (459) In order to discuss the Viceroy's announcement, the League and the Congress convened meetings of their respective Working Committees on October 22, 1939. On the eve of the League's Working Committee meeting, Mian Ahmad Bashir of the Majlis-i-Kabir-Pakistan wrote to Jinnah, "If the British Government is really serious and sincere in bringing about peace in the subcontinent, it should not only appreciate the differences, but also allow the two nationalities separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous homogeneous States." (463) Subsequently the League Working Committee in its resolution appreciated that "His Majesty's Government have emphatically repudiated the unfounded claim of the Congress that they alone represent all India and note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government recognised the fact that the All India Muslim League alone truly represents the Musalmans of India and can speak on their behalf; also that the rights and interests of the minorities and other important interests concerned have been duly recognised.... In view of the urgency of the matter, the Committee empowers him (President) to give an assurance of cooperation and support on behalf of the Musalmans of India to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the War." (466)

On the other than the Congress Working Committee, at its meeting held on October 22, 1939, considered the Viceroy's declaration as a reiteration of the old imperialist policy. It took particular objections to the stress on differences among Indian Parties, describing it as a 'screen' to hide the true intentions of Great Britain. The committee categorically declined to admit any necessity for a prior agreement with the Muslim League as a condition precedent to the fulfilment of its demands. Its contention was that the Constituent Assembly would adequately secure protection for the Muslims. To express its disapproval of the Viceroy's statement, the Committee called upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations. (466)

The resignation of the Congress Ministries from office left the field open for Jinnah to raise his demands and extract concessions from the British Government, which desperately stood in need of support in the increasingly critical War situation. The strategy adopted by Linlithgow and Zetland was to lay continuous stress on divergence of views between the two communities. On November 1, 1939, Linlithgow in his interview with Gandhiji, Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad, stipulated that any expansion of Viceroy's Executive Council to include more Indian representatives and

any return to popular Government in the Provinces was conditional upon the Congress and the League reaching an agreement. (476) Nehru's reaction was that "the British Government had foisted the communal issue to secure its own vested interests." (493) Jinnah was thus presented with a veto on any further constitutional development.

The resignation of the Congress Ministries alarmed the India Conciliation Group,²⁴⁸ which consisted largely of Quakers including Horace Alexander, Alexander Wilson and Carl Heath, who was the Chairman. On November 12, 1939, Heath addressed a letter to Gandhiji, Nehru and Rajendra Prasad observing, "While it is no more true deduction that the Hindu-Muslim tension is being raised as a mere means to divide and rule, than it is to suggest that the Congress seeks to profit by the British Government's War embarrassments... Great Britain needs to carry the Muslim world with her at this time of immense struggle." (495) In the House of Commons, India debate on October 26, 1939 Stafford Cripps, aptly called the English Nehru, condemned the Government's lack of appreciation of the new circumstances which had inevitably arisen with the coming of the struggle in Europe.²⁴⁹ Dissatisfaction with official policy among some Members from each of the three British Parties led Cripps to undertake an exploratory visit to India, in order to discuss his scheme envisaging that Britain was now willing to grant India a Dominion Status, which conceded the rights of Indians to frame their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly. Cripps' scheme had attracted some support but had no accreditation whatsoever. Zetland remained non-committal when, two days before his departure, Cripps sounded him out²⁵⁰ on how the Government would regard proposals to resolve the Indian problem on the model of the settlement with Southern Ireland. (510)

Upon his arrival at Allahabad on December 8, 1939, Cripps showed Nehru his scheme and gave him a copy to send on to Gandhiji. Reporting to Mahadev Desai on December 9, 1939, Nehru remarked that Cripps scheme had some desirable features, but also had 'two or three fatal defects.' At Delhi, Cripps had an interview with G.D. Birla and Liaqat Ali on December 11, 1939 and gleaned the complexities of the communal problem. Birla admitted that the Congress may have been seriously at fault in excluding non-Congress Muslims from Provincial Cabinets, with the result that talented Muslims such as Liaqat Ali in U.P. felt themselves consigned to permanent opposition. Birla now saw only one solution : separate Hindu and Muslim nations with the cession of districts and appropriate population movements, followed, perhaps, by a loose federation holding the minimum powers necessary.²⁵¹

Birla's gloomy analysis was anticipated, by Mian Ahmad Bashir of Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, who in his letter of December 6, 1939, four days before Cripps arrival at Allahabad, drew Nehru's attention to Bhai Parmanand's first proposal to partition India into Hindu and Muslim zones in 1904 and pointed out that "the Pakistan Movement is to reincorporate Islamic States in those parts of the Indian continent where the Muslims form the bulk of the population." (517)

In his interview with Cripps, Liaqat Ali pointed out that the time for safeguards was passed and sketched out three possible solutions : (1) partition, (2) free sovereign States, with Hindu and Muslim federations, and (3) a confederation and Dominion Status for each Province, with a federal Government exercising such powers as they chose to cede, subject to their right to opt out.²⁵² He told Cripps that "Muslim opinion

has recently become very strong for partition of India into Muslim India and Hindu India, as they feel that that is the best solution for every one concerned." (531)

When Cripps went to Lahore on December 12, 1939, Sikandar Hayat corroborated the trend of Cripps thoughts of a settlement in terms of a loose federation as a prior condition of detailed Constitution-making. Thereafter Cripps on December 15, 1939, had an interview with Jinnah who underlined the impossibility of Western democracy in India with its inevitable permanent entrenchment of the majority community. His immediate proposals were "that Congress should accept the Muslim League as the negotiator on behalf of the Muslims, that Muslim should be represented in the provincial Governments and that no bill should be proceeded with if two-thirds of the Muslim members of the Legislature objected to it on communal grounds." Thereafter Cripps tackled Jinnah on his call for "Day of Deliverance." He felt that Jinnah was quite willing to meet Nehru.²⁵³

In his meeting with Gandhiji and Members of the Congress Working Committee on 19-20 December, 1939 at Wardha Cripps felt that Gandhiji had "some verbal criticism as to "Dominion Status" and "one or two other matters, but said that otherwise the scheme would form an acceptable basis for negotiation and arrangement so far as he was concerned." He was "quite convinced that the next step must be with the British Government."²⁵⁴

Like Cripps, Linlithgow had come to realise that the Muslim League would resent any promise of a Constituent Assembly without prior settlement of the constitutional problem. Such a declaration would further inflame Muslim opinion of which Jinnah's call for a Day of Deliverance was an ominous indication. A day before the 'Day of Deliverance,' Linlithgow made an assessment of the position at length. If Britain yielded to Congress now, the Party would use its enhanced prestige to drive a hard bargain over Britain's commercial interests. Linlithgow's emphasis was primarily imperialist. He wrote to Zetland, "It is no part of our policy, I take it, to expedite in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of the control to Indian hands at any pace faster than that which we regard as best calculated, on a long view, to hold India to the Empire."²⁵⁵

It was in this developing situation that Jinnah, as a shrewd strategist, realised that he must hold his team together. He, therefore, issued an appeal to observe December 22, 1939 as a Day of Deliverance to mark the end of the Congress rule. (508, 516) Jinnah's action made the Congress bang the door of negotiations with him as these were now considered futile. (526, 530) The indignation and despair caused in the Congress circles by Jinnah's tactics was conveyed by Birla in his interview on December 9, 1939 with Linlithgow, who was now convinced that Jinnah's "importance in political negotiations will immensely increase if he could hold his team together behind him." (524) More significant was the reaction of Zetland who, in his letter to Linlithgow on December 14, 1939, commented "Jinnah has been exploding like a machine gun." (540)

What prompted Jinnah to issue an appeal for the Deliverance Day was his desire to express in his own words "our relief and to show its intensity in a manner that would force ears that had hitherto been deaf to listen to us." (537) In his letter of December 13, 1939 to Nehru, Jinnah wanted the Congress "to treat the League as

the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India and thereby pave the way for the evolution of an agreed formula for a demand of a declaration by His Majesty's Government that would satisfy both the Congress and the League." (534) Nehru, could not agree as naturally he thought that "constitutionally having a national basis, the Congress could not give up its national character by acknowledging Muslim League as the sole representative organisation of the Muslims." (538)

Jinnah's appeal for the Day of Deliverance evoked criticism as also support from different quarters. Hassan Ispahani friend of Jinnah and, financier of the League thought that "the Deliverance *farman* dropped like a bolt from the blue and upset many a mental equilibrium." (547) While another businessman, Mohammad Dawji Didabhoy appealed to Jinnah on December 14, 1939 "to find some *via media* and postpone the demonstration to some opportune moment." (542) Sultan Ahmad thought that the Day of Deliverance "has lowered the stock of the Muslim League." (563) M.A. Bari suggested to Jinnah that "accomplishing the object of calling attention to the problem, he should now gracefully call off the proposed demonstration and bring about Hindu-Muslim unity." (555) Clarifying his stand, Jinnah issued a statement on 17 December, 1939, and pointed out that the Deliverance Day "is not directed against the Hindus" and appealed "for support of all his fellow countrymen who believe that conditions in India necessitate popular rather than an irremovable majority Government." (550) Dastur Noshervan Kaikubad stated that the Parsis regarded the outgoing of the Congress Ministries as a deliverance." (556) While Dwarkadas Jethabhai Dani maintained that "all communities were invited to participate in the Day of Deliverance." (558)

The Day of Deliverance was reported to have been observed in an orderly and disciplined manner. Jinnah claimed support of other minorities and non-Congress Hindus including followers of Dravida Kazgham". (568-69) D.G. Dalve of the Liberal Party, however, thought that "it was a partial success owing to divided opinion among the Muslim community, but the untouchables joined the demonstration because, taking advantage of this move, Dr. Ambedkar wanted to get out of the Poona Pact and secure separate electorate for the depressed classes." (568)

While the Depressed Classes, led by Dr. Ambedkar, openly supported the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha at its twenty-first session at Calcutta held on 28-30 December, 1939 criticised the various schemes and V.D. Savarkar presiding over the session elaborated the basic tenets of *Hindutva* ideology, envisaging the concept of Hindu *Rashtra*. (573-74)

XX

The facts stated above, enable us to arrive at the conclusion that the inauguration of the provincial autonomy in 1937 led to the widening of the chasm between the majority and minority communities as also sharpening of the differences between the Congress-Left and the Congress-Right. Under the Act of 1935, the Congress and the League contested the elections, according to the Raja of Mahmudabad, "as two parts of the same army fighting a common enemy on two fronts." The election

results demonstrated that out of 1585 seats allocated to the Provincial Assemblies, the Congress won 716 seats securing clear majority in six out of eleven Provinces and emerged as the single largest Party in three other Provinces but its performance in the Muslim electorate was dismal. The League, on the other hand, won 109 out of 482 contested seats but failed to secure clear majority in any of the four Muslim majority Provinces.

Notwithstanding the opposition of its Left Wing, the Congress, buckling under the pressure of its Right Wing, accepted office and formed Ministries in nine Provinces. In order to revive the spirit of the Lucknow Pact, Jinnah wanted to form Congress-League coalitions in Bombay and U.P. but swayed by the euphoria of its electoral victory, the Congress wanted the League to merge into it but this was not acceptable to Jinnah who now started to revitalise the League and widen the mass base of his party by embarrassing the Congress Ministries from outside the Legislatures by alleging that the Congress was not interested in safeguarding the rights of the minorities.

Conscious of its poor performance in Muslim electorate, the Congress-Left launched Muslim Mass Contact Campaign but it was sabotaged by the Congress-Right which apprehended that the success of the campaign would widen the social base of the Congress-Left and bolsters the image of socialist Nehru. In order to consolidate its position within the Party, the Congress-Right had organised itself into the Congress Nationalist Party under the leadership of Madan Mohan Malaviya who in the words of the Left leader Satya Pal, "under the cloak of unalloyed nationalism was digging the grave of nationalism."

What further complicated the problem further was the dichotomous approach to the agrarian legislations adopted by some of the Congress Ministries. In the Muslim majority Province of the Punjab, Muslim landlords dominated the rural areas while the Arya Samajist Hindu traders and money lenders were the spokesmen of the Hindu interest. In Bengal, Hindu Bhadrak of metropolitan Calcutta and Muslim Jotedars of East Bengal dominated the provincial politics. This rural-urban divide was, unfortunately, given a communal twist. Moreover, the Hindu big business not only became the financiers of the Congress but also started having a say in political matters. Similarly, the nascent Muslim big business began to finance the Muslim League. The competitive struggle within the business class was confused with communal undertones. The Muslim segment of the big business, having close links with the Governments in the Muslim majority Provinces, favoured greater provincial autonomy in financial and economic matters while their Hindu counterparts supported a strong unitary Centre where they hoped to wield greater financial and economic influence than their Muslim counterparts. It was in pursuit of the commercial interests of his mercantile class that G.D. Birla, having closer links with the Congress-Right and the Hindu Mahasabha, proposed a Muslim Federation of North-West as early as February 7, 1938 to Linlithgow, who encouraged him, "to pursue it further as his reflections envisaged perpetuation for indefinite period of time British military power in India."

The problem now resolved itself into a controversy over a strong Centre with few powers to Provinces and autonomous Provinces with as few central subjects as circumstances permitted. Disillusioned by the experience of the provincial autonomy,

some of the Muslim leaders formulated alternative schemes but they were doomed to failure because most of them envisaged a weak Centre. Even Sikandar Hayat's confederal homogenous cultural zones scheme as also, "Punjabi's" Confederacy of India were rejected though the last scheme, presented in the mid-summer of 1939, was reported to have tacit approval of Jinnah.

The concept of confederacy of India perhaps made the Congress-Left to initiate Congress-League rapprochement and some of their leaders including Mian Iftikharud-Din and Hussain Zaheer opened negotiations with Liaquat Ali, telling him that they would persuade the Congress High Command to come to terms with the League. They, however, wanted some face saving device. Coincidentally, the Congress-Right also came to realise that Jamiatul-Ulama and Majlis-i-Ahrar were disillusioned and Muslims were, by and large, getting alienated from the Congress.

This belated realisation in the Congress and subsequent attempts at Congress-League entente, coincided with the declaration of the Second World War dramatically changing the political climate in India. In protest against Viceroy's dragging of India into the War without consulting its leaders and declaration of the War aims on 17 October 1939, the Congress Ministries resigned leaving the field open to Jinnah to extract concessions for the League from the British Government which desperately wanted Indian contribution to the War. The major army recruiting area was in the Muslim majority Province of the Punjab and Britain needed at this critical hour, in the words of Carl Heath, Chairman of India Conciliation Group, to carry "the Muslim world with it." The League was thus presented with an opportunity which it exploited to its advantage by offering its cooperation in the prosecution of the War. The Viceroy was now convinced that, "Jinnah's importance in political negotiations will immensely increase if he could hold his team behind him." Subsequently, when the League observed 22nd December 1939 as the Deliverance Day, it is reported to have found sympathies among the Depressed Classes led by B.R. Ambedkar and Dravida Kazhagam headed by Ramaswamy Naicker who found their interests identical with those of the Muslim minority, while V.D. Savarkar, at the 21st Session of the Hindu Mahasabha held at Calcutta on 28-30 December 1939, stridently advocated his concept of Hindu Rashtra or Hindu Nation which was akin to League's concept of religion based Millatism or Muslim Nationalism as propounded by Iqbal, against the composite cultural nationalism of the Congress-Jamiatul-Ulama combine.

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236. However three years earlier on April 3, 1936 at Bombay he said, "Muslims could arrive at a settlement with the Hindus as two nations if not as partners" *Nation's Voice*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
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247. Note of an interview between Jinnah and Linlithgow, October 5, 1939 quoted in Uma Kaura, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
248. It was set up in 1931, at the behest of Gandhiji to promote mutual understanding between Great Britain and India. During his visit to England (June-October, 1938) Nehru met members of this group at the country house of Stafford Cripps, *R.J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-1945*, London, 1979, p. 4.
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1

Jinnah's Speech [Extract]

Tribune, 3 January, 1937; Nation's Voice, p. 103

Nagpur, 1 January, 1937. 1. Hindus and Muslims, should present a united front. They must stand together and work together for the welfare of this Province and the freedom of our motherland, declared Mr. M.A. Jinnah, M.L.A., President of the All India Muslim League, addressing this evening a mixed audience estimated at over 3,000 Hindus and Muslims at Chitnis Park.

2. Explaining the objectives of the League, he said that it stood for independent, progressive ideas. Their desire was to send the best representatives to the new Legislatures, who would cooperate with other progressive groups for the uplift, progress and freedom of the motherland. His advice to Muslims, as also to sister communities, was to produce by the process of hammering fine steel and weed out those who were obstructing their march to freedom. Mr. Jinnah was sure that better minds among both the communities would concentrate on achieving the common objective. He emphasised their duty to ensure that every section of the people of the country was raised to a higher standard and reminded the audience that there could be no hope of progress so long as they had amidst them people, who were neglected or remained useless units of the country.

2

Jinnah's rejoinder to Nehru [Extract]

There is a third party in this country and that is the Muslims
The Statesman, Calcutta, 4 January, 1937; Pakistan in the Making, pp. 538-39

"I regret the Congress interfering in the affairs of Muslims by putting up Muslim candidates in opposition to the League candidates," remarked Mr. M.A. Jinnah inaugurating the election campaign on behalf of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board candidates at a largely attended meeting of Mohammadans at Mohammad Ali Park, Calcutta, yesterday. The occasion was the anniversary of the death of Maulana Mohammad Ali.

2. "I warn my Hindu friends and the Congress," said Mr. Jinnah, "to leave the Muslims alone. We have made it clear and we mean it that we are ready and willing to cooperate with any other group or groups of progressive and independent character, provided that their programme and our programme are approximately the same. We are not going to be the camp followers of any party or organisation."

3. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have said in Calcutta that there are only two parties in the country, namely, the Government and the Congress, and the others must line up. "I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is a third party in this country and that is the Muslims. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody. We are willing as equal partners with our sister communities to come to a settlement in the interest of India."

4. Continuing, Mr. Jinnah said that the All India Muslim League was the only organization which could speak with an authority that could not be challenged, and he asked the Mohammadan voters to support the League candidates in the coming elections. The Provincial and Central Parliamentary Boards of the League were composed of men who had faithfully served the community and who could be relied upon to see that the principles of the League were fully maintained by the men returned on the League ticket. What would an independent candidate do? Who was going to exercise any control over him or to watch whether he was really behaving or not?

7. "I appeal to you in the name of the one organization which the Muslims possess today, in your own interest and for the sake of unity, to see that those who are creating differences are smashed and that the flag of the Muslim League is carried into the Legislatures."

3

Abdul Halim Ghuznavi¹ to Maharajadhiraj B.C. Mahtab, of Burdwan² [Extract]

Star of India, Towards Freedom Papers I, pp. 1313-14

8 January, 1937

My dear Friend,

1. With the advancing years, the conviction has steadily gained ground on me that for the good Government of Bengal, it is absolutely necessary that the two great communities—the Hindus and the Muslims—should bury the hatchet and commence to work together for her welfare on non-communal lines and in spirit of mutual tolerance and cooperation. It is on that account and also with a view to end the communal bitterness that I welcomed the following proposal for the settlement of the communal differences which Mr. B.C. Chatterjee³ put forward during his visit to London in 1933 with the sanction and approval of the Hindu and Muslim leaders including the Hon'ble Nawab Sir Mohiuddin Faruqui, the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Azizul Haque, the Hon'ble Sir B.P. Singh Roy,⁴ Dr. Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta,⁵ Khan Bahadur M. Abdul Momin, Mr. Fazlul Huq,⁶ Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy⁷, Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy, Moulvi Abul Kasim.⁸ The proposal was as follows:

1. The proportion of seats allotted on the Bengal Legislative Council to Bengal Muslims and Hindus by the Communal Award⁹ to remain subject to revision at the end of 10 years.

2. The Cabinet to contain an equal number of Hindu and Muslim Ministers.

3. All the services under the Provincial Government to be recruited from now in equal numbers in the proportion of 50-50 from the Hindu and Muslim communities in Bengal subject to the reservation of an agreed percentage thereof for members of the European, Anglo-Indian and Christian communities of the Province and subject to the candidates of all the communities of the Province satisfying a test of minimum efficiency to be formulated by a Provincial Services Commission. . . . Unfortunately however, the Hindu leaders later on backed out of the agreement. So the proposal fell through.

4. Although this discouraged me for the time being I did not lose all hope, but went on persisting that some suitable arrangement and understanding should be arrived at in the interest of the people of Bengal as a whole. It heartened me to find that the arrangement proposed in 1933 had the support of such leaders amongst others as the Hon'ble Nawab Sir Mohiuddin Faruqui, the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Azizul Haque, the Hon'ble Sir B.P. Singh Roy, Dr. Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta, Khan Bahadur M. Abdul Momin, Mr. Fazlul Huq, Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy, Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy¹⁰ and Moulvi Abul Kasim. I, therefore, profoundly deplored the existence earlier this year of a bitter controversy in Bengal between the Hindus and the Muslims regarding the Communal Award. So it gave me great relief when in the month of August last you broached to me the subject of Hindu-Muslim settlement. . . . Thereafter I spoke to you about the infructuous proposal of 1933 and enquired whether anything on the same lines was feasible and acceptable by you and your friends. . . .

5. When, therefore, I received your letter of the 8th September last in which you stated that you and your friends took a favourable view of the proposal, I at once proceeded to consult H.H. the Right Hon'ble the Agha Khan¹¹ who replied on 17th October 1936 as follows: "Proposed settlement with the Hindus would be excellent if possible and if acceptable to leaders of both parties. Deserving of every encouragement."

6. Thereafter I approached most of the other All India Muslim Leaders who also have given hearty support to the proposal mentioned below. Just at the present moment it cannot be expected that those who are contesting the forthcoming election to the Provincial Assembly in Bengal will commit themselves, however sympathetic they may be in this connection. . . .

7. The acceptance of the proposal on Muslim side must be understood to be subject to the proviso that all agitation against the Communal Award except in the manner agreed upon must cease as soon as this settlement is put through, otherwise it will be inoperative and of no effect.

I remain.

Yours sincerely,
ABDUL HALIM GHUZNAVI
(Kt., M.L.A.)

1. Sir Abaul Halim Khan Ghuznavi (1876-1953); Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1927-45, delegate to the three Sessions of the Round Table Conference, 1930-32, started 'United Bengal Stores' to popularise *Swadeshi* goods.

2. Maharajadhiraj of Burdwan, B.C. Mahtab; President, Anti-Communal Award Committee.
3. B.C. Chatterjee; leading criminal lawyer of Bengal.
4. Sir B.P. Singh Roy, Revenue Minister, Bengal, 1938-41; President, All India Liberal Federation.
5. Dr. Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta, translated Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's *Anandmath* 'The Abbey of Bliss.'
6. A.K. Fazlul Huq (1873-1962); Secretary Bengal Provincial League, 1913; established Nikhil Banga Krishak Praja Samity Femeleoration of Bengal peasants, delegate to the Round Table Conference, 1930 and 1931; Premier, Coalition Ministry, Bengal, 1937-41; organised Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference, Calcutta, June, 1942; headed the United Front Ministry in East Pakistan, 1954; Central Minister, Pakistan, August 1955 to March 1956; Governor, East Pakistan, 1956-58.
7. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (1893-1963); Secretary, Bengal Provincial Muslim League; Member, First Bengal Legislative Council 1921; Minister for Labour, Commerce, Rural Reconstruction, Finance, Public Health and Local Self-Government and Food, 1943-45; Premier, Bengal, 1946-47; Convener, Awami League, 1949; Federal Minister of Law, Pakistan, 1954-55; Prime Minister, Pakistan, September 1956-October 1957.
8. Moulvi Abul Kasim (1863-1943); started as a Congress activist under Surendra Nath Banerjee; promoted education among Muslims in Bengal; President, Bengal Muslim League; Member, Council of State; Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1926; Chairman, Reception Committee, AIML, Calcutta Session, December 1928.
9. On 16 August, 1932, Mac-Donald, British Prime Minister, announced 'Communal Award' which allocated separate electorates for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans, others falling under a general constituency. It retained weightage given to Muslims in minority Provinces. The Depressed Classes were assured separate special constituencies but Gandhiji's reaction was one of bitter oppositions. He went on fast unto death on 20 September, 1932 in the Yervada jail. Four days later, leaders of the untouchables including B.R. Ambedkar agreed *inter alia* to an accord called the Poona Pact which provided for reservation of seats for the depressed classes in the general (Hindu) constituencies.
10. Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy, Al-Mamun, Tagore Law Professor, Calcutta University, 1911; President, Calcutta Khilafat Committee, 1924; Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1910-26 and Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-35.
11. Agha Khan III (1877-1957); religious head of the Ismailis; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1902; Member, Deputation of Muslims on Separate Electorates and Adequate Representation, 1906; President, AIML, 1907-13; Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1921; delegate to Round Table Conference, 1931-32; President, League of Nations Assembly.

4

B.C. Mahtab Maharajadhiraja, B.C. Mahtab to Abdul Halim Ghuznavi

Star of India, Towards Freedom Papers, I, pp. 1314-16

8 January, 1937

My dear Friend,

1. I have to thank you for your letter dated the 17th December, indicating the terms of a possible settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question in Bengal. I feel

you are entitled to the gratitude of the people of Bengal for the trouble you have taken to secure the assent of prominent and representative Muslim gentlemen to your proposals which evince an earnest desire on your part to secure inter-communal harmony in this Province. It is particularly gratifying to me and my friends who have been in close touch with me in this matter that your proposals have the approval of His Highness the Agha Khan, a copy of whose cabled message to you is embodied in your letter under reply. I also note with great satisfaction that you "approached most of the other All India Muslim Leaders who also have given support to the proposal mentioned" in your letter. Your proposals are as follows:

- I. The Communal Award to remain subject to revision at the end of ten years or unless and until the Communal Award is printed in the newspaper modified by the mutual agreement of the communities affected by it.
- II. The Cabinet to contain an equal number of Hindu and Muslim Ministers.
- III. All the services under the Provincial Government to be recruited from now in equal numbers in the proportion of 50-50 from the Hindu and Muslim communities in Bengal, subject to the reservation of an agreed percentage thereof for members of the European, Anglo-Indian and Christian communities of the Province and subject to the candidates of all the communities satisfying a test of minimum efficiency to be formulated by a Provincial Commission.

2. You will, no doubt, remember that during our informal discussions we had on two occasions, the benefit of the suggestions and opinions of two important Congress leaders namely, Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy¹ and Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose². They spoke freely and frankly and took part in the discussion apparently without reserve. Although they said that they could not at that stage be formally associated with the proposals, they both expressed the opinion that the proposals when presented to the public would greatly ease the communal tension which unfortunately existed and was growing. They even suggested certain slight alteration in your original draft, some of which you accepted and are incorporated in your final draft, which I have quoted verbatim from your letter in the previous paragraph of this letter.

3. I placed your letter, with your proposals, before the Negotiations Sub-Committee of the Bengal Anti-Communal Award Committee³ at a meeting held last evening, and I am very glad to be able to inform you that the said Sub-Committee, which was vested with plenary powers by the parent body in this matter, have unanimously accepted the proposals as the basis of a complete Hindu-Muslim settlement in Bengal in the near future. It is our hope, as we believe it is yours, that our joint efforts, which have resulted in these obviously reasonable proposals, will at once create an atmosphere of trust and goodwill and so far, at any rate as this Province is concerned—there will be no need in future for militant public agitation either against or in support of the Communal Award. On my behalf and on behalf of my Committee I thank you for your good

offices and for the truly public spirited urge in you which impelled you to move in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

B.C. MAHTAB

Maharajadhiraj Bahadur of Burdwan
President, Bengal Anti-Communal Award Committee

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1. Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy (1882-1962); eminent physician and Congressman of Bengal, Chief Minister of West Bengal from 1948 till his death.
 2. Sarat Chandra Bose (1889-1950); left-wing Congress leader of Bengal; Leader, Congress Parliamentary Party in Bengal, 1937-39; joined the Interim Government, 1946; fell out with Congress and formed the Socialist Republican Party.
 3. Bengal Anti-Communal Award Committee with Maharaja of Burdwan as President signed three point agreement on 7 January, 1937 concern communal settlement in Bengal.

5

Jinnah's Speech [Extract]

Star of India, 9 January 1937, Nation's Voice, pp. 111-12.

Dacca, 8 January, 1937. 1. Mr. M.A. Jinnah who arrived here yesterday with Khan Bahadur Azizul Haque, Education Minister, Bengal, addressed a public meeting last night at the Curzon Hall explaining the policy and principle of the All India Muslim League.

3. He said that at present there was a fundamental difference between the Muslims and the Congress and he felt that the Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the League stood out as a landmark in the political history of India and if the Muslims had been able to settle their differences once, Mr. Jinnah saw no reason why the same could not be achieved again. It was for that reason that the League was endeavouring by systematic organisation to produce the best materials among the Muslims.

4. Both the Hindus and Muslims, he said, were required to weed out the obstructive and objectionable elements. He asked those of his Hindu friends who got delirious over the Communal Award to drop that attitude and not to make a fetish of it. He asked them to think of the larger interests of the country. There was a certain section of the Press, he said, that suffered from the communal phobia. Mr. Jinnah asked them to understand that it served no purpose. On the contrary, it led to bitterness. They could not achieve anything by using the Press for the purpose of misrepresentation and propagation of untruth. Proceeding, Mr. Jinnah said, what was required was sound commonsense, practical wisdom and better understanding to achieve the freedom of India, and he was sure the Muslims would not lag behind in the struggle for freedom.

5. In spite of *separate electorate* and in spite of the difficulty that faced the country, continued Mr. Jinnah, the Hindus and Muslims could join hands and form one party, provided they could agree upon a common policy and programme according to which they could work together both inside the Legislature and outside. This was in their hands today. He appealed to the Muslims to support the All India Muslim League and its policy and programme. It was the only organised body and an All India body. Solidarity and unity among the Muslims were the first essential for their progress.

6

Nehru's Rejoinder to Jinnah [Extract]

*The Hindustan Times, 12 January, 1937; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,
Vol. VIII, pp. 119-22*

10 January, 1937. 1. Mr. Jinnah has in a recent utterance taken exception to my saying that essentially there were only two parties in the country, the Government and the Congress¹ and he has reminded me that there was a third party and that was the Indian Muslims. In course of his speech, he has made some remarkable statements. I am rushing about from place to place in Bihar and can find no time to give the careful consideration which Mr. Jinnah's speech deserves. But the importance of what he has said impels me to steal some time from an exhausting programme, after a very heavy day's work, to offer a few remarks.

2. Mr. Jinnah, it seems to me, has said something which surely is communalism raised to the [illegible] powers? He objects to the Congress interfering with Muslim affairs in Bengal and calls upon the Congress to let Muslims alone. This objection and demand bear a strong family likeness to what Bhai Parmanand² has often said on behalf of the Hindu communalists. Carried to a logical conclusion, Mr. Jinnah's statement means that in no department of public activity must non-Muslims have anything to do with Muslim affairs. In politics and social and economic matters the Muslims must function separately as a group and deal with other groups as one nation deals with another. So also in trade unions, peasant unions, business, chambers of commerce and like organisations and activities. Muslims in India are indeed a nation apart and those who forget this fact commit a sin against the Holy Ghost and offend Mr. Jinnah.

3. Again, who are the Muslims? Apparently only those who follow Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League. When Maulana Mohammad Ali³ joined the Congress, Mr. Jinnah tells us that he fought against the Muslims. It was small matter that thousands of Muslims were members of the Congress then and millions sympathised and cooperated with it. Being outside the fold of the Muslim League and not following Mr. Jinnah's lead, they can be presumed to be other than Muslims. Presumably, according to Mr. Jinnah, powerful Muslim organisations in the Punjab and in Bengal, like the Ahrars and the Kisan parties, being outside the fold of the Muslim League, are not really Muslims. We have a new test of orthodoxy.

4. What exactly Mr. Jinnah would like us, of the Congress, to do with the large number of Muslims in the Congress, I do not know. Would he like us to ask them to resign and go on bended knee to him? And what shall I say to the great crowds of Muslim peasants and workers who come to listen to me?

5. All this seems to me an extraordinary and harmful doctrine and most unjust to the Muslims. His reference to a third party is also far from happy or complimentary to the Muslims. Between British imperialism and Indian nationalism he would have them remain as a political group apart, apparently playing off one against the other, and seeking communal advantage even at the cost of the larger public good.

6. I am totally unable to think along these or any other communal lines, and with all deference to Mr. Jinnah may I suggest that such ideas are mediaeval and out of date? They bear no relation whatever to modern conditions and modern problems, which are essentially economic and political. Religion is both a personal matter and a bond of faith, but to stress religion in matters political and economic is obscurantism and lead to the avoidance of real issues. In what way are the interests of the Muslim peasant different from those of the Hindu peasant? Or those of a Muslim labour or artisan or merchant or landlord or manufacturer different from those of his Hindu prototype? The ties that bind people are common economic interests, and in the case of a subject country especially, a common national interest. Religious questions may arise and religious conflicts may take place, and they should be faced and settled. But the right way to deal with them is to limit their sphere of action and influence, and to prevent them from encroaching on politics and economics. To encourage a communal consideration of political and economic problems is to encourage reaction and go back to the Middle Ages. It is an impossible attempt, for it ignores realities.

7. The realities of today are poverty and hunger and unemployment and the conflict between British imperialism and Indian nationalism. How are these to be considered communally?

8. There are, of course, many groups and parties and odd individuals in the country today. But historically speaking the present contest lies between imperialism and nationalism. All 'third parties,' middle and undecided groups, etc., have no real importance to this historic sense. They have consequently no great strength and they function only in elections and the like and fade away at other times. The communal groupings have no such real importance in spite of occasional importance being thrust upon them.

9. Mr. Jinnah leads a party in the Legislative Assembly. The members of that party have shown the most remarkable independence of each other and of the party. Why is that so? Because no common principle or policy binds them and at the touch of any real problem they break apart. That must also be the inevitable fate of communal parties.

10. There is no question of dictators and camp followers. The Congress is a democratic organisation with its roots deep down in the Indian soil. Its doors are open to every Indian who believes in independence. For it the dominant issue is that of independence to enable us to get rid of poverty and the exploitation of the people. It may make mistakes but it tries always to think in terms of the nation and in terms of national freedom, and deliberately to avoid a narrower or a communal outlook.

11. What does the Muslim League stand for? Does it stand for the independence

of India, for anti-imperialism? I believe not. It represents a group of Muslims, no doubt highly estimable persons, but functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle classes and having no contacts with the Muslim masses and few even with the Muslim lower middle class. May I suggest to Mr. Jinnah that I come into greater touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League? I know more about their hunger and poverty and misery than those who talk in terms of percentages and seats in the councils and places in the state services. I have had vast Muslim audience in the Punjab and elsewhere. They did not ask me about the communal problem or percentages or separate electorates. They were intensely interested in the burden of land revenue or rent, of debt, of water rates, of unemployment, and the many other burdens they carry.

12. As President of the Congress I have the honour and privilege to represent the innumerable Muslims throughout the country who have taken a valiant part in the struggle for freedom, who have suffered for the great cause of independence and who have stood shoulder to shoulder with others in our historic fight under the banner of the Congress. I represent the many brave Muslim comrades who still stand in the front ranks of our forces and who have been true to the Congress through the strain and stress of past years. I represent the hunger and poverty of the masses, Muslims as well as Hindus; the demand for bread and land and work and relief from innumerable burdens which crush them; the urge to freedom from an intolerable oppression. I represent all this because the Congress represents it, and I have been charged by the Congress to hold aloft its principles and the torch that it has lighted to bring hope and strength and brightness to the dark corners of our land and to the suffering hearts of our people.

13. The Congress welcomes all cooperation, it has repeatedly stressed, the need for a joint front against imperialism. It will cooperate with pleasure with the Muslim League as with other organisations, but the basis of this cooperation must be anti-imperialism and the good of the masses. In its opinion no pacts and compromises between handfuls of upper class people, and ignoring the interests of the masses, have any real or permanent value. It is with the masses that it deals for, it is concerned above all with their interests. But it knows that the masses, Hindu and Muslim, care little for communal questions. They demand urgently and insistently economic relief and in order to obtain this political freedom. In this broad basis there can be the fullest cooperation between all elements in the country who seek the good of the people as a whole and their freedom from imperialism.

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1. Inaugurating the election campaign at Calcutta on 3 January, 1937 Jinnah remarked that Pandit Nehru was reported to have said that there were only two parties in the country, namely the Congress and the Government and others must line up.
 2. Bhai Parmanand (1874-1943); leader of Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha in Punjab; early protagonist of division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines.
 3. Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878-1931); editor, *Hamdard* and *Comrade*; President-elect, AIML Calcutta Session, 1917-18, led Khilafat Movement, 1919-24; President, Indian National Congress, 1923; delegate to Round Table Conference in London where he died on 5 January and buried in Jerusalem.

7

*Jinnah's Statement**Amrita Bazar Patrika, Towards Freedom Papers, p. 131*

14 January, 1937. 2. Interviewed by the "Associated Press" regarding the Ghuznavi-Burdwan Pact, Mr. Jinnah said—"It will be for the Council of the Muslim League to consider and decide one way or the other. But I must say that these two gentlemen have proceeded in their individual capacity and therefore, they have adopted a wrong procedure." (A.P.)

8

*Brabourne¹ to Linlithgow² [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers [Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 38-39]*

THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BOMBAY, 15 January, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Linlithgow,

2. The nearer we get to the date of the elections, the more uncertain does the eventual seem to become.

A large number of candidates were nominated on December 18, 1936, and after subtracting those who were returned unopposed and those who have withdrawn, there remain 364 candidates for the 149 seats still to be filled for the Assembly, and 61 candidates for the 25 seats which remain to be filled in the Council. A large number of the candidates for the Assembly are standing as Independents, and it is quite impossible to say what their future allegiance will be if they are elected. Some of these are really Congressmen who have not been selected by Congress but fancy their chances of election on the strength of their personal influence in the constituencies; some of them are non-Brahmins who are standing for the same reason. It is, of course, quite possible that many of these candidates will rejoin their old parties if and when elected but, if they do not, there seems a chance of there being quite a number of so-called independent M.L.As. who might form a separate bloc in the Assembly when the time comes.

4. Now that the Faizpur session is over, Congress are back at electioneering, and their campaign is now in full swing. Such estimates as I hear are still much the same as before, namely, that Congress should get somewhere between 50 and 75 seats, but this is still chiefly guess-work. I hope to get a more detailed estimate early in February, and I will pass it on to you as soon as I receive it.

5. Congress leaders in this Presidency are still as anxious as ever to take office should they get the chance, but opinion seems to be hardening against the likelihood

of their being allowed to do so. Should they eventually get somewhere in the neighbourhood of 70 seats, I would very much prefer to see them take office. They would have to take in quite a few people from other parties to get their majority, and this they could do if they were prepared to water down somewhat their "wrecking" pledge. On the other hand, a solid bloc of 70 well disciplined Congress members in opposition would, I think, be a very nasty thorn in the side of any Government.

6. The Mohammadans are in a very unsatisfactory state. It still seems probable that Jinnah's party will secure a considerable proportion of the 30 Mohammadan seats, but, once the elections are over there will be endless disputes over leadership of the party in the Assembly. There are at the present moment at least four, more or less equal, candidates for this post. Jinnah's outburst against Congress in his speech at Calcutta may make a considerable difference in the orientation of his followers' politics. Whereas, previously, it had seemed possible that the Jinnah party might be prepared to combine with Congress and form a Coalition Ministry, it now seems as if this eventuality is unlikely.

7. The split in the non-Brahmin party continues; and they are damaging their chances by putting up too many candidates. They have no party discipline, and individuals who have not been selected as party candidates have no hesitation in standing on their own. My non-Brahmin Minister assures me that, once the elections are over, he will be able to heal the split. All I can say is that I hope he is right!

8. I am sorry for whatever Ministry may come into office on April the first, as our 1937-38 budget is bound to be a very difficult one. The late rains helped us a lot, but we have nevertheless got definite "scarcity" in several districts and this is bound to have serious repercussions on our finances.

Yours ever.

BRABOURNE

1. Michael Brabourne, Governor of Bombay, 1933-37, and of Bengal, 1937-39.

2. Lord Linlithgow, Victor Alexander John Hope, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1936-43.

9

B.S. Moonje's¹ interview in Nagpur on 15 January, 1937 *Moonje Papers*

2. *Interviewed Dr. Moonje said:* Communal relations between Hindus and Muslims have reached a stage in consequence of the Communal Award in which there is no possibility of amicable and honourable settlement, until the Award itself is destroyed or set aside. But if the Bengalee leaders are prepared to quietly and (sic) brought out the old and invalid Poet² from his seclusion a few months ago, then perhaps the agreement may be said to be the best under the circumstances. But so long as they

do not insist on the equal division of members in the Legislature between the Hindus and Muslims, there is great danger of the Hindu section of the Ministry and also the Hindu section of the services losing their independence, and equality of status in joint responsibility and degenerating into subserviency to the statutory and unchangeable Muslim majority in the Legislature. Why should we not have the boldness and courage of taking the lesson of our past blunder of the Lucknow Pact,³ though no one doubts the sincerity of the motive of the Hindu leaders at the time, and insist on the settlement of the Communal problem on none other than the principles evolved by the League of Nations or approach the League with a request to take cognizance of it and interfere in the matter. The Bengalee leaders, however, know their business better. I would in the end appeal to them to bear in mind that the problem is the All India one and cannot be satisfactorily solved piece-meal. The Hindu Mahasabha⁴ is the only competent organisation of the Hindus to deal with the problem.

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1. Balkrishna Sheoram Moonje (1872-1948), Member, Central Legislative Assembly; President, Hindu Mahasabha, 1927.
 2. The reference perhaps is to Rabindranath Tagore, the great Indian Poet (1861-1941).
 3. The Lucknow Pact (1916) was a historic event marking the coming together of the Congress and the League in the cause of larger national interest. It is widely accepted that the Pact was a result of concessions offered by both sides. Jinnah was at his best in offering compromise solutions likely to be accepted by both sides. The Congress, for its part, had conceded separate electorates and was even agreeable to their introduction in the Punjab and the Central Provinces where these had not existed before. Most of the Constitutional Provisions adumbrated in the Pact were incorporated later in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.
 4. Formally born at Allahabad in 1915. A few years later, it was re-Christened Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha. In its formative phase it derived a great deal of strength from the Arya Samaj's *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* movements of early 1920s. Prominent among those who took active part were Swami Shradhanand, Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Bhai Parmanand and Dr. B.S. Moonje under whom it acquired a more militant character and stood for a strong and united Hindu community. The initial Congress stance of neither accepting nor rejecting the Communal Award drove a deep wedge between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha to fight the Congress from within, Madan Mohan Malaviya and M.S. Aney formed the Congress Nationalist Party which was to act as a powerful pressure group.

10

Nehru's election speech, Ambala, 16 January, 1937

*Hindustan Times; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,
Vol. VIII, pp. 7-8*

18 January, 1937. 1. All those people who talk in terms of Hindu rights and Muslim interests are job hunters, pure and simple, and fight for the loaves and fishes of office. How long are you going to tolerate this nonsense, this absurdity?

2. The Ghuznavi-Burdwan Pact in Bengal has exposed the pretensions of these supposed opponents of the communal decision. It has conclusively proved that all this opposition to the communal decision was merely a fight for spoils.

3. It appears the only aim of the opponents of the Award is to get Ministerships and Government jobs and they are prepared to sell their community for their own petty interests.

4. India's problem is linked up with the problem of the world and the election business is important inas much as it helps us to grasp this problem. But I warn you to beware of minor issues.

5. There are only two forces in the country, the Congress and the Government. Those who are standing midway shall have to choose between the two.

6. I do not want your vote for me or for any of my friends. To vote against the Congress candidate is to vote for the continuance of British domination.

7. Elections come and go but there is no escape from the major problem of India's poverty. Congressmen are going to the legislatures to continue the fight for freedom and oust those who have been weakening our efforts.

8. I want to make it clear that Congressmen are not entering the legislatures in any spirit of cooperation with the Government or for working this constitution. These elections are very important as they help in establishing mass contact with the millions of voters and non-voters. It is the Congress alone which is capable of fighting the Government.

9. The opponents of the Congress are bound with each other by a community of interests. Their demands have nothing to do with the masses.

10. The Congress attitude with regard to the communal decision is quite correct and the attempt of the Hindu Mahasabha to malign the Congress is regrettable.

11. What is this Burdwan-Ghuznavi Pact? Hindu Mahasabha leaders have blessed it. The Communal Award which has been condemned as most undemocratic and anti-national will remain, and seats allotted to the respective communities. But there will be equal number of Hindu and Muslim Ministers. Could there be anything more palpably selfish than this?

12. The very nature of this Pact confirms the wisdom of the Congress stand on the Award. You are already familiar with its decision in regard to this Award. I appeal to you to strengthen the Congress. I am sanguine that the Congress will come out with flying colours in the election fight. The Congress victory at the polls will necessarily lower the Government prestige. It would mean the victory of the Congress principles and ideals.



11

Governor of Bengal (John Anderson) to Secretary of State (Zetland)

Telegram L/PO/6/70; TF 42

17 January, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1. Your private and personal telegram Press reaction to Ghuznavi-Burdwan Pact not favourable as a whole. Chief Hindu criticism is that they leave Communal Award untouched. Some individuals welcome them but others regard as mere distribution of offices and Ministry. Some Mohammdan opinion protests against surrender of better opportunities. There is general unwillingness on the part of persons seeking election to commit themselves.

12

Zetland¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]

L/PO/6/70; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 44-45

18 January, 1937

6. I have received from Halim Ghuznavi an account of his negotiations with the Hindus carried on with the intention of lessening the tension over the Communal Award. This is all very praiseworthy, but I notice that the chief item in the agreement which they have come to is the appointment of an equal number of Muslims and Hindus as Ministers, and it seems to me that here they are taking a good deal for granted since the appointment of Ministers is a prerogative of the Governor, who may object to having his hands tied by an agreement to which so far as I know he is not a party. I have, therefore, asked Anderson² to let me know what he thinks of the arrangement before I reply to Ghuznavi. It is possible, of course, that you may have made some reference to it in your letter of the December 31st.

1. Zetland (1876-1961); Governor of Bengal, 1917-22; Secretary of State for India, 1935-40.

2. John Anderson, Governor of Bengal, 1932; Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, 1939-42.



13

*Jinnah's statement**Nation's Voice, pp. 116-20*

1. *Bombay (By Mail)*: "The urgent question facing every nationalist in India today is how to create unity out of diversity and not fight each other. The All India Muslim League is trying to do this in its own humble way and it has no quarrel with those who are fighting for the country's freedom. As I have always maintained, the Muslim League is prepared to join hands with any progressive party in the fight for the country's freedom but to achieve this the question of minorities must be settled satisfactorily. Here I am not talking of only Muslims but all minorities. Further, we are not prepared to merge ourselves into any organisation, however great it may be and however advanced its programme and policy may be, unless it is determined by common consent."

2. This passage appears in a long statement issued by Mr. M.A. Jinnah in reply to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru:

"On November 3, 1936," continues Mr. Jinnah, "I stated in my interview: 'It is obvious that we do not agree or endorse the programme and policy of the Indian National Congress. But in the various Legislatures the Congress party or any other party which stands for the progress and welfare of our motherland will naturally receive our cooperation for the same object.' This statement of mine incurred the displeasure of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and he, instead of appreciating it, gave a reply that he did not care what 'may be or might be,' but what he wanted was real fighters. I did not wish to take any notice of this flippant criticism because it is no use indulging in controversies amongst ourselves. The thing is that we should try and understand each other. I might have replied to him, and I do so now in self-defence. Where was this great fighter when he agreed to the Second Round Table Conference¹ after having boycotted the first? Did he not know that the Round Table Conference was called on the basis of the announcement made by His Majesty's Government on October 31, 1929?

It runs as follows: "The goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August, 1917, to be that of providing for the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. But, in view of the doubts, which have been expressed both in Great Britain and India regarding the interpretation to be placed on the intentions of the British Government in enacting the statute of 1919, I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status. In the full realisation of this policy it is evidently important that the Indian States should be afforded an opportunity of finding their place and even if we cannot at present exactly foresee on what lines this development may be shaped, it is from every point of view describable that whatever can be done should be done to ensure

that action taken now is not inconsistent with the attainment of the ultimate purpose which those, whether in British India or the States, who look forward to some unity of All India, have in view.'

3. "But this is not all. When the Gandhi-Irwin Pact² was arrived at what did this great fighter do, again? Where was he? The Congress accepted this position and I am quoting from the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement, Clause 2, which runs as follows:

"As regards constitutional questions, the scope of future discussions is stated with the assent of His Majesty's Government, to be with the object of considering further the scheme for Constitutional Government of India discussed at the Round Table Conference. Of the scheme there outlined, Federation is an essential part: so also are Indian responsibility and reservations or safeguards in the interests of India for such matters as, for instance, defence, external affairs, the position of Minorities, the financial credit of India and discharge of obligations."

"Does it lie in his mouth to parade so much that he stands for complete independence of India, which, when it suits him, becomes the substance of independence?"

4. "Now coming to his recent pronouncement, I am glad that he admits that he has not given full consideration to my speech as he has been rushing about from place to place. That may account for his incoherent statement. In the first place, what he said, which was reported in all the papers, is as follows:

'There are only two parties in the country—the Government and the Congress. The rest must line up.' I was addressing a meeting where I was appealing to Musalman voters to support the League candidates and I said: I regret to say I find much interference of the Hindus and the Congress in setting up candidates against the Muslim League candidates. Our policy and programme is not a selfish one. We are ready and willing to cooperate with any group of a progressive and independent nature, provided its policy and programme approximately correspond with that of our own.

5. "Then I naturally could not allow the claim of Pandit Jawaharlal that the Congress represents the whole of India and that there is no other party of any consequence. It is not only devoid of any foundation, but calculated to do enormous harm. I was speaking only on behalf of the Musalmans. But surely Pandit Jawaharlal knows that there are other parties also in the field. May I remind him that he wrote at least three essays recently with regard to the policy and the attitude of the Congress towards the Communal Award in order to placate the other parties and the Congress men and that he temporarily secured some agreement which is again in the melting pot? And yet in his (own) fashion he considers that the communal question is not vital.

6. "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is torn between Benares and Moscow and the rest of his statement where he deals with social and economic matters and his claim that he has got a large body of Musalman followers cannot be accepted by any intelligent man. If he has got the solid backing of the Musalmans, why is he not contesting every seat from the Musalman electorate instead of confining himself only to one or two in the Punjab? All told, I do not think there are more than a dozen candidates that are set up by the Congress in the Musalman electorates. And why create this

controversy and attack the Muslim League, whose policy and programme is a full-blooded national one? Only we do not agree with certain methods and means to which the Congress stands pledged. The communal question or the Hindu-Muslim question, he ought to know by now, is purely a question of minorities and political problem which must be adjusted. Musalmans happen to be the largest, but, besides the Musalmans, there are other minorities in the country and it is the duty of every Indian to create a sense of security and confidence so far as they are concerned by meeting them equitably.

7. "If I remember right, not very long ago Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking to the Frontier Pathans, promised to give a blank cheque to the Musalmans which he was willing to write with an Indian pen on *Swadeshi* paper. Was it an important issue at that time and not a trifling matter as he is now preaching? What has happened to that blank cheque? The Congress has not the monopoly, nor is it the sole custodian of Indian nationalism.

8. "When he refers to the Independent party³ in the Assembly with contempt, he utterly ignores all the services that they have rendered. But for this party the Congress party would not have carried a single measure and, if he looks at the division list for the last two years, as admitted by Mr. Bhulabhai Desai,⁴ the majority of the Musalmans have voted for national interest in spite of the fact that they are returned on their individual efforts and from separate electorates. He says that the Muslim League represents a group of Muslims, no doubt highly estimable persons, but functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle class. But what is the Congress high command composed of? They are also estimable persons of the upper middle class. Where are the peasants and workers and besides what is the total number of the members of the Congress? Even a large bulk of patriotic and nationalistic Hindus are not members of the Congress, because they do not believe in the Congress methods.

9. "I am thankful to him for his kind offer when he says: "The Congress welcomes all cooperation.... It will cooperate with pleasure with the Muslim League as with other organisations (and I am glad that he recognises that there are other organisations also), but the basis of this cooperation must be anti-Imperialism and the good of the masses. In its opinion no pacts and compromises between handfuls of upper class people and ignoring the interests of the masses have any real or permanent value. It is with the masses that it deals. It knows that the masses, Hindu or Muslim, care little for communal questions. They demand urgently and insistently economic relief and in order to obtain this political freedom on this broad basis there can be the fullest cooperation between all the elements in the country who seek the good of the people as a whole and their freedom from Imperialism.

10. "Does he think that the policy and programme which he is preaching will meet the demand which he describes as urgent and insistent for economic relief and would obtain this political freedom? Let him draw up a concrete and practical scheme, which will meet the urgent and insistent demand of the masses and which will give them real economic relief immediately, and I assure him that the Muslim League will offer its fullest cooperation, because he is not the only Indian who feels for those who are suffering from poverty and hardships.

11. "He makes a great mistake when he assumes to be the sole custodian of the interest of the masses. I would ask him also to define how he wants us to fight Imperialism. At one time he says we must wipe off all the Princes and the Indian States, destroy all capitalists, confiscate their lands and property etc. and set up immediately a Socialistic form of Government. At another time he says we must present a united front for the achievement of freedom first and we will decide everything else through a Constituent Assembly at some unknown date, when we have got possession of power or when we are on the verge of the possession of power. I wonder whether the masses who demand and require urgent and insistent economic relief, can understand what he means.

12. "The Muslim League is willing and ready and, in fact, it is part of our programme and policy to cooperate with any other responsible party, provided a common policy and programme can be agreed upon and which will create a really united front. The League does not believe in assuming a non-communal label, with a few adventurers or credulous persons belonging to other communities thrown in and who have no backing of their people, and thus pass off as the only party entitled to speak and act on behalf of the whole of India. I flatter myself that I am put in the same category as Bhai Parmanand by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, but may I draw his attention to the fact that there is a vital difference between him and me for he stands for Hindu Raj whereas I stand for a full democratic responsible Government for the people of India?

13. "I wonder whether he realises where his preaching will land him and the innocent people who may follow him. I would request him to come to earth and study more the existing conditions and facts facing us and apply his energy and his ability as a practical man to the solution of problems that are facing us and cry a halt and give up his fantastic programme. Is he going to rise or remain as Peter Pan,⁵ who never grew up?"

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1. While repressing the Civil Disobedience Movement, the British tried to create a compromise by convening the first session of the Round Table Conference (12 November, 1930—19 January, 1931) without any Congress representation but with the participation of the princes and other political groups. At the second Plenary Session (30 November, 1931), attended by Gandhiji, saw a play-up of communal issue. The third session of Round Table Conference (November-December, 1932) formulated certain new reform proposals which were embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935.
 2. An accord on political situation reached between Gandhiji and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, popularly called the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, was signed on 5 March, 1931. Under its terms the Congress called off the Civil Disobedience and agreed to participate in the Round Table Conference and the British Government agreed to release the political prisoners.
 3. Jinnah was Leader of Independent Party in the Legislative Assembly, 1934.
 4. Bhulabhai Desai (1877-1946); leader of the Congress Party in Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935; one of the authors of Desai-Liaquat Pact of 1945; defended I.N.A. prisoners at Red Fort Trial in 1945.
 5. Hero of J.M. Barrier's play (1904) of the same name, one who retains youthful features and is immature.

14

*Statement by Maulana Azad¹**The Hindu, 30 January, 1937; Towards Freedom Papers, I, p. 80*

Bombay, 29 January, 1937. 1. "Even if Muslims wish to view the situation only from the point of view of their own collective interest the only right path of success for them is that with increasing enthusiasm they should support the Congress and not keep aloof from it. Muslims cannot do anything by keeping aloof from the majority," observes Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in a statement urging Muslim voters of Bombay to support Mr. S.A. Brelvi² in the forthcoming elections to the Bombay Legislative Assembly.

2. "There are only two courses before them, either by supporting the Congress to win the sympathy and help of enlightened and tolerant Hindus or by keeping aloof from it to strengthen the hands of fanatical Hindus," adds Mr. Azad. "The present elections have provided for them a valuable opportunity, they will soon see what a favourable atmosphere for satisfaction of their collective aims has been created. By supporting Congress candidates they can demonstrate that they are not a whit behind any other community in their efforts to win Independence for the country and promote its welfare."

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1. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958); President of the Congress, 1923 and 1939-46; Member, Interim Government, 1947 and Minister for Education in the Government of India 1947-58.
 2. Syed Abdullah Brelvi (1891-1949); Editor, *Bombay Chronicle*, 1915-49; Member, Congress Working Committee, 1930; Member, All India Muslim Majlis, 1944; Founder Member of All India Newspapers Editors' Conference and its President, 1944-45.

15

*Election Manifesto of Hindu Mahasabha¹**Jayakar Papers*

NAGPUR, 29 January, 1937

Failure of Gandhiji's Dictum for Hindu-Muslim Unity, Establishment of *Swaraj*, the Responsibility of Majority Community, Determined and Uncompromising Opposition to Communal Award, Policy of Responsive Cooperation.

1. Why is the Hindu Sabha contesting the elections against the Congress? The Congress claims to represent the entire nation and the several religiously separate communities that inhabit the nation. If it be so, then why should the Hindus, by their Hindu Sabha, think of challenging the claim of Congress to represent them? What particular pleasure should they feel, and why, in opposing the Congress, if it should

be really working for the welfare of the entire nation without discriminating between its nationals on considerations of their creeds and religious beliefs? Why should the Congress on the side meekly put up with its disowning by the Muslim League and on the other fight vehemently against the Hindu Sabha when the Hindu Sabha does not, like the Muslim League, disown the Congress but itself fights the battles of the Congress to enable it to steer clear of communalism and to meet the arrogant affront of the Muslim League?

2. So far as the Hindu Sabha is concerned, it is its most painful duty to have to play the role of an oppositionist. It is particularly painful to it because so far as the essentials of the objective of *Poorna Swaraj* is concerned, there is absolutely no difference between the Hindu Sabha and the Congress. Besides most of the prominent members of the Hindu Mahasabha have spent the best portions of their lives in the service of the Congress and the Congress itself is practically wholly a Hindu body. And yet the Hindu Sabha is forced, in the interest of true and unalloyed nationalism and evolution of India as a united nation to oppose the Congress and why?

3. Since the rise of Mahatma Gandhi and the assumption of dictatorial powers by him, the Congress, under his lead and guidance, has been following a policy which, being needlessly pro-Muslim, is ruinous not only to the interests of the Hindus but also to the very growth of true nationalism in India and subversive of all possibilities of brotherly friendship being established between the Hindus and the Muslims.

4. The Congress preaches that there can be no Swaraj in India without Hindu-Muslim unity. A price has thus been placed on the Hindu-Muslim unity which has now become a marketable commodity. The Mahatma and the Congress want Swaraj in six months time; while the Viceroy wants to broaden and perpetuate the British Empire in India. In this tug of war between those two conflicting interests, both sides began to woo the Muslims, on the assumption that neither can attain their objective without Muslim cooperation, to secure the friendship entirely and exclusively to themselves. To purchase this unity, Mahatma Gandhi began to offer Blank Cheques but the Muslims ignored the Mahatma, as he had actually no sovereign power of Constitutional authority to give what he was promising, and went over bodily to the Government and secured the rights and privileges of the Communal Award. The Mahatma, having morally forfeited his right by his offers of Blank Cheques, to fight against the Communal Award seriously, as the situation really deserved, had to be satisfied with mere verbal condemnation of the Award as anti-national and anti-democratic but this condemnation, in its practical operation, could not rise above—'Neither accepting nor rejecting' the Award. But even this the Congress, in its mentality of defeatism in respect of the Muslims, did not dare do, when the resolution for the acceptance of the Communal Award was brought forward by Mr. Jinnah on the floor of the Delhi Legislative Assembly. The Congress was committed by its own resolution to oppose either the acceptance or the rejection of the Communal Award but they kept quiet and permitted Mr. Jinnah's resolution for the acceptance of the Award to pass.

5. The temptation and hopes operating on the conscience of the Congress were and still are that the Muslims will accept the Congress objective and programme of complete Independence and join the Congress for the rejection

and the ending of the entire constitution including the Communal Award.

6. But the fact is that the Muslims will not accept the Congress objective of complete independence and cannot afford to antagonise the Government which alone, in contrast with Mahatma Gandhi and his Congress, has the sovereign power and the constitutional authority to give what the Muslims want and which has already given them the Communal Award. The Award is their one potent instrument for domination over the majority community of the Hindus in spite of their own minority. They will, therefore, not agree to give up the Award and to destroy the Provincial Autonomy of the New Constitution. They may join hands with the Congress for improving the Provincial Autonomy after previously securing their consent for further improvement in the Communal Award in their own communal interests. They will cooperate with the Congress, in making a show of destroying the Federal part of the Constitution, using it, at the same time, as a lever for coercing the Congress to agree to one-third reservation, also in the Indian States quota of representation in the Central Federal Legislatures and for getting such reservation sanctioned by the Government. They have already secured such reservation in the British India's quota of representation by the Communal Award. After thus securing this concession both from the Congress and Government, it will, then, be no surprise, as our past experience in such matters amply warrants us to expect, if the Muslims would again forthwith part company from the Congress and go over to the Government to support and maintain the very same Federal scheme. This is exactly the advice which has been given to the Muslims by no less a person than H.H. Agha Khan who says: "Whatever happened in the Centre, there is enough scope for work in the Provincial Scheme."

7. If the situation is viewed, and the Muslim mentality is studied, with open eyes, in the light of the past experience, it will be plain that it is all hoping against hope to expect to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity by pursuing the methods of consistent and persistent surrender by Blank Cheques as prescribed for it by Mahatma Gandhi and his Congress so long as his slogan of "No *Swaraj* without Hindu-Muslim Unity" is allowed to prevail and mar the manliness and self-confidence of the Hindus, including a mentality of defeatism in them.

8. By such back-boneless yielding all along, however, what has the Congress gained? Has it succeeded in winning the Muslims to its side? Can we conceive of a more merciless parting kick than is conveyed in these recent words of Mr. Jinnah?

"I regret that the Congress has been interfering with the affairs of the Muslims by putting up Muslim candidates in opposition to the Muslim League candidates. Pandit Jawaharlal is reported to have said that there were only two parties in the country, namely the Congress and the Government, and the others must line up." Mr. Jinnah is reported to have said: "There is a third party, namely, the Muslims. We are not going to be dictated by anybody.... We are not going to be the camp followers of any party."

9. This is a paraphrase, in rather an offensive tone and language peculiar to Mr. Jinnah, of what H.H. Aga Khan has been and is preaching. He says it is wrong to suppose that the Muslims are a mere Community and that too, a Minority community. Muslims are not a Community but a Nation, a separate nation in themselves, and they must be treated as such. This is just the germ out of which has grown the ambition of

dividing India into Hindu-India of the South and the Muslim-India under the intolerent Crescent in the North, the Pakistan.

10. Should this be the kind of return which the Congress deserved at the hands of the Muslims for all its anti-National pro-Muslim policies and programmes and for the consequent ruin of the poor harmless Hindus?

Sir Mohammad Iqbal,² the friend, guide and philosopher and the inspiring poet of the Muslims says:

'I am opposed to Nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims: I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. 'Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of a man. Yet that which really matters is a man's faith, his cultural, his historical tradition. These are things which, in my eyes, are worth living for, and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of a man happens to be temporarily associated.' 'Our ideal is well defined. It is to win, in the coming Constitution, a position for Islam which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country.'

11. Thus the Muslims have no idea of Patriotism or Nationalism; nor do they care for *Swaraj* in India. Their one point, on which they have concentrated, for the present, all their energy and intellect and staked everything that counts in this life, is how to win a position for Islam in India, even if it be at the cost of others.

12. What is the cure to such a mentality? It is not a mere bluff. The Congress slogans of 'No *Swaraj* without Muslim Unity' or offers of Blank Cheques are no cure. They only generate the defeatist mentality in the Hindus and further strengthen the separatist and bargaining mentality of the Muslims. The remedy lies in the robust Nationalism of the Hindu Mahasabha. It is neither inspired by any sordid and poisonous desire to gain illegitimate advantages at the cost of other communities tinged with the fear of any community nor handicapped with the feeling of the helplessness and defeatism because this or that community is not prepared to co-operate and pull its weight in companionship. The Hindu Sabha in its pure and unalloyed Nationalism seeks the friendship for all without, however, helplessly depending on it and scrupulously refrains from gratuitously offending anybody. Hindu Mahasabha believes in the age-long dictum which Mr. Jinnah has now been preaching to the Muslims:

"Organize yourself and unite. I make no secret of it that we have got a lot of rubbish in our midst. We must improve, raise up or weed that out. If we go through that process and bring out better Muslims, the finest steel of the Muslim, and if the Hindus do the same and equally bring out their finest steel, then there will be real unity and on that day the freedom of India is won."

13. Who can say, with justice, to the contrary? And Mr. Jinnah is no ordinary man. He is par excellence, the one man amongst the Muslims who can deliver the goods from his side. If the real Hindu-Muslim unity cannot be attained in any other way, as Mr. Jinnah rightly says, then it must be admitted, as the Hindu Mahasabha has always been asserting, that the ways of the Mahatma and the Congress are not the ways to bring about what Mr. Jinnah calls real Hindu-Muslim unity which can win freedom of India. And if the Mahatma be right that there can be no *Swaraj* without

Hindu-Muslim unity, then the ways of the Mahatma and the Congress will not lead to Swaraj, much less to *Poorna Swaraj*. The *Swaraj* can only be attained if the Hindus, as Mr. Jinnah observes, organise and unite and bend all their energies and concentrate all their resources on the one objective of bringing out the finest steel of the Hindus. In this enterprise and for this purpose, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League of Mr. Jinnah, are collateral opponents preparing eventually for real heart-to-heart Hindu-Muslim unity, having received co-education in the same school of stern and implacable realities and under the same Grand Master, the practical World and the History of India of the last one thousand years.

14. If such is the real mentality of the Muslims and if Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of complete renunciation and surrender, practised with almost religious faith and fervour during the last 16 years, could make no change in their mentality, then the question is—How are Nationalism, Hindu-Muslim Unity and Swaraj to be established? What is the conception of the Hindu Mahasabha in respect of these and what remedy does it prescribe?

15. The Hindu Sabha advises the Hindus to shed their mentality of defeatism and remembering the doings of their forefathers before the British came, to take courage in both hands and assert the right of the majority community. In any country, it is always the responsibility of the majority community to establish *Swaraj* and to create its own nationalism, and to maintain internal law and order and to defend the *Swaraj* from foreign aggression. Say, in Afghanistan, who have established Afghan *Swaraj*? Who maintain internal law and order? It is the special responsibility of the Afghans, the majority community of Afghanistan, as it is also their happy privilege. The Hindu and the Sikh Afghans who form the minorities in Afghanistan, help and co-operate with them, but if they were not to do so, it does not mean that the Afghans will throw up the sponge and approach the British Premier for the Communal Award. If we only make up our mind to walk in the footsteps, say of the Afghans and of the Germans, there will be no foundation left for our defeatist mentality and our helplessness. A wide vista of live virility and hope, hitherto unexperienced, will be immediately opened out to us, and we will feel the glow and energy of real regenerated manhood. The world will then recognise us as men and respect us as such and also feel awe about us. Our Minorities will then give up their shrewd friendship with the shrewder Britishers and begin again to claim kinship with us as they really are our kins in blood and bones.

16. The only special provision that is made in the Constitution of the country as regards the minorities and that too, only in the European countries but not in Afghanistan or Arabia or South Africa or America, is that safeguards are provided for the protection of the religion, language and personal laws of the different minorities. These principles have been aptly codified by the League of Nations, which have been god-fathered and recommended to the world at large, as the public Law of Europe and of the whole world by no less a person than the Right Honourable Sir Austin Chamberlain.⁸ The League of Nations has further prescribed that no such rights and privileges be conceded to the minorities as would establish a particular minority by Statute as a permanent foreign element in the body politic of a Nation and would effectively prevent political assimilation of the minority into the major community.

17. Such is the Nationalism as it is conceived and practised in every day life in both Western and Eastern countries. If it is so, then why should Nationalism be interpreted differently in India?

18. So far, however, the difference between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress were merely differences of mentalities induced in their respective leaders by differences of their past historical traditions, and of their policies and programmes and hope was not wanting at least in some of the leaders of thought in the Hindu Mahasabha that a day is sure to dawn, sooner or later, when, by the experience of the everyday realities of the inter-communal situation in India, the Congress and the Hindu Sabha may come nearer and join hands in co-operation and companionship for the realisation of the common aim of Poorna Swaraj. But recently events have happened and are happening which raise fears of fundamental and unadjustable differences and alienations of mind arising between the Congress and the Mahasabha, which, may God forbid.

19. When Pandit Jawaharlal was elected President of the Congress nine months ago, some who were conversant with the impetuosity of his nature, steeped as it is in the Communism of the Moscow brand, were perturbed but the consolation at the time was that it is an eventuality which will last only for eight months. But now that, even after realising fully what belief swayed him and what the springs of his actions are, as have been made so very perfectly clear in his writings and activities, he has been re-elected President, in spite of his frank warning conveyed by him in the following words:

"I have expressed my views on Socialism and pointed out how this colours all my outlook and my activity." The situation has assumed quite a different aspect.

21. Such is the mentality of the Hindu Sabha with which it has boldly entered the field for contesting the election, in the spirit of revolt of love against the Congress, irrespective of considerations of success or failure, in the faithful and honest discharge of its duty to the Hindu Religion, Hindu culture and the Hindu society in general and to Nationalism in particular.

22. Briefly, therefore, the candidate of the Hindu Sabha stands for:

- I. Maintenance of Religion as opposed to the principle.
- II. Maintenance and protection of Hindu Religion and culture against encroachments and aggressions of the other proselytising religions so that this land of Hindustan may remain in reality as it is in name, the land of Hindus, the *Hindu Rashtra*.⁴
- III. Establishment of Swaraj in which all, irrespective of their creeds or faiths, shall be equal before the Constitution and the laws of the land.
- IV. Settlement of the minorities problem on the principle of true and unalloyed Nationalism as evolved and formulated by the League of Nations.
- V. Determined and uncompromising opposition to the Communal Award, with the object of destroying or getting it annulled.
- VI. Organising the country for undertaking the responsibility for the defence of India and particularly for meeting all exigencies arising from developments taking place in countries immediately beyond the frontiers of India,

- such as the West Asiatic Pact with its 20,00,000 of standing army.
- VII. Making provision on mass proportions for the physical and military training of the people.
- VIII. Organisations of Industry and Commerce on the system of modern mechanical industrialisation for promoting economic prosperity and with a view to make provision for making the country self-sufficient for defence and for the general militarisation of the people.
- IX. General Nation Building on scientific lines such as: (a) Improvement of agriculture and the market system so that the agriculturists should get the full worth of their labours and their investment in the land; and economic prosperity of the Agriculturists. (b) Development of Industries and making provision for the equitable distribution of profits with a view to assuring adequate wages and making provision for educational and social amenities for the labourers.
- X. Responsive cooperation—neither non-cooperation nor “respectful cooperation” which includes all legitimate means. The Hindu Sabha does not believe in the possibility of wrecking the Constitution in its truthful sense at least until the present British Government in India is not shorn of their Military, Naval and Air Power.
- N.B. It has already been proved and demonstrated in Nagpur, both negatively and positively, that ministerships are not offices in the gift of the Government. They are constitutional rights and privileges conferred on the people which they may or may not exercise as they may deem it expedient for the time being for strengthening the hands of the people for carrying on the struggle to win their freedom.

JAGANNATH PRASAD VERMA,
Secretary

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1. Not given.
 2. Sir Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938); Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1926; President, AIML Allahabad Session, 1930; helped in evolution of the concept of separate homeland within India for the Muslims.
 3. Sir Neville Austin Chamberlain (1869-1940); Chancellor of the British Exchequer, 1931-37 and Prime Minister, 1937-40.
 4. The concept of *Hindu Rashtra* or Hindu Nation is derived from V.D. Savarkar's tract *Hindutva* written in 1922. It is in this tract that Savarkar advanced the thesis that Hindus were a nation.



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*Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of January 1937 [Extract]**Home Poll F. 18-1/37, pp. 1-3*

CONFIDENTIAL

1. *General.* The elections have overshadowed all other matters of political interest. Polling began in most constituencies on the 18th January and the results are now known in all constituencies for the Bengal Legislative Assembly.

2. The position of parties in the Assembly and in the Council is shown below. It is at present too early to attempt a forecast of the attitude which will be assumed vis-a-vis a Ministry and its personnel by the three independent groups of Caste Hindus, Scheduled Caste Hindus and Muslims, but it is clear that the Congress opposition will be by no means negligible and may from time to time receive support from other groups. On the other hand, statements in the Press of the leader of the Muslim Proja Party, Mr. Fazlul Huq, indicate that his party will be prepared to cooperate with other Muslim groups.

Assembly

Congress Caste Hindus, including one Independent

Congress

43

Congress Scheduled Caste Hindus (including one who captured a non-reserved seat)

7

Congress Labour

4

Total Congress

54

Independent Caste Hindus (including Tea Garden Labour Member)

14

Independent Scheduled Caste Hindus (including one who captured a non-reserved seat)

23

Hindus Nationalists

3

Hindu Sabha (both Scheduled Caste Hindus)

2

Total non-Congress Hindus

42

Muslim League

40

Tenant (Proja) Party

38

Independent Muslims (including two Muslim Labour Members)

43

Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians

31

248*

* Two members have been returned for two constituencies each.

Council	
Congress Caste Hindus	3
Independent Hindus	5
Hindus Nationalists	1
Hindu Sabha	1
Scheduled Caste Hindus	Nil.
Muslim League	4
Independent Moslems	13
Europeans	3
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	30
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NOTE : The above figures are approximate only, as complete party list of Muslims is not available. There is a small group of Mohammadans of a tenant party (the Krishak Projas), perhaps half a dozen, who may go with Congress.

2. In a House thus divided into a number of groups, it is clear that any group which remains detached from party or communal interests must occupy a key position and it may be confidentially expected that the European-cum-Anglo-Indian bloc of twenty-nine members will be able to make its weight felt effectively. This group may expect on occasion to receive the support of the two Indian Christian members.

3. The success of the Congress and Proja Parties has been greater than was generally anticipated and, together with the capture of five out of eight labour constituencies by Congress or extremists, indicates a marked swing to the Left in Bengal politics. In the Chittagong Division, the Commissioner refers to the attacks made on the zamindari system at meetings organised by Krishak Samities and mentions that at rural meetings held by the Muslim League, speakers rose to voice the Krishak point of view but were not allowed a hearing. All but one of the successful candidates from the Noakhali district are non-matriculates and this again illustrates the extent to which the less fortunate members of the community have become articulate under the new franchise. In the Dacca Division, however, the Commissioner comments on the apathy of the electorate except in the Bakarganj North-East (General) constituency where there was a keen contest between a Congress candidate and a Scheduled Caste candidate. In the Midnapore district Congress has been uniformly successful (with one exception) in the Assembly General constituencies. The success of Mr. Debendra Lal Khan who secured 70,431 votes, as against the next largest number of votes 5,499 and who is an "out-and-out" Congress man was especially noteworthy in the Midnapore Central Rural General constituency. Another outstanding success was that of Niharendu Datta Mazumdar, the Congress Labour candidate, and a well-known Communist who secured 51,526 votes against the next highest total of 9,228 in the Barrackpore Factories constituency.

4. It is at present too soon to give any provincial estimate of percentage of the electorate which went to the polls, but the District Magistrate of Chittagong reports that about 50 per cent polled in his district. The Presidency Commissioner records his

personal observations on polling in the Khulna district where not only were the voters extremely slow in recording their votes but many of them appeared to be unable even to apprehend the meaning of the pictures which were provided to enable them to discriminate between the ballot boxes of rival candidates.

5. Prominent among the defeated candidates are Hon'ble Sir Nazimuddin,¹ Member, Bengal Executive Council, who was defeated by a large majority by Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq, the Proja Party² leader, but for whom it is expected that another seat will shortly be found; the Maharaja of Santosh, President of the Bengal Legislative Council, who was defeated by the Maharaja of Mymensingh by two votes; Mr. N.K. Basu, the present Leader of the Opposition, who was defeated by a Congress candidate, and Mr. B.C. Chatterjee, the leader of the National group. Prominent among new arrivals in the provincial sphere of politics are: Nawab K. Habibulla³ of Dacca who was formerly in the Council of State; Maharaj Kumar Uday Chand Mahtab of Burdwan who defeated a prominent Congress candidate; Babu Birendra Kishore Roy Chaudhuri of Gouripore, Mymensingh, an influential landlord, who defeated a Congress candidate; Sahibzada Syed Kazem Ali Meerza, son of the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad, Shahzada Yousouff Meerza Bahadur of the Oudh family, and Nawabzada K. Nasirulla of the Dacca Nawab's family. Mrs. Sahabuddin who secured the Muslim women's seat is the wife of Mr. K. Sahabuddin who acted as a temporary Member of the Governor's Council last year and who has also been returned to the Bengal Assembly.

Among the members of the old Legislative Council who have secured re-election to the new Bengal Legislative Assembly may be mentioned: Sir Bijay Prosad Singh Roy, Sir K.G.M. Farouqi, Khan Bahadur M. Azizul Huq, Ministers in the present Government, Mr. J.N. Basu, leader of the Liberal group and Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, a prominent Muslim leader.

6. In general the elections have passed off without disorder, but in Noakhali district a fracas took place between the supporters of rival candidates in the course of which some twenty-three persons were injured, one seriously.

8. The celebration of "Founders Day" by the representatives of the 40,000 college students of Bengal passed off without a hitch and was attended by some 4,000 students, notwithstanding the opposition of the students of the Vidyasagar College and the Islamia College. The former objected to the celebration on the ground that ceremony was calculated to develop a "slavish" mentality, while the students of the Islamia College objected to the singing of the song *Bande Mataram*,⁴ which they regarded as offensive to Muslim sentiment, and also to the use of certain symbols by the University which have associations with the Hindu faith.

1. Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894-1964); Premier, Bengal, 1943-45; Member, AIML Working Committee, Chief Minister of East Pakistan, 1947; Governor-General of Pakistan, 1948-51; Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1951-53.

2. The Krishak-Proja Party owed its origin to the liberal ideology of Fazlul Huq, Akram Khan and Abdul Kasem, who stood for the economic reconstruction of Bengal, abolition of *zamindari*, Hindu-Muslim unity and welfare of peasantry. It formed Ministry with the League in April, 1937, but conflict in ideas led to formation of the Progressive Coalition Ministry in December, 1941 with the support of Congress, Hindu Mahasabha and Forward Block.

3. Khwaja Habibulla, Minister for Public Health and Local Self-Government, Bengal, 1943.
4. The *Bande Mataram* song, appearing in Bankim Chandra Chatterji's novel *Anandmath* contained certain stanzas which were objected to by the Muslims whose religious sentiments they were alleged to hurt.

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*Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of January, 1937 [Extract]**Fortnightly Report Home-Poll, F. 18-1/37, pp. 1-2*

31, January 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

Political. The Elections. Polling began on the 18th of January amidst general enthusiasm. In most places the elections have been peacefully conducted and have not given rise to serious disorder. In Amritsar, however, a Hindu Nationalist died a few days after receiving injuries in a scuffle with some Congress supporters. At Chaprar in the Sialkot district, there was a riot which necessitated the despatch of a special body of police. In Lahore at the polling stations for women, there was much confusion and the District Magistrate and police officers had to be called in to restore order. The women voters actually came to blows. Contests, in which the Ahrars are taking part, have become very bitter because their opponents have published letters alleged to have been written by Ahrar leaders, condemning the Mohammadan agitation over the demolition of the Shahidganj Mosque.¹ At Gujranwala, the Ahrars² had several stormy meetings. From some districts reports have been received of flagrant corruption by candidates and their agents, votes being actually bought outside polling stations. In one district a few voters demanded from the presiding officer, whom they mistook for a party agent, payment that had been promised. The poll in most urban constituencies has been surprisingly low. In some places it has been only fifty per cent of the number of registered voters. One Deputy Commissioner gives as a reason the prompt action taken against impersonation he expresses the belief that a large number of voters appearing on the register are bogus and agents fear to produce persons answering to the bogus names.

2. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's visit, which is described below, has improved the position of most Congress candidates in the province. One or two Hindu candidates who were opposing Congressites made spectacular withdrawals during the visit. In one or two other constituencies withdrawals were hastened by intimidation and rowdiness by Congress scallywags. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya³ arrived in Lahore by air on the 19th of January to support Nationalist candidates. He was not given a hearing in Lahore and the two meetings, which he attempted to address in Amritsar, were rowdy and ended in disorder. The Pandit had to be escorted to safety and he was so disgusted that he left the Province hurriedly. M. Zafar Ali Khan,⁴ the President of the Majlis-i-Ittihad-i-Millat,⁵ visited Jullundur, Rohtak and Karnal in support of certain Muslim candidates, but he received a very poor reception.

3. *Congress.* From the 16th to the 18th of January Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,

who did most of his journeys by air, visited twelve districts and made twenty-one speeches. His audiences in the aggregate amounted to two and a quarter lakhs, mostly Hindus, with some Sikhs and a very small portion of Mohammadans. His tour was frankly an electioneering one. His speeches were all very much on the same lines. He stressed everywhere the view that Indian politics were mainly a matter of a fight between Congress and Government; no improvement in the state of the country was possible under British Imperialism; the present British Government had, therefore, to be turned out and the Congress was the only organization in India capable of doing this; therefore, it should be supported. This being his theme, the whole trend of his speeches was to stir up hatred and contempt of the Government. He was more extreme and outspoken than on his previous tours and did not trouble to conceal that his object was the destruction of the present form of Government, in which he includes the new Constitution, by any means available.

4. In its result the visit seems to have been a great personal triumph. When he came to the province the chances of some Congress candidates were very doubtful; there was disloyalty within the Provincial Congress Committee and the lower middle classes of Hindus, on whose support the Congress mainly relies, were being pulled this way and that by conflicting personal and local allegiances. He was able by his personal appeal to call back to their allegiance to the Congress the mass of the Hindu middle classes and for a few days after his visit Congress was stronger and more solid than it has been for many years. It is doubtful if this strength or unity will last, for it is based on personal considerations and not on principles. But in the instance of Lahore it lasted long enough to compel a strong Hindu election board candidate to give up the fight and it has probably lasted long enough elsewhere to turn the scales in favour of some Congress candidates. Jawaharlal appeals to Indian pride generally and particularly to Hindus in the Punjab as an outstanding man of their community in a province where outstanding Hindus are few. There is little reason to suppose that his last tour increased his following or the following of the Congress among Mohammadans who regard him as essentially a Hindu leader. The tour confirms the previously expressed view that Jawaharlal is potentially a danger of the first magnitude and that if circumstances were favourable to a Civil Disobedience Movement, such as was launched in 1930, it would, with his personal prestige behind it, receive considerable support from non-agriculturist Hindus, especially of the middle classes in the towns. There is no reason to suppose that the tour has increased his following outside the towns and he has never attempted to make headway among the Muslim rural population in the province.

5. The "*Daily Herald*," a Lahore Hindu Mahasabha paper, writes that in talking of the long and tedious journey facing Congress, Nehru struck a pessimistic note. It admitted that "whatever be the results, Congress candidates cannot complain that they have not been supported and backed by their High Command. Unlike Hindu Mahasabha candidates, their task was made easy by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.⁶ If now Congress candidates fail, the fault will be that of Congress policy or of the candidates themselves." The paper goes on to criticize the Congress President's message and his failure to hold out hopes of immediate relief to the hungry, poor and unemployed and characterizes his blame of the Hindu Mahasabha for the Bengal pact as untrue and in extremely bad taste. "Voters are accustomed to

sentimental antics of this stamp and most of them are not to be tricked by such tactics. Our reading of the situation is that, in spite of all the speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the elections will be decided not by rhetoric, but by commonsense. Personalities will decide the final issue."

1. The demolition of Shahidganj Mosque by Sikhs at Lahore on 4-5 July, 1935 led to widespread agitation which became pre-eminent symbol of Muslim Mass Mobilisation.
2. Founded in 1929, Majlis-i-Ahrar was formally launched in 1931 in Lahore with the objectives to fight for freedom foster between different communities and work for the betterment of masses especially Muslims.
3. Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946); President of the Indian National Congress 1909, 1918; Member, President Hindu Mahasabha, 1916, 1917, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1935; Founder of Banaras Hindu University accompanied Gandhiji to London to the second session of RTC, well-known for his orthodox pro-Hindu leanings.
4. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956); Editor, *Zaminder* joined *Majlis-i-Ahrar*, attended AICC meeting 28 March, 1930; left the Congress in 1932 due to differences with Gandhiji; left Ahrar and formed the Ittihad-i-Millat Party in 1935; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1937-45; re-elected Muslim League Member, 1946.
5. The Majlis-i-Ittihad-i-Millat was founded in 1935 by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to lead the Muslims who were taking part in the Shahidganj agitation in Punjab. Its programme was to recruit volunteers and dress them in blue shirts for the purpose of carrying on the agitation.
6. Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949); renowned poetess; President, Indian National Congress, 1925.

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Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi¹ to Nehru [Urdu]

Maulana Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi Papers

2 February, 1937

My dear Panditji,

1. Regards. I received your letter. Thanks for remembering me. You have asked me which action of yours do I grudge. I have no grudge against you whatsoever. I do, however, feel hurt when persons like you, who are the standard-bearers of India's freedom commit unwarranted mistakes. Misinformation campaign is carried on throughout the country that Muslims are not with the Congress. Absolutely baseless though it is both the nationalist Hindus and the British are engaged in this campaign for their own vested interests. Their aims are different. The British want to show to the world that the Congress is an organisation of the Hindus only and the Muslims are not with it whereas the Hindu nationalists do it in order to rope in Muslims to make sacrifices for the country's freedom under the Congress banner but when the time comes for the distribution of national largesse they would be given a short shrift and would be told that they had not participated at all in the fight for freedom otherwise the number of Muslims in the Congress is no way less than those of the Hindus in terms of the demographic proportions. I believe that 90 per cent of the

nationalist Hindus in the heart of their hearts, don't want the Muslims to join the Congress though they would not say so publicly.

2. You will recall that Maulana Shafi Daudi, Sayyid Murtaza Bahadur etc. were Congressite till 1922, but they left it when the Swaraj Party betrayed the Hindu mentality in the Assembly and opposed the reforms regarding the Frontier and walked out.

3. I am among those who would like the Muslims to be in the Congress in spite of all these faults of the Hindus. For me, the freedom of the country is the dearest thing in the world.

Communal Settlement and the Congress Leadership.

4. The propaganda that is being carried out in India against the communal settlement surprises me a great deal. I keep wondering, O' God, what a foolish world we are living in. The matters which we should have solved ourselves but we could not because some selfish and anti-national Indians did not allow it. Now it is no use, putting the blame on others. The communal settlement took place in Lucknow in the form of Nehru Report² but Gandhiji in order to please Sikhs drowned it in Ravi. And the people who were stoned in the market places and streets by their co-religionists were not even consulted. Thereafter, he went for the Round Table Conference to get complete independence. In those days I was in Bombay. I called on him to advise him against going to London. I told him that until he solved the communal stalemate in India, there was no point in his going to negotiate the freedom with the British. The Congress is the same Hindu party which openly canvassed against Diwan Chaman Lal, who had fought the Punjab Assembly election against Bhai Parmanand, just two years back.

5. In Ludhiana, widely respected and senior members of the Ahrar Party,³ along with their volunteers, had gone to felicitate the candidate who had won on the Congress ticket. But the communally inspired office-bearers of the local Congress Committee badly humiliated them and turned them back. On the other hand we maintained that we had canvassed for the Congress at the last hustings. A friend told me that we were not free from troubles and if we went on supporting Congress like this the Muslims would not come along with us. I told him that if we could go to prison together in the Civil Disobedience Movement why should we not stand by them now when the larger cause of the country is at stake. You and several other leaders of the Congress said in Punjab that it was a toady Province. Whereas, the reality is that the masses of the Punjab, whether Hindus or Muslims love Congress from the core of their heart but the fact is that the people are fed up and irritated with the Congressmen. The strength of an organisation depends on the nobility of character of its members and their ability to see through things. The political environment has been made congenial in last two years with enormous difficulties. I am afraid this atmosphere of amity and harmony may get polluted.

6. The annual elections of the Congress Committees are neither advertised in the papers nor are they publicised in the towns through other means. The eligibility for the membership and also between what dates the aspirants for the membership can enrol themselves are not made public. My personal experiences testify to this. Last year I had asked some Congress friends of mine for the membership forms. I

was denied. If the Congress conducts its elections in the Punjab the way Government does it, all other parties would automatically fade out. The functionaries of the Congress Committees are very much wanting in generosity. The people think that the Government tries to influence the voters but my experience tells me that the Congress Committees do not at all want to make new members lest their posts are endangered. I have apprised you of with the situation so that you may take remedial steps. It is not a complaint nor it is maliciously motivated.

7. The extracts of your speech which you delivered in Bombay against Mr. Jinnah have been published in newspapers. All the Muslims of India have expressed displeasure over it and the Muslim Press has condemned you in the editorials. We ourselves differ from Mr. Jinnah on innumerable issues but we move with utmost care lest it causes unnecessary dissensions. No matter, whether one is an admirer of Mr. Jinnah or his detractor, but one thing every-body agrees upon is his moderate credentials. The Government could never bribe him and he was never won over to their side. The repeated successes of the Congress in Assembly owes a lot to Mr. Jinnah's association. No one can deny this fact. You know that of late Mr. Jinnah had been reiterating the willingness of his party to work with Congress. Moreover, he espouses the idea of joint-electorate. Muslim Press has even gone to the extent of claiming that both you and Mr. Jinnah knew it well before the elections were held that the Muslim candidates could not win on the Congress tickets. You knew it also that all the Hindus on the Congress tickets could not be victorious. Therefore, you had then appreciated Mr. Jinnah's electoral campaigning. The success of Congress in few Provinces has caused an opaque haughtiness in the Congress leadership. Now they treat others as the children of lesser Gods as they began treating the Muslims in the wake of the ephemeral reconciliation of 1920. Today you are a very great leader of India. Nothing of the sort should escape your lips which may stir a crisis between the two communities. Such things would be pernicious to the national interests. With such an insignificant victory we have begun to think that the British have been driven out and we have become masters of our own destiny, whereas, the British are very much present in the country. I can very justifiably say that the communal riots are the upshots of the irresponsible speeches and writings of the leaders. You have picked up a quarrel with Mr. Jinnah on a non-issue. Your silence would have been more effective and louder an answer in this matter or you could have phrased your answer with mild words in order to avoid the consequent bitterness. The Nehru Report failed merely because of rather unbecoming treatment meted out to Mr. Jinnah in the Lucknow Convention and today we are repeating the same history. The late Dr. Ansari⁴ had rightly remarked that there was no strife in India rather the pitch had been queered by the personal bickering of the leaders. Had there been no inter-personal bitteresses among Mr. Jinnah, Pt. Motilal Nehru⁵, Jayakar⁶ and Maulana Shaukat Ali,⁷ the country would not have been in such a mess. After so many years the environment is becoming amiable once again. We would do well if you do not let the harsh words spoil it. Your speech about Mr. Jinnah has been commented upon by the entire Muslim Press. Ideologically Mr. Jinnah is near to you. He is a moderate. None is better than him. Please try to bring him closer to you.

8. I want to meet you at the earliest at some nearby place provided you stay

there for two-three days so that we can discuss the state of affairs. I keep corresponding with you because I wish the Congress to be held in high esteem by the people, and I want India's freedom to come closer. Since I hold you very dear to my heart so I have candidly expressed whatever were my feelings without bothering how you would take my words.

The Editorial of *Ehsan* which carries your speech is enclosed.

Habib-ur-Rahman Ludhianvi,
President, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam-Hind.

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1. Maulana Habibur Rehman (1892-1956); a Khilafatist; founder of the Ahrar Party, 1929, President, Majlis-i-Ahrar, 1931; attended Azad Muslim Conference, Delhi, 29 April, 1940.
 2. Officially called 'Report of the Committee by the All Parties Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution of India' and popularly called the Nehru Report after the Committee Chairman (August, 1928) contains the broad outlines of the constitutional framework. It was placed before the All-Parties Convention at Calcutta which witnessed a violent clash between Jinnah representing the All India Muslim League and M.R. Jayakar who put forth the All India Hindu Mahasabha view-point. Jinnah demanded, *inter alia*, that one third of the total seats in the proposed Central Legislature be reserved for Muslims; that in the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, too, there should be reservation of seats for Muslims on a population basis and that residuary powers of the federation be vested in the Provinces. Jayakar, on the other hand, questioned Jinnah's *locus standi* as a representative of the Muslims and warned against going back on the Report. Jinnah's amendments were overwhelmingly out-voted and this, in Jinnah's fateful words, proved "the parting of the ways."
 3. Founded in 1931 by Chaudhri Afzal Huq, the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, an advanced Muslim political party that cooperated with the Congress in the 1934 Assembly election. The leading Ahrars were Maulana Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Maulana Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi and Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar.
 4. Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880-1936); renowned medical practitioner; led All-India Medical Mission to Turkey, in the Balkan War (1912-13); President AIML Nagpur Session, 1920; President, Khilafat Conference Gaya, 1922, resigned from Muslim League and Khilafat Committee, 1926 and declared his commitment to Congress.
 5. Pandit Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), President, Congress Sessions at Amritsar, 1919 and Calcutta, 1928; participated in Non-Cooperation Movement 1920; organised Swarajya Party and played important role as its leader in the Central Legislative, 1923; author of 'Nehru Report.'
 6. Mukund Ramrao Jayakar (1873-1959); leader of the Moderates; delegate to the three sessions of the Indian Round Table Conference (1930-32).
 7. Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938); Trustee and President, MAO College Board, Secretary, Central Khilafat Committee; led Khilafat Movement along with his brother Maulana Muhammad Ali; delegate to the Indian Round Table Conference, 1931; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1934-38.



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*Linlithgow to Zetland**Zetland Papers Ref No. 4*THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, *New Delhi*, 4 February, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

In paragraph six of your letter of 18th January you mentioned your correspondence with Anderson about the Ghuznavi-Burdwan agreement. As I mentioned in my last letter I have not of course seen your correspondence with Anderson, nor have I so far heard from him (he is still on tour in the Andamans). But Ghuznavi wrote to me a few days ago to ask for an interview with a view to explaining the position in regard to the Award and his views on the Bengal elections. Anderson, whom I consulted by telegraph on this matter, strongly advised against receiving Ghuznavi. He added that the settlement had an unfavourable reception, but that he considered that judgement should be reserved until the leaders who would be mainly concerned in the formation of the new Government had pronounced opinion. It would be in their power to give practical effect to the settlement should they so desire.

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*Nehru's speech [Extract]**Bombay Chronicle*, 10 February, 1937; *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. 8, pp. 21-23

Bombay, 9 February, 1937. 11. The communalists among the Hindus and the Muslims are quarrelling over loaves and fishes of office. But the people at large are gradually able to see what lies behind the cloak of communalism and are rallying round the banner of the Congress.

12. In certain sections of the Press a report of a secret Pact between the Congress and Mr. Jinnah regarding the acceptance of office by the Congress has appeared. It is a false and malicious report. It would be a grievous mistake if the Congress accepts office, after the nation has spoken its mind in the manner it is doing in Province after Province. We should remember the issue on which we have approached the electors and they are giving their verdict. Then, how on earth can I sign a Pact with Mr. Jinnah whom I have seen only once during the last five years and that too only for five minutes at a students meeting in Allahabad?

13. I regret that Mr. Jinnah should call the Congress Muslims "adventurers." I most emphatically protest against such a description. The Congress Muslims in the North-West Frontier Province and other Provinces cannot be called so and their suffering and sacrifice have evoked admiration from the entire country. After all,

what does Mr. Jinnah know of the national movement when he has not cared to take part in it even once?

14. There are Muslims in the Congress who can provide inspiration to a thousand Jinnahs. Let not Mr. Jinnah pour ridicule on the Muslims in the Congress. What does he know of their steadfastness, their patriotism, their struggle, their heroism and their sacrifice? Mr. Jinnah does not understand our demand for independence that has shaken this mighty Government. I challenge Mr. Jinnah to show whether there is any other party or organisation in India than the Congress which has given such a consistent fight to the Government with a view to alleviating the lot of the poor, hungry and unemployed. Not only Britain but the entire world cannot resist India's demand if but a quarter of India resolves to assert the claim for independence.

15. Mr. Jinnah speaks in sarcastic terms about independence. He does not realise that the course of events in the world and the very spirit of the times are going to work for India's freedom. I am sorry to see the way Mr. Jinnah's mind works. He does not understand the significance and the real spirit of national independence. Mr. Jinnah may prefer responsible Government, but, I, for one, would not agree to join such a party in preference to the Congress which stands for national independence. As for the achievements of Mr. Jinnah's party, I shall not say a word.

16. I am sorry that the Congress did not set up more Muslim candidates. In the United Provinces, I found a large number of Muslim voters asking me in whose favour they should exercise their franchise in the absence of Congress candidates. The voters of the U.P., whether they were Hindus or Muslims, were all anxious to vote for the Congress.

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Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the first half month of February, 1937

Home Poll, F. 18-2/37 pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

1. *General.* Since the election results were known the principal preoccupation of the politically minded has been in Ministry-making and the Press of all shades of opinion has joined in this congenial task and given the utmost publicity to the various issues involved.

2. The position is complicated by the fact that the several groups which will constitute the Assembly, and of which approximate figures were given in my last report, are by no means static and several members of those groups are claimed by more than one party. It may be anticipated that not a few of the "Independent" members will be willing to wear the label of the party which ultimately secures a position in the Ministry for its leaders, and there may be additions to and defections from the three principal groups of Congress, the Muslim League and the Proja Party.

3. Numerically, the Congress is actually the largest body but it would be incapable

of securing a working majority in the House without support from other groups. The groups with which it has the largest measure of affinity is the Proja Party of Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq but, although a coalition of these two groups was a possibility which could not be ignored, a statement which was issued to the Press of Sunday, 15th February, above the signatures of Mr. Huq and the Nawab of Dacca¹ (with others), Presidents respectively of the Proja Party and the Muslim League, sets all doubts at rest for the time being at any rate by declaring that "the leaders of the League and Proja Parties have decided to cooperate under the leadership of Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq for the purpose of working the Constitution and, as a result of discussions, have arrived at an agreement subject to the ratification of the Parties."

4. The air is thus cleared to the extent that it is now known that the eighty odd members of the League and Proja Parties combined will support a Ministry containing their leaders. Whether the Independent Muslim group of approximately forty members will also join the coalition is not, at the moment of writing, certain. The Hon'ble Minister Nawab Sir K.G.M. Farooqui is mentioned as a leader of this group and its accession to the coalition would, with the support of the European-cum-Anglo Indian group of twenty-nine and some Independent Hindus, conduce to the formation of a Ministry with a handsome majority in the Lower House.

5. The Congress Party has thus failed to win over the Proja Party but it is believed that it has been more successful with Scheduled Caste Hindus, returned on an Independent ticket; it actually claims to command about seventy votes.

6. The position as regards the Ministry is that there are seven Ministries and two Under-Ministries to be filled. A preliminary difficulty with which would be Ministry-makers are faced is as to the allocation of portfolios so as to secure the adhesion of prominent Independent Hindus like Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sarkar,² a successful business man and financier; Mr. Syama Prasad Mukherjee,³ the well-known Vice-Chancellor of the University, and Sir Bejoy Prasad Singh Roy, the present Minister for Local Self-Government, while satisfying the claims of the Muslim groups. In opposition, along with the Congress Party, these gentlemen would be formidable. On the other hand, after satisfying the claims of the protagonists of the League and the Proja Party it will be difficult to find three seats in the Council of Ministers for Hindus, so that a preliminary issue which is likely to arise is whether there should be five or four Muslim and two or three Hindu Ministers. For the Under-Ministries of Law and Justice and Commerce and Labour the names of a Scheduled Caste member and a Muslim have been freely mentioned. Meanwhile, a section of the Hindu Press is endeavouring to create an atmosphere unfavourable to the inclusion of certain prominent leaders of the Muslim League in the Ministry and under such captions as "Communalism must go" vehemently attacks the Hon'ble Member Sir Nazimuddin. On the other hand, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* in an article under date 2nd February indicates that the part the Congress Party will play under the new Constitution will not be merely that of wreckers. The article concludes:

"On the whole, therefore, and unless a peculiar situation is created through the Governor forming an injudicious Ministry or making too hasty a use of his reserve powers and unless unfortunate party and communal squabbles figure too prominently again in Bengal's public life, there is much useful and good work that the Congress may do or help in getting done in the legislature."

7. Criticism has already appeared in the Press of some of the items of the programme which Mr. Fazlul Huq is even now outlining while touring the Province as the conditions on which he will assume office, e.g., a primary school and dispensary in every village; and no time has been wasted by his opponents in pointing out that he will be faced with the problem of co-ordinating Provincial resources to such ends.

8. The Divisional Commissioners report certain further reflections on the elections the results of which were only partly known when they submitted their last reports. The Dacca Commissioner quotes the District Magistrate of Bakarganj who attributes the defeat of the Hon'ble Sir Nazimuddin by Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq to the latter's popular personality and describes the Bakarganj members of the Assembly who have been elected on the Proja Party ticket as "influential men of their localities and both loyal and reliable." The Burdwan Commissioner states that although there has been a revival of Congress mentality amongst the people, it does not necessarily mean that the electorate is in favour of wrecking the Constitution. The District Magistrate of Midnapore thinks that the pro-Government propaganda carried on in that district in recent years has been ineffective but the Commissioner thinks that this estimate is unduly pessimistic. At the same time the immediate effect of Congress victories at the polls in Midnapore district has been to undermine, at any rate temporarily, official authority.

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1. Sir Salimullah, Nawab of Dacca (1884-1912); circulated a scheme for the formation of an All India Muslim Confederacy, the precursor of AIML; President, Calcutta Session of AIML, 1912.
 2. Nalini Ranjan Sarkar (1888-1953); Finance Minister, Bengal, 1938-39 and 1941-42; Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1942-43.
 3. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (1901-53); Founder-President of the Jana Sangh, 1951.

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Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the first half of February, 1937

Home Poll, F. 18-2/37 pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Political. The Elections. With the results of only seven contests still to be declared, the party position, according to Press reports, was as follows on the evening of the February 13.

Unionists (comprising 77 Muslims, 7 Hindus, 1 European, 1 Anglo-Indian and 2 Indian Christians)	88
Congress (comprising 9 Hindus, 4 Sikhs and 2 Muslims)	15
Khalsa National Party ¹	12
Hindu Election Board	11
Akali Party	10

Ahrars	2
Ittihad-i-Millat	2
Muslim League	2
Congress Nationalist	1
Independents (comprising 8 caste Hindus, 7 Scheduled caste Hindus, 5 Muslims and 5 Sikhs)	25
Total	168

Later information is to the effect that ten members who fought the elections from non-Unionist platforms, have joined the Unionist Party and that when the Assembly meets, the Party will have about a hundred adherents out of a total house of one hundred and seventy-five members. Considerable enthusiasm prevailed as the results were announced, but, with the exception of a few minor incidents, no serious disorder occurred. In Amritsar the successful Congress members were taken in a somewhat rowdy procession round the city and some Ahrars showed their resentment at Dr. Kitchlew's² success by throwing stones at his carriage.

4. A few of the most interesting results are the defeat of Khan Bahadur Sardar Habib Ullah Khan, a prominent member of the Unionist Party, at the hands of Iftikhar-ud-Din,³ the well-to-do scion of a good family, who has Communist tendencies, being interested in the Youth Association and the Indian Progressive Writers' Association. He stood as a Congress nominee, but actually succeeded as an *Arain*. His opponent tried to secure the Jat vote by pointing out that he withdrew from another constituency in favour of a Jat: the contest thus became a tribal affair and the Arains, being in the majority, secured the return of Iftikhar-ud-Din. Dr. Muhammad Alam⁴ staged a return to political life by standing as a nominee of the Majlis-Ittihad-i-Millat, thus securing the support of those Mohammadans, who still hope for the return of the Shahidganj mosque. Dr. Alam has already announced his intention to return to the Congress fold and this has annoyed Mohammadans and some Hindus, who refer to his recent communalist activities. Chaudhri Afzal Haq,⁵ one of the Ahrar leaders, who is a member of the present Council, was unseated by his Unionist opponent in what was once regarded as a safe Ahrar constituency.

1. The Khalsa National Party, also called the Sikh Nationalist Party in contemporary record, represented the landed aristocracy's domination in the factionalised politics of Punjab in the 1930s. On its winning a substantial block of rural seats in 1937 elections, its leader Sir Sunder Singh Majithia was included in the Unionist Cabinet as a countervailing force against the Akalis who were increasingly focusing on the religious symbolism, such as playing of music before mosques, the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi characters and the use of *Jhatka* procedure for slaughtering animals. The party ceased its activities after 1940.
2. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew (1888-1963); started Urdu daily *Tanzim* from Amritsar 1921; participated in the Khilafat Movement; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937.
3. Iftikhar-ud-Din (1907-62); joined the Congress in 1935 and then the Muslim League in 1946; Minister for Rehabilitation in Pakistan, 1947; founded Azad Pakistan Party, 1951, and Founder-Member, National Awami Party.

4. Dr. Muhammad Alam, a barrister and prominent nationalist leader of the Punjab.
5. Chaudhri Afzal Huq, Member U.P. Provincial Ahrar Party.

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*Haig¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers; Towards Freedom Papers I, pp. 143-46 Camp*

17 February, 1937

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

2. The Muslim situation is still obscure. There are rumours that the Congress will make considerable efforts to win over at least the whole of the Muslim League group, realising that if they do this and thus split the Muslims seriously, they will render the whole Opposition ineffective. I think they are fully alive to the danger of having an active and united Muslim opposition. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful whether for the Ministry they will pass over the handful of genuine Congress Muslims in favour of those who are clearly not in real sympathy with the Congress aims; and even if, to begin with, they attach a fair number of Muslims to themselves. I doubt whether this attachment will last long. But both the Muslims and the landlords may be affected by what happens in other Provinces, and there are rumours from Bihar that the Congress are making some impression on these classes there.

3. Sir J.P. Srivastava² is in the mood to continue the fight, and he could do a great deal to give weight to the Opposition. He realises that in view of the figures I gave to your Excellency in my last letter, the Leader of the Opposition must be a Muslim. I have seen the Nawab of Chhatari³ recently. He talks very sensibly about the whole position, but he is not a natural fighter and I am inclined to doubt whether he would take on the position of Leader of the Opposition. It is not impossible that this would fall on Sir Muhammad Yusuf,⁴ who has considerable skill in what one might call the unseen working of the political machine.

5. Everyone assumes that the Congress intends to take office, and I do not think they will require any kind of encouragement from me. In view of the situation that is now developing, the uncertainty of the attitude of the Muslims and the landlords and the soreness among the latter, I have come to the conclusion that it would be unwise for me to go out of my way to see the Congress leader at any early date. I think this would merely depress the opposition elements and increase the probability that they would lie down and allow themselves to be trampled on. My present idea, therefore, would be not to send for Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant⁵ until just before the Delhi meeting, or even perhaps not till after it. There is, I think, a good deal to be said for the latter course.

Yours sincerely,
HARRY HAIG

1. Sir Harry^{*} Graham Haig (1881-1956); Home Secretary, 1926-30; Home Member, 1932-34; Governor of U.P., 1934-39.
- 2 J.P. Srivastava (1889-1954); leading industrialist of Uttar Pradesh; Member; National Defence Council.
3. Ahmed Said Khan, Nawab of Chhatari (1888-1982); founded National Agriculture Party; Home member, U.P., 1926-33; Governor of U.P., 1933; formed Ministry for a short period after the Congress refusal to form Ministry in 1937; Prime Minister, Hyderabad State, 1941-47.
4. 3. (Nawab) Muhammad Yusuf; barrister and influential landholder in the eastern U.P., Minister, U.P., 1926-36.
5. Govind Ballabh Pant (1887-1961); Leader, Swaraj Party in UP Council, 1923-30; Congress Premier, 1937-39 and Chief Minister, U.P., 1946-55.

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Nehru to Cripps¹[Extract]

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 31-34

22 February, 1937

3. You must have heard of the Congress victory at elections here. That victory is big enough but to grasp the real significance of it you must remember what we were contending against. We had the Government apparatus and all the other vested interests against us and all means, fair and otherwise, were employed to defeat us. But the enthusiasm for the Congress was so tremendous that it swept everything before it. Our majorities have been enormous.

4. Remarkable as this election victory has been, the really significant feature of the election campaign has been the shaking up of the masses. We carried our message not only to the thirty million and odd voters but to the hundreds of thousand of non-voters also. The whole campaign and the election itself have been a revelation of the widespread anti-imperialist spirit prevailing throughout the country. It has also made clearer the class cleavages among the people. The big landlord class and other vested interests were ranged against us. They were swept away in the Congress flood, their most determined opponents being their own tenants.

5. This class cleavage is very apparent in the comparison between the elections for the Provincial Assemblies (Lower Houses) and the Provincial Councils (Upper Houses). In the former the franchise was low and the electorates were large, the average constituency having as many as forty to sixty thousand voters. In the latter the franchise was a high property one and the electorate was very small, usually some hundreds. In the assembly elections we carried all before us and our majorities were prodigious, varying, as a rule, between twenty thousand and fifty thousand. In the Council elections we fared badly though even here we won a few seats. The election made it perfectly clear that the wider the mass appeal, the greater was our success. With the present electorate of about ten per cent of the population (for the lower house) we have gained ninety per cent of the seats in the general constituencies.

We could have won 100 per cent of these seats but for the tremendous pressure of vested interests, and sometimes the questionable tactics employed against us. If this is any indication of the Congress strength, as it undoubtedly is, then our position is even stronger so far as 90 per cent of non-voters are concerned. Only a microscopic handful at the top, fearful of social changes, might be said to be against us and to cling to the present dispensation, though even they are critical of it.

6. This applies to the general constituencies. It does not apply so far to the Muslim special electorate and we have succeeded in regard to Muslim candidates. Partly this is due to our own timidity as we ran few Muslim candidates. The burden of running over a thousand candidates was great and we did not wish to add to it. If we had run more Muslim candidates, I think we would have had a fair measure of success, especially in the rural areas.

7. But it is true that the Muslim masses are more apathetic. They have been too long doped with communal cries. They have no leaders of their own and they are a little hesitant in casting their lot completely with the others. Still it is obvious that even these Muslim masses are getting out of the rut of communalism and are thinking along economic lines. Equally significant is the change that is coming over the younger generation of Muslims. These young people are definitely cutting themselves away from the old communal ways of thought. On the whole, I think that the communal position is definitely brighter. The Hindu communalists have been largely swept away by the Congress and they count for little. The Muslim communal leaders still function but their position weakens for they have no reply to the questions about poverty and hunger and unemployment and independence that their own people put to them. They can think only in terms of jobs for the upper classes.

8. As a whole, India is wide-awake and expectant. It talks and thinks in terms of the poverty of the masses and how to relieve it, and inevitably it is being driven to a radical solution of our social problems. Politically the masses are wholly anti-imperialist, so also the middle classes, except the top fringe. My extensive touring has been a revelation to me of the suppressed energy of the people and of their passionate desire to be rid of their burdens. The Congress is supreme today so far as the masses and the lower middle classes are concerned. Even the Muslim masses look up to it for relief. It has hardly ever been in such a strong position.

1. Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (1889-1952); Member of War Cabinet and deputed by it to India as leader of the 'Cripps Mission' 1942; President Board of Trade, 1945-47, Member of Cabinet Mission to India, 1946.



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*Ganpat Rai¹ to Jayakar [Extract]**Jayakar Papers, Hindu Mahasabha, Head Office, New Delhi*

27 February, 1937

Dear Mr. Jayakar,

It is proposed to hold a meeting to deliberate on the question whether under the present system of communal electorate an All India Hindu Party should be set up for the purposes of taking elections including the Municipal, District Board and other Local bodies in hand, as the Congress, although predominantly Hindu body, has openly disowned to protect the Hindu interests as such. This will naturally be of much interest to those who contested elections with the Congress during the last elections for the Provincial Assemblies under the Government of India Act, 1935, and have either failed or if successful have experienced the serious difficulty of opposing the country-wide organisation as the Congress is. No one can come to any other conclusion than this that the only way to protect Hindu interests is to have a strong party organisation on an All India basis throughout this country. Besides this after the inauguration of the Federal Scheme under the Government of India Act, 1935 the elections to the Central Legislature are likely to be held in September or October 1938. In order, therefore, that the above objects may be achieved it is proposed that a meeting be held at Delhi in the month of March 1937 after the 20th, when there will be a number of public holidays. Will you kindly let us know whether you will be able to spare some days during that time and take part in the deliberations of that conference?

Hoping to hear from you at your earliest convenience and thanking you very much in advance.

Yours truly,
GANPAT RAI
Honorary Secretary

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1. Ganpat Rai (1898-1977); an active worker of the Arya Samaj and Member of Hindu Mahasabha Delegation which met Cripps in 1942.

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*Jinnah's Press Interview [Extract]**Times of India, 1 March, 1937; Nation's Voice, pp. 127-28*

28 February, 1937

2. "This is the first time that the All India Muslim League from the centre, without

effective Provincial or district organisations, has made an attempt at mass contact and has entered the field of elections to the Provincial Legislatures under the new Constitution, and the task was, as I have often repeated, "stupendous." He added: "This was so, firstly because the Muslims are in every way backward and are not organised, and, secondly, because we have not a network of existing organisation in the shape of provincial and district bodies. But a beginning had to be made and I am more than satisfied at the result of the first attempt."

3. "Our policy and programme are well-known," continued the League President. "It is summed up in two main features: (1) that the present Provincial Constitution and the proposed Central Constitution should be replaced immediately by full democratic Self-Government, and (2) that in the meantime, the representatives of the Muslim League in the various legislatures will utilise the legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the Constitution for the uplift of the people in various spheres of national life. We shall cooperate with any progressive group in the legislatures for the welfare and in the interests of the provinces and the country generally."

4. Referring to the strength of the League Party in the various legislatures, Mr. Jinnah said: "The result of our efforts has been that in Bengal, the Muslim League Party has secured 50 per cent of the seats and is the largest Muslim group. In the United Provinces, it put up only 35 candidates for the lower house and secured 29 seats out of a total of 66. In Madras, the Muslim League Board put up 11 candidates for the Assembly and three for the Council, and has succeeded except for one seat in the Assembly. Bombay has achieved the highest success. It has secured two-third out of a total number of 30 seats, and I have already received telegrams from the independent candidates expressing their desire to join the League Group."

5. "In the Punjab, I admit, most regretfully we have failed. In Bihar, no Muslim League Parliamentary Board was set up. In the Central Provinces, both the parties of Mr. Rauff Shah¹ and Mr. Shariff applied to be affiliated to the Muslim League. But under the rules, Mr. Rauff Shah and Mr. Shariff² being members of the Central Parliamentary Board, had the authority to constitute a board, and as they could not agree with me in spite of my strenuous efforts, and as the applications to be affiliated were not given in time, it was considered best that they should take the verdict of the electorate, and whichever party commands a majority, that party board may be recognised by the Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board."

6. "With regard to Assam, the Muslim League has carried away nine seats out of 34. In the North-West Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind, no Muslim League Board was formed."

7. "Muslims have every reason to be congratulated on this achievement after a work of only a few months," Mr. Jinnah went on to say. "It is up to them now to organise throughout India and to take their proper place and share in the administration and governance of the Provinces and the country. The Constitution and policy of the League do not prevent us. On the contrary, it is part and parcel of our basic principle that we are free and ready to cooperate with any group or party from the very inception, or inside the Legislature, if the basic principles are determined by common consent."

1. Shah Syed Abdul Rauf (d. 1950); President, Muslim League, Central Provinces and Berar for several years; Member of Indian Constituent Assembly, 1947-49.
2. M.Y. Shariff, Member of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board from Central Provinces.

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*Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of February, 1937 [Extract]**Home-Poll F. 18-2/37, pp. 1-2*

CONFIDENTIAL

3. There have been important developments in the position as between the Muslim League and the Proja Party and on 24th February a statement was issued under the signatures of Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq and the Nawab of Dacca announcing the ratification by the parties of the agreement arrived at between their leaders. It is reported further that the independent Muslim members of the Assembly are gradually turning towards the League-cum-Proja Party and are unwilling to form any third group which may impair the solidarity of the Muslims in the Assembly. It is believed that the Muslim leaders favour the inclusion of Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy in the Ministry from among the caste Hindus.

4. The League-Proja Party, in the statement referred to above, has put forward a common programme of policy, the main items of which are concerned with the amendment of the Permanent Settlement and the Bengal Tenancy Act, and other measures designed to improve the lot of tenants and cultivators; the immediate introduction of free compulsory primary education; and, nearly at the bottom of the list, the repeal of repressive laws and the release of political prisoners and detenus. It is reassuring that the last mentioned item is qualified by the provision that it is accepted so far as is consistent with public safety.

5. The overwhelming victory of the Hon'ble Member Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin over his opponent Mr. Fazlul Karim, a retired member of the Bengal Civil Service, in the North Calcutta constituency vacated by Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, indicates that he enjoys the confidence of a considerable proportion of the Muslim electorate notwithstanding his earlier defeat at the hands of Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq in the Patuakhali North Constituency.

6. With the election of twenty-seven members by the Bengal Legislative Assembly the composition of the Upper House of the Provincial Legislature is as under, excluding nominations to be made by His Excellency the Governor:

Congress Caste Hindus	10
Hindu Nationalist	1
Hindu Sabha	1
Independent Caste Hindus	12
Muslim League	11

Proja Party	3
Independent Mohammadans	13
Europeans	6
Total	<hr/> 57 <hr/>

7. It is commonly reported that a considerable number of votes were sold at prices ranging from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000. It is perhaps significant that if the voting had proceeded on strictly communal lines three more Mohammadans and two more Scheduled Caste representatives would have been elected.

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Henry Brabourne to R.M. Maxwell¹

Fortnightly Reports, No. S.D.-625 Home Department (Special)

Bombay, 1/5 March, 1937

My dear Maxwell,

I am desired to submit my report for the second half of February 1937.

2. *Political.* The last election results were announced on the 26th ultimo. The strength of the parties is as follows:

Legislative Council	
Congress	14
Independents	6
Muslim League	2
Democratic Swaraj	2
Liberal	1
European	1
Total	<hr/> 26 <hr/>

(excluding 4 to be nominated by His Excellency)

Legislative Assembly	
Congress	85
Muslim League	18
Independent Muslims	12
Other Independents	19
Ambedkar's Party	13
Non-Brahmins	10
Democratic Swarajists	2
Khoti Sabha	2

Nationalist	1
Europeans and Anglo-Indians	8
Labour	5

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3. Congress is the predominant party in both Houses. Though they have not secured absolute majorities, they ought to be able to command a majority of votes on most occasions. Except in Thana, Bijapur and Dharwar, where they secured only 5 out of the 19 seats, the Congress did well in the General Constituencies in all Districts. Their success must be attributed less to political convictions than to superior organisation, the enthusiasm produced by the last minute tours of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Messrs. Vallabhbhai Patel,² Rajendra Prasad³ and M.N. Roy⁴ and to the extravagant promises held out by their candidates. It is noteworthy that no Congressman has been returned by a Muslim Constituency, while among the Scheduled Castes the Congress secured only 4 out of the 15 seats. The Finance Member and both the Ministers have been returned, each of them topping the poll in his constituency.

4. It is understood that three of the Independent Muslims have agreed to join the Muslim League Party, thereby increasing its strength to 21, while the remaining nine have declined to join unless the League is reconstituted. Mr. M.A. Jinnah is reported to have stated that the two main features of the League programme would be that the Party would utilize the legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit for the country and that they would attempt to get the present Provincial Constitution and the proposed Central Constitution replaced immediately by full democratic Self-Government. The Honourable Sir A.M.K. Dehlavi,⁵ the present Minister for Local Self-Government, has been elected leader of the Party in Bombay.

5. Speculation is rife both in political circles and in the Press as to the possible Constitution of the future Ministry and the decision of the All India Congress Committee on the question of acceptance of offices by Congressmen is eagerly awaited. Latest Press reports indicate that opinion among Congressmen in the Presidency is in favour of acceptance of office.

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1. Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member, Viceroy's Executive Council since 1938.
 2. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950); Leader, Bardoli Satyagraha, Congress President, 1931; Home Member, Indian Interim Government 1946-47; Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India, 1947-50.
 3. Rajendra Prasad (1884-1963); joined Gandhi in the Champaran Movement; President, Indian National Congress, 1934, 1939 and 1947-48; President, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; President, First Republic of India, 1950-62.
 4. M.N. Roy; Narendra Nath Battacharya (1893-1954); better known as Manabendra Nath Roy; the name he adopted in 1916; founder member of the Jugan Party in 1914; left India in 1916 and participated in revolutionary movements in Mexico and in European Countries; in 1919 founded the Mexican Communist Party; one of the founder members of the Communist International; in 1927 went to China as the representative of the Comintern; differed from the Comintern in 1928; returned to India in 1931; was arrested and sentenced to six years

- imprisonment; joined Congress for a short period and later founded the Radical Democratic Party and the Indian Federation of Labour; supported the Government during the Second World War; after his break with Communism became one of the principal exponents of Radical Humanism.
5. Sir Ali Muhammad Khan Dehlavi (1871-1952); Minister, Public Health and Local Self-Government Bombay, 1936-37; Leader of Opposition, 1937-46; President, Bombay Provincial Muslim League; retired from public life 1946.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Gopichand Bhargava¹ [Extract]

*Gopichand Bhargava Papers; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,
Vol. VIII, pp. 402-403*

SWARAJ BHAWAN, ALLAHABAD, 5 March, 1937

My dear Dr. Gopichand,

Kripalaniji² has shown me your letter to him. I have taken the trouble to go into this matter and I must confess that the more I look into it the more it disgusts me. Punjab politics seem to have got into such a hopeless state of mess that nothing but a major operation is likely to put them on right lines. The Congress in the Punjab simply means a handful of persons in a few cities, and that handful quarrelling continuously. The last elections showed us where the Congress was strong and where it was weak. Nowhere in India have we got such a thing as a typical pro-Government party like the Unionist Party gaining so much support in the Province. I must confess that I have not quite got over the fact that the key seats in the Punjab were left uncontested by us. It is my belief that we could have captured almost every rural seat in the Punjab, Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh, if we had approached the peasantry on right lines.

2. The Congress does not even go near the peasantry in the Punjab and in cities it is busy with personal squabbles.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Gopichand Bhargava (1890-1966); a prominent Congress leader of the Punjab; Leader of Opposition, 1937-40; Chief Minister of Punjab, 1947-51.
 2. Acharya J.B. Kripalani (1888-1982); President, Indian National Congress, 1946; later resigned from the Congress and was one of the founders of the Congress Democratic Front and later on the Praja Socialist Party.



30

Nehru's speech at the Congress Legislators meeting [Extract]

*The Hindustan Times, 8 March, 1937, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,
Vol. VIII, pp. 54-55*

Lucknow, 6 March, 1937. The Congress victory has created an atmosphere in the country which could not have been accomplished by individual canvassing as pursued in the previous elections.

2. We must, however, investigate the causes of the few defeats which we have suffered. Though the Muslim nominees of the Congress have been defeated in the U.P. I refuse to believe that the Congress has no hold on the Muslim masses. I am sure that when the next opportunity comes we shall not lose a single Muslim seat in the rural areas though I am not quite certain about the urban seats. I don't think the Muslim masses are indifferent to the Congress. In my opinion, our defeat was mainly due to our failure to reach them. Our efforts at reaching them in the countryside were inadequate, mainly due to the paucity of Muslim workers. We now need Muslim workers in larger numbers.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers Roll No. 2

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 8 March, 1937

PRIVATE

4. I have also read with great interest your telegram¹ informing me of what has passed between Erskine² and Rajagopalachari.³ I am fully in agreement with you as to the line which we should take, and I have telegraphed to you suggesting that we should stand by the sections of the Act which define the responsibilities of the Governors and also upon paragraph 8 of the Instruments of Instruction to them. I do not know whether Gandhi is likely to seek an interview with you. It has, however, occurred to me that he may do so, and if he does I think that there would be great advantage in your making public immediately after any interview which you may grant him, our attitude towards any suggestion which he may make on the lines of that put forward by Rajagopalachari in Madras. This would knock on the head any rumours which might get about if any appreciable time elapsed between an interview with Gandhi and a statement with regard to it that negotiations were in progress between you and me in connection with any request for any modification of the provisions of the new Constitution in respect of the reserve powers vested in the Governors. I think it is sound myself (sic) to make it quite clear that there can be no

question of any bargain of this kind between the Congress and ourselves. It is quite conceivable that in taking up the attitude which they have done towards the new Constitution they may find that they have got themselves into a considerable mess, and, in view of their attitude towards us. I do not see why we should do anything to help them out of it. Incidentally, it is pretty certain, I think, that the Muslim would view with great suspicion and with very grave dislike anything which tended to centralise control and, therefore, to minimise the independence of the Provinces.

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1. Not available. It should, however, be noted that the Madras Congress considered it highly desirable that the Congressmen should accept offices in the Provinces where they were in clear majority.
 2. Lord John Francis Ashley Erskine, Governor of Madras, 1934-1940.
 3. Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (1879-1972); Premier, Madras, 1937-39 and Chief Minister, 1952-54; Governor, West Bengal, 1947; Governor-General of India, 1948-50; one of the founders of Swatantra Party.

32

Instructions to the Governor of Madras [Extract]

Special Responsibility to Safeguard Minorities interests Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution I, pp. 379-80

8 March, 1937. 7. In making appointments to his Council of Ministers Our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature those persons (including so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers.

9. Our Governor shall interpret his special responsibility for the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of Minorities as requiring him to secure, in general, that those racial or religious communities for the members of which special representation is accorded in the Legislature, and those classes of the people committed to his charge who, whether on account of the smallness of their number or their primitive condition or their lack of educational or material advantages or from any other cause, cannot as yet fully rely for their welfare upon joint political action in the Legislature, shall not suffer, or have reasonable cause to fear, neglect or oppression. But he shall not regard as entitled to his protection any body of persons by reason only that they share a view on a particular question which has not found favour with the majority.

Further, our Governor shall interpret the said Special Responsibility as requiring him to secure a due proportion of appointments in Our Services to the several communities, and, so far as there may be in his Province at the date of the issue of

these Our Instructions an accepted policy in this regard, he shall be guided thereby, unless he is fully satisfied that modification of that policy is essential in the interests of the communities affected or of the welfare of the public.

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Nehru's talk to Muslims

The Hindustan Times, 12 March, 1937; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 8, p. 39

Sarai Aghamir, Lucknow, 11 March, 1937. You want me to devise means to draw in more Muslims into the struggle. I can do so only after having talks with the Muslims. Meanwhile you may ask questions on the points on which you want satisfaction. You know how the leaders of every community, for their own benefit and for other reasons, have been creating misunderstandings in connection with the last elections to the legislatures. Poverty, hunger, disease and destitution afflict Hindus and Muslims alike. I wonder why the Congress, which is fighting for the cause of the country irrespective of any caste or creed, should be held responsible for the present state of affairs. The best course for Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, in my opinion, is to work among the Muslim masses whose vital problems are identical with those of others.

2. It is not true that the Muslims have deserted the Congress. The best among them are in the Congress. The present strained relations between the Hindus and the Muslims are not due to religious or other reasons but due to the activities of certain interested parties. When Mr. Jinnah dubbed the Congress Muslims as self-seekers, I replied that the Congress Muslims have done better work than Mr. Jinnah. I have never said that the Congress belongs to one community. The Congress is a fighting force in the country representing Hindus and Muslims and all other communities alike.

34

Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the first half of March, 1937 [Extract]

Home Poll F. 18-3/37

CONFIDENTIAL

2. In the sphere of politics the most important event has been His Excellency the Governor's action in calling upon Mr. Fazlul Huq to form a Ministry. Faced with the claims of his own supporters and the leading members of the Muslim League Mr. Huq's task is by no means an easy one. He himself has declared that the position is bewildering and has appealed for public help, sympathy and support while announcing

his intention to select, irrespective of party ties, the "very best men, the very ablest men, men of sterling character and integrity." The first problem which confronts him is how to form a Council of Ministers in which the Hindu community will be adequately represented while due consideration is given to the claims of the prominent members of the League and Proja Parties. The Hindu Press urges him to follow the example of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in the Punjab and divide the seats in the Cabinet between the two communities on a half and half basis. *The Star of India*, on the other hand, interprets this as an appeal to the generosity of the Moslem leader which should be rejected because of the ill-treatment meted out to Moslems by the Hindu community during the last half century.

3. Further speculation as to the composition of the Council of Ministers is unprofitable in view of the impending announcement of the appointments.

4. In some quarters the coalition of Mr. Fazlul Huq with the so-called "Khwaja" party (the Muslim League) is deplored as a disappointment to the crores of cultivators in Bengal, on the ground that he will be compelled to pursue a policy which has the support and approval of the Muslim League and the European group in the Assembly.

5. The proposed hartal which is being organised for 1st April next in pursuance of the resolution of the Faizpur Congress is said to have been unfavourably received by the Mymensingh District Congress Committee which favours processions with black flags as a more convenient form of expressing disapproval of the new Constitution. The local Muslims would resent any such demonstration as an insult to a Government which is likely to be more Muslim in composition than any previous Government in this Province and attempts are being made by the local authorities to dissuade local Congress supporters from organising a demonstration which might result in communal trouble. In Bankura district a meeting of the District Krishak Samity is to be held towards the end of March at which propaganda will be carried on for the success of the hartal on 1st April. Preparations for a general strike in the industrial areas on 1st April next are going on and the principal agitators are those mentioned in the paragraph of this report which deals with the Industrial and Labour situation.

35

C.W. Gwynne to R.M. Maxwell [Extract]

Home Poll (I) F. 18-3/37

CIVIL SECRETARIAT, UNITED PROVINCES, LUCKNOW, 18 March, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Maxwell,

I am desired to submit my fortnightly demi-official report for the first half of March, 1937.

A meeting of the Muslim members of the United Provinces Legislature was held

at Lucknow during the weekend. Mr. Jinnah came down to try and promote unity, and his efforts were for the time at any rate successful. After prolonged discussions it was decided that all Muslims would unite under the banner of the Muslim League so as to form a single party in the United Provinces Assembly. The leader of the Muslim League at present is Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman.¹

Yours sincerely,
C.W. GWYNNE

The Honourable
Mr. R.M. Maxwell CSI., CIE., ICS.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department, New Delhi.

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1. Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman (1889-1973); Member, All India Congress Committee, 1917-29; Secretary, Muslim Nationalist Party, July, 1929; Member, Congress Parliamentary Board, 1934; Muslim League; Member, U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1937 and 1946-47; Member, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1946-47; migrated to Pakistan, 1948; Governor of East Pakistan, 1953-54.

36

Nehru's Presidential Address to the All India Convention of Congress Legislatures [Extract]

The Hindustan Times, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII;

20 March, 1937

Delhi, 19 March, 1937. The very greatness of your success at the polls is a striking testimony of the response of the masses to this policy and programme. Millions have testified to their faith and confidence in this; they have given it the final seal of approval of the Indian people.

2. The electorate was confined to a bare ten per cent of our people, but everybody knows that the lower down the scale we go, the greater is the Congress strength. The remaining ninety per cent are even more solidly for the Congress than the ten per cent who have supported us. Though our success has been overwhelming and has confounded our opponents, and swept away the representatives of the big vested interests who opposed us, it should be remembered that the whole machinery of election was so designed as to weaken us. The pressure of an autocratic and entrenched Government was exercised against us, and behind it were ranged all the reactionaries and obscurantists who always flourish under the shadow of imperialism. Yet we won in resounding manner.

3. Only in regard to the Muslim seats did we lack success. But our very failure on this occasion has demonstrated that success is easily in our grasp and the Muslim masses are increasingly turning to the Congress. We failed because we had long neglected working among the Muslim masses and we could not reach them in time. But where we reached, especially in the rural areas, we found almost the same response, the same anti-imperialist spirit, as in others. The communal problem, of which we hear so much, seemed to be utterly non-existent, when we talked to the peasant, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. We failed also among the Muslims because of their much smaller electorate which could be easily manipulated and coerced by authority and vested interests. But I am convinced that, even so, we would have had a much larger measure of success if we had paid more attention to the Muslim masses. They have been too long neglected and misled and they deserve special consideration. I have no manner of doubt that they are turning to the Congress to seek relief from their innumerable burdens and their future cooperation is assured, provided we approach them rightly and on the basis of economic questions.

4. We have too long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them. That is a discredited policy and I trust that we shall not revert to it. And yet some people still talk of the Muslims as a group dealing with Hindus or others as a group, a medieval conception which has no place in the modern world. We deal with economic groups today and the problems of poverty and unemployment and national freedom are common for the Hindu, the Muslim, the Sikh and the Christian. As soon as we leave the top fringe, which is continually talking of percentages of seats in the legislatures and state jobs, and reach the masses, we come up against these problems. This way lies the ending of what has long been known as the communal problem.

5. One of the most remarkable signs of the times is the ferment among the Muslims in India, both the intelligentsia and the masses. Without any effective leadership, they have drifted aimlessly, and they resent this helpless position and feel that the communal leadership they have had has weakened them politically, in spite of the trivial and superficial gains which they are supposed to have got from an imperialism which seeks to wean them away from the national movement. Muslims, young men and old, and the Muslim Press, are full of this self-analysis, and the desire to get out of the communal rut and line up with the forces of freedom and progress is strong within them. They see how the Congress has swept away Hindu communal organisations, how it has captured the imagination of the masses, and they feel a little desolate and left out. They want to share in the triumphs of today and tomorrow, and are prepared to take their share of the burdens also. And so this election and our campaign, though they resulted in the loss of Muslim seats as a rule, have been a triumph for us even in regard to the Muslims. They have gone some way to lay the ghost of communalism. It is for us now to go ahead and welcome the Muslim masses and intelligentsia in our great organisation and rid this country of communalism in every shape and form.

6. The elections have many lessons to teach us but the outstanding fact is this: where we went to the masses direct we won overwhelmingly. Our partial lack of success in some provinces was clearly due to the Congress organisation there being

confined to the cities and having little contact with the peasantry. We must remedy these failings and speak more and more the language of the masses and fashion our policy to meet their needs. We must carry the Congress organisation to every village, the Congress message to every mud hut.

37

*Iqbal to Jinnah**Shamsul Hasan Collection*

LAHORE, 20 March, 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I suppose you have read Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's address to the All India National Convention and that you fully realise the policy underlying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned. I believe you are also aware that has at last brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self-organization in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia. While we are ready to cooperate with other progressive parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims. I, therefore, suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this convention you must re-state as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem. If you could hold this convention, it would test the credentials of those Muslims Legislators who have formed parties contrary to the aims and aspirations of Indian Muslims. It would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity. I am coming to Delhi in a few days time and hope to have a talk with you on this important matter. I shall be staying in the Afghan Consulate. If you could spare a few moments, we should meet there. Please drop a line in reply to this letter as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,
MOHAMMAD IQBAL

P.S. Please excuse me. I have got this letter written by a friend as my eye-sight is getting bad.

38

Jinnah's Press Interview, New Delhi, 20 March, 1937 [Extract]

*Civil and Military Gazette, 21 March, 1937;
Nation's Voice, pp. 133-134*

Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, in an interview, with an Associated Press representative on the Congress resolution on acceptance of office said:

"I congratulate the right wing Congress leaders for having carried the Congress with them. They have adopted a formula, which is practically the same as was adopted by the All India Muslim League on April 12, 1936, namely, in the present conditions we should utilise the constitution for what it is worth. The condition that Ministerships shall not be accepted unless the leaders of the Congress Party in the legislature is satisfied and able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his powers of interference or set aside the advice of the Ministers in regard to their constitutional activities is a surplusage.

4. "Now, struggling as we are for national Self-Government, perhaps it will be easier for the All India Muslim League parties to cooperate with other progressive parties as the Congress is also lined up. I now urge upon the Musalmans of India to make every effort to organise the Musalmans all over India and make the All India Muslim League and its policy and programme a success. I appeal to those Musalmans, particularly who feel strongly as anybody else in this country for national Self-Government and freedom of India, to rally round the Muslim League banner.

5. "We have decided to contest the seat, which was won by the Muslim League at Bahraich, but the member who won the seat, I sorrowfully have to say, is no more with us. So we have to capture that seat again. The Congress, I believe, is going to contest that seat. It will be a great mistake on the part of the Congress to do so. There is really no substantial difference now at any rate between the League and the Congress as wrecking of the Constitution has disappeared from the Congress programme.

6. "I have often said that I am trying to see that Musalmans should wholeheartedly and sincerely adhere to the policy and programme of the All India Muslim League which is both national and patriotic and we shall always be glad to cooperate with the Congress in its constructive programme. It is no use encouraging an individual Musalman to come into the fold of the Congress for the sake of a prize. In conclusion, I urge that let us now concentrate on those causes which stand in the way of a United Front." (A.P.)

39

Abdul Wali¹ to Nehru

All India Congress Committee; File No. G 5 (I)/1937

Barabanki, 28 March, 1937 "... I have been fretting over the fact that Khaliq is

cutting himself asunder from the Congress. It is his too great ambition and too much reliance on his own tactics that has led him astray. However, with the concurrence of Rafi Kidwai² I approached Khaliq last evening to suggest that it was never too late to mend and that he might even now leave that wretched group and its leadership. Well, that has nothing to do with you. That was a matter between me and Khaliq. But during the course of conversation between me and Khaliq it transpired that a scheme is being hatched with the help of Pantji [Govind Ballabh Pant] and Mohanlal³ to bring about coalition between the Congress and League parties in the Assembly. To tell you the truth, I am deadly against it.

2. My conviction is that the Congress will not be doing its duty to the Musalmans of India if it ever thought of making pacts and coalitions with the Muslim League. The Congress belongs as much to the Musalmans as to the Hindus. It can very well make coalition or enter into pacts with socialist groups but it cannot do any such thing with any of the communal groups. That would mean that the Congress disowns that particular community and treats it as an alliance. My idea is that once the Congress enters into pact with the Muslim League it loses the right to ask the Muslims to join it. Even in 1916 when I was the paid Assistant Secretary of the Muslim League, I opposed the idea of the Pact but I was too small a man to command any respect for my view from big bosses.

3. Then we have to consider the position of the Muslim League. It cannot claim the support of the whole Muslim community. What is the use of entering into contract with an organisation which cannot deliver the goods. The Congress cannot consider the case of U.P. singly just to afford facilities to a particular individual. The Provinces in which there is a Muslim majority, the Muslim League is nowhere. . . .”

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1. Abdul Wali (1885-1941); a Congressman of Lucknow; Suffered imprisonment several times during the freedom struggle; Worked as Secretary to Motilal Nehru, 1923-26; published *Maloomat*, an Urdu monthly magazine.
 2. Rafi Ahamad Kidwai (1894-1954); joined the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1921; Worked among the Kisans in Oudh district and helped to organise the no-rent campaign in 1931-32; Minister for Revenue, Home and Jails in U.P., 1937-39 and 1946-47; Minister in the Government of India from 1947 till his death.
 3. Mohan Lal Saksena (1896-1965); Congress leader in U.P; Member, U.P. Legislative Council and Chief Whip, Swaraj Party, 1924-26; Elected Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1934 and 1945; President, U.P. Provincial Congress Committee, 1938-39.

40

Jamiat leaders meet Gandhiji

Moonje Papers

BOMBAY CHRONICLE, 21 March, 1937

“*Al Jamiat*,” the official organ of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind publishes the following

account of an interview which the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind¹ had with Mahatma Gandhi in the Harijan Colony:

2. The discussion was confined to two questions. The deputationists invited Mahatmaji's attention to the statements of a number of responsible Congress leaders which the Jamiat leader thought created difficulties in the way of Muslims joining in the Congress and fighting for India's freedom under its banner. The Jamiat leaders also suggested to Mahatmaji to establish, apart from political controversies, a separate institution with the sole objective of creating a better understanding in all social and cultural matters among the different communities of India and to create a spirit of toleration through such an institution by non-political work on the lines of All India Spinners Association and Harijan Sewak Sangh. The Jamiat leaders thought that such an institution would go a long way in strengthening the Congress.

3. With regard to the first question Mahatmaji said that he would give his attention to that.

Reverting to the second question, Mahatmaji said. "There is no cause dearer to my life than the cause of Hindu-Muslim Unity and since I have taken up this cause I have staked my life on several occasions on this issue. All those Muslim leaders who come in closer touch with me know it that I have this object every moment in my eye and every minute a fire is kindling in my heart."

4. Mahatmaji however, told the Jamiat leaders that he had been pondering over fresh avenue of real Hindu-Muslim unity. Mahatmaji thought that the present situation when the Congress has been returned in a majority in elections in most of the Provinces might help in this task.

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1. The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, a religio-political body was founded in the wake of the Khilafat movement at the initiative of Maulana Mahmudul Hasan (1878-1926) who presided over its first conference in 1919. With the collapse of the Non-cooperation agitation when the Hindu-Muslim question assumed alarming position, the Jamiat stood for communal harmony. The Jamiat generally came to be dominated by the Deoband *Ulama*. It was generally in favour of unconditional cooperation with the Congress so far as the cause of freedom was concerned.

41

Nehru to Abdul Wali

*All India Congress Committee File No. G 5 (KW) (i), 1937;
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, p. 77*

30 March, 1937

My dear Wali,

I have just received your letter. I am very glad you wrote me, because I value your opinion and especially at the present moment when we are all thinking hard to deal with the Muslim position in the Congress.

2. About Khaliq I need hardly tell you that I have myself been much put out at the way he has been drifting away from the Congress. For so many years past I have had a warm corner in my heart for him and I believe that my affection for him is reciprocated. It has grieved me, therefore, to find the political developments seem to be driving each one of us away from the other. For nearly a year I have neither seen him nor corresponded with him. I would be happy indeed if he broke loose from the reactionaries who surround him.

3. I am surprised to learn from your letter about a scheme being hatched to bring about a coalition between the Congress and the League Party in the assembly. I had not heard anything about it. I am entirely opposed to this as I am opposed to all pacts and coalitions with small groups at the top. So far as I know my colleagues of the Working Committee are also opposed to it. Abul Kalam Azad who is here at present also definitely opposes it.

4. But what worries me is the larger question of getting Muslims in a body to join the Congress and to get rid of their vague suspicion of that body. For undoubtedly there is that suspicion and hitch. I wonder if you have any suggestions to offer. If so do write to me.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

42

Craik¹ to Baden-Powell²

Brabourne Papers; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 295-96

30 March, 1937

Dear Lord Baden-Powell,

Recently it was pointed out to me that an extract from the song "*Vande Mataram*" is included in the national songs on page 277 of the second edition of "Scouting for Boys in India," and I notice that in "Hints to Instructors" on page 270 the teaching of the words of the song is suggested. Although the passage quoted, and indeed the song generally, is harmless, it actually originated as a 'hymn of hate' against Muslims. The context in which it appears in Chapter X of Bankim Chandra Chatterji's novel "*Ananda Math*" is briefly as follows :

2. The song is sung by Bhabananda who is invoking the 'Mother.' He exclaims, "The Hinduism of the Hindus cannot be maintained unless the bearded drunkards (the Muslims) are expelled." Then there is the following conversation:

Mahendra : "How will you expel them?"

Bhabananda : "By Killing."

Mahendra : "You alone will expel them? With a single slap?" By way of answer Bhabananda sings three lines of the song (which are included in the extract in 'Scouting

for the Boys in India') and which, freely translated, read, "Why is 'the Mother' called *Abala*? She has at her call the mightily roar of seventy million throats, and sharp swords in twice seventy million hands." Bhabananda then says, "The Englishman does not run away for fear of his life. The Muslim, forsooth, when he begins to sweat, calls frantically for sherbet. The English have determination. They carry out what they resolve. The Muslim is lackadaisical. Lastly, about courage, the sight of a single cannon ball will cause a crowd of Muslims to fly, but a crowd of cannon balls cannot scare away a single Englishman."

Notwithstanding this anti-Muslim and rather pro-English origin, the leaders of the Bengal revolutionary societies borrowed many ideas from this novel, and the special vow which had to be taken by members of one of the largest terrorist organisations in Bengal during the anti-partition agitation, was practically the same as that in the book which was taken by the adherents of the Sanyasis. For many years the phrase "Vande Mataram" has been literally the war cry of the terrorists in Bengal, and although the words simply mean 'Hail Mother' they are commonly shouted as a slogan by terrorists when committing outrages, and by others as an outward sign of sympathy with revolution and of defiance against Government.

The song has really no claim to be regarded as a national song, and having regard to its origin, and its subsequent revolutionary associations, I cannot help feeling that it is inappropriate for inclusion in "Scouting for Boys in India." I, therefore, hope you will not mind my writing to ask you if it would not be possible to drop it quietly in the next edition of the book.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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1. Sir Henry Duffield Craik (1876-1955); Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, 1922-27; Home Member, Governor-Generals Executive Council, 1934-38; Governor of Punjab, 1938-41; Political Adviser to the Viceroy, 1941-43.
 2. B.H. Baden-Powell.

43

Nehru to Pant

*All India Congress Committee, File No. E-1/1936-37;
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 78-80*

Allahabad, 30 March, 1937

My dear Pantji,

I have just received a letter from an old Muslim friend whose opinion I value. In the course of this letter he says that "a scheme is being hatched with the help of

Pantji and Mohanlal to bring about coalition between the Congress and League parties in the assembly." I am surprised to read this and I can hardly believe that there is anything behind it. Still I am referring the matter to you, because it has been brought to my notice under the best of auspices. I am personally convinced that any kind of pact or coalition between us and the Muslim League will be highly injurious. It will mean that we almost lose our right to ask the Muslims to join us directly. It will mean many other things also which are equally undesirable. But I need not go into this matter in any detail. Abul Kalam Azad, as you know, is strongly opposed to it.

2. As I told you on the telephone last night I have telegraphed to Vallabhbhai suggesting to him that a meeting of the Parliamentary Sub-committee be held about the 7th April. Abul Kalam has been on this and I think, on the whole, that it will be a good thing to have the meeting. But we must have Working Committee meeting also before long.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

44

Nehru's circular letter

*All India Congress Committee, File No. P-1/1937-38;
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 122-24*

31 March, 1937

During our election campaign and subsequently there has been much discussion about increasing Congress contact with the Muslim masses. Wherever we went we found a willing response from them, an eagerness to hear the Congress message and a desire to line up with our freedom movement. But the lack of previous work amongst them, and the paucity of trained Muslim workers, prevented us from taking full advantage of this new interest and awakening. Since then the subject has engaged the earnest attention of leading Congressmen and it has been felt that we must make a special effort to enrol Muslim Congress members, so that our struggle for freedom may become even more broadbased than it is, and the Muslim masses should take the prominent part in it which is their due. Indeed when we look at the vital problems facing the country, the problem of independence and of the removal of poverty and unemployment there is no difference between the Muslim masses and the Hindu or Sikh or Christian masses in the country. Differences only come to the surface when we think in terms of the handful of upper class people. Even these differences are no doubt capable of adjustment if approached in a friendly manner and with the larger viewpoint always before us.

2. The first thing to be done is to concentrate on enrolling Muslim members of the Congress. With a large membership, they will inevitably play an important part in Congress work and will help in shaping Congress policy. I suggest to your Committee,

therefore, to pay special attention to this matter and take immediate steps to organise enrolment of Muslim members. I know that large numbers are waiting to be approached by our workers and will gladly join.

3. I suggest also that each Provincial Congress Committee should appoint a Special Committee to consider and take in hand this work of increasing Congress contacts with the Muslim masses, rural and urban. This Committee will not lay down any policy for that is the work of the Provincial Congress Committee. It will concentrate on the enrolment of members and otherwise entrusting the Muslims in the day to day activities of the Congress. These activities will not of course be carried on separately by the Muslims but by Congressmen generally in each particular area.

4. The office of the All India Congress Committee is starting a separate department for this purpose and we shall gladly help with advice, leaflets, pamphlets, etc. The Provincial Muslim mass contact Committees will naturally work under the direction of their P.C.Cs. But it would be desirable if they kept in direct touch with the A.I.C.C. office.

5. There is one other matter to which I should like to draw your attention. Complaints reach our office sometimes that notices of meetings, etc., are not always issued in Urdu and so many people remain ignorant of our activities and cannot join our meetings. These complaints are often justified. I should like you, therefore, to impress upon your District and Local Committees to issue notices in Urdu in all areas where there is an Urdu reading population. This will apply more specially to the Punjab, Delhi and U.P. and to the larger towns elsewhere.

45

Haig¹ to Linlithgow

Haig Papers; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 310-12

31 March, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I saw the Nawab of Chhatari on the evening of the 29th and he agreed to try and form a Ministry. The following figures may be of interest. The number of those in the Legislative Assembly not elected on the Congress ticket is 95. Of these 66 are Muslims, 27 belonging to the Muslim League and the remaining 39 having a general allegiance to Chhatari. The 29 non-Muslims consist of Hindu zamindars, Scheduled Castes, special interests and minor Minorities—a heterogeneous collection who could probably be controlled for the most part by Sir J.P. Srivastava.

2. When I saw Chhatari on the evening of the 29th, he was in quite good heart and we discussed the possibility, in view of the Congress refusal of office, that a certain number of those returned on the Congress ticket, might in the course of four months, possibly be won over. I had already ascertained that Srivastava would be willing to work with Chhatari.

3. Chhatari came to see me again yesterday evening, the 30th. He was in rather a defeatist mood. Srivastava had promised his support, but Chhatari's primary task naturally was to try and secure the adhesion of the Muslim League whose leader is Khaliqzaman, a man very anxious for office and who has been in close negotiation recently with the Congress, from whose views he is not very far apart. Khaliq refused to join Chhatari, his reason being that the new Ministry could not last more than four months and that any who joined it would be politically discredited. Khaliq's own position, however, in the Muslim League is precarious, for there are at least two other aspirants to its leadership. There is to be a meeting of the League on the 4th April. I fear it is impossible to bring it on earlier. It has been agreed that the question of joining a Government should be discussed with the League on that date. They may as a body refuse, or they may split, in which case Chhatari would have no difficulty in securing a Minister from among them. Chhatari, however, indicated that if the Muslim League refused as a body to have anything to do with the Ministry, he might find it impossible to go on. Meantime, Chhatari is meeting a number of his own followers on the 1st April.

4. I think Chhatari has been rather shaken by the views expressed by Khaliq. He put to me very definitely two points.

- (a) That it is really futile to take office merely for four months, that they can do no good to the country, and that they would merely damage their own personal reputations.
- (b) That it is likely that the Congress will start agitation which will require strong repressive measures, and that a Ministry in such a position will not be able to take such measure. (This is a valid point, though I have been very careful not to suggest any such thing to Chhatari. Your Excellency will remember that I mentioned the point in para 2 of my telegram No.1-G of March 20th, 1937).

5. Chhatari has also, at my suggestion, communicated with Chintamani² with a view to seeing whether his support could be secured. But he thinks that Chintamani would refuse to join such a Government and would be opposed to the principle of forming one. He believes that Sapru³ is opposed on principle to a Minority Government being formed. Certainly Sapru when I saw him a fortnight ago expressed that view to me. It appears that he has expressed it also to others.

6. If Chhatari finally abandons the task of forming a ministry, it might still be possible to get someone else to take it on; but I feel it is important not to have a Ministry which would be regarded as a mockery and would in fact be a source of weakness.

7. Chhatari hinted that his own attitude might be affected by the question of arrangement in the event of my having to take over the administration after the defeat of the temporary Government. He seemed to suggest that if the leaders of this Government could look to some provision as advisers under my administration, they might be prepared as it were to cut their throats politically by accepting office under these circumstances. But if at the end of four months they were merely to retire into private life, the prospect would be less attractive.

8. I think in any case it would be desirable now to explore arrangements that

would be suitable if it is necessary to act under Section 93. I still hope that it will be possible to form a Ministry, but I cannot be confident about it. I fear in any case that the present unsatisfactory state of suspense will have to continue till after the Muslim League meeting on April 4th. I shall see Srivastava today and possibly get some more definite views from him, and I shall keep your Excellency fully informed of developments.

9. Chhatari in his present mood seems to have given up all hope of securing accretions of strength during a Ministry of four months, though my own feeling is that there will be so much disappointment among Congressmen at not taking office that the situation is not without possibilities. But as he at present views the position, I think he would probably wish to avoid meeting the Legislature and, therefore, the conclusion indicated in Your Excellency's telegram No. 269-S, dated the 30th March may be of value.

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1. Sir Harry Graham Haig; Governor, U.P., 1934-39.
 2. C.Y. Chintamani (1880-1941); Editor, *The Leader*, 1909-20, Minister of Education, U.P., 1921-23; President, National Liberal Federation, 1920 and 1931.
 3. Sir Sapru, Tej Bahadur (1875-1949); a leading lawyer of Allahabad and prominent liberal leader, Law Member, Government of India, 1920-23.

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Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of March, 1937 [Extract]

Home Poll, F. 18-3/37, pp. 1-3

CONFIDENTIAL

General. The personnel of the new Ministry has now been announced and it has met with a good reception. There are few surprises in its composition; the names of the Hon'ble Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, the Nawab of Dacca and Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy from the Muslim League, and Mr. Nausher Ali¹ from the Proja Party together with the Hon'ble Sir Bejoy Prosad Singh Roy and Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sarkar from the Independent Hindus had figured prominently in all forecasts of the probable composition of the Council of Ministers. Mr. Mukunda Behary Mullick's appointment as a representative of the Scheduled Castes had also been anticipated. The only surprises are the inclusion in the Cabinet of Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandi of Cossimbazar, a great land-owner; and Mr. Prasanna Deb Raikut, a leading land-owner of ancient family from Jalpaiguri district—the latter as another representative of the Scheduled castes; and the exclusion of Mr. Shamsuddin Ahmed, the Secretary of the Proja Party. Nawab Musharuff Hosain,² an ex-Minister and a prominent personality in North Bengal where he has considerable interests in the tea industry, had also been freely mentioned as a probable representative of North Bengal Muslims.

2. As might be expected, the Proja Party is not altogether satisfied with this

arrangement under which it has secured only two seats in the Council of Ministers including the one held by the Chief Minister, Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq. A statement has been issued to the Press by twenty-eight members of the party criticising the Ministry as unsuited to carry out the policy which their leader has from time to time enunciated. On the other hand, *Amrita Bazar Patrika* congratulates Mr. Fazlul Huq on the "fifty-fifty division of the Cabinet between the two communities," but criticises the size of the Cabinet and expresses the hope that in the allotment of portfolios the claims of the Hindu community be taken into consideration. *Azad* of the 18th March voices the view of a certain section of Bengal Muslims when it says "so far as we know the Bengal Muslims will never acquiesce in the (fifty-fifty) proposal out of their own accord."

3. Comments on the Congress decision to accept office and subsequent developments are chiefly important as voiced in the Press and are dealt with in the Press section of this report.

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1. Nausher Ali Syed, Speaker, Bengal Legislative Assembly.
 2. Nawab Musharuff Hosain; Minister, and Legislative Assembly, Bengal.

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Rajendra Prasad's Statement

All India Congress Committee Papers

Poona, 1 April, 1937. "The present movement amongst Congressmen to enlist the Muslims as Congress members is intended and expected to explain to the Musalmans the Congress policy and programme and to enlist their sympathy and support for all that the Congress stands for. Experience during the elections has convinced Congressmen that in many provinces there is amongst the Musalmans much appreciation of Congress programme and that the Congress has not so long realised this latent sympathy of the Muslim masses. The attempt is to enlist this sympathy. The Congress has always been an organisation whose doors have been open to all members of all castes and communities in India and surely there is nothing wrong in approaching the Musalmans with that policy and programme. It is hoped that when they are properly explained to them the Muslim masses will respond with as much enthusiasm as the Hindu masses have done. There is no conspiracy in this against any Muslim leader or Muslim group. It is obviously the only proper course for an organisation like the Congress.

2. One would have thought that instead of rousing suspicion and opposition the efforts would be welcomed and supported, but, unfortunately, Mr. Jinnah and Maulana Shaukat Ali have adopted an attitude of opposition. Mr. Jinnah has treated a simple statement of fact by me as a challenge. There was no question of any challenge, and, after all, there could be no challenge to him in my province where he did not

set up any candidate for election on his ticket. The demonstration and '*hartal*' of April 1 in Bihar were entirely spontaneous in which the Musalmans joined with as much enthusiasm as the Hindus. I cannot attribute them to the Musalman's love of 'tamasha' as Mr. Jinnah would have me to do.

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Pant to Nehru

Nehru Papers, Vol. 19

NEW DELHI, 3 April, 1937

My dear Jawaharlal Ji,

We had a complete Hartal, a huge procession in the morning and a mammoth meeting in the afternoon here yesterday. The Muslim attitude was distinctly hopeful: they contributed their full share in all these functions. The reports from other places are equally satisfactory. The directions of the Congress seem to have been carefully observed even in the remotest parts of the country.

2. I was concerned to hear of your indisposition. Trust you are better now.

3. I find that the meeting of the Working Committee fixed for the 10th has been cancelled. We have a meeting of our Provincial Council that day. The Working Committee will be again meeting at Wardha. We last met on the 22nd and not more than a month will have elapsed if the next meeting is held on or about 20th.

4. The Governor has not succeeded in forming any Ministry in our Province so far. I had reasons to believe that the Muslim League would not accept any place in the cabinet. Chhatari had, it seems, accepted the invitation but has found insuperable difficulties in his way. If the Press report is correct he could not collect more than 11 persons in his support. It has created an interesting situation. If the Government had followed a straight-forward course the Constitution should have been suspended after the break down of the negotiations with the Congress. They have, however, been trying to keep up the mask and *ad interim* Ministries have been set up in no less than 5 Provinces. Our Province has proved better than others even in this respect. I am watching developments. Chhatari has, probably, not finally declined yet but I understand that he too has lost all ardour.

5. Your correspondent is evidently suspicious if not cynical. He is, perhaps, unaware of the limitations of plain minds. It requires a singular knack to hatch plots or to scent them and I must confess that both are equally uncongenial to and beyond me. There are more than 140 members in our party in the Legislature and no alliance is permissible with any group except with the sanction of the Working Committee according to the Wardha resolution. In the circumstances it would require more than usual audacity to hatch a plot of this nature.

6. I had no occasion to meet Khaliq since the election up to the 29th. In fact I took care not to do so lest there should be any misunderstanding. I saw him on the

evening of the 29th after the acceptance of office by the Congress had been finally ruled out. I did not like the idea of the Muslim League cooperating with any Ministry and got the desired assurance from Khaliq. I had a long talk with him and stressed the need and the advisability of the Nationalist Musalmans merging themselves in the Congress. Similarly I pressed him to join the Congress actively both inside and outside the Legislature. He has well nigh agreed to do so but wanted to examine the matter further before taking an irrevocable decision. I should not be surprised if Salimpur¹ goes over to Chhatari and joins his cabinet. In that case, I think, the position will be clarified. I spoke to you in this connection while you were here in Delhi. I was looking forward to the next meeting of the Council at Lucknow on the 10th when I should get an opportunity of discussing this matter with you. I hope you will be at Lucknow then; if not I will come to Allahabad. I personally had never had any doubt as to what the situation requires. It is, however, desirable to await further developments before reaching any final decision.

7. I shall be sending a note about the income tax case direct to Lahore.

Yours sincerely,
G.B. PANT

N.B. The matter was discussed orally and some letters were also exchanged between Mohan Lal and Khaliq. I understand that this was done with a view to avoid a conflict with the Muslim League at Bahraich and to prepare the ground for future action. Mohan Lal will be at Lucknow on the 10th and I need not say more at this stage. I notice that Chhatari has formed his cabinet.

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1. The reference is obviously to the Raja of Salempur who was Chairman of Muslim League Parliamentary Board.

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Rajendra Prasad's Appeal

The Amrit Bazar Patrika, 8 April, 1937; Moonje Papers

Patna, April 6. Babu Rajendra Prasad in the course of a lengthy statement expresses joy in the hartal being made successful by the joint efforts of Hindus and Muslims and says:

"Both Hindus and Muslims have begun to feel that after all, the differences that occasionally arise and result in breaking the heads of one another are unreal and that the freedom of country is the hankering for all and the absence of it is the cause of misery equally to all."

Continuing he stated "The Congress has, therefore, never been despaired of a real and lasting unity being evolved. It owes it to country and to the Musalmans in

particular to bring out this inherent unity in bold contrast to the apparent and surface conflict that arises now and then. The Congress workers whether they are Hindus or Muslims should approach the masses of both communities without distinction and interest themselves in their day to day struggles and in turn interest them in the great struggle for freedom. I have no doubt that the day is not distant when both will stand shoulder to shoulder and march forward to the great goal of national independence. The appeal of the President of the Congress has, therefore, come not a day too soon, and I hope all Congress Committees and Congress workers will engage themselves in making the Congress organisation as wide and broad-based as possible. There should be Congress members of all communities enrolled in large numbers everywhere and there should be Congress Committees established in every village. Let the slogan be no village without Congress Committees and no Committees without Musalman.

My appeal to the Musalmans is that they should join the Congress in as large numbers as possible. They can make the organisation their own. None dare ignore or resist them if they come in their thousands and hundreds of thousands and none can take away the prize from their hands if they fought and suffered for it." (United Press)

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 4

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 9 April, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I shall not be able, before closing this letter, to study your speech in the Lords and the course of the debate, but I must again tell you how grateful I am to you for the unwavering support you have given me on the constitutional issue. Out here, there has been a good deal of confused thinking, and a certain amount of wobbling as well. Both the *Statesman* and the *Times of India*, with the *Pioneer* a good third, have joined the chorus that daily sings the praises of a Linlithgow-Gandhi interview. I do not know what I could say to the little man if he turned up in this room. Any "formula" (how they love the word!) that I could agree upon with him as to my own and the Governors' use of their special powers must necessarily be either illegal or dishonest! If we mean to change the law, let us amend the Act. I do not suppose that public opinion and Parliament at home would agree to abrogate the safeguards. I am myself entirely satisfied that the Act as it stands goes as far as it is safe or wise in India's own interests to go. If Gandhi extracted from me at this stage anything that could be twisted to look like a vindication of the A.I.C.C.'s demand to Governors, that they should undertake not to use their powers under the Act, the prestige of Congress would, I am convinced, be raised to a most dangerous level. In this connection, I have been a little disturbed to hear from more than one Muslim visitor

that there is evident, here and there, a tendency on the part of the rank and file of Mohammadans to drift towards Congress. I do not as a rule pay much attention to affirmations by Muslims of the doctrine of indispensability—i.e., their own! But I can see that at present and in this matter of which I am writing, some of them are genuinely apprehensive. I am quite unable for the present to measure the significance or to gauge the extent of these tendencies; but the thing must be closely watched. Meantime, the Minority Ministries, much as one may regret the necessity for their instalment, have encouraged the Muslims by giving them the Chief Minister's post in the United Province and in Bihar, while in Bombay they had a first refusal of Congress' leavings. This is another reason why I am loathe to appear to be anxious to parley with the Mahatma at this moment. I recognise that if Congress is prepared to say they will take office under the Constitution, we can hardly avoid summoning the legislatures and submitting the Minority Ministries to the axe; but short of that, I don't want, if I can avoid it, to discourage these good chaps who came forward to take office in most uninviting circumstances, or to damp down their growing readiness to have a go with constructive policies.

2. I enclose a copy¹ of an interesting letter from Hyde Gowan² on the reactions in the Central Provinces to the Congress decision. I form a rather similar impression in regard to the attitude of the Congress rank and file from information which reaches me from other Provinces. The control of the small Central Committee is unquestionably strong, and the events of the past fortnight provide convincing proof of the extremely good discipline existing in the higher ranks of Congress throughout India. But however that may be tension within the party as time goes on in increasing degree as they see these minority Governments functioning and—still more important—making appointments, seems likely to me to become very marked. One appointment of great importance Congress have already lost in Congress Provinces, and that is the appointment of Advocate-General. There are in the same way signs of a growing Hindu feeling in certain "Congress" Provinces that the effect of the Congress abstinence has been prejudicially to affect Hindus. Thus, in Bihar, despite the Hindu preponderance in its population, there is a Muslim Chief Minister; the same is true of the United Provinces, while in Bombay the Chief Minister might have been a Muslim and is, in fact, a Parsee. But it is too early yet to judge with any confidence how things will develop, and we can but keep a close watch and aim at retaining the initiative wholly in our own hands.

1. Not available.

2. Sir Hyde Clarendon Gown; Governor of CP & Berar, 1933-38.



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*Nehru to Gopichand Bhargava**Gopichand Bhargava Papers, Lahore**9 April, 1937*

Sardar Vallabhbhai writes to me that you had asked him about Dr. Muhammad Alam joining the Congress party in the Punjab. Further that K. Gauba¹ also wants to join, so also Kitchlew. Sardar Vallabhbhai has left the matter to me to decide.

2. As a matter of fact there is not very much to decide as ordinarily if an elected member of an assembly is prepared to take our pledge in a bonafide manner we have to accept him as a member of our party. Only when we suspect malafides or some deep intrigue can we reject his application. I am not prepared to say that we can take up this nonpossumus attitude in regard to any of these three persons.

3. Alam and Kitchlew are old Congressmen. But both had drifted away. So far as I know Kitchlew has kept away from the political field. Alam has been indulging in some activities, for instance the Shahidganj affair, which were undesirable activities. I had a talk with him the other day in Allahabad and I told him that I considered his Shahidganj record as something very much against him. Further I took exception to his recent participation in a meeting where the Sikandar Hayat Ministry was criticised on the ground of not having enough Muslim Ministers. He gave various explanations which needless to say were not very satisfying so far as I was concerned. Nevertheless I told him and so did Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who was here that his business was to join the Congress party in the Assembly after taking the Congress pledge.

4. So far as Kitchlew is concerned he can certainly join the party if he takes the pledge. I understand however that he may not like to join the Party if Alam is there. This seems to me to be an unreasonable attitude. We cannot always pick and choose our colleagues and we have to accept such as come our way in the democratic process. It is easy enough for me to raise objections to any number of people whom I may not approve of in various committees or organizations through which I function, but obviously I cannot do so. Therefore, it seems to me a wrong attitude for Kitchlew to take up. For us to agree to take a person on condition that we do not take another would be doubly wrong. I hope, therefore, that Kitchlew will appreciate the logic of this argument.

5. As regards Gauba I must confess to feeling some surprise at his desire to join the Congress party. I should like to know something more about it. In the past his politics have been far removed from those of the Congress. Has he undergone a sudden political conversion? Has he written to you on this subject? We must be clear about these matters and I would suggest to you to ask him to write to me directly. If he gives us the necessary assurances that he believes in the Congress policy and is prepared to abide by Congress discipline then we may certainly have him. But we should be absolutely clear about these matters.

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1. K.L. Gauba, Member, All India Council of Muslim League; M.L.A, 1935.

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Daultana's Statement

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 24

Lahore, April 19: Interviewed by the Associated Press on the statement of the Allahabad Muslim Conference, Khan Bahadur Mian Ahmed Yar Khan Daultana,¹ M.L.A., Chief Secretary of the Unionist Party, said :

"We have long been familiar with this type of make-believe conference which can be made by the real leaders of the Congress to pass any resolution. The resolution for which this shadow conferences took the responsibility amounts to this: Muslims have been asked to join the Congress and help it to destroy their political safeguards not only as a part of the present Constitution but as a part of any Constitution. This is frankly the policy of the Congress with regard to the safeguards of Minorities, and this is what Muslims are being asked to endorse. I have no doubt that behind the stalking horse of such conferences, the Congress is going to revise its old, old attempt to get round the political safeguard of the Minorities. I am sure, however, that this attempt is once again doomed to failure despite the funds which may be provided for financing it.

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1. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (1896-1940); Member Punjab Legislative Council, 1921-26, 1931-37; Secretary, Punjab, Unionist Party; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937.

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Jinnah's Press Statement

The Times of India, 19-20 April, 1937, Nation's Voice, pp. 137-39

Bombay, 19 April, 1937: "I must condemn the deliberate attacks that are being made by our opponents to misrepresent the policy of the All India Muslim League," says Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, in a statement to the Press: "It is absolutely untrue to suggest that the Muslim League does not stand to fight for the freedom of our country. If anyone cares to read honestly the policy and programme that have been laid down now by the League in black and white and have been broadcast repeatedly, he will find that it stands for full national Self-Government for the people of India, but at the same time it considers that there cannot be, and will not be, any real national Government established in this country until the rights and interests of the Minorities are protected and safeguarded by an

honourable settlement. This alone will create a sense of security in them and will win their trust and confidence in the majority rule. The League has stood since the Lucknow Pact of 1916, and stands today, for this basic principle."

2. Congress Idealists

"I regret to find that a few of the Congress leaders have been actually talking as idealists who have adumbrated a new policy. This recent orientation of their policy towards Muslims and the Muslim League is bound to fail and lead to disaster. I find that efforts are being made in a somewhat deliberate fashion to divide Muslims for an ulterior object by appealing to their patriotism and national feelings, by falsely representing that the Congress alone has got the monopoly to champion and fight for the freedom of India and that no other party has a right to exist if they do not cent per cent agree with the Congress. When the question of the protection of the minorities is raised by anybody who dares to raise it, he is dubbed as a Communalist, for there is, in their opinion, no such thing as a Hindu-Muslim question in reality. This is so far from the truth, that we can only come to the conclusion that the object of these people is to split Muslims and break the Muslim League. This policy, I venture to say, will set back the national advance of the country. The unity and an honourable settlement between the Hindus and Muslims and other Minorities is the only pivot upon which national Self-Government for India's 350 millions can be constructed and maintained."

3. Minorities' Interests

May I here quote Mr. Gandhi. He says: 'It, therefore, pains me to find Lord Zetland playing the old familiar tune of divide and rule. The Congress cannot exist for two days if it disregards the interests of the Minorities. It cannot bring about mass rule by dividing India into factions. The Congress Ministries, if they ever come into existence, will dig their own graves without the Governor's safeguards the moment they trample upon the rights of the Minorities or resort to injustice otherwise.'

4. Of course, this statement assumes that people cease to exist the moment they do an injustice or a wrong thing, but in this practical world, and he must be aware, in many parts of the world, majorities have flourished by trampling upon the rights of Minorities resulting in grave injustice to them and yet they (the majorities) are not buried although they may be taking their course towards digging their grave for a long time. Why put this temptation then in the way of the majority and keep the minority in constant and terrible fear?

5. League's Position

May I quote Mr. Gandhi again from his recent statement. He says, if the assurance asked for by the Congress is not given by the Governors: 'I prefer an honourable deadlock to dishonourable daily scenes between Congressmen and the Governors.' That is precisely the position of the Muslim League—that they prefer an honourable settlement to the dishonourable daily scenes that are taking place and will take place between the Hindus and Muslims.

6. "This sort of game of dividing the two great sister communities by such

methods has been the historical misfortune of India with the result that we are now saddled with the foreign domination and further efforts by the Congress in that same direction to divide and rule Muslims will only lead to an indefinite stay of that domination. Anyhow I am glad that the President of the Congress has now admitted that they have so far neglected the Muslims, and that was the reason why the Congress failed to get support in the recent elections from Muslims. It is to the good that the Muslim League has at least convinced him that it is essential to have some regard for their opinion and sentiments. But I regret that he should have found a solution which will produce more bitterness and will frustrate the object that every nationalist has at heart."

7. Propaganda among Muslims

"In his circular letter which he issued recently to the various Provincial Congress Committees, he urges upon them to work amongst the Muslim masses. He suggests the formation of Provincial Muslim mass contact committees, under the Provincial committees, to enrol Muslim members and generally to rouse the interest of Muslims in the affairs of the Congress. For this purpose he wants them to publish their notices, meetings, etc., in Urdu as well. The All India Muslim League and every Muslim who can read and write, except those who obey the Congress implicitly, are to be ignored.

8. "We are told by another Congress leader who is no less an authority than the President himself, viz., Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose, 'that the problem before us is that of *dal-bhat* and fundamentally there is no difference between Hindus and Muslims. What is needed at present is a bit of propaganda on economic lines amongst the Muslim masses.' I suppose he has forgotten the insistence of the Hindus recently in Bengal for a fifty-fifty share in the Ministry. Does he know that besides the poor masses there are others whose problem of *dal-bhat* also requires to be settled on economic lines, and will be, instead of carrying on a bit of propaganda amongst the poor Muslim masses, to formulate a programme which will give immediate and real relief to the masses? I assure him that if he does that the Muslims will readily join with him for the achievement of any such programme without any further 'bit of propaganda.'

9. Muslim Intelligentsia

"So now I find that the Congress leaders have no use for the Muslim intelligentsia as they are to a man incapable of serving their country or the interests of their community. They are so dense that they do not understand the Hindu intelligentsia, and hence these few estimable gentlemen of the upper middle class' have issued a *ukase*, while declaring non-cooperation against the Muslim League parties in the legislatures immediately after the success in six Provinces, they have declined to have anything to do with the League party in any of the Legislatures unless they surrender their principles and their convictions, for swear their party, policy and programme and sign the Congress pledge unreservedly and unconditionally. This they find is not possible. So now they think they will persuade the Muslim masses to disown every Muslim leader or representative of theirs and these few men, supernationalists of the Congress, expect the Muslim masses to follow their lead.

Their interests, they say, will be more and better looked after by them because the problem of protection of minorities in a representative Government will be better understood by the masses because you can always talk to them in terms of *dal-bhat* and throw in a bait of Urdu notices; otherwise Hindi is to be national language of Muslims."

10. Hartal Incidents

"What surprises me most is Babu Rajendra Prasad's satisfaction. He says that the Muslims of Bihar joined the hartal demonstration on April 1, in spite of my opinion to the contrary, but I think Babu Rajendra Prasad knows that my expression of opinion was not followed up by any organised effort. Does he want me to make such an effort in future? Besides, with his experience as a practical man, does he not realise that Muslims love any demonstration or *tamasha* and always enjoy excitement? But is this all that he can say of the cooperation and support of Muslims? I am afraid he has grievously misunderstood the Muslims."

11. "We have revived the Bombay Presidency Muslim League and we are going to carry on our work of organisation throughout the Presidency of Bombay and throughout the country at large. I appeal to Muslims all over India to organise the Provincial and district Leagues and enlist as many members as they can. Nothing is going to deter us from pursuing a policy which we know is in the best interests not only of the Muslims but of the country at large. We are prepared to cooperate as equals but we will not submit to dictation or subjugation."

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Maulana Shaukat Ali's Statement

The Times of India, Moonje Papers

TIMES OF INDIA, 22 April, 1937

Lucknow, April 21. "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru must know that if he, as President of the Indian National Congress, wants Muslims to join the Congress *en masse*, he has to go and get in touch with the people, who count, and it is his duty to meet and talk things over with Mr. Jinnah, President of the Muslim League," said Maulana Shaukat Ali, interviewed by the Associated Press.

2. *The Maulana added:* "All that is being said and written in the Press about Muslim mass contact and the Muslim League would have been very amusing if it was not so tragic and full of danger. Howsoever Pandit Jawaharlal may be encouraged by what paid or unpaid Muslims may say to him, he will fail unless he meets real Muslims. Efforts like his will only widen the gulf and lead to a fearful catastrophe. Cannot he imitate and follow the example of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan¹ who, with his party in an overwhelming majority in the Punjab, offered men like Raja Narendranath,² Choudhry Chhoturam³ and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia⁴ seats in his Cabinet—men who really count in their respective communities?"

3. "Let me tell every one that, in spite of newspaper propaganda and platform speeches, when the other side starts work and puts the true things before the Muslim masses, his (the Pandit's) friends will fail miserably.

"I cannot help but admire Mr. Jinnah's patience. He is not carried away by arrogance or the justice of his cause to say things in retaliation which might injure the very cause which all well-wishers of India have at heart."

4. The Maulana, concluding, said: "Does Pandit Jawaharlal want to try a policy of peaceful penetration? We need no Mussolini in India 'to wield the sword of Islam to protect Islam.' We are quite capable of looking after ourselves.

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1. Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942); leader of Unionist Party and Premier of Punjab, 1937-42; author of federal scheme comprising seven zones.
 2. Raja Narendranath (1864-1945); Hindu Mahasabha leader of Punjab.
 3. Chhotu Ram (1881-1949); founder-member, Unionist Party and its leader in the Punjab Assembly, 1926-31; President, Punjab Assembly, 1936; Minister for Development and Revenue in the Punjab Government, 1937-45.
 4. Sunder Singh Majithia, Member, Khalsa National Party; Minister, Punjab, 1937.

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Shamsul Hasan Collection

LAHORE, 22 April, 1937

My Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I do not know whether my letter which I posted to you about two weeks ago ever reached you. I posted it to your address at New Delhi, and when I went to Delhi later, I discovered that you had already left Delhi. In that letter I proposed that we should hold immediately an All India Muslim Convention, say at Delhi, and once more to re-state the policy of Indian Muslims both to the Government and to the Hindus.

2. As the situation is becoming grave and the Muslim feeling in the Punjab is rapidly becoming pro-Congress for reasons which it is unnecessary to detail, I would request you to consider and decide the matter as early as possible. The Sessions of the All India Muslim League is postponed till August, and the situation demands an early re-statement of the Muslim policy. If the Convention is preceded by a tour of prominent Muslim Leaders, the meeting of the Convention is sure to be a great success. Please drop a line in reply to this letter as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Sd. MUAHAMMAD IQBAL
Bar-at-Law

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*Nehru to H.N. Brailsford*¹*Nehru Papers; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, VIII, p. 87*

ALLAHABAD, 24 April, 1937

My dear Brailsford,

One of the most promising signs in India today is the ferment among the Muslim masses and intelligentsia. There is a general feeling among them that they have been led astray by their communal leaders. Strenuous efforts are being made to keep them away from the Congress and you must not be surprised if you read occasionally of Hindu-Muslim riots.

Yours very sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Henry Noel Brailsford (1873-1958); leading columnist to *Manchester Guardian*, *Tribune*, *Daily News* and *Nation*; Editor, *The New Leader*, 1922-26; visited India in 1930.

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Nehru's Press Statements

The Hindustan Times 28 April, 1937, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*,
No. III, pp. 125-129

Allahabad, 25 April, 1937. 1. For various reasons the problem of increasing the Muslim element in the Congress has recently received considerable attention. This has been so both on the side of prominent Congressmen, Hindu and Muslim alike, and on the part of others who, though sympathetic, have hesitated to join the Congress. There is no doubt about it that Muslim India is in a state of ferment today. The Muslim masses inevitably think more and more in terms of common economic problems and common burdens together with others. As a reaction to these new currents certain prominent Muslims, connected with communal organizations, have tried to dissuade Muslims from joining the Congress and have even hinted at dire consequences and catastrophes if this should happen.

2. I have no desire to enter into these controversies which tend to become personal and in which irrelevant issues are often raised. It is not, therefore, with a view to controversy that I issue this statement, but I do feel that clarity of ideas is desirable and the Congress position should be clearly understood. I find that even Congressmen sometimes fail to appreciate this and talk in terms of pacts and compromises with Muslims or other religious groups.

3. The Congress is a political organization dealing also inevitably with economic

problems for these problems affect the masses of India more than anything else. The objective of the Congress is political independence, that is, the capture of power by the people of India, irrespective of their religion. Every Indian of the hundreds of millions who inhabit this country must be a sharer in this power and must benefit by the new order that we strive for. For ultimately it is this order which removes our crushing poverty and unemployment, which we work for. Subjection and poverty are the common lot of Indians whatever their religion might be; freedom and economic and cultural betterment must also be the common lot of all of us. In the struggle to obtain this the Congress offers a common platform to all and because it thinks in terms of the masses and their betterment, it goes to them, organizes them, advises them, seeks strength and guidance from them.

4. The Congress, being a political organization, does not concern itself with religion or connected matters. But religion and culture being important matters in the life of many individuals, it is right that they should want to know how these are viewed by the Congress. Therefore, the Congress declared at Karachi and subsequently in the clearest language that the fundamental and basic rights of All Indians must contain provisions for the free exercise of religion, for freedom of conscience, for the protection of the culture, language and script of minorities, and further that all citizens whatever their religion or caste or sex, were equal before the law and in regard to public employment, office, trade or calling. The franchise must be on the basis of universal suffrage.

5. This assurance has been repeated in the Congress election manifesto and is the basis of all Congress policy. It applies to all majorities and Minorities alike and it is unthinkable that the Congress will ever vary it. Having given this solemn assurance, the Congress has nothing further to do with religious or cultural matters and it pursues its political struggle. In this political struggle it has gained great power because millions of people have sided with it, approved of its programme, and looked to it for deliverance from their thralldom and misery. That programme was a common programme for All Indians, whatever their religious persuasions may be. The development of the nationalist movement has crystallised power in two opposing ranks, and we have in India today two dominating forces—Congress India, representing Indian nationalism, and British imperialism.

6. I have often been made to say in the public Press, owing to a mistranslation that there were only two parties in India. That is manifestly wrong for there may be, and are any number of parties, big or small, important or confined to a handful. But what I have said, and what I think is true, is that there are two principal forces in India today, that of Congress and that of imperialism. Others incline during a crisis towards the one or the other, or are mere lookers—on and do not count. We have had big crises and conflicts in the past, and as is the way with nations and communities, we have gained strength and self-reliance thereby. Out of a fiery furnace of a nation's suffering and conflict, the Congress has steeled itself and risen higher and higher, strong in the love and strength of our millions. Those who kept out of it and relied on the feeble prop of an alien and vanishing Government remain themselves feeble, without self-reliance or strength unable to charge themselves with the energy of a nation on the move.

7. Strength does not come to a nation or a community from mere numbers or special seats in the legislatures or protection given by outsiders. It comes from within and from the cooperation and goodwill of comrades in a common cause. The minorities in India will not flourish by being spoon-fed from above but by their own merits and strength. Can anyone imagine that any majority in India can crush the brave Sikhs, small as they are in numbers? Only a lunatic can think that the Muslims can be dominated and coerced by any religious majority in India.

8. The time has gone by when religious groups as such can take part in political or economic struggles. That may have been the case in medieval times. It is inconceivable today; the lines of cleavage are different, they are economic. Therefore, to think in terms of communal groups functioning politically is to think in terms of medievalism. And this is the reason why communal groups in India fail so dismally in the political field; they have and can have no common political economic policy; they split up and are usually dominated by reactionaries. Having no inner strength they look inevitably to favours from the imperialist masters. And what are these favours? A few state jobs, a few seats in legislatures. How does this effect the hunger of the millions or the unemployment of vast numbers?

9. Realization of this is coming slowly to those who hoped for relief from their communal leaders and so they are turning more and more to the Congress and thinking in terms of political and economic power.

10. We talk of approaching the Muslim masses. That is no new programme for us although the stress may be new. That is part of our principal programme of developing increasing contacts with the masses, whether they are Hindu or Muslim, Sikh or Christian or any others. The religion of all these is their personal matter which the Congress guarantees. But we think of them not as religious units but as suffering units of the hungry Indian masses who cry loudly for succour.

11. It must be remembered that the Congress has always had large numbers of Muslims in its fold, and larger numbers have sympathized with its activities. Some of the most eminent of our national leaders have been and are Muslims. But it is true that the Muslim masses have been largely neglected by us in recent years. We want to repair that omission and carry the message of the Congress to them. Why do others object to this? If they disagree with the political or economic policy of the Congress, they are at perfect liberty to place their policy before the masses. But it is to the masses that the appeal must be made.

12. This is important, the appeal to the masses. Our problems cannot be solved, we hold, by a few people at the top. And that is why we have lost faith in the old style all parties conferences, in a few persons, representing communal organizations with no common political background, meeting together and discussing and quarrelling. We have had enough experience of these in the past, and that experience does not call for repetition. We are, of course, always willing to discuss our problems with all who earnestly desire their solution, whether they agree with us or not. But the way to a solution is not through a so-called all parties conference.

13. Those who talk of the Congress entering into a pact or an alliance with Muslims or others, fail to understand the Congress or the new forces that are moving our people. We have already made a great pact among our people, a great pact

among ourselves, among all who desire national and economic freedom, to work together to this common end. The Muslims are in this pact just as the Hindus and Sikhs and so many Christians. They are there as Indians, and if they have problems *inter se*, as they must have occasionally, they will discuss them and decide them democratically within the great organization which has come to represent to such a remarkable degree the will of the Indian people. Is it not better and dignified to do this than to seek favours from and take deputations to our alien rulers who dominate over us, and seek to play off one against the other?

14. When we have gained our freedom, that is the only possible and democratic way for us. And even now, in the course of our struggle for freedom, that is the only way.

15. Some people suggest that semi communal nationalist parties should be formed, like a Muslim Congress Party. That seems to me a wrong course and one which will encourage communalism and injure the larger cause. Our experience of the Nationalist Muslim Party in the past was not a happy one. Such half-way groupings confuse the issue and the masses are perplexed. Those who disagree with the Congress will, of course, form their groups and parties. But those who agree should not stand on the doorstep; they should enter the nation's chamber and take full share in shaping the nation's policy. There are many today who talk vaguely of being Congressmen and of being in favour of independence. But they work through other and communal organizations and waste their strength thereby.

16. The crisis deepens and the people of India will soon have to take many fateful decisions. Already these petty and unreal problems, communal and the like, shade off into the background and the real issues pregnant with destiny, overshadow India and the world. What will our answer be whether we are the Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs or Christians? Shall we stick to our little ways, lost in a wilderness of pettiness? Or will we, united and firm of purpose, take the shaping of events in our strong hands and make the history of our choice?

58

Jinnah's Statement

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 12-14/1937

25 April, 1937, Bombay. Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League has issued the following statement to the Associated Press: "I understand that there is a move to invite to a meeting of the members of the Congress to be held on May 2 and 3 some Muslim members who have been elected on the Muslim League ticket in the United Provinces Assembly and also that a conference is going to be convened at Allahabad.

2. "I am entirely in the dark as to what the object of this move is. But I want to make it clear that it would be useless for any individual or individuals effectively to carry Muslims behind them if any settlement is arrived at with a particular group or

even for the matter of that, say a whole Province. It is a pity that these round about efforts are made. The only object of it can be to create some difference between Musalmans. It is no use dealing with those men who are in and out of the Congress and in and out of the League, at one time with one and another time with the other, as it suits them."

3. "I am sure the Muslims of U.P. won't betray the Musalmans of India and, therefore, any effort to settle by individuals which may be advantage to them for the time being won't carry us anywhere."

4. "I have been promised by Mr. Khaliquzzaman, Leader of the Muslim League party in U.P. Assembly, that he would let me know what the situation is in the U.P. I have sent him reminders and I am waiting to hear from him for the last three weeks, and I can't understand the mystery of his silence."

5. "I only trust he won't enter into any commitments which may be repudiated not only by Muslims of his Province but by the Muslims of All India."

6. "The method of dealing with individuals or groups can only result in isolating and dividing Muslims group by group or Province by Province and destroying the unity front." (A.P.I.)

59

Nehru's Press Statement

The Bombay Chronicle, 26 April, 1937

Allahabad, 25 April, 1937. In another statement Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru says: "I am sorry that anything that I have said or done should lead Mr. Jinnah to think that I want to function as a dictator.¹ Far from dictating to others I cannot even dictate to myself. I am a servant and worker of the Congress carrying out its directions. Personally I find it difficult to think of a question on communal lines. I think on political and economic lines. But I should like to assure Mr. Jinnah and others that the Congress attaches the greatest importance to the building up of a united India and of removing the differences and the suspicions which unfortunately separate sometimes the various religious groups. To that end the Congress will cooperate with all others but inevitably that unity must have an enduring political basis. It cannot be the unity of subjection."

1. In response to a suggestion by *Jayabharat*, a daily of Bombay, that Jinnah's offer of cooperation should be accepted, Jawaharlal had wired: "Congress is bound by the fundamental policy of independence, rejection of the new Constitution and working on mass basis for mass betterment. I am willing to cooperate and discuss with representative individuals or groups on this basis." Jinnah replied: "It appears to me that he has taken the position of a dictator. It comes to this 'accept what I have already decided and then I shall talk to you.' This is not the way to arrive at a settlement."

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*Muslims Conference**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 12-14/1937*

Allahabad, 26 April, 1937. Khan Bahadur Mr. Bashiruddin, Manager, Islamia School, Etawah, is reported to have been requested to accept the Presidentship of the Muslim Conference proposed to be held here on May 15 and 16.

2. The object of the Conference will be to consider ways and means to bring the Muslims into Congress fold. It is reported the organisers recently considered the question as to whether all classes of Muslims should be invited to the Conference or only the Congress Nationalist Muslims or such Muslims who were prepared to come into Congress fold. It is understood that the general view was that it would not be open at the Conference to consider whether the Muslims should join the Congress or not. The Conference will be, accordingly, of the Muslims who believe that the Muslims should join the Congress and the business before it would be to consider ways and means of bringing the Muslim masses into the Congress fold.

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*Nehru to K.M. Ashraf¹**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 12-14/1937**26 April, 1937*

My dear Dr. Ashraf,

I have to thank you very much for your kind letter. I am glad that you have contradicted the statement that the visit of Maulana Ahmed Saeed² to Allahabad had something to do with the Hindu-Muslim settlement. When I first read in the papers that the President of the Congress had given an assurance to him that all his demands would be accepted by him, I was surprised because no progressive Muslim would give a blank cheque to the Ulama regarding the interpretation of the Shariat Law. I am, therefore, very much relieved that the visit of Maulana Ahmed Saeed to Allahabad had no special meaning. I am not surprised to read your impressions about the U.P. Ahrar Conference because I know that many of the Ahrars are not as radicals as they proclaim themselves to be. I am glad to know that the Conference to be held in Allahabad will be confined only to the Musalmans who were members of the Congress. I think that for the present the most effective policy for the Congress would be to carry on intensive propaganda among the Muslim masses, but in doing so it is necessary that the Congress workers should not do anything unwittingly that might hurt the sentiments of the Musalmans specially in respect of their language. I shall be very glad if you will

kindly keep me in touch with the developments in the U.P. from time to time.
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Dr. Kunwar Muhammad Ashraf (1903-62); eminent Marxist historian; joined Non-Cooperation Movement but left after Chauri Chaura incident in 1922; went to London for higher studies, 1927; Returned to India, 1932 and plunged into the freedom movement; Member, Executive of Congress Socialist Party; In-charge of Congress Minorities Cell, 1936; Presided over All India Students Federation, Calcutta, 1939; in jail, 1939-43; Editor, *Naya Daur*, Urdu daily of the Communist Party of India; passed away in Germany.
 2. Maulana Ahmed Saeed (1888-1959), Founder Secretary, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. Participated in the Khilafat Movement and Non-Cooperation Movement; presided over Bihar Muslim Independent Party Conference, 1936; participated in Azad Muslim Conference, Delhi, 1940.

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Proceedings of U.P. Muslim League Working Committee

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 15-17/1937

LUCKNOW, 26 April, 1937

The Meeting of the Working Committee of the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board passed the following resolution regarding its present policy.

2. This Committee is of opinion that it is not possible for the Muslim League Parliamentary Board or the members elected on its ticket to join the Congress in its policy of wrecking the Constitution, but can cooperate with the Congress or any other progressive party in the Legislatures whose policy and programme are approximately the same as those of this board.

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Congress Leader's Appeal

The Times of India, Moonje Papers

29 April, 1937

Allahabad, April 28. A mass meeting was held at Pursotamdas Park this evening, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru presiding. Several members of the Working Committee explained the position taken up by the Congress regarding the demand for assurances and the urgent need to establish closer contact with the Muslim masses.

5. Mr. Bhulabhai Desai maintained that there was really no such thing as a Hindu-Muslim question which had been artificially created. From his experience in the Legislative Assembly he could say that whenever any question of national importance came up before the House, the Muslims always sided with the Congress in defeating Government. He had no doubt that in the next elections the Muslims would return a large number of Congressmen to the Provincial Assemblies. He appealed to the electorate to return Congressmen in larger numbers in the next elections.

6. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad criticised those who advocated that Muslims should maintain their separate entity in politics and emphasised that there was no room in politics for such separate communal or sectional entities. He maintained that such a tendency was injurious to the cause of the country and he, therefore, appealed to all Muslims and others to join the Congress.

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Resolutions of Majlis Ahrar

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 15-17/1937

Kanpur, 30 April, 1937. 2. A number of resolutions were passed outlining the programme of work for the new year. A resolution was passed expressing faith in a programme for the establishment of [contact] with the masses. Where necessary the Party will work with the Congress in the city as well as in the villages.

3. The Party decided to work among the Muslim masses in the city and the villages and to rally them for a struggle for the country's freedom.

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Statement of the organisers of the U.P. Muslim Congressmen's Conference [April, 1937]

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 12-14/1937

In his solicitude Mr. Jinnah has chosen to ask us our objective in holding the conference of U.P. Muslim Congressmen. He is further anxious that we may not be betraying the Muslims of India. As to our bonafide Mr. Jinnah may as well kindly recall that practically all of us have actively participated in Muslim movements spreading over a decade and a half. Only recently we organised the Palestine Conference at Allahabad. Individually most of us are connected even at present with the various progressive social and religious Muslim movements.

We, on our part, are somewhat amazed at the reactions of Mr. Jinnah towards the new signs of life which are visible among U.P. Muslims and their growing anti-Imperialist outlook. Of course, Mr. Jinnah refused to see or acknowledge the revived

urge of the Muslims of India for freedom and national struggle. In fact he characterises all such tendencies as betrayal of Muslim interests. It is a misfortune that after the bold and courageous leadership of the late Maulana Mohammad Ali and the Shaikh-ul-Hind.¹ Mr. Jinnah should have chosen to court popularity with certain sections of Muslims who are only too closely associated with social and political reaction. Political question apart, even on a primarily religious issue like the Khilafat Movement when the Congress made tremendous sacrifices and put it in the forefront of its demands, Mr. Jinnah was silent. Again, when the Frontier Muslims were terrorised and the Congress instituted an enquiry, Mr. Jinnah and his League did not move. Where was the League when the Muslims of Karachi suffered? How about the Palestine agitation? Does Mr. Jinnah utter a word today when Waziristan is being subjected to daily bombardments? What shall we Muslims conclude then except that Mr. Jinnah and his League talk when the Muslims suffer and their enemies go on tightening their hold? Has Mr. Jinnah ever identified himself with the sufferings of the Musalmans? Some of us have concluded that Mr. Jinnah and his compeers are made of totally alien stuff which has nothing in common with the masses.

The Congress, on the other hand, is preparing the masses, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to fight the battle of economic and political freedom. It has a tradition of suffering and sacrifice to which we Muslims have substantially contributed. During the last elections, the Congress succeeded in routing Hindu social reaction while Mr. Jinnah ended up by strengthening the Muslim reactionary elements in our Province. Does Mr. Jinnah suggest that the Muslims should go on treading this path of reaction and death? It is a sign of life when we want to part company with Mr. Jinnah and those friends who have kept the Muslims away from the national anti-imperialist struggle.

Thus, those of us who have joined the Congress or are about to join it, are not less conscious of the rights and the interests of the Muslims than Mr. Jinnah. But we have learnt through bitter experience that Muslim leadership outside the Congress is futile if not dangerous and the Muslim masses cannot any longer identify themselves with these upper class gentlemen and their theories of inactivity and cowardice. We want the Muslims to be bold and sacrificing and we certainly want them to participate in the freedom struggle around us. This alone shall protect their rights and position. We do not believe that Hindus or Englishmen shall protect our rights.

The bonds of weak and futile leadership are bound to break and we are only helping those persons in U.P.—the centre of Islamia culture and healthy political life—by calling a conference of those who have turned their back towards this essentially reactionary leadership and decided to join the Congress for struggle and freedom.

1. Shaikh-ul-Hind Maulana Mahamudul Hasan (1851-1920); Principal, 1905, involved in 'The Silk Conspiracy Case' and interned in Malta, 1917 presided over the annual session of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, which fully cooperated with Congress; inaugurated the Jamia Millia Islamia shortly before his death.

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*Ahrar Conference Resolutions [April, 1937]**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. 15-17/1937*

The U.P. Provincial Ahrar Conference concluded its deliberations at Lucknow on Monday night (26th April, 1937).

2. The Conference passed a number of resolutions, one regarding the attitude of the Ahrars towards the Congress and the other regarding the new Constitution.

3. In the first resolution the Conference reiterated their objective as "complete" independence for the country. It further urged the Muslim masses to cooperate with the progressive forces in the country, specially with the Congress in order to check the economic exploitation of the country, and to ameliorate the conditions of the Muslim masses.

4. A committee was formed consisting of Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi,² 2. Maulana Aziz Ahmad Khan³ M.L.A. 3. Ghazi Hamidul Ansari,⁴ 4. Chaudhri Afzal Haq and 5. Maulana Ismail Zabi to recommend to the Central Ahrar Council the ways and means to be adopted by them for bringing about the desired co-operation with the Congress.

5. By another resolution the Conference protested against the recent utterances of Lord Zetland and other British imperialists in not accepting the Congress formula for acceptance of offices and further condemned the formation of interim Ministries.

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1. Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, a nationalist Muslim who contested against Liaquat Ali Khan from Meerut.
 2. Maulana Aziz Ahmad Khan; Member, All India Council of Muslim League, 1935.
 3. Ghazi Hamidul Ansari; Prominent Member of the Ahrar Party.

67

*Report on Revision of Leagues Constitution**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. 12-14/1937*

Lucknow, 1 May, 1937. The attainment of the status of a free and independent country by India by all legitimate means with a democratic form of Government in which the rights and interests of Musalmans are protected by adequate and effective constitutional safeguards has been recommended as the goal to be adopted by the All India Muslim League. The recommendation has been made by a Committee appointed by the League Council in March last to revise the Constitution¹ and rules of the All India Muslim League which held a number of sittings under the Presidentship of Nawab Mohamamad Ismail Khan of Meerut and has now submitted its report

which will be considered at a meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League. (A.P.I.)

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1. A small Committee under the Chairmanship of Nawab Ismail Khan was appointed early in 1937 to consider the Constitution of the Muslim League.

68

Nehru's Press Statement

*The Hindustan Times, 5 May, 1937; Selected Works of
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 129-32*

Allahabad, 2 May, 1937. I have read Mr. Jinnah's latest statement with care. I agree with him that the Muslim League is a political organisation and often acts on the political plane. But because it is confined to a religious group it is, like others of its kind, essentially a religious or communal organisation. I can fully understand and appreciate a religious or cultural organisation acting on a religious or cultural plane only. I can also understand a political organisation acting politically, whatever its view might be. But to mix the two is to create confusion and prevent the proper decision of any issue. Mr. Jinnah tells us that the Muslim League is a political organisation and its policy and programme differ in vital respects from that of the Congress. The mere fact that a person is born to or professes the faith of Islam does not surely mean that he must also conform to the political policy and programme of the Muslim League. If he disagrees with that policy, as large numbers of Muslims do, he must inevitably seek some other political organisation whose policy and programme appeal to him. If he agrees with the Congress policy he will join it and function through it politically. That does not mean that he wants the disruption of Muslims. He is merely acting as politically thinking people act. Obviously there are great differences of political opinion *inter se* among Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, etc. Among each of these religious groups one may find Congressmen, Socialists, anti-Socialists, Communists, Liberals, direct-actionists, revolutionaries, moderates, extremists, believers in different kinds of economic theory, supporters of the Douglas Credit System or any other system. These cleavages of political and economic opinion are rightly represented by political and economic parties in the public life of the country. But to form a religious or communal party, which also dabbles in political and economic matters, cuts across these real cleavages of opinion on live issues and thus is an unreal party in the political sense. Or else it partly represents, as the Muslim League or Hindu Sabha or Sikh League may claim to represent, a certain section of a religious group which holds by certain political and economic theories. But even this it does not do with clarity and precision as it is always talking in terms of religious group which by its very nature is a politically mixed one.

2. I do not agree with the policy of the Liberal Party but I can understand it. It

is a political party which bases its appeal on a certain political theory and its doors are open to all, Hindus or Muslims or others, who agree with that theory. Not so the Muslim League or the Hindu Sabha.

3. Mr. Jinnah has failed to understand me if he thinks that I am out to destroy other parties. But because I believe in the Congress policy and programme, I try my hardest to push that forward and to convert all others, Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, etc. to that viewpoint. Mr. Jinnah or the Liberals or any other individual or group are perfectly entitled to push their policy forward in the same way. Why then does Mr. Jinnah object to my working among the Muslims for the spread of Congress ideals? The objection is not political, it is communal, and hence the confusion of thought and action. When Mr. Jinnah talks of the Musalmans or warns them to do this or that, he is not speaking politically but communally. He is presuming that all Musalmans must inevitably think on the same political lines and these should be in accordance with the policy laid down by him and the Muslim League. Surely that is a large presumption.

4. Mr. Jinnah thinks that the Congress policy is wrong and harmful. I think likewise of his policy. We differ. Let us agree to differ and work democratically for the spread of our respective viewpoints. I would gladly welcome Mr. Jinnah as the leader of a purely political party open to all denominations and with a defined policy. Political and economic issues will then be placed clearly before the country and the people of the country, who will ultimately decide these issues, will be enabled to think about them on right lines. To appeal to Musalmans or Hindus as religious groups on political matters is obviously the wrong thing. It is the medieval attitude, when politics and economics were in the background and it cannot possibly fit in with the modern world. It is because of this that I say that I find difficult to think on communal lines.

5. It is very unfair of Mr. Jinnah to say that the Congress considers it utter nonsense to safeguard the rights and interests of the Minorities. The very reverse of this is true. In so far as religious and cultural and linguistic rights are concerned (and these are generally considered to be the basic Minority rights) these have been amply safeguarded by the Congress as far as solemn declarations can safeguard them. There may be other questions which require consideration and certainly occasions have arisen in the past and will arise in the future, in this imperfect world, when political adjustments are desirable in regard to Minorities. The Congress is fully alive to this and is always ready, when such occasions offer themselves, to help bringing about such an adjustment. But political adjustments must be in consonance with a basic political policy. To have a relatively minor adjustment at the expense of fundamentals is not an adjustment; it is the uprooting of the whole structure, a complete loss of equilibrium.

6. The Congress does not and cannot accept the Communal Award because it is a negation of our fundamental principles of democracy and of a united India. It is incompatible with freedom. But Mr. Jinnah knows that the Congress policy is to get it altered in cooperation with, and with the goodwill of, the communities concerned.

7. When Mr. Jinnah says, quite rightly, that the Muslim League differs in vital respects from the Congress in political matters, does he expect the Congress including

the Muslims who agree with the Congress, to give up its policy in deference to the Muslim League, a policy which has been a beacon light to us and to millions in this country these many years, and for which so many of us have gone repeatedly through the valley of the shadow? Mr. Jinnah knows that in the hour of our trial when we faced the might of a proud empire, many prominent leaders of the Muslim League sought alliance with the die-hard leaders of the Conservative Party in England, than whom there are no greater enemies of Indian freedom. Are we to submit to them now, we who have refused to submit to the embattled power of that empire, and who prepare afresh for fresh trials and tribulations in the struggle for independence which has become the life-blood of all our activities?

8. Mr. Jinnah refers apparently to my faith in socialism. It is true that I desire to put an end to imperialism all over the world and I look forward to the establishment of a socialist state not only in India but elsewhere also. I believe in a world order based on the principles of socialism, and I am convinced that only thus will the distempers and miseries that afflict us find final burial. But the Congress is not committed to this creed or policy. Nevertheless the Congress thinks and acts in terms of the masses, Hindu or Muslim or other, seeks strength from them, and determines its policy with reference to them. Therefore, it considers that even political adjustments with Minorities will have a surer and more real basis if the masses are enabled to have their say in the matter.

9. Do I talk like a dictator or a sovereign authority? It is for others to judge. But may I venture to say that Mr. Jinnah, when he objects to our carrying on our ordinary political work among Muslims or issues mandates and warnings to Musalmans as a whole, regardless of their political opinions or affiliations, adopts an attitude which may without impropriety be called dictatorial?

69

Brabourne to R.M. Maxwell

Home Department (Special), Nos. B. 1208

BOMBAY, 1/4 May, 1937

I am desired to submit my report for the second half of April, 1937.

5. In a lengthy statement issued to the Press on the 19th April, Mr. M.A. Jinnah, who has been unanimously elected President of the Bombay Presidency Branch of the All India Muslim League, explained the attitude and the programme of the League and condemned the deliberate attempts made by Congress leaders to misrepresent its policy. He also pointed out that the object of the Congress is to divide the Muslim community and break the Muslim League and appealed to Muslims to organize Provincial and district branches of the League and enlist as many members as possible. In another statement issued on the 29th as a rejoinder to statements made by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. Jinnah warned the Muslims against taking a leap in the dark by joining the Congress.

70

Jinnah's Press Statement

Star of India, 3 May, 1937, Nation's Voice, pp. 142-43

Bombay, 2 May, 1937. "My attention has been drawn to two successive statements of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru dated about April 25, and I wish I can honestly say some Congress leaders have been asserting that there is no Hindu-Muslim question and that the Minorities problem does not exist in India. I did not say that Pandit Jawaharlal was functioning like a 'Dictator' but I did say that he was talking as such, and it is quite clear from his statement that he is talking as if he were a sovereign authority. He says: 'Personally I find it difficult to think of any question on communal lines.'

2. "That may be so, but 99 per cent of the people who surround him not only think on communal lines but their words and their deeds speak eloquently. However, I am glad that the President, to put it in his own words, attaches the greatest importance to the building up of a United India and of removing differences and suspicions which unfortunately separate sometimes various religious groups."

3. "It is not religious groups but political groups which do not agree with the Congress with regard to its policy and programme. I think he is doing a very great injustice when he talks of the Muslim League as a religious group. The Muslim League is a political organisation and its policy and programme differs in vital respects from that of the Congress. For instance, the Congress policy as interpreted by him in his latest statement is, to use his own words: 'the objective of the Congress is political independence, that is, the capture of power by the people of India, that when that power is captured he will by means of a Constituent Assembly frame the Constitution for India with a strong hand.' 'When he was asked when will this be achieved his reply was during my lifetime.' I wish him long life.

4. "In the meantime he is preparing for a revolution to destroy the imperialistic power not only in India but all over the world, and thus he will succeed in removing our crushing poverty and unemployment for which he is working. In his school of thought there is no programme pending the achievement of the great ideal except to destroy every other party who dares to differ from him in any way. He is welcome to put forward this ideal and utopia, but I regret to say that I cannot subscribe to it having regard to the conditions and realities of the situation in India. I see in this no immediate relief on economic lines to the poverty and unemployment which is facing us. I warn the Muslims, therefore, not to jump into this and take a leap in the dark, and I may say to the better-minded Hindus 'please think before it is too late.'

5. "Next, the policy and the programme of the All India Muslim League are laid down and until they are changed by the All India Muslim League we are bound to pursue our programme that we must work the Provincial Constitution for what it is worth having regard to the present conditions of our country. This does not mean that we are not as stoutly opposed to the Government of India Act, 1935, as any other party. Whereas the Congress policy and programme is to 'wreck' the Constitution

whatever that may mean. I say this because it is being interpreted and construed in different ways by different spokesmen of the Congress."

6. "Third we stand by the Communal Award until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned, whereas the Congress is out to destroy it, and refuses even to accept it provisionally till we may come to an honourable settlement of our own."

7. "Next our basic principle is that the rights and the interests of the Minorities must be safeguarded in any Constitution by whomsoever it may be framed. The Congress considers this as utter nonsense."

8. "Next in the present circumstances and the realities of India, the Muslim League is not prepared to resort to direct action, because it will be suicidal in the present divided condition of India. Thus it will be seen that the vital differences are not confined only to minorities problems. I am rather amused when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru refers to the Congress resolution passed at Karachi and proceeds to say that this assurance has been repeated in the Congress election manifesto and is the basis of the Congress policy and says: 'It applies to all majorities and Minorities alike and it is unthinkable that the Congress will even vary it.'

9. "Here, then, it is obvious that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru not only talks platitudes, but speaks as if he possessed sovereign authority over the minorities. Surely Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has studied the histories of other countries where the minority question is not only limited to the assurances embodied in the Congress election manifesto which any decent Government is bound to give. The spirit of his attitude is again indicated in the next paragraph where he states: 'having given this solemn assurance, the Congress has nothing further to do with religious or cultural matters and it pursues its political struggle.' Does he not know that besides such religious and cultural matters, there is an absolute necessity for political adjustment as to the rights and interests of the minorities.

10. "However, no useful purpose would be served in continuing this controversy. I appeal to the Muslims to organise themselves. We want no assurance from one party or the other in this country, or for the matter of that, from the British Government. It is only by organising and presenting a united front that the Muslims will secure their rights which are due to them in the future Government of our country, and it is only by organising and gaining strength on our own merits that we shall be able to defend any encroachment by or dictation from others, and that is the reason why frantic efforts are made to prevent the Muslims from organising and we are asked to liquidate and wind up the Muslim League.

11. "I have been appealing to the Congress leaders not to pursue this new orientation of their policy and programme. It is sure to lead to greater bitterness. Of course, in theory nobody disputes that any party has a right to put up a candidate in any constituency they like but it is the spirit and intention of such a move which has got to be considered and judged. I have repeatedly said that if the Congress or any other party is willing to cooperate, our hand is there to the extent that we can agree for the better mind of Hindus and say that proceeding on the lines of alliances and honourable settlement as equals is a surer course and path towards a united front which will alone win freedom for India."

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Jinnah's speech

Civil and Military Gazette, 6 May, 1937; Nation's Voice, pp. 146-147

Bombay, 5 May, 1937. "You can't possibly construct a full, complete democratic responsible Government in any country unless you take the minorities with you and create a sense of security and confidence in the minorities," said Mr. M.A. Jinnah addressing a joint meeting of the European and Indian Progressive Groups last evening on the "Minorities Problem."

2. Mr. Jinnah added: "It is no use discussing the fact that the heredity, language and social life and outlook vary from community to community and in some respects fundamentally. Democratic full responsible Government means the rule of the majority and before a stable Government is possible the minorities problem should be adjusted. Had we been able to settle the minorities problem, the new Constitution would have been written differently." After referring to "the many futile efforts undertaken so far to solve the communal problem." Mr. Jinnah said: "I believe in the policy of the spider. Try and try, for it is no use crying over spilt milk. The Communal Award is only a provisional arrangement till a substitute is found."

3. Mr. Jinnah deplored the attitude of the Congress towards the communal problem in treating it as a trifling matter and continued: "Congressmen say that the question before the country is economic namely, poverty and hunger. It seems to me that this is putting the cart before the horse. This policy and plea of hunger and poverty may succeed temporarily for the reasons are obvious.

4. "No party is really satisfied with the present Government so much so that anything against the present Government goes (sic) and dissatisfaction, disapproval and condemnation against the Government have been carried on for many years. If only some basis be found for a united front, the communal problem will be solved, and there is no hope for India to achieve her goal without it."

5. "The Muslim League is justified in its demand from the majority community, for what is the position of the 60 million of depressed classes in India today who have been refused even their elementary rights?"

6. He was opposed to the Congress for he did not agree with the policy, programme and methods pursued by the Congress. If he were the "Zaghlul Pasha¹ of India, he would have called all the minority communities, granted what they wanted and presented a united front for winning responsible Government for India." (A.P.)

1. Saad, Zaghlul Pasha (1850-1927); Egyptian nationalist leader; founded the Wafd Party in 1919.



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Haig to R.M. Maxwell [Extract]

Home Department (Special), D.O. No. F. 4/2-C.X

LUCKNOW, 6 May, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Maxwell,

I am desired to submit my fortnightly demi-official report for the second half of April, 1937.

8. An Ahrar conference was held at Lucknow during the second half of April. There was a distinct pro-Congress feeling at the meeting. Muslim feeling generally in the Province is much agitated by the attempts of Congress to induce Muslims to join them. As a general rule they are not prepared to wreck the Constitution or to abandon the Communal Award, but with the Ahrar pressure on one hand and the great strength of the Congress on the other, they are finding some difficulty in adopting a policy which commands general favour. Proposals are on foot for the reconstitution of the Muslim League and it is evident that Muslim leaders find the present position extremely difficult. The issue has been somewhat cleared by the recent controversy between Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Jinnah.

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Haig to Puckle¹ [Extract]

Home Department (Special), D.O. No. F. 5/1-CX

NAINITAL, 19 May, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

I am desired to submit my demi-official report for the first half of May.

12. Meetings of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board were also held in Lucknow at the same time Mr. Jinnah visited Lucknow in order to attend and to make clear his own policy on the questions of Muslim-Congress union. The proceedings demonstrated the powerful influence which Mr. Jinnah wields in the Muslim world. The conference determined not to amalgamate their organization with that of the Congress and it seems probable that this decision will be accepted by the majority of Muslims in the Province. The Congress-minded Muslim leaders and workers called a conference at Allahabad on the 15th to consider what plans they should adopt to popularize the Congress ideals and programme amongst the Muslim masses. Congress are making great efforts to secure mass contact with them though so far with little success. Mr. Pant received an address from the Ahrars.

1. Sir Frederick Hale Puckle, Director-General of Information, Government of India since 1939.

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*Gandhiji to Jinnah**Towards Freedom Papers, I pp. 572-73*

TITHAL, 22 May, 1937

Dear Shri Jinnah,

Kher¹ has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness, and in such distress I cry out to God for light.

Yours sincerely,
M.K. GANDHI

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1. Bal Gangadhar Kher (1888-1957); Premier, Bombay (1937-39); Chief Minister, Bombay, 1946-52.

75

*Emerson¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 558-62*

BARNES COURT, SIMLA, E., 22 May, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

2. In my last letter I mentioned that there seemed to be signs of Muslim feeling hardening against Congress. This is now definitely the case. One reason is that Congress are attempting to ignore Muslim leaders and approach the Muslim masses direct. Another is the arrogant spirit shown generally by Pandit Jawaharlal, and reflected in statements made by Kripalani, the Secretary of the All India Congress Committee. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, in replying to a deputation of the All India Kshatri Conference, made a strong speech against Congress pretensions. I attach a copy. This was entirely on his own initiative, and in fact, when he showed me the draft of this speech, I advised him to tone down one or two passages which he did. He tells me that the speech was made in consequence of representations made by Muslim members of the Unionist Party among whom the feeling against Congress is greatly increasing. This feeling is shared by the rural Hindu Minister, Rao Bahadur Sir Chotu Ram, who carries with him the Jats of the South-Eastern districts of the Province. Before Sikander spoke, Chotu Ram had done a tour in the districts of Ludhiana, Jullunder and Hoshiarpur where Congress and Communist parties are particularly active. He visited

a number of villages and addressed informally several meetings at which the attendance amounted to two or three thousand. He spoke freely against Congress and found the people ready to listen although the audience included a certain number of Akalis and other extremists. The general line he took was to attack them for their lack of any constructive work and for their failure to take the chance offered to them in those Provinces where they were in a majority. This again was entirely on his own initiative. Generally, it seems to me that history is repeating itself. Congress arrogance is increasing the apprehensions among Muslims of Hindu domination, and communal feeling will soon reach a dangerous level. Congress may be able to get a few adherents among Muslims, but every success in this direction will strengthen the feeling of Muslims as a community against them.

Yours sincerely,
H.W. EMERSON

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1. Sir Herbert William Emerson; Home Secretary, Government of India, 1930-33; Governor of Punjab, 1933-38.

76

Jinnah's Speech [21 May, 1937]

Times of India, 22 May, 1937; *Nation's Voice*, pp. 151-52

"We are prepared to fight for the country's freedom as equals with other parties but never as camp followers nor shall we submit to anybody's dictation," declared Mr. M.A. Jinnah, addressing a mammoth Muslim meeting held under the auspices of the Bombay Presidency Muslim League at Mohamed Ali Road, Bombay, on Friday night (21 May). The entire gathering demonstrated its willingness to fight under the banner of the Muslim League.

2. Mr. Shaukat Ali referring to the Congress programme for Muslim mass contact said: "For God's sake do not waste your money and time bullying the Muslims; the Muslims will not be bullied. Try honourable friendship and understanding, and the Muslims will be ready to accept the proffered hand."

3. Long before the arrival of the leaders, the large enclosures behind the Mandvi Post Office was occupied by more than 10,000 Muslims. Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Shaukat Ali received an enthusiastic ovation on their arrival at the meeting. Mr. Jinnah who presided said that their work had not finished with the elections. A more important work—that of organising Muslims not only in Bombay but all over the country—had now been launched by the Muslim League. He appealed to every Muslim to join the League and he assured them that within a short time the League would become a strong party capable of fighting any other party in the country.

4. The League's policy, Mr. Jinnah explained, was that they were prepared to

fight for the freedom of the country but not to become the slaves of others. They would fight as equal partners with the Hindus but would not follow anybody's dictation. Bombay Muslims had been dubbed Mawalis, but within a very short time the League had removed that wrong impression. They had secured 20 out of 30 seats in the Provincial Assembly and that was no small matter. They had also demonstrated that they were not job hunters.

5. Mr. Jinnah observed that from 1916 to 1935 he had been under the impression that the Hindus and Muslims would join hands and work together. In 1935, he spent four or five weeks holding conferences with Babu Rajendra Prasad (then President of the Congress) and trying to get the Muslim viewpoint accepted at least by the Congress leaders if not by the Hindu Mahasabha. But he did not succeed.

6. The new Constitution had now been in operation for more than a month, and conditions were different. He wanted to make the Hindus realise that without the friendship of the Muslims the fight for freedom would be futile. Mr. Jinnah said his idea was to form a progressive independent nationalist group to work with the Congress for the common good for the country. He had always been prepared for an honourable settlement, but finding no way to further that objective he had decided to strengthen the Muslim League.

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Asaf Ali¹ to Jinnah

Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 573-76

KUCHA CHALAN, DELHI, 23 May, 1937

My Dear Jinnah,

I have been closely following and most carefully studying and weighing all that has been said in the course of the controversy, which is proceeding in the Press. On two occasions, I felt like clearing up a point or two urged by you. Once in the beginning of the year I felt that a certain reference to Muslim Congressmen was unfortunate and I issued a brief statement confining myself to that only, and once again recently I felt that our point of view was not receiving the consideration which it deserved. The statement I issued to the Press you may or may not have read it. I am, therefore, sending you a copy of it. Some of the northern newspapers also thought it desirable to omit a sentence or two to suit their purpose.

2. You may take it from me that the way I have stated the case represents a fairly accurate picture of the working of many minds, among the thinking section of Muslims in the north barring the Punjab Unionists, who are by no means supporters of the League.

3. For an appeal to the masses, a concrete programme alone will answer the purpose. We who have worked among the masses for well nigh twenty years know this to our cost. The collapse of the Khilafat Movement led to disorganisation,

which left agitated pools of reaction here and there, but made reorganisation impossible. The bitterness of communal riots which filled the period of reaction rendered all attempts at reorganisation along sound lines impossible. The set of prominent Muslims who plunged headlong into the forces of reaction separately controlled wholly ill-assorted groups, which had very few points of real contact between them. I need not dilate on this point.

4. The secret of the recent revulsion in favour of the Congress lies in just one simple fact. In 10 out of 11 Provinces the substance of your 14 points has been conceded, and the percentage in services has been fixed, but it has not brought the desired relief to the educated unemployed, and those who are crushed under debts. I may hazard a guess that about 33 per cent of rural indebtedness (roughly 300 crores) on an average rate of 9 per cent interest covers the liabilities of the Muslim population of India. In other words nearly 27 crores a year should be paid by Muslims to keep down interest only. More often than not, 75 per cent of this interest is not paid regularly and the accumulated liability converts owners of land into landless tillers—mere peasants on sufferance. If statistics were collected, the process of expropriation which is in the progress would be found to be appalling. In this respect the Muslims are exactly on the same footing with their Hindu neighbour and the educated unemployed both among Hindus and Muslims are in the same boat. Quite naturally, therefore, they are turning to the first person, who promises them relief. They have grown sick of the futility of squabbles. They want a “move on.” Working, wrecking or temporising with the Constitution are mere slogans, which mean nothing to them, until one can show them how any one of these methods can give them some relief. The success of the Congress in six Provinces has brought home to them the realisation that the relief looked for cannot be guaranteed by exclusive Minorities. These and similar factors have operated to herald the turn of the tide. Again, the slogan “Muslims Unite” even to work the Constitution and to fight both foreign and indigenous exploiters is, in my opinion, hardly calculated to yield the result expected. It may embitter some. If all Muslims of India cannot unite on the purely religious issues, and Sunnis, Ahl-i-Hadis, Shias, Qadyanis, and numerous other subdivisions must continue to break into riots, is there any real chance of a solidly United Muslim front against a political organisation which says “we want to fight the cause of your poverty, unemployment, indebtedness, landlessness and so forth?” It would be a weak cry “Muslims unite against the Congress,” particularly when the Congress says “Preserve your culture, your language, your religion, and even your social structure. We will not interfere with you. It is your business and not ours. But if you want freedom, let us all work together to achieve the end we are both working for. We have to mobilise our forces, and move as one man under a unified command. Let any one of you, say Mr. Jinnah, come on to the council of War, and let him lead and hold the High Command like General Joffre, who was placed at the head of the Allied Forces before the knockout blow was struck.” Nobody says dissolve the League. We simply urge: Let the League join the Congress also, and pull its proper weight in the counsels of the council of war. None of us, nor you, I am sure would claim infallibility. I go further and suggest that none but you should join the Congress and say I also represent another political organisation with the same aims and objects as

you have, but I would like you to consider the urgency of my bringing them in. They have certain doubts and suspicions and they are a, b, c, d; do you not think it worth your while to settle them? "The problem is exactly the same as you are face to face with in regard to other Muslim organisations. Why must you insist on bringing all Muslims into the League? Why cannot Ahrars, Proja Party, Unionists, Jamiat, and so many other wholly or predominantly Muslim organisations turn round and say "cooperation, yes, but we must control our groups separately." Even within the Congress, groups do not lose their individuality.

5. But how is the rapprochement to be brought about? Is working and wrecking the only bone of contention? You know it more than anybody that hard words never broke any bone. What about "Replacing the present Constitution." Is the Communal Award another bone of contention? The Congress is pledged to seek no alternation of it, by invoking outside aid. When it is done, it must be by agreement among the contending parties. The culture, language, script and religion of minorities are already guaranteed. What else is there?

6. Will you for enlightening those who think as I do, help me with a clear statement of the points at issue, just to enable me to initiate a thorough discussion of the whole question with those who are in a position to come to a definite decision on the point?

7. You know how much I admire and respect you, even though you may not know how much personal affection I have for you. It pains me beyond words to see such great reserves of political experience and ability as you unquestionably possess go uncoordinated. Unless you have reasons for discounting every word of what we say, may not some of us, whom you know as not wholly devoid of reason and political experience, expect a calm consideration of our point of view, and a reasonable concession to our reasoned wishes? In certain nationalist circles I have even incurred odium for praising you "excessively" in my public utterances. But in regard to public matters, I do not expect you to be swayed by personal friendships or ties. But a dispassionate consideration of public questions surely includes the assessment of the views held by those who have proved their capacity to suffer for their convictions.

8. What are the concrete points, you would, for instance, expect the Congress to concede to secure the general economic welfare of the Muslims? If you will be so kind as to let know them in detail, I shall see that they reach those who can speak authoritatively. A controversy in the Press may be useful up to a point, but it hardly answers the purpose.

With kind regards.

Ever yours sincerely,
ASAF ALI

1. Asaf Ali (1888-1953); Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935 and 1945; Secretary, Congress Assembly Party, 1935 and 1945; Member, Interim Government, 1947; Governor of Orissa, 1948-52; Indian Ambassador, U.S.A., 1947-48 and Switzerland, 1952-53.

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*Siud [Sayyid] Hussain¹ to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers*

MOHAMMAD MANZIL, 29 CAWNPORE ROAD, ALLAHABAD
GRAND HOTEL, DELHI, 25 May, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I came away on the evening of the 8th as I was not well and remained in bed for about a week.

2. As I wrote to you earlier that I had a talk with Mrs. Naidu and Maulana Azad about the Muslim mass contact and they had assured me that the Congress will not persist in it. I was hopeful that the Congressites meeting at Allahabad will not decide to approach the Muslims direct but after the Lucknow happenings I was told the party of Khaliq and that of Maulvi Hussain Ahmad² decided that it will not be possible for them to dominate the League and so they should work in the Congress. The 3 young men of Allahabad who are practically unknown persons and were put up by the Congress to manage the holding of conference also saw that they have no place in the League and they along with Sir Wazir Hasan³ and Khwaja Abdul Majid⁴ also joined hands with them.

3. They have now set the ball rolling and we ought to begin the work in right earnest. The work has begun in Allahabad, Lucknow and Meerut.

4. The Committee which was appointed at Lucknow to organise the League consists mainly of Congress inclined persons and it is not very likely that the Committee will do much; the individuals may do something.

5. The difficulty is that the success of Congress and inclination of some Ulama towards the Congress has made others timid and among those who worked among the masses and are against the present Congress policy. There are only two persons in U.P. who can lead the opposition. They are Maulana Shaukat Ali and myself. The others will merely follow.

6. Shaukat is not always available and moreover he wants some people with him to keep him going.

7. I am open Congress-hater and make no secret of it and consequently I am a big target of the opposition but I do not mind it and have been leading the opposition and have made the life of Congressites a hell but my health has broken down at present and I need at least 3 weeks rest which I have not been able to get. There are only two classes of people as they are put before the public. Any one who is anti-Government, he is styled as Congressman or extremist and any one who is anti-Congress he is styled as communalist or reactionary. The real reactionaries and the Ministry followers have no place at least in U.P.

8. These Ministers are the worst lot and are useless for everybody even for the Government as they have no following nor they can ever have and the poking of their nose spoils the work of others also. They are not even good for funds. We must stand on

our legs and keep them at arm's length and utmost as camp followers at least in U.P. As I told you the Allahabad District League has passed a resolution inviting the All India session at Allahabad which has been published in papers and I am enclosing a formal invitation. I am returning to Allahabad today and will stop there about a week and then I will go to Calcutta where I intend to take a short rest as our High Court is closed. I have good many friends there and if you suggest to do anything there, please write to me.

9. Have you issued the letters about which you were telling to me at Lucknow?

10. I still think that you ought to have a sort of round table discussion with about 30 or 40 people, leaders of various Muslims institutions, before the session, at Bombay or any other place. I can arrange at Allahabad or ask some people at Calcutta if you like. You must have read what Mr. Khaliq & Co., did in Congress meeting at Lucknow. It is disgraceful.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,
SIUD HUSAIN

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1. He seems to be identical with Siud Hussain (1886-1949); son of Nawab Siud Mohammad of Dacca and Calcutta and cousin of Shaheed N. Abdullah Suhrawardy; educated Aligarh and England; on the staff of *Bombay Chronicle* (1917-19); Editor Motilal Nehru's *Independent*; published from Allahabad, February 1919; went to England with the Khilafat Delegation, February, 1920; President, National Committee for India's Independent in America, 1939; return to India at the end of the War. First Indian Ambassador to Egypt were he died.
 2. Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani (1879-1957); a product of Deoband School who joined a group of revolutionaries against the British Government, arrested and jailed at Malta 1914; assumed leadership of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind; and collaborated with the Indian National Congress; participated in the Khilafat Movement, 1921, the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930 and 1932; and the Quit India Movement, 1942; opposed the two-nation theory and demand for Pakistan.
 3. Sir Syed Wazir Hassan (1872-1947); Secretary, All India Muslim League, 1913-19; Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1916-19; Member, Committee to discuss details of Congress-League Scheme of Reforms, December 1917-January 1918, Chief Judge, Oudh Chief Court, 1930-34; President, Muslim League Session, Bombay, 1936; joined the Congress, 1937.
 4. Khwaja Abdul Majid (1885-1962); contemporary of Jawaharlal at Cambridge and a lawyer from Aligarh, who joined the Congress, 1915.

*The Muslim Chamber of Commerce to Chief Accountant,
Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta*

Freedom Movement Archives Papers

28 May, 1937

I am directed by the Committee of this Chamber to inform you that it has been

brought to the notice of my committee that the ratio fixed by the Government for employment of Musalmans in various grades of services in the Reserve Bank of India is not maintained and that cases have occurred where the claims of qualified Musalman employees for promotion have been disregarded in preference to members of other communities and that the principle of proportional representation laid down by the Government for recruitment of the Musalmans in the services of the Government has been completely overlooked in the Calcutta office of the Reserve Bank of India.

2. I have to request you to kindly furnish me with a list of Musalmans, Hindus and other non-Muslim employees in the Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta, in the various grades *i.e.* as junior clerks, senior clerks, junior superintendents, senior superintendents and officers for information of my Committee and any other particulars bearing on this question that you may desire to send.

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Jinnah to Asaf Ali

Towards Freedom Papers, p. 612

28 May, 1937

My Dear Asaf Ali,

I thank you for your letter of the 23 May.

2. Do you think any useful purpose will be served by my formulating concrete proposals. I recognise your good intentions, your good offices when you assure me by saying "I shall see that this reaches those who can speak authoritatively." May I know which are those who can speak authoritatively? Cannot they think of any concrete proposals which will secure a general economic welfare of the Musalmans as well as satisfy them sufficiently to restore a sense of security and confidence in the majority. My reading of the situation is that the Congress headquarters are not really in earnest to tackle the question of Indian Musalmans. I hope that information is wrong. But at present I see no light.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH



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*Iqbal to Jinnah**Shamsul Hasan Collection*

LAHORE, 28 May, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you so much for your letter which reached me in due course. I am glad to hear that you will bear in mind what I wrote to you about the changes in the Constitution and programme of the League. I have no doubt that you fully realise the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslims cannot attract our masses.

2. Under the new Constitution the higher posts go to the sons of upper classes; the smaller ones go to the friends or relatives of the Ministers. In other matters too our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question, therefore, is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslims poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises, I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law, I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for sometime in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g. N.W. India, Palestine may be repeated. Also the insertion of Jawaharlal's socialism into the body politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among the Hindus themselves. The issue between social democracy and Brahmanism is not dissimilar to the one

between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India, I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy, it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems, therefore, are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than the Hindus. But, as I have said above, in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems, it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru.

3. Anyhow, I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration either in your address or in the discussions of the coming session of the League. Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of present difficulties.

Yours sincerely,
MUHAMMAD IQBAL

P.S. 4. On the subject-matter of this letter I intended to write to you a long and open letter in the Press. But on further consideration I felt that the present moment was not suitable for such a step.

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Nawab of Chhatari's to Tej Bahadur Sapru¹ [Extract]

Sapru Papers, Roll No. 3, Serial 2

CAMP ALIGARH, 30 May, 1937

My dear Sir Tej,

Thanks for your letter of May 21. The last letter that I wrote to you must have reached by now. Sir J.P. Srivastava showed me one of your letters. I have not seen the other. Yes, I wrote a letter to Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant, a copy of which I enclose along with a copy of the Pandit's reply. I am glad the "*Leader*" has supported us in this.

2. Now, I will tell you what I think of the situation. In my humble opinion it will be desirable if, before the legislature meets, we ask H.E. the Governor formally to approach the majority party once again to accept office in view of the statements made by various Governors and by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. The constitutional position has been made quite clear and what is still more convincing is the real working of the Constitution in the last two months. If a Governor does not like to interfere with the programme of a Minority Ministry how would he dare to interfere with the programme of a majority Ministry as long as they are within the

Constitution. If they accept office, well and good; if they refuse again, then personally I feel that we shall be in a better position to face the Legislature as we shall be able to say that twice they were offered office and twice they declined and that we are carrying on King's Government but that we do not wish to stick to office and that we advised the Governor to give them another offer. Of course, whatever we may say, a vote of censure will be passed on us. The present condition in the House is that while there was a great danger of the Muslim League going over to the Congress side, the Congress people took up such a high and mighty line that Mr. Jinnah fought with Jawaharlal and they have decided not to join the Congress. Therefore, I feel that with the exception of three or four persons like Khaliq, Muslims will not join the Congress in a vote of no-confidence. As to the other members I may tell you that we may be able to get eight or nine persons more towards our side, and our number may go up to 100; it cannot go beyond that. If a vote of no-confidence is passed and if the Congress refuses again to accept office, there will be no alternative left but to suspend the Constitution. I agree with you that it is not likely that if another election is held within a year or so we may have a majority in the House. The reason is this, that although we used to advocate lowering the franchise, the franchise has been so much lowered that the average voter cannot understand that no Government can run without taxation and that by dividing the wealth of the rich people it is possible to make them poor, but it is impossible to make the rest rich. These questions are such that only a man with education and developed intelligence can follow. The result of the election will be that further promises from the Congress may carry it through once again. But if the tenants are disappointed, say, for two years, and if a propaganda is carried on that the Congress made promises but could not fulfil them, the position may be different. Although it may sound rather retrograde, yet I am sure we have lowered the franchise too much, having regard to the condition of our electorate. My own reading of the situation is that if the Congress is not going to accept office within three months they will again embark on a campaign of non-cooperation and we shall again have to maintain law and order at any cost. When I say "we" I do not mean this Government, what I mean is that the British Government in the Provinces will have to maintain law and order. After a spell of non-cooperation there may be another election but at present there are signs that the Congress people are trying to prepare the rural areas for non-cooperation. One great difficulty which I am faced with at present is this. You know I always believe in mixed parties: but in the present situation if I speak of mixed parties, the Muslims are likely to say, "If you believe in a mixed party, let us go and join the Congress. It is a mixed party and less communal than other Hindus that you have got with you." That is really my most difficult problem. I was approached by many friends to start a new mixed party, but I have declined for the following reasons : (1) I do not think this is a proper moment to do so. If the Congress people accept office and commit mistakes, then they will give us an opportunity to do so. If they do not accept office but embark on a policy of non-cooperation, then again there will be an opportunity to do so; but not till then. (2) The Muslim question. If I ask them to join the mixed party, at any rate some

of them will join the Congress. However, I will discuss all this with you on your return.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely
AHMAD SAEED

The Rt. Hon. Sir TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU, P.C., KCSI., LL.D.
Governor House,
Park Lane, London, W.I.

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1. The language of the original letter in English has been left untouched.

83

Fortnightly Report on Bihar for the second half of May, 1937 [Extract]

Home-Poll (I) F 18-5/37, p. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

2. A considerable amount of activity has been noticed in the holding of meetings to persuade Muslims to join the Congress. Though this move cannot be treated lightly, it is perhaps significant that the Congress failed to put up a candidate for the seat in the Legislative Assembly vacated by Mr. Badrul Hassan, although they tried to find one. The propaganda has had a severe blow in the announcement made last week that Urdu was being introduced as an optional court language throughout the Province except in the aboriginal tracts. This announcement is likely to have great influence on the attitude of the Muslims.

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J.B. Kripalani to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, I, p. 45

SWARAJ BHAVAN, ALLAHABAD, 4 June, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Mr. Jinnah is reported to have said : "In 1935 he spent four or five weeks holding conferences with Babu Rajendra Prasad (then President of the Congress) trying to get the Muslim viewpoint accepted at least by the Congress leaders, if not by the Hindu Mahasabha, but he did not succeed." This, as you know, is entirely misleading and

false. If you think proper you may issue a statement. The gentleman who sent this cutting from Maharashtra enquired whether the facts were real as given by Mr. Jinnah.

With *Pranams*,

Yours sincerely,

J.B. KRIPALANI

85

Brabourne to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers; Towards Freedom Papers, p. 625

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, GANESHKHAD, 5 June, 1937

I had a long conversation with Jinnah a few days ago, and he told me that his Muslim League Party would, in the event of the present Ministry being defeated, be prepared to form a Ministry provided that they could see the chance of a majority of even two or three in the Assembly. He went on to say that Ambedkar¹ and party were prepared to back him in this, and that he expected to get the support of ten or a dozen of the so-called Congress M.L.A's mentioned above. He made it quite clear to me that they would not support the present Ministry.

2. It is, of course, quite impossible to rely on anything that Jinnah tells me and the only thing for me to do is to listen and keep silent. I obviously cannot tell Jamnadas Mehta² what Jinnah told me, or *vice versa*, as both of them are hopelessly indiscreet. The only thing that is clear is that a vast amount of intrigue is going on behind the scenes, but in the long run, I cannot see anything coming out of it all, as none of these people trust each other round the corner. Were I to hazard a guess, it would still be that the present Ministry will be defeated on the budget proposals and the alternative will then lie between Congress or Section 93³.

3. Jinnah went on to tell me some of his plans for consolidating the Muslim League throughout India and how he is doing his utmost to awaken the Mohammadans to the necessity of standing on their own feet more than they do now. His policy is to preach communalism morning, noon and night and to endeavour to net Mohammadans to found more schools; to open purely Mohammadan Hospitals, Children's Homes etc., and to teach them generally "to stand on their own feet and make themselves independent of the Hindus." He assures me that he is as keen as ever to work Provincial Autonomy and more firmly than ever against Federation.

1. B.R. Ambedkar (1893-1956); Member, Bombay (Simon Commission) Provincial Committee and Lothian Committee on India Franchise; delegate to RTC; Member, Governor-General's Executive Council, 1941; drafted India's Constitution; leader of Untouchables in India, Minister for Law, India, 1947, resigned, 1951; converted to Buddhism along with a large number of his followers and advised Scheduled Castes to convert themselves to Buddhism.

2. Jamnadas Mehta (1884-1955); a Congressman and railway trade union leader; representative of the Government of India with the Government of Burma, 1944-46.
3. Under this Section the Governor could assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercised by any Provincial body or authority.

86

*The Congress Socialist**Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, pp. 626-627*

5 June, 1937

The annals of repression of the past few months in our country show that the Socialists have become, for the Government of India, the latest "Public Enemy No. 1." The increasing influence of the Socialists in the national movement, the militant peasant and labour movements they are organising and leading, the awakening and mobilisation of the masses that their work and ideas have made the Government apprehensive. The Socialist technique of revolution offers possibly the most decisive challenge imperialism has had got to face so far. The old game of fostering communalism and developing provincialism is not likely to work any longer—these fissures are closing up with the growth of the socialist movement. The Government is, therefore, devising a new plan of divide and rule. Socialism is a revolutionary movement based on class struggle. The Government seeks to combat its growing influence by rallying together those who abhor revolution and class conflicts. This is the well tried method in Europe, the arch exponents of which have been maniacs like Hitler¹ and Mussolini.² As president Nehru has repeatedly asserted imperialism is the colonial expression of Fascism.

2. But the new technique of the Government was fully developed by that doyen among imperialists, Lord Hailey.³ In a recent speech he said: "You cannot so suddenly re-organise society as to remove the danger of the appeal which this movement (socialism) can make. True, but you could make it politically innocuous if you could once bring into parliamentary system that large number of those members of the Congress to whom those ideas must be as unwelcome as they are to us."

3. The Government's first concern then, is to rally together the reactionist. And then with the bogey of socialism to split the nationalist forces use the nationalist forces to fight and destroy the nascent socialist movement. Acceptance of offices by the Congress is to be the first move in the direction. By chaining the Congress to constitutionalism, the revolutionaries are to be isolated, and then pulverised. Will the nationalist forces allow such a split to occur? Will they play this role?

4. The suppression of the developing socialist movement will cripple the nationalist movement. It will be robbed of its most dynamic content. Like the Chinese "nationalists" the Indian "nationalists" will get tied to the apron strings of imperialism. Such a split will strengthen imperialism, weaken nationalism. The Socialists do not desire any split in the nationalist forces—they seek to create the broadest based anti-

imperialist front. They demand only condition and that is allegiance to direct action and rejection of constitutionalism—the only course that is worthy of the revolutionary traditions of our National Congress. “Today they do not make Socialism the issue before the country—they merely seek to realise freedom of the country, the very *sine qua non* for the masses to come into their own. They demand of the nationalist an unswerving allegiance to direct action—their path leads to victory. The Government seeks to draw the nationalist forces in its net of constitutionalism, and Gandhiji’s latest statement shows that it may catch the fish, and that way lies frittering away of our achievements, dissipation of our destiny.

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1. Adolf Hitler (1889-1945); Leader of the Nazi Party and Dictator of Germany from 1933-45; author of *Mein Kampf*.
 2. Mussolini (1883-1945); Fascist Dictator of Italy from 1923 till his death.
 3. William Malcolm Hailey (1872-1969); Governor of Punjab, 1924-28 and of United Provinces, 1928-30 and 1931; Member of Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations, 1935-38.

87

Gandhiji to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, I, p. 46

6 June, 1937

Bhai Rajendra Prasad,

2. Have you read my interview that appeared in *The Times of India* regarding the acceptance of office? My views are stated there. However, we may tone down our conditions, but, if even then they are not accepted we should refuse to form Ministries. This is my firm opinion but it may be overlooked if the opinion and experience of the leaders of the six Provinces differ from mine.

I hope you are well.

With blessings,
BAPU

88

Rajendra Prasad to Kripalani

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. G.-65/1937

P.O. ZIRADAI, DIST. SARAN, 10 June, 1937

My Dear Kripalaniji,

As regards Mr. Jinnah’s statement I am surprised to read it. The terms that were

ultimately evolved were entirely accepted by me and I offered to sign any document embodying them and I assured him that he might take my signature as on behalf of the Congress. I told him further that I would get those ratified by the Congress. But he insisted on Pandit Malaviya and Hindu Sabha and Sikh leaders accepting those terms and would not be satisfied with Congress accepting them. So the matter had to be dropped. I do not know if it is worthwhile pursuing this controversy any more. Sardar Vallabhbhai wrote to me that he did not quite like your being drawn into it either. But if you think I should issue a statement, you may issue the portion marked as my statement after finding his statement from the cutting.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana's Article

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 847/44-45

11 June, 1937

The Civil & Military Gazette of June 11, has published an article which visualises the probable developments in connection with the present constitutional deadlock in six Provinces of India. Referring to a question which is likely to create a good deal of interest in political circles, the article says: "The Congress leaders gave their replies to the Governors on the eve of the introduction of the present constitution and nothing has happened since to show that they have changed their minds. Unless, therefore, the Congress leaders take steps to make it clear that they are now prepared, which they were not on April 1, to accept offices on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution, the probability is that they will not be asked to repeat their previous reply. . . . If the Congress leaders take no steps to undo the position to which they committed themselves during their last interviews, the Governors, taking the Congress leaders at their words, consider it unnecessary to summon them again, there will be two alternative courses for the Governors. They may retain the Minority Ministries for another definite term or may take the administration of their provinces into their hands and convert the Ministries into advisers."

Unionist Party's Hope

The delay which has already occurred in the introduction of Provincial Autonomy in six Provinces of India is regrettable enough. None but those who are out to wreck the Constitution will feel anything but sincere regret if Provincial Autonomy in these Provinces receives a further set back such as is visualised in the Civil and Military Gazette articles. We of the Unionist Party wish the majority parties in every Province to assume the responsibility of office as a duty which they owe to the electorate. We particularly wish the Congress to avail itself of the opportunity of carrying out its

economic programme to which it professes to attach great importance. It has been repeatedly stated that the constructive economic programme which the Congress adumbrated in its Election Manifesto, and which it has explained in the course of its resolutions from time to time is, practically speaking, identical with the programme which we are trying to carry out. We should like the Congress to share with us a country-wide campaign in pursuance of this programme. While cherishing this whole-hearted desire, we cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that the Congress is perfectly wrong in shifting to the Governors or to any other party the blame for the present deadlock. If, after the first session of the Legislative Assemblies in those Provinces where the Congress commands majorities, the Constitution is either suspended or Minority Ministries get a fresh lease of life, the responsibility for such a setback to Provincial Autonomy will beset wholly with the Congress.

Hopeless Maze

By adopting the slogan of wrecking the Constitution and by devising an illogical formula as a compromise between the slogan of wrecking and the policy of working the Constitution, the Congress has manoeuvred itself into a hopeless maze. If the Congress leaders, particularly, Mahatma Gandhi, calmly review the main features of the present situation, they will perhaps realise the kind of impression that their self-contradictory policies are creating on disinterested minds. There is no doubt that Mahatma Gandhi holds a large majority of the Congress in his pocket. Mahatma Gandhi says that the suspension of the constitution is the last thing in the world that he desires and is even prepared to give his life in an attempt to avert such a tragedy and its consequences. Yet it is the Mahatma more than anybody else who has been responsible for securing the election of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the Presidentship of the Congress. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's uncompromising hostility to the Constitution embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, and his desire, however dangerous, but nevertheless straightforward and unambiguous, to make it impossible for the Act to function, are no secret to anybody. On the one hand, Mahatma Gandhi tells the British Government that he is prepared to give his life to avoid the suspension of the Constitution and consequent bitterness between India and Britain; on the other hand, he puts Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the Presidential chair of the Congress, keeps him there and allows his slogan of wrecking the Constitution to prevail.

The Dual Policy

What is the explanation of the dual policy? Then, he devises a formula which, if accepted and rigidly applied, would have the effect of giving the Right wing of the Congress power to deal with the minorities as it likes. This Right wing of the Congress represented by Mr. Rajagopalachari, Babu Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and others stands for a certain culture no less than for a certain political policy. This school of thought has no use for those Godless ideals of Bolshevism which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and his comrades have borrowed from Russia. Yet Mahatma Gandhi prevents his real party which commands an overwhelming majority in the Congress, from repudiating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and allows the Pandit to strut on the platform of the Congress as its President and impose

upon it his slogans. Here is a threefold policy, consisting of (1) an offer on behalf of the Right wing of the Congress to the British Government to work the Constitution, (2) an attempt to keep Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in prominence and to allow to go ahead with his extremist slogans of wrecking the Constitution and combating British Imperialism, and (3) a formula which is calculated to turn the minorities in the Congress dominated provinces into political Shudras. To a plain mind this triple policy of Mahatma Gandhi can only signify one thing: Mahatma Gandhi wants power for the Right wing of the Congress for the sake of the culture which it represents. In order to frighten British Imperialism into making terms with him and sharing its power with the Right wing of the Congress, he holds aloft Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as a bogey for the British Government.

A Pawn in the Game

"Give us the power to rule over the minorities. We are prepared to make a bargain with you. If you do not make a bargain with us there is Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who, if the control of the Constitution passes into his hands, will make no compromise with British Imperialism." This can be the only meaning of the triple policy. At any rate this is the only plausible explanation of the puzzle which this policy presents. Poor Jawaharlal Nehru is only a pawn in the game. He is to serve as an inducement to the British Government to make terms with the Mahatma's party. He must, therefore, be kept in prominence. The minorities are politely and blandly to be kept out of the way while making terms over their heads with the British Government. Hence the persistent refusal to talk business with the minorities and the formulas which ignored their existence and their point of view.

The campaign may be very cleverly designed but it suffers from one defect. The minorities sometimes see through the game and refuse to be used like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as helpless pawns in a game of negotiations between the Right wing school of the Congress and the British Government. This upsets the game. We have been watching different phases of this game for several years past. It has never succeeded, and I think, will never succeed. In pursuance of this game the Congress, that is, the Right wing of the Congress has once again been caught in its own snare.

Congress and Minorities

It is time that it made a serious effort to rescue itself from the meshes of this net. It should make up its mind in a straight forward manner about the main issue involved. Does it want to work the Constitution or to perpetuate the present deadlock? If it wants to work the Constitution, as Mahatma Gandhi says it does, it should make up its mind to repudiate the Leftist group and its wild cries of wrecking. Again, does the Right wing of the Congress really want to carry out a constructive programme for the benefit of the masses? If so, it has only to grasp the splendid opportunity that has come its way without wasting its time and energy on meaningless controversies which have absolutely no practical bearing on this issue. Lastly, is the Right wing of the Congress anxious to exercise real political power by turning the special powers of Governors into a dead letter? If so, it should make up its mind to ensure the goodwill and cooperation of the Minority communities in those Provinces where it is

in the majority, instead of insisting on a formula which cannot but create alarm and suspicion in the minds of the minorities.

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*Muslim Chamber of Commerce to Reserve Bank of India**Muslim Chamber of Commerce Papers*

15 June, 1937

I have to acknowledge with thanks your letter No. C.O.R. 558/6-37 dated Bombay the 3 June, 1937.

2. You have mentioned in your letter that the Bank had already taken steps to ensure adequate representation of all communities including the Musalman community on its staff. But I am not in a position to place this matter before my Committee in the absence of facts and figures to substantiate this assertion and I regret very much to note that in the paragraph 2 of your letter you have expressed your inability to furnish me with the information bearing on this point.

I shall, therefore, invite your attention to the resolution of the Government of India in the Home Department No. F. 14-17 B/33 dated Simla, the 4th July, 1934 which has laid down the Government policy regarding recruitment of services. I give below the first paragraph from Section I. ---General. "In accordance with undertakings given in the Legislative Assembly the Government of India have carefully reviewed the results of the policy followed since 1925 of reserving a certain percentage of direct appointments to Government service for the redress of communal inequalities. It has been represented that though this policy was adopted mainly with the object of securing increased representation for Muslims in the public services, it has failed to secure for them their due share of appointments and it has been contended that this position cannot be remedied unless fixed percentage of vacancies is reserved for Muslims. In particular, attention has been drawn to the small number of Muslims in the Railway services, even on those railways which run through areas in which Muslims form a high percentage of the total population.

The review of the position has shown that these complaints are justified, and the Government of India are satisfied by the enquiries they have made that the instructions regarding recruitment must be revised with a view to improving the position of Muslims in the services."

3. In this resolution the Government of India have laid down certain rules for recruitment of services and the principle underlying these rules has been recognised for All India services of the Government of India and it has also been widely followed by Quasi-Government Departments and organisations.

4. I have no authoritative figures to disclose the present number of Musalman employees of the Reserve Bank of India in Calcutta but I am sure that the number of Muslim employees is far below the ratio fixed by the Resolution of the Government

referred to above. It is a matter of vital interest to the commercial community and specially this Chamber as a representative body and I expect that the issue raised by my Committee shall not be disposed of by you in a manner which does not completely satisfy them. If the authorities of the Bank have taken care to ensure adequate representation of the Muslim community on its staff, there should be no difficulty in furnishing me with the number of employees recruited and the proportion of the Musalmans in the various grades of services in the Bank.

5. I need not refer to the very substantial figures of trade and commerce controlled by the Musalmans in this City nor to the fact that Musalmans in Bengal are in majority for the simple reason that these are well-known facts and need not be emphasised here. But they are significant and clearly establish the claim of the Muslim community for maintaining the proportionate ratio in the services.

6. I may be permitted to say that the information at the disposal of the Chamber though not authoritative, does not disclose the satisfactory state of affairs so far as the number of Muslim employees in the Reserve Bank is concerned and the Chamber relying as it does on the Government Resolution has every reason to believe that you will be willing to discuss with us the present position and support the views of the Chamber on this question and evolve a system of recruitment of your staff to meet the Muslim demand in this respect.

7. I do not, however, desire at this stage to enter into a discussion of some complaints received by us regarding promotions and claims of the Muslim employees of the Reserve Bank in the hope that if you are disposed to consider the entire problem from the point of view I have put before you, then it will not be difficult to come to an understanding in regard to such cases.

8. I shall be obliged if you will kindly let me have the information I asked for in my previous letter and also your observations regarding this question with reference to the Government policy laid down in the Resolution referred to above.

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Syed Wazir Hasan's statement

Independent India, 20 June, 1937; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 663-64

Sir Syed Wazir Hasan has advanced a powerful plea for the Muslims joining the Congress and has declared his own resolve to resign from the Muslim League if it does not change its Constitution and decide to join the Congress in its struggle for independence. The remarks of Sir Syed (Wazir Hasan) advocating unity in preference to cooperation deserve the attention not merely of the Muslims but of all other sections and classes in the country. He says, "It will be seen that I have insisted all along upon joining the Congress and have not suggested cooperation. I have reasons for this view. A bare cooperation must always leave services through which adverse influences may creep in and either kill cooperation altogether, or make it so weak as to render it of no value whatsoever. Another

reason is that for the purpose of carrying on political and Constitutional agitation to a successful issue, it is always of immense advantage that there should be one United Front and one platform which is presented by such a powerful, well organised and disciplined body as the Indian National Congress." We wholeheartedly endorse these remarks. We have always held that the Congress should be a union of all anti-imperialist classes and forces in the country. We have always deprecated the idea of any one of those classes standing outside the Congress and merely offering it cooperation. This latter conception weakens the Congress and disrupts the Unity of the anti-imperialist forces. Every class participating in the anti-imperialist struggle will have its independent class organisations for its own specific class purposes but all of them will unite in the Congress for the attainment of the common goal of national independence. That is the only and the surest way of immediately building up a united people's anti-imperialist front.

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*Iqbal to Jinnah**Shamsul Hasan Collection*

LAHORE, 21 June, 1937

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you so much for your letter which I received yesterday. I know you are a busy man; but I do hope you won't mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India and perhaps to the whole of India. I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war which, but for the police and military, would become universal in no time. During the last few months there has been a series of Hindu-Muslim riots in India. In North-West India alone there have been at least three riots during the last three months and at least four cases of vilification of the Prophet by Hindus and Sikhs. In each of these four cases, the vilifier has been murdered. There have also been cases of burning of the Koran in Sind. I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political i.e. the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intimidate Muslims even in the Muslim majority Provinces. And the new Constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority Provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims partly to please those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to reject this Constitution. It seems to me

that the new Constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus. In the Hindu majority Provinces, the Hindus have, of course, absolute majorities and can ignore Muslims altogether. In Muslim majority Provinces the Muslims are made entirely dependent on Hindus. I have no doubt in my mind that this Constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this, it is no solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims.

2. The only thing that the Communal Award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to a people whom this constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them. The Congress President has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, i.e. the Mahasabha, whom I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus, had declared more than once that a United Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguist affinities. Many British statesmen also realise this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots which are rapidly coming in the wake of this Constitution are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country. I remember Lord Lothian told me before I left England that my scheme was the only possible solution of the troubles of India, but that it would take 25 years to come.¹ Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of a North-West India Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading. I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organised and disciplined and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West India would be finally driven to take.

3. To my mind the new Constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim Provinces reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?

4. Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought, at present, to ignore Muslim Minority Provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority and Minority Provinces. It will, therefore, be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority Province. The month of August is bad in Lahore. I think you should seriously consider the advisability of holding the coming session at Lahore in the middle of October when the weather is quite good in Lahore. The interest in the All India Muslim League is rapidly growing in the Punjab, and the holding of the coming session in Lahore is likely to give a fresh political awakening to the Punjab Muslims.

Yours sincerely,
MOHAMMAD IQBAL
Bar-at-Law

1. Philip Henry Kerr Lothian (1882-1940); Liberal Party delegate to the three sessions of the Indian Round Table Conference (1930-32) and Member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1933-34.

93

*Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India to Muslim Chamber of Commerce**Muslim Chamber of Commerce Papers*

Copy of letter No. C.O.R. 654/937-35 dated the 25 June, 1937 from the Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Central Office, Bombay to the Chamber.

With reference to your letter No. G-8/37 of the 15th instant I would point out that as indicated in our previous letter the policy of the Board of the Reserve Bank of India is to regulate recruitment so as to prevent any one class or community having an undue preponderance in any office or category of staff, not to prescribe quotas for the recruitment of particular classes or communities. In these circumstances the Bank regrets that it is unable to furnish you with the figures requested by you.

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*Secretary to the Government of Sind, Home Department to Thorne [Extract]**Home Department (Special), F.H.(S)/37*

SIND SECRETARIAT, KARACHI, 28 June, 1937

SECRET

My dear Thorne,

3. *Communal*: Two further incidents of "Quran burning" occurred at Shikarpur on the 8th and 11th instant but though they caused a certain amount of excitement no disturbances took place.

4. *General*: A Conference styled the "Sind Hindi Conference" was held at Karachi from the 4th to 6th June under the Presidentship of Kaka Kalekar,¹ a Congress leader from Bombay. Speeches were delivered suggesting that Hindi should be made the *lingua franca* of India, and the view was expressed that the result of teaching Hindi to the Muslims would be to bring that community closer to the Hindus. The local Congress Committee helped the conference in every way.

5. Another conference called the 'Hindu Panchayats Conference' attended by about 200 persons was held at Karachi from the 5th to the 7th June under the Presidentship of Diwan Bahadur Hiranand Khemsing, M.L.A. with a view to devise ways and means for protecting Hindu interests. Amongst the decisions arrived at were: (1) the formation of a central body styled the 'Karachi Hindu Central Panchayat'

in order to bring the Hindus of the city together and create spirit of cooperation among the various Panchayats and Associations of Karachi.

2. The formation of a central Hindu Panchayat consisting of two representatives of every existing Hindu Panchayat Association; (3) the formation of a Hindu Volunteer Corps in the city of Karachi for the protection of the Hindu community.

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1. Kaka Kalelkar, Member of the Committee headed by Dr. Zakir Hussain Committee for preparing a planned syllabus. The report of this Committee is called the Wardha Scheme.

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Khaliquzzaman to Nehru [Extract]

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. G 61/1937

29 June, 1937

Thanks for your letter.³ It is so kind of you to have pointed out to me the objectionable nature of some of the leaflets that have been issued under my signature along with others. I hope you will not find it difficult to believe when I say that I neither know the contents of any one of them, nor the dates of their issue. I cannot, however, disown my responsibility as the Secretary of the League Board for anything that is done in its name. I shall not, in future, allow my name to be associated to anything which has not been approved by me. I frankly tell you that the whole affair is so distasteful to me that I have refused to go to the constituency.

2. I think, however, that the fight in this constituency is only a side issue to the main question. The problem of religious minorities has been difficult of solution in every country but in our own country it is distinctly more so because of the existence of a powerful third party. After 20 years of service to the Congress in my own humble way, when I associated myself with the League, I did it with the express intention of rooting out the baneful influence of the Muslim reactionary group which was successfully resisting the growth of patriotism among the Muslims by raising the communal issues meant more to help their own cause and the British Imperialism than to advance the Muslim cause. In this effort, I had not only to sacrifice my energy and money but also my profession. I took care, at every step, to avoid conflict with the Congress, and expected fullest possible support from it, thinking that though the method of fighting the reactionary forces was indirect, it was all the same calculated to raise the standard of political thought in the Muslim community generally. In my fight within the League I succeeded to a great measure but my success was soon converted into a defeat when I found that I had failed to convince the Congress of the utility of this indirect method of dealing with the Muslim question. My position in consequence of this has become simply pitiable. Having sought election on the League ticket, I feel I am honour bound to stand by it so long as I have not made up my mind to throw away that ticket and seek re-election. Apart from my own personal

question it is a matter which concerns many other friends and co-workers, who find themselves in this predicament. Besides this I cannot help feeling that the policy of direct approach to the Muslim voter will only tend to stiffen the back of the opposition and give a longer lease of life to the reactionaries. Already I find that there is not only more life and bustle in the reactionary camp but the work of organisation is also being taken seriously in hand, as would appear from the reports in the Press. Though the Congress and the League have existed as separate organisations, for a long time, still never before there was such keen a rivalry between them for association with the Muslim masses. The conclusion to which I am driven is that there is a fundamental difference between the nature of the activity within and without the legislatures. So long as the Congress stoutly refused to enter the legislatures, or consider the possibility of acceptance of offices, there was neither the desire nor the necessary impetus to the League to offer any organised opposition with the Congress activities, but in the present programme of the Congress it is felt that there is a possibility of the Congress accepting offices and becoming itself the Government of the Province for all practical purposes. There is nothing wrong in the acceptance of offices by the Congress if it is considered to be in the benefit of the country, but it is certain that there being no political parties worth the name, the opposition if any, will only come from the minority groups particularly in Provinces where the majority group is very strong. Every party would in these circumstances covet every seat in the Legislature and the fight will necessarily be bitter.

3. I have frankly and honestly given you my own estimate of things, but unfortunately I am not today in a position to offer any advice on these problems. The question with which I am more concerned these days is a personal one. I am torn between two loyalties. I have not yet been able to find a solution, but even if I could discover one that would not solve the bigger questions. In fact my fears are that the issues may become more confounded. I have often dispassionately thought of the League without me, but I could never believe that it would in that event be in any way poorer for the League. In fact I know that there is an undercurrent running which aims at the severance of my connection with that body to enable the opposite group to have a clear hand in shaping its policy.

4. Therefore, I look up to you both as the Head of a mighty organization and the leader of thought in India, to find out some solution for this problem. With the influence that you command in both the communities and your personal charm, you can yet stem the tide and save the Provinces from becoming an armed camp. I know you have in your possession opinions of other Muslims also to the contrary but still I venture to claim that my views do deserve consideration at your hands.

5. Recently both Rafi and Mohan Lal had a talk with me about the position of the League Members in case the Congress decided to accept offices. I have made the same offer to them as I made to you when we met last. They wanted to know from me as to what would happen if the League party refused to accept my lead. I have told them that in that event the League Party would certainly go against the declared policy of the Parliamentary Board as contained in its manifesto, and I will have no hesitation in fighting another election on that issue, though I am confident that I shall be able to carry the party with me on this matter. Lastly I wish to assure you that my

regard and devotion to you is as great as ever. It is only irony of fate and coincidence of event that I am debarred from actively associating myself with some of the activities which are so dear to you. I hope events will so shape themselves soon that I shall be allowed to pursue my line of thought and action more freely. . . .

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1. Nehru's letter of 27 June in which Nehru referred to the Bundelkhand bye-election when a statement, signed by six or seven persons including Khaliquzzaman, was issued supporting the Muslim League candidate.

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Nehru to A.G. Kher [Extract]

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. G. 61/1937

ALLAHABAD, 30 June, 1937

My dear Kher,

3. I am sure you realise the great importance of Sherwanis¹ election. It has become a test election for us and its consequences are going to be far-reaching, both from the political point of view and the communal.² Therefore, every Congressman must make it a point of honour to do his utmost in this connection. For a victory for us in this would indeed be a triumph for the Congress and our cause. This is not at all a personal individual affair. I hope you and all our colleagues in Bundelkhand will set to work in earnest and make the whole place hum.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. N.A.K. Sherwani (1887-1956); joined the Congress in 1921; defeated in the election to the Provincial Assembly 1937; Elected Member, U.P. Assembly, 1946; Minister of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in U.P., 1946-51.
 2. The reference seems to be to the *Khilafat* dated 25 June, 1937 which read, "Musalmans should unite among themselves as they have been ordered to do by God and His Prophet to support the Muslim League candidate to give a crushing reply to the Non-Muslim organisation."



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*Fakhruddin Peerzada to Jayaprakash Narayan⁶ [Extract]**Jayaprakash Narayan Papers,*

MULTAN DIST., 30 June, 1937

My dear Mr. Narain,

If you are the Narain of Iowa and Chicago, U.S.A. read this note, otherwise throw it in the wastepaper-basket and do not spend your valuable time on it. I am Mr. Din of Iowa and Chicago etc., if you can respect (recollect).

5. In spite of all its claims to be "National" I still believe Congress to be based on purely communal ideas and interest. Why to wreck the present constitution because it grants rights to Muslims in the Provinces in which they hold majority. The Hindus consider it their birth right to get what they can get and strive for more. Good and well so far. But as soon as similar rights or privileges are given to the Muslims, they begin to cry, hold protest meetings and observe hartals and misname their activities as National on the strength of firstly, their majority in the country and secondly Congress. Congress is a good cloak and they know how to use it for their integrity. No doubt, Congress today is the leading force in India and is winning its favourite from all quarters but I am afraid the bombshell must burst as soon as the sweetened jealousies of the Congress become apparent and put a brake to the Congress wheel. It is better to live and let live but the Congress must monopolize the entire control to itself.

Wish you all that is best in life .

Yours sincerely,
(Mr. Din) FAKHRUDDIN PEERZADA,
Leader, Mailsi

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1. Jayaprakash Narayan (1902); one of the founders of the Congress Socialist Party, 1934; Member, Congress Working Committee, 1936; leading member for sometime of the Socialist Party and of the Praja Socialist Party; served as President, All India Railwaymen's Federation and All India Posts and Telegraph Employee's Union; launched Sarvodaya Movement.

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*Nehru to Khaliquzzaman**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 141-144*

ALLAHABAD, 1 July, 1937

My dear Khaliq,

I have your letter of the 29th. I have read it carefully and it seems to me that there

is a great difference between what you say in this letter and what you told me when we met. It is difficult to discuss this matter properly in a letter and, therefore, I do not propose to do so. It is obvious that the problem of a Minority, religious or otherwise, is always a difficult one and we must apply ourselves to its solution. But behind this Minority problem there is yet another—the conflict between the progressive elements and the reactionary elements. The line of action that this appealed to you in the past and seems to appeal to you now is to associate yourself with the communal and reactionary elements in order to make them more progressive and less communal. This may be in theory occasionally a possible policy but all our past experience in India has shown that it ends in one thing—the absorption of the progressive in the reactionary group. It astonishes me to survey this process going on during the last dozen years or so. Today it has arrived at its culminating point and the attitude of the Muslim League is more intensively communal than I could have conceived possible for any organisation. I have no doubt that you were not responsible for the working of the various notices and leaflets that have been issued in Bundelkhand. But the fact remains that some of them are issued above your name. That is the pity of it. Today in the eyes of the public you must inevitably stand for the extreme limit of communalism and political reaction. I know you do not feel that way but circumstances have forced you to act in that way.

2. You are perfectly right in saying that there is more life and bustle in the reactionary camp than there has been in the past. Is that not inevitable when a doomed policy tries to protect itself by all means, fair or foul? And in this attempt to protect itself it has to stoop to highly undesirable methods because it cannot meet the other party in the field of argument. These are always the signs of the fading away of a group which has ceased to have any meaning in real politics.

3. The identical process has taken place in the political field with the growth of the national movement in India. The reactionaries have joined hands and tried to form a joint front between themselves and British imperialism. Are we then to give up our national movement or to tone it down because reactionaries get frightened and organised?

4. The Bundelkhand election has a certain temporary value but after all, it is a small affair and will pass. The Muslim League has a perfect right to put up a candidate to represent its policy. It is not that I object to it but the astounding notices that are coming show the depths to which the League has fallen. Even Jinnah has no other argument left in a political contest but to appeal in the name of Allah and the Holy Koran. A community, majority or minority, which adopts such tactics is in a poor way. Fortunately there are many Muslims who do not adopt these tactics and they will serve their community as well as the larger cause far better. I am rather glad that this Bundelkhand election has thrown this flashlight on the real conflict. That conflict has nothing to do with the minority questions but is a political conflict. On the one side there is progressive thought in action and every desire to solve the minority problem fairly and in cooperation with those concerned. On the other there is sheer communalism, religious bigotry and political reaction. When such clear conflicts occur, people have to choose definitely on which side of the barricade they will be. They cannot remain in the manger. So far as the world is concerned you seem to

have chosen the side of reaction and communalism. If I am grieved at this am I to blame? From day to day our fight continues and while people talk of offices and the Ministries, our young men—Hindu and Muslim—go to prison. The world hovers at the brink of catastrophe and the Muslim League under its brave leadership, talks in terms of four hundred years ago.

5. Is the League a democratic organisation or is it not just a close preserve of certain individuals? Why should I accept it as the representative of the Muslims of India when I know it represents the handful of Muslims at the top who deliberately seek refuge in the name of religion to avoid discussing mass problems? I have certain measure of intelligence and I have studied political, economic and allied problems. Am I to insult my intelligence by talking baby-talk of an age gone by? You know what has happened in the Muslim countries of the West, in Turkey and Iran and Egypt and Palestine and Syria. You know also what Muslims there think of communalism and all its work. Do you not see that this communal policy which the Muslim League here has fathered is a policy more injurious to the Muslims of India than anything that a majority could do would be? It is a doomed policy both from the point of view of the community and the larger world, but unhappily people get wrapped up in little things, in the affairs of the moment, and do not see whither the world is going. It is quite possible that the Muslim League may win a few elections, may rouse up some of the Muslim masses in the name of Islam and the Koran. But is that the way to build up the strength of the Muslim minority in the country or to make it play an effective part in the shaping of India's destiny?

6. I have given more thought to this problem in India than to any other. I know that it is a difficult problem just as every real problem in life is difficult. I shall do my utmost to help in its solution with the goodwill of all parties concerned. You know me well enough. I hope you realise that personal prestige and the like do not come in my way much. But I cannot have dealings with political reaction, because that means a surrender of all my principles and a divorce from the realities of the situation.

7. Is it not a strange thing that in this conflict men like Wazir Hasan and Maulana Hussain Ahmad should be ranged on the progressive side and that you should be on the side of the reactionaries? It is not a question of associating yourself with my views or all my activities. Wazir Hasan has not done so. Far from it. But there should be a certain integrity about our politics in public life and if we ally ourselves with those who have not got this integrity, inevitably we suffer from this alliance.

8. I am quite sure that I have your affection and good wishes as you have mine. I also feel that at the back of your mind you must largely agree with me. And yet fate has worked that you are working with and helping people against your own wishes and conviction and thus aiding the cause of reaction and bigotry in India.

10. Indu will be going back to Europe in September. I am going to Wardha today. I shall come back to Allahabad, from Wardha, about the 8th or the 9th.

Yours affectionately,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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*Jinnah's Statement**The Bombay Chronicle*

2 July, 1937

"My attention has been drawn to the statement issued by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru from Allahabad dated 30 June to the effect that I have issued an appeal addressed to the voters of Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpur Muslim Rural Constituency where a bye-election is taking place for the Provincial Legislative Assembly. I have issued no statement of any kind whatever up to the present moment; nor have I seen the contents of the alleged statement which is attributed to me. I maintain what I have often said that the All India Muslim League is a political organisation and we stand by the policy and programme and basic principles enunciated by the All India Muslim League."

2. "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru says, that every person is entitled to preach and advocate the policy and programme of his party. But may I point out to him that a large body of Congressmen and a section of Congress Press instead of placing before the public the policy and programme of the Congress and attacking and criticising the policy and the programme of the Muslim League are resorting to misrepresentation and vilification of the Muslim League and all those who are connected with it by giving out slogans and catch-words such as that the Muslim League and all those connected with it stand for the allies of the British imperialistic power, that they are against national freedom and that they are all toadies and flunkies. I am personally attacked in a large section of the Press and it is made out that I am the greatest enemy of India, a rank communalist, that I stand unmasked in my true colours and that I am making a bid for leadership of the Musalmans."

3. "Is this the way of explaining to the people the policy and programme of the Congress? Is this how the Congress propose to establish mass contact with Muslims? In my opinion this policy of mass contact with Musalmans by Congress is fraught with very serious consequences. There is plenty of scope for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to improve his own people, the Hindus, as there is a lot of undesirable elements amongst them. Similarly the Muslim League should do the same thing as there are plenty of undesirable elements among the Musalmans."

4. "Coming back to the question of personal attack I shall give an instance. No less a person than the Secretary of the Indian Congress gave an interview to the Press. The interview is crooked, disingenuous and totally untrue. Mr. Kripalani in his statement dated May 19 said, 'Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points (one would have thought they were exhausted) having been granted by the foreign Government and guaranteed by the Congress, unless Musalmans relinquished them voluntarily, may we ask what more is needed?' I ask Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru if it is true that the Congress has guaranteed the fourteen points of the Muslims."

5. Mr. Kripalani referred to my Bombay speech of May 21, in which I said that in 1935 I spent four or five weeks holding conferences with Babu Rajendra Prasad,

the then President of the Indian National Congress, trying to get the Muslim point of view accepted at least by the Congress leaders, if not by Hindu Mahasabhaites. But I did not succeed. With reference to this speech I am accused that I have a short memory and in support of this accusation the Congress Secretary relied on a Press message as his authority. Surely a man who has risen to the position of the Secretary of the Indian National Congress ought to know better than rely on Press reports. The statement which I made in my speech is absolutely true and I repeat it.

6. "At times it is very difficult to say who are Congress leaders and who are Mahasabha leaders, for the line of demarcation between the two with regard to a large number of them is very thin indeed."

7. "Neither Babu Rajendra Prasad nor I had any authority to come to a binding agreement, as the talks were naturally subject to confirmation by the Congress and the Muslim League. Babu Rajendra tried to ascertain the consensus of opinion among Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders regarding the formula which he himself had approved but it was found that not only the Hindu Mahasabha leaders rejected it out of hands but even a certain section of influential Congress leaders were deadly opposed to the formula, which, therefore, had to be dropped, as it was useless to proceed further." (A.P.)

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Nehru's Statement

The Bombay Chronicle

5 July, 1937

Wardha, 3 July, 1937. Mr. Jinnah has denied having issued any statement to the Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpur Muslim voters such as I referred to. I am glad to have his denial. But the Khilafat newspaper gives prominence to such a statement and various other newspapers have published English translations of it. I understand that this statement with Mr. Jinnah's name attached to it is being distributed in Bundelkhand. I would suggest that Mr. Jinnah might find out who is responsible for this misuse of his name and should dissociate himself from the statement in question.

2. Mr. Jinnah complains of misrepresentation of the Muslim League and of himself by many Congressmen and by the Congress Press. May I point out to him that there is no such thing as the Congress Press in the sense that the Congress owns or controls a newspaper? But if there is any misrepresentation on the part of anyone I am sorry for it and I shall gladly help in removing it if he will point out what and where it is.

3. To call the Muslim League politically reactionary is a matter of opinion and Mr. Jinnah cannot grudge us the liberty of holding to that opinion. It may be that our standards are different, but surely Mr. Jinnah will not deny that many prominent members of the League have quite a remarkable record of reactionary political activity

and of alliance with British imperialism against the Indian freedom movement.

4. Mr. Jinnah has again told us that the Congress policy of Mass Contact with Mussalmans is fraught with very serious consequences. Why the endeavour of a political organisation to enrol members should have such dire consequences I do not know. Surely that is the first function of every organisation and as I have said previously, I think I would welcome the Muslim League enrolling members for its own programme and policy. Apparently it does not believe in enrolling members or in any kind of mass contacts. The objection, therefore, is to mass contacts as such and not so much to the Congress having them. May I point out to Mr. Jinnah again that this is no new policy for the Congress? During the last seventeen years there has been no period when the Muslim membership of the Congress has not been counted by thousands and tens of thousands. We do not keep separate communal records of members; for us a Muslim or a Hindu member stands on the same footing. But if Mr. Jinnah desires to compare the Congress Muslim membership with the membership of the Muslim League, I can have the necessary statistics gathered together. I imagine he will find that the number of Muslim members of the Congress is enormously greater than the total membership of the Muslim League.

5. I am advised by Mr. Jinnah to improve my own people, the Hindus. Not being religiously or communally inclined, I venture to think of my people as the Indian people as a whole and I act on the political and economic plane. I seldom think, unless I am forced to, of the religious persuasions of people. In my Congress work I have to deal from day to day with colleagues and comrades who are Hindus and Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, Buddhists and Jews, and others who attach no religious label to themselves. May I also add that I am not at present to improve anybody, although no doubt improvement is often desirable. That improvement will follow on an extensive scale when freedom comes, and, therefore, I am primarily interested in Indian freedom and the removal of the poverty and exploitation of India's millions.

6. Mr. Jinnah refers to an interview given by Mr. Kripalani. My colleague is not here and I have not this interview with me but I shall answer the question put to me. The Congress has not agreed to or guaranteed Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points. But the Congress has said that it seeks a change in the Communal Award in cooperation with and with the goodwill of the parties concerned, including Muslims. That is obviously what Mr. Kripalani meant.

7. Another statement of Mr. Kripalani is objected to. This relates to what happened during the conversation between Babu Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Jinnah two years ago. I was not in India then and have no personal knowledge, but Mr. Kripalani was in constant touch with developments. The quotation which he gives is not from a Press report but from the official Congress publications issued at the time. To verify this matter still further, reference was made to Babu Rajendra Prasad himself. Rajendra Babu stated that not only did he himself agree to the formula drawn up during those conversations, but as President of the Congress, he assured Mr. Jinnah of his ability to get it accepted and passed by the Congress. Mr. Jinnah, however, insisted on having the adherence and signatures of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and some leaders of

the Hindu Mahasabha. This additional agreement could not be obtained. There can be no doubt whatever that, if Mr. Jinnah had so desired at the time, Rajendra Babu would have secured the assent of the Congress to the formula.¹

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1. The formula was intended to be a substitute to replace the Communal Award and when it was found that it did not have the backing of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs and it was dropped.

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Rajendra Prasad's rejoinder to Jinnah

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. G-65/1937

11 July, 1937

I have read Mr. Jinnah's statement of July 3. In the conversations which I had with Mr. Jinnah in 1935 we were able to evolve a formula. I accepted it not only in my personal capacity, but as the President of the Congress and offered to have it ratified by the Congress. I was keeping in touch with prominent Congressmen while the conversations were going on and had received universal support for it from them. There were several members of the Congress Working Committee at Delhi at the time and they were in full agreement with me. There was absolutely no difference among Congressmen and I was successful in obtaining the support of the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha of the Punjab also. But Mr. Jinnah insisted on having the signature of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and other leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha. This I was unable to secure and the matter had to be dropped. It was not dropped because Congressmen were not agreeable but because those leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha on whose signature Mr. Jinnah insisted were not agreeable. It is not correct to say even that a certain section of influential Congress leaders was deadly opposed to the formula which, therefore, had to be dropped.

2. I had gone further and told Mr. Jinnah that the Congress and the League should accept the formula and the Congress would fight those Hindus who were opposed to it as it had fought them during the recent Assembly elections quite successfully in most of the Provinces. But this was not considered enough by Mr. Jinnah and as it was impossible to fulfil his demand that the Hindu Mahasabha should also join the matter had to be dropped. I dare say that Mr. Jinnah will himself recall all this conversation if he charges his memory a little. I kept full notes of the conversations from day to day and they are in the Congress office.



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*Nehru to Gandhi**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. G. 61/1937*

13 July, 1937

Sherwani's election is an uncertain affair. One thing can be said, that the majority either way is likely to be small. The electorate is 7500. Probably 5000 will vote and I imagine that the majority will be less than 500. Probably much less. The major fact against us is a question of caste brotherhood. The Muslim League candidate is a Malkhan Rajput and 25 per cent of the total electorate consists of these Malkhan Rajputs. These people in a caste panchayat have decided to support the Muslim League candidate and they have even gone so far as to threaten with various pains and penalties those members of the brotherhood who vote against their candidate. These people are so frightened of this caste order that they dare not even come out of their houses to our meetings. They simply keep away. This is a solid bloc of votes and we have so far been unable to touch them.

2. Then, of course, there is the cry of Islam in danger and this is being exploited to the uttermost by Shaukat Ali and some others. As a matter of fact we have had all the better of the argument and we have produced quite a galaxy of Muslim leaders including men like Maulana Husain Ahmad and other Ulemas to support Sherwani. The general feeling among the better class Muslims is entirely in favour of Sherwani. The peasantry as a rule is also in his favour except for the Malkhani Rajputs. The whole electorate is very backward, politically speaking. Whatever the result of the election, it has been a great success from our point of view in awakening the Muslim masses there and large number of Muslims of the middle classes have volunteered for help to Sherwani. Students of Aligarh have come of their own accord to help him. Altogether the atmosphere created by this election not only in the constituency but in the U.P. generally is good. There is considerable resentment at the exploitation of religious and at the backwardness of the Muslim masses who can be misled in this way.

3. There are, of course, elements of trouble in the constituency in the sense that Shaukat Ali and others are always talking in terms of trouble. Shaukat Ali continually refers to a possible civil war. He has said that he will make a Spain of India and so on and so forth. His language sometimes is astonishingly vulgar. All this may delude some people. But it has produced the strong reaction among the thinking Muslims against him. Many people who were half-hearted in their support of the Congress are now much stronger and more determined.

4. Yesterday at Orai I had a slightly unpleasant experience. As I was coming back in a car from Jalaun accompanied by Mahmud and two others, suddenly a group of little boys, hardly more than six or seven years of age, headed by two grown ups with the Muslim League flags, tried to stop our car and then threw stones at it. A window pane was broken, but no one was hurt. Such incidents, small in themselves, create excitement. However, I treated it lightly and I believe the excitement passed.

Some of our Muslim colleagues there were very angry and wanted to demand police action. But I stopped this.

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*Pant to Nehru [Extract]**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. XIX*

LUCKNOW, 19 July, 1937

My dear Jawaharlalji,

3. I am eager to meet you in order to settle whatever is still outstanding, but do not see any way of escape from Lucknow at present when we are just getting into the saddle and there are so many problems facing us.

I am really perplexed and do not see any solution as there is no prospect of your coming here or in the neighbourhood till the 26th. The Muslim League being practically out of the field now, we have to find out a competent and dependable member from that community. Ibrahim¹ is perfectly reliable but it does not look to me dignified enough to offer him this office in the present circumstances. It looks like a bait and may even lower him in public estimation. I too have received a telegram from Maulana Hussain Ahmad asking me to wait for his arrival before taking any final decision as regards the selection of another Muslim Member of the Cabinet. He is probably thinking of pressing the claim of Ibrahim. I have already expressed my feelings candidly to some of the advocates of Ibrahim and they seem to be satisfied with what I told them. The cabinet now cannot possibly be smaller than seven and I am not sure if two Muslims out of seven will be regarded as being adequate by the communal minded Muslims. With our differences with the Muslim League all these matters are likely to come in for adverse criticism. On the other hand, a Cabinet of nine looks much too large.

6. Maulana Halim² had spoken to me bitterly against the Muslim League on Saturday. He came to me again last evening and told me that he had changed his opinion as having come to know of the terms on which the arrangement was based he had revised his opinion. He seemed now to be equally enthusiastic the other way. I expressed my helplessness and told him that if he was particularly keen he could see you.

Yours affectionately,
G.B. PANT

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1. Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim (1889-1964); joined Swaraj Party, Member, U.P. Council, 1926, and U.P. Assembly, 1937-39; Minister, U.P. Government, 1937-39, and again from 1946 to 1958; Minister of Irrigation and Power, Government of India, 1958-63; Governor of Punjab, 1964.
 2. Maulana Halim, refers to Abdul Halim Sidiqi (1889-1969); leader of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind in U.P.

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*Pant to Nehru**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. XIX*

LUCKNOW, 20 July, 1937

My dear Jawaharlalji,

Maulana Halim, in spite of his promise, did not turn up in the evening, with the result that the letter that I had written out yesterday has remained lying here so far.

Habib-ur-Rahman saw me this morning and he is now proceeding to Allahabad to meet you. He had brought a letter for me from Husain Ahmad and will be giving you a similar message from him. He is very keen on Ibrahim being included in the Cabinet. I have in fact no difficulty except this that it has an ugly look of indecent exploitation of the situation. That may not have been Ibrahim's motive but uncharitable critics will find enough of material to attack Ibrahim as well as the Congress on this score. He is so far the solitary member of the Congress who has deserted the League on whose ticket he was elected and his selection as a Minister can be easily connected with the breach of the Muslim ticket which alone has enabled him to transfer his allegiance from the League to the Congress. The *Ulamas* who have thrown their lot with us will not apparently be satisfied if another person is selected in his place. His exclusion is likely to be resented by them.

P.S. If Ibrahim resigns his seat and seeks re-election a solution can be found. In the meantime he can join the Cabinet.

Yours affectionately,
G.B. PANT

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*Nehru's statement**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 164-65*

20 July, 1937. Mr. M.A. Jinnah's methods of controversy get curiouser and curiouser. In his latest statement he has referred triumphantly to a statement issued by some members of the Nationalist Party in Bengal. What is the issue between us? Mr. Jinnah stated that even the Congress refused to agree to the formula evolved by him and Rajendra Babu during their Delhi conversations two years ago. It is admitted that Babu Rajendra Prasad agreed to this formula. It is further clear that Rajendra Babu, the then President of the Congress, assured Mr. Jinnah that he could get the Congress as an organisation to accept it, and he did so after consulting several members of the Working Committee who were in

Delhi at the time. Rajendra Babu deliberately took that responsibility on himself and if Mr. Jinnah knew anything of the Congress, he must have realized that Rajendra Babu could deliver the goods so far as the Congress was concerned. It is true that Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and some members of the Bengal Nationalist Party did not accept that formula. But it is equally true that their opposition would not have prevented the Congress from accepting. Mr. Jinnah will remember that the Bengal Nationalist Party was opposing the Congress in many matters and indeed had run candidates in opposition to Congress candidates during the elections to the Central Assembly. Therefore, for Mr. Jinnah to say that even the Congress rejected that formula is entirely incorrect and I am surprised that he does not appreciate this patent fact. The Congress would have certainly accepted it on the recommendation of its President and the Working Committee. But Mr. Jinnah wanted the Nationalist Party also to agree. This they would not do and Rajendra Babu had no authority to speak for them. Because of this Mr. Jinnah did not consider it worth while to proceed with the matter, although Rajendra Babu was perfectly prepared to place it before the Congress and get its formal assent. This is the sequence of events and if Mr. Jinnah will consider it carefully, he will no doubt realise that his statements on this issue have been far from correct and that he has been doing an injustice not only to those whom he has sought to criticise, but also to himself.

2. This is past history, but the present holds us, and I am still waiting to know what Mr. Jinnah's reactions are to the methods adopted on behalf of the Muslim League in the recent Bundelkhand election. He has denied the notice issued in his name. Does he also disagree with its contents? If not, may I presume that this is his and the Muslim League's political platform. My visit to Bundelkhand has enlightened me greatly as to how communal organisations run elections and the notices and other material that we have collected will no doubt be of value to the future historian.

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Nehru to Rajendra Prasad

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 165-71

ALLAHABAD, 21 July, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter about Orissa affairs. I have been wanting to write to you for the last four days about a curious situation that has arisen here but as the urgency seemed to pass, I delayed writing. I shall now put you briefly in possession of the facts.

2. During the general elections in the U.P. there was not much conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League. It was the desire of both parties to avoid a conflict as much as possible and to accommodate each other. In the early stages of

the election campaign a number of Muslims who were more or less Congressmen were doubtful if they would stand on behalf of the Congress or the League. If they had been pressed to do so they would have probably stood on the Congress ticket. But as there was no such pressure they drifted gradually to the League side under the vague impression that it was much the same thing. The League election board in the U.P. was a curious affair. There were some fairly good and old Congressmen in it, there were hopeless reactionaries and there were middling people who drifted hither and thither.

3. As we looked upon the election campaign it was a tussle with the Agriculturist Party¹ which was a wholly Government party of big zamindars. The League also was opposing them and so inevitably our opposition to the League weakened. We did not want to split the forces opposed to pure reaction.

4. I did not know much about all this and had practically nothing to do with it. As the election campaign developed and strength became apparent, some Muslims came to us wanting to stand on our ticket. But they were not obviously desirable from the Congress point of view and we allowed matters to drift, although we began to regret not having run more Congress Muslim candidates.

5. There was no kind of arrangement between the U.P. Congress and the League, but a kind of convention developed. In one or two instances we opposed League candidates and came near to success.

6. During the election campaign the outstanding and most powerful worker on behalf of the League was Maulana Husain Ahmad who has always been very near to the Congress. During my tours where there was no Congress Muslim candidate, I usually supported the League candidate if he was not an obvious reactionary, as sometimes he was.

7. After the elections there was a tussle inside the League and the reactionary elements seemed to gain the upper hand. Relations between the U.P. League became more strained. During the convention at Delhi this matter was discussed by us with the Jamiat leaders who had so far supported the League fully but who were now worried at the reactionary turn it was taking.

8. After the convention the U.P. League board became even more reactionary and its President, the Raja of Salemur,² joined the interim Ministry. This created a crisis in the League which resulted in the resignation of many members from its Parliamentary Board. Among those who resigned was Maulana Husain Ahmad. Most of those who resigned were not M.L.A.'s but one M.L.A. Hafiz Ibrahim, also resigned and formally joined the Congress party. There were at least four or five other M.L.A.'s in the League group who were keen on joining the Congress party but who for various reasons refrained at the time.

9. During the months that followed there was much controversy between the two groups of Muslims—those of the League and those who had resigned and their sympathizers who were supporting the Congress. Bitterness grew, the success of the Congress appeal to the Muslim masses irritated the Muslim Leaguers. So matters stood and the distance between the League and the Congress went on widening. This came to a head in the recent Bundelkhand election. This election although we lost it, was an eye-opener to everybody. All manner of Muslims from Maulvies and

members of the Jamiat to young students trooped up, often uninvited, to help the Congress candidate. The reactionary methods of the League irritated them and they grew quite enthusiastic in their opposition to it. We lost the election for two reasons: (1) the cry of Islam in danger and (2) bribery on an extensive scale. Many voters came to us and told us that they would vote for the Congress candidate if we paid them a little more than the other side was paying. There was a third reason also—the strength of caste feeling. Quite 25 per cent of the voters were Malkhand Rajputs and the Muslim League candidate belonged to the same brotherhood. Their *biradari* decided to support him and threatened to punish any member who did not do so. People were made to take the oath on the Quran. This solid block of votes went wholly against us almost without a single exception. But for it we had a comfortable majority. There was also shameless personation in regard to women voters, the same persons voting again and again.

10. In spite of all this the election was a most hopeful sign of a growing political consciousness among the Muslims. All our workers are sure that if the election was held again in the same area we would win. Last time we only put in about ten day's intensive effort. We got the real rural vote of the peasants but the residents of the *qasbas* were far more difficult. It was interesting to find that the Muslim peasant was not carried away by the cry of 'Islam in danger.' When asked why he was voting for the Congress, he confessed frankly that he did so because he expected the Congress to reduce his rent.

11. Generally speaking, therefore, our position has been considerably strengthened by the election. We have discovered to our pleasant surprise that there is a strong band of Muslim workers all over the Province who are determined to fight reaction and to support the Congress. Quite a number of the leading lights of the Jamiat have helped us enthusiastically. They were disgusted by the tactics of the League's supporters in Bundelkhand. We have collected a large number of leaflets and posters issued by the League and they are instructive reading.

12. It is true that we have still to face a solid mass of reaction and the cry on religion carried off many people. It is also true that bribery is rampant during Muslim elections. The voters are very poor and are smaller in number. We cannot and will not compete in these corrupt practices. Still the outlook is hopeful.

13. I have, without intending to do so, discussed at some length the Bundelkhand election. Still it will help you to form a background.

14. Towards the end of June, a little before the Working Committee meeting, the U.P. Muslim League leaders, Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan,³ made an approach towards the Congress. This had obviously some connection with the possibility of Ministries. They pointed out that last March their Parliamentary Board has offered cooperation to the U.P. Congress Party on the basis of the 'Wardha Programme' as laid down by the Working Committee, and were prepared to work under the discipline of the Congress Party. You will remember the Working Committee resolution on the Congress policy in the legislatures, passed at the Wardha meeting prior to the convention. It was not clear whether Muslim League Board accepted the whole resolution or only the particular items of the legislative programme. If the

former, then they accepted the Congress policy 100 per cent including independence, fighting the Act, constituent assembly etc, etc.

15. I knew nothing about all this nor did Maulana till it was vaguely hinted at Wardha early this month by Pantji. But it was all very vague and I did not like the look of this angling for Ministries.

16. When Maulana Abul Kalam Azad went to Lucknow from Wardha, he saw Khaliq who told him that he was practically prepared to give him a blank cheque provided two of their number were included in the Ministry—himself and Nawab Ismail Khan, the President of the U.P. Board. Maulana looked at all this with some suspicion but he felt attracted by the possibility of the whole Muslim League ceasing to exist as a separate group and being practically absorbed by the Congress.

17. He and Pant came to Allahabad and we discussed the matter at great length. I disliked (we all did) this bargaining for seats in the Ministry. We disliked taking in two persons who, from the Congress point of view, were weak. We feared reaction among Congressmen in general, and Congress Muslims in particular, who would have been irritated at their being excluded in preference for those who had been fighting the Congress. What of those who had severed their connection with the League and joined us? What of those Muslims of ours who had stood by the Congress during all these years? What of the Jamiat which was supporting us and opposing the League? You must remember that we have always had a strong and staunch group of Muslims with us in the U.P. They have not been many but they are growing in influence and younger Muslims are now strongly attracted to us. Were we going to ignore those who were with us and favour our opponents who joined us just to get the spoils of office? And then there was the risk of conflicts arising within the Ministry or the party—conflict of a communal or political nature resulting in resignations and the creation of an awkward situation.

18. All this and more we considered and we hesitated. And yet the alternative was worth having if, it could be secured. This was the winding up of the Muslim League group in the U.P. and its absorption in the Congress. This would have a great effect not only in the U.P. but all over India, even outside. This would mean a free field for our work without communal trouble. This would knock over the British Government which relied so much on these troubles.

19. After much discussion in which two other members of the U.P. (Kripalani and Narendra Deva)⁴ joined. We came to the conclusion that we should offer stringent conditions to the U.P. Muslim League group and if any accepted them in toto then we would agree to two Ministers from their group. Besides them one Minister would be Rafi Ahmad.

20. We drew up these conditions. The March resolution of the Working Committee on Congress policy in the legislatures was to be accepted from A to Z after full consideration so that there might be no misapprehension. The Muslim League group will be wound up, including the U.P. Parliamentary Board. All the Muslim League M.L.A.'s to become full members of the Congress Party (but there was this that they were not specially asked to take the Congress pledge). All of them to abide by the discipline of the party. In bye-elections, no separate candidate; all to support the Congress candidates and generally to endeavour to increase the prestige of the

Congress. If the Congress decided on resignation from the Ministry or from the legislature, they would follow suit. And some others. You will agree that these were pretty stringent conditions and in effect amounted to something more than the Congress pledge. But we did not ask them to sever all connection with the parent Muslim League. The position would have been a peculiar one involving a dual loyalty to some extent. It could not last and we expected the U.P. Leaguers to break from the parent League.

21. We decided to offer these conditions and also that, if any condition was not agreed to, then not to come to terms with them.

22. Maulana and Pant went to Lucknow. They sent for Nawab Ismail Khan but he was ill in Meerut and could not come. There were talks with Khaliq who agreed to all the conditions except two: the winding up of the Parliamentary Board and not to set up separate candidates at bye-elections. These were vital conditions. Khaliq said that he personally would agree but he had no authority to do so. In effect, he pointed out, this might happen anyhow. Therefore, Maulana said he could not give a final answer and came to Allahabad.

23. Meanwhile rumours had spread that we were talking with the Muslim League. Of course the details were not known. There was consternation among all our people, especially the Muslim Congressmen, the Jamiat people and young Muslims. Not only consternation but anger for the Bundelkhand election was fresh in everybody's mind. Maulana Husain Ahmad sent a special messenger and so on and so forth.

24. I was feeling very uncomfortable and was instinctively repelled by all this talk on an opportunistic basis. I felt trouble would follow and ultimately we sent word that we regretted we could not alter our previous conditions at all; if they were accepted in toto we would agree, not otherwise. We had no authority to go beyond this without consulting the Working Committee. So the matter dropped and Maulana Azad went off to Bombay. Khaliq said he was unable to agree.

25. Today Khaliq made another approach. He suggested that he would call an emergent meeting of his executive to consider the question of the bye-elections if we could postpone decision for some days. I spoke to him on phone. I referred him to Pantji but did not encourage him at all.

26. That is how matters stand now. Maulana Azad is keen on Hafiz Ibrahim being taken into the cabinet. He is a good and competent man and used to belong to the Swaraj Party. He might be described as a moderate Congressman. Pantji knows him well. There is just one difficulty about him and that is this. It might be said that he left the League and joined us in order to get into the Ministry. This would not be true as he left the League in March or early April when the question of Ministry was not in the air. He left with a group including Maulana Husain Ahmad. He is intimately connected with the Jamiat. Still it is possible that the torrent may be hurled against him.

27. I am tired of writing this long letter. By the time you reach the end of it you will appreciate the humour of my saying at the beginning that I would give you a brief account. But the matter was complicated and I wanted you to be in full possession of the facts in case of possible developments. Vallabhbhai has already had a chance of discussing this with Maulana Azad.

28. I am sending a copy of this letter to Bapu. Maulana Azad has not returned yet from Bombay, nor is there any news of him.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Encouraged by the British Government, there emerged in August, 1934, two landlord parties in U.P. The National Agriculturists' Party of Agra and the National Agriculturists' Party of Oudh—proclaiming self-flaunted aim for the 'uplift' of the Province. These were rent by personal conflicts but, in 1937 elections, managed to become the second-largest group in the Assembly and formed an interim Government under the Nawab of Chhatari from 3 April to the end of July, 1937. With the Congress accepting the office on 29 July, they formed themselves into an Independent Party but landlord hopes of a political future were finally frustrated.
 2. Raja Shabin Ali Khan, resigned from the National Agriculturist Party in U.P. in 1936 to participate actively in the election campaign of the Muslim League.
 3. Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan (1884-1958); Member, Indian Legislative Assembly 1923, 1926 and 1946; Member, All India Muslim League Parliamentary Board, 1936, Working Committee, 1938 and Chairman, Committee of Action; Delegate to Cabinet Mission since 1945; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50, Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1947-48; Member, Lok Sabha, 1950-52.
 4. Acharya Narendra Deva (1889-1956); joined the Independence of India League, 1928; Member, Congress Working Committee, 1936-38; U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1937-48; was one of the leaders of Congress Socialist Party; courted imprisonment during individual Satyagraha, 1940; was again arrested during Quit India Movement; Vice-Chancellor of Lucknow and Benarus Hindu University respectively in 1947 and 1951, Chairman, Socialist Party, 1949 and Praja Socialist Party, 1955; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-56.

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Hasan Ispahani¹ and Khwaja Nooruddin² to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. No. 515/P-48

TELEGRAM

CALCUTTA, 22 July, 1937

In our opinion Rajendra Prasad's offered ratification of your formula regarding Hindu-Muslim differences should be given best consideration. Kindly wire opinion.

HASSAN ISPAHANI,
KHWAJA NOORUDDIN

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1. Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani (1902-1981); Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937; President, Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1945-47; Joint Secretary, Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1936-37; its Treasurer, 1936-37; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee; Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947.

2. Khwaja Nooruddin (1900-); joined Muslim League in 1916; Member, Bengal Provincial League Council, 1921; joined Indian National Congress, 1928; Member, Bengal Provincial Congress Committee; founded Muslim Majlis; Member, Muslim League Parliamentary Board, Bengal 1936; Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1946-47.

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Syed Zakir Ali to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 515, p. 49

TELEGRAM

LUCKNOW, 22 July, 1937

Refer Rajendra Prasad's offer *Pioneer* publishes today. Khaliquzzaman and others including Shaukat Ali having wired you urging settlement with Congress. Ismail Khan apparently not consulted. Shaukat Ali left here seventeenth. Personally distrust circumventing you sending *Pioneer* cutting by post.

SYED ZAKIR ALI

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Ahmad Saeed to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 515, p. 51

TELEGRAM

DELHI, 22 July, 1932

Please do accept Rajendra Prasad's offer.

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Secretary, Young Men's Muslim Association to Nehru

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. 76/1937

ALLAHABAD, 22 July, 1937

Dear Sir,

I, on behalf of the Association, do beg to represent the following for your keen consideration with fervent hope that the subject embodied hereunder will meet with agreeable reply.

2. Out of the ten Ministers in the Madras Cabinet only one seat was awarded to Muslims. This attitude on the part of the Congress was not at all [to] the Muslim hearts. This will not only spliback [spill black] dots on the reputed names of the members but also may prove a blockade for the Muslims to join the Congress. Thus it is most respectfully prayed to consider the subjects and to award one more seat to Muslims.

4. Of the total Muslim population of Madras Presidency 1/3 were living in Malabar and I regret that such a Province was neglected without representation in the Ministerial circle, though a leading Mopla Congress man has come to the Legislature with surprising majority of votes. In response to the agitation of the Muslims and unsavarnas in respect of the partiality brought about by Mr. K. Raman Menon, while he was the Secretary of the K.P.C.C. and President of the Malabar Civic Board, a Committee was formed to enquire into the subject. It is not decent to appoint the same person to a Ministerial post ere the decision of the Committee. Can this be termed to be a communal partiality? Can I take liberty to question you at the points above and the actions of the parts of the Congress so far will not be sufficient to agitate Muslims and can this be sufficient to suspect to the bonafides of the Congress?

5. I, therefore, request to provide immediate relief for the Madras Muslim grievances awarding their legitimate claims to deserving persons. Excuse me for the trouble.

Secretary,
Y.M.M.A

Copy to M/s Abul Kalam Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel and Babu Rajendra Prasad.

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Maulana Shaukat Ali's speech

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. 15-17/1937

New Delhi, 22 July, 1937. The possibility of the annual session of All India Muslim League being held at Lucknow on August 13, 14 and 15 was foreshadowed by Maulana Shaukat Ali, who addressed a mass meeting of Muslims at the Jama Masjid after the Juma prayers. A mild stir was caused when a Pathan rose to his feet in the course of Maulana Shaukat Ali's speech and challenged the accuracy of the speaker. This enraged the audience and the Pathan was about to be mobbed when he was rescued.

2. Maulana Shaukat Ali appealed to the Muslims to join the League in their thousands and to revive the Khilafat Committee. He emphasised the importance of the forthcoming session of the League, whose main task, he said, would be to unite Muslims of all shades of opinion and prepare an electorate [electoral] political and economic programme for the whole of Muslim India. Maulana Shaukat Ali said that,

in order to bring together all sections of Muslim opinion, he would personally approach the Jamiat-ul-Ulama leaders and explore all avenues for a rapprochement.

3. Referring to communal unrest Maulana Shaukat Ali reiterated that what Muslims wanted was an honourable understanding with the major community, not political slavery. They could only achieve an honourable understanding by closing their own ranks.

4. Concluding Maulana Shaukat Ali said that for their political and economic advancement, Muslims should not rely on others but should have complete faith in God and unbounded self-confidence. The eyes of Muslim India were focused on Delhi, which had always been in the forefront in political activities and had given the lead to the rest of the country in bringing about a new orientation of Muslims politics.

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Hassan Ispahani to Jinnah

Jinnah-Isphanani Correspondence, p. 83

CALCUTTA, 23 July, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Our hearts were filled with joy when we read of the victory of the League at Jhansi. The Congress were beaten fair and square and acknowledged the League as the representative of Muslim opinion in India by reopening the discussion and by undertaking to ratify the now famous Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad formula. Nooruddin and I as individuals, and as your devoted followers, telegraphed you our opinion in the matter yesterday as under:

"In our opinion Rajendra Prasad's offered ratification of your formula regarding Hindu-Muslim differences should be given best consideration stop kindly wire opinion stop Hassan Ispahani Khwaja Nooruddin."

2. I hope you will agree with our submissions. I am not an advocate of surrender or of settlement at all costs with the majority community, but I will certainly welcome a settlement that is honourable and dignified. I feel convinced beyond doubt that *Swaraj* will remain a myth unless there is definite understanding and equitable adjustment of political and civic rights between the Hindus and Muslims. I await your decision and opinion with interest.

Yours very sincerely,
HASSAN



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*Mobarak Ali¹ to Rajendra Prasad**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*

ALI MANZIL, P.O. GULZARBAGH, PATNA, 27 July, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

(Apropos of) our talks of the 23rd current may I remind you to very kindly get me a copy of your and Mr. Jinnah's unity plan which unfortunately did not materialise. Your offer to Mr. Jinnah as published in the *Statesman* of the 23rd is very generous indeed and after I am in possession of these terms of which I have very faint recollection at the moment, I propose to move in the matter and shall do my best to bring about the so needed communal harmony. Might I know in case the rank communalists of other Provinces stand in our way, is it possible for our Province to give a lead in the matter? We have fortunately in our midst the personality of your goodself and it is no secret that you enjoy equal confidence of all the communities alike and, therefore, it is all the more easy for us to give a lead to other Provinces and I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that others will follow suit sooner than later.

With compliments and apology for the trouble, I remain.

Yours sincerely,
SYED MOBARAK ALI

1. Syed Mobarak Ali; Member, Muslim League.

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Jinnah's Statement

Civil and Military Gazette, 28 July, 1937; Nation's Voice, pp. 162-65

"I have seen the report of the statement of Babu Rajendra Prasad under the heading 'Rajen Babu returns to the charge.' Babu Rajendra Prasad begins by saying: 'I have seen Mr. Jinnah's statement regarding the breakdown of the Delhi negotiations. I am afraid that there is nothing in my statement which I should withdraw.'"

2. "The statement that I complained of was made by him in his interview which was published on July 6, 1937, in which he stated: 'It is not correct to say that even a certain section of the influential Congress leaders were deadly opposed to the formula. I think he must be satisfied now after the statement of the Bengal leaders who say that that is not true. In what he characterises as a sporting offer, he makes another statement which also is absolutely incorrect and without foundation. He says: 'I am making a sporting offer to Mr. Jinnah that I offer to get the formula accepted by the Congress even

today if he offers, as he had done then, to get signatures to it of all Musalman leaders barring one or two whom he had named to me.'

3. "It is a conditional offer devoid of any sporting spirit. In the first place I never offered to get signatures to Babu Rajendra Prasad's formula of all Muslim leaders barring one or two whom I had named or any leader. Babu Rajendra Prasad has forgotten the genesis of our conversations. I was requested by Babu Rajendra Prasad and other Congress leaders to meet him, and the question was how to put an end to the bitter controversy that was raging at the time over the Communal Award until a substitute was agreed upon between the communities concerned, and that we should utilise the Provincial Constitution for what it was worth and carry on our united struggle until we secure a Constitution for our country which will satisfy our people. This was not acceptable to Babu Rajendra Prasad and his friends."

4. "Next it was suggested that if they could propose a substitute on the basis of joint electorates which would be more in the interests of the Musalmans than the Communal Award, would I then consider it? I naturally said, if any such proposal came with the universal support of the communities concerned, namely, the Hindus and Sikhs, I would place it before the session of the All India Muslim League without delay and in my reply to his letter asking me to meet him I wrote as follows:

'Dear Rajendra Prasad—Thank you for your letter of the 24th instant. I have consulted a few friends and I should be glad to meet you in my individual capacity for the purpose referred to in your letter as requested by you. Yours Sincerely, M.A. Jinnah.'

5. "I had no authority from the League to come to any agreement and my position today is exactly the same as before. It is somewhat astonishing that Babu Rajendra Prasad should have adopted the method, the manner and the channel of approach, through which he flung this 'sporting offer' with regard to an issue which involves the fate and the future of 80,000,000 of Musalmans and the country at large. In all seriousness I appeal to him, does he think that this is the right way to open negotiations, through the channel of the Press for the settlement of this vital and far-reaching question?"

6. His 'sporting offer' amounts to this, that I must get the signatures of all Musalman leaders from all over India except one or two, and request him to get it passed by the Congress.

7. "Surely, if a substitute for the Communal Award, which the Musalmans have already accepted, is to be proposed, it can only come from the Hindu and Sikh leaders who are opposed to it and the two communities directly concerned. I can repeat now what I said when we commenced our talks at Delhi in January, 1935, that if Babu Rajendra Prasad is so sure of getting the Congress to adopt his formula as a substitute for the Communal Award and inform me to that effect with the authority and sanction of the Congress, I will place it before the All India Muslim League without delay.

8. "I do not wish in any way to make the course of negotiations or settlement difficult. But I must say in self-defence that the sudden change of front and the manner, the method and the channel, namely the Press, that are adopted and what is being reported in newspapers about a few Muslims in the United Provinces threatening

to leave the Muslim League if I do not carry out what Babu Rajendra Prasad has enjoined me to do, lead me to suspect that it is not a genuine desire for an honourable settlement, but is an attempt to divide the Musalmans to split the Muslim League and to strike a blow at unity among Musalmans for which I have been working.

9. For until yesterday, not to go beyond the Faizpur resolution according to the pronouncements of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking with the authority of the President of the Congress, the position was that "to talk about the rights and interests of the minorities and their safeguards was utter nonsense." The Congress, according to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the Secretary of the Congress, in their latest statements, was out to destroy the Communal Award as it was not acceptable to them and we were told that if we wanted any settlement, we must apply to the Hindu Mahasabha. In the meantime the Congress policy was that the Musalmans should join the Congress unconditionally and sign their pledge.

10. "After the Congress was flush with its majority in six Provinces, it deliberately decided to ignore, nay decided to non-cooperate with the Muslim League parties in the various Provincial Legislatures and they have in forming the Ministries vindicated the justice and the fair treatment to the Minorities urged and promised by Mahatma Gandhi very recently by having made a good feast of all the loaves and fishes that are at present available for the Congress party in the various legislatures and getting a stray Musalman to exchange a pledge overnight to accept Ministry the next morning. I regret that I should be obliged to point out these matters and that I should have to resort to a post-mortem inquisition.

11. "As to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's statement which appears side by side with that of Babu Rajendra Prasad on the 20th July, what can I say to that busy body President? What does he know of what took place between me and Babu Rajendra Prasad? He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose in everything except minding his own business. Again he comes back to another point with regard to the statement which was alleged to have been issued by me as an appeal to the voters of Bundelkhand-Jhansi (electorate) which I have already repudiated and said that no such statement was issued by me.

12. "I assure the Musalmans and the public at large that I am not in the slightest degree affected by anything that has happened in the past and nobody will welcome an honourable settlement between the Hindus and Musalmans more than I and nobody will be so ready to help it, and as an earnest on my part I sent a message to Mr. Gandhi when he was at Thithal only in the month of May last appealing to him to take up the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement and concentrate his great influence and efforts to which I received the following reply on May 22, 1937:

'Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light.

Yours sincerely,
M.K. GANDHI

13. In conclusion, I want to say a word to Musalmans. Those few waverers who are ready or about to betray us for jobs need not seek excuses or loopholes to justify their threatened secession from the All India Muslim League. They may go, but those members of the League if they have a shred of conscience left, should tender their resignations and contest the seats again on Congress ticket. I am sure that the All India Muslim League will be all the better without such men. To those who suffer from defeatist mentality I say, have courage and faith, *Delhi dur ast*; and I say to all Musalmans of India to organise, consolidate and establish solidarity and unity. Service, suffering and sacrifice are absolutely essential conditions before we can achieve anything big and secure our rightful place in the national life of our country." (A.P.)

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Gandhiji's draft

Sardar Patel Papers; File No. 1-33-2/1937

30 July, 1937

This is merely my draft subject to alterations and additions—M.K.Gandhi.

2. Although Shri Jinnah's letter leaves little hope of mutual understanding being established between the Muslim League and the Congress, it is necessary, for the sake of Congressmen whether Hindus, Muslims or from any other community and also for the sake of the millions of non-Congressmen who are allied to no party, who are politically dumb, but whom nevertheless it is the Congress boast, made good on many occasions, that it seeks¹ to represent, that without waiting for a mutual understanding the Congress should state its communal policy in unequivocal terms. For the Congress does not need the spur of mutuality for the sake of doing strict justice without which it cannot exist for a moment. In brief, then, this is the Congress policy on the communal question, in particular here, the Hindu Muslim question.

- (i) Bad as the so-called Communal Award is, it stands until it is revised by the mutual consent of the parties concerned.
- (ii) In the Provincial Assemblies (barring the Frontier) where the Congress has a majority, the Congress shall have a Muslim member (or members) in the Cabinet chosen from among the largest Muslim group provided that he accepts the Congress programme, both parliamentary and constructive, and loyally abides by the Congress discipline while he remains in the Cabinet.

3. In the distribution of posts subject to the fulfilment of conditions of merit and efficiency wherever there is disparity, attempt shall be made to reach the numerical proportion of the Muslims to the Hindus in the respective Provinces. This rule shall apply to all minorities.

4. Wherever a particular community or class is more backward in education than the rest, it should be the duty of the Congress to make special provision for the levelling up of its educational standard.

5. In the Provinces where the Congress is in a minority and the Muslims are the majority community, the Congress members shall always remain in opposition. But the opposition shall not be obstructive. It shall examine every act of the Government on its merits and support it wherever it is beneficial in terms of the Congress policy and programme.

6. Where in such Provinces the Muslims are divided in groups the Congress will help that group which, from the Congress standpoint, is in every way the best.

7. In order to prevent reactionaries from getting control of the administration—subject to the control and guidance of the Working Committee—Congress members in such Provinces may ally themselves with such Muslim group or groups enabling them to form Ministries irrespective of communal representation therein. Congressmen dare not think in communal terms. Hence they may not cavil at a Ministry composed wholly of Muslims or any other community, the sole test being integrity, ability and robust nationalism according to the Congress ideal.

8. In Parliamentary Muslim elections the Congress should not put up candidates in rivalry with other organisations unless the Congress is satisfied that the voters themselves desire to be represented by a Congress candidate.

9. The Congress does believe in Muslim mass contact but not in any spirit of hostility towards any Muslim organisation. The contact that the Congress seeks, however, is not necessarily through making Muslims members of the Congress but by serving them in the ways open to the Congress and acceptable to the Muslims. Thus the Congress has been serving thousands of Muslim sisters and brothers through the All India Spinners Association organising carding, spinning and weaving among them.

10. Every Congressman represents in his own person the best that is in Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and other faiths. He will, therefore, sympathise with the Hindu horror of cow slaughter and respect for all creations symbolised through the cow; he will sympathise with the Muslim in his desire for perfect peace and in and about a house of worship and, therefore, his objection to noise in the shape of loud music before mosques at prayer times. These two are taken by way of illustrations in as much as they have actually led and still do lead to deadly feuds between the rival communities. But the Congress feels that respect for other faiths cannot be cultivated by forcible means, much less by mass violence. Hence the Congress cannot regard with equanimity attempts on the part of Hindus to prevent cow slaughter by forcible means nor Muslims stopping by forcible means music or processions before mosques. These must be matters of mutual adjustment between parties. The general rule, however, should be that prevailing custom as to cow slaughter or processions should be respected and should have the force of law. Where no custom can be proved Muslims should have the freedom to slaughter cows so long as the slaughter is not made purely with a view to offend Hindu susceptibility. Similarly, in the absence of custom, Hindus may play music before mosques during prayer times and loudly at any other time. *Arti* in Hindu temples cannot be interfered

with except when it is done so boisterously as wantonly to offend the devotees in neighbouring mosques.

11. As to the Hindi-Urdu controversy, the Congress attitude is plain: that its official language is Hindustani as commonly spoken in the North by Hindus and Musalmans and written either in the Devanagri or Urdu script. But the Congress is of opinion that both Hindi, i.e., highly Sanskritised Hindustani written in the Urdu script must be recognised during the transition stage and it is the duty of every educated Congressman to familiarise himself with both the forms of speech and both the script.

12. As to the singing of the long established national song, *Bande Mataram*, the Congress anticipating objections has retained as national song only those stanzas to which no possible exception could be taken on religious or other grounds. But except at purely Congress gathering it should be left open to individuals whether they will stand up when the stanzas are sung. In the present state of things in local Board and Assembly meetings which their members are obliged to attend the singing of *Bande Mataram* should be discontinued.

13. The National Flag must find its proper place at purely Congress gatherings. But no attempt should be made to fly it on general public buildings, municipal offices or school building where there is any opposition whatsoever.

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1. The original document is a typed one. There seems to be some typing mistake.

116

Congress Party's Statement

The Pioneer, 30 July, 1937; Congress Government I, pp. 115-16

30 July, 1937. The Muslim League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group. The existing members of the Muslim League Party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. They will similarly be empowered to participate in deliberations of the Party. They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline of the Congress Party in an equal measure with other members, and the decisions of the Congress Party as regards work in the Legislature and general behaviour of its members shall be binding on them. All matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the party; each individual member having one vote.

2. The policy laid down by the Congress Working Committee for their members in the legislatures along with the instructions issued by the competent Congress bodies pertaining to their work in such legislatures shall be faithfully carried out by all members of the Congress Party including these members.

3. The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be

dissolved and no candidate will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any by-election. All members of the Party shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by the Congress to fill up a vacancy occurring hereafter.

4. All members of the Congress Party shall abide by the rules of the Congress Party and offer their full and genuine cooperation with a view to promoting the interests and prestige of the Congress.

5. In the event of the Congress Party deciding on resignation from the Ministry or from the Legislature the members of the above mentioned group will also be bound by that decision.

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Maulana Azad's note on the Congress terms as mentioned above

The Pioneer, 30 July, 1937; Congress Government I, p. 117

It was hoped that, if these terms were agreed to and the Muslim League group of members joined the Congress Party as full members, that group would cease to exist as a separate group. In the formation of the Provincial Cabinet it was considered proper that they should have representatives.

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Nehru to the Secretary, Young Men's Muslim Association

All India Congress Committee Papers; F.G. 76/1937

4 August, 1937

The Secretary,
Young Men's Muslim Association
P.O. Baliapatam

Dear friend,

I have your letter. In this matter of appointing Ministers to a Cabinet, I have no competence to interfere. But you must realise that Ministries are not distributed territorially or communally, though, of course, some of those factors have to be borne in mind. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has been entrusted by the Congress to advise in the selection of Muslim Ministers. I have forwarded the relevant papers to him. But may I suggest to you that young men should be more interested in policies and programme than in State jobs and offices?

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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*Fortnightly Report on Madras for the second half of July, 1937 [Extract]**Public (General) Department; D.O. No. P. 4-14*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FORT ST. GEORGE, 6 August, 1937

POLITICAL

5. The situation amongst the Malabar Muslims at present is that there are three parties, or at least followers of three policies—those who have joined or who favour joining the Congress unconditionally, those who adhere to Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League and those who are anxious to stand apart from both of these parties as independent loyalists; the second of these parties is probably at its strongest in North Malabar while the recent movement towards forming the third party is so far confined to Eranad and Walluvanad in South Malabar.

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*Ahmad Yar Daultana to the Editor of Daily Ehsan**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 26/131*

DILNAWAZ, DALHOUSIE, 10 August, 1937

Dear Mr. Editor of the Daily Ehsan,

I have read your leader appearing on page 3 of the Issue of the daily *Ehsan* dated the 9th August 1937. The words that I have used about the flag are as follows: "As far as the Congress is concerned, it seems that in its own opinion the best method of keeping the Muslim Minorities in the six Provinces happy and contented is to insist that the Muslim representatives must sing *Bande Matram* when Congressmen sing it, must salute the Congress flag and must accept Congress chosen nonentities from among themselves as their representatives in the cabinet, or in some cases, must go without any representation whatsoever in the cabinet."

The papers can interpret it in any way they like. But you will agree with me that there is no ambiguity in what I have said. The present Congress flag is no doubt, the flag of the Congress and not that of Indian nation. The Muslim League is the only All India Muslim institution and all Muslims, whether they belong to communal or non-communal political parties, at present look upon the League for lead in the All India matters in general and those connected with the federation in particular. The Muslim League has not adopted the present flag as the National Flag of India. I have great respect for the Congress, some of its leaders and the flag, as it represents the biggest and most powerful of all the vocal parties in this country. I am not at all hostile to the

Congress and should welcome their power in this country provided the Muslims have their proper place in it. But I certainly resent that a Mohammadan in order to get a seat in the Cabinet in Congress governed Provinces should be made to salute the flag or sing any national *Geet* which he rightly or otherwise believes it to be associated only with the biggest political party in this country (being mainly financed by Hindu capitalists) and does not honestly believe the flag to be the National Flag of India or a political song to be the National Anthem. Will it be fair on the part of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to insist that all the Non-Muslim Ministers should sing Sir Mohammad Iqbal's *Qaumi Taranah*?

It is the prostitution of the Constitution to select a Musalman to represent Muslims in the Cabinet of a Province who does not either represent them or command their respect and confidence. My personal view is that a majority community should either have a true representative of the minority to represent them in their Cabinet or should defy the minority and try to do without them. I have greater respect for the Premier of Orissa for having the courage of openly defying the Minority community than for the Premiers of other Congress dominated Provinces who have tried, though in vain, to camouflage and make fool of the minority communities of their Provinces. The Daily *Ehsan* are the great supporters of the All India Muslim League and if they are able to make the League as such or its President or our universally respected Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, to salute the Congress flag as their National Flag I will be in the front row to pay my homage to it. I was disagreeably amused to read the great theory of political philosophy of the present day expounded by the Editor of the Daily *Ehsan* when he wanted to convey that writing of articles against the Congress pleases the British Government. I am sure that he was not serious when he wrote it, otherwise I should be excused if I say, that he forfeits all the rights of being called a well-informed Pressman or a shrewd journalist. Can any one in these days be so bold as to say that the propaganda against the Congress courts the pleasure of the British Government. If some of my Muslim friends feel in this way I am sure they and those who agree with them will very soon be sadly disillusioned. Those who have the eyes to see clearly what is in the atmospheres today can only call this theory of my learned friend a political misnomer. It is historically an anachronism and grammatically this phrase represents the figure of speech called oxymoron. The editorial staff of a well-reputed newspaper like the Daily *Ehsan* are expected to be better informed. We have given a practical lead to India in these matters. Our creed is the creed of humanity and our religion is the religion of human brotherhood. But how long obstacles will be placed in our way by our jaundiced friends, it is for them to reply.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- MOHAMMAD YAR DAULTANA

Copy submitted to Mr. Jinnah for information.

Sd/- MOHAMMAD YAR DAULTANA,

Dilnavaz, 10-8-37.

Dalhousie.



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Secretary, Young Muslim Party, Meerut to Nehru

All India Congress Committee Papers

MUFTI STREET, MEERUT, 24 August, 1937

Sir,

2. India is going speedily towards progress and the goal of freedom but I am sorry and feel shy when I say that the Muslim India is much backward and is not fighting shoulder to shoulder with the other communities of the country as they should.

3. There is a group of prominent Ulamas under the head (sic.) of Maulana Husain Ahmed Madni and Mufti Kifayat Ullah¹ which is trying its best for Muslim political uplift but reactionaries are more in number and have much wealth at their disposal while these venerable *Ulamas* have only their lives to sacrifice over the country and Islam. But the question is why Muslim India is politically backward. Its reply you know better than myself.

4. Late Maulana Mohammad Ali said once and you have also written in your *Autobiography* that most of the Muslim leaders are useless and self-seekers while most of the public is good enough. The Muslim public in India is being used by these self-seekers. Then why not these selfish leaders be thrown out of the public life. But now the question arises who can do it? My answer to this is Congress can do it and should do it. Indian National Congress is the only political body which may really be called national. While communal leaders are useless, it is the duty of national leaders to lead the Muslim public as well. The Congress has realised it to some extent. But the Congress is not paying sufficient attention towards Muslim political uplift. It should devote sufficient time and wealth for Muslim's political uplift as it is doing in the case of Harijans. It is the duty of a national institution to call it really a Congress rule. It would bring awakening to the sleeping citizens of the nation, namely, the Muslims.

5. I may take the case of Meerut City for example. It is one of the cities where the Congress is most powerful and influencing body of the town and the district. But what is being done by the local Congress for Muslim mass contact? How many posters and pamphlets have been issued? How many leaders have been called to Meerut for this object? How many Muslims have been enrolled here as Congress members? As far as I think the Congress diary is nearly blank. Though some work is being done in the villages but cities should not be ignored all about. Citizens have much influence over the village population. The thing which is pricking my heart is this: the Meerut Muslim is in public being misled and is being made communalist by the Muslim Leaguers. They are opposed to idle and armchair politicians but they are working hard to gain favour among the Muslims, and the world is theirs who try to get them. So they are gaining strength here day by day. They are opposing Congress and are calling it a Hindu organization and ask the Muslims to join the Muslim League which they call to be the Muslim organisation. But what the local Congress is

doing to combat this evil communalism. Nothing, nothing and again nothing. What have they done of your circular about Muslims Mass Contact problem? Have they filled it or thrown it in waste paper basket? What have they done of it? I think, you know the Meerut Muslim public well, as it is not long you came here and were welcomed here by each and every section of Meerut Muslims. But about now, if you come at present you will see the devil of communalism sitting over the neck of Meerut Muslims. Why, because the so-called Leaguers worked hard and because the local Congress Committee is doing nothing in the city in this direction. Will you instruct the local Congress leaders to work hard for Muslim Mass Contact?

6. If the local Congress Committee does not realize its duty it will have to face a great communal riot and it would be a blemish over the forehead of the Congress rule (if we can call it really a Congress rule). It would bring great setback to the Congress object and Congress progress. It is amazing to see that the armchair politicians are working hard like labourers and the national workers are sleeping in their comfortable houses. Do they think that they have attained *Swaraaj*? If not, then what is the cause of their silence and leisure?

7. When such is the Mass Contact work here the same may be in other parts of the country. Now, this programme is being laid before the country, it should not be proved a failure. It should have a successful end. Though in the beginning it would seem to be a difficult task because the Muslims are being called upon to hear anything about mass contact, and the Congress is presented before them as a huge monster but sooner or later I think, the Muslim will realize the truth and would come to the Congress fold running and running. As soon as the curtain of wrong is raised, the Muslims would enter the Congress fold in large numbers.

8. There is one great weapon of these reactionaries and that is of 'Islam in danger.' I declare it with my full force that it cannot be checked and opposed by Hindu Congressmen. The Muslims, and better *Ulamas*, would answer this slogan of theirs. I in the end, would present some suggestions for your kind consideration and beg you to issue instructions based over them to all the Congress Committees in the country.

Suggestions

- (i) Firstly, Muslim leaders, Muslim Congressmen (*Ulamas*, lecturers and propagandists like Maulana Husain Ahmed Madni of Deoband, Mufti Kifayat Ullah of Delhi, Maulana Ahmed Saeed of Delhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Attaullah Shah Bhukari,² Maulana Hifzur Rahman of Seohara³ and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan be pressed to tour the whole country with a definite programme and only with this object before them. Moreover, the other Muslim Congressmen may be also asked to tour their respective Provinces and districts. *Ulamas* and Muslim leaders would be more suitable for this object than our venerable Hindu leaders. When the general atmosphere becomes (turns) in our favour, then there will be no question of Hindu and Muslim leaders to tour the country for the Congress work whatever it may be.
- (ii) A weekly bulletin be issued from the Central Office of the Congress, Allahabad, explaining to the Muslims the true condition of the country, the lot of the Muslims under the Congress, its object and its being a national organisation and such other

matters with relation to the Muslim Mass Contact work. They should be sent to be published in every Hindi and Urdu papers. (iii) The misleading posters, pamphlets, and articles be replied at once by the local Congress Committees. (iv) Lectures should be arranged according to the local requirements by the local Congress Committees. (v) The death anniversaries of prominent Muslim leaders like Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan,⁴ Mohd. Ali and Hazrat Sheikhul Hind (Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan) be observed throughout the whole of India under the auspices of the Indian National Congress. (vi) The Urdu-Hindi question is being presented vehemently before the public. So, all the publications of the Congress be published in Urdu as well. Secondly, the lectures delivered by the Congressmen should be in the language which common people are able to understand easily and not in the language which the lecturers want to popularize, because while they popularize one thing they have a drawback in another matter. The language question in my humble opinion be better postponed for some future time. The Madras Premier's announcement regarding the Hindi being the compulsory language in Madras Presidency, is being presented as a proof of the Congress being a Hindu organization. So, better postpone it for sometime.

9. In the conclusion, I request you to draw full attention towards the question of Muslims contact in India and particularly at Meerut. The Leaguers have called Mr. Zafar Ali Khan⁵ of Lahore. M. Shaukat Ali, M. Abdul Hamid of Badaun and such other Leaguers here. Now they have pronounced that Mr. Jinnah would be coming to Meerut in a week or so.

10. There should be a reply to all that. We the Muslim youths of Meerut, are always at your service, but we want a leader to lead us. We request you to lead us and instruct the local Congress to give us a right lead, that we may do something for the country.

Praying for your long life.

Secretary, re-elected Muslim League Member, 1946

The Young Muslim Party, Meerut

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1. Mufti Kifayatullah (1872-1952); founder President, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 1919, Member, Khilafat Committee, Lucknow, 1922; started *Tabligh* Movement, Delhi, 1924; Member, Congress Working Committee, 1930; Member, Muslim League Parliamentary Board from Bihar, 1936; led a delegation to the conference of Ulama in Egypt, 1938; opposed demand for Pakistan.
 2. Ataullah Shah Bukhari (1891-1967), participated in Shahidganj Mosque agitation and Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930; Member, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind; presided over All India Ahrar Conference at Lahore, 1943; opposed partition.
 3. Maulana Mohammad Hifzur Rahman (1901-1962); joined the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind and took part in the Khilafat Movement, 1919, Vice President, UPCC, 1946-51; imprisoned five times for taking part in Congress movements, Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57 and 1957-62.
 4. Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1927); President, All India Muslim League, 1919; President, All India Khilafat Conference, Ahmedabad, 1921; President, Indian National Congress, 1921-22.
 5. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956), Editor, *Zamindar*; *Khilafatist* joined *Majlisi Ahrar*; attended AICC, 1930; left Congress, 1932; left Ahrar and formed Ittihad-i-Millat Party 1935; Member, Legislative Assembly, 1937-45.

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Nehru to Ali Sardar Jafri¹

All India Congress Committee Papers, F.No. 65(KW)2/1937

ALLAHABAD, 1 September, 1937

Dear Sir,

I have your letter without date. I have not followed very closely the controversy in *The Statesman* about *Bande Mataram*.

2. The Congress has not officially adopted any song as a kind of national anthem. In practice, however, the *Bande Mataram* is often used in national gatherings together with other songs. The reason for this is that 30 years ago this song and this cry became a criminal offence and it developed into a challenge to British imperialism. Thousands of people suffered because of this and it came to be associated in the minds of the public with a fight against British imperialism. To this extent it became a symbol of nationalism in India. I do not think anybody considers the words to have anything to do with a Goddess. That interpretation is absurd. Nor are we concerned with the idea that the author of the book, which contains this song, had in his mind when he wrote it, because the public does not think on these lines.

3. I think that the whole song and all the words in it are thoroughly harmless and nobody can take exception to their meaning. But I also think that the song is not suitable as a National Anthem. It contains too many difficult words which people do not understand and the ideas it contains are also out of keeping with modern notions of nationalism and progress. We should certainly try to have more suitable national songs in simple language. But great songs and anthems cannot be made to order. It requires a genius for the purpose. I suppose in time we shall get something good. Meanwhile there is no reason why we should not give full permission for the use of the *Bande Mataram* as well as other favoured songs which many people have come to associate with our struggle for freedom.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. Sardar Jafri (1913-); eminent Urdu Poet, one of the leaders of the Progressive Writers Movement; edited *Diwan Ghalib* and *Diwan Mir* in Hindi and Urdu scripts.



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*Gopinath Bardoloi¹ to Rajendra Prasad**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*

ASSAM CONGRESS PARTY, SHILLONG, GAUHATI, 10 September, 1937

My dear Sree Rajendra Prasad,

2. On the 27th August we had our Land Revenue Reduction (50 per cent) Resolution. The spirit of cooperation with us was prevalent among those non-Congress members. In their speeches the leader of the Muslim League, Maulavi A. Matin Choudhary,² and one Maulavi A. Rahman from Surma Valley Muslims strongly supported it. The debate was carried beyond the conventional time (5 p.m.) by the kindness of the Speaker; then the Ministerial party began their dilatory tactics till prayer time came. We moved for closure, but failed, the rule being that 2/3 of the members present must be in favour of the motion; and the debate adjourned till 30.8.37.

3. The whole atmosphere changed in the meanwhile. It was given out among the Mohammadans, that the Muslim Raj was at stake. Telegram after telegram began to pour into the Muslim members that our resolution of 50 per cent reduction meant a no-confidence motion and hence all Muslims should unite to defeat it and rally round the Muslim Ministry. On the 29th, one Mr. Ansari (said to be the nephew of late Dr. Ansari) addressed all the Muslim members of the House and insisted on a Muslim solidarity under the banner of the Muslim League. Except one, Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed,³ M.A.(Cantab) L.L.B., Bar-at Law, the staunchest Mohammadan supporter of the Congress, who resisted this move, and refused to be a party to the League, the rest joined. I understand they agreed to tone down their attitude towards the Congress Land Revenue Resolution by consenting to support an amendment of 33 per cent. Then the same party agreed to withdraw their amendment of Ministers' salary for Rs. 1500 and Rs. 1000 to the Government bill of Rs. 2000 and Rs. 1800. They also secured the approval of the Ministers to passing of the Members Salary Bill for Rs. 100 p.m. and Rs. 5 daily allowance in place of the Government proposal of Rs. 1000 per year and Rs. 3 per diem. On the 30th we lost our Land Revenue Resolution, which stood at the amendment above stated. On the 1st September we were defeated in every item, beginning from the Speaker's Salary Bill to the Members' Emoluments—Bill, Congress fighting every inch of the ground with their 9 supporters from the Surma Valley Hindus and Scheduled Castes, Babu Kedarmal⁴ of the Commerce constituency and of course the brave Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed.

4. The situation as left on the 1st September is that we are only 42 now—the Government side being composed of 33 Musalmans, 13 Europeans, and labourers and about 20 of Assam Valley United Peoples Party and Hill Tribes.

5. There are some who seem to think that if you and Maulana Azad had been here this communal combination would not have been possible and Congress would not have to face a communal bloc. The communal Hindus now fear that this is a

prelude to a policy of populating the whole Assam Valley with Mohammadan immigrants and converting Assam into a Mohammadan Province.

6. The Congress, of course, is free from any of these misgivings but what we all feel is the want of proper guidance at the right moment from the Centre. The condition of Assam is so very peculiar and its problems so manifold that we feel the necessity for more consultation and better coordination with the central body. It appears, however, that you (I do not mean you individually) pay no importance to our manifold problems. The Province is tired of asking Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to visit the Province at least once. We feel you (I mean you and Maulana Saheb) should visit the place locally to understand its peculiar problems. It is by such contact alone that you would encourage us and make the Congress stronger. Indeed there are so many things to consult you (for which you must, of course, know the local conditions) what we will treasure a tour by you two. Will you be available for a tour towards the end of November or beginning of December? It will, of course, be cold here then, but surely not quite unbearable.

Yours sincerely,

G.N. BARDOLOI

Leader, Assam Congress Party

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1. Gopinath Bardoloi (1890-1950); joined Non-Cooperation Movement, 1921; leader of the Congress Party in Assam Assembly, 1937; formed the Coalition Ministry in Assam, 1938; Chief Minister, 1946-50.
 2. A. Matin Choudhary (1895-1949); joined Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-37; Chief Whip and Secretary, Independent Party in the Assembly; Vice President, All India Muslim League, 1934, Minister, Government of Assam, 1939, Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947.
 3. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad (1905-77); Minister, Government of Assam, 1938-39; imprisoned during freedom struggle, 1940, 1942-45; Advocate General, Assam, 1946-52; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1954-57, Minister, Assam, 1957-66; Minister, Government of India, 1966, 1966-67, 1969-71, and President of India, 1974-77.
 4. Babu Kedarmal, Member, Legislative Assembly, Assam.

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Raja Narendranath¹ to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents

STRAWBERRY, SIMLA, 16 September, 1937

My dear Babu Rajendra Prasad,

I have just seen "Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad Agreement" about replacing separate electorates by joint electorates. I remember we met at Delhi some years ago. Pandit Nanackchand² was with me. We agreed to have joint electorates without disturbing the seats assigned to each community by the Communal Award. So far as the Punjab is

concerned, the condition that we attached was that the Sikhs should also be reconciled to our view and that our assent was subject to their assent. I remember having asked you the number of seats assigned to the Federal Legislature for Provinces in which Hindus were in majority. I think that you said the number as far as you remembered was 40 and then about the Federal Legislature I also agreed to joint electorates on the basis of seats assigned by the Communal Award to the various communities in the Central Legislature. There was no talk so far as I remember about differential franchise or about population being reflected in the voter's strength. Am I right? You obtained our signatures on some sort of paper; but there was no mention in it either about differential franchise or population being reflected in voters' register. My memory seldom fails me in important matters like these. I even remember the figures; but it is just possible that this particular case may be an exception and I might have forgotten the purport of what I signed. The formula as is now announced never came before us in its entirety. Do I remember aright?

2. So far as Punjab and Bengal are concerned this demand about differential franchise on the part of Muslims is absurd. The communal distribution of the population in the east and west is such that no community benefits or loses by lowering of the franchise. An intelligent man like Jinnah should be able to see through it. The differential franchise detracts from the value of joint electorates.

3. What is meant by population being reflected in the voter's register? The expression is much too vague. If in the Punjab or Bengal the voting strength of Muslims is 51 per cent can we not say the population is reflected on the voters register? All that is needed is that a majority in the population should not be a minority in the voters register.

4. I am a very careful reader of all that is going on in the country in the sphere of politics. I find from day to day that my anticipations with regard to the communal question cropping up when you sit down to frame a new Constitution have been correct. The amendment which Mr. Jinnah thinks of proposing about the Constituent Assembly is significant. The communal problem is a hard nut to crack and I fear it will break your teeth when you grapple with the control of the Military and the Foreign Policy.

5. You visit the Punjab but you move within a very narrow circle. The communal problem is most poignant in our Province. Every now and then there are murders and clashes about the route of procession and of music before mosque. On your next visit to Punjab, will you kindly include Panipat in your itinerary and take Desh Bandhu Gupta³ with you. There is trouble there with regard to the route of procession and music before mosques. The Hindus are most dissatisfied with the orders of the Deputy Commissioner who is an Indian (but a Muslim). In his letter received yesterday Mr. Desh Bandhu Gupta writes to me that "the Hindus are being made to feel that they are helpless and there is no justice for them left in the Punjab. This feeling should not be allowed to grow." The feeling has arisen over the question of route and music before mosques. Will you kindly explain both to the Hindus and Muslims at Panipat that these mutual squabbles about trivials delay the application of the Statute of Westminster to India.⁴ I hope your appeal to them will prove effective.

6. You cannot imagine to what extent I am worried by people who come to me to complain about local officers. Hindus only come to me and not Muslims. They are

dissatisfied with the Hindu Deputy Commissioner because they are weak. They are dissatisfied with Muslim Deputy Commissioner because they are bigoted. As to Europeans they can very well understand what their policy has been and will be in the future in the face of the pronouncement by the Viceroy that the Civil Service should follow loyally the policy of the Ministry under whom they serve. In the Punjab, of course, they suppose there is Muslim Raj in spite of Sir Sikander's assurances to the contrary. When you come here, you have not only to secure mass contact with the Muslims but also to help in the solution of communal problems which the Congress Ministry of the future will have to tackle. Unless you solve those problems, you will not get Muslim support for the Congress. All that we urge is that you have not only to reconcile the Mohammadans but also to satisfy the Hindus. I am willing to help but Sir G.C. Narang⁵ and Bhai Parmanand should also be consulted.

P.S. If each community is to have separate single member constituencies joint electorates become valueless.

Yours sincerely,
NARENDRA NATH

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1. Raja Narendra Nath (1864-1945); Commissioner, Lahore, 1911; represented the Landlords Constituency in the Punjab Legislative Council, 1921-1937; President, All India Hindu Mahasabha Conference, 1927, attended the Round Table Conference, 1930-31.
 2. Nanakchand, founder President, Punjab Democratic League, 1923 and Secretary, National Reform Party in the Punjab Legislative Council; attended RTC, 1932.
 3. Desh Bandhu Gupta (1901-51); a leading Congressman of Delhi, editor, *Tej* from 1923; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50.
 4. The reference obviously is to Dominion Status.
 5. G.C. Narang, Member Punjab Assembly.

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Nehru's Speech on Hindu-Muslim Question

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 19 September, 1937

Abmadabad, 19 September, 1937. The Congress is a political body whose doors are open to all. It has routed the Hindu Sabha. The Muslim League's existence is seen only in a few Provinces and is confined to only a few Muslims belonging to the upper classes. Its policy and programme differ from those of the Congress. How can there be unity between the two bodies unless the Congress gives up its ideals? The Hindu-Muslim question is a question of the upper classes and not of the masses. Both Hindu and Muslim masses are steeped in poverty which can be removed from both simultaneously and not separately.

2. The Congress has nothing to do with religion. It is a political body fighting for the country's freedom in which the Muslims should take their due share. The

Indian National Congress works for the betterment of the masses. There is nothing like the Hindu-Muslim question but it is the question of doing away with the country's bondage.

3. I, therefore, appeal to the Muslims to join the Congress in large numbers.

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Jinnah's Public Address

Civil and Military Gazette, 21 September, 1937, Nation's Voice, pp. 172-173

Simla, 20 September, 1937. "There is no difference between the ideal of the Muslim League and that of the Congress or any other recognised political organisation in the country, the ideal being complete freedom for India. There cannot be any self-respecting Indian who favours foreign domination or does not desire complete freedom and Self-Government for his country," said Mr. M.A. Jinnah in replying to an address presented to him at a largely attended reception held in his honour on Saturday afternoon" (18 September).

2. The question to consider, said Mr. Jinnah, was how to achieve this ideal. "I honestly tell you," he added, "that no one dislikes the present conditions more than myself, but at the same time I hold that the realities must be faced. There can be no solution if people continue to believe in the principle of 'acquisition first and distribution afterwards' or in the latest dictum, 'possession first and partition afterwards.' What is required is to evolve a mentality by which our people can think only in terms of citizenship."

3. "I may add that our country is not alone in this problem. Other countries had to face similar problems. England had its Roman Catholics and Protestants and Canada its British and French. But they ultimately solved their problems and I make bold to say that we can also solve this problem. I, therefore, appeal to every patriotic Indian that, instead of fighting for a distant ideal, to mould the whole of India into mere citizens when the Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Musalmans, Musalmans politically. Let us first solve this problem of the Minorities."

4. Why the League? "I have repeatedly been asked why there should be a Muslim League. My answer is that those who question the existence of the League should read its Constitution and ideal. They will honestly find that there is no difference between the ideal of the League and that of the Congress or any other political organisation. The election manifesto speeches of prominent Muslim League members would test the testimony that we wanted to send in the legislatures men who were patriotic nationalists and independent.

5. "It will be conceded that there is an undesirable element in the Muslim community just as there is an undesirable element in any other community in India. Our aim and purpose has been to weed out this undesirable element from the public life of the country and only have a body of men who will be independent, selfless and think and act in terms of nationalism. With this view I also hold that Hindu

leaders and Muslim leaders can exercise greater influence over the members of their community and this is possible under the present conditions by means of separate organisations."

6. "This to my mind is the best and quickest road to advance and the realisation of our goal. Because when we have hammered out the best minds of the Hindus and the Musalmans, it will and must lead more quickly towards unity and united front which is essential for our struggle. This is reality and the shortest road, while the other is ruin and will lead us to the longest road. It is no crime if I wish to make my community strong as long as my activities are not anti-national, are not obstacles in the way of the freedom of the country and not against any community. If I make my community strong, independent and patriotic during my life time I will feel that the purpose of life has been achieved and I have not lived in vain and if Mr. Bhulabhai Desai can achieve the same for his community he would have done his part."

7. The Main Work: "Separate electorates or no separate electorates, we then both will first work for the freedom of our country. But the freedom of our country does not mean freedom for the majority and the rule of the majority. I may assert that even the ordinary majority can be extremely oppressive and tyrannical. It, therefore, stands to reason that the majority, with a fundamentally different culture, traditions, social life and outlook always tries to force its ideals on the minorities."

8. "Historical instances come from Czechoslovakia. That country is governed by a sovereign majority, while we are all slaves, and yet two million Germans out of 14 million Czechs and Slavs had apprehensions and fears of the majority. After a long and strenuous struggle and, no doubt, under pressure from the League of Nations, which is responsible for the protection of the minorities in sovereign States and with backing from the German nation, this small German minority compelled the sovereign majority to guarantee to it security of its culture and language. Is this religious? Is this communalism? Germans, Czechs and Slavs are all Christians. They are more homogeneous than any community in India. They dress alike, eat alike, live alike and intermarry and yet their fear and apprehension of the destruction of their culture and language had to be removed. In the same way Musalmans want that their religious culture, language and political existence in national life should be adequately and effectively safeguarded. There is no communalism or religion involved in this demand."

9. "It was pure and simple a question of the minorities which had to be faced by statesmen in other countries and was to be solved. In conclusion I may state that none desire a settlement with majority community more than myself. I want unity. I want a united front. So does the other community and party; but our definition of what is fair and just has come to bear a different meaning, interpretation and standard. If India is to have freedom—and there is no self-respecting man who does not desire the freedom of his motherland—then the problem of the minorities must be solved bravely and justly and must be solved at once. In any honest attempt towards the solution of this problem other communities and parties will not find the Musalmans or myself lagging behind."

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*Interview with Mr. M.B. Nanavati, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India**Muslim Chamber of Commerce Papers*

24 September, 1937. As desired by the Committee in their meeting held on the 21 September, 1937 the Secretary arranged an interview with Mr. M.B. Nanavati, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, and saw him along with Mr. G.A. Dossani,¹ on the 24th September, 1937, at the office of the Reserve Bank of India. Mr. Nanavati had examined the relevant papers and his attitude was sympathetic and helpful. He, however, mentioned that the Board had laid down a definite policy to regulate the proportion of all communities in the services under the Bank and the Managers, at each Branch, were instructed to follow these directions. In this respect the Governors were merely a supervising authority, who, from time to time, examined all records and satisfied themselves that the instructions were followed. In some cases it was found necessary to recruit people from other Provinces, for instance, the Punjab, to get the required number of Muslims. The Secretary, however, pointed out the unauthorised figures in his possession relating to the number of employees in the Calcutta Branch. On examination of these figures Mr. Nanavati promised to go again into the question personally and see that the policy of the Board was followed. As to the promotions of the present employees and their rights and privileges, he said that it was not possible to ignore merit and disregard efficiency. But he said that he was satisfied with the promotions given at the Calcutta Branch and further emphasised that the policy of the Bank was not to give undue preponderance to any one community, whether Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, Christian etc. They usually followed a system of recruitment in which applications were called for posts advertised at the beginning of the year and these applications kept on the waiting list. As vacancies occur they are filled up by the candidates included in the list. It so happened sometime that properly qualified Muslim candidates were not to be found. The Secretary mentioned the number of applications he had forwarded to the Bank and promised to send more if the Bank required Muslim candidates. Mr. Nanavati also said that even when Muslim candidates were not to be found and the vacancy was filled up by a member of other community, the Board demanded an explanation for it.

1. Gulamhusein Allidina Dossani, Director, Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd., Alliance Press Ltd., and the Orient Press of India Ltd., New Delhi; Member, Muslim Chamber of Commerce and Indian Chamber of Commerce.



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*Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]**Zetland Papers, No. 40*

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 27 September, 1937

PRIVATE

2. I was as relieved as you must have been when the hunger-strike¹ in the Andamans came to an end;² and Anderson is to be congratulated on the way in which he rode the storm in Bengal. But I have not the least doubt that what we have witnessed there is only the first of what will prove to be a series of revolts, probably of increasing violence, by the Hindus of Bengal against a Muslim raj. The fact that there are Hindus in the Government may act to some extent as a check upon such revolts; but I doubt whether in the long run it will prove to be an effective check, for I cannot see them ever resigning themselves to a position of statutory subordination to the Muslims in the Legislature. You will remember my importunity over this aspect of the Communal Award during the sittings of the Joint Select Committee. I am disposed to think that the assured position of the Muslims in the Legislature has been of immediate advantage from our point of view, for a Congress Ministry in Bengal at this stage might have been not only troublesome but positively dangerous. But looking to the future I foresee times of great difficulty. Moreover, the Muslims are I think, much more likely to adopt a communistic outlook than the Hindus, for communism is much more in consonance with their social organisation than it is with that of the Hindus. And I gather from Anderson's reports that the present Ministry is already getting into tangles over its proposed tenancy legislation. However, in the circumstances of the case we cannot look very far ahead, for we are tied up in the Communal Award and we shall have to concentrate on getting over each fence as we reach it without a spill.

8. I was greatly interested in your account of your talks with Jinnah and Bhulabhai Desai. I am sure that personal contact is a card to play for all that it is worth at this stage. And I am sure that you must find the study of character and outlook involved in it of absorbing interest.

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1. The reference is to 200 long-term political prisoners in the Andamans who went on hunger-strike on 24 July, 1937 demanding repatriation to their home Province Bengal. This set all Bengal a flame leading to students' strikes and a mammoth rally organised by Rabindranath Tagore. A.K. Fazlul Huq, the Premier of Bengal, brought them back to Bengal and released a large number of political prisoners.
 2. The adjournment motion in the Central Assembly to censure the Government for their callous attitude towards the Andamans hunger-strikers was carried by 62 votes to 55 on 25 September, 1937.

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*Maulana Zafar Ali Khan's Speech**All India Congress Committee Papers, F.N. 15-17/1937*

28 September, 1937. The question of changing the creed of the All India Muslim League would be settled at the coming session of that body at Lucknow, declared Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Central) of Lahore, presiding over the Calcutta Muslim League Conference in the Town Hall yesterday (Sunday).

2. He challenged the Congress claim that they represented the Indian Muslims also. They (the latter) could, the Maulana emphasised, cooperate with the Congress only on equal terms, but would never merge themselves into that body.

3. Britain had betrayed them, continued the Maulana, and thrust a Constitution upon them which had done more harm to the cause of Islam and the Muslims of India than to the cause of the Hindus. A great crisis had arisen in their affairs. They found that they had been handed over to the tender mercies of the majority community where the rule was that of the vote.

4. The Maulana next criticised the main features of the Constitution and described how the Congress, in spite of its declared policy to put an end to it, had agreed to accept office and cooperate with Britain within the four corners of the Constitution so far as Provincial autonomy was concerned.

5. Mr. Gandhi's Supremacy: Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he said, was against office acceptance. Though a great power in the land, the Pandit was only of secondary importance so far as the settlement of affairs in India was concerned. The man of primary importance was Mr. Gandhi and he gave the fiat for office acceptance. If the Congress claim to represent the Muslims was a honest one they could have expected from it fair treatment of the slim minority in the Provinces where the Congress was in a majority. Not a single Muslim Minister had been included in the Cabinet of Orissa.

6. The creed of the Muslim League would be settled at the coming session of that body at Lucknow. When this was done the League would take the place of the Congress and then they would be in a position to dictate their own terms.

7. Unless there was an honourable settlement between the Congress and the League, there would be no peace in India.

8. The conference passed a resolution recommending that the Constitution of the All India Muslim League should be thoroughly democratized and that the attainment of complete independence and the creation of a free Islam within a free India, should be adopted as its creed and idea at the coming session of the League. It was also resolved that the All India Muslim League should oppose and frustrate the federal scheme outlined in the Government of India Act.

9. The Conference urged the formation of branches of the Muslim League in different parts of Calcutta, Howrah and the 24 Parganas.

The meeting condemned the agitation by the Congress against the present Bengal Ministry and urged the amendment of the Calcutta Municipal Act and the Calcutta University Act to remove grievances of the Muslims.

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*Rajendra Prasad to Vallabhbhai Patel [Extract]**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*

SADAQAT ASHRAM, PATNA, 28 September, 1937

My dear Vallabhbhai,

3. The *Bande Mataram* song is objected to by some Musalmans on the ground that it is invocation to Hindu Goddess and in terms it means idol worship which Musalmans can never agree to. While there are Musalmans who do not look upon the song in this light there is no doubt a feeling among them not to accept it as National Song just as many of them do not accept the tricolour as the National Flag.

It seems there is going to be widespread opposition to the National Flag and the *Bande Mataram* song and this opposition gains strength from thoughtless and inopportune action of our workers and sympathisers at certain places. I think that in this connection also our policy should be laid down in unmistakable terms.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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*Rajendra Prasad to Raja Narendranath**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*

SADAQAT ASHRAM, DIGHAGHAT, PATNA, 29 September, 1937

I thank you for your letter of the 16th September, 1937. The controversy which has arisen between Mr. Jinnah and myself has forced certain discourse including the terms of formula which we had evolved in 1935. The controversy at present has no particular value and is not likely to end in settlement. Mr. Jinnah threw the blame on the Congress for not agreeing to the formula of 1935. I retorted that it was acceptable to the Congress but that Mr. Jinnah insisted on its acceptance by Pt. Malaviaji and other Hindu leaders. So its failure came about. I would, therefore, put you at ease immediately that it is not going to be concluded at present.

2. As regards the discussion that we had in Delhi in 1935 I will remind you that most of the conversations that you had with Sardar Vallabhbhai and Mr. Bhulabhai Desai and I was present on some occasions. The paper which you signed is also not with me but with one of them. Your acceptance was subject to the condition that agreement should be accepted by Sikhs also. The terms of the formula were the same as have been published now. The question of differential franchise was discussed at length and in fact the negotiation broke down on that account.

3. The Sikhs and Bengal Hindus would not accept it and Mr. Jinnah would not give it up. Malaviaji had some other objections too. I think we could have got it through if the Sikhs and Bengalis did not take that attitude on this point of differential franchise. I am afraid, therefore, that you are under a misapprehension. However, the question is of no importance at present.

4. Some days ago I just passed through the Punjab to the N.W.F.P. but could not make time to stop in Punjab. I had some correspondence with Lala Desh Bandhu Gupta sometime ago regarding the Panipat affair. I am somewhat surprised to learn that the present Ministry is not acting as fairly as was to be expected. I was under the impression that Mr. Manohar Lal, one of the Ministers enjoys the confidence of the Hindus and he along with the other Hindus and Sikh Ministers was able to exert influence on the administration to keep things going straight. I fear the situation, therefore, is complicated by division amongst Hindus and Sikhs themselves. It is, therefore, not possible to put the entire blame on the Prime Minister alone. The Cabinet as a whole must share the responsibility for Government policy, and if the Ministers are dissatisfied they should make it known. The position then will be clearer and it will appear to the world outside that it is purely a communal Ministry that is functioning there. What with the Ministry having no less than three non-Muslims and what with all the attempts which are published in the Press of Sir Sikander to solve the communal problems? The general impression created outside is that the communal tangle is somehow getting solved. But I gather from your letter that is not so, and in that case it is only right that the world should know it. It is difficult for a man in my position to be much help. We can act only through our organisation, Congress; and the Congress is not very strong among members of any community in the Punjab.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Shamsul Hasan Collection

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

LAHORE, 7 October, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

A strong contingent from the Punjab is expected to attend the Lucknow Session of the League. The Unionist Muslims are also making preparations to attend under the leadership of Sir Sikander Hayat. We are living in difficult times and the Indian Muslims expect that your address will give them the clearest possible lead in all matters relating to the future of the community. I suggest that the League may state

or re-state its policy relating to the Communal Award in the shape of a suitable resolution. In the Punjab, and I hear also in Sind, attempts are being made by misguided Muslims themselves to alter it in the interest of the Hindus. Such men fondly believe that by pleasing the Hindus they will be able to retain their power. I personally believe that since the British Government wants to humour the Hindus who would welcome the upsetter of the Communal Award they (the British Government) are trying to get it upset through their Muslim agents.

2. I shall prepare a list of 28 persons for the vacancies in the League Council. Mr. Ghulam Rasool¹ will show you this list. I do hope that this choice will be carefully made. Our men will leave Lahore on the 13th.

3. The Palestine question is very much agitating the minds of the Muslims. We have a very fine opportunity for mass contact for the purpose of the League. I have no doubt that the League will pass a strong resolution on this question and also by holding a private conference of the leaders decide on some sort of a positive action in which masses may share in large numbers. This will at once popularise the League and may help the Palestine Arabs. Personally I would not mind going to Jail on an issue which affects both Islam and India. The formation of a Western base on the very gates of the East is a menace to both.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

MUHAMMAD IQBAL

P.S. The League should resolve that no Province should come to any understanding with other communities regarding the Communal Award. This is an All India question and must be settled by the League alone. Perhaps you may go further and say that the present atmosphere is not at all suitable for any communal understanding.

1. Ghulam Rasool, Member, Council of All India Muslim League.

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Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ismail¹ to Rajendra Prasad [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents I.

CONFIDENTIAL

ISMAIL MANZIL, PATNA, 8 October, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

3. It is indeed very unfortunate that the Indian National Congress, the only well organised, most disciplined and most influential body in the whole of India, which alone can claim credit for all the advancement and subsequent achievements in the country, is being misunderstood and attacked by those who belonged to the Indian

National Congress from the Khilafat days of 1919. (We of the moderate section who previously belonged to the Indian National Congress still regard it with reverence and respect, however much we may disagree with its methods.) I find that Maulana Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani² and Zaffar Ali Khan, who were rabid and blind followers, are now the bitterest enemies. The community of the Musalmans in the whole of India is being misled, misguided and misdirected. Please pardon my saying that this state of affairs is in evidence since 1929 as before that even the Jinnah section of the Muslim League was entirely in sympathy with the Congress. I may refer you to the Calcutta sitting of the League held in December 1927 and again in December 1928. It was after the result of the Lahore Session of the Congress that the sympathy of the Musalmans was alienated. Please pardon my saying frankly that a great blunder has been committed. The thing has been spoilt and enemies have taken advantage of it, and the time-servers and self-seekers exploited their objects—the result is deplorable. Now everything is taken advantage of and is being objected. To create misunderstanding and to destroy the honest intention is very easy but to pave the way for mutual understanding is most difficult and every attempt made at it is being destroyed by self-seekers. I am absolutely willing to cooperate with you in the removal of all misunderstanding and in creating a healthy atmosphere. I shall look into the writings of the *Star of India* and shall make a public statement in consultation with others. But please pardon my saying plainly that it is very unfortunate that the Congress Governments have started their regime on the strength of the majority in the Legislature without least care to maintain friendly relations between the different classes, communities and interests. I am not unreasonable nor I am selfish but I do feel and must say that the two measures, namely of (i) taxation and the other of (ii) reducing the income is most unjust, unfair and unwarranted, more particularly when my House, the Upper Chamber, was so disrespected as not to be consulted in these matters: (1) the resolution regarding the Constituent Assembly, (2) resolution regarding the agricultural income-tax. Now pray excuse me what does it show? Does it not indicate that the Congress Government ignores the existence of the Upper Chamber? If not, why are we not consulted? Are we not humans? Are we not capable of advancing views? Is there no precedence in India itself when similar resolutions of vital importance were discussed both in the Legislative Assembly and in the Council of State not to speak of the Dominion Parliaments where both Houses are always consulted? I submit that the Congress Government can expect cooperation only if they will show scrupulous regard for the wishes of all. Governments do not exist for a group or for a class. Please pardon my submitting very friendly and frankly what I honestly feel. I do not ascribe any motive, far be it my intention.

4. Now turning again to the burning question as to how to remove the differences between Hindu and Muslims, both the intelligentsia and the masses, is a matter which deserves serious consideration and is a matter which is the duty of all patriotic Indians to remove. I feel that the meeting held on the evening of the 24th September was not properly arranged, nor ample opportunity had been given to all to have their say. The whole thing was hastily done, hence taken advantage of by the enemies to misinterpret and to suppress the real fact. However, I shall discuss with you how to

solve this problem when you return first alone at any place fixed by you and then as we decide.

5. There are some other matters, for instance, the singing of "*Bande Mataram*" sung in schools and in gatherings which though not new is being misinterpreted. This matter also requires further thinking over. The writing in a local vernacular paper called *The Muslim* is being objected to by 90 per cent of the Musalmans in Bihar and my friend of the *Star of India* who has been recently touring some of the districts of Bihar is considered a new "*Masih*" (Christ) and a saviour of Muslim interests. He has been speaking and writing things which he could not have done unless material was supplied from Bihar. The whole Muslim community, except only about 5 per cent, is against Congress somehow at present.

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1. Khan Mohammad Ismail, Member, Legislative Council, Bihar.
 2. Maulana Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951); Urdu Poet and Politician, joined Congress, 1903; Member, League delegation to England on Khilafat issue, 1919; League President, Ahmedabad Session, 1921; joined for two years for sedition, 1922; Member, U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1946; Member, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1948.

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Rajagopalachari¹ to Nehru

Rajagopalachari Papers

CAMP: MOHANUR, 9 October, 1937

My dear Rajaji,

Can you possibly find time to ask the Jamiat-ul-Ulama people to issue a statement of *fatwa*² that the first stanza of Bankim's "*Bande Mataram*" song which is being sung in the Madras Assembly when we begin the sittings does not offend Musalman's religious sentiment? Such a statement will be of great use against the mischievous agitation set up here by anti-national Musalmans and which is catching the ignorant people's fancy for a quarrel.

I am enclosing a letter from Jamia Millia. Please ask Zakir Husain³ to go ahead and to send you the books when they are ready. Kindly write something for the Readers and send me the whole thing when they are ready in both scripts.

Yours sincerely,
PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,
Ananda Bhawan, Allahabad

1. C. Rajagopalachari or Rajagopalachariar (1879-1972); joined Non-Cooperation Movement, 1920; Secretary, Indian National Congress, 1921-22; Premier, Madras, 1937-39; Member, Viceroy's

- Council, 1946-47; Governor, West Bengal, August, 1947; Acting Governor-General of India, 1948-50; Chief Minister of Madras, 1952-54.
2. Religious decree issued by Muslim Mufti.
 3. Dr. Zakir Husain (1897-1969); Shaikhul Jamia (Vice-Chancellor) Jamia Millia Islamia, 1926-48; collaborated Mahatma Gandhi in framing Basic National Education Scheme launched in 1938; President, Hindustani Talimi Sangh, 1938-48; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1948-56; Governor of Bihar, 1957-62; Vice-President of India, 1962-67; President of India, 1967-69.

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The All India Shia Political Conference

Indian Annual Register, Lucknow, 11-12 October, 1937, Pt. II, pp. 415-16

The Sixth Annual Session of the All India Shia Political Conference¹ commenced at Lucknow on the 11th October 1937, under the Presidency of Sir Wazir Hassan, who in the course of his address said:

“The poverty and miserable plight of the Muslim masses is as great as (if not greater) that of the Hindu masses. In this work of creating national sanctions behind the struggle for political freedom, the Congress will welcome cooperation from all communities and classes. But obviously if co-operation is offered on terms or at a price, Congress cannot pause to consider such terms or to evaluate the price.”

Sir Wazir Hassan continued: “I deny that what is called the problem of the Minorities is a reality. I am convinced that the so-called problem of the minorities is a creation of British imperialists and is always used as a weapon to impede the progress of nationalism in this country.” Sir Wazir regretted that communalism raised its head at every step that was taken or intended to be taken on the march to the goal of freedom by the Congress or any group of Indian Nationalists. The communalists amongst the Hindus were as much obstructive as communalists amongst the Musalmans. The Congress had, thus, to fight the battle of freedom on three fronts, viz., British imperialist, Hindu communalist and Muslim communalist, and, God willing it would win on all fronts.

“The days of drawing-room politics and intellectual gymnastics with a view to moulding an agreed formula by the best of the Hindu and Muslim communities had gone, he said, and added: “You cannot reverse the wheels of force which are dominating the thoughts and actions of the people and nations of the entire world. If you have the least impulse of patriotism in you, you cannot let your politics degenerate from nationalism to communalism and from communalism to fanaticism.”

As regards their rights under the Communal Award. The attitude of the Congress was perfectly clear though that attitude had neither the authority nor the wish to disturb the adjustments made by the British Parliament in the Award as regards seats in the Legislatures of the country. “With whom are we to make a settlement,” asked Sir Wazir Hasan. In the Provinces where the Musalmans were in a majority and

formed the Governments, neither the All India Muslim League nor the Provincial Leagues had any status. Taking a view of the position of the League in all the Provinces, the President thought that the League could not be said to represent a majority of the Musalmāns in any Province of British India, except Bombay, and in several Provinces the League did not represent Muslims at all. Further, he said, there was no guarantee forthcoming that any settlement between the League and the Congress would be honoured and accepted by the Musalmāns of India as a whole or even by the Musalmāns in the Provinces separately. Sir Wazir maintained that the proper time for a settlement of what was called the minority problem would come after India had attained the status of a free country.

Sir Wazir thought that the crux of the problem was that the aspirations of India for independence could not any longer be satisfied with a mere change of mentality. What India wanted today was action. He believed that obviously the forces of freedom would be immeasurably enhanced if all the Musalmāns of India would also contribute their share of sacrifices and services in the fight for independence and he felt convinced that the battle for freedom must be fought at any sacrifice or cost. "It should be remembered" said the President "that the destiny of India in future will not only fall into the hands of the young and educated people of today but also into the hands of the masses who in their eagerness to attain freedom as the only panacea of all ills will not pause to consider such trifles as what is now called the minority problem. For, does not 'the adult franchise' imply the supremacy of the masses? If such is the reality of the future, I trust that you, my friends, will be no party to qualifying the main purpose of the resolution relating to the Constituent Assembly by annexing provisos to safeguard the interests of minority communities and classes.

Sir Wazir Hasan thought it advisable in the interest of the solidarity of the Muslim community that they should work for the attainment of their goal from inside the Muslim League. Referring to the Madhe Sahaba question, the President advised that whether the finding of the Tribunal was adverse or favourable it must be accepted most readily and in the full belief that justice had been done.

Resolutions—2

12 October, 1937. Noisy scenes marked the proceedings of the second day of the All India Shia Political Conference, at which far-reaching decisions were taken. After a warm discussion, the Conference decided that Shias should join the Congress unconditionally.

Sir Wazir Hasan, speaking at length, traced the history of the Muslim League and said that that body did not treat the Shias honestly and had forced their hands to join the Congress.

By another resolution, the Conference opined that separate electorates for all legislatures should be abolished and should be replaced by joint electorates with reservations of seats for Muslim minorities on the basis of the ratio fixed by the Communal Award, and that joint electorates, with the ratio of representation of Musalmāns as provided by the present Municipal and District Boards Act, should be immediately introduced.

The Conference unanimously passed the Constituent Assembly resolution as passed

by the United Provinces Assembly without any proviso. While resolving and requesting the Congress to note that the Muslim League did not represent the entire Muslims of India, allegations were made that the rights of the Shia minority were always crushed by the League and that the League Party had helped the Madhe Sahaba agitation.

The Conference formed a propaganda committee and decided to start a newspaper.

The Conference "condemned" the Royal Commission's recommendation for the division of Palestine.

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1. Established in 1929, its inaugural session presided over by Raja Nawab Ali, advocated joint electorates and rejected Communal Award. It came into prominence by giving a tough fight to the ideology of partitioning the country on the plea that the Shias formed only a Minority among the Muslims. Sir Wazir Hasan, President of 1937, Lucknow session informed the Viceroy that they owed no allegiance to the League.

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Raja of Mahmudabad's¹ Welcome Address

Foundations of Pakistan, p. 264

Lucknow, 15 October, 1937. In the course of his welcome address, as Chairman of the Reception Committee, the Raja of Mahmudabad said:

2. We are here to decide many difficult questions, questions which will not only affect our own community but the whole of India, in fact the world. I say 'the world' because means of communication and transport have developed so rapidly that we cannot completely isolate ourselves from the rest of the people that inhabit the globe. What happens in India today is of vital importance to Asia and other continents tomorrow.

3. A delicate political situation has been created in our own country. The majority community refuses to recognise even the existence of the Muslim community as such, and it refuses to work in cooperation with our leaders for national advancement.

4. We have been dubbed reactionaries, we have been maligned, and personal attacks have been made against us. But I repeat that there is not one Musalman who sits here today who does not want freedom of thought and action, and who does not want to have a free country to live in. They, that call us reactionaries, must remember that they are talking to Musalmans,—Musalmans whose religion teaches them that without liberty they cannot truly live in. We want liberty for our country, but we also want liberty for our community. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.

1. Amir Ahmad Khan, Raja of Mahmudabad (1914-73) succeeded his father as Raja of Mahmudabad, 1931; Treasurer, All India Muslim League, 1938-42; President, All India Shia Muslim Conference,

(twice); President, All India Muslim Students Federation; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946; Director, Islamic Centre, London, 1968-73.

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Jinnah's Presidential Address [Extract]

Star of India, 16-17 October, 1937; Nation's Voice, pp. 176-82

Lucknow, 15 October, 1937. 2. "The policy and the programme that you are called upon to formulate and lay down involves the fate and the future of the Musalmans of India and the country at large. On the 12th April, 1936, the Muslim League at its Sessions, the first time in its history, undertook the policy and programme of mass contact. The League considered the prevailing conditions and surveyed the situation that we had to face—the forthcoming elections on the eve of the inauguration of the new Provincial Constitution embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935,—and had no alternative but to enter the field and contest the elections to the Provincial Legislatures. It was also felt that there was no alternative but to utilise the Provincial constitution for what it was worth, although it was far from being satisfactory. I may here reproduce the resolution that was passed on the 12th April, 1936. "Whereas the Parliamentary System of Government which is being introduced in this country with the inauguration of the new Constitution presupposes the formation of parties with a well-defined policy and programme which facilitates the education of the electorate, and cooperation between groups with approximate aims and ideals and ensures the working of the Constitution to the best advantage; and whereas in order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslims community and to secure for the Muslim their proper and effective share in the Provincial Governments, it is essential that the Muslims should organise themselves as one party, with an advanced and progressive programme, it is hereby resolved that the All India Muslim League do take steps to contest the approaching Provincial elections and for this purpose appoint Mr. Jinnah to form a Central Election Board under his Presidentship, consisting of not less than 35 members, with powers to constitute and affiliate Provincial Elections Boards in various Provinces, having regard to the condition of each Province and devise ways and means for carrying out the aforesaid objects.'

3. "In pursuance of that decision, the Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board was established in June, 1936, and also in various Provinces, Provincial Boards were established to give effect to the resolution and the instructions of the League. It was not without difficulty and it was no small task to be performed, in the absence of any previous preparations or any existing sufficient organisations and machinery. It was a stupendous undertaking to contest elections in all the Provinces specially when Musalmans all over India are numerically in a minority and weak, educationally backward, and economically nowhere. There never had been made any systematic effort for their social and economic uplift, whereas our sister communities have gone

far ahead with their organisations and the systematic programme supported by a large bulk of people, especially the Hindus, who are not only in a majority but better trained, more disciplined and far better equipped educationally, economically and financially.

4. "But here I may mention that within a short time of about six months' work before the elections were over, the results were very hopeful and there is no need for us to despair. In each and every Province where League Parliamentary Board was established and the League parties were constituted we carried away about 60 and 70 per cent of the seats that were contested by the League candidates, and since the elections were over I find that hundreds of District Leagues have been established in almost every Province from the farthest corner of Madras to the North-West Frontier Province. Since April last the Musalmans of India have rallied round the League more and more and I feel confident that once they understand, realize the policy and programme of the Muslim League the entire Musalman population of India will rally round its platform and under its flag. The Muslim League stands for full national democratic Self-Government for India. A great deal of capital is made as to phrases more for the consumption of the ignorant and illiterate masses. Various phrases are used as *Purna Swaraj*, *Self-Government*, *Complete Independence*, *Responsible Government*, *Substance of Independence and Dominion Status*. There are some who talk of complete independence. But it is no use having complete independence on your lips and the Government of India Act, 1935,¹ in your hands. Those who talk of complete independence the most mean the least what it means. Was the Gandhi-Irwin Pact in consonance with complete independence? Were the assurances that were required before the offices would be accepted and the provincial constitutions should be worked consistent with *Purna Swaraj* and was the resolution after the assurances were refused accepting offices and working the Provincial Constitution enacted by the British Parliament and forced upon the people of India by the imperialistic power in keeping with the policy and programme and the declarations of the Congress Party? Does wrecking mean working? These paper declarations, slogans and shibboleths are not going to carry us anywhere. What India requires is a complete united front and honesty of purpose and then by whatever name you may call your Government is a matter of no consequence so long as it is Government of the people, by the people, for the people.

5. "The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu and since they have formed the Governments in six Provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fairplay at their hands. Wherever they are in a majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to cooperate with the Muslim League parties and demanded unconditional surrender and signing of their pledges."

6. "The demand was insistent: abjure your party and foreswear your policy and programme and liquidate Muslim League; but where they found they had not a majority like the North-West Frontier Province, their sacred principle of collective responsibility disappeared and promptly the Congress party was allowed in that

Province to coalesce with any other group. That any individual Musalman member who was willing to unconditionally surrender and sign their pledge was offered a job as a Minister and was passed off as a Musalman Minister although he did not command the confidence or the respect of an overwhelming majority of the Musalman representatives in the legislatures. These men are allowed to move about and pass off as Muslim Minister for the "loyal" services they have rendered to the Congress by surrendering and signing the pledge unconditionally and the degree of their reward is the extent of their perfidy. Hindi is to be the national language of All India and that *Bande Mataram* is to be the national song, and is to be forced upon all. The Congress flag is to be obeyed and revered by all and sundry. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words. The result of the present Congress party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and strengthening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence. I dare say that the British Government will give the Congress a free hand in this direction and it matters very little to them, nay, on the contrary, it is all to the good, so long as their interests imperial or otherwise, are not touched and the defence remains intact, but I feel that a fearful reaction will set in when the Congress has created more and more divisions amongst Indians themselves, and made the united front impossible."

7. "Here it will not be out of place to state that the responsibility of the British Government is no less in the disastrous consequences which may ensue. It has been clearly demonstrated that the Governor and the Governor-General who have been given the powers and special responsibility to safeguard and protect the Minorities under the Constitution which was made so much of by Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, during the controversy on the assurances demanded by the Congress party, have failed to use them and have thereby been a party to the flagrant breach of the spirit of the Constitution and the instrument of instructions in the matter of the appointment of Muslim Ministers. On the contrary, they have been a party to passing off men as Muslim Ministers by appointing them as such although they know full well that they do not command the confidence of the Muslim representatives or the public outside. If in a matter like this the Governors have shown their utter helplessness and disregard for their sacred obligations which were assumed by the British Government for the protection of Minorities, could they or would they be able to afford protection in hundred and one other matters which may not come up to the surface or known in the day to day working of the Legislature and the administrative machinery. These are very serious and noteworthy signs of the time. The one wholesome lesson that I ask the Musalmans to learn, before it is too late, is that the path before the Musalmans is, therefore, plain. They must realise that the time has come when they should concentrate and devote their energies to self-organisation and full development of their power to the exclusion of every other consideration. I have pointed out before that a section of Musalmans is divided, that there is a group that stands with face turned towards the British, if they have not learnt by now of the bitter consequences, they will never learn. God only helps those who help themselves. There is another group which turns towards the Congress, and they do so because

they have lost faith in themselves. I want the Musalmans to believe in themselves and take their destiny in their own hands. We want men of faith and determination and who would fight singlehanded for their convictions although at the moment the whole world may be against them. We must develop power and strength till the Musalmans are fully organised and have acquired that power and strength which must come from the solidarity and the unity of people without which nothing can be achieved."

8. No settlement with the majority is possible as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it. Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement. Offers of peace by the weaker party always mean confession of weakness and an invitation to aggression. Appeals to patriotism, justice and fair play and for the goodwill fall flat. It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper unless they are backed up by power. Politics means power and not relying only on cries of justice or fair play or goodwill. Look at the nations of the world, and look at what is happening everyday. See what has happened to Abyssinia, look what is happening to China and Spain, and not to say of the tragedy of Palestine, to which I shall refer later.

9. "The Congress High Command speaks in different voices. One opinion is that there is no such thing as Hindu-Muslim question and there is no such thing as Minorities' question in the country. The other high opinion is that if a few crumbs are thrown to the Musalmans in their present disorganized and helpless state, you can manage them. They are sadly mistaken if they think that the Musalmans can be imposed upon. The All India Muslim League has now come to live and play its just part in the world of Indian politics and sooner it is realized and reckoned with, the better it will be for all interests concerned. The third opinion is that there is no light to be seen through the impenetrable darkness; but as the Congress goes on acquiring strength and power so the past promises of the blank cheques remain unfilled and unsigned."

10. "I want the Musalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single definite uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India. The Congressite Musalmans are making a great mistake when they preach unconditional surrender. It is the height of defeatist mentality to throw ourselves on the mercy and goodwill of others and the highest act of perfidy to the Musalman community, and if that policy is adopted, let me tell you, the community will seal its doom and will cease to play its rightful part in the national life of the country and the Government. Only one thing can save the Musalmans and energise them to regain their lost ground. They must first recapture their own souls and stand by their lofty position and principles which form the basis of their great unity and which bind them in one body politics. Do not be disturbed by the slogans and the taunts such as are used against the Musalmans, *communalists*, *toadies* and *reactionaries*. The worst toady on earth, the most wicked *communist* today amongst Muslims when he surrenders unconditionally to the Congress and abuses his own community and becomes the nationalist of nationalists tomorrow. These terms and words and abuses

are intended to create inferiority complex amongst the Musalmans and demoralise them; and are intended to sow discord in their midst and give us a bad name in the world abroad. This is the standard of propaganda which can only be treated with contempt."

11. "The All India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other Minorities effectively. That is its basic and cardinal principle. That is the *Causus belli*. That is why the Muslim League and those who stand by it have incurred the displeasure of the Congress for what else are we doing which the Congress objects to. Congress is doing exactly what we decided two years ago. The League is not going to allow the Musalmans to be exploited either by the British Government or any other party or group inside the Legislature or outside. The Congress with all its boasts has done nothing in the past for the Musalmans. It has failed to inspire confidence and to create a sense of security amongst the Musalmans and other Minorities. The Congress attempt under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Musalmans is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Musalmans and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders. It is a dangerous move and it cannot mislead any one. All such manoeuvres will not succeed notwithstanding the various blandishments, catchwords and slogans. The only honest and straightforward course is to give the Minorities a fair deal. All the talk of hunger and poverty is intended to lead the people towards socialistic and communistic ideas for which India is far from prepared. The Muslim League in the present conditions consider the policy of direct action as suicidal and futile. Two such attempts have hitherto failed and have entailed untold misery and suffering to the people, and it had to be wound up after two decades of persistent efforts in that direction with the result that a more reactionary Constitution is forced upon the people, and the Congress is working now."

12. "To ask by a resolution the Governor-General to convey to the Secretary of State for India, to call a Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult franchise is the height of all ignorance. It shows lack of any sense of proportion. A Constituent Assembly can only be called by sovereign authority and from the seat of power—a special body of men chosen as the representatives with the authority of the sovereign people to frame such Constitution of the Government of the country as they may think proper, and their function ceases and the Constitution so framed by them would automatically take the place and function as the Constitution of the Government of the country. Who is to constitute the electorates on the basis of adults franchise, and how many representatives will be chosen by these electorates constituted on the basis of adult franchise, and what will happen to the Minorities in such constituencies, and what will the electorates understand and how will they make their choice of this special body of men with final authority and power to frame the Constitution of this great continent? Who will direct the machinery to choose the special body of men with representative authority to frame such Constitution as they may think proper? Who will set in motion the machinery? And above all what will happen to the Minorities in such a body? Is the Congress really serious that the Secretary of State is going to carry out all these requirements? When only a few days ago the representative of the British Government speaking with the highest authority, His Excellency the Viceroy,

said that he was full of hope that they might succeed in securing the federation of India in the near future, that when he came out to India he had expressed the hope that the scheme of federation was on the whole one calculated to secure federation within a reasonable time after the inauguration of Provincial autonomy, and that his experience of the last 18 months had confirmed him in that view regarding the establishment of federation within a reasonable time."

13. "Taking the country as a whole the Congress is still far from occupying the seat of authority and it is travesty of realities to think of British Government calling a Constituent Assembly and for the ability of the Congress to do so is a pure moonshine. Let the Congress first bring all principal communities in the country and all principal classes of interest under its leadership. To ask a Foreign Government who is the ruling and sovereign authority in this country to convene such a body before even the communal problem has been solved and before all important communities in India have accepted the leadership of the Congress is like putting the cart before the horse, and not to forget that 1/3 of India stands on a very special footing constituting the Indian States and Ruling Princes."

14. "Instead of ploughing the sands, let the Congress at least concentrate and see that the All India Federation scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, which is more reactionary than even the present Central Constitution is, not brought into being as now it is so emphatically and confidently asserted by those who speak with authority on behalf of the British Government that it is soon going to be inaugurated. What is the Congress going to do? Do they think that they can single-handed as a party prevent it? Or will some other formula be evolved and Congress quietly accept it as a *fait accompli* as it has done the provincial constitution in spite of all the rantings of some of the foremost leaders of the Congress against it?

15. "To the Musalmans of India in every Province, in every district, in every tehsil, in every town, I say your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and ameliorative programme of work for the people's welfare and to devise ways and means of social, economic and political uplift of the Musalmans. We shall not hesitate to cooperate with any party or group in any practical and constructive programme for the welfare and advance of the Provinces or the country. I entreat and implore that every man, woman and child should rally round one common platform and flag of the All India Muslim League. Enlist yourself by hundreds and thousands as quickly as you can as members of the All India Muslim League, Provincial Leagues and District Leagues. Organize yourself, establish your solidarity and complete unity. Equip yourself as trained and disciplined soldiers. Create the feeling *esprit de corps*, and of comradeship amongst yourselves. Work loyally, honestly and for the cause of your people and your country. No individual or people can achieve anything without industry, suffering and sacrifice. There are forces which may bully you, tyrannise over you and intimidate you, and you may even have to suffer. But it is by going through this crucible of fire of persecution which may be levelled against you, tyranny that may be exercised, the threats and intimidations may unnerve you, but it is by resisting, by overcoming, by facing these disadvantages, hardships and suffering and maintaining your true conviction and loyalty that a nation will emerge worthy of its past glory and history and will live to make the future history greater and more

glorious not only of India, but in the annals of the world. Eighty millions of Musalmans in India have nothing to fear. They have their destiny in their hands, and as a well-knit, solid, organised, united force can face any danger, and withstand any opposition to its united front and wishes. There is the magic power in your own hands. Take your vital decisions—they may be grave and momentous and far-reaching in their consequences. Think hundred times before you take any decision, but once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man. Be true and loyal, and I feel confident that success is with you.”

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1. The Government of India Act of 1935 envisaged Federal Executive comprising Councillors as well as Ministers but they were not responsible to the Legislature, the Governor-General having the authority to ignore their advice. The Federation consisting of both British India and the Princely States was to come into being when States, with at least half of their population, had agreed to join it. However, the Princes, in spite of their weighted representation in the Council of State as well as the Assembly, were reluctant to join the Federation. In the case of Provinces, the scope of autonomy was greatly expanded in as much as the administration was to be carried on by Indian Ministers responsible to the Legislature although in some cases the Governors had overriding powers.

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Resolutions passed at the Lucknow Session [Extract]

Historic Documents, 231

LUCKNOW, 15-18 October, 1937

5. Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of Full Independence in the form of a federation of free democratic States in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other Minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the Constitution.

That this meeting of the All India Muslim League records its emphatic disapproval of the scheme of the All India Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 and is opposed to its introduction and urges upon the British Government to refrain from its enforcement as it considers the scheme to be detrimental to the interests of the people of India generally and to those of the Muslims in particular.

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The Sind Hindu Conference, Karachi, 15 October, 1937

The Indian Annual Register, 1937, Pt. II, pp. 422-24

Presiding over the Sind Hindu Conference held at Karachi on the 15 October, 1937 Bhai Parmanand said:

When in the Hindu Mahasabha session at Ajmer I called the attention of the country to the importance of the Constitutional measure that was being moulded into shape in London, I was bitterly assailed by the Congress Press. But time has shown that I was right in emphasising that the Constitution, with all its defects, could not be ignored and to-day the Constitution has conquered the Congress.

The most prominent outcome of the working of the Constitution is, as designed by its framers, the division of the country into two parts. There are the Congress Ministries in office in the six Hindu Provinces while Muslim Ministries have been formed in the remaining four or five Provinces. The attitude of the Congress Ministries in the Hindu Provinces is to me a very puzzling one. While the Muslim Ministries are quite free to look to the interests of their communities without any regard for the Congress or the Hindus, the Congress Ministries are wedded to their pro-Muslim Congress programme, and are ever alert in their attempts to appease the insatiable Muslim communal hunger. It is clear to any impartial observer that the Hindus in the Muslim Provinces have to combine themselves under the banner of a Hindu party if they want to protect their interests and live with honour and self-respect. To force the Hindus in these provinces to adopt the pro-Muslim Congress policy would be unnatural and detrimental to their interests. In the Hindu majority Provinces the main function of the Hindu Sabhas will be to keep the Congress Ministries on their rails and to prevent them from going too far in the pursuit of their policy of pleasing and cajoling the Muslim community.

To save their face in the matter of Constitution-making, the Congress Party now proposes to summon a Constituent Assembly. Such a proposal I consider to be a mere make-believe and sham. The Constituent Assembly can be summoned only when the existing Government breaks down. It is meaningless to ask the present Government to summon the Constituent Assembly. We all know full well the views of the Muslim community in Provinces like Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier. I may say there (sic) that the North-West Frontier Congress judging it from its Muslim outlook, is very little different from Muslim parties in other Muslim Provinces. While the Muslims want to create "a free Islam in a free India," how can any one expect better results from a Constituent Assembly than from the various Unity Conferences that have gone before. The proposal of a Constituent Assembly under these circumstances is a grave political blunder.

Next comes the question of Federation. I have not the least doubt that Parliamentary mentality having come to stay, the Congress cannot but accept Federation though Pandit Jawaharlal is most emphatic in opposing the scheme. He used very strong language in his first speech and when it was criticised, he explained in a statement that he was not correctly reported. He was not against Federation as such but he was opposed to the Federal-Scheme embodied in the Government of India Act. Babu Rajendra Prasad has also supported this view and told us that Congress will oppose Federation because it lacks the element of popular control in it. By popular control Babu Rajendra Prasad evidently means Congress control; and in this sense the Hindu Provinces alone have come under popular control. Now Hindus number three-fourths of the population; and had they been allowed representation according to their proportion in the population of the country, then there would have been popular

control in the Federal Assembly in spite of the quota to the Indian States. The Hindus have been deprived of their just rights of representation by the Communal Award which the Congress has virtually accepted. Hence the complaint of popular control in the Federal Centre.

While Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru finds fault with the Federation on account of the share of the Princes in it, my view is that it is the Communal Award that really deprives the Federal Assembly of popular control. Out of the 250 seats assigned to British India, the Hindus should get 187 if they are given their proper share according to population. And this means one-half of the total number of seats in the Federal Assembly inclusive of the Indian States. Supposing they were under the influence of the Congress, then surely the Federal Assembly could not have been accused of lacking in popular control. But the position of the Hindus has been reduced so low by the Communal Award that their representatives will have no effective voice in the Assembly. Instead of seventy-five per cent, the Hindus have been given forty-two per cent in the Assembly; out of 250 they get only 105, and out of these 105, nineteen are reserved for the depressed classes. So, practically speaking, the Hindus get only eighty-six seats while the Muslims, who form only one fourth of the population, get eighty-three seats. Pandit Jawaharlal attaches no value to the question of number of seats in the legislature; he calls them a few crumbs from the table of British Imperialism. I think he would realise the importance of these crumbs if he just pays a little closer attention to the dodge played and the havoc done by the Communal Award.

Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant has made a very elaborate and clear speech on the Constituent Assembly, in which he says, "I can say so with a little authority that I am supposed to possess that there will be no Constitution passed by the Constituent Assembly if the Hindus and Muslims do not agree. It is impossible to conceive of a Constitution which may be framed against the wishes of 70 millions of people in this country. That Constitution cannot last for the fraction of a second.... I agree I have never made a secret of it that unless there is an agreement between us and unless there is full concord between us we can have no freedom." Is that possible? The Muslims have fought for separate electorates and gained them with the avowed object of preserving their separate entity. Even now, Mr. Jinnah reflects the Muslim mentality when he says that the Muslims should develop their separate nationality. Quite recently a Moslem League Conference was held at Calcutta under the Presidentship of Maulana Zafarali Khan of Lahore. In the course of his address the Chairman of the Reception Committee said, "The Muslim League should adopt complete Independence and the creation of a free Islam within a free India as its political goal; and open branches at every town and village inhabited by Muslims." Maulana Zafar Ali himself gave expression to similar feelings that the Muslims wanted to live as a self-sufficient and independent nation of India.

To work out a scheme of genuine joint electorates with this mentality of a big community is like attempting to fit in a square peg into a round hole. We must, then, await with patience a change in the Muslim angle of vision, before we can have joint electorates.

The feeling of self-respect has kept the Hindus alive throughout the ages, under all the invasions and storms. For the sake of their religion, Hindus have undergone

all sorts of sufferings and tribulations. But the faith was bright and there was something in Hinduism which was not to be found elsewhere. It is this faith which has kept the depressed classes within the Hindu fold for thousands of years in spite of their troubles and disabilities. It was the spirit of national self-respect that produced Shivaji,¹ Rana Pratap,² Guru Govind Singh³ and Banda Bairagi.⁴ Take away this spirit and this faith and the Hindu society becomes a lifeless skeleton. It is fashion with some people to talk of Hindu communalism. Such talks are absurd in the extreme. Politically, it is in the interests of the Hindus to be above all communal spirit. Their religion and bigoted intolerance are poles apart; the Hindu religious philosophy teaches tolerance of every other religion or religious theory. To lecture to the Hindu youths on the evils of communalism is simply to attempt to convert the converted.

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1. Shivaji (1627-1680); founder of the Maratha State in the Deccan who fought relentlessly against the Mughal imperialism.
 2. Rana Pratap, a chieftain of Mewar who valiantly resisted the spread of the Mughal empire.
 3. Guru Govind Singh (1666-1708), the tenth and last Sikh Guru who established the Khalsa fold.
 4. Banda Bahadur (1670-1716); a militant follower of Guru Govind Singh who fought inter militant wars with emperor Bahadur Shah I.

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Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ismail to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents I, pp. 113-15

ISMAIL MANZIL, PATNA CITY, 17 October, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Rajendra Babu,

3. As regards the minority problem, I am afraid the thing is daily getting worse and worse. Whoever may be responsible and whatever may be the reason the fact cannot be denied that in Bihar in particular there is no single Musalman who can claim credit for having the community at his command and under his influence as on account of certain reason and personal considerations, though they have one object in view only, their personal motive precludes them from differing their fusions and to listen to the least interested. I admit this is defeatist mentality but I have to face it. What was not popular in Bihar last year is most popular today, namely the influence of the All India Muslim League and as such, as one belonging to the community know in which direction the wind is blowing. I assure you that I am neither sentimental nor emotional, I am subtle in my political views and conviction. The Congress has much to gain by meeting the wishes of the Minority but on account of their mentality of the numerical strength they are adamant. This is not a Provincial problem which the so-called leader of this place can solve. It is an All India problem and has assumed a vast

magnitude beyond conception. This is my firm conviction and as I have to live with my community, work with my community, die with my community I shall, therefore, have to respect their wishes and sentiments whatever may be my own personal feeling and please excuse my very plain and frank talking. The whole correspondence shall be kept secret and I close with the prayer that impasse may yet be removed.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
ISMAIL

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Comments on League Session and Shia Political Conference at Lucknow to Thorne [Extract]

Home Department (Special) F. 10/1-C.X

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED PROVINCES, LUCKNOW, 18 October, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Thorne,

I am desired to submit my fortnightly demi-official report for the first half of October, 1937.

6. Mr. Mohammad Ibrahim, M.L.A., Minister for Communications, who was elected on the Muslim League ticket and subsequently joined the Congress Party, has now resigned his seat and is seeking election as a Congressman. He is being bitterly and vigorously opposed by the Muslim League. The gulf between the Congress and the Muslim League has been greatly widened by the recent deliberations at the Muslim League Conference at Lucknow, to which reference will be made later.

9. The most important events of the period are the Conferences which have recently taken place in Lucknow—the Shia Political Conference and the Muslim League. Particular importance attaches to these conferences on account of the policy of the Congress Party to establish Muslim mass contact, with a view to winning over the Musalmans. The reaction of the Shias was favourable; that of the Muslim League was hostile, but its political aims are in fundamental matters similar to those of the Congress. The Shia conference aroused less interest than the Muslim League owing to the smaller numbers of the Shia community and the fact that All India leaders were not present. Resolutions were carried in favour of—

(1) a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for a free India; a joint electorate with reservation of seats in accordance with the Communal Award in all legislative and local bodies; an invitation to all Shias to join Congress;

(2) a declaration that the All India Muslim League is a non representative body and that the Congress should treat it as such.

Mr. Jinnah presided over the Muslim League (session) and the Premiers of the Punjab and Bengal attended. The proceedings have been fully reported in the Press. The main features politically are the determination to resist coalescence with the Congress Party, and to maintain Muslim solidarity. They opposed e.g. the singing of *Bande Mataram* as a national song, and held a flag-hoisting ceremony of the Muslim flag. While genuine enthusiasm was apparent, the presence of hostile elements, the Ahrar Party and the Azad Party, made itself felt in some minor disturbances in which several persons were injured. At the same time, though the League will resist the Congress party's efforts at mass contact, it is opposed to the present Constitution, and with Congress advocates the goal of independence, the Muslim League creed being changed to the "establishment in India of full independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other Minorities are equally and effectively safeguarded." Resolutions were passed condemning British policy in Palestine.

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*Gandhi to Jinnah**Congress Leaders Correspondence with Mr. Jinnah, p. 29*

SEGAON, WARDHA, 19 October, 1937

Dear Friend,

I carefully went through your speech at Lucknow, and I felt deeply hurt over your misunderstanding of my attitude. My letter was in answer to a specially private message you had sent to me. It represented my deepest feeling. The letter was purely personal. Were you right in using it as you did?

2. Of course, as I read it, the whole of your speech is a declaration of war. Only I had hoped you would reserve poor me as bridge between the two. I see that you want no bridge. I am sorry. Only it takes two to make a quarrel. You won't find me one, even if I cannot become a peace-maker.

3. This is not for publication, unless you desire it. It is written in all good faith and out of an anguished heart.

Yours sincerely,
M.K. GANDHI



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Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ismail to Rajendra Prasad***Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. I, p. 115***

ISMAIL MANZIL, PATNA CITY, 19 October, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I write to express to you my most grateful thanks for your kind thought of me and of my humble efforts towards reconciliation and ramifications in the cause of my country. Personally I hold a very strong view but I regret both the Zamindars and the Musalmans are at present diverting their energies in wrong channels. I shall always do my very best to avoid chances of friction.

I have carefully read Mr. Jinnah's address and searched in vain to find something for the guidance of Musalmans and found to my regret nothing but hatred towards the Congress. Even poor Sir Wazir Hasan, who is an ex-President of the League, is so disgracefully treated. I have written very strongly on this question to the Press. God save the Musalmans of Bihar if they are to be guided under the Muslim League's banner by Khan Bahadur Ibrahim, Ghazi Jafar Imam¹ and Ghazi Badruddin the former whose whole ambition in life is to worship at the official shrine. Let Mr. Jinnah come to Patna as is reported and then I shall have a heart-to-heart talk with him. I know the atmosphere very well, yet I shall put up an honourable fight.

Yours sincerely,
ISMAIL

1. Ghazi Jafar Imam, a leading Muslim of Patna.

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Rafi Ahmed Kidwai's Statement***The Pioneer, 19 October, 1937; TFI, pp. 1048-50***

1. The Hon. Mr. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Minister for Revenue, U.P. Government, criticised in the course of an interview with a representative of *The Pioneer* the speeches of Mr. Jinnah and the Bengal Premier delivered at the open session of the Muslim League.

2. Referring to Mr. Fazlul Huq's threat of retaliation Mr. Kidwai said that "a man who can entertain or express such sentiments is not fit to hold any responsible office."

3. Asked to express his views on the speech made by Fazlul Huq, the Premier of

Bengal at the open session of the Muslim League, the Honble Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Minister for Revenue, U.P. Government, said:

4. "It is difficult to believe that any one holding the responsible office of Premier of a major Province like Bengal can say what Mr. Fazlul Huq is reported to have said at the open session of the Muslim League."

5. "Mr. Fazlul Huq forgets that he is the head of the Government of a Province in which the proportion of the Muslim to the non-Muslim population is about 55 to 45. Does Mr. Fazlul Huq mean to say that because the Governments of Bihar and U.P. or of Madras and the C.P. somehow or other, either by legislation or by administrative action offended the susceptibilities of the Muslim elements of the population, he as the head of the Government of Bengal would make the Bengali Hindus suffer, for the actual or imaginary sins of the Government of either of these four Provinces?"

6. "A man who can entertain or express such sentiment," added Mr. Kidwai, "is not fit to hold any responsible office and no man who claims to have any sense of responsibility can dare to think on such lines."

7. Continuing, Mr. Kidwai said: "Mr. Fazlul Huq charges the Congress and Congressmen with 'falsehood and hypocrisy.' Those who know Mr. Fazlul Huq and have watched the vagaries of his meteoric political career will not take him seriously. He can say one thing today and quite the contrary the next day. His contemporaries in Bengal know him well enough to consider what he has said of any value. I am sure he himself will forget what he said at Lucknow before he has re-entered the outsidcs of the Presidency of Bengal."

8. Referring to Mr. M.A. Jinnah's Presidential Address at the All India Muslim League session, Mr. Kidwai said: "Mr. Jinnah claims that the All India Muslim League is a political organisation. Does anything in his Presidential Address justify this claim? Three-fourths of this address is devoted to bitter criticism of the Congress."

9. "The session was held in a Province where the agrarian problem is acute. There is countrywide excitement and talk of class war; taluqdars and zamindars are trying to organise themselves to defend their so-called rights and privileges, the Kisans think they have come into their own and are in a defiant mood. But there is not a word on these or similar problems in Mr. Jinnah's address. He has referred with contempt to this talk of hunger and misery. He thinks that to talk of poverty, of oppression and of Kisans rights is to preach socialism and communism. The whole session has ended without putting forth any suggestion as to how to solve these and similar problems."

10. "Once before about 21 years ago, in 1916—Mr. Jinnah presided over the annual session of the All India Muslim League at Lucknow. That was the first session of the League which Mr. Jinnah had attended, for prior to that he had persistently refused to join the League because he had considered it a communal organisation; only after it had adopted the Congress creed as its own that Mr. Jinnah joined it. One has to compare Mr. Jinnah's address delivered in 1916¹ with the one delivered at this session to realise how far he has drifted from the position he took up then."

11. "Mr. Jinnah characterises *Vande Mataram* as an anti-Islamic song. Mr. Jinnah had been a devoted and enthusiastic member of the Congress and of its chief executive, the All India Congress Committee, for a number of years. Every year the session of

the Congress opened with the singing of this song and every year he was seen on the platform listening to the song with the attention of a devotee. Did he ever protest? Mr. Jinnah left the Congress, not because he thought the *Vande Mataram* was an anti-Islamic song, but because he was opposed to the change of creed, that was made at the Nagpur Congress which was defined as the attainment of *Swaraj* instead of Dominion Status."

12. "Today the League has declared independence as its goal. This declaration has been arrived at in spite of Mr. Jinnah's opposition. Let us see if he would stick to it."

13. "In his Presidential Address Mr. Jinnah has not made any reference to any one of the problems that face us today. In his early twenties Mr. Jinnah was opposed to our giving support to Turkey in her troubles. Today he has very generously and very enthusiastically assured the Arabs in Palestine that the Muslims of India are prepared to make every sacrifice to help the Palestine Arabs in their struggle of independence. But, then, at that time Mr. Jinnah talked of Hindustan as his motherland, today he refers to it barely as India Poor India."

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1. In his Presidential Address delivered on 30 December, 1916 Jinnah *inter alia* said, "our joint conference in Lucknow were moved by honest efforts on either side to find lasting solution of our differences and I rejoice to think that a final settlement has at last been reached which sets the seal on Hindu-Muslim cooperation and opens a new era in the history of our country."

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Nehru to Subhas Bose¹

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. P-5/1937

ALLAHABAD, 20 October, 1937

My dear Subhas,

Your letter of the 17th. Certainly as suggested by you I shall discuss the *Bande Mataram* song with Dr. Tagore. I do not know any formal statement is necessary by the Working Committee but we should be clear in our own minds. I have managed to get an English translation of *Ananda Math* and I am reading it at present to get the background of the song. It does seem that this background is likely to irritate the Muslims. Further there is the difficulty of the language which is not understood by most people. I do not understand it without the help of dictionary.

There is no doubt that the present outcry against *Bande Mataram* is to a large extent a manufactured one by the communalists. At the same time there does seem some substance in it and people who are communalistically inclined have been affected by it. Whatever we do cannot be to pander to communalists feeling but to meet real grievances where they exist.

I have decided now to reach Calcutta on the 25th morning. This will give me time to see Dr. Tagore as well as other friends.

Yours affectionately,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945); General Secretary 1937 and President of the Congress 1938, re-elected 1939 defeating Mahatma Gandhi's nominee; resigned Presidentship and founded All India Forward Bloc; placed under house arrest at the beginning of Second World War but escaped to Germany in 1941; organised Indian Independence League in South-East Asia; organised and led the Indian National Army and acclaimed as Netaji after the fall of Japan died in an aircraft accident on 18 August, 1945.

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H.W. Emerson to Linlithgow [Extract]

Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 1056-62

21 October, 1937

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

4. The outstanding impression left by Jawaharlal's visit was that of domination and arrogance on the part of Congress in so far as he represents its attitude. In his main speech at the political conference in Hoshiarpur, he mentioned (and apparently regarded) as the supreme act of wickedness on the part of the Punjab Ministry the fact that it had the temerity to attack Congress. There seems to me no doubt that he is or was genuinely amazed that anyone should have such audacity. It is this domineering and arrogant spirit which is causing most bitter resentment and which affected the Muslims most at Lucknow. I think it strongly influenced Sikander in taking the step which he has taken.

5. I do not know whether Sikander had made up his mind before he went to Lucknow. He mentioned to me at Simla that Jinnah was anxious for his help in All India politics, but the discussion was not pursued. A day or two before he left for Lucknow he told me that he was going there, but I gathered that his chief object was to attempt to influence the League against passing a resolution in favour of complete independence. When he returned, I had a long talk with him with special reference as to how his action might effect the Ministry and his support in the Provincial Legislature. I gather that he had previously mentioned the matter briefly to Sir Chhotu Ram, but that he had not taken Sir Sundar Singh and Mr. Manohar Lal into his confidence. He certainly had no discussion with the supporters of Government as a whole or with the Unionist Party as a body. As I will mention presently, he did not seem to me to appreciate the consequences of his action so far as Provincial politics are concerned. Before I come to this, however, it may be of interest to your Excellency

to give an appreciation of Muslim feeling as interpreted by Sikander after his visit to Lucknow. Although this was voiced in Jinnah's opening address, the resentment was much stronger than even Jinnah represented it to be. The basis of it is the apprehension felt by Muslims regarding the future. In their view the Congress regime in Congress Provinces has been characterised by the spirit of arrogance and domination which I have mentioned above. Particular causes of offence are the non-inclusion of representative Muslims in Congress Cabinets, the flaunting of the Congress flag, the prominence given to "*Bande Mataram*" and the attempt to make Hindi the universal language. To Muslims these are the outward and visible signs of the intention of Congress to create Hindu raj. Apparently some of the delegates from other Provinces gave concrete examples of the oppression of Muslims. I gather that this was particularly the case with delegates from Bihar. Sikander himself admitted that the complaints were probably very exaggerated, but at the moment Muslims everywhere, except in the North-West Frontier Province, are on the lookout for grievances against Congress and are in a mood to see nothing good in anything that Congress Ministries may do. Again, Muslim loyalists in Congress Provinces feel that there is no one to help them. While the more intelligent of them realise that under the new Constitution a Governor must support his Ministers and the Servants of Government must carry out the Ministerial policy, they are not reconciled to these consequences of responsible Government which they did not fully foresee. The less intelligent, of course, are frankly puzzled. Sikander told me that speech after speech was couched in the most bitter invective, and that feeling ran so high that, if any Congress leader had appeared in the conference, he would have been in physical danger. The words Sikander himself used were that he would have been in danger of being lynched. I asked Sikander what was the view generally of Muslims at Lucknow regarding the ultimate aim of Congress. He said that their view, which he shared, was that Congress would be in no hurry to have an open breach with the British Government, that their aim was first to get control in the Provinces and complete domination over the Minorities, especially the Muslims and, when that happened, to drive the British out. If they succeeded in this, they would have the Minorities at their mercy. In the Muslim view this policy of Congress must result in civil war. I give this apprehension not as my own, but as that of Muslims as interpreted by Sikander. According to this view, and here I agree, the Punjab and to a less extent Bengal must be the bulwarks against Congress domination. It is again a case of history repeating itself. After the Irwin-Gandhi agreement Muslims were very depressed and in a thoroughly defeatist mood; they had stood aside from the civil disobedience movement and many of them had given strong and invaluable support to Government. They at first thought that the agreement threw them to the wolves and were ready to make terms with Congress. Gandhi, however, missed the best choice he ever had of coming to terms with them, and gradually their confidence and courage revived. Much the same has happened now. They went to Lucknow in a defeatist mood. They left determined to fight Congress to the last or, in the alternative, to enforce favourable terms for themselves.

6. Muslims are very afraid of Federation because they believe that it will give Congress domination at the Centre, and that through the Centre they will be able to exercise a large measure of control in non-Congress Provinces. I give this again not

as my own appreciation, but as that of Muslims. Incidentally, Sikander expressed the view that Congress intend to accept the present scheme of Federation, after the usual pretence of opposition because they believe that, it will ultimately place them in a position of domination at the Centre.

7. I now come to the effect of the Lucknow agreement on Provincial politics. According to Sikander, all that he agreed to do was to support Jinnah in All India politics and to advise his Muslim supporters in the Provincial Legislature to join the Muslim League making it clear that in Provincial concerns the position of the Unionist Party would remain unchanged. The Secretary of the Muslim League has issued an account of the agreement which would practically mean the merging of Muslim members of the Unionist Party into the Muslim League. Sikander tells me this morning that the statement is wrong and that he is having it corrected. I am not sure at the moment whether the views of Sikander and Jinnah coincide as to what was or was not agreed upon. Sikander has no doubt on the point, but the next few days will show whether there is any misunderstanding. If Sikander has, in fact, unconsciously agreed to an arrangement which would merge the Unionist Party into the League, then he will have to repudiate it, since he fully realises the unfortunate consequences of any such arrangement. Even assuming, however, that the agreement goes no further than he intended and believes it to have gone, it is clear that there has been a big change in the position he has previously held in All India and Provincial politics. The Hindu and Sikh Press at once seized on the importance of what happened at Lucknow. Sikander himself, when I talked to him immediately after his return, did not seem to realise it. He seemed to think that everything would go on much as before. He has now appreciated the change. As I pointed out to him, he is going to find increasing difficulty in assuming the mantle of a non-communal leader. He has, in fact, become a Muslim leader and the opposition Hindus and Sikhs will in future, refuse to regard him as anything else. His Hindu and Sikh colleagues are, I think, a little uneasy, but not seriously perturbed. Sir Chottu Ram, however, would be very upset if there were any question of merging the Unionist Party in the League. The Premier is unlikely at present to lose any of his Hindu or Sikh supporters in the Legislature. On the other hand, his action is undoubtedly thoroughly approved by his Muslim supporters and the danger of any split in the Muslim ranks has been removed for sometime to come. It is improbable that the Unity Conference will now lead to any useful result. As I have suggested in previous letters, there was never much chance of this, while there was a real danger that, owing to the general character and wide implications of the recommendations, it would increase rather than reduce communal tension. The reason why Sikander's action is likely to have little effect at present on his non-Muslim supporters is to be found in the fact that it is generally recognised that Lucknow represents a very definite and strong challenge to Congress, and for the moment, among non-Muslim supporters of Government, resentment against Congress is stronger than communal apprehensions. Chaudhri Sir Chottu Ram, for instance, who is non-communal, is more influenced by the fear of Congress domination than by the fear of Muslim aggression. On the other hand, Hindus with Congress sympathies and those Sikhs, who are not supporters of Sir Sunder Singh, are furious with what has happened and are already making counter-plans. The

Akalis are already thinking of joining Congress, with whom they have always been in close sympathy. The Hindu Sabha may do the same, while it may be assumed that Congress will receive considerable accession to their strength in the towns, communal feeling will certainly be increased, but paradoxically I am inclined to think that the immediate, though not necessarily the lasting, effect will be to reduce communal riots in the Punjab. One reason for them has been the growing feeling among Muslims that their interests have not been sufficiently protected. On the other hand, I have little doubt that communal troubles will increase elsewhere.

8. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot fail sooner or later to give embarrassment. Sikander is deluding himself if he thinks that Provincial politics can be divorced from All India Muslim interest. For instance, there was a very offensive resolution passed at Lucknow about Shahidganj. Sikander tells me that it was passed after he left and he did not know about it. However they may be, the Muslim League has expressed itself in favour of the return of the site to the Muslims. Sikander himself admits that this is out of the question. What are his Muslim supporters going to do in the matter? Are they going to support him as Premier responsible for law and order or are they going to Press the League's views? These and other difficulties are likely to arise.

9. The League, of course, passed other resolutions at Lucknow relating to Waziristan, Palestine & Co., but the real business which outshadowed everything else was the declaration of war against Congress. From the All India point of view, it is difficult to judge the effects of the Lucknow meeting. Tentatively I would suggest that some of the consequences are likely to be the following: (I) It has greatly reduced the chance of Congress Ministries provoking a crisis with Government. (II) It will put a brake on their activities. Their policy is likely to be less extreme in regard to many matters than appeared likely a few weeks ago. (III) If it is, in fact, the aim of Congress to work for a mass revolution in a few years, then their difficulties will be greatly increased. (IV) It may gradually undermine the unnatural alliance between Muslims and Congress in the North-West Frontier Province. (V) It will promote separatist tendencies as between Provinces. (VI) It will greatly aggravate the communal situation. (VII) It may ultimately lead to an agreement between Congress and Muslims.

10. I must apologize for the length of this letter, especially as it deals to some extent with matters outside the Provincial sphere, but, owing to the fact that Sikander played a prominent part at Lucknow, I have naturally had to consider the implication of his action.

Yours sincerely,
H.W. EMERSON



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*Note by Gopinath Bardoloi [Extract]**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*

22 October, 1937

Strength of Parties in the Assembly :

Congress	31
Surma Valley Hindus	9
Indian Commerce	1
United People's	9
Tribal, Backward Lbr	14
Europeans	9
Muslim League	33
Independent Muslim	1

For all practical purposes, the Congress party can count upon the support of the Surma Valley Hindus (9), the Indian Commerce member (1) and the Independent Muslim. (1)

2. In the last budget session, when the Muslim members had not yet united themselves into a communal group, the Leaguers and the United Muslim Party aligned themselves with the Congress party in defeating the Government on all occasions. Toward the fag end of the session, however, when the fate of the Ministers' Salary Bill was trembling in the balance, the Ministry succeeded in breaking the morale of the Muslim League Party by means of baits, such as Ministerships and fat salaries for members.

3. One Mr. Ansari, reputed to be connected with the late Dr. Ansari, came and helped combine all Muslims with one exception under the Muslim League.

4. The chance of appointing another Muslim Minister is, however, remote and rupture among the members of the Muslim League is not improbable.

5. The United People's Party: Sj. Rohini Kumar Chowdhury, an erstwhile Congressman, now a Minister, is the leader of this party which is composed of Assam Valley Hindus. They are 9 in all.

6. Certain sections of public opinion are in favour of a coalition with this party.

7. Whether coalition is likely to be sanctioned by the Working Committee? And what are the conditions which must be fulfilled before the Working Committee approves of it? If substantial agreement to work the Congress programme is sufficient? Any relaxation of the rule regarding Ministers' salaries?

G.N. BARDOLOI
Leader, Congress Party,
Assam

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*Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]**Haig Papers; Towards Freedom Papers I, pp. 1069*

24 October, 1937

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

7. You will have seen very full accounts of the Muslim League meeting in Lucknow. In my letter of October 7th I said that Muslim opinion seemed to me to be very uncertain at the moment and irritable. The Conference discharged its irritation in full measure against the Congress, and less markedly against the British in regard to Palestine policy, federation and the ultimate goal of full independence. But the sense of uncertainty has for the time being at any rate been removed, for the Muslims have now been given a very strong and definite communal lead which seems to have inspired great enthusiasm, and will obviously have a most important bearing on political developments in the near future. War has been declared unmistakably between the Congress and the Muslim League. The Shias had a few days earlier decided to join the Congress but, I think, a great many of them will in fact follow the lead given by the Muslim League. The first great trial of strength is in progress at present over the bye-election in which Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim, one of my Ministers, is standing. No one is prepared to give a very confident opinion as to the result of the election which will be most hotly contested. But if Ibrahim is beaten, I think the Ministry will be placed in position of some considerable embarrassment in connection with filling his place.

Yours sincerely,
H.G. HAIG

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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers Roll No. 4*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 27 October, 1937

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

4. As you will probably have gathered from the reports, a somewhat considerable Muslim agitation has developed against the use of "*Bande Mataram*" as a "National Anthem," and resolutions on the subject have been passed at the recent Muslim League Conference. That is all to the good from our point of view, for it is clearly preferable that the pressure should come from independent quarters rather than

from Government, and I am glad to think that the Muslims should appear to be waking up to the significance of the song, given its history, from their point of view. I am not without hope that a somewhat similar situation will shortly develop in regard to the Congress flag. In the meantime I think you should see the correspondence, of which I enclose copy, with Haig about the difficulties with which he is confronted in regard to Lothian's proposed visit to the Allahabad University. I am the more thankful, in the light of its significance and of the developments with which it deals, that one should have played for safety in advising Lothian as to the desirability or otherwise of his visiting India this cold weather when he raised the point a few months ago.

5. Emerson is sending you by this air mail a copy of his secret report of the 21st October, No. F.L./12, which deals primarily with the developments in connection with the recent meeting of the All India Muslim League at Lucknow, and I also enclose copy of an illuminating C.I.D. report of statements Sikander is alleged to have made at the meeting. I took the opportunity of my visit to Lahore to discuss the situation with Emerson in some detail. I have no doubt whatever that his conclusion, that the significance of the meeting of the League, and the attitude adopted in it by the Muslims, are of great importance, is correct; and that its reactions on All India politics and the general position may, if Muslims can but hold together and work to a common policy, be expected to be considerable. Emerson's letter summarises his conclusions very clearly, and I am generally disposed to agree with those conclusions as stated in his paragraph 9. I ought to explain that, when he suggests that the conclusions of the League may ultimately lead to agreement between Congress and the Muslims, what he has, I gather, in mind is that sufficient pressure brought upon Congress by a solid Muslim front may result in getting Congress to adopt a more reasonable attitude, and possibly to reach an agreement with the Muslims which would give the latter a certain amount at any rate of what they want. So far as the Punjab situation is concerned, the effect of the League's discussions has been definitely to strengthen and to consolidate Sikander's position. For it would seem that he has for sometime past, primarily no doubt as a result of his endeavours to promote communal unity, been suspect to the extreme Muslim elements; and these elements, in the light of his conduct at Lucknow, are now entirely re-assured that in Sikander they have a sound communal leader.

6. From our point of view, desirable as agreement between all parties may be in principle, I am not sure that such a consummation is entirely to be welcomed. But the alternative—absorption of the Muslims by Congress—would be equally undesirable. The contingency in question is, however, as Emerson fully accepts, one which at the moment would appear to lie some distance ahead, and I do think that we need concern ourselves particularly about it, save to the extent that it is proper to take it into account in any endeavour to assess the position over the field as a whole.

7. You will have seen that Emerson's general reaction closely corresponds to that of Haig (see his letter of 24th October, which will have been repeated to you) though Haig does not analyse the position in the same close detail as Emerson. I shall watch with interest for the views of other Governors. I asked Emerson how Sikander contrived to harmonise this apparently definite communal

development on his part with the efforts which he is making (and which I took every opportunity to support in the speeches I made in the Punjab) to eliminate communal differences in his Province, and to work for a degree of unity between the various religious sects concerned. Emerson was alive to that side of the matter, and from the translations which he showed me from the vernacular Press it is quite clear that it has attracted considerable attention locally. More than that: there is some conflict, it appears, between the statements which were made by Sikander on his return to the Punjab and the statements which have been made by other persons present at the Conference. But Sikander (whose position, so far as one can form any conclusion on such a matter in a visit of four days to a Province, is a very strong one locally) is in no way perturbed. He has so far adopted the tactic of ignoring requests for explanation of the alleged inconsistencies, and there is at this stage no sign of unrest in the Punjab Unionist Party. The Sikh representative Sir Sundar Singh is, I gather, much more concerned with Sikh politics than with these wider questions; and Chottu Ram, equally, is not very greatly disturbed at what is taking place. In fact, the general impression I derived was that the Punjab Ministry are much more afraid of Congress than concerned with possible inconsistencies in Sikander's attitude.

8. You will judge, from all this, that the position is by no means free from intricacy, but I am sure that Emerson and Haig are right in attaching real importance to what has taken place.

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Jinnah's Speech

Star of India, 1 November, 1937; Nation's Voice pp. 188-93

Patna, 27 October, 1937. "When the Hindus blame us, do you know what they mean? They want you to be reduced to a Minority in the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and N.W.F.P. They have majority in seven Provinces where Providence has given them overwhelming majority. They know that in Punjab and Bengal they can swamp the Muslim majority under the device of joint electorate. Here is the proof. When we get separate electorate, what is the policy of the League? I ask my Hindu friends to read the League resolutions over and over again. They will then find that the policy of the Muslim League is one of full-blooded Nationalism. Why can't they yet cooperate with us and insist on joint electorate?", declared Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, in the course of his speech at Rizwan, the house of the late Syed Hasan Imam,¹ Patna, on October 27. Mr. Jinnah was lustily cheered when he rose to speak. Thanking the citizens of Patna for according him a "magnificent reception" on his arrival he said:

2. "I know that that reception was not given to me. I know the significance and the inner meaning of that reception. It is not because I am Mr. Jinnah but because of the policy and the programme of the Muslim League. You have demonstrated your

approval in the fullest degree this morning. It is one more signal of encouragement to me to work with all the more energy for the policy and programme I stand for. It seems that the issues—the vital issues, the paramount issues—issues which are matters of life and death to the Muslims, I venture to say, not only to the Muslims but to the country that we live in—these issues, I am now beginning to see, are being clarified. The more they are clarified, the easier it will be for the communities to find a solution of them.”

3. “I am not a poet. I am not an orator. I can only reason. One gentleman here has characterised me as the Mustafa Kamal Pasha¹ of India. I wish I were Mustafa Kamal. In that case I could easily solve the problem of India. But I am not. I have not the army behind me. Therefore, I have got to reason. My strongest and longest gun is this reasoning. I want you, therefore, to realise that with our shortcomings, with our weaknesses we are just on the fringes of organising our community. It is a stupendous task. But with your assistance and support, I shall be able to accomplish it.”

The Real Issue

4. “What is it we are fighting for? What is the real issue before us? I have lived all my life,—it cannot be said that I have ever thought otherwise than to fight; and, if, necessary to die for the freedom of my country. Two years ago I was the same Mr. Jinnah as I am today. Two years ago I was also President of the Muslim League. Since 1913 I have always stood for what is the creed of the Muslim League, namely, that the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities must be safeguarded. I have not changed. Yet two years ago I was the hero of nationalism. If you look up the papers—the same papers which are now abusing me and vilifying me. You will see that they were all holding me up as the hero of heroes of the nation.”

5. “What have I done since? During the last two years one important event has happened. A new Constitution has been framed and introduced in India. Under that Constitution my community was hopelessly placed. Numerically in a minority, educationally backward, economically nowhere, and financially almost bankrupt, we had to run the election under the new Constitution on the basis of separate electorate.”

6. “You are told day in and day out that separate electorate is vicious in principle, that it is holding up national progress and national advance. Let me tell you, and you take it from me that I am not in the habit of making wrong statements, far less untrue statements. Let me tell you that you will find it in the report of the Round Table Conference that I and the Muslim delegates stood for joint electorates over and over again, but that it was rejected. Let me tell you that we are not so much under the obsession of separate electorate. But we do not want to be deceived by the slogans and catchwords of ‘Nationalism.’ We do not want to be absolutely swamped away.”

7. “Anyway, we put up our candidates who were pledged to that policy and programme of the Muslim League. I should have thought that the Congress should have regarded it as a very great advance indeed. Instead of that what did they do? For a short time they did not quite see the things. After a short time they thought that this means organising the Muslims. And then they tried to put up some candidates. These

candidates in most places were defeated. After we secured a fairly substantial success, the Congress leaders came forward and became very solicitous and anxious to establish mass contact with the Muslims."

8. "I ask, did the Congress, take any interest in the Muslims before? I ask the Congress leadership, will they point out to me what have they done to promote the interests of the Muslims during the last 20 years? Mass contact; they say: The Muslims in the past have been in the no-man's land. Having no organisation, no system, their leaders were exploited either by the British Government or by the Congress to the fullest extent. It was only with the coming of the League that the Muslim came to his own. He came to feel, I am the owner—it is my land and I will not allow anyone to trespass on it. But what do we get from the Congress? The Congress says, Oh: the League is the organisation of the upper middle classes who do not represent the Muslim masses; they are only reactionaries, toadies and flunkies. The Congress says that Mr. Jinnah is going to be swallowed up by these toadies and flunkies. But I tell them that Mr. Jinnah is not going to be swallowed up by toadies and flunkies. There are toadies and flunkies among both Hindus and Muslims and we shall put them in their proper places."

"See the Monstrosity":

9. "But we hear of mass contact. For what? To get hold of men who will be their creatures, who will be their creatures, who will sign their pledge, take up their programme and sing *Bande Mataram*. Just see the monstrosity of this. The majority of the Muslims have no confidence in those Muslims who are willing to sign the pledge to work out the policy of the Congress. Yet these are just the persons who are accepted as Ministers—Muslim Ministers at that. This is adding insult to the injury. It is following the policy of the ostrich. They think that we are all fools. They say, here is a Muslim Minister. That man struts about in the Province as a Muslim Minister. He manages somehow or other. He betrays the party whose pledge he signed. He says he has changed his views; he says he does not agree with the party any more not because we have done anything wrong for we have not done anything at all. Yet such a man is made to pass as a Muslim Minister."

10. "This I say, is adding insult to injury. The Congress is following this sort of policy. They know full well that these are not real coins. These are counterfeit coins, spurious coins. They do not command the confidence of the Muslim public—the majority of Muslims have no confidence in them. Yet they are passed as representatives of Muslims and the world sought to be convinced that the Congress represents not only Hindus but also Muslims."

Congress Creatures Game

11. "This is one attitude. We are a disorganised community. We are weak. And of course there is temptation of position, posts and pay. These attract some people. The Congress, therefore, says, let us see how many more creatures of this kind we can secure to our side so as to show that we represent not only Hindus but also the Muslim community. This is the game which is now being played at Bijnor. It is the biggest folly that they are doing. I am confident that they can't possibly succeed in imposing themselves on Muslims like that. Nor can those who take our votes at the

time of election by signing our pledge and then join another party with the policy of which we do not agree. How long, I ask, can these tactics, these manoeuvres succeed?"

12. "These are, however, small matters. What is the biggest issue—most vital issue? That is the question of the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities. Those of you who have any knowledge of the history of the world will know that India is not the only country where we are talking about the protection of the Minorities. Why here do we talk about it? For this reason: we have got a democratic form of Government and as time passes we will get more and more of responsible Government. That system of Government, however, is worked by majority votes. It is the majority votes that will decide. In that system of Government the question is rising, not once or twice, but several times in every country, in every part of the world. The same question is rising in India. It is no use shirking that main question. I know what some people on the Congress side say. They say, well, why not do what happened in Poland, Czechoslovakia and such other countries for the solution of minorities problem. But I must remind them of what Lord Morley once said that the fur-coat of Canada cannot be worn in India with a temperature of 108 degrees. India is to solve its minority question having regard to the peculiar conditions and circumstances in this country. There are not two countries who have solved the minority question exactly on the same lines. Canada, Egypt, Czechoslovakia—all have different solutions. We will have our own solution too. This minority question has got to be settled according to the conditions, according to the genius of the people—according to the circumstances that are to be found here."

13. "We tried our best to find solution of this problem in London at the time of the Round Table Conference by agreement. We failed, I do not want to say who is to blame for the failure but the fact is we failed. Therefore, the British Government has given the Communal Award. I should have thought that common sense and ordinary intelligence would make any man here say: well, never mind who is to blame; after all we could not come to an agreement; here is the Communal Award although I do not deem it a worthy gift—I do deny, however, that it is detrimental to the real interests of the Hindus of this country—well, I should have thought that a great mind will say, God willing, we will come to our own settlement; in the meantime, let us accept it for what it is worth and in the meantime let us have no rest until we have got a better substitute—an agreed substitute."

Nehru's Essays On 'Award'

14. "But no. Instead of that we have a raging and tearing propaganda on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha against the Communal Award. Sometimes it is difficult to find out who is a Hindu Mahasabhaite and who is a Congressman. The greatest leader who is regarded as next to Gandhiji, this great leader of the Congress, when the Communal Award is to be fought, becomes a Hindu Mahasabhaite. He takes the lead to destroy the Award. What forces are let loose against it? In the back vanguard of the Hindu Mahasabha, after a great deal of consideration and cogitation, a wonderful formula is produced that, since the Congress claims to represent the whole of India, it shall not express any opinion regarding the Award—that it neither accepts nor rejects it."

15. "Then there was a row in the Congress circles. You know that at the election time, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had to write three essays to formulate and define the attitude of the Congress towards the Communal Award. The Congress has now declared that it is equally against the Communal Award. Well, have you any proposal to make as a substitute? What are we told? Oh: You are talking nonsense, you are introducing religion in politics; there is no such thing as Minority question at all, the issue before the country is hunger and poverty of the masses; it is only an economic issue. I ask you if this is really an honest answer?" Voices—No, no.

16. "The question, therefore, for the Muslims and other minorities is of the life and death. Why do I say this? It is a historical fact that even an ordinary majority,—an overwhelming majority is likely to be oppressive and tyrannical. How much more is the danger when the majority consists of those whose religion, whose culture, whose philosophy, whose language, whose ordinary life, whose outlook—daily outlook—is fundamentally different from those of the Muslims? What will be the position of the Muslims if that majority is going to decide everything for us? Are we wrong, are we unreasonable when we say that we are not prepared to trust this majority's goodwill and that we want our rights and interests to be incorporated in the Constitution itself. That is really the point in general, that is really the fight, that is really the issue."

17. "If you want instances of the oppression of the minorities by a majority, I can give any number of them. Take the case of America. America won her independence by a revolution. That country is now a free country. There, a great leader, Abraham Lincoln,³ declared at the time of the revolution that America wanted Government of the people by the people and for the people. On that declaration independence was won. But did the minorities there get freedom? America is not inhabited by white men alone. There are millions of Negroes living in America. Have they got freedom? Whose freedom it is that America has won? It is the freedom of the white man, not of the black man. Similarly in India too it may be the freedom of the Hindus alone and not of the Muslims."

18. "Take another instance. South Africa has complete Self-Government. Do you know that our nationals in South Africa can be numbered in lakhs? That country is free; that country is independent. Do you know how Indians are treated in that free and independent country? Have Indians there got freedom? Have they got any political franchise? I am giving you these instances to show how millions can be reduced to the position of slavery and political serfdom in the country in which they live. These things have been done and may be done again in India."

19. "Take our own country. My heart beats as strongly for the Depressed Classes as for the Muslims. The Depressed Classes in this country live in shameful serfdom. Sixty millions of them had no political franchise or municipal franchise. Can they live within the limits of a village? Can they draw water from the same well? They are looked upon as Pariahs. Such a state of affairs exists today in this country. Therefore, remember this : If you are not strong, if you are not united, if you do not build up your organisation, by system and method, you will be submerged by the Hindus in this country and reduced to a class of Shudras and Pariahs of the future."

20. "I cannot believe it is possible that the Congress leadership does not

understand this issue. But I do not want to attribute motives. I take it, however, that they do not understand. I take a charitable view of them and accept that they are foolish. So let us make these foolish people understand that the only way to get national freedom is to come to a settlement with Muslims." Voices: hear, hear.

Stronger Will Be Muslims

21. *Proceeding, Mr. Jinnah said:* "The Congress has to learn a great deal. It is following the policy of a crude beginner. The Congress thinks that bullying will do. It thinks that intimidation, threats and a certain amount of tyranny will make Muslims hesitate and fall back. These are the methods which have been tried by the British Government also. But I say from this platform, I am convinced that the more you bully, the more you intimidate, the more you tyrannise, the stronger will be the Muslims. We want to keep our position as a class. We refuse to submit to any party or community. We are ready as a class to collaborate for joint action, but we refuse to follow the commands of Wardha or even of Mahatma Gandhi." Voices: hear, hear.

22. *Concluding, Mr. Jinnah said:* "The Muslim heart is throbbing for a fight for the freedom of the country. If you want their cooperation, then change your policy. No arrogance, no bullying from above. Come down to earth and take your proper place. And then we will march with you in the battle for independence." (Prolonged Cheers.)

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1. Syed Hasan Imam (1871-1933); eminent lawyer; Judge, Calcutta High Court, 1912; presided over the special Session of the Congress in Bombay, 1918.
 2. Pasha Mustafa Kamal; Founder of Modern Turkey and its first President, 1922; abolished Caliphate, 1924; given the title of 'Ataturk' (Father of Turks), 1933.
 3. Abraham Lincoln; President of USA (1860-65); assassinated in 1865.

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Congress Working Committee's statement

All India Congress Committee Papers, 42/1936

28 October, 1937

The *Bande Mataram* Song

2. A controversy has recently arisen about the *Bande Mataram* song. The Working Committee desire to explain the significance of this song. This song appears in Bankim Chandra Chatterji's novel "*Anandmath*" but, it has been pointed out in his biography, that the song was written independently of and long before the novel, and was subsequently incorporated in it. The song should thus be considered apart from the book. It was set to music by Rabindranath Tagore in 1896. The song and the words "*Bande Mataram*" were sought to be suppressed by violence and intimidation. At a session of the Bengal Provincial Conference held in Barisal in April 1906, under the

Presidentship of Shri A. Rasul, a brutal lathi charge was made by the police on the delegates and volunteers and the *Bande Mataram* badges worn by them were violently torn off. Some delegates were beaten so severely as they cried *Bande Mataram* that they fell down senseless. Since then, during the past thirty years, innumerable instances of sacrifice and suffering all over the country have been associated with *Bande Mataram* and men and women have not hesitated to face death even with that cry on their lips.

3. The song and the words thus became symbols of national resistance to British imperialism in Bengal especially, and generally in other parts of India. The words "*Bande Mataram*" became a slogan of power which inspired our people and a greeting which ever reminds us of our struggle for national freedom.

4. Gradually, the use of the first two stanzas of the song spread to other Provinces and a certain national significance began to attach them. The rest of the song was very seldom used and is even now known by few persons. These two stanzas described in tender language the beauty of the motherland and the abundance of her gifts. There was absolutely nothing in them to which objection would be taken from the religious or any other point of view. The song was never sung as a challenge to any group or community in India and was never considered as such or as offending the sentiments of any community. Indeed the reference in it to thirty crores of Indians makes it clear that it was meant to apply to all the people of India. At no time, however was this song or any other song, formally adopted by the Congress as the National Anthem of India. But popular usage gave it a special and national importance. The Working Committee feel that past associations, with their long record of suffering for the cause, as well as popular usage have made the first two stanzas of this song a living and inseparable part of our national movement and as such they must command our affection and respect. There is nothing in these stanzas to which any one can take exception. The other stanzas of the song are little known and hardly even sung. They contain certain allusions and a religious ideology which may not be in keeping with the ideology of other religious groups in India.

5. The Committee recognise the validity of the objection raised by Muslim friends to certain parts of the song. While the Committee have taken note of such objection in so far as it has intrinsic value, the Committee wish to point out that the modern infinitely greater importance (sic) than its setting in historical novel before the national movement had taken shape. Taking all things into consideration, therefore, the Committee recommend that wherever the *Bande Mataram* is sung at national gatherings, only the first two stanzas should be sung, with perfect freedom to the organisers to sing any other song of an unobjectionable character, in addition to, or in the place of, the *Bande Mataram* song.

6. But while there can be no question about the place that *Bande Mataram* has come to occupy in the national life, the same cannot be said as to the other song. People have adopted songs of their choice irrespective of merit. An authentic collection has long been felt as a desideratum. The Committee, therefore, appoint a Sub-Committee consisting of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Shri Subhas Chandra Bose and Shri Narendra Dev, to examine all current national songs that may be sent to it and those who are so inclined are invited to send their composition to

this Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee will, out of the songs so received, submit to the Working Committee the collection that it may choose to recognise as being worthy of finding a place in a collection of national songs. Only such songs as composed in simple Hindustani or can be adapted to it, and have rousing inspiring tune will be accepted by the Sub-Committee for examination. The Sub-committee shall consult and take the advice of poet Rabindranath Tagore.

7. The Working Committee recommends to PCC.'s to take similar steps in regard to songs in the Provincial languages.

8. *Note:* In the statement attention is drawn to the reference in the *Bande Mataram* song to thirty crores of Indians. It should be remembered that this figure crept in at a later stage when the song came to have a national significance. As Bankim Chandra Chatterji wrote it, the figure was seven crores. This applied to the then Province of Bengal which included Bihar. Even then it referred to the entire population of the Province without any religious distinction.

9. Protection of Minorities: The Congress welcomes the growth of anti-imperialist feeling among the Muslim and other Minorities in India and the growing unity of all classes and communities in India in the struggle for India's independence which is essentially one and national basis. In particular the Congress welcomes the large number of members of the Minority communities who have joined the Congress during the past year and given their mass support to the struggle for freedom and the ending of the exploitation of India's masses.

10. The Congress approves of and confirms the resolution of the Working Committee on Minority Rights passed in Calcutta in October 1937, and declares afresh that it regards it as its primary duty and fundamental policy to protect the religious, linguistic, cultural and other rights of the Minorities in India so as to ensure for them in any scheme of Government to which the Congress is a party, the widest scope for their development and their participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation.—Resolution No. XVI, Congress Session, 1937, Haripura.

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Historic Documents, p. 212

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

LAHORE, 30 October, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I suppose you have already read the resolution passed by the A.I.C.C. Your move in time has saved the situation, and we are all waiting for your observation on the Congress resolution. The *Tribune* of Lahore has already criticised it and I believe Hindu opinion will generally be opposed to it. However, it should not act as an

opiate as far as Muslims are concerned. We must carry the work of organization more vigorously than ever and should not rest till Muslim Governments are established in the five Provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan.

2. The rumour is that part of the Unionist Party does not mean to sign the League creed. So far Sir Sikander and his party have not signed it and I heard this morning that they would wait till the next session of the League. The idea, as one of themselves told me, is to slacken the activities of the Provincial League. However, I shall place you in possession of all the fact in a few days time and then ask your opinion as to how we should proceed. I do hope that before the Lahore Session you would be able to tour in the Punjab for at least two weeks.

Yours sincerely,
MUHAMMAD IQBAL
Bar-at-Law

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Nehru's speech [Extract]

Amrita Bazar Patrika, 30 October, 1937; Towards Freedom Papers, pp. 1091-95.

CALCUTTA, 30 October, 1937,
A.I.C.C. Session

5. Our workers have been talking a lot about the Muslim mass contact move on the part of the Congress. There is a lot of misconception about it. We do not, in our calculations and scheme of things, discriminate between Hindus and Muslims as such. Our mass contact move has succeeded beyond the most optimistic calculations, so much so that today the Congress claims a far larger number of Muslims in its fold than the Muslim League can do. Only recently a vigorous attack was launched on the Congress by Mr. Jinnah's Muslim League at Lucknow. But we need not worry about such baseless insinuations. A few days ago at Bijnor, there had been a straight contest between the Congress and the League, and you will hear shortly that the Congress nominee has succeeded with a thumping majority.

6. Fortunately, we meet here in this Province of Bengal which has got a tremendous record in our political life, a record of great sacrifice, a Province which has been in the forefront of our national struggle for all these generations. Yet it is our misfortune that you are not sharers in the freer atmosphere and feeling of exhilaration that the Congress Ministries have brought in other Provinces. You have yet to put up with the old ways of repression. You have the same old heavy atmosphere. You have yet to think of problems, which in other Provinces are past problems, where they can now face newer problems. But you have to spend yet so much of your energy on the problems of repression, of detenus and political prisoners, banning of Congress organisations in Midnapore and Chittagong, and so many things. You

are oppressed and naturally your major problem is still how to get out of these.

7. I wish to assure you that in those Provinces where the Congress Ministries are functioning there is no forgetting of what is happening in Bengal. There is anxious realisations of this state of affairs and a deep-seated desire to do something which might be of help to you because obviously we hang together.

8. It may be that the British Government, while introducing Provincial autonomy, sought to increase provincialism, to introduce differences between various Provinces, so that they may not engage themselves so much in the problems of All India. Be that as it may, we have certainly based our national movement on the fullest and completest freedom of India, and it is inconceivable that we would think of half a dozen Provinces and forget the rest. It is impossible. If Bengal is pulled down, the whole of India is pulled down, the rest of India is pulled down for the time being. One affects the other. We cannot consider these problems in isolation, and, therefore, the problems that are worrying Bengal are not the problems of Bengal but the problems of India, in which the whole of India has not merely an academic interest but a live interest. I hope that desire will bear fruit.

9. I hope you have seen in today's paper a statement issued by the Working Committee in regard to the *Bande Mataram* song. You must have seen in some of the newspapers, big headlines expressing resentment at the Working Committee's statement. I want to tell you, first of all, that this statement was drawn up by the Working Committee after most anxious and prolonged thought and after consultation with a large number of people that we could get into touch with.

10. I want to tell you that we did not consider this matter in Calcutta only but for weeks past we had been considering this matter by correspondence and otherwise, by consultation specially with leading friends in Bengal and elsewhere.

11. Why did we consider it? Not because objection was taken to it by some—the Congress is strong enough to fight that objection—but because having carefully examined it we felt that in regard to one or two matters, legitimate objections might be taken. We have to consider it from an All India point of view, because we are the All India Congress. We cannot think in terms of Provincial groups or religious sections. We have to look at it from an All India point of view. There are certain words in it which certainly can be taken objection to by some. If so, we have no sufficient answer to give to those who object. We do not very much mind the objections of some people who do it just for the sake of it. But we wanted to consider this problem purely rationally.

12. Therefore, the first thing I wish you to realise is that this was done after most careful consideration—and in a small way after months of consideration—certainly after some days of intensive thought and consideration. Nothing was done rapidly or in a hurry. Of course long consideration does not justify a false or wrong act.

13. But I want you to read carefully the statement that the Working Committee has issued and I beg of the editors and leader-writers of newspapers to read it very carefully, because I feel that the statement reached many of the newspapers in the small hours of this morning. When they got it probably they did not have much time to read it carefully, and I do say—not in a spirit of challenge—that there is not a single word in the statement to which anybody can take any objection.

14. You will see that the major part of the statement is meant to be placed before the public—and we are thinking in terms of All India, not merely the public of Calcutta or of Bengal, but thirty-five crores of Indians. We have to deal with a large number of people who do not know the background of the *Bande Mataram* song. They have heard it and they have liked it and a sentiment has grown round it. Few know how it arose and when it arose. Because of this ignorance of the background, many honest misconceptions have arisen about it.

15. You will see that three-fourths or more than half of the statement shows the tremendous significance of the *Bande Mataram* song in the national movement and national life of India. We have tried to show how it has become a part of our national life which it is impossible for any resolution of anybody to take out. For the first time in the Congress history we have dealt with this song more or less officially. It had never been done before—in spite of the tremendous sentimental reverse, that have grown up—so far as I know, by the A.I.C.C. and much less by the Congress; so that for the first time we have recognised officially the place of the *Bande Mataram* song, which has been used so often. The *Bande Mataram* song, really speaking, has now become a far greater part of our national movement than it was at any time before. At the same time, we have tried to point out that a part of the song, the first two stanzas, are such that it is impossible for anyone to take objection to, unless he is maliciously inclined. We have recognised that in the rest of the song there is ideology, imagery, allegory, etc., which people of various groups cannot put up with. Remember, we are thinking in terms of a national song for All India. Therefore, if there is an ideology which various groups in India cannot honestly and sincerely accept, then it is an improper ideology for a national song.

16. I, for myself, cannot really enthuse over ideology, Hindu or Muslim. As soon as the ideology comes I forget *Bande Mataram*. People's mind is diverted to other thoughts and it introduces a sense of confusion in their minds, since their attention is diverted to allegories, phraseologies, and ideologies which do not suit other people. The latter part of the song is seldom used in the rest of India. We have in our statement recognised the existing practice and at the same time removed certain misapprehensions which were justified. I think the Working Committee's statement is a good statement and a right statement. To all our friends, who have seen some danger in it, I say that there is no danger in it and it is not disparagement of the song that has grown up in our national movement.

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Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of October, 1937 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-10/37, pp. 1-3

4. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, who was with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru during his tour, remained behind in the Punjab and addressed students in Lahore and Amritsar and Public meetings in Lahore and Hoshiarpur. The Lahore students' meeting was

mainly directed against the recently formed Muslim Students' Federation. Dr. Ashraf alleged that communal leaders, apprehending their political death, strove to maintain their existence by crying out that their religion was in danger.

9. *Muslim Affairs:* The most important event in Provincial politics during the fortnight has been the reactions of the Muslim League meeting held at Lucknow. The Jinnah-Sikander agreement¹ was received with immediate and very hostile criticism from the Hindu and Sikh Press opposed to Government. It has also caused a certain amount of uneasiness among Hindus and Sikhs generally. It is generally regarded as a Muslim declaration of organised opposition to the Congress, while extremists pretend to see in it a combination which will operate in the interests of British imperialism. It has been very favourably received in Muslim circles where it is looked upon as the outward sign of concerted resistance to what Muslims regard as the danger of Congress domination. In these circumstances, there is the obvious danger that it will be followed by increased tension in communal relations. Those who are opposed to the Punjab Ministry have naturally seized on the opportunity to sow dissension among the supporters of a coalition Ministry representative of the three communities, and they are likely for sometime to come to concentrate on the propositions that the non-communal and economic basis of Government policy has now been disturbed, if not destroyed, and that the Unionist Party is, or will be submerged by the Muslim League. The Ministry intend to show by their policy and actions that there is no foundation in practice for these propositions. The indications are that for the present at any rate the agreement will have little, if any, effect on the Government following in the Legislature. It is, however, likely to draw more closely together the opposition elements. It is believed that the Akali Party will formally join the Congress and that some members of the Hindu Sabha will work more closely with the opposition. Thus, the probable effects on Provincial politics are, on the one hand, greater solidarity within each of the three communities and also between Hindus and Sikhs and, on the other hand, a clearer demarcation within all three communities of the forces hostile to and favourable to the Congress.

The Ahrars held their Annual Conference at Batala beginning on the 23rd October. The speeches and discussions were on the usual lines but the Conference came to no decision on the question of joining Congress. Ahrar leaders, however, took a prominent part on the Congress side in the recent election campaign at Bijnor in the United Provinces. It would appear, therefore, that the leaders are anxious to join Congress but are fearful of the results of such action on their followers. There are already signs that the Ahrar organisation will lose many adherents if their leaders take such a step.

1. The Agreement was concluded at the 1937 Lucknow session of the All India Muslim League with a view to unite the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. While it enabled Sikandar Hyat Khan to strengthen his position in Urban areas, Jinnah found it convenient to create a broad-based Muslim front that would give substance to claim that League was a fully representative Muslim organisation.



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(Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay) to Thorne [Extract]

Home Department (Special) S.D. 2919

CONFIDENTIAL

BOMBAY, 1/5 November, 1937

My dear Thorne,

I am desired to submit my report for the second half of October 1937.

4. To protest against the opposition of the Muslim League to the "*Bande Mataram*" song, October 26th was observed at Poona and Bombay as "*Bande Mataram Day*" by the Hindu Mahasabha and the Democratic Swaraj Party,¹ when speeches were made urging the adoption of the song as the national anthem of India. On both occasions a flag of green, saffron and red silk bearing the inscription "*Bande Mataram*" was hoisted. This flag is said to have been first unfurled by Madame Cama² at a conference held in Germany 30 years ago and has since become the emblem of the "Abhinav Bharat Sangh."

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1. After the Congress, led by Gandhiji, rejected the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and launched the Non-Cooperation movement in 1920, Lokmanya Tilak advocated 'responsive cooperation' and some of his followers founded the Democratic Swaraj Party to work for the reforms. It accepted the Council Entry programme of the Swaraj Party at the Centre but ranged itself against the Congress in the Provincial elections.
 2. Madame Cama Bhikaji (1861-1936) attended Socialist Congress at Stuttgart and unfurled the flag of Indian freedom; met Indian revolutionaries in London, 1908; lived in Paris for 30 years; before returning to India, 1935.

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Historic Documents, pp. 212-13

URGENT

LAHORE, 1 November, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan with some of the members of his party saw me yesterday and we had a long talk about the differences between the League and the Unionist Party. Statements have been issued to the Press by both sides, each side putting its own interpretation on the terms of Jinnah-Sikander agreement. This has caused much misunderstanding. As I wrote to you before, I will put you in possession of all those

statements in a few days time. For the present I request you to kindly send me as early as possible a copy of the agreement which was signed by Sir Sikander and which I am told is in your possession. I further want to ask you whether you agreed to the Provincial Parliamentary Board being controlled by the Unionist Party. Sir Sikander tells me that you agreed to this and, therefore, he claims that the Unionist Party must have their majority in the Board. This, as far as I know, does not appear in the Jinnah-Sikander agreement.

2. Please reply to this letter as early as possible. Our men are touring in the country and forming Leagues in various places. Last night we had a very successful meeting in Lahore. Others will follow.

Yours sincerely,
MUHAMMAD IQBAL
Bar-at-Law

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Abdul Halim Ghuznavi to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F 266/6-8

18, CANAL STREET, CALCUTTA, 4 November, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

1. I have been watching with very great interest your activities in connection with the League and the reactions thereto as appear in the Press. Your bold bid to organise the Indian Muslims by establishing contacts with the masses is bound to engender opposition from different quarters and be misunderstood for diverse reasons. It has taken the Indian National Congress years to get to the point and it is on the fringe yet. But although in the past I have not seen eye to eye with you in several matters, I have always admired your sincerity of purpose, broadness of outlook and above all your independence. National interest and welfare demand that Indian Muslims should be organised under one banner, should have one mind and above all should speak with one voice. When they are able to do that, it is then alone that it will be possible for them to cooperate effectively with other progressive political groups with a view to agree on a collective programme leading towards the common goal. It is because I appreciate this that I went out of my way to call on you when you were in Calcutta and personally expressed my sincere admiration for your self-imposed mission for the good of the Muslims and the country as a whole.

2. However, it is very difficult in a big movement like yours and particularly in its early stages, always to distinguish friends from foes and differentiate elements strong and weak, particularly in the Provinces. The fight often is for supremacy between the real representatives of a Province and the nominees of a vocal clique.

From the list published in the newspapers as regards the Bengal personnel, it appears that a clique has got the better of the people. But that is not due to any fault of yours or of the League. The defect will soon be obvious when, I am sure, it will be remedied.

3. Naturally Congress is very angry with you because you have said something nasty about it which is really true. It cannot like you, particularly the present type of dictators who hold the Congress in bondage. They propose to do just as they like and have unquestioned obedience. But they cannot brook or tolerate any opposition. This is usual. But they have got a tartar in you and they are somewhat unnerved. The A.I.C.C. have found your arguments somewhat difficult to meet and passed them over almost in silent disgust.

4. I am afraid the League nominee will be losing in Bijnor election and I quite understand why he will lose. The Congress nominee is a sitting member of the Government and he has been in the U.P. Council for the last 12 years or so and has always been elected uncontested; also the League has been in the field too late for this particular election.

5. What will be your next programme? The Central Federation is ahead and the Congress seems to be *ad idem* with the League on this matter. I wonder if the two organisations will be working together herein.

6. When do you expect to come next to Bengal? I should like to have early notice of it as I desire to give an afternoon Party in your honour.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH Esqr, M.L.A.

(sd/-) ABDUL HALIM GHUZNAVI (Central),
(Abdul Halim Ghuznavi) Kt., M.L.A.
Mount Pleasant Road, (Central)
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

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Jinnah to Gandhiji

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, p. 89

BOMBAY, 5 November, 1937

I am of opinion that I was fully justified in publishing your letter from Tithal last May. I am of opinion that I was fully justified in doing so, but your letter means something different from what I understand it to mean. Surely it was open to you to offer your explanation to the public. The letter was not marked as it is usual to do so when its publication is not desired by the writer, and my message to you was not

private. Even now you do not indicate how I have misunderstood your attitude or the contents of that letter.

2. I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. Kindly read it again and try and understand it. Evidently you have not been following the course of events of the last twelve months.

3. As to reserving you as a 'bridge' and 'peace-maker' don't you think your complete silence for all these months has identified you with the Congress leadership, although I know that you are not even a four-anna¹ member of that body.

4. I regret to say that I find nothing definite or any constructive proposal in your letter under reply, except that it is written in all good faith and out of an anguished heart which I reciprocate.

1. One fourth.

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Shamsul Hasan Collection

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

LAHORE, 10 November, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

After having several talks with Sir Sikandar and his friends I am now definitely of the opinion that Sir Sikandar wants nothing less than the complete control of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Board. In your pact with him it is mentioned that the Parliamentary Board will be reconstructed and that the Unionists will have majority in the Board. Sir Sikandar tells me that you agreed to their majority in the Board. I wrote to you sometime ago to enquire whether you did agree to the Unionist majority in the Board. So far I have not heard from you. I personally see no harm in giving him the majority that he wants but he goes beyond the pact when he wants a complete change in the office-holders of the League, especially the Secretary who has done so much for the League. He also wishes that the finances of the League should be controlled by his men. All this to my mind amounts to capturing the League and then killing it. Knowing the opinion of the Provinces as I do, I cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends. The pact has already damaged the prestige of the League in this Province; and the tactics of the Unionists may damage it still further. They have not so far signed the creed of the League and I understand do not mean to. The session of the League in Lahore, they want in April instead of February. My impression is that they want to gain time for their own Zamindar League to function in the Province. Perhaps you know that on his

return from Lucknow Sir Sikander constituted a Zamindar League whose branches are now being made in the Province. In these circumstances please let me know what we should do. Kindly wire your view if possible. If this is not possible, write a detailed letter as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,
MUHAMMAD IQBAL

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Gopinath Bardoloi to Rajendra Prasad [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, I, pp. 118-20

CONGRESS HOUSE, GAUHATI, 13 November, 1937

My dear Rajendra Babu,

4. Communal feeling and preaching are preventing many Mohammadan members from joining the Congress party, while they are not feeling the pressure from their constituencies as well as they should have done. I am told the Sylhet Mohammadan masses are Congress-minded and intensive propaganda amongst them by distinguished Mohammadan leaders like the Maulana Saheb (Maulana Azad) and Maulana Abdul Ghaffar Khan may result in converting them into Congressmen. To me this latter method is a far superior and super one than directly approaching the members who are not always influenced by the only consideration of doing good to their constituencies. It is for this reason that I suggested a tour by those two worthies.

5. There were other questions which also required discussion, e.g. this "Line System."¹ It would appear that the Muslim League has made it their communal question and naturally they want Assam also to be a Muslim Province just like Bengal. But view this matter entirely from a different point of view. The economic problem of the Province is bound up with this system. We cannot think that in the near future we shall have no spot of earth for our children and ultimately for ourselves and we shall be driven to the solution of acute difficulties which face some other Provinces. The linguistic problem also increases the difficulties of an economic Government, and what is worse, a source of constant friction resulting in violence, incendiarism and crimes of all kinds, naturally disturb the peace in society. Have you given any thought to this subject? If the Karachi resolutions are literally interpreted, the immigrants have every right to acquire land, property, etc., and there cannot be a "Line System." On the other hand, our people, whether Congressmen or otherwise, all feel that adequate reservation must be there. The Congress members who have been allowed to join in a committee for an enquiry, have been expressly directed to stress that viewpoint. Secondly, we also think that it is not by an enquiry that such a problem can be solved; it would require

propaganda among both the communities. These are problems the solution of which surely required direction from you. Will you kindly advise us?

Yours sincerely,
GOPINATH BARDOLOI
Leader, Congress Party, Assam

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1. The state in Assam had set up a system of "Lines" beyond which Mymensinghians could not go in order to protect economic interests of the indigeneous people of the Brahmaputra Valley. The newcomers were looked upon as the spearhead of the expansion of the "Muslim Zone" in North-Eastern India.

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Khaliquzzaman to Nehru

A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 265-67

LUCKNOW, 28 November, 1937

My dear Jawahar,

I received your letter along with the enclosure a few days back. You will remember that in May last, when the Bundelkhand election was being fought, I wrote to you in detail the dangers which I apprehended in the Muslim mass contact movement, and I think that the present situation is the result of that policy of the Congress. No one can deny the Congress the right to contest Muslim seats even during the existence of the Communal Award and the Separate Electorates, but in the larger interests of the country, I think, it would have been preferable to leave the Muslims to send their representatives from their own platform so long as they stood by separate electorates. Unfortunately, I have not been able to persuade you to agree with this view. The unpleasant occurrences are directly connected with these elections and so long as these elections continue, I am afraid, the present situation will not admit of any solution. The Muslim Congress candidate and his supporters must proclaim themselves to be as good and pious Muslims as their opponents, the Muslim Leaguers, and all the religious zeal of the belligerents must be brought into play to carry the electorate with them. Personally, I feel that even though the Congress may be able to have its candidates returned from the separate electorates it is unfair on its part to force the issue so long as the Communal Award is not modified. Recently Dr. Moonje in one of his statements after the Bijnor election, congratulated the Congress for having torn the Communal Award to pieces. I am sure the Congress will not be moved to take part in the Muslim elections under the Separate Electorate system from any such motive, but the necessary consequence of the Congress policy is to destroy the Award even when the Congress agrees not to alter or modify it except by agreed settlement. Barring this difference in the programme of the League and the Congress,

I do not find anything else which could have anything do with the present bitterness amongst the members of the two organisations. And these bye-elections also cannot go on for ever. When they are over and people sit down coolly to think over the programme and the work that is ahead I hope much of the estrangement will be dissolved and forgotten.

The Muslim League is now wedded to the ideal of independence and it should be its bounden duty to cooperate with any movement which aims at the destruction of Imperialism. As soon as the Congress will embark on any active programme of fight, I hope the League will not lag behind, but will fight in closest association with the Congress. Similarly in regard to the work inside the legislatures, the League has fully endorsed the Wardha programme and its members are bound to support it.

I am not in a position to give you any detailed information about the statement made by Maulana Shaukat Ali in connection with the exercise of undue influence over the others, but I do however maintain that the action of the Congress Government in having allowed the Hon'ble Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim to retain his Ministership and resign his seat to seek re-election was certainly most improper, if not wholly unconstitutional. The Government of India Act has authorised the Governor to appoint a person as Minister from outside provided he secures a seat for himself within six months of his appointment; but it nowhere allows a Minister to retain his office as a Minister and resign his seat when his appointment was made as a Member of the Legislature. Apart from this, you will readily appreciate the fact that 80 years of foreign rule have practically destroyed all power of resistance of the Muslim community and it has become accustomed to respect and fear power. Any one seeking election as a Minister was bound to have the advantage of this weakness of the Muslims. I had conveyed to the Premier my objection against his procedure, but I did not receive any reply beyond a simple acknowledgement. However, that is a matter of the past now. Nawab Ismail Khan may be able to give you the information you ask for.

As regards the instances of unruly or objectionable behaviour of the Members of the League and its method of propaganda, I believe that what has been conveyed to you must be based on facts and true, but that is only one side of the picture. The filthy language and abuse that is indulged in daily by the Muslim Congressmen, the Ahrars and the Jamiat people and the baseless propaganda that is being carried on by them does not do credit to the other side either. As an instance, I may inform you that Maulana Ataullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches described the delegates of the League as foul smelling dead bodies. Similarly the description of the Muslim Leaguers as *Bhands* and *Madaries* by the *Hindustan*, a Congress organ, was a limit of irresponsible journalism. The attack on a sympathiser of the League in a mosque at Lahore by the Ahrars will show that the tendency to violence is also shared by these supporters of the Congress who, while they proclaim that they do not believe in the existence of separate political organisation, retain Muslim party labels perhaps as a concession to the weakness of the Muslims for a separate group existence. The bitterness, therefore, is more acute between the Muslims and the Muslims than between the Hindus and the Muslims. I am sure this exuberance of temper and irresponsibility will die out in time to come and we shall be able to work shoulder to shoulder for

the freedom of India when the fog and mist of misunderstanding of each other's viewpoint has been cleared up. In the meanwhile, effort should be made by responsible members of the organisations to control their unruly elements by persuasion and true guidance.

Yours sincerely,
KHALIQ

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Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan to Nehru

Congress Government I, pp. 209-14

MEERUT, 30 November, 1937

Pray accept my profuse apologies for the inordinate delay that has occurred in replying to your letter of November the 11th,¹ which I received under a registered cover, some days after I had written to request you to furnish me with a copy of it.

I believe that delay in its receipt was due to the fact that it had been following me about from place to place.

I am sensible of the courtesy which has prompted you to write this letter and give me the benefit of your considered views on the present situation in the country, specially with reference to the accentuation of communal bitterness. While I fully appreciate your concern at the unfortunate turn events have taken and share your distress at the exacerbation of communal feelings and religious antagonism, yet I can not endorse your wholesale condemnation of the Muslim League spokesmen, or accept the accuracy of the reports on which your information on this point is based. I cannot help thinking, if you will forgive me for saying so, that you have been rather hasty in arriving at conclusions on the basis of information supplied to you from interested quarters and that you have not properly sifted or scrutinised the evidence in support of the rather serious allegations which have been made against our workers. Some of these indeed are most fantastic and have caused me considerable amazement, for I assure you, I was not aware that such statements were being broadcasted [sic.] by our authorised workers. Of course our organisation cannot be responsible for the speeches and statements of those who have nothing whatever to do with our organisation. Would you kindly tell me where and by whom these statements are supposed to have been made? During elections many persons who have no connection with the League, but are interested in its candidate also go about preaching for which the League cannot be held responsible.

You are perfectly right when you say that we should conform to a certain standard in our public work and should not unnecessarily arouse religious passions and animosities, but I make bold to say that this advice is as much needed by the Maulvis and propagandists employed by the Congress to popularise its policy and programme

among the Muslim masses as by the Leaguers. I wonder whether the speeches delivered by the Ahrar leaders, who are today espousing the Congress cause, have been reported to you. I also do not quite know whether you ever read vernacular papers in which they are often reproduced. If you have not done so, I cannot possibly describe here the filthy abuses of the Muslim League and its leaders in which these heroic gentlemen indulge. Suffice it to say that their speeches often verge on obscenity and vulgarity; yet they are received everywhere by Congressmen with acclamation and they are commissioned by Congress Committees to please the cause of their candidates in every election.

I am afraid that your workers purposely refrain from furnishing you with information which would not be to their credit. It is not my intention to enumerate here our grievances against those who have been working or speaking on behalf of the Congress nor do I propose to refer at any length to the anti-Muslim League propaganda which has been carried on for several months past by the so-called nationalist Press, both English and vernacular. I shall, however, draw your attention to a drama published in a paper called "*Hindustan*" of which the Hon. the Premier of the U.P. is supposed to be a Director. I should like to know what you think of it after you have read it. Then again, please, read the speech delivered at the Punjab Political Conference by no less a person than Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar² in which he does not spare even the private life and religious beliefs of Mr. Jinnah. If responsible people can talk in this manner, why should it cause you any surprise if ordinary speakers do not conform to any very high standard in their criticism?

I am sure that you must be aware that the nationalist Press has been vilifying and calumniating our most respected leaders without any protest from any Congress public man of eminence. The patience of the Musalmans is well nigh exhausted and if they, therefore, hit back, it may be occasionally below the belt. You should not feel greatly horrified. The advent of democracy has let loose on the country, orators and speakers who, in their criticism and utterances are not restrained by any consideration of measure or decorum. It will take sometime before things settle down and conventions are established. I could easily multiply the few instances I have given here; but what useful purpose would that serve? It is not likely to advance the cause which you have in view namely, the discussion of public affairs on their merits without importing religious or sectional considerations. Mere apportioning of blame or fixing responsibility for the present unhappy state of affairs on any particular community will not, I venture to say, help in easing the situation. If we honestly desire to find out the root causes of this conflict we shall have to approach the problem in a different manner; but if the idea is merely to prevent the dissemination of irresponsible and loose talk, all I can say is, that I shall be happy to cooperate with you in any measures which you may consider necessary for the purpose.

You have referred to certain posters, statements and speeches made during the Bijnor and Bundelkhand elections to, which you take strong exception. I am convinced that in trying to achieve success in elections people often stoop to all kinds of things and address appeals to the lowest instincts and sentiments of the masses. This is not peculiar to India but it is prevalent in most countries having democratic Constitutions. Three more bye-elections are being hotly contested by the two organisations, which, I have no

doubt, will further aggravate communal feelings. Undue importance is being given to success at these elections, not so much by the League as by the Congress, for it challenges the right of the League to represent Musalmans. It is possible that the situation may improve after the elections are over, though I am not sure whether the mass contact movement which is being carried on aggressively by the Congress among Muslims, will not continue to cause friction and maintain the present tension.

You have very kindly asked me to define our points of agreement and points of difference, but I think, having regard to our readiness to work in the legislature on the basis of the Wardha Programme which, as you say, is fairly comprehensive it is now for you to point out where you still differ from us. With a view to help you to study the whole question I am attaching to this the resolutions of the All India Muslim League passed at its annual session held at Lucknow in April last, together with a copy of our election manifesto. You will note from these resolutions that the League has altered its creed and has democratised its Constitution. They will also indicate, I have no doubt, that as far as the interest of the whole country is concerned, there is not much difference between the policies and programmes of the two organisations.

In this connection I may be permitted the liberty of stating that if this Mass Contact Movement had not been thrust upon us and the Muslim League parties had not in the various legislatures been so contemptuously treated by the Congress wherever they happened to be in a majority, the Musalmans would have been nearer the Congress ideals today than they are likely to be for some considerable time to come. I know many Musalmans who had Congress leanings or had been formerly active members of that organisation, viewed with grave suspicion and dismay this new move of the Congress. This is the reason why you find men like Maulana Qutbuddin Abdulwali Sahib and Syed Zakir Ali Sahib, Joint Secretary of the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, adopting this line of thought and giving expression to it in their statements, of which you naturally disapprove. These are their honest conviction which they are ready to justify. They claim the right to put their own interpretations on the policy which the Congress is at present pursuing with regard to Musalmans and I believe you will not dispute their right to do so, though you may entirely disagree with their interpretations. There are many thinking Musalmans who firmly believe that the Congress by this movement is trying to destroy Muslim solidarity and create disruption in the community, and that the Muslim supporters of the Congress are being financed and helped by the Congress which, at present constituted, is an overwhelmingly Hindu body, to fight their co-religionists and curb their spirit. Another factor which has contributed to the accentuation of the differences is the appointment to Ministerial offices of persons who have abjured their parties and only recently joined the Congress.

I have mentioned some of these facts so that they may help you in studying the other side of the case.

I shall now briefly deal with some of the points raised specifically in your letter:

Your recent resolution on the Communal Award has certainly removed one great grievance of the Muslim-community and we trust it will be allowed to stand.

I have read with great interest your article on the language and script question. I am thankful to you for sending me a copy of it. It makes practical suggestions for

solving this difficult question and I am sure it will receive approbation from every fair-minded man.

I have already made my observations on the "fantastic statements" purported to have been made by some Muslim Leaguers in Bijnor and elsewhere. All that I wish to say here is that local Congress Committees should be directed to draw the attention of the local Muslim League whenever people are found indulging in such reckless and irresponsible talk.

You complain that no responsible Muslim Leaguer has condemned the violence perpetrated by a League volunteer on a Congress Muslim worker in a running train. I may tell you in this connection that we instituted an inquiry into this incident and found that the volunteer in question had sufficient provocation to justify the act. I think the less said about this incident the better. Moreover, as the case is still *sub judice* it will not, therefore, be proper to say more on the subject.

I am sorry that you should think that the Muslim Leaguers encourage and resort to violence. There is no foundation for such an assumption.

It is not the Muslim Leaguers who have raised the cry of Islam in danger; it is our opponents who have put this into our mouths. Every Muslim believes that Islam can never be in danger.

You rightly deprecate the charges of bribery levelled against your colleagues of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama. But what are they in comparison to the atrocious charges that are being laid daily against Maulana Shaukat Ali by Congress Muslims? They only demonstrate out moral indignation.

I had also heard at Bijnor that you had snatched away a Congress flag from the hands of a volunteer on which 'Allah-o-Akbar' was inscribed, because you considered it an unauthorised innovation. I am gratified to learn that there was no shadow of a foundation for this stupid rumour.

As regards Maulana Shaukat Ali's assertion that peasant voters in Bijnor were influenced by Revenue officials and others to vote for the Congress candidate all that I can say is that he must have some evidence to justify it, otherwise I cannot understand his making such a statement. I shall inquire from him and let you know.

It is open to Dr. K.M. Ashraf to clear his position by contradicting in the Press false statements attributed to him. I am sorry at what took place in a recent meeting of the Aligarh University Union when he was addressing it. But you will agree that the Muslim League had nothing to do with this episode. You would be glad to learn that the Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University has condemned the behaviour of the students in a Press statement recently.

You say that "the spirit of violence is evident," and you quote certain instances to prove it. May I enquire from you whether you attribute it to the activities of the Muslim League? I do not wish to draw unjust inferences, but from what you have said in your letter, I feel that you imply that we have deliberately created this obnoxious atmosphere. If that is so, I hotly deny it; if, however, you have mentioned these instances only to show that communal bitterness is prevalent in the country and that efforts should be made to remove it and bring about a better understanding between the two communities, we are prepared to welcome your endeavours in that direction and assist you to the best of our ability.

1. The letter perhaps refers to Nehru's letter of 11 November, 1937. The source (i.e. A Documentary Record of the Congress Government, 1937-1939, Vol. I, p. 204) mentions that Nehru's letter is dated 10 November, 1937. SWJN Vol. 8 (p.192) also mentions 10 November.
2. He seems to be identical with Sardar Sardul Singh, Advocate, who was a member of Election Disputes Panel of the Congress appointed in 1935.

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Rajendra Prasad to Krishna Sinha¹

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, I, pp. 137

ZIRADI (SARAN) 5 December, 1937

My dear Sri Babu,

I am enclosing a Hindi translation of a letter I have received from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. There are two things in it. The first relates to local bodies. He wants that reservation of seats with joint electorates to Muslims should be provided by legislation. The Muslim League Party is making much capital out of this question and he thinks that if these things are adopted without there being any demand on the part of Musalmans it will have a great effect in reassuring Musalmans and cut the earth from under the feet of the League propaganda. He does not feel there is any harm, in principle, in conceding reservation of seats and maintaining joint electorates.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

1. Sri Krishna Sinha (1887-1961); Chief Minister of Bihar, 1937-39 and 1946-61.

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H.K. Kripalani to Maxwell [Extract]

Home Department (Special) F. No. P-25-H(S)/37

SECRET

SIND SECRETARIAT, KARACHI, 7 December, 1937

Fortnightly Report for the second half of November, 1937 [Extract]

My dear Maxwell,

Political-Congress propaganda in rural areas was vigorously pursued during the fortnight, particularly in the Sukkur district, where it is proposed to hold a Conference

of cultivators on the 11th and 12th instant on the lines of the one recently held at Kandiaro. According to Press reports, Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, M.L.A. will preside at the Conference. Muslims are being enrolled for the Conference in appreciable numbers. The success of the propaganda has been due to glowing accounts of the arrangements that are in progress. A novel method of approach to the Muslim masses is the presence in their mosques of Congress leaders preaching the Congress doctrine direct and also through Maulvis.

Yours sincerely,
H.K. KRIPALANI

R.M. MAXWELL, Esqr., C.S.I. C.I.E., I.C.S.,
Secretary to The Government of India,
Home Department, New Delhi.

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Hasan Ispahani to Jinnah

M.A. Jinnah Ispahani Correspondence, pp. 95-96

CALCUTTA, 15 December, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

We smarted under the pain of our defeat at the hands of the *Ulama* in Bijnor. God was merciful and did not allow us to bear this humiliation for long. The tables are now reversed and I should like to know what the Pandits and High Gurus of the Congress now feel about their influence and control over the Muslim masses. If India wants freedom and if there is to be salvation for the downtrodden hundreds of millions of people, then the Congress should realise without further delay that such freedom can only be achieved by cooperation and by gaining the goodwill of the largest minority in India. The accredited representative of this large minority today is the All India Muslim League and the sooner the Congress come to their senses and met the League on the basis of equality—climbing down several steps from their high pedestal—the better will it be for national unity, progress and happiness.

2. I am told that you will be presiding at the All India Muslim Students Conference at Calcutta at the end of this month. Is this correct information?

With my best regards to Miss. Jinnah¹ and yourself,

Yours sincerely,
HASAN

1. Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967) popularly known as *Madar-i-Millat*; looked after her brother on his wife's death, 1929; opposed Ayub Khan as Presidential Candidate on behalf of combined opposition parties, 1964-65 and lost.

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*Fortnightly Report for the Central Province and Berar for the first half of December, 1937 [Extract]**Fortnightly Report Home-Poll, F. 18-12/37, pp. 1-3*

4. Mr. Savarkar¹ reached Nagpur on the 11th and was given an enthusiastic reception. The Municipal Committee presented an address to him, and a meeting to accord him a public reception was attended by about 15,000 persons. The Hon'ble Minister for Public Works presided. In his speeches Mr. Savarkar ridiculed the cult of non-violence, but he was careful to say that violence must not be used to secure freedom until the time is ripe for such an action. He hoped that the new Governments would concentrate on making India strong and armed, when freedom would come of itself. The Rashtrya Swayam Sevak Sangh² arranged a march past in his honour. The tone of his speech to the volunteers was anti-Muslim. Mr. Savarkar also visited all the four districts of Berar and addressed meetings on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha. He received address from several Municipal Committees. At Akola he spoke at two sessions of the Hindu Mahasabha Conference which were attended by the leading Hindus of Berar. The burden of his speeches was that there must be Hindu rule, as India is the land of the Hindus, and that Hindus should tolerate all Minority communities except the Mohammadans because the latter would be certain to join Muslim invaders from the North when India obtains Swaraj. In view of the strong anti-Muslim feeling created by Mr. Savarkar's utterances at Akola, Mr. Brijlal Biyani³ convened a Congress meeting at which Dr. Kanade Shastri was the principal speaker. This meeting attracted an audience even larger than that of the Hindu Mahasabha meeting and the speeches are reported to have a good effect in soothing the communal feelings created by the Mahasabha.

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1. V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966); political convict suffered transportation and imprisonment 1910-37; released, 1937; presided over Hindu Mahasabha, Ahmedabad, 1937; Nagpur, 1938; Calcutta, 1939; Madhura, 1940; Bhagalpur, 1941; and Kanpur, 1942.
 2. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) a militant front organisation of Hindu revivalism, was founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925 with the object of uniting the Hindus by propagating that Hinduism was in a state of siege by fundamentalism from within and without. His successor Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1940-73) expanded the range of its activities and provided martial orientation to it by ensuring high degree of discipline through physical exercises and ritual hierarchies and by glorifying some Hindu rulers like Shivaji, Rana Pratap and Guru Govind Singh who fought against the Mughal rulers.
 3. Brijlal Biyani, President Berar Congress Committee.



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*Khaliquzzaman to Abdur Rab Nishtar¹**Nishtar Papers, Lucknow, 20 December, 1937*

Dear Mr. Nishtar,

A recruitment to services in my Province is made on the basis of competition generally but if the number of Muslims is less than 30 per cent the proportion is made up by selection. Previously in some departments the Muslim element predominated while in other it was practically non-existent but now for some years past the Government has been making efforts to secure an all round 30 per cent to the Muslims.

2. The Muslims are 15 per cent of the total population of my Province.

3. I hope you will kindly let me know the percentage of services in your Province and the percentage of the Muslim population there. I shall be obliged if you could also give me some idea of the Working of the Congress Government in your Province.

Yours sincerely,
(sd/-) KHALIQUZZAMAN

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1. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar [1899-1958]; Member, Legislative Assembly, N.W.F.P., from 1937; Minister, N.W.F.P., 1943-45; delegate to Simla talks with Cabinet Mission, 1946; Member for Communications, Interim Government, 1946; Member, Partition Council representing Muslim League; Minister in the Government of Pakistan, 1947-49 and 1951-53; President, Pakistan Muslim League, 1956.

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*Sir Manubhai Mehta's¹ Article Published in CIR Times on the Eve of Hindu Mahasabha Session at Ahmedabad [Extract]**Jayakar Papers, 25 December, 1937*

2. Meanwhile we read of public repudiation, with scorn and contumely flung at the idea from all sides. The Muslim League has been the latest insult with which Federation has been denounced. Political motives of a cunning texture lie hidden beneath the so-called love of liberalism that has shaped this policy of the League from the very first. By the appearance of the Indian States on the scene, the representatives of the Indian States would bring in a large and preponderating force of Hindu Legislators, so as to swamp Muslim influence. A large majority of Indian States is Hindu by religion and this influx of Hindu Representatives would leave at the Centre woefully out-numbered. It was seriously proposed at the Round Table

Conference that at the 40 per cent seat promised to the Indian States in the Council of States, one-third that number should be the guaranteed reserve for representatives of the Muslim Faith. The idea had only to be enunciated for being summarily rejected. Then once again it was seriously brought on to the anvil before the Consultative Committee at Delhi in 1932, then in the presence of His Excellency the Viceroy. Minister after Minister from Indian States rose in dignified protest and denounced the idea. It was at the meeting that that remarkable and never to be forgotten episode occurred. Three Muslim Ministers, two of them representing Hindu States, like Sir Mirza Ismail² from Mysore, Sir Liaquat Hayat Khan³ of Patiala and even Sir Akbar Hydari⁴ from the premier Muslim State of Hyderabad rose to disclaim the proposal and it was there that the idea received its final rites of burial at the hands of Lord Willingdon. Since then Mohammadan statesmen have seen in Federation the anger spot for their communal aspirations. Their astute leader Jinnah had from the very outset seen this fatal potentiality in Federation and he from the very start had hurled his deadly challenge to the Federal India which he were ever to oppose and run down since his exclusion from the Round Table Conference in 1932. The plea that Federation would only result in (left blank in the original text) the Federal ideal by bringing a large autocratic element in the form of representatives, not elected by the people from the states but nominated by their autocratic Rulers is only a (left blank in the original text) to screen their fear about the failure of their communal or pan-Islamic stream.

3. Our Hindu leaders have unfortunately played the part of scapegoats and unwitting tools into the hands of astute Muslim Leaders. According to a common adage prevalent in the country, the Brahmin or Hindu is slow-witted and only wakes up after the bus has departed. His Muslim brother is ready... he strikes while the iron is hot and gets what he wants. While the Hindu delights to live and glory in the past, the Muslim lives and acts in the living present. The spectacle of the Congress leaders playing in the hands of Jinnah's Unionists at the session of the Legislative Assembly in 1936 and denouncing Federation is too well-known to need recounting. The plea of the Congress leaders that their dose of democracy has been too much diluted by adding the milk and water representation from the States in the Federal Legislatures is not un-answerable. Their fear that the representatives nominated by the Indian Rulers would be only another substitute for the official bloc, now being chased away, and that the States' Members would only ally themselves with the English upholders of imperialism has no solid ground for support. They ought to remember that at the very first sitting of the Round Table Conference progressive and liberal Rulers had held to the promises that they would consult their own Legislative Assemblies in choosing a panel of representatives from whom they could nominate their States Members. Assemblies broad-based on an elective basis were being adopted by an increasing number of States. The Legislative Assemblies of Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir and Baroda were not bodies of yes, yes politicians who shaped their votes according to the patronising nod they received from their presiding bureaucrat. It was in the hands of the States' subjects to get their Legislative Assemblies broad-bottomed(?) and really effective. Instead of helping the young idea of responsible Government grow in the Indian States the President of Congress has mathematised

the States as anachronism which he has waged a holy war to consolidating a camaraderie among the Hindu Statesmen and providing a buttress against pan-Islamism. The Congress has only to bear in mind that in opposing Federation tooth and nail it does not again pull the chestnuts out of fire for the benefit of his Muslim brethren. He has also to remember that there is something like Divide and Rule in Imperial politics. Let the Congress Hindu beware of where his country is being unwittingly led and of the drift his aimless leadership is subjecting his country to. The British Statesmen, however, is wide awake. The Muslim League has openly accepted the goal of Independence. The only support for the permanence of the British connection is the much abused Treaty obligation of the Indian States, and alliance with the Indian States is the one pivot of Federal Constitution.

4. The new Government of India Act has two fundamental policies to implement. The first is Provinces Autonomy and the second, Federation; the two are inter-dependent and complementary to each other. Already the inconvenience and anomalies of having independent Provincial Governments with a weak Government at the Centre are flashing upon the eagle eyes of the British Statesmen. Let the Congress Hindu not close his eyes to the danger of allowing the Provinces, now made autonomous to wax strong year after year in virtual independence until they become too powerful to be brought under control of a responsible Government at the Centre. The pan-Islamic propaganda only howled out for such a march of their Provinces with Muslim majorities so as to enable them to defy Federation in the near future.

5. The British Government cannot be expected to sleep over this possibility that can never be in the true interest of the country. Their endeavour ought to be to secure the speedy accession of the Indian Rulers to the Federal Constitution so as to enable the whole Constitution of 1935 to be successfully launched. They have vast resources at their command; and their armoury is replete with devices to bring about such an accession to Federation. The *Abhisarika* has been sent out and she is merrily visiting Ruler after Ruler, offering remission of tribute to one, and restoration of ceded territory to another. To the third who promises a return of his acknowledged suzerainty over effect(?) principalities that have become too powerless to hold up their heads in the flood, and swim with the other to the goal safely. They are bound to sink unless they are taken up within the fold of their old sovereign from whom they have been torn aside by the pax Britannica Compensation for salt revenues foregone and restoration of jurisdiction over lands ceded for Railways are only a few of the blandishments the *Abhisarika* has been changed to employ by way of decoy and the result has not yet been despaired of.

6. The Congress opposition to Federation need not be unduly feared or magnified. The Congress was determined to wreck the Constitution. It has resolved not to accept responsibility as Ministers. But while swearing they would never accept, they accepted. We may not take their crusade against Federation too seriously. What is wanted at this (juncture) is a level head and a keen vision. Opportunism though morally looked down upon has been always held up as a successful political level in diplomacy.

1. Sir Manubhai N. Mehta C.S.I. (1868-1946); Dewan of Baroda, 1916-27; Prime Minister of Bikaner and Rajputana (1927-34); Home Minister of Gwalior, 1937; attended Round Table Conference, 1930-31 and Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Reforms, 1933; served on Viceroy's Consultative Committee, 1932; Chairman, Committee of Ministers, Chamber of Princes, 1944.
2. Sir Mirza M. Ismail, Diwan of Mysore, 1926-41; delegate to the three Round Table Conferences; Prime Minister of Jaipur, 1942-46; Prime Minister of Hyderabad, 1946-47.
3. Sir Liaquat Hayat Khan of Patiala held the view that the Princes were definitely nearer the Federation.
4. Sir Akbar Hydari; Finance Minister, Hyderabad, 1921-37; Member, Governor-General's Executive Council, 1941-42.

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Nehru to Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 200-04

ALLAHABAD, 26 December, 1937

My dear Nawab Sahib,

I must apologise to you for the delay in answering your letter of December 1st. It reached me about the middle of the month on my return from Assam and I have been overwhelmed with work since then.

2. You suggest that I have been hasty in arriving at certain conclusions on the basis of information supplied by interested parties. It may be so and perhaps on a fuller consideration of all the evidence I might vary my opinion. Indeed I wrote to you in order to balance the facts and accusations in my possession with such as you might draw my attention to. Any person, however judicial-minded he might be, is invariably influenced to some extent by what he sees and hears. I have seen something and I have heard a great deal about the activities of some of the workers on behalf of the League and I have been influenced thereby. But essentially my distress was due to the whole background of the Muslim League propaganda as evidenced by their official leaflets and notices and other statements. All this was intensely communal and anti-Congress. Political questions were hardly referred to and the stress was on religious and communal questions which did not arise at all. This seems to me a great disservice to any community and to the nation, for progress comes through the development of the political mentality in a group. Nationalism is obviously a higher ideal than communalism in so far as politics is concerned.

3. The flag issue is now being raised. So far as we are concerned we have not raised any objection to the Muslim League flag being put up or displayed. But do you not think that this is definitely a step back which will lead to all manner of complications? The Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League and Christian associations will put up their flags in public places with equal justification. That surely is not the way to promote unity and consolidation and nationalism or to advance to the freedom

of India. For all these years we have treated the tricolour flag as the national flag of India and it has gained a wide-spread respect and currency. Purposely it was designed to signify the unity of India; one of its colours was green to signify the Muslims. Maulana Muhammad Ali (and probably Maulana Shaukat Ali also) hoisted it on numerous occasions and spoke eloquently on its significance. Chaudhry Khaliquz-zaman had it hoisted on the Lucknow Municipal Board buildings and elsewhere. Is he now going to put up the Muslim League flag or a variety of flags representing different communities?

4. It is all this background of communalism, separatism, anti-nationalism and non-political consideration of political issues, that distress me. I realise and appreciate that the Muslim League, in so far as its resolutions are concerned, has come much nearer to the Congress politically. That is a welcome advance. But the background does not fit in with this; indeed it is in direct contradiction with it. Take again the fact that many of the present leaders of the Muslim League (I do not refer to you or to Mr. Jinnah) sided completely with the British Government throughout our struggles with it, and some of them actively cooperated with the most reactionary conservatives and diehards in England. Am I to understand that they are converts to independence and direct action now?

5. I might remind you that last May or June, when I was in Burma, my attention was drawn to certain references to Mr. Jinnah in the Gujarati Press. These papers were not Congress papers; indeed they were partly anti-Congress. I did not myself see what they had written, but on being told that they had indulged in personal criticism, I deprecated this and publicly apologised to Mr. Jinnah, although I was in no way concerned with the papers.

6. Whatever the shortcomings and errors of the Congress might be, it is in conception and even in practice a national movement. It has no other *raison d'être*. It cannot admit the argument that it must not function in a particular religious group. For if it does so, it ceases to be national. If it does so, it must also retire from other such groups, and ultimately it must fade away. There is no middle course.

7. You refer to the belief that the Congress is trying to destroy Muslim solidarity. That is often said but I do not understand it at all. There can be and should be religious or cultural solidarity. But when we enter the political plane, the solidarity is national not communal; when we enter the economic plane the solidarity is economic. The Congress is out to build-up national solidarity and at the same time to preserve in every way possible the cultural solidarity of different groups.

8. It is very unfair of any one to charge Muslim supporters of the Congress with being financed by the Congress. Naturally in our elections we help our candidates, Hindu or Muslim. Apart from this what is meant? If it is hinted at that Muslims in the Congress are there for love of money it is a calumny and a falsehood. Our finances are perfectly above board and can be inspected. In our various offices there are a number of Hindu as well as Muslim whole time workers who are paid a maintenance allowance, which is usually far less than what they can earn otherwise or what they were actually getting before they joined us.

9. You refer to the appointment to Ministerial offices of persons who have abjured their parties and only recently joined the Congress. Presumably you refer to

Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim. I think you are very unfair to him. Perhaps you do not know that Hafiz Ibrahim has been a Congressman for years past and has held office in Congress committees. He left the League Parliamentary Board long before the Ministries were formed on the ground that the Board was allying itself to reactionary elements which had opposed the League and the Congress in general elections. That attitude was a perfectly comprehensible and justifiable one, whether one agreed with it or not. Subsequently as you know he resigned and sought election again. What more can a man do?

10. We are a political organisation trying with such ability and energy as we possess to work for a certain end. In the nature of things, being a national organisation we work among all classes and groups in India. This means no ill-will to other groups or individuals. Our effort must necessarily be to gain their goodwill. So far as the minorities are concerned it is our declared aim and purpose to go out of our way even to gain their goodwill. So if we agree in such a large measure why should we not carry on in a friendly way?

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Jinnah's Presidential Address to Muslim Students Federation

The Star of India, 28 December, 1937; Nation's Voice, pp. 202-04

Calcutta, 27 December, 1937. Mr. M.A. Jinnah in the course of his speech said that last year he presided over the Lucknow Session of the All India Students Federation which was opened by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. But now he was presiding over the All India Muslim Students Federation. What was the reason? Mr. Jinnah explaining the circumstances which had forced him to change his mind and revise his opinion said that he had come to the deliberate conclusion that there was no alternative, no escape and no honourable course open for the Muslims but to organise on separate lines and first set their house in order. As none was caring to do anything for their good and uplift they must organise for self-defence and self-help. It was not to be done by anybody else for them. Nobody would do it for them. Nobody had done it for them in the past. He had deliberately come to the conclusion that unless they woke up and organised themselves and developed themselves, and qualified themselves nobody could have respect or care for them.

2. Last year Mr. Jinnah wished Godspeed to the All India Students Federation with the hope that the task of bringing the Hindus and Muslims on a common platform which the elders had failed to accomplish will be effected by the youth of India. But he was soon disillusioned. The authorities of the All India Students Federation managed to pass all resolutions and execute all business while he was occupying the Presidential chair but the election of the office-bearers was held only when he had

left the Conference. Next morning he was informed by the Muslim students that the Hindu students had managed to totally exclude the Muslim students from the posts of office-bearers.

3. In the present conditions of things it was difficult for the Muslim and Hindu communities to work in cooperation, in harmony and in unity in all matters. He had life-long experience and enough patience and had made great efforts to work together with members of the other communities on equal, fair and honourable terms. "But I am sorry to say" said Mr. Jinnah, "that I have failed so far. This exactly has been the fate of Muslim young men and students." The Muslim youth had now started the Muslim Students Federation. He wished them to go on with organising themselves although they should never fail to cooperate with any other sister community whether they were young or old men, on equal and honourable terms.

4. "While we want to raise ourselves to the highest stature, our hand of cooperation for the good of our Province and country is always fully stretched but on equal terms. We are not going to be subdued or to be the camp followers or slaves or the subject race of *"Hindu Raj,"* "*(Allah-o-Akbar)*."

5. Mr. Jinnah then inviting Syed Abdul Aziz,¹ Barrister-at-Law, Patna, Ex-Minister of Education, Bihar, to deliver his inaugural address, paid glowing tributes to his All India fame for his great record of services in the cause of national welfare and nationalism. Mr. Aziz, said Mr. Jinnah, was a "Nationalist" and so was he. [Mr. Aziz "I think we are still true and sincere Nationalist." I mean Mr. Aziz was a 'Nationalist' ! In the sense that he was recognised as such by even the Hindus. But unfortunately the conditions had forced men like the speaker and Mr. Aziz to unite on a communal platform of Muslim students.

6. "I Welcome Syed Abdul Aziz as one of the communalists," said Mr. Jinnah, "If for demanding a rightful place for Muslims in the Government of the country and in other spheres of life, I am dubbed a communalist, I plead guilty to the charge; if for taking steps to raise the members of my community socially, politically and economically, I am called a communalist, I will gladly accept that appellation. The truth is that in the present atmosphere of our country, it is becoming very very difficult for two sister communities to work in harmony and unison in almost all matters and I am convinced there is no other course open to us except to organise ourselves through separate organisation like the All India Muslim Students Federation. But while we will go on in this way we shall never fail to cooperate with any other sister community on equal and honourable terms. Only we are not going to be camp followers and slaves under a Hindu Raj," concluded Mr. Jinnah.

1. Syed Abdul Aziz (1885-1947); Member, Provincial Legislature, 1926-30; Minister, Education, Bihar and Orissa, 1934; President, Bihar Provincial Muslim League, 1936-40.



*Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana's Article on Congress Ministries**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 26/198*

Commenting on a previous article contributed by me to these columns, Professor Gulshan Rai¹ expressed surprise at my suggestion that the Muslim members of various provincial Legislatures should try to make a concerted move for the purpose of forming a party in the Federal Legislature. The Professor pointed out that my suggestion was not in accord with the claims and professions of the Punjab Unionist Party, which prided itself on being a non-communal organisation. He suggested that the Muslim members of the Punjab Unionist Party should rather help in the organisation of a Liberal Party. I am very much afraid that my learned friend has misunderstood the purpose of my suggestion. I am not in favour of forming a communal party in the Federal Legislature. For one thing a purely communal party of Muslims can never hope to command a majority in that legislature. For another, it would be wrong in principle and injurious to the future interests of India to divide any Legislature into purely communal parties.

2. If my friend again reads my article carefully, he will find that I suggested a concerted move by Muslim members of various Provincial Legislature for the purpose of enlisting the cooperation and help of non-Muslim groups so as to form a non-communal party capable of making a bid for a majority in the Federal Legislature. I even suggested that the formation of alliances with non-Muslim groups for this purpose should be as welcome to me before the election as after it. Why I suggested a Muslim combination to start with was because of the practical consideration that generally speaking the Muslim members of the Provincial Legislature are already a more or less homogenous group and can form a dependable and readily available nucleus for a larger non-communal party. As for the Liberal Party, there is, no doubt, such a party in the country, but there is no Liberal Group worth consideration just now in any Provincial Legislature. And it is the Provincial Legislatures not the parties outside them, that are to elect the Federal Assembly. From a practical point of view it would, therefore, be best for Unionists, Liberals, the Muslim League and all other parties with common or mutually adjustable programmes that an inter-Provincial Muslim combination should be formed as a big enough nucleus for a comprehensive non-communal party which might compete with the Congress Party on an equal footing.

3. This procedure would have been preferable even when the Congress had not yet declared its hand. It appears to me that the Congress has now very nearly forced Muslims to adopt this course. All those who have been watching carefully the tactics of the Congress Parties since they assumed Offices in six Provinces must have been impressed with one main feature of their policy. Behind the smoke screen of propaganda and meaningless stunts, the Congress Parties in the Congress-governed Provinces have only been trying to reduce the minority communities to virtual political subjection. This is really the main difference between the policy of the Congress

majorities in their six Provinces and the policy initiated by the Leader of the Unionist Party, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, in the Punjab.

4. We have been hearing a great deal about the singing of *Bande Mataram* in the Legislatures of those Provinces. They seem to sing this song to celebrate the meeting of the Legislature, to celebrate the election of Congressmen to Speakerships and to celebrate various other occasions. They have been marching to the Legislatures at the head of processions. All this is, of course, quite novel. They have also been staging a few other political stunts of extremely doubtful value from the point of view of the interests of the taxpayer. But what is the constructive policy behind these pyrotechnics? The real test of the relief and reforms which the Provinces concerned may hope to get at their hands is yet to come. I believe some indication of it will be available when the Congress parties present their Budgets to their Legislatures. That will show the real economies and beneficent measures which the Congress parties are able to carry out.

5. In the meantime such measures as have so far been announced by them indicate nothing but an attitude of excessive partisanship. "We are in power and, therefore, our supporters and friends should enjoy special privileges." This is frankly the real policy behind the much advertised release of a number of political prisoners, the refund of the securities of certain newspapers and the removal of ban from certain political associations. This passion for "Lording it over other fellows" has indeed exhibited itself in a very unpleasant form in at least one Province where the Congressite Premier has seriously proposed and the Congressite speaker has openly accepted the proposal that the Speaker in the Legislature concerned should not consider himself above party politics. How far this passion will eventually take the Congress parties remains yet to be seen. If the Congress is not able to check it in time, we may find the Ministers which are now proudly proclaiming the release of their friends from Jails and the refund of the securities of pro-Congress newspapers, may be found before long dealing much more ruthlessly with their opponents than the pre-Reform bureaucracy ever did. Already we have noticed some extremely alarming instances of their intolerance for non-Congress parties. Apart from the declaration that the Speaker in a certain Congress-governed Provinces need not be above party politics, the Congress parties seem to resent the attitude of those who do not salute the tri-coloured flag, do not join the chorus of *Bande Mataram*, or do not stand when the Congress Party makes some kind of a demonstration of its majority.

6. The thoroughly alarming beginning which the Congress parties have made in the Congress-governed Provinces in this respect is more conspicuous in the manner in which they have treated the Minority communities in the matter of Ministerial elections. In Orissa they have frankly declined to take any Muslim in their Cabinet. In the other Provinces they have chosen Muslims with no following as their Ministers. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in the Punjab had shown India the method of taking real representatives of Minority communities in the Cabinet without jeopardizing in any way, the principle of Joint Ministerial Responsibility or Ministerial homogeneity. He had shown the leaders of majority parties in other Provinces how they could avoid the temptation of luring away a few nonentities

from the Minority groups and putting them in office.² I would like to remind the Congress what the great philosopher of the East [Iqbal] has said:

"All know the art of making a man lose consciousness of self with intoxicating wine of selfish persuasions.

But the real man is he who selflessly administers the potential liquid of his counsel in such rhymes as to arouse the slumbering consciousness of self in man."

Unfortunately the Congress parties have failed to follow his example. Instead, they have followed that unhealthy and provoking device which Sir Sikander had discarded.

7. In the United Provinces the Congress Party did not come to terms with Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, the Leader of the Muslim League Group, despite his well-known pro-Congress leanings. They preferred to lure four weaklings, some of whom were as poles apart from the Congress in the past, into signing the Congress Party's creed and gave a Ministership to one of them. In plain words the Congress policy is nothing short of a deliberate attempt at keeping real Muslim representatives out of office and power with the help of a few who are prepared to forswear their election pledges and act as camp followers of the Congress Party for personal gain. Such men can be found in every community and every party. The policy, however, of taking advantage of such men and utilizing their services for the purpose of keeping their community in political subjection amounts to encouraging political immorality and is fraught with grave dangers from the point of view of inter-communal feelings.

8. As the smoke-screen of propaganda, which now conceals these bare-faced tactics of the Congress parties, melts away, there is bound to arise deep resentment among Muslims not only in the Congress-governed Provinces but, I am very much afraid, in the Punjab and Bengal as well, against these tactics. Not long ago certain Congress leaders were loudly proclaiming that a majority party cannot hope to rule long unless it keeps the Minorities contented and happy. The worst of tyrants who have ruled this world have often had some such platitudes on their lips. As far as the Congress is concerned, it seems just now that in its own opinion the best method of keeping the Muslim Minorities in the six Provinces happy and contented is to insist that the Muslim representatives must sing *Bande Mataram* when Congress men sing it, must salute the Congress flag and must accept Congress chosen non-entities from among themselves as their representatives in the Cabinet or some cases, must go without any representation whatsoever in the Cabinet.

9. The Congress has made a small beginning with this policy but I really shudder to think of the destination to which this beginning may eventually lead India. Muslims in six Provinces are in a small minority and are otherwise weak. Under the protection of the Constitution the Congress majorities in these Provinces can spurn and insult them with no immediate harm to themselves. But they should realise that they are running the very real risk of embittering inter-communal feelings throughout the country. We in the Punjab have given proof of our sincere wish that majorities everywhere should govern their Provinces with the genuine goodwill and cooperation of the minorities, but our humble efforts in this direction will not take India very far, if the Congress parties in six Provinces persist in the policy on which they have already embarked.

1. Gulshan Rai, a Journalist of Lahore.
2. Sikander Hayat Khan was of the view that the Muslims should not form parties in legislatures on communal lines though they should work as a single organised team for the protection of Muslims rights and interests.

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Savarkar's Presidential Address to the 19th Session of the Hindu Mahasabha

Indian Annual Register, 1937, Pt. II, pp. 419-22

AHMEDABAD, 30 December, 1937

Besides the President-elect those present included Dr. Moonje, Mr. Bhopatkar,¹ Bhai Paramanad, • Dr. Kurkoti,² Sri Sankaracharya, Sir Gokulchand Narang, several local lawyers, mill-owners and doctors. Hindu Congress leaders were conspicuous by their absence. The proceedings commenced with Vedic prayers by Prof. Athawavale followed by welcome songs and *Bande Mataram*.

2. Welcoming the delegates and visitors, Mr. Thakor, Chairman of the Reception Committee, referred to Mr. Fazlul Huq's speech at the last session of the Muslim League at Lucknow in which he held out threats of retaliation and said that it revealed the mentality of the Muslim leaders like Mr. Huq and their hope of a Muslim Raj.

He said: "Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the Muslim League in his recent speech at Surat exhorted his co-religionists to do away with the internal differences and to become united and organised under the banner of the Muslim League. He appealed to them to join the League which was striving hard to train Musalmans to fight for their rights and for the amelioration of the community in general. They could maintain their present political position in the present upheaval of the country only if they could make their voice a living one.

Under the present Constitution of India the Mohammadans are a privileged community, enjoying special rights and privileges; if their leader thinks it necessary for them to unite and fight for their rights, how much more it is necessary for the Hindus, who has to regain lost ground, to do so?

May I consequently, from this platform, request the Hindus, Sanatanists, Arya Samajists, Sikhs, Jains, etc., to enrol as members of the Hindu Mahasabha, to lend the organization their material and moral support and thus to strengthen the hands of its leaders in safeguarding the legitimate interests of the Hindus?

The Hindus as a class are extremely peaceful and tolerant people; they believe in the principle of "live and let live." One of the objects of the founders of the Mahasabha is to promote good feelings between the Hindus, ex-Hindus and other communities in India and to act in a friendly way with a view to evolve a united and self-governing Indian Nation.

In his extremely instructive volume 'A Civilisation at Bay' the late Dr. K. Kunhi

Kanan, a profound student of Sociology, speaking with great detachment makes the following observations regarding Indian Mohammadans:

"The safeguards they demand in Provinces where they are in a minority, they refuse to concede to Hindus in others where they are in the Minority. The object appears to be to gain political dominance in the outlying Provinces of India contiguous with foreign territories under Islamic rule. The Hindus rightly feel, in view of Pan-Islamism, that any surrender to this demand would make for dangerous affiliations which may reduce the Hindus as a whole to political impotence and endanger the integrity and unity of India as a whole" (pp. 441-442).

The learned author praises the Mohammadans for their strong sense of brotherhood, solidarity and readiness to suffer for the sake of their community, but laments their narrowness of outlook, exclusiveness as far as members of the other communities are concerned, and exhorts them to come to an amicable settlement of their claims with the Hindus, and not solely with the Government. The Hindus in my humble opinion would be well advised even now to try to cultivate friendly relations with their Mohammadan brethren provided the latter care to respond to such a gesture; further than this it would not in my humble opinion be desirable to go for friendship which cannot be forced on those who do not wish to be friendly.

The Presidential Address

Presiding over the session Mr. Vinayak D. Savarkar observed: "Though we form an overwhelming majority in the land we do not want any special privileges for our Hindudom. Nay, more, we are even willing to guarantee special protection for the language, culture and religion of the Mohammadans as a Minority if they also promise not to infringe the equal liberty of other communities in India."

He added "Let the Indian State be purely Indian. Let it not recognize any invidious distinctions whatsoever with regard to franchise, public services, offices and taxation on the grounds of religion and race. Let not cognizance be taken whatsoever of a man being a Hindu or a Mohammadan, a Christian or a Jew. Let all citizens of Indian States be treated according to their individual worth, irrespective of their religions or racial percentage in the general population. Let their language and script be the national language and script of the Indian State which is understood by an overwhelming majority of the people, as happens in every other State in the world. Let no religious bias be allowed to tamper with their language and script. Let "one man, one vote" be the general rule irrespective of caste, creed, race or religion. If such an Indian State is kept in view Hindu Sanghathanists, in the interest of Hindu Sanghathan itself, will be the first to offer their whole-hearted loyalty to it. I, for one, and the thousands of Mahasabhaites like me, have set this ideal of the Indian State as our political goal ever since the beginning of our political career and shall continue to work for its consummation to the end of our life."

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1. L.B. Bhopatkar (1880-1960), Lawyer and Politician; elected to Bombay Assembly, 1923 on Swaraj Party ticket; veered towards Hindu Mahasabha and advocated linguistic division of the country.
 2. Dr. Kurtkoti; Shankaracharya of Kavvir Peeth.

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Resolutions Adopted at the 19th Session of the Hindu Mahasabha Held at Ahmedabad, 30th, 31st December, 1937 and 1 January, 1938

Jayakar Papers

Cow Protection: This session congratulates the Hindus on the successful termination of their agitation against the proposed erection of a central abattoir at Lahore and records its appreciation of the action taken by His Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor-General and Punjab Government in abandoning the project in deference to Hindu sentiments with respect to cow-slaughter.

This Session of the Mahasabha congratulates the Hindus in Jammu Province upon the struggle in their cow-protection agitation.

Federation: In view of the fact : (a) that under the Constitution of the Government of India Act of 1935, some elements of Provincial Autonomy have been introduced and the Congress has been actually working the Provincial Governments for the present, and (b) that the Provincial Autonomy will not work with Constitutional smoothness unless responsibility is introduced in the Central Government at least provided for under the Act, this Conference puts on record its deliberate opinion that in spite of the defective and unsatisfactory character of the Constitution, the Hindus should utilize whatever powers are provided for under the Act in the interest of the evolution of Hindustan as a united nation and urges upon the Government to expedite the introduction of the Federation.

The Hindu Mahasabha warns the Government and all those who may be concerned with it that, as the Mahasabha has fundamental opposition to the so-called Communal Award and is determined to do all that lies in its power to do away with it as early as possible, the Mahasabha will not tolerate any attempt to extend the scope of the Award so as to apply also to the Indian States.

Hindi as Lingua Franca: This Session holds that Hindi which originated from Sanskrit is the common spoken and not mixed with the words of foreign origin language and Devanagri character is the common script for India and the action of all those, who try to belittle the importance of Hindu preservations of Hindu culture and traditions of India is condemnable, and condemns the decision of Wardha Educational Conference to include Urdu in the general educational curricula.

Appreciation of Office Acceptance: This Session of the Mahasabha appreciates decision of the Congress to work the Constitution in spite of its serious defects and to utilise the legislatures and whatever powers the Constitution gives for the advancement of national interests.

Congratulations to Interim Ministers: This Session congratulates the interim Hindu Ministers who accepted the office in the teeth of opposition, in the interest of the people of Hindustan and thus prevented a breakdown of the Constitution.

Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh: The Hindu Mahasabha congratulates the working and the discipline of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh of Dr. Hedgewar¹ of Nagpur everywhere and recommends the Hindu Sabha workers to promote and help the

organisation which stands for the defence of *Hindu Rashtra*.

Prevention of Cow-Slaughter. (a) This Session deplors that the slaughter of cows is carried on in this country on a tremendous scale after the advent of British Raj which is causing a grievous hurt to the religious feelings of millions of Hindus and affecting detrimentally towards the health and agricultural industry of this nation. This conference, therefore, demands from the Central and all Provincial Governments an immediate statutory prohibition of all Cow-slaughter, entirely and completely.

(b) This Session appeals to all Hindus to take active measures to bring about cow protection by means of keeping cows. This Session also requests all Hindu M.L.A's to do the needful in their respective legislatures.

Bengal: This Session of the Hindu Mahasabha views with great indignation and unequivocally condemns the communal activities of the Bengal Government as evidenced by several proposed legislations and administrative measures as also by the speeches of the Premier, Mr. Fazlul Huq and calls upon the Hindus of Bengal to unite and organise themselves in defence of their political, economic and cultural rights.

Assam: This Session of the Hindu Mahasabha condemns the Government policy of the unrestricted immigration into the Province of Assam, which is deliberately calculated to turn into a Muslim majority Province and calls upon the Hindus of Assam to resist this policy.

This Session of the Hindu Mahasabha re-affirms its Lahore resolutions about the removal of slaughter house at Mathura and resolves that if the present Provincial Government does not give satisfactory answer to that resolution, the Hindu Mahasabha will be compelled to commence its last year's programme.

The newly elected Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha has adopted the following resolution:—'This meeting of the newly elected Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha in pursuance of the resolution passed yesterday at the open Session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, regarding early introduction of Federation appeals to the Hindu and Sikh Princes to make up their minds to join the Federation as early as possible, in the interest of evolution of India as a United Nation.'

1. Dr. K.B. Hedgewar (1889-1940), Secretary, Organiser and founder of the RSS.

Nehru's Statement

The Hindustan Times, 3 January, 1938; Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 207-210

Bombay, 1 January, 1938. From Press reports it appears that Mr. M.A. Jinnah has issued some kind of a challenge to me, though I have not been able to make out

what this is about and why he should think it necessary to issue challenges. Nor have I any recollection of any previous challenge to which he refers. Mr. Jinnah is further reported to have said that he is fighting the Congress leadership which is misleading the Hindus. In the same week Mr. Fazlul Huq has called upon Muslims to prepare for direct action against Hindus and has threatened to use a big rod against those he disapproves of. He looks forward to communal conflicts and prophesies dire happenings in which he will play a prominent role. All this frank incitement to communalism and hatred and conflict is strange language which one has not associated so far with political leaders and those in positions of responsibility. I have no taste or aptitude for controversy of this kind and I can only regret that matters which should be discussed dispassionately and with the ordinary courtesies of public life should be dealt with in such a manner. Whoever wishes to fight the Congress on the communal issue will have to fight in the air, for the Congress will have nothing to do with such internecine conflicts. We have fought, not without success, the mighty power of British imperialism and that fight we shall continue till imperialism flourishes no more in India. In that fight we shall gladly cooperate with every individual and group in India, whatever our minor differences might be. We think in terms of no other fight, and we shall strain every nerve and do our utmost to gain the confidence and goodwill of all our countrymen. Mr. Fazlul Huq's approach is one of threats and angry defiance. Mr. Jinnah's approach is anything but friendly. But I should like to assure Mr. Jinnah, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, that even without the issue of challenges, any statement or proposal by Mr. Jinnah will always have the most careful consideration. We are always prepared to sit down and consider any of the problems which afflict India. So far as the Minorities question is concerned, it is the declared and well-established policy of the Congress not only to do full justice to them, but to go even beyond that in order to inspire confidence and goodwill in them. The Congress can conceive of no freedom for India which is not an equal freedom for all the various religious communities which inhabit India and in which all do not share equally and have full opportunities of growth and development. So far as religious and cultural matters are concerned it has given the fullest possible assurances and declared that these should be incorporated in our fundamental rights in the Constitution. A further assurance has been given in regard to personal law. In regard to certain political rights, the Communal Award stands for the present and we have stated repeatedly that we seek no change except with the concurrence of those concerned. We have further declared that we shall stand by the provisional agreement which was arrived at between Babu Rajendra Prasad, acting as Congress President, and Mr. Jinnah. What remains? If there is anything of importance left over, let us have it out by all means and consider it. My difficulty is that I do not know what the argument is about.

2. Essentially the Congress is a political body acting on the national and political plane, and inevitably dealing with economic questions. All these overlap communal and religious boundaries. Because of the strength that has come to the Congress from the organised masses of this country, and because of the growing importance of India, the Congress functions also to some extent on the international plane. This is bound to grow. This also has nothing to do with religious or communal questions.

3. I welcome the recent re-orientation of the Muslim League and some of its resolutions which have brought it much nearer, in theory at least to the Congress. I welcome its new objective of independence. I hope this theory will be translated into practice and strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle.

4. I would beg Mr. Jinnah to remember what the Congress is today. It is very different from what it was in the days when he was associated with it. During this period it has grown remarkably and is today an organisation with thirty one lakhs of members actually on its rolls, of whom about a hundred thousand are Muslims. It influences scores of millions of others. But apart from the vast numbers it influences, it has succeeded by its continuous work among the masses and its campaigns of direct action, in developing political consciousness among the people and in creating strength and self-reliance in them. These millions, though more disciplined than ever before and capable of united action, are not dumb sheep who can be driven at the will of a few leaders, howsoever honoured and respected the latter might be. Even our village committees are vital bodies having a will of their own and striving to express it. The Congress is thus a vast democratic organisation, influenced greatly by its leadership no doubt, but essentially reacting to the pressure and urges coming up from its tens of thousands of local committees.

5. What are our major problems today? Politically, the fight against the proposed federation and for independence; socially and in the sphere of economics, the fight against poverty and unemployment, and the necessity to lighten the burdens of our masses and raise their standards of human levels. There are ever so many other matters of importance and demanding attention—education, medical relief and sanitation, the development of planned industry—but before we can grapple with them the basic problems must be solved. In facing these basic problems of federation and independence and poverty and unemployment, we come up against great vested interests, imperialistic and semi-feudal. The recent decisions of the Muslim League lead me to hope that that organisation is beginning to think of their problems in the same light as we have done for so many years. If so, let us cooperate by all means with each other and with all other anti-imperialist elements in the country in this fight for freedom, whether the method of fighting is by direct action or otherwise.

6. May I express the hope that any further approach to the communal or minorities question will be a dispassionate one, and will not seek to rouse bitterness and hatred which can never help in the consideration of any problem. In this dynamic and revolutionary age, pregnant with big possibilities, those of us who have a measure of influence with our countrymen dare not lose sight of the big things or encourage passions which weaken us and lower us in the world's esteem.



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Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Maxwell

Home Department (Special), F. No. S.D. 22

BOMBAY, 1/4 January, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Maxwell,

I am desired to submit my report for the second half of December 1937.

4. Communal: In view of the harmonious relations existing between the Hindus and Mohammadans of Poona City since the settlement of the dispute regarding the playing of music at the Sonya Maruti Temple, Government have ordered the release of 22 prisoners who were convicted and sentenced in connection with the communal riots of April 1936.

The nineteenth session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha was held at Ahmedabad from the 30th December to 1st January. According to Press reports the Presidential speech of Mr. V.D. Savarkar was highly communal in tone. By one of the resolutions adopted at the session the existing aim in the Constitution of the Mahasabha has been altered to read as follows: "The aim of the Hindu Mahasabha is the maintenance, protection and promotion of the Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilization and advancement and the glory of *Hindu Rastra*, and, with a view to secure them, to attain *Purna Swarajya*, i.e., absolute Political Independence for Hindustan by legitimate means."

Another resolution, while expressing fundamental opposition to the Communal Award and the extension of its application to Indian States, recommends that "Hindus should utilise whatever powers are provided for under the Act in the interests of the evolution of Hindustan as a united nation, and urges upon Government to expedite the introduction of Federation."

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Jinnah's Address to Calcutta Muslims

The Nation's Voice, pp. 212-24

STAR OF INDIA, 7 January, 1938

Calcutta, 7 January, 1938. A largely attended meeting of the Muslims of Tantibagh, Calcutta, was held at Anjuman Road under the auspices of the local Muslim League to accord a welcome to Mr. M.A. Jinnah during his recent visit to the city. The gathering consisted mostly of 'Momin Ansars.' Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Azad read the welcome address in Urdu which expressed the complete faith of the 'Momin Ansars'

and all other working and professional 'Jamats' of the Muslims in the Muslim League and assured Mr. Jinnah of their solid support. They also hoped that he will supplement the 'Political' programme of the Muslim League with a 'social' programme and make special efforts to eradicate the barriers of caste and distinctions of classes from the Indian Muslim society. The Muslim Society, it said, must be freed not only from the 'Political' subjection of the Hindus but also from the 'Social' subjection of caste which was the greatest curse of Hinduism.

2. Mr. Jinnah in his reply said that the Muslim League was fighting for the underdog. The labouring and working classes and the professional 'Jamats' of the community constituted its backbone. The Muslim League's primary and fundamental object was to raise them to the fullest stature of their manhood and to work for their economic, social, educational and political uplift and welfare. The problem of poverty cannot be solved in a moment by magic but a very great deal can be done immediately for the relief of the poor people and it was the duty of all Muslims to bring that about.

3. Referring to the welcome address which paid tribute to Mr. Jinnah for renouncing Privy Council practice and a life of princely ease and comfort in London in response to the call of the Muslim India which elected him leader of the Muslim League in 1935 at a most critical and chaotic state of Muslim politics, he said that he left London and adopted the present course of strenuous life only because he had no doubt in his mind that the political future of the Indian Muslim community and Islam, to which he was proud to belong, was in danger of disintegration for want of a bold and correct leadership and the utter lack of organisation. He had now come to the deliberate conclusion after much thought and experience that unless the Muslims of India organise and all sections and groups of them unite on a common platform, they were doomed to serfdom and subjection in India. The Muslims must get the power and force or organization at the back of their voice otherwise it will be nothing but a voice in wilderness.

4. Continuing, Mr. Jinnah said that he was not fighting the Hindus. He was not even fighting the Congress. He was fighting the Congress leadership which had got intoxicated and had consequently taken leave of reason. It was his patriotic duty to bring that leadership to senses. He was fighting for the freedom of all and for equal justice to all. He stood for the principle of "equality" without which liberty was worthless and meaningless. The Congress had a peculiar political dictionary of its own in which "nationalism" meant "Hinduism" and "*Swaraj*" meant "*Hindu Raj*" and the "wrecking" of the Constitution meant the "working" it. Similarly, in Congress dictionary "freedom" meant the freedom of the Hindus and the slavery of the Muslims and other minorities and weak people.

5. The sole business of the Muslim League in India was to secure real freedom, real equality and real justice for all groups, communities and classes without any distinction. But the work of organizing a mass of 9 crore people was not an easy task. No one man can accomplish that task unless he got the cooperation and support of all the sections of the Muslim community. What was supremely necessary at the moment was a band of brave souls, an army of bold and disciplined, selfless and sincere workers who were ready to sacrifice and suffer for the Muslim cause.

6. When the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) started to preach Islam he was

a minority of one in the world. By the force of his faith he challenged the whole universe and wrought the greatest revolution in the shortest time in the world with the help of the *Holy Quran*. If the Muslims procure the power of that "faith," organisation, discipline and sacrifice, they have no reason to fear the hostile forces of the entire world. Let them shake off their lethargy, defeatism and despondency. Let them regain their faith, recapture their souls and remake their history once more in India (cries of '*Allah-o-Akbar*' and loud cheers).

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*Nawab of Chhatari's letter to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 100/V.17*

22, OUTRAM ROAD, LUCKNOW, 7 January, 1938

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I received your telegram yesterday morning in reply to mine. I wired you after seeing Pandit Jawaharlal's statement in the Press. I wanted to consult you on this point; as such consultation was not possible, I said a few words, copy enclosed after consulting Nawab Ismail Khan. I understand Jawaharlal and many other prominent Congress people as well as His Highness Agha Khan are all in Bombay and it may be a good occasion for you to feel the ground.

With my best wishes throughout the New Year for you and yours.

Yours sincerely,
AHMAD SAEED

M.A. JINNAH Esqr.,
Bar-at-Law
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

Enclosure

Nehru's Statement: Bridging the Gulf

It is understood that Mr. Jinnah is shortly to issue his impressions of the Congress President's statement on the inter-communal situation in the country, making the position of the Muslim League clear on the subject.

2. Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, who also received a copy of the statement from the Congress President, while welcoming this gesture said that the Muslim League's position on the subject would be made clear in a statement which Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, would be issuing from Bombay where he had invited the Raja of Mahmudabad.

3. The Nawab of Chhatari, interviewed on the Congress President's statement, said: "I welcome the statement made by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, about the Muslim situation in the country and, without anticipating the decision of the Muslim League. I am sure that serious efforts would be made by both sides to bridge the gulf which has proved so far very detrimental to the interests of the country."

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*Raghib Ahsan¹ and others to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1093/103-4*

CALCUTTA, 8 January, 1938

Dear Sir Jinnah,

We beg to forward to you the copy of the abridged telegraphic message sent to you on January 6 regarding Hindu-Muslim Pact move.

2. We have consulted Sir Nazimuddin, Mr. H.S. Subrawardy and other Bengal leaders. They entirely agree with it. With Salams.

Yours-in-Islam,
S.M. OSMAN
Mullajan Md.
(Secretaries)
Raghib Ahsan.

Enclosure

Calcutta Khilafat and Muslim League
(Three Terms of Congress-League Armistice)

1. Messrs. Syed Muhammad Osman M.A.B.L. Secretary, Calcutta Muslim League, Mulla Jani Muhammad, Secretary, Calcutta Khilafat Committee, sent the following telegraphic message to Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, regarding the move for Hindu-Muslim Pact on January 6, 1938.

2. The Muslims, while desiring genuine unity and amity have no faith in the bonafides of the present Congress move. It is not sincere but seems clearly designed to torpedo Muslim League Mass movement and to damp and kill Muslim spirit for self organisation and self-defence. Please do not repeat Gandhian Bardoli blunder by any precipitous move. Muslims' reply to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's statement is that he must first satisfy the following three armistice terms as conditions pre-requisite for entering into negotiations for a lasting genuine settlement:

1. Firstly, the Congress must cease fire, suspend hostilities and stop all frontal attacks on the Muslim League and League leaders. There can be no peace with a revolver point at the head of the League.

2. Secondly, the Congress must disband the Muslim mass contact committees. There can be peace with the Congress but not with the deserters, rebels and traitors of the Muslim Camp.

3. Thirdly, the Congress must dismiss the Dummy Muslim Ministers who are an affront to Muslim public opinion and an insult to the Muslim parties in the Provincial Legislatures.

Negotiations without pre-requisite guarantees of change of hearts are worse than useless. They are dangerous and may divide and destroy Muslim League's growing organisation.

4. Formulas based on joint electorates are utterly unacceptable to Muslims at this stage. Any opening of negotiations on this basis is fraught with dangers of demoralization and disintegration. League-Congress Coalition cabinets on terms of perfect equality is the only solution of the Communal problem.

1. Raghib Ahsan, General Secretary, Bengal District Muslim League; Member All India Muslim League Council

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*Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1093/156*

CALCUTTA, 9 January, 1938

Dear Sir Jinnah,

I think you have received the telegraphic message sent to you by the Calcutta Muslim League and the Calcutta Khilafat Committee regarding the Congress move for Hindu-Muslim Pact. I now hereby beg to submit to you the editorial comment of the *Star of India* on the Calcutta message. The telegram and the comment was, of course, written by me but has the complete support of all Muslim Leaguers in Bengal. Khwajah Sir Nazimuddin, Nawab Bahadur and Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy fully agree with it, with Salams.

Yours-in-Islam,
RAGHIB AHSAN

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*Khwaja Hasan Nizami¹ to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1093/116*

DARGAH HAZRAT KHWAJA,
NIZAMUDDIN AULIA, NEW DELHI,
10 January, 1938

My Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Bakr'Id is drawing near. I am informed that the enemies are trying to create a fuss and chaos on the occasion. It is, therefore, very necessary to avoid a collision between Hindus and Muslims. I think that you should inform the Provincial Muslim League to handle this delicate situation very carefully, and to advise the illiterate Muslims not to insist upon slaughtering cows.

2. General Muslim opinion suggests a change in the name of the All India Muslim News Agency—they like 'Muslim Information Service' instead. Your orders are awaited for this change. You will have to perform the opening ceremony of the Service. The Service will present an address to you on telephone and you will formally open the Service on phone. Please let me know the suitable date and time for it.

3. Please order somebody to send me addresses of all Muslim League Offices, and also please ask those Offices to cooperate with the Service.

4. The *Madina* Bijnor has filed a defamation case against me in connection with

the Bijnor election. The hearing is fixed for 26th January, 1938. I will send you full particulars of it when they are available.

5. I hope you are in the best of your health.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
KHWAJA HASAN NIZAMI

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1. Khawaja Hassan Nizami (1876-1955); a well-known Urdu essayist; wrote on many subjects including literature and religion; involved in a Press controversy with Maulana Muhammad Ali, aligned with Muslim League during 1945-46; in 1947 moved to Hyderabad, where he started a daily newspaper but returned to Delhi in 1950.

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S. Zafarul Hasan¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1090/22-23

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH, 10 January, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

1. Mr. Prasad has published the terms of the former agreement between you and him, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has made a statement which is regarded as an admission of the defeat of his arrogant attitude towards Musalmans and the Muslim League. As one who has given continued thought to the Hindu-Muslim problem, and who has the warmest admiration and respect for you, I feel I must speak to you on the point.

2. The Hindus have apparently stretched the hand of friendship towards you as the Leader of Musalmans, and you are as a gentleman expected to take it. The Musalmans have so repeatedly asked for the hand. But unfortunately accepting it would be the greatest of hazards.

3. After Pandit Jawaharlal's mass contact tactics, the Hindus have perhaps realised that that is not the way to destroy the solidarity of Musalmans. The way is to make friends with them by taking Mr. Jinnah back to his agreement with Mr. Prasad, and inducing him to accept joint electorates. Once joint electorate is accepted, the game is won. There will soon be no Muslim Nation, and no Muslim League. The Hindus shall thereby get an effective hand in the election of the Muslim representatives. The Muslim M.L.A. shall have to be the representative of Hindu electors too. He will then hardly be in a position to Press for the exclusively Muslim interests; and he will generally have but little interest in them. In the Minority Provinces, like U.P., there will soon be no real Musalmans sitting in the Assemblies; and men of the type of Dr. Ashraf and others, i.e., nominal Muslims shall soon have ousted them.

Then there may come a second move. This Pandit Jawaharlal or another Pandit

Jawaharlal may again start a mass contact movement amongst Musalmans! Who can stop this? And then the table will be altogether turned. Muslim representatives will be elected on Congress ticket; and there will be an end of the Muslim League as a great political party. That would be disastrous; and I feel pretty sure that that is what is at the bottom of the recent move. Then there will be, as Pandit Jawaharlal will have it, only two parties in the land—Government and Congress!

4. This I think is rather the move of the Communist party who now-a-days call themselves socialists, than of the Nationalist Congressites who have proved themselves bad enough. By accepting joint electorate you will be putting the Muslim masses in the hands of the Communists. What will become of Islam and Islamic culture then? Musalmans will soon turn Communists, and that is what Jawaharlal is yearning for. And then India will be in the convulsions of the Communist Revolution!

5. Before accepting joint electorate do please give the fullest consideration to these things. The solidarity of the Muslim nation should in no case and for no price be jeopardised.

With the sincerest of good wishes.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

PROF. DR. S. ZAFARUL HASAN

M.A. (Alig), D. Phil. (Oxon), Dr. Phil. (Erl)

Chairman, Department of Philosophy.

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1. He seems to be identical with Dr. Zafarul Hasan who was appointed a member of a Committee by the Muslim League Council meeting of 4 December, 1938 to report on the Wardha Scheme. He was also co-author of Constitutional Scheme with Dr. Afzal Hussain Kadri.

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Mohammad Ismail Khan to Nehru [Extract]

Congress Government I, pp. 219-21

MEERUT, 16 January, 1938

3. You observe that you feel distressed at the "whole background of the Muslim League propaganda" which you characterise as "Intensely religious, communal and anti-Congress." Now I ask you, is it fair to cast the whole blame for this on the Muslim League? Can the Congress have the temerity to deny that its own propaganda among the Muslim masses has been free from these blemishes? Has it not during the recent bye-elections and in its mass contact movement utilised to the fullest extent the religious and spiritual influence of eminent Muslim theologians, and, through them done its best to exploit the religious sentiments of the ignorant masses in every conceivable manner? Believe me, among the Musalmans these Ulamas (sic.) are held

in high esteem not because of their extreme political views but because of their religious erudition and spiritual attainments. An ordinary Muslim regards every utterance of theirs as a religious injunction. If the object of the Congress had been merely to convert the Muslim masses to its political and economic programme it should have employed politicians in preference to these worthy gentlemen who by their training and education are prone to give a religious tint to every secular affair. On the contrary, our experience was that in every election frantic efforts were made to secure the assistance from these *Ulamas* for the Congress candidate. I was personally informed at several places during the recent bye-election by Muslim voters that they dare not vote for our candidate because their Pir had threatened to excommunicate them if they did so.

4. Then again, during these recent elections I was rather shocked to see Hindus—whether Zamindars, bankers or vakils—who only the other day were bitterly opposed to the Congress, materially and morally backing the candidates. It was not because they had suddenly become converts to the Congress ideals, but because of the insidious propaganda which is being covertly carried on among the Hindus that the Congress Government virtually means a Hindu Government. If after this exhibition of communalism by a majority community, a minority devises effective measures for its security, can you blame it and wonder at its communalism?

5. With regard to the flag issue all I need say here is that I am not aware that any Muslim organisation has recognised the tri-colour flag as the National Flag. I have always understood it to be the Congress flag. I have also some recollection that when a controversy was raised by the Sikhs about its colours, it was authoritatively stated that its colours did not have any communal significance. I do not know whether the Hindu Mahasabha or the Christian community treat the tri-colour flag as the National Flag.

6. I would beg of you, if you wish to set things right, not to be swayed by your prejudices against persons who do not see eye to eye with you at the present moment and condemn them as communalists. You must seriously ponder why the Congress has failed to inspire confidence in the Minority communities and has been unable to carry with it even an appreciable number of the Muslim community in spite of its oft-proclaimed resolutions guaranteeing religious and cultural liberty to the various communities. To me it seems that the bulk of the Hindu community in spite of its pretensions of nationalism is still imbued with narrow communalism. Its social exclusiveness and separatism are not conducive to the evolution of national consciousness and sentiments of nationality of which nationalism is only a manifestation.

7. I do not for a moment deny the right of the Congress to convert Muslims to its ideals. It is the right of every political organisation to do so. What we do object to is the concerted efforts liberally financed by the Congress that are being made not only to induce the Muslims to join the Congress but also to bring into disrepute the Muslim League. The Muslims are being urged to wind up their communal organisations. Similar efforts as far as I know are not being made among other communities. Nor have these communities been asked to disband their organisations.

8. I believe it will be recollected that when separate electorates were provided

for the Untouchables at their own request and Muslims backed up their claims, the Hindu leaders were most vehement in their denunciation of the Muslim attitude towards the question. They were charged with breaking up the solidarity of the Hindu community. Muslims entertain similar resentment against the Congress leaders today for launching this mass contact movement.

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Nehru to Jinnah

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, p. 212

LUCKNOW, 18 January, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have read the statement you issued recently to the Press with care. I am afraid we approach the question from differing viewpoints and I feel that your approach is not very helpful. But I entirely agree with you that an argument carried on through the medium of the Press is not desirable. Indeed I had decided not to issue Press statements on the subject, but after your Calcutta speech, in which you mentioned my name and issued some kind of a 'challenge' to me, I felt that a public statement was unavoidable. Hence my statement, in which I tried to avoid unnecessary controversy.

2. You know perhaps that for some months past I have been in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan on this subject and I have been anxious to find out what the points of difference and agreement were. I am afraid I do not know this yet and your last statement does not help. I would feel grateful to you if you could kindly throw light on this and let me know what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration. I think this will help us all and lead to an avoidance of needless controversy. We can then come to grips with the subject. As I have said in my last statement, we are eager to do everything in our power to put an end to every misapprehension and to endeavour to solve every problem that comes in the way of our developing our public life along right lines and promoting the unity and progress of the Indian people.

3. I am leaving for Lahore today. From there I go to the Frontier Province and return to Allahabad in about ten day's time. Kindly address your reply to Allahabad.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU



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*Jinnah to Nehru**The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Pt. I, p. 363*

BOMBAY, 25 January, 1938

JINNAH-NEHRU EXCHANGES

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th January, 1938. I must say that it is very difficult for me to understand it. I fail to see what you are driving at. It does not suggest any useful proposal of a concrete character, besides re-approaching me and informing me that 'we approach the question from differing viewpoints,' and you further say, 'I feel that your approach is not very helpful.' You further refer to my Calcutta speech and say: "in which you mentioned my name and issued some kind of a 'challenge' to me. I felt that a public statement was unavoidable and hence my statement." But you do not even now give me the purport of my speech, and what was the 'challenge' which compelled you to say what you did in your statement which you considered unavoidable.

I know nothing about your being in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan referred to in your letter.

Finally I note your request that I should let you know 'what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration.' I am glad that you agree with me that the arguments carried on through the medium of the Press are not desirable. But do you now think that this matter can be discussed, much less solved, by and through correspondence? I am afraid that is equally undesirable.

I may state for your information that I received a letter from Mahatma Gandhi dated the 19th October, 1937, and I replied to him on the 5th November, 1937, and I am still waiting to hear from him. I reciprocate the sentiments expressed in the last but one paragraph of your letter at the end of it.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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*A.M.K. Dehlvi to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 16/89-92*

28 January, 1938

1. Separate electorates must be retained for they form the most natural division

of the Indian people and are convenient as a matter of practical politics. If this system of election is disturbed, then there is a serious danger of a breaking asunder of Muslim solidarity.

2. This principle to apply to all elective bodies, from the highest to the lowest.
3. Representation to be in accordance with the proportion of the population in each area, that is to say, representation in the legislatures on a majority basis in the majority Provinces and with weightage in the Minority Provinces, if weightage is asked for by and granted to other communities in the Provinces in which Musalmans are in a majority. Special constituencies such as women, universities, commerce, industry, labour etc. should in no case be allowed to turn a majority into a Minority. The total strength of Muslim representation should in no case be less than one-third of the total number of seats in either House of the Central Legislature.... Weightage should be demanded all-round, particularly in the Centre where the Muslims will be in a permanent Minority.
4. All the suggestions about representation and electorates should apply *pari passu* to administrative posts, Governmental, semi-Governmental and in public bodies, both in the superior as well as in the subordinate grades, to prevent discrimination being exercised against Musalmans in the name of efficiency as is being done today.
5. The system of worship and practice of religion with full freedom to preach it to be guaranteed to the Muslims in the Constitution.
6. Every piece of legislation, rule of law, or regulation, affecting the Muslims, if opposed by a two-thirds majority of the Muslim members of the body discussing it, to be dropped, *ipso facto*, conversely any similar measure, if supported by a similar majority of the Muslims, to become law.
7. Any ordinance, departmental order, rule, regulation or bye-law affecting the Musalmans to be withdrawn if a petition signed by the majority of two-thirds Muslim members of the Provincial or Central Legislatures, as the case may be and presented to the Governor or the Governor-General.
8. Constitutional guarantees to be provided for the Muslims in the matter of education, language, script, personal law and cultural institution.
9. If the final form of the Constitution assumes a Federal shape, all residuary powers to be vested in the federating units.
10. The number of Muslims in Provincial Cabinets to reflect the strength of the Muslim representation in the Assembly in each Province. Such Ministers to be appointed only when they possess the confidence of a majority of the Muslim members.
11. If a change in the Constitution takes place, provision to be made relating to the above points to the effect that no such change could be made except when a majority of the representatives of the affected community votes in favour of such change, or when there is in favour of such a change a majority or at least 75 per cent.
12. As stated above I am against Joint Electorates; but if at all they are conceded, provision shall be made that the electoral roll shall reflect the proportion of the two communities in the population of the Province.

I would strongly suggest that any move for a unity talk should emanate from the majority community. I would also strongly suggest that before our terms are finally handed over to the Congress, we should have a meeting of the representatives of

Musalmans at some central place at which all the safeguards required are thoroughly discussed. When you call such a meeting, I would press upon your consideration the names of two important young men. Mr. Abdur Rahman Siddiqui,¹ M.L.A. Calcutta and Mr. Sheub Qureshi,² Bhopal, particularly the latter who I may add without exaggeration, could speak with much knowledge and experience of the mentality of the Congress.

I cannot claim that these points exhaust the subject; but they cover the chief safeguards which I thought should be demanded.

Yours Sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH,
Esq., Bar-at-Law

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1. Abdul Rehman Siddiqui (1887-1953); Founding Member of AIML, 1906; Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937-46; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946; Governor, former Pakistan.
 2. Sheub (Shuaib) Qureshi; started his career as a Congressman; General Secretary, AICC; 1924-25; after 1947, served for short while as High Commissioner for Pakistan in India.

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Jinnah's Statement

Star of India, 31 January, 1938; Nation's Voice, pp. 229-50

New Delhi, 30 January, 1938. Mr. Jinnah said that the Congress policy in the seven Provinces where it had formed Government should give the Muslims some idea of what its ultimate object was. The Muslims numerically, educationally and economically were inferior to the Hindus and if they wanted to have an honourable existence and have some say in the affairs of the country, Mr. Jinnah said, they should do all in their power to attain solidarity and unity. He wanted to warn them in time against the Congress attitude which had convinced him that the rights of Muslims were not safe in the hands of the Congress.

2. Mr. Jinnah added that the League was still a baby and if it was carefully nursed, there was no reason why it should not attain the stature of a full-grown person in a short time and become as powerful as any other similar organisation in the country. He claimed that it was through the help and cooperation of Muslims in the past that the Congress had carved out its present position and felt sure that, if all the Muslims rallied round the League, it would become equally powerful. When that stage was reached, he would tell them what to do in the case of Palestine and the Shahidganj Mosque. Mr. Jinnah concluded his speech with a note of optimism as regards the future of the League and through that of Muslim India, and said that his optimism was based on numerous signs of awakening among Muslims.

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*Jinnah's Agenda of Nehru-Jinnah Meeting¹ Which did not materialise**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 40/1-12*

1 February, 1938

The All India Muslim League to be recognised as the one authoritative and representative Organisation of the Indian Muslims.

(1) Muslim Mass Contact: Must cease; (2) *Bande Mataram*: Must go to; (3) National Flag: Must go; National Anthem to be considered and agreed upon; National Flag to be considered and agreed upon.

Economic, Social, Educational, Political Programme Policy: To be framed and agreed upon by the Muslim League and the Congress as the basis of work and action inside and outside the Legislatures. Any other matter may by agreement be included as the circumstances and occasion may require or demand by the consent of the boards, which may be appointed by the Muslim League and the Congress, provided they do not depart from the fundamental principles of the agreed policy and programme.

Muslim League and Congress to appoint their respective boards with a view to cooperate and collaborate and adopt such joint action from time to time, in accordance with the basic principles of the Policy and Programme formulated by them as aforesaid. These boards should be equal in number and work together as representing their respective organisations. The decisions of the Muslim League board with regard to the Muslim League party shall be final and same would be the case with the Congress board and the Congress Party.

Communal Award: Separate electorates and Communal Award to stand (and) till a substitute is agreed upon by the parties concerned.

Coalition: Coalition Governments should be formed by the Muslim League and Congress parties in the Legislatures.

The quota of Muslim League Ministers to be fixed in each Province where Congress Party can form Government and *vice-versa*, where Muslim League can do like-wise. The Ministers so chosen and appointed, shall be selected and nominated by the Muslim League board and Congress board according to their respective quota. Grants-in-aid to all Legislative, local and representative bodies should be fixed and the quota fixed for the Musalmans should be given to the Musalmans in such manner and extent as the Muslim League board may determine unless it be agreed to by the Musalman Members of such body by a majority of 3/4. Separate Electorates in local body or bodies not to be touched and to be introduced where it does not exist if necessary and demanded by the Musalmans in any district or place.

Services: at least in proportion to representation in administration posts. Pasi Paris (sic). Government Semi-Government and the public bodies in all Superior and Subordinate Grades. No territorial-redistribution or adjustment in order to affect distinct (?) majority or reduce the majorities of the Musalmans in the Provinces where they

are at present in majorities. Future Constitution to replace the present one to be framed and adopted with the consent and agreement of the All India Muslim League and the Congress.

1. At the meeting of the Muslim League Council, held on 31st January, 1938 Jinnah had stated that he had received a confidential letter from Nehru should an opportunity of meeting with him occur he wished to know on what lines the discussions should take place. The Council unanimously vested in Jinnah full powers to hold discussion with Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President. It was for this meeting that Jinnah had jotted down the points for discussion which never took place.

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Gandhiji to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, pp. 89-90

SEGAON, 3 February, 1938

1. Pandit Nehru told me yesterday that you were complaining to the Maulana Sahib about the absence of any reply from me to your letter of November 5 in reply to mine of October 19. The letter was received by me when I was pronounced by the doctors to be seriously ill in Calcutta. The letter was shown to me three days after its receipt. Had I thought it necessarily called for a reply, even though I was ill I would have sent one. I have re-read the letter. I still think that there was nothing useful that I could have said in reply. But, in a way, I am glad that you awaited a reply. Here it is.

2. Mr. Kher told me definitely that he had a private message from you. He delivered it to me when I was alone. I could have sent you a verbal message in reply; but, in order to give you a true picture of my mental state, I sent you the short note. There was nothing to hide in it; but I did feel, as I still do, that the way in which you used it came upon me as a painful surprise.

3. You complain of my silence. The reason for my silence is literally and truly in my note. Believe me, the moment I can do something that can bring the two communities together nothing in the world can prevent me from so doing.

4. You seem to deny that your speech was a declaration of war, but your later pronouncements too confirm the first impression. How can I prove what is a matter of feeling? In your speeches I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915 I returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? If you say you are, in spite of your speeches, I shall accept your word.

5. Lastly, you want me to come forward with some proposal. What proposal can I make except to ask you on bended knees to be what I had thought you were. But the proposal, to form a basis of unity between the two communities, has surely got to come from you.

6. This is again not for publication, but for your eyes. It is the cry of a friend, not of an opponent.

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Nehru to Jinnah

The Indian Annual Register, 1938, pp. 1363-84

WARDHA, 4 February, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 25th January reached Allahabad on February 1st after I had left. It has been forwarded to me here and reached me yesterday.

I am sorry that my previous letter was difficult to understand. My purpose in writing it was, as I stated, to find out what our points of difference and agreement were. Presumably there are points of difference as you have repeatedly criticised the Congress policy and practice. If these points of difference are noted down and our attention drawn to them it would make their consideration easier. In view of this agreement it distressed and surprised me to find that there was so much conflict. I have tried, therefore, to find out what this conflict is about. I do not see how I can make proposals, concrete or vague, when I do not know what the points in issue are. It is true that in reading your speeches I have come across various statements to the effect that the Congress is trying to establish *Hindu Raj*. I am unaware of how this is being done or who is doing it. If any Congress Ministries or the Congress organisations have made mistakes, these should be pointed to us. A report of your Calcutta speech appeared in the newspapers at the time and is no doubt available to you and for me to give you a purport of it seemed hardly necessary. In this you state that you are fighting the Congress, that you are fighting the Congress leadership which is misleading the Hindus. Further you have said that you want to bring the Congress High Command to its senses. May I suggest that those who are privileged to advise or lead the Congress have no desire to fight anybody except British Imperialism? In any event, if we mislead or misbehave we have a right to enquire from our critics where and how we have done so.

Further, in your Calcutta speech you said: 'I have long long ago, months ago now, thrown out a challenge to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and I throw out a challenge now—let him come and sit with us and let us formulate a constructive programme which will give immediate relief to the poor.' It was to this 'challenge' that I referred in my last letter. I do not remember on which previous occasion you had issued a similar challenge to me.

It is always helpful to discuss matters and problems face to face and, as I have said previously, we are always glad to do so. A short while ago you met Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, one of our most respected leaders than whom there is no one better fitted to explain the Congress viewpoint in regard to the Minorities problem or

any other matter. Whenever necessity arises every one of us will willingly welcome a talk. But even such a talk is likely to be vague and infructuous if some clarification of ideas does not take place previously. Correspondence helps in this process and sometimes is even preferable as it is more precise than talk. I trust, therefore, that you will help in clarifying the position by telling us where we differ and how you would like this difference to end. You have also criticised the Congress in vigorous language, as you were no doubt entitled to do. But are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate those criticisms in private at least, if not in public?

I have inquired from Mr. Gandhi about your letter to him dated the 5th November, 1937. He received it in Calcutta when he was lying ill there and he felt that it needed no answer. Your letter had been in answer to his and the matter seemed to end there for the time being. He was good enough to show me his letter and yours and it seemed to me that no particular reply was called for. I understand that he wrote to you yesterday.

I hope to be in Allahabad by the 9th February.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Barkat Ali¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 213/ 11-14

19 TEMPLE ROAD, LAHORE, 4 February, 1938

PRIVATE

Dear Jinnah,

1. Dr. Iqbal was issuing a statement to the press on the present position of the League *vis-a-vis* the Unionist Party² in the Province, when it was decided to first consult you on that statement. Mr. Ghulam Rasul Khan is separately sending you a copy of the Statement.

2. The position in the Punjab at the present moment is that about 21 to 25 Muslim members of the Unionist Party have signed the League Punjab unconditionally and are ready to declare themselves as a Muslim League Party within the Punjab Assembly. If the declaration is made public the Unionist Party will receive a shock and will not be able to survive it. These members want to come out with their declaration in response to Dr. Iqbal's statement. I assure you that with 21 to 25 Muslim members openly declaring themselves for the League, much larger number will follow. This will bring the Unionist Party to its senses. They have been dodging us so far. In their party meeting, their (illegible) to members is that Mr. Jinnah who had refused the late Sir Fazli's³ offer to confine himself to matters of All India Policy, had now come down from his high pedestal and had agreed to accept the Unionist Party as the dominant leading party whose policy will prevail in Punjab. This is stabbing the League.

3. I request that you may kindly not object to the statement which Dr. Iqbal is issuing. It is a dramatic effect which will raise the League very high. If for the sake of any false unity or any solidarity with the people who are only playing off and intend to deceive us, you interfere with the issuing of this statement, the result will be disastrous and the League will take long to consolidate its position in the Assembly, however strong it may be outside.

4. Of course, we will obey any orders that you give. But, if the present psychological moment is allowed to slip away, we shall miss a capital opportunity. It does not mean that the League Party will at all join the opposition. No, we shall play our cards wisely but the League must figure as a substantial party within the Legislature separate from and independent of the Unionist Party.

With all regards,

Yours sincerely,
BARKAT ALI

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1. Malik Barkat Ali (1886-1946); Professor of English, Journalist and Lawyer; Member, Reforms Committee, AML, 1915-16; Secretary, Punjab Muslim League, 1917; Member, Muslim League Delegation to the All Parties Convention, 1928; Muslim League Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937; Member, AML Working Committee, 1938; re-elected, 1946.
 2. Formed in 1923, the Unionist Party was an outcrop of the old Zamindar Party founded in 1921, which was reorganised by Sir Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936) and Chaudhary Chhotu Ram on cross communal lines to protect the peasant-proprietors from economic depression, money lenders and other non-agricultural sections of the populations. In 1936-37 elections the Party won 96 seats out of 176. Sikandar Hayat Khan entered into a pact with Jinnah in 1937 and, though it bolstered Unionist's power in Urban areas, the Party under Khizar Hayat Khan was routed in 1946 elections by the Muslim League and eventually ceased its activities for all practical purposes.
 3. Mian Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936); Member, Punjab Province Congress Committee and of Indian Association, Lahore, 1905; attended inaugural Session, AML, Dacca, 1906; Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1916-1920; Minister for Education, Health and Local Self-Government, 1921, 1923 and 1924; leader Rural Party in Punjab Legislative Council; founded Punjab Nationalist Unionist Party, 1923; Revenue Member, Punjab, 1926-30; Leader of the House in Punjab Legislative Council, 1926-1930; Governor-General's Council, 1930-35; Minister for Education, Punjab, 1936.

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Nehru to Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 218-20

WARDHA, 5 February, 1938

My dear Nawab Sahib,

To continue my letter of yesterday's date.

The Congress mass contact movement has never been thought of in terms of

Muslims only or confined to them. It was thought of in terms of extending the organisation and influence of the Congress among all classes of people. In a sense it has been in existence for many years but it took more pointed shape at the Lucknow Congress of 1936. No mention was made of Muslims at the time. Later on, and quite apart from elections, I laid stress on carrying it on more particularly amongst the Muslims. The elections came and afterwards again we emphasized it. This was in furtherance of our general programme as a political body. It was not directed against the Muslim League.

2. Naturally we welcomed noted Muslim *Ulamas* when they joined the Congress. We welcomed other Muslims also who were politicians and economists. So far as we were concerned we had no desire to emphasise the religious aspect of any question through these *Ulamas*. Some of these *Ulamas* were old colleagues of ours in the Congress or the Khilafat movement, and though their viewpoint was not purely political, it was definitely political in most matters that concerned us. You are right in saying that during the elections many of these *Ulamas* were requested to help. The candidates or their organisers made special efforts to obtain their assistance. There was nothing unnatural about this. I have learnt for the first time from your letter that someone working for our candidate threatened to excommunicate Muslim voters. I do not know who did this but in any event it was highly improper for him to do so.

3. Many odd people unconnected with the Congress probably supported the Congress candidates. Surely this had nothing to do with a Hindu Government as it had probably little to do with a great love for the Congress. But the opposite candidate was running on a definite communal ticket and it is not surprising that *zamindars* and others preferred a Congress candidate who stood on a wider platform. Suppose a Hindu Mahasabha candidate opposed a Congress candidate. Is it not extremely likely that Muslim *zamindars* and *vakils* who are in no way associated with the Congress, would prefer the Congress candidate to the purely communal candidate? This is not communalism but a reaction from communalism.

4. You have drawn my attention previously to certain offensive epithets said to have been used against members of the Muslim League. I have no information except what you say, about these epithets. It is possible that exaggerated or perverted reports reached your ears. In any event your complaint has been, so far as I can remember, not against Congressmen but against Ahrars and others. I am glad that even in the super-heated atmosphere of the elections, Congressmen were not guilty of improper behaviour. It is possible that some Ahrars erred. If so, I am sorry. They are not closely associated with the Congress and are unused to our discipline and methods.

5. As for the National Flag, it took birth 17 years ago during the early days of the non cooperation movement. Its colours and shape etc. were determined after careful consultation with leaders of all communities in the Congress. In those days Muslims were present in large numbers in the Congress and the flag was frequently used by the Khilafat Committee. Its colours were certainly determined to represent various communities, green being for Muslims and white for other minorities. We did try later not to lay stress on the communal reason for the colours as we wanted it to be considered the common National Flag of all. Maulana Mohammad Ali delivered any

number of eloquent orations on the National Flag as representing the unity of India and all communities.

6. It is obvious that India must have a National Flag, a flag which all can call their own. A communal flag cannot possibly take its place and it is hardly proper to put up any communal flag on public buildings used by people of all communities. During the past 17 years the National Flag has become very popular all over India and it has been endeared to us by any number of sacrifices and even deaths to protect its honour. You are perfectly right in saying that many Hindus, and so also many Muslims, are swayed by communal feelings. But the point is: What lead we must give, what objective we have, and what methods we pursue? If we do anything that increases communalism and separatism, then we do injury both to our community and to the nation.

You are mistaken if you think that the Congress has neglected other groups or Minorities in India and in concentrating on the Muslims only. You know that we have fought the Hindu Mahasabha and disabled it politically. We have done effective and successful work among the Christian masses in the south. We have approached the Sikhs, Parsis and Jews. Our policy is the same throughout. Naturally, you will, agree, the Muslims have a special importance and we desire to gain their goodwill. But allow me to tell you that there has been no liberal financing of anybody. Our income is almost entirely derived from four anna subscriptions.

There is no question of the Congress trying to break the solidarity of the Muslims or any other community. It is on the political field that we make appeal and thus want to make a common platform for all. As for Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim, you are right in saying that he did not join the Civil Disobedience movement. But he has long been a member and office-bearer of a local Congress Committee and a member of the Swaraj Party in the Legislature. I do not know why he stood as a Muslim League candidate. One of the reasons probably was because at the time there was no apparent conflict between the Congress and the League.

I enclose copies of the correspondence I have had with Mr. Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Jinnah's Address to Aligarh Students

Nation's Voice, pp. 233-236

Aligarh, 5 February, 1938. Mr. Jinnah next struck a personal note and recalled the Lucknow Pact with which he had been so closely associated. It was based on a small step forward towards Self-Government. Since 1924 the Musalmans have not been behind any other in their honest desire for full Self-Government. In this matter there was no difference. But the basic principle so far both of the Congress policy

and the League policy had been that the rights and interests of all the Minorities must be safeguarded in any constitution by whomsoever framed. Many efforts had been made since 1924 till the Round Table Conference to settle the Muslim-Hindu question.

"At that time," said Mr. Jinnah, "there was no pride in me and I used to beg from the Congress. I worked so incessantly to bring about a rapprochement that a newspaper remarked that Mr. Jinnah is never tired of Hindu-Muslim unity. But I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I felt very pessimistic about my country. The position was most unfortunate. The Musalmans were like the No-Man's Land; they were led by either the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp-followers of the Congress. Whenever attempts were made to organise the Muslims, toadies and flunkeys on the one hand, and traitors in the Congress camp on the other, frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor could I make the Musalmans realise their precarious position. I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that I did not love India; but I felt utterly helpless. I kept in touch with India. At the end of four years I found that the Musalmans were in the greatest danger. I made up my mind to come back to India as I could not do any good from London. Having no sanction behind me, I was in the position of a beggar and received the treatment that a beggar deserves.

Then in 1935 I entered into negotiations with the President of the Congress. A formula was evolved but the Hindus won't look at it. In 1936, I said to the Congress, 'Never mind what was done. Stop this bitter controversy over the Communal Award. Good, bad or indifferent, let it stand in the absence of an agreed solution. Let us face the bigger issues.' But when I felt I had exploited every method of bringing about unity, I turned round to see what the actual situation demanded. I saw that the new Constitution was coming. From 1924 to 1936 it came to this nothing doing. In sheer desperation I called the session of the All India Muslim League in April 1936, and the League decided to contest the elections in the Provinces. There was opposition from every direction—from the Congress, from many of our own people. With no primary organisations and with very inadequate resources, the League fought the elections and achieved a considerable measure of success. But still in some of our own majority Provinces there was no Muslim League party. However, working with determination and perseverance since April 1936, we have achieved something which is wonderful. (Cheers).

"Let us recapitulate our position. Firstly, there was the bureaucracy; they felt that they had acquired a prescriptive right over the Musalmans. They said, 'Well, if this Jinnah fellow comes, Muslims will be out of our hands.' It has happened so. The Musalmans, thank God, are today out of their hands. But power has now passed to a certain extent into the hands of the majority community. It is now clear that the British Government shows no signs of coming to the help of Muslims but is throwing them to the wolves. I am glad, so far so good. To a very great extent the Muslim League has freed the Musalmans from the clutches of the British Government. But now there is another power which claims to be the successor of the British Government.

Call it by whatever name you like, but it is Hindu and Hindu Government.

Political language is woolly and misleading. I shall speak plainly. What is the attitude of the Congress? It may be summed up thus: 'The Muslim League is composed of toadies; it is a reactionary body, it is in alliance with the Imperialistic power.' That is how they denounce the Muslim League. Well, what has the League done? The League decided with regard to the prevailing conditions that the Provincial Constitution should be utilised for what it was worth. On the other hand, the decision of the Congress was to wreck the Constitution. The Congress did not have patience with the League which had adopted a fullblooded nationalistic programme. We were trying to make the Muslim League completely representative of the Muslim community. I was misrepresented and maligned in the Congress Press. I was dubbed a communalist. They said, 'Well, Jinnah may be all right, but he is surrounded by toadies and flunkys who will swallow him up.' Every time some plausible excuse was made to ignore the Muslims. The Congress tried to poison the minds of our youth and delude them into the belief that the Congress stood for complete independence and would remove poverty and hunger. But what were really their designs? They wanted certain assurances from the British Government which they failed to get. They are not only utilising but working the very Constitution they had so vehemently professed to wreck. To the Muslims they gave all sorts of silly assurances. In one Province, the Congress Premier went to the extent of declaring that he would lay down his very life if a single brick of a mosque were touched. That sounded very noble. But what actually happened? In that very Province, viz., Bihar, the cumulative system of voting has been taken away with the result that no Muslim was elected in the last election. We, therefore, cannot depend upon assurances and goodwill. In politics, goodwill and love and affection and regard can only be demonstrated when you are strong. People know how to touch your weak points or, if you like, your strong points. When you are told of this heart-rending hunger and poverty, when somebody comes and tells you, Oh! What is the use of anything? Let us remove these appalling conditions. The Congress is struggling to achieve independence and to establish a communistic and socialistic Government. The economic issue is the only issue that faces us'—you will be moved. I confess I myself sometimes feel moved. This has been constantly dinned into the ears of the youth. When you think you will be able to destroy the British Government, the *zamindars*, the capitalists, with one stroke, refer to the conditions of Europe. In Germany Hitlerism came into existence because of socialistic and communistic movements. So did Fascism rise in Italy. What is the fight in Spain about? It is the same issue. When the question was put to the President of the Congress as to when he would be able to fulfil this wonderful programme, he said, 'within my lifetime' and added 'when we have captured power, we will destroy this Constitution, not by the quill-pen. But the question is how long will he hold the quill-pen or rather the reed-pen which he is doing at present? (Laughter.)

"We in India have been brought up in the traditions of the British Parliamentary Democracy. The Constitution foisted on us is also modelled more or less on the British pattern. But there is an essential difference between the body politic of this country and that of Britain. The majority and minority parties in Britain are alterable, their complexion and strength often change. Today it is a Conservative Government,

tomorrow Liberal and the day after Labour. But such is not the case with India. Here we have a permanent Hindu majority and the rest are Minorities which cannot, within any conceivable period of time, hope to become majorities. The majority can afford to assume a non-communal label, but it remains exclusively Hindu in its spirit and action. The only hope for Minorities is to organise themselves and secure a definite share in power to safeguard their rights and interests. Without such power, no Constitution can work successfully in India.

"My appeal to you is: Come to the platform of the League. If Muslims are united, the settlement will come sooner than you think. You will have established your claim to achieve freedom. After a few months' work the League's name is known in every corner of India. Lakhs of people are joining it. Even those who are against us will realise that they are under a serious delusion and their only course is to join the League and make the Musalmans speak with one voice (Cheers).

"What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Maulvis as a whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other; but there is a section of them which is undesirable. Having freed ourselves from the clutches of the British Government, the Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Maulvis, may I appeal to the youth to emancipate our women. This is essential. I do not mean that we are to ape the evils of the West. What I mean is that they must share our life not only social but also political." (Cheers)

"The personnel of the League is far from being perfect. It is no use making allegations; it is no use telling me this man is bad or that man is undesirable. If you are really in earnest, your only course is to join the League and make improvements. I am convinced and you will agree with me that the Congress policy is to divide the Muslims among themselves. It is the same old tactics of the British Government. They follow the policy of their masters. Don't fall into the trap. This is a moment of life and death for the Musalmans. Take it from me that, unless there is unity among the Muslims at any cost, they will be lost. If our house is defective, we must set it right ourselves. If you support us, we will set it right ourselves as we like and desire."

"Mr. President, I have received from you today the greatest message of hope. March forward and no power on earth can resist you. I find in front of me the finest recruiting ground. Lakhs are ready to serve the platform and flag of the All India Muslim League. To make a good, efficient soldier, you at least require a year. To make a good subaltern, at least five years are required. I see enormous power latent in these people. The stage has been more easily reached than the stage of harnessing them and mobilising them and making them a political army. What is the difference between the Hindus and the Muslims? If Wardha makes any decision and issues orders tomorrow, millions of Hindus will follow and obey. I ask you, suppose the Muslim League were to issue any order, what will happen to it? We are not sufficiently equipped and trained, and, therefore, it will be difficult to produce lakhs of Muslims to carry out orders. The British Government is always thinking of what the Congress is doing, what is going to be the repercussion of the British policy in the Congress Camp. But will the British Government think of you? No, because you are not an

organised power. Therefore, develop your power and establish your solidarity. The Muslim League is determined to win freedom but it will be a freedom not only for the strong and the dominant but also for the weak and the suppressed." (Prolonged applause.)

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Interview Between Linlithgow and G.D. Birla¹

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5

Enclosure 1

1. NEW DELHI, *Monday, 7 February, 1938.* Mr. Birla struck me as being in great good humour and much improved in health, a condition due perhaps to the fact, as he later told me, that his business interests are at present in a most flourishing condition. The Congress, he thought, was moving towards acceptance of the federal scheme in the Act. No doubt I would be anxious to afford Mr. Gandhi such reasonable accommodation on points of detail as might enable him when the time comes to carry with him a sufficient number of his own people. Mr. Birla said that I might have felt that the recent pronouncement of the Working Committee on Federation indicated some hardening of feeling against accepting the scheme, but if I would look past the opening paragraphs, containing as they probably did, the fulminations of Jawaharlal Nehru, I would, he felt sure, discover signs in the later part of the pronouncement which would convince me that his diagnosis of the attitude of Congress and in particular to Mr. Gandhi's own mind, was the correct one.

2. Rather to Mr. Birla's surprise, Mr. Gandhi, it seems, is not worrying over much about the reservation of Defence and Foreign Affairs to the Governor-General. At the moment he is concentrating upon the method of choosing States' Representatives at the Centre. This, it appears, is the part of the scheme which Mr. Gandhi's own friends are finding it difficult to swallow. No doubt I would be anxious to help Mr. Gandhi by persuading a number of Rulers to make at any rate a move in the direction of setting up machinery for democratic election of States Representatives at the Federal Centre. I said that that was all very well but had Mr. Birla himself or had Mr. Gandhi, considered the practical difficulties of many course of that kind. Mr. Birla said he did not suppose that Mr. Gandhi had done so since it was not his way to worry about details but rather to concentrate upon essential and fundamental things. I said that that, no doubt, was a splendid position from which to view the world, but unfortunate people, situated as I myself am situated who are responsible for working out these schemes so that they may be rendered capable of being worked in practice, were perforce bound to think out in every detail and in all its consequences every proposal of the kind he had in mind. For example, had Mr. Gandhi considered the effect upon the Muslim mind of any general setting up of democratic machinery for the purpose of choosing States Representatives? If not, I could tell him from my own experience

that the Muslims were already concerned to insist, if any such machinery were embodied, that an appropriate proportion of States seats at the Centre should be reserved for Muslim candidates. Again, had Mr. Birla and his friends faced up to the difficulties which would be involved in adopting any uniform system of popular selection in face of the fact that some States had more than one representative, others one representative and many others no more than a share in a representative common to a group? Indeed, I thought it was no exaggeration to say that insistence upon a prior acceptance of conditions of the kind he was advocating might be expected to postpone the Federation by at least 20 years. But would Federation on an All India basis be capable of being secured after the lapse of any such period of time? Had Mr. Birla, for instance, heard of a strong movement in the Punjab towards a Federation of the North-West comprising the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, and the Punjab States and in support half a million rifles on the Frontier, and beyond them the whole weight of the Muslim world? Such a scheme was by no means academic and it might interest him to know that certain very influential persons in the Punjab had not only declared their preference for this plan but had openly advocated it before the Muslim Conference in Lucknow in private session. Mr. Birla's reaction to this last point was interesting. He said the communal position in India was growing rapidly worse. Congress was well aware of this and its leaders were deeply apprehensive as to the future. Might it not take the sting out of the communal position if the Muslims were given their Federation of the North-West? For a moment, I thought that Mr. Birla must be teasing me, but his countenance portrayed no such design and I am convinced that for the time being he meant what he said. I asked him whether in contemplating such an arrangement, he envisaged the perpetuation for an indefinite period of time of British military power in India sufficient to guarantee that no collision would be allowed to take place between the Muslim Federation and its Hindu counterpart. If so, I recommended him to pursue his reflections a little further. For my part and having regard to the military power at the disposal of the Muslim Federation, I thought that no more serious danger could be conceived whether to the future unity of India or to the peaceful evolution of a Hindu confederacy further South.

3. Mr. Birla informed me that Mr. Gandhi saw no objection to a British India Federation nor was he in any hurry for either that Federation or any alternative arrangement. He concluded this part of his remarks by telling me that he was quite certain that some accommodation between ourselves and Congress would be essential to a settlement and that his strong opinion was that such compromises should be carried out by means of conversations between Mr. Gandhi and myself.

1. G.D. Birla (1894-1983); one of the topmost businessman of India and Congress financier; delegates to second Round Table Conference, 1931; publication: *Under the Shadow of Mahatma*.



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*M.N. Roy's Speech at Aligarh**The Light, 8 February, 1938; Freedom Movement Archives, PC/GA/Clip/3*

Speaking at the Muslim University, Aligarh, Mr. M.N. Roy, the Communist of international fame displayed a spirit which, if followed by Congress leaders, should before long put an end to the present unseemly communal squabble. The common rule to keep religion at arms length from politics, he observed, does not apply to Islam, for "Islam is a religion of revolt." This is sympathetic appreciation of Islam which is so lacking in the rank and file of Congress circles. Islam is another name for freedom and it is sheer lack of appreciation on the part of Congress leaders, if not narrow communalism, to flood the country with the propaganda that any talk of religion on the part of Musalmans is unpatriotic and anti-national. The fact is that the freedom movement of India attained to its highest pitch only when it succeeded in mobilising and enlisting the enthusiasm latent within Islam as a faith during the Khilafat Movement. The motive power behind the Frontier Red Shirt Movement which may be called the sword arm of the Congress is also purely religious, springing from the reservoirs of force hidden within Islam. To insist, therefore, that the word religion should be taboo in politics is absolutely unfair, as far as Islam is concerned, for, as Mr. M.N. Roy has frankly put it, Islam is a religion of revolt—revolt against all injustice, all inequality, all oppression.

Mr. Roy justified Muslim apprehensions against the majority community. It was for the majority to allay those apprehensions and he advised the Congress to concede Muslim demands unconditionally, for without unity there could be no freedom. This again is frankness and fairness so lacking in the Congress High Command.

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*Herbert Emerson to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 20, pp. 36-37*

CAMP, 12 February, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. Meanwhile, there have been developments outside Lahore which are of considerable interest both from the communal and political point of view. The Muslim League held a meeting of its Council at Delhi, which was presided over by Jinnah. The Unionist Party was represented by several members, while the Punjab Branch of the Muslim League was represented mainly by Malik Barkat Ali and Pir Taj-ud-Din.¹ I think I mentioned the former in one of my letters dealing with the Lucknow session,

at which the so-called Sikander-Jinnah pact was concluded. Since he may attain some prominence, I may give Your Excellency some further information about him. He was originally in the Punjab Provincial Civil Service, but was dismissed for corruption. He then took up practice at the Lahore Bar, and without any special attainments, is now doing fairly well. He was elected to the Provincial Assembly on the Muslim League ticket, being one of the very few League candidates who were successful. Before the Lucknow session he was, therefore, more or less in the wilderness. When Sikander and Jinnah came together, Barkat Ali found himself in danger of being side-tracked and shortly after the Lucknow session he issued a statement to the effect that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party had now become absorbed in the Muslim League and that Sikander had become a disciple of Jinnah. It was this statement, more than anything else, which prevented the Agreement being translated into effect, the present position being that, although many Muslim Unionist members have signed the League ticket, they have all attached the proviso that membership is subject to the Sikander-Jinnah Agreement, and I believe that their forms of membership have either not been handed in, or have not been accepted with this condition. I do not know what Jinnah's views are on the matter but it is obviously not to his interest to have an open breach with Sikander, and I imagine that he does not wish to force the issue. Meanwhile, Barkat Ali is doing his best to create mischief. A few days ago, I saw an intercepted letter from him to Jinnah, in which he abused Sikander and the Unionist Party claimed that about twenty Muslim Unionists were prepared to join the League without any condition, and invited Jinnah to agree to his proposal to create a cave in the party by a sudden announcement to this effect. I do not expect that Jinnah will be foolish enough to agree. He probably knows, in the first place, that Barkat Ali is thoroughly unreliable, and second, that the statement about the Muslim Unionists is untrue or greatly exaggerated. It is, however, clear that Barkat Ali, for his own ends, is doing his best to embarrass the Punjab Government. His attitude at the Muslim League meeting at Delhi was consistent with this object. His speeches consisted of either a personal attack on myself or of a demand that the Muslim members of the Ministry should resign.

1. Pir Taj-ud-Din, Member, All India Muslim League Council.

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Ainul Mulk's Statement

The Statesman, 12 February, 1938; Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, pp. 255-56

1. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's Bombay Statement of January 2 on the Hindu-Muslim question has produced hopeful reactions and the stage has been set for a talk between the leaders of what, for the sake of convenience, may be described as

Hindu India and Muslim India. Whether the Jinnah-Jawaharlal talks will produce in 1938 better results than the Jinnah-Prasad talks did in 1935 is yet to be seen. Too much optimism would not, however, be justified. The Pandit, by way of annotating his Bombay statement while addressing the U.P. delegates for Haripura at Lucknow, at the end of January, emphatically asserted that in no case would Congress "give up its principles." That was not a hopeful statement because any acceptable formula or pact that may be evolved by the leaders of the Congress and the League would, one may guess, involve the acquiescence of the Congress in separate electorates (at least for a certain period), coalition Ministries, recognition of the League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Muslims, modification of its attitude on the question of Hindi and its script, scrapping of *Bande Mataram* altogether, and possibly a redesigning of the tri-colour flag or at least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance.

2. It is possible that with a little statesmanship on both sides agreement can be reached on all these points without any infringement of the principles of either, but the greatest obstacle to a satisfactory solution would still remain, in the shape of the communalists of the Mahasabha, and the irreconcilables of Bengal, all of whom are not of the Mahasabha alone. The right of the Congress to speak in the name of Hindus has been openly challenged and even the Jinnah-Prasad formula which did not satisfy the Muslims—and nothing on the lines of which is now likely to satisfy them—has been vehemently denounced by the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Vishnupur recently which passed no extremely communal resolution, and that the latest utterances of the Congress President-elect on the communal situation generally and the Jinnah-Prasad formula in particular show some restraint.

The only thing for Muslims to do in the circumstances is to wait and hope for the best, without relaxing their efforts to add daily to the strength of the League, for it will not do to forget that it is growing power and representative character of the Muslim League, which has compelled Congress leaders to recognize the necessity for an understanding with the Muslim community.

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Jinnah to Gandhiji

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, pp. 90-92

NEW DELHI, 15 February, 1938

1. I did not complain to the Maulana Sahib about the absence of any reply from you. I only mentioned the facts, as he was anxious that we two should meet. Anyhow, I am glad to hear from you.

2. My message to you through Mr. Kher, as I informed you in my last letter, was not private. It was only when Mr. Kher went to see you at Wardha that I did say that he should not mention the matter to any one except you and that if you yourself

were inclined in the first instance, to take up the matter, then it would be more than half the battle won. On his return to Bombay Mr. Kher told me that it was difficult for you to give a reply as you were restricted not to disclose it to any one or consult anybody else.

3. Thereupon I said that it was not intended to be a secret and that he was free and you were free to put your heads together and let me know whether at that juncture you were inclined to take up this matter with the powerful and overwhelming influence which you exercise over the Congress.

4. Then he saw you again at Tithal and from that moment it ceased to be a private matter between two individuals; and he brought me your reply in writing which I had to publish, because you know of the controversy between me and Babu Rajendra Prasad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the Press where it was sought to make out that I was putting every obstacle in the way of a Hindu-Muslim settlement.

5. As your letter was not marked confidential, I used it. Besides, what is wrong in my saying that I had approached you on my own accord and that was the reply I received from you. I cannot understand why you feel so much about it.

6. You say that I complained of your silence. Well, I do. But you further proceed to say: 'Believe me the moment I can do something that can bring the two communities together nothing in the world can prevent me from so doing.' Now, what am I to gather from this? Am I right in interpreting that the moment is not come?

7. With regard to your opinion that my speech at the Lucknow session and my later pronouncements, which you are pleased to call a declaration of war, I can only repeat that it is in self-defence. Evidently you are not acquainted with what is going on in the Congress Press: the amount of vilification, misrepresentation and falsehood that is daily spread about me—otherwise, I am sure, you would not blame me.

8. You say that when in 1915 you returned from South Africa everybody spoke of me as one of staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both the Hindus and Muslims, and you ask me a question, 'Are you still the same Jinnah?' And proceed further to say, 'If you say you are, in spite of your speeches, I shall accept your word.' And you say that in my speeches you miss the old nationalist. Do you think that you are justified in saying that? I would not like to say what people spoke of you in 1915 and what they speak and think of you today. Nationalism is not the monopoly of any single individual, and in these days it is very difficult to define it; but I don't wish to pursue this line of controversy any further.

9. You conclude by saying, 'Lastly you want me to come forward with some proposal. What proposal can I make except to ask you on bended knees to be what I had thought you were; but the proposals, to form the basis of unity between the two communities, have surely got to come from you'. I think you might have spared your appeal and need not have preached to me on your bended knees to be what you had thought I was.

10. As regards the formulation of proposals which would form the basis of unity, do you think that this can be done by correspondence. Surely you know as much as I do what are the fundamental points in dispute. In my opinion, it is as much up to you to suggest ways and means of tackling the problem. If you genuinely and sincerely desire and feel that the moment has come for you to step in and with

your position and influence you are prepared to take the matter up earnestly, I will not fail to render all the assistance I can.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 25, p. 46

Telegram R., 17 February, 1938. 1. *Important.* No. G.122. In continuation of my telegram No.121 of February 17th, I have now seen Khaliquzzaman, leader of Muslim League party, and discussed with him informally as with Chhatari. He seems clear in his own mind that formation of Minority Ministry would be useless and inexpedient. He says even if Chhatari's party and Muslim League were to combine, there would be no possibility of this, which would be predominantly Muslim, attracting to itself any Hindu support. Indeed he goes so far as to say that he thinks Chhatari's own comparatively few Hindu followers would possibly leave him. He sees no advantage in minority Ministry taking office with no prospect of ever securing majority.

2. I made it clear to Khaliquzzaman that my conversation with him was at present informal but that it was likely that after a day or two I might wish to approach him formally in order to receive from him a formal reply. He leaves for Bombay today and will not be back till February 23rd. I have, therefore, arranged to telegraph to him and get reply by telegraph. He does not think any further conversation would be of value. Nor do I.

3. As to probability of Congress starting civil disobedience, if Governor assumes full powers, he expressed an interesting view. He said he thought they would not do so because if they did, they would be vigorously opposed by Muslims and there would be serious riots. I give this view for what it is worth. I have had no means yet of checking its validity.

4. I think everything points to Chhatari giving a definite refusal when he returns from Delhi, and it looks as if about the 19th I shall have to ask Your Excellency to agree to issue a Proclamation under Section 93. Unless there is any possibility of a settlement with Congress, it seems undesirable for present situation to continue too long. If, however, there were any possibility of a settlement I would, of course, gladly hold my hand for a few days.

Repeated to Governor of Bihar.

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Jinnah to Nehru

Congress Government I, pp. 230-31

NEW DELHI, 17 February, 1938

1. I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th February. You have now flung at me more

complaints and grievances of trifling character. Evidently you rely on that section of the Press which is bent on misrepresenting and vilifying me, but I am glad that you say I mention these instances to show how misapprehensions arise. But the real question at issue is more important and it is in regard to this that clarification is necessary. Therefore, I don't think any useful purpose will be served to carry on correspondence with regard to the various matters mentioned in your letter. You will please not introduce matters which you may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chowdhry Khaliquzzaman or anybody else. These again will lead to reference and cross reference and the matter will never end.

2. As regards my Calcutta speech, the word "Challenge" is obviously due to the imagination of the reporter, for the very context shows clearly that it was an invitation. However, the discussion of all these matters in correspondence will lead us nowhere. I do not believe in the doctrine which you lay down, "but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least, if not in public." I, for my part, make no such distinction. I am prepared to substantiate anything that I have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. The crux of your letter on the real, vital point of the Hindu-Muslim unity is a repetition of what you said in your previous letter, namely, that you want me to note down the "points of difference" and discuss them through and by means of correspondence—a method which, I made it clear in my last letter, is highly undesirable and most inappropriate. I welcome your suggestion when you say "whenever necessity arose every one of us would willingly welcome a talk." If you think that necessity has arisen and anyone of you is willing, I shall be glad to see you. You prefer talking at each other, whereas I prefer talking to each other. Surely you know and you ought to know what are the fundamental points in dispute.

3. I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi and I have replied to him, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 30, pp. 51-52

TELEGRAM R.,

LUCKNOW, 20 February, 1938

1. *Important. No. G-127.* I had further talk with Chhatari this morning on his return from Delhi where he had consulted Jinnah and other Muslims. His views represent general trend of opinion. He says that if the present crisis indicated a definite change in policy of British Government and was likely to be real and decisive struggle with Congress, then Muslims and conservative forces would be solidly with British. It would be worthwhile taking office and there would be some prospect of securing a considerable and perhaps growing degree of popular support. But if this

is to be what Chhatari calls a friendly quarrel, with periodical waiting on events and hopes of reconciliation before long, then he considers it would be useless and definitely damaging to position of Minority to fill this gap so as really to oblige other parties to dispute. His position, thus, is not unlike that described by Hallett in paragraph 2 (b) of his telegram No. 505 of 18th February.¹ But Chhatari would put the minimum period for which Ministry would require to be maintained in office at two years.

2. From point of view of Minorities this position seems to me not unreasonable. From our point of view I can see no advantage in stop-gap Minority Ministry. It would be weakness at a time when we may want to be strong. It will not lessen hostility of Congress, while expedients that would be required to keep it in office would in my opinion invalidate any claim that we were still substantially working the Constitution. It seems not only that it is impossible in this Province to secure an alternative Ministry but that this is a course which on the whole, even if it were possible, would not be wise. What I contemplate is that if resignation of Ministry is confirmed, I should take over at once under Section 93. In the course of next three or at most six months coming back to office or we should be faced with prolonged struggle with Congress. If latter contingency arose we could then consider whether it was able by some amendment of the Act or other expedients to try and form a Muslim plus moderate Ministry or in some other way to associate the opponents of Congress with administration.

3. My conversation with Chhatari continued to be on a strictly informal basis. I told him that for the present I did not intend to extend to him any formal invitation but that if and when the resignation of Ministers became effective I should then propose to approach him formally. He made it clear that in that case, for reasons explained above, his answer would have to be a refusal.

4. Chhatari made it clear, as Khaliquzzaman had, that in case of civil disobedience the Muslims are likely not merely to be indifferent but actively hostile to such movement. The landlords also, to a large extent, might come out strongly against it; but this would depend in part on their anticipations of what would happen after civil disobedience.

5. The consequences of complete rupture with Congress are so for whole future of present Constitutional plan that it seems to me very important to endeavour to reach some settlement with Congress on present issue which, from point view of this Province, should not be matter of great difficulty. If there is no settlement either now or after a few months and situation drifts into civil disobedience the resumption of normal working of existing Constitution will present grave difficulties.

Repeated to Governor of Bihar. Ends.

1. Not available.



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*George Cunningham¹ to Laithwaite²**Linlithgow Papers, No. 12, pp. 26-27*

GOVT. HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 24 February, 1938

SECRET

D.O.NO. G.H. 61-C./38.

Dear Laithwaite,

I send, herewith, for His Excellency's information a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 23rd February 1938, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the first half of February 1938.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure

SECRET

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report No. 4, dated 23rd February, 1938:

1. The resignation of the United Provinces and Bihar Ministries has not caused much excitement in this Province. Comment in the Press has been unimportant, though its general tendency has been to justify the action of the Ministers and to support the resolution adopted by the Working Committee at Haripura. There has also been reference to an alleged statement by two of my Ministers to the effect that they would, of course, follow whatever orders were given to them by the Congress centre. This is contrary to what Dr. Khan Sahib³ told me himself. He told me clearly that he would be very reluctant to obey any instruction to resign, and that if he received any such order, he and his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, would proceed to Haripura to argue the point. He cannot of course, however, express such feelings in public. But he would certainly make a strong effort to have the North-West Frontier Province treated as a special case in the event of any general order for the resignation of Congress Ministries. Apart from Dr. Khan Sahib's desire which I believe is genuine—to make a real success of his Ministry, there are other reasons to influence him in favour of staying in office. Many measures implementing his policy are coming before the session of the Legislature which start on March 1st. There is also the possibility of a coalition Ministry being formed by the Independents and Democrats, who are now supporting the Congress, joining the Muslim Nationalists, provided a seat on the Cabinet is offered to their leaders. If such a Ministry were to be formed, the Khan would certainly try to hit back and retrieve some of their lost privileges.

2. Further reports as to the effects of Jawaharlal's visit to the Frontier in January go to show that the reactions, both in tribal territory and in the districts, have been negligible at any rate up to the present. It is in fact common talk that Nehru's tour on the whole did the Congress Party more harm than good; for it appears to have given the Opposition a useful text on which to preach anti-Hindu propaganda. There is also some talk among Hindus of the lack of sympathy which Jawaharlal Nehru showed for their sufferings in recent disturbances.

3. The visit, moreover, has given a fillip to the Muslim League, which has recently made some

progress in the Province. The name of the League is beginning to become known to illiterate people, both in towns and villages, who had never heard of it a month or two ago. Developments are likely to take place within the next few months when leading Muslim speakers from other parts of India are expected to tour the Province. At the same time, I think it doubtful whether the League will be able to form itself in this Province into an effective Opposition to Congress. It certainly will not do so unless it can find more efficient leaders than it has at present. If it ever were to become a really effective organisation, I foresee in it more danger to this Province than I do in the Congress Party. The doctrine of the Muslim League is at present frankly communal; that means that on the North-West Frontier it may at any time become fanatical. One of its leaders recently told me that they have decided no political party could succeed if it did not have a uniform and they are talking of clothing their supporters in a Khaki uniform with a green sash. In addition to this, as a counterpart to the Kirpan of the Sikhs, they have suggested arming their followers with some kind of spear. I warned my informant that if this sort of thing happened they were taking a long step towards civil war. He said bluntly that things, in fact, had come to the pitch of civil war between Hindus and Mohammadans, mainly as a result of the power given to the Hindus by the new Constitution. Much of all this is mere talk, and the Chief Minister, with whom I have sometimes discussed the question, does not think that the Muslim League in this Province is going to make much headway. But it will require watching. Some of the speeches made recently by supporters of the League have been by no means friendly to the British.

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1. Sir George Cunningham, Governor, N.W.F.P., 1937-39.
 2. Sir John Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to Viceroy since 1936.
 3. Khan Sahib (1882-1958); brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and friend of Jawaharlal during his student days in London; Physician and leading Congressman of the N.W.F.P.; Prime Minister N.W.F.P., 1937-39 and 1945-47; Chief Minister, West Pakistan, 1955-57; assassinated in Pakistan on 9 May, 1958.

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Gandhiji to Jinnah

Congress Government I, pp. 200-201

SEGAON, 24 February, 1938

I thank you for your letter. I have read your letter to Jawaharlal also. I observe that both the letters invite not written replies but a personal discussion. I do not know whether it will take place in the first instance between you and Jawaharlal or, now that Subhas Bose succeeds him, between you and the latter. If your desire that before this there should be a talk between you and me, I would be delighted to see you in Segacon any time which is convenient to you before March 10, after which, if health permits, I might have to go to Bengal. So far as I am concerned, just as on the Hindu-Muslim question I was guided by Dr. Ansari, now that he is no more in our midst, I have accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as my guide. My suggestion, therefore, to you is that conversation should be opened in the first instance as between you and the Maulana Sahib. But in every case regard me as at your disposal.

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*Nehru to Jinnah**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 222-24*

BOMBAY, 25 February, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

1. Your letter of the 17th February reached me at Haripura. I had no intention of flinging any complaints and grievances at you. In my attempt to find out what your complaints were I read your speeches as reported in the newspapers (usually by a newsagency) and noted down some of the points on which you had laid stress. I am glad to know that you have been misreported but you have not pointed out where the misrepresentation comes in, nor so far as I know, have you issued any statement to the Press correcting the misrepresentation. May I suggest that it will be worthwhile to correct these errors so that the public might not be misled? A clear and authoritative statement from you will help us also understanding what you stand for and what you object to.

2. I note that you do not wish me to introduce in our correspondence any matters which we may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chowdhry Khaliquzzaman. I did not know that they represented any different viewpoint from yours. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to the repeated attempts I have been making to find out what the political and communal policy of the Muslim League is and wherein it differs from that of the Congress. You will remember saying last year that the Muslim League had an entirely different policy even on political matters from that of the Congress. Since then the League has changed its objective and its economic outlook and has thus approached nearer to the Congress. I am anxious to find out what the real meaning of these changes is. Without this clarification it is difficult for us to understand the present position.

3. You say that you do not believe in the doctrine that I lay down, namely: "Are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least, if not in public?" Further you say that for your part you make no such distinction and are prepared to substantiate anything that you have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. If you will read my sentence again you will no doubt observe that I have nowhere laid down any such doctrine as you imagine. I would indeed welcome a public treatment by you of the criticisms made by you. But if you yourself were unwilling to write to the Press on the subject, as you indicated in your letter, I put it to you that we were at least entitled to request you to substantiate the criticism in private.

4. If you have made no criticisms of the Congress, and the Press reports are entirely wrong, then of course no question of substantiation arises. All that need be done is to contradict the Press reports. But if criticisms have been made, as presumably they have been, then I would request you to justify them publicly or privately as you might choose. Personally I would prefer the former method.

5. I am afraid I must confess that I do not yet know what the fundamental points of dispute are. It is for this reason that I have been requesting you to clarify them. So far I have not received any help in this direction. Of course we shall willingly meet you whenever opportunity arises. Our President, Subhas Chandra Bose, or Maulana Abul Kalam Azad or I or any other member of the Working Committee can meet you at a suitable opportunity.

6. But when we meet what are we to discuss? Responsible people with organisations behind them can hardly discuss anything in the air. Some clarification of the issues, some clear statement of what is wanted and what is objected to, is always desirable, otherwise we may not come to grips with the subject. You will remember the argument about what transpired at Delhi in 1935 between you and Babu Rajendra Prasad. There has even been a difference of opinion about the facts. It would be unfortunate if we repeated this performance and then argued about it later.

7. It is thus highly desirable for us to define the issues first. This is also necessary as we have always to consult many colleagues in regard to any matter affecting the Congress policy. There is surely nothing undesirable or inappropriate about this defining of issues by correspondence. It is the usual method adopted between individuals and organisations. May I, therefore, beg of you to enlighten me?

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Proceedings of All Bengal Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference

All India Congress Committee Papers, B 9/1938

MURSHIDABAD, 28 February, 1938

1. No black flag demonstration marred the commencement of the second day's session of the Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference this afternoon. Amidst shouts of "*Bande Mataram*", "*Hindu Muslim-ki-Jai*" and "*Allah-o-Akbar*," the Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad occupied the chair. The attendance totalled over ten thousand. Peasants from neighbouring villages mustered strong and squatted on the open compound surrounding the pandal, defying the scorching rays of the sun. A larger number of women than yesterday attended the Conference before which were placed the resolutions for approval by the Subjects Committee.

2. Dr. R. Ahmed¹ moved the unity resolution which was seconded by Shri Chandra Chatterjee of Dacca. Mr. M.A. Zaman, M.L.A, supporting referred to the pledges and promises given by the Bengal Ministers and regretted that they had failed to stand by them. He appealed to the peasants to unite and thereby regain their lost prosperity. Mr. T.C. Goswami, M.L.A. rising amidst applause commended the new move for

unity. The real cause of dissension between the two communities, he said, was economic, not political. Mr. Narendra Narayan Chakravarty, M.L.A., said that the solution of the communal problem lay in personal sacrifices on the part of Hindus and Muslims to whom he appealed to eschew personal differences. After Mr. Asimuddin of Commilla had spoken in support of the resolution it was put to vote and carried unanimously.

3. Professor Humayun Kabir² moved the second resolution. He said that illiteracy and poverty were the burning problems of the country and unless solution was found, the welfare of the people would be in jeopardy. If the masses were made conscious of their condition and acquainted with the real cause of their sufferings, they would naturally strive to improve their lot. Mr. Abdul Karim, ex-M.L.A., seconding the resolution drew a contrast between India and other countries with regard to the spread of education there. India was lagging far behind and this state of affairs should not be allowed to continue. Mrs. Hemaprava Majumdar M.L.A., and several others then spoke in support of the resolution which was adopted unanimously.

4. Third resolution regarding the starting of branches of the Unity Association was likewise passed.

5. Winding up the deliberations of the Conference the Nawab Bahadur expressed his gratification at the response to the call of the conference and the excellent progress made by it within a short time. He said that it was their mission to seek to establish cordial relations between the two communities and appealed for the whole-hearted support to this unity movement from all irrespective of their religious leanings.

6. "My last words are, those of us who have the spark of true patriotism in us, shall never hesitate to think that we shall live for India and die for it." Concluding the President thanked all who had contributed to the success of the Conference including the organisers of the volunteer corps.

The Resolutions: 7. Earlier, the Subjects Committee of the Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference, after eight hours deliberations, approved the following resolutions which were placed before the open Conference and passed unanimously.

(i) "The Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference reiterates its faith in the fundamental and indissoluble unity of the economic and political interests of the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal as communities and declares that the recent phenomenon of inter-communal bitterness and conflict is a manifestation of the political plan of the struggle for power in the form of patronage and services among groups and individuals of the middle classes of the two communities, and this has been magnified and, indeed made possible by the colossal scale of illiteracy among the masses of the Province and is bound to disappear with greater dissemination of knowledge and growth of political consciousness among them."

8. "The Conference, therefore, declares that the unfortunate tension between the two communities can be brought to an early end by removing the chief of the causes of dissension, specified above, out of the field of political struggle and for that purpose recommends that (A) immediate steps be taken for early introduction by the Government of free and compulsory primary education, including, adult education, among the masses without taxation; (B) intensive propaganda, preferably on a local regional (level) undertaken to explain to the masses the fundamental unity of economic

interests among the Hindu and Muslim peasantry and to educate them to properly appreciate and identify their interests in economic, political and cultural fields in as much as only a mass movement base on an economic programme can successfully eradicate the evils of communalism.

(ii) This Conference resolves that branches of the Hindu-Muslim Unity Association be started in districts, sub-divisions and other local centres."

Conference Ends: 9. The two-day session of the All-Bengal Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference was concluded this evening. Most of the leaders are of the opinion that the conference was a success.

The absence of Mr. B.C. Chatterji, who greatly contributed arriving to settlement was much felt towards the end of the Conference. He had to leave immediately after the Subjects Committee meeting.

10. The leaders who attended the Conference are leaving by tonight's train for their respective places. His Highness and members of his family are leaving for Calcutta tomorrow morning. (A.P.I.)

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1. Dr. R. Ahmad, actively participated in the All-Bengal Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference, Murshidabad, 1938.
 2. Humayun Kabir (1906-1969); Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1937-45 and 1946-48; Deputy Leader, Krishak Praja Party, 1937-45 and its Joint Secretary, 1944-45; associated with Maulana Azad at Simla Conference, 1946; Educational Adviser and Secretary, Government of India, 1952-56; edited Maulana Azad's *India Wins Freedom*.

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Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Maxwell

Home (Special), F. No. S.D. 684, Home Department (Special)

BOMBAY, 1/3 March, 1938

My dear Maxwell,

1. I am desired to submit my report for the second half of February 1938.

5. The Bombay Presidency Muslim League held a Conference at Ahmedabad on February 27th and 28th under the Presidentship of Sir Ali Mahomed Khan Dehlavi, leader of the Party in the Bombay Legislature. The Conference passed resolutions expressing its emphatic disapproval of the Federal Scheme, declaring implicit confidence in Mr. M.A. Jinnah's leadership, opposing the appointment of a Muslim Minister "who did not command the confidence of the representatives of the Muslim community," and declaring that Muslims had absolutely no faith in the "paper resolutions" passed by the Congress purporting to safeguard the religious, social and other rights of Muslims.



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*Jinnah to Gandhiji**Sardar Patel Papers, F. I, 33-34**3 March, 1938*


Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have received your letter of the 24th February, 1938. I am sorry for the delay in replying as I was not well. In your letter I missed the note of response, first whether you are of opinion that you see light now and the moment has come and secondly if so, whether you are prepared to take the matter up in right earnest and thirdly I find that there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line you will be repeating the same tragedy as you did when you expressed your helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and die-hard views, did not agree and you had to say that although you were willing but what could you do. This happened as you know before you went to the Round Table Conference. At the Round Table Conference the tragedy was repeated by you when you seemed to be willing to accept provisionally certain terms; but you there also expressed that you were helpless as the Hindus were unwilling and you as a representative of the Congress would have no objection if the Hindus and Musalmans came to an agreement.

2. We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left that you recognize the All India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India and on the other hand you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise machinery of approach.

3. Of course, I shall be glad to see you, although I shall be equally glad to see Pandit Jawaharlal or Mr. Bose as you may desire; the matter as you know will not be clinched without reference again to you by either of them. Therefore, I will prefer to see you first. In any case I am sorry to say I cannot come to Segaon to see you before the 10th March. I have to go to Bombay and also I have fixed various other engagements of my tour; but we can fix up the time and place that may suit us both.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH



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*Jinnah to Nehru**Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, p. 251*

NEW DELHI, 3 March, 1938

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th February. I regret to find the same spirit running through of making insinuations and innuendoes and raising all sorts of matters of trifling character which are not germane to our present subject with which you started, namely, how to find the basis of approach to the most vital and prominent question of Hindu-Muslim unity. You wind up your letter by insisting upon the course that I should formulate the points in dispute and submit to you for your consideration and then carry on correspondence with you. This method, I have already stated, in my considered opinion, is undesirable and inappropriate. The method you insist upon may be appropriate between two litigants and that is followed by solicitors on behalf of their clients, but national issues cannot be settled like that.

When you say "that I am afraid I must confess that I do not know what the fundamental points in dispute are," I am only amazed at your ignorance. The matter has been tackled since 1925 right upto 1935 by the most prominent leaders in the country and so far no solution has been found. I would beg of you to study it, and do not take up a self complacent attitude, and if you are earnest I don't think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the main points in dispute are, because they have been consistently mentioned both in the Press and on the public platform even very recently.

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*K.M. Ashraf to Mahabir Tyagi¹**All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. B-11/1938*

SWARAJ BHAWAN, ALLAHABAD, 5 March, 1938

My dear Tyagiji,

I am enclosing herewith two more communications regarding alleged communal behaviour of certain Hindu Congressmen in Moradabad and Bulandshahr respectively. Regarding the Bulandshahr affair I was asked by the Secretary last year to investigate the matter. I will submit my report in case you want me to do it. But I would very much like the Bulandshahr affair examined by some one else along with other issues of a general character.

2. I am enclosing herewith a separate note on what I want you to do in connection

with Muslim contact work in the Province and another note on publicity and propaganda.

Yours sincerely,
K.M. ASHRAF

SHRI MAHABIR TYAGI

Secretary, Provincial Congress Committee,
Nadan Mahal Road, Lucknow.

A Note on Muslim Contact Work :

1. There is a general complaint that various Congress offices in the Province do not issue their communications in Urdu script for the convenience of Muslim Members. The Secretary should, therefore, issue a circular calling on the district and town Congress Committees to carry on their correspondence and other routine office work both in Deonagari and Urdu scripts where Congressmen so desire. The membership forms, leaflets, handbills, circulars and other publications may be similarly printed in both characters. The Congress offices should print their letter-marks and other designations both in Hindi and Urdu and no distinctive symbol of any community should appear on such papers. The electoral rolls should be prepared both in Hindi and Urdu wherever demanded. I suggest that we even recommend to the various Urdu speaking districts in our Province that office bearers in the Congress should learn both the characters.

2. There is a general complaint that the National Flag Song as now sung is not very intelligible to many Muslim Congressmen in certain parts of the Province. We should soon appoint a Committee to select a number of National Songs and Flag Songs acceptable and intelligible to both Hindus and Muslims.

3. We have received numerous complaints that prominent members of the Hindu Mahasabha occupy responsible positions in the Congress organisation. The Council should take the earliest opportunity to define the term "Communal organisation" and apply in the existing conditions of our Province.

4. That a Minorities Contact Committee may be formed with the President and Secretary as ex-officio members and a report of our minorities contact work submitted at the annual Conference. In case the Council does not agree to this proposal I suggest that the Propaganda and Publicity Committee should include one or two Muslim Congressmen and concentrate on Muslim contact work.

5. We should appoint some persons in our National Service with special reference to the Muslim contact work in our Province.

6. The Provincial office in issuing tracts should include special tracts on communal question.

7. The P.C.C. office should be in receipt of all the important communal papers and should contradict the false news and other malicious propaganda which is published in them from time to time. This work should be specially assigned to a man in the Provincial office. I suggest the following papers be subscribed immediately :

1. *The Alaham*, Delhi. 2. *The Zamindar*, Lahore. 3. *The Asre Jadid*, Calcutta. 4. *The Star of India*, Calcutta. 5. *The Huq*, Lucknow. 6. *The Star Weekly*, Allahabad. 7. *The Khilafat*, Bombay. 8. *The Ahsan*, Lahore. 9. *The Hindu Herald*, Delhi.

Publicity and Propaganda: 1. We should perform a number of propaganda tours in our public van all over the Province. With this view we should consult the road maps and inform the various Congress Committees. I offer my services without reservations in this connection.

2. We should prepare the following tracts to be published both in Hindi and Urdu from our offices :

1. The Congress Programme
2. A Short History of the Congress

3. Congress Attitude towards Muslims (resolutions summarised)
 4. Congress Ministries at Work
 5. Indian Peasant Problem
 6. Defects of British Rule in India
 7. The Present Constitution and the Federal Scheme
 8. The Constructive Work in the Congress Programme (A survey)
 9. Communal Problem
 10. Harijan Problem
3. Fortnightly bulletins both in Hindi and Urdu.

1. Mahabir Tyagi (1899); Member, AICC, 1923-65, of Constituent Assembly, 1946-49, of Lok Sabha, 1952-67; Union Minister of Revenue and Expenditure, 1951-53, of Defence Organisation 1953-57; and of Rehabilitation, 1964-66, Chairman, Fifth Finance Commission, 1968-69; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1970.

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K.M. Ashraf to Sitla Sahai

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. B-9/1938

SWARAJ BHAWAN, ALLAHABAD, 5 March, 1938

My dear Sitla Sahaiji,

1. I hope you have talked the matter over to Rafi Saheb or Pandit Jawaharlalji. In any case I am expecting to hear from you in that connection.

2. As per promise I am enclosing herewith 7 Press cuttings of Muslim communal papers chosen at random during the last two weeks just to give you some idea of what the Muslim papers are writing about your Government:

Enclosure No. 1 deals with alleged excess of Hindus in Radaika (Oudh). There is again in column 4, a report of the speech alleged to have been delivered by Mr. Har Prasad M.L.A. in Hamirpur. On the back page you will be surprised to find an almost provocative estimate of what happened in Cawnpore when Haji Saheb went there.

Enclosure No. 2 deals with the affairs of Zahidabad in Gorakhpur District. It is reprinted from the *Mashriq* of Gorakhpur. On the back page are certain serious allegations in connection with cow-slaughter in Thana Ghosi District Azamgarh. Similar allegations from a village in Saharanpur district.

Enclosure No. 3 deals with a harrowing account of Hindu excess against Muslims in village Rampur, Sultanpur district. This is taken from the *Al-Hilal* of Bombay.

Enclosure No. 4 is similarly a copy from the *Al-Hilal* which deals with Hindu excesses in Mombabazar, district Azamgarh.

Enclosure No. 5 is a reprint from the *Aftab-i-Hind* of Aligarh which appears in the *Daily Khilafat* of Bombay in 2nd March issue. It summarises under 23 headings the various forms of excesses which are perpetrated by your Government against the Muslims of U.P. You will please note that the list continues in a subsequent number.

Enclosure No. 6 deals with excess against Muslims in Aligarh, district.

Enclosure No. 7 is a report on the Deoria riots prepared by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama of Gorakhpur.

I will add in this connection that the *Daily Wabadat* of 24th February contains on

page 2 serious allegations against the police. It is asserted that the Office Bearers of the Muslim League in Atrauli (Aligarh District) were wrongfully detained in lock-up and persecuted for their political notions. I hope you will kindly take immediate steps in this connection. I understand that Pandit Jawaharlal is also writing to Pantji about it.

Yours sincerely,
K.M. ASHRAF

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Nehru to Jinnah

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII, pp. 224-227

ALLAHABAD, 8 March, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

1. Thank you for your letter of March 3rd. I am afraid our letters to each other repeat themselves. I go on requesting you to tell us what exactly are the points in dispute which have to be discussed and you go on insisting that this should not be done by correspondence. At the same time you have pointed out that the main points in dispute have been constantly, and very recently, discussed in the Press and public platform. I have carefully followed Press statements and your public speeches. In my effort to discover these points of dispute I enumerated some of the criticisms which you were reported to have made in public speeches. In your reply you stated that you were misreported, but you did not say what the correct report should have been. Further you said that these were minor and trifling matters, but again you did not point out what the major matters were. You will perceive my difficulty. I hope I am not making any insinuations or innuendoes, as you suggest in your last letter. Certainly it is not my intention to do so, nor to raise trifling matters which are not germane to the present subject. But what are the matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so, I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement made in the Press or platform which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful.

2. It is not my desire, may I repeat, to carry on a controversy by correspondence, but only to find out what the main points of discussion and dispute are. It is surely usual for national issues to be formulated and clarified in this way to facilitate discussion. Both in national and international matters we are frequently adopting this course.

3. You are perfectly right in saying that this matter has been tackled since 1925 repeatedly. Do you not think that this very history warns us not to approach it in a vague manner without clear ideas as to what we object to and what we want? Apart from this, much has happened during these past few years which has altered the

position. For instance, the Communal Award. Do you want this discussed with a view to some settlement being arrived at on another basis?

4. It is obvious that the Congress is exceedingly anxious to remove all causes of misunderstanding and friction. Apart from wider national issues, it would like to do so because such misunderstanding comes in the way of its work. It has frequently considered the problem and passed such resolutions and put forward such proposals as it considered right. I do not wish to discuss as to whether these were right or not. That may be a matter for argument. But according to our lights we tried to do our best. If we did not succeed to the extent we hoped to do that is our misfortune and we shall gladly consider suggestions which might lead to better results. What are the various aspects of this matter? May I enumerate them? (I) The Communal Award, which includes separate electorates and reservation of seats. (II) Religious guarantees. (III) Cultural protection and guarantees. Presumably these are the three main heads. There may be some minor matters but I do not refer to them as you wish to concentrate on the main issues.

5. As regards the Communal Award, the position of the Congress has been clarified. If it is your desire to discuss this matter, I should like to know it.

6. As regards religious and cultural guarantees, the Congress has given as full assurances and guarantees as is possible. If, however, any other guarantees are considered necessary, they should be mentioned. About one of the questions which you have referred to in your speeches, the language question, I have written to you previously and sent you my brochure. I trust that you agreed with its main conclusions.

7. Are we going to discuss these matters or some others which I have not mentioned above? Then again the background of all such discussions must necessarily be a certain political and economic one—our struggle for independence, our anti-imperialism, our methods of direct action whenever necessary, our anti-war policy, our attempt to remove the exploitation of the masses, agrarian and labour problems, and the like. I take it that with the re-orientation of the Muslim League's policy there will not be any great difference regarding this anti-imperialist background.

8. You will forgive me for repeating myself in these letters and for saying the same things over and over again. I do so because I am keenly desirous of your appreciating my viewpoint which I believe is also the viewpoint of my colleagues in the Congress. I have no desire to take up your time and to spend my time in writing long letters. But my mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues cannot lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that, in spite of my repeated requests, I am not told what issues have to be discussed.

9. I understand that Gandhiji has already written to you expressing his readiness to have a talk with you. I am not now the Congress President and thus have not the same representative capacity, but, if I can be of any help in this matter, my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss these matters with you.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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*Gandhiji to Jinnah**Congress Government I, pp. 201-202*

SEGAON, 8 March, 1938

I thank you for your letter. I hope you have completely got over your indisposition. Your letter revives painful memories. I will not discuss at this stage, at any rate, the various debatable points raised in your letter. Suffice it to say that I am at your disposal. If you cannot come to Segaon and my health permits, I will gladly go to Bombay to meet you when you are there. At present I have to go to Bengal and then for a while to Orissa. This will take me through the whole of this month. The earliest, therefore, that we can meet will be in April.

Two questions arising from your letter demand a reply. You ask me whether I have now seen the light. Much to my regret I have to say, 'No.' If I had, I would proclaim the news from the house-tops; but that limitation does not debar me from taking advantage of the slightest opportunity of finding a way out of the present difficulty.

You expect me to be able to speak on behalf of 'the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country.' I am afraid I cannot fulfil the test. I cannot represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean; but I would exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure an honourable settlement.

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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 15 March, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

14. You will have seen in paragraph 7 of Haig's Report No. U.P. 61, dated 9th March,¹ an interesting reference to developments in the United Provinces in regard to the flying of the Congress flag. The competing claims to fly their own flag on ceremonial occasions on Municipal and District Board buildings by the Muslim League and the Communists appear to have produced healthy reactions on the Congress side, and Haig suggests that it is not out of the question that in order to avoid the considerable embarrassment that is now being experienced, they might adopt the principle of refusing to allow local bodies to display party emblems. Nothing, I need not say, could be more satisfactory from our point of view than that this problem,

presenting as it does an awkward feature from our side, should be resolved by the interplay of party jealousies, and you may have noticed that *Bande Mataram* has had a somewhat similar fate in Madras, whereafter a long drawn-out controversy between Congress and other parties, which attracted great attention in the Press, the Prime Minister has asked that the singing of the song at the commencement of business each day in the Legislative Assembly should be abandoned pending agreement between the various parties affected.

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1. Not available.

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Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the First Half of March, 1938 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-3/38, pp. 1-2

2. Bhai Parmanand of the Punjab visited Nagpur on the 10th March. At a meeting attended by about 5,000 persons, he accused the Congress Government of constituting a dictatorship and of giving way to Muslim opinion on every occasion. He attacked the Congress attitude towards Federation and thought that Federation was the only means by which the unity of India could be preserved.

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Jinnah to Nehru

Congress Government I, pp. 236-38

NEW DELHI, 17 March, 1938

1. I have received your letter of the 8th March, 1938. Your first letter of the 18th January conveyed to me that you desire to know the points in dispute for the purpose of promoting Hindu-Muslim unity. When in reply I said that the subject matter cannot be solved through correspondence and it was as undesirable as discussing matters in the Press, you, in your reply of the 4th February, formulated a catalogue of grievances with regard to my supposed criticism of the Congress and utterances which are hardly relevant to the question for our immediate consideration. You went on persisting on the same line and you are still of opinion that those matters, although not germane to the present subject, should be further discussed, which I do not propose to do as I have already explained to you in my previous letter.

2. The question with which we started, as I understood, is of safeguarding the rights and interests of the Musalmans with regard to their religion, culture, language,

personal laws and political rights in the national life, the Government and the administration of the country. Various suggestions have been made which will satisfy the Musalmans and create a sense of security and confidence in the majority community. I am surprised when you say in your letter under reply, "But what are these matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so, I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement in the Press or platform which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful." Perhaps you have heard of the Fourteen Points.

3. Next, as you say, "Apart from this, much has happened during these past few years which has altered the position." Yes, I agree with you, and various suggestions have appeared in the newspapers recently. For instance, if you will refer to the *Statesman*, dated the 12th of February, 1938, there appears an article under the heading, "Through Muslim Eyes" (Copy enclosed for your convenience). Next an article in the *New Times*, dated the 1st of March, 1938, dealing with your pronouncements recently made, I believe at the Haripura session of the Congress, where you are reported to have said: "I have examined this so-called communal question through the telescope and, if there is nothing, what can you see."

4. This article in the *New Times* appeared on the 1st March, 1938, making numerous suggestions (copy enclosed for convenience). Further, you may have seen Mr. Aney's¹ interview where he warned the Congress, mentioning some of the points which the Muslim League would demand.

5. Now, this is enough to show you that various suggestions that have been made, or are likely to be made, or are expected to be made, will have to be analysed and ultimately, I consider, it is the duty of every true nationalist, to whichever party or community he may belong, to make it his business and examine the situation and bring about a pact between the Musalmans and the Hindus and create a real united front; and it should be as much your anxiety and duty as it is mine, irrespective of the question of the party or the community to which we belong. But if you desire that I should collect all these suggestions and submit to you as a petitioner for you and your colleagues to consider, I am afraid I can't do it for the purpose of carrying on further correspondence with regard to these various points with you. But if you still insist upon that, as you seem to do so when you say in your letter, "My mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues could not lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues are to be discussed." This is hardly a correct description or a fair representation, but in that case I would request you to ask the Congress officially to communicate with me to that effect and I shall place the matter before the Council of the All India Muslim League, as you yourself say that you are "not the Congress President and thus have not the same representative capacity but if I can be of any help in this matter my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss these matters with you." As to meeting you and discussing the matters with you, I need hardly say that I shall be pleased to do so.

Enclosure I: Extract from *The Statesman*, New Delhi edition, dated 12 February, 1938, "Through Moslem Eyes" by Ainul Mulk.²

Enclosure II: Extract from the "*New Times*," Lahore, dated 1 March, 1938, "The Communal Question."

In its last session at Haripura the Indian National Congress passed a resolution for assuring Minorities of their cultural and religious rights. The resolution was moved by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and was carried. The speech which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made on this occasion was as bad as any speech could be. If the resolution has to be judged in the light of that speech, then it comes to this that the resolution has been passed not in any spirit of seriousness, but merely as a meaningless assurance to satisfy the foolish Minorities who are clamouring "for the satisfaction of the communal problem." Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru proceeded on the basis that there was really no communal question. We should like to reproduce the trenchant manner in which he put forward the proposition. He said: "I have examined the so-called communal question through the telescope and, if there is nothing, what can you see?" It appears to us that, it is the height of dishonesty to move a resolution with these premises. If there is no Minority question, why proceed to pass a resolution? Why not state that there is no Minority question? This is not the first time that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has expressed his complete inability to understand or see the communal question. When replying to a statement of Mr. Jinnah, he reiterated his conviction that in spite of his best endeavour to understand what Mr. Jinnah wanted, he could not get at what he wanted. He seems to think that with the Communal Award, which the Congress had opposed, the seats in the Legislature have become assured and now nothing remains to be done. He repeats the offensive statement that the Communal Award is merely a problem created by the middle or upper classes for the sake of a few seats in the Legislature or appointments in Government service or for Ministerial positions. We should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that he has completely misunderstood the position of the Muslim Minority and it is a matter of intense pain that the President of an All India organisation, which claims to represent the entire population of India should be so completely ignorant of the Muslim Minority. We shall set forth below some of the demands so that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru may not have any occasion hereafter to say that he does not know what more the Muslims want. The Muslim demands are:

1. That the Congress shall henceforth withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should cease to prate about it as if it were a negation of nationalism. It may be a negation of nationalism, but if the Congress has announced in its statement that it is not opposing the Communal Award, the Muslims want that Congress should at least stop all agitation for the recession of the Communal Award.

2. The Communal Award merely settles the question of the representation of the Muslims and of other Minorities in the Legislatures of the country. The further question of the representation of the Minorities in the services of the country remains. Muslims demand that they are as much entitled to be represented in the services of their motherland as the Hindus, and since the Muslims have come to realise by bitter experience that it is impossible for any protection to be extended to Muslim rights in the matter of their representation in the services, it is necessary that the share of the Muslims in the services should be definitely fixed in the Constitution and by statutory enactment so that it may not be open to any Hindu head of any department to ride

roughshod over Muslims in the name of "Efficiency." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru knows that in the name of efficiency and merit, the right of Indians to man the services of their country was denied by the bureaucracy. Today when Congress is in power in seven Provinces, the Muslims have a right to demand of Congress leaders that they shall unequivocally express themselves in this regard.

3. Muslims demand that the protection of their Personal Law and their culture shall be guaranteed by the statute. And as an acid test of the sincerity of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress in this regard, Muslims demand that the Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to ensure that the Shahidganj Mosque is restored to its original position and that the Sikhs desist from profane uses and thereby injuring the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims.

4. Muslims demand that their right to call *Azan* and perform their religious ceremonies shall not be fettered in any way. We should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that in a village, in the Kasur Tehsil of the Lahore District, known as Raja Jang, the Muslim inhabitants of that place are not allowed by the Sikhs to call out their *Azan* loudly. With such neighbours, it is necessary to have a statutory guarantee that the religious rights of the Muslims shall not be in any way interfered with, and on the advent of Congress rule to demand of the Congress that it shall use its powerful organisation for the prevention of such an event. In this connection we should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that the Muslims claim cow slaughter as one of their religious rights and demand that so long as the Sikhs are permitted to carry on *Jhatka* and to live on *Jhatka*, the Muslims have every right to insist on their undoubted right to slaughter cows. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is not a great believer in religious injunctions. He claims to be living on the economic plane, and we should like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to know that for a Muslim the question of cow slaughter is a measure of economic necessity and that, therefore, it does not remain open to any Hindu to statutorily prohibit the slaughter of cows.

5. Muslims demand that their majorities, in the Provinces in which they are at present in a majority, shall not be affected by any territorial redistributions or adjustments. The Muslims are at present in a majority in the Provinces of Bengal, Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Let the Congress hold out the guarantee and express its readiness to the incorporation of this guarantee in the statute that the present distribution of the Muslim population in the various Provinces shall not be interfered with through the medium of any territorial distribution or re-adjustment.

6. The question of National Anthem is another matter. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot be unaware that Muslims all over have refused to accept the *Bande Mataram* or any expurgated edition of the anti-Muslim song as a binding National Anthem. If Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot succeed in inducing the Hindu majority to drop the use of this song, then let him not talk so tall, and let him realise that the great Hindu mass does not take him seriously except as a strong force to injure the cause of Muslim solidarity.

7. The question of language and scripts is another demand of the Muslims. The Muslims insist on Urdu being practically their national language; they want statutory guarantee that the use of the Urdu tongue shall not in any manner be curtailed or damaged.

8. The question of the representation of the Muslims in the local bodies is another unsolved question. Muslims demand that the principle underlying the Communal Award, namely, separate electorates and representation according to population strength, should apply uniformly in the various local and other elected bodies from top to bottom.

We can go on multiplying this list but for the present we should like to know the reply of the Congress and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the demands that we have set forth below; we should like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru fully to understand that the Muslims are more anxious than the Hindus to see complete independence in the real sense of that term established in India. They do not believe in any Muslim Raj for India and will fight a Hindu Raj tooth and nail. They stand for the complete freedom of the country and of all classes inhabiting this country, but they shall oppose the establishment of any majority Raj of a kind that will make a clean sweep of the cultural, religious and political guarantees of the various minorities as set forth above. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is under the comforting impression that the questions set forth are trivial questions, but he should reconsider his position in the light of the emphasis and importance, which the minorities, which are affected by the programme of the Congress, place on these matters. After all it is the Minorities which are to judge and not the majorities. It appears to us that with the attitude of mind which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru betrayed in his speech and which the seconder of that resolution equally exhibited in his speech, namely, that the question of Minorities and majorities was an artificial one and created to suit vested interests, it is obvious that nothing can come out of the talks that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru recently initiated between himself and Mr. Jinnah. If the Congress is of the belief that this reiteration of its inane pledge to the minorities will satisfy them and that they will be taken in by mere words, the Congress is badly mistaken.

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1. Madhao Shrihari Aney (1880-1968); Vice-President, Indian Home Rule League, acting President, Indian National Congress, 1933; Member, Executive Council of Governor-General, 1941-43; representative of the Government of India in Ceylon, 1943-47; Governor of Bihar, 1948-52; Member, Lok Sabha, 1959-67.
 2. See No. 192 *Supra*.

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Inspector General of Crime to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa

Towards Freedom Papers, TC No. 690/S.B.

22 March, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. No. 690/S.B.

I attach for your information an Urdu pamphlet in original printed at the Lakhinarayan Press, Cuttack together with an English translation. This is being

distributed throughout the Province by the local branch of the Muslim League.

This effusion is not calculated to encourage good feeling between the various communities and ranks of society. The same, however, can be said of the speeches of certain Provincial politicians. If Government wish to examine the matter further, it is suggested that the Government Translator and Legal Remembrancer be called to advise.

(Sd/-) Illegible
for Inspector General Police
Orissa

Muslim League, Cuttack: A memorandum for the Muslim Brethren. The inner motive of the Congress and the *Bande Mataram* Song.

My dear Muslim Brethren,

After accepting Ministry, the Congress have directed to sing *Bande Mataram*, as the National Anthem in the Council Chamber, schools and public meetings where people of every community and religion meet. Whenever this song is sung, all members of Congress and Assembly without caste or creed are to stand up and to hear the song with reverence. *Bande Mataram* is a sort of prayer of the Hindus. They sing this with reverence before the Goddesses Kali and Durga who are their Goddesses. The purpose of the song and the purpose for which it is being sung are as follows:

"India is a country for the Hindus. The Mohammadans are foreigners."

It is obvious from the fact that they want to destroy the houses of the Mohammadans and demolish the mosques and to erect temples instead. They in other words, intend either to wipe out the Muslims from the face of the earth or to drive them out of India. For this reason only they earnestly sing the song as a prayer before their Goddesses.

As the song is of anti-Muslim nature the Muslim Leaders and the Mohammadans Pandits (sic.) have passed a resolution in the 25th sitting of the Lucknow Muslim Conference. This resolution is well-known to every Mohammadans. This song was strictly prohibited to be sung and meetings were held in every part of India to bring this resolution to the notice of the Mohammadans mass so that they should protest against it.

Prominent figures like Dr. Tagore, S.C. Bose and others had supported this idea of not singing *Bande Mataram* in public meetings and had informed the Congress Committee that this song is of anti-Muslim feeling. But the Congress Committee did not mind their suggestions and this anthem is still being sung in the Madras Assembly. It is a matter of regret that the Congressmen are not the well-wisher of Mohomedans. For this only thousands of Mohammadans have since quitted the Congress and joined the Muslim League. But still there are some narrow-minded cowards and selfish Mohammadan who are attached to the Congress. These people are explaining the meaning of the song in a quite different way and misguiding us. Only to disillusion the masses we are giving below the correct meaning of the song, so that every Mohomedan can understand this and may decide his line of action.

In 1838 A.D., B.C. Chatterji was born in the village of Kamdapur in Bengal

Presidency. He wrote and published a book called *Anandmath* in Bengali. There is a song of 7 lines in this book. The meaning of the first line is as given below: B.C. Chatterji was a worshipper of Goddesses Kali and Durga and an official under the Bengal Government. In the year 1891, he retired as a First Class Magistrate. Afterwards he became famous as an author and a dramatist. (He in his articles and dramas, used to criticise the Mohammadan Rulers and find fault with the Mohammadan masses. He was of the opinion that Mohammadans should be driven out of India. With this evil motive in view he composed a "painted drama borrowing its foundation on a vague, imaginary false incident, of one of the small groups of the Sanyasis, which was supposed to have occurred in the year 1773, a long time previous to his birth.) The book became very favourable and popular among the Bengalees in a very short time. They considered it as their one of the religious scriptures and the author a *Rishi* (sage). This was translated into Tamil by one Pandit C. Trochatna Muslim Pala. The second edition of this book was published in 1919 by a Brahmin named Ganesh and Co.. This book consists of 331 pages. There is mention of this *Bande Mataram* in this book on page 34. The meaning of the song is as follows:

"We bend before Mother India and offer our earnest and fervent prayer to her." On page 45 it is written "No other thought should come to us until and unless we have driven out the drunkards and big bearded people (Mohammadans). Then there will be peace and tranquillity in our country." On page 88 it is written, "Oh friends, get up, now time has come to drive out Mohammadans, who are like the nests of birds and burn the foes of our creed to ashes. Throw these ashes in the rivers. Burn the residences of these hogs and give relief to our Mother Country from pains."

It is written on page 89—"March forward, destroy the villages of these culprits, burn the cottages of these hogs and throw the nests of these birds into the fourwinds and pray to God in His name."

It is mentioned on page 112 "We do not want to be king, because these Mohammadans are the enemies of the community. Our sole aim is only to kill them."

On page 161 it is written "Our preceptor has been vested with all divine powers. India will be our country in future. Let this secret be confined. But, beat these bare headed fellows." The second man called out "May our kind be victorious." Third man said "Ye come Hari and Murari." The 4th man spoke out "*Bande Mataram*."

In short, I am going to shorten my words. Now my Mohammadan brethren might have understood the real meaning of "*Bande Mataram*." Just see what bad ideas the Hindus cherish on (about) us (Mohammadans). Their minds are full of revenge. They compare our houses to the nests of birds and sheds of hogs. They are quite ready to kill and to extinguish our existence even. They have desires to erect temple of Kali in places of our mosques. They are worshipping their Goddesses and singing *Bande Mataram* in order to save their wealth and rotten (sic.) India. Their desire is to extinguish our existence from the land of India so that their rotten Indian gets a relief and peace from these Mohammadans.

Oh my brothers, one who is a real Mohammadan in the true sense of word can he side with the Congress? No, certainly not. One who does so is an enemy of society and Islam. Those who know that a certain man is attached to the Congress for money, service or position should advise him to side with the Muslim League. For

the sake of religion, freedom and self-protection, all Mohammadans should try combinedly. They should beg mercy of God for their past sins if they have committed without their knowledge. God is gracious He may pardon them. God will maintain their prestige as he was doing before the Congress if we remain aloof from the Congress. He will protect us from all evils. If the Congress Government is not providing the Mohammadans, there is God to give every one his bread. Solely depend on Almighty. He will help us.

May God help us.

Muslim League, Cuttack

The following is a translation of the Urdu pamphlet circulated by the Muslim League, Cuttack: First of all we should be grateful to God in that He had inspired the Mohammadans with a feeling for which they have decided to struggle for themselves for the achievements of the prosperity of their country and society and to see to their own profit and loss. They do not want to leave their fates for others kind considerations. This awakening had led to the establishment of the Muslim League in Cuttack.

The first duty of the Muslim League was to make the country especially the Muslims of Orissa understand its aims, objects and policies etc. But unfortunately before it could actually do this work, it was found that certain enemies of society appeared to show treachery towards the Muslim interests and, therefore, the League considered it necessary first to warn Mohammadans against this treachery. We want to explain certain points to them (Mohammadans) before we take up the subject-matters of the League. Please read attentively.

Let friends say what they like, but the Muslim League has no quarrel with any other religion, society and community. With great regard to the rules of the Muslim religion, the League strictly prohibits it to quarrel and to create violence. But unfortunately, the League has got a quarrel with an important party of the country namely the Congress on the ground that this party being a strongly organised party, cares very little for any other weaker parties. This party claims to make the country independent and it wants its orders to be carried out by the different communities by force. This party has a special grudge against those who do not opine with them. This party has also a special grudge against the League for the reason that the League exposes the policies of the Congress to the public. This is not the proper place to discuss what the Congress has done with the different communities of India specially with the Mohammadans of Orissa. We will discuss later what the Congress has done and will do with the Mohammadans of Orissa. Now it will suffice to say that Orissa has formed a separate Province. Let the Mohammadans form a very minor community here, but as they are one of the bigger parts of the Indian Nation, they have the right to take part in the politics of Orissa. This is also desirable in every respect and justice loving Hindus have agreed to this point. Hence the Maharaja of Parlakemidi¹ with regard to the claims of the Mohammadans, took one Mohammadan Minister in his temporary Ministry. But as soon as the Congress Ministry came the Mohammadans were informed that if they (Mohammadans) want to take part in politics, they should sacrifice their independent thoughts and give up their own views. They will only be given a share in politics provided they promise to agree with the Congress in every

point and to share the Congress on its every shout, or else, they will be deprived of these.

It is evident that no sensible and respectable persons would accept these conditions, but still the Mohammadans in the name of justice appealed to them (Congress). Then Babu Rajendra Prasad came to Cuttack and a deputation of Mohammadans waited upon him. The superior authorities of the Congress were also informed. But the situation remained unchanged. When this flame which has been set by the Congress spread all over India and when justice-loving people of different communities besides the Muslim League complained against this oppression, the Congress has been trying to give a bluff, to the sympathisers of the Mohammadans of Orissa by providing that they (Mohammadans of Orissa) have nothing to grumble at. There is a meeting to be held at Deland in the District of Puri. Some Mohammadan Congress Leaders have also been invited there under the pretext of attending the meeting and attempts are being made to persuade the Mohammadans to attend this function in great number so that Congress will be able to prove that the Mohammadans have no complaint at all. We want to warn the Mohammadans that they will be tempted and solaced with big promises and they will be called in the name of those Mohammadan Leaders who are coming from outside. There is every possibility of Mohammadans being appointed to discharge the same duties which were being performed by those who did not utter even a word against the injustice done to the Mohammadans. For the present they should give one reply to their (Congress Party's) persuasions and the reply is this:

Congress kept aloof from us and insulted us. Mohammadans should not go to pay their respects to a Darbar headed by a leader from outside where he has been surrounded with his own party members with their own plans. No wise Mohammadan can tolerate these insults towards his society, he too cannot do so as to offend his sympathisers. It is necessary for the Mohammadans to make Congress activities unsuccessful and also they should convene meetings in each and every village in order to explain the real state of things. They should not do this in a disorderly manner or by force. The League requests the Mohammadans not to disunite and not to give opportunity to other communities to laugh at them. They are requested to keep themselves aloof to avoid the underhand means of the Congress and to prove themselves that the Mohammadans of Orissa cannot be made fools of. At last, all Mohammadans are requested to pray to the Almighty to mitigate their troubles.

(Sd/-) MIRZA TAHIR BAIG,
Secretary, Muslim League, Cuttack

1. Maharaja of Parlakemidi, Member, National Defence Council, Premier of Orissa since November, 1941.



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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 48, p. 84

23 March, 1938

SECRET

No. U.P. 63.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. At the same time, it is interesting to consider what are the real causes of the very bad feeling which prevails at present throughout the Province [the United Provinces] between the Hindus and Muslims, and which manifested itself almost inevitably in these outbreaks. To my mind they are to be found in the present political grouping. As I have mentioned more than once, a position in which practically the whole of the important Minority community of Muslims is ranged in the Legislature in opposition to the Government is bound to lead to serious communal friction. The Minority cannot get their own way in the Legislature and as a permanent communal Minority have no prospect of ever getting it and they are tempted inevitably to redress the weakness of their parliamentary position by rousing religious feelings and emphasizing the importance of the community outside the Legislature, even at the risk of communal outbreaks. This is the Muslim contribution to the trouble. But the Muslims are not solely responsible for the ill-feeling. There is also a reverse side to the picture. The Hindus have been undoubtedly elated by the establishment of what is in effect a Hindu Government. There is a good deal of popular feeling that this is *Hindu Raj*, and several officers have told me that they think the Hindu attitude towards communal questions has been aggressive lately. The Holi is particularly a time when provocation is likely to be given to other communities. The Ministry undoubtedly find these conditions an embarrassment, and it remains to be seen whether anything will be done to revive the ideas of a coalition between the Congress and the Muslim League, without which I should anticipate that this state of communal tension will continue and will come to a head again whenever there is a provoking cause, which is bound to arise not infrequently.

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Pant to Nehru

A Bunch of Old Letters, p. 280

23 March, 1938

Many thanks for your very kind letter. The communal disorders with attendant

violence and bloodshed that broke out in this Province have caused me intense pain and grief. Things are almost normal now in Allahabad and Benares but communal frenzy may again burst at any time. I received a telegram from you about the riot at Allahabad and also sent you one. As you must have read in the papers an account of the disorders and as you will soon be here I do not propose to write at length about them. The propaganda carried on during the last few months by the Muslim League under the cloak of politics is primarily responsible for this state of affairs. It is so easy to rouse feelings in the name of religion and, when a party has to stoop to this in order to secure its political ends, it cannot have any reasonable grievance against the existing order.

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Nehru to Jinnah

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. VIII pp. 232-41

CALCUTTA, 6 April, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 17th¹ March reached me in the Kumaun Hills where I had gone for a brief holiday. From there I have come to Calcutta. I propose to return to Allahabad today and I shall probably be there for the greater part of April. If it is convenient for you to come there, we could meet. Or if it suits you better to go to Lucknow, I shall try to go there.

I am glad that you have indicated in your last letter a number of points which you have in mind. The enclosures you have sent mention these and I take it that they represent your viewpoint. I was somewhat surprised to see this list as I had no idea that you wanted to discuss many of these matters with us. Some of these are wholly covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion.

As far as I can make out from your letter and the enclosures you have sent, you wish to discuss the following matters:

(i) The Fourteen Points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929. (ii) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism. (iii) The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the Constitution by statutory enactment. (iv) Muslim Personal Law and culture should be guaranteed by Statute. (v) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque. (vi) The Muslims' right to call *Azan* and perform religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way. (vii) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter. (viii) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments. (ix) The *Bande Mataram*

song should be given up. (x) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged. (xi) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength. (xii) The tri-colour flag should be changed or alternatively, the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance. (xiii) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims. (xiv) Coalition Ministries.

4. It is further stated that the formula evolved by you and Babu Rajendra Prasad in 1935 does not satisfy the Muslims now and nothing on those lines will satisfy them.

5. It is added that the list given above is not a complete list and that it can be augmented by the addition of further 'demands.' Not knowing these possible and unlimited additions I can say nothing about them. But I should like to deal with the various matters specifically mentioned and to indicate what the Congress attitude has been in regard to them.

6. But before considering them, the political and economic background of the free India we are working for has to be kept in mind, for ultimately that is the controlling factor. Some of these matters do not arise in considering an independent India or take a particular shape or have little importance. We can discuss them in terms of Indian independence or in terms of the British dominance of India continuing. The Congress naturally thinks in terms of independence, though it adjusts itself occasionally to the pressure of transitional and temporary phases. It is thus not interested in amendments to the present Constitution, but aims at its removal and its substitution by a Constitution framed by the people through a Constituent Assembly.

7. Another matter has assumed an urgent and vital significance and this is the exceedingly critical international situation and the possibility of war. This must concern India greatly and affect her struggle for freedom. This must, therefore, be considered the governing factor of the situation and almost everything else becomes of secondary importance, for all our efforts and petty arguments will be of little avail if the very foundation is upset. The Congress has clearly and repeatedly laid down its policy in the event of such a crisis and stated that it will be no party to imperialist war. The Congress will very gladly and willingly cooperate with the Muslim League and all other organisations and individuals in the furtherance of this policy.

8. I have carefully looked through the various matters to which you have drawn attention in your letter and its enclosures and I find that there is nothing in them which refers to or touches the economic demands of the masses or affects the all-important question of poverty and unemployment. For all of us in India these are the vital issues and unless some solution is found for them, we function in vain. The question of State services, howsoever, important and worthy of consideration it might be, affects a very small number of people. The peasantry, industrial workers, artisans and petty shop-keepers form the vast majority of the population and they are not improved in any way by any of the demands listed above. Their interests should be paramount.

9. Many of the 'demands' involve changes of the Constitution which we are not

in a position to bring about. Even if some such changes are desirable in themselves, it is not our policy to press for minor Constitutional changes. We want to do away completely with the present Constitution and replace it by another for a free India.

10. In the same way the desire for statutory guarantees involves Constitutional changes which we cannot give effect to. All we can do is to state that in a future Constitution for a free India we want certain guarantees to be incorporated. We have done this in regard to religious, cultural, linguistic and other rights of minorities in the Karachi Resolution on Fundamental Rights. We would like these fundamental rights to be made a part of the Constitution.

11. I now deal with the various matters listed above:

(i) The Fourteen Points, I had thought, were somewhat out of date. Many of their provisions have been given effect to by the Communal Award and in other ways. Some others are entirely acceptable to the Congress; yet others require Constitutional changes which, as I have mentioned above, are beyond our present competence. Apart from the matters covered by the Communal Award and those involving a change in the constitution, one or two matters remain which give rise to differences of opinion and which are still likely to lead to considerable argument.

(ii) The Congress has clearly stated its attitude toward the Communal Award, and it comes to this that it seeks alterations only on the basis of mutual consent of the parties concerned. I do not understand how any one can take objection to this attitude and policy. If we are asked to describe the Award as not being anti-national, that would be patently false. Even apart from what it gives to various groups, its whole basis and structure are anti-national and come in the way of the development of national unity. As you know it gives an overwhelming and wholly undeserving weightage to the European elements in certain parts of India. If we think in terms of an independent India, we cannot possibly fit in this Award with it. It is true that, under stress of circumstances, we have sometimes to accept as a temporary measure something that is on the face of it anti-national. It is also true that in the matters governed by the Communal Award we can only find a satisfactory and abiding solution by the consent and good will of the parties concerned. That is the Congress policy.

(iii) The fixing of the Muslims share in the State services by statutory enactment necessarily involves the fixing of the shares of other groups and communities similarly. This would mean a rigid and compartmental State structure which will impede progress and development. At the same time it is generally admitted that State appointments should be fairly and adequately distributed and no community should have cause to complain. It is far better to do this by convention and agreement. The Congress is fully alive to this issue and desires to meet the wishes of various groups in the fullest measure so as to give to all minority communities, as stated in No. 11 of the Fourteen Points, "an adequate share in all the services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having the due regard to the requirements of efficiency." The State today is becoming more and more technical and demands expert knowledge in its various departments. It is right that, if a community is backward in this technical and expert knowledge, special efforts should be made to give it this education to bring it up to a higher level. I understand that at the Unity Conference held at Allahabad in 1933 or

thereabouts, a mutually satisfactory solution of this question of State services was arrived at.

(iv) As regards protection of culture, the Congress has declared its willingness to embody this in the fundamental laws of the Constitution. It has also declared that it does not wish to interfere in any way with the Personal Law of any community.

(v) I am considerably surprised at the suggestions that the Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj mosque. That is a matter to be decided either legally or by mutual agreement. The Congress prefers in all such matters the way of mutual agreement and its services can always be utilised for this purpose where there is no opening for them and a desire to this effect on the part of the parties concerned. I am glad that the Premier of the Punjab has suggested that this is the only satisfactory way to a solution of the problem.

(vi) The right to perform religious ceremonies should certainly be guaranteed to all communities. The Congress resolution about this is quite clear. I know nothing about the particular incident relating to a Punjab village which has been referred to. No doubt many instances can be gathered together from various parts of India where petty interferences take place with Hindu, Muslim or Sikh ceremonies. These have to be tactfully dealt with wherever they arise. But the principle is quite clear and should be agreed to.

(vii) As regards cow-slaughter there has been a great deal of entirely false and unfounded propaganda against the Congress suggesting that the Congress was going to stop it forcibly by legislation. The Congress does not wish to undertake any legislative action in this matter to restrict the established rights of the Muslims.

(viii) The question of territorial distribution has not arisen in any way. If and when it arises it must be dealt with on the basis of mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

(ix) Regarding the *Bande Mataram* song, the Working Committee, issued a long statement in October last to which I would invite your attention. First of all, it has to be remembered that no formal National Anthem has been adopted by the Congress at anytime. It is true, however, that the *Bande Mataram* song has been intimately associated with Indian nationalism for more than thirty years and numerous associations of sentiment and sacrifice have gathered round it. Popular songs are not made to order, nor can they be successfully imposed. They grow out of public sentiment. During all these thirty or more years the *Bande Mataram* song was never considered as having any religious significance and was treated as a national song in praise of India. Nor, to my knowledge was any objection taken to it except on political grounds by the Government. When, however, some objections were raised, the Working Committee carefully considered the matter and ultimately decided to recommend that certain stanzas, which contained certain allegorical references, might not be used on national platforms or occasions. The two stanzas that have been recommended by the Working Committee for use as a national song have not a word or a phrase which can offend anybody from any point of view and I am surprised that anyone can object to them. They may appeal to some more than to others. Some may prefer another national song. But to compel large numbers of people to give up what they have long valued and grown attached to is to cause needless hurt to them

and injure the national movement itself. It would be improper for a national organisation to do this.

(x) About Urdu and Hindi I have previously written to you and have also sent you my pamphlet on "*The Question of Language*." The Congress has declared in favour of guarantees for languages and culture. I want to encourage all the great Provincial languages of India and at the same time to make Hindustani, as written both in Nagri and Urdu scripts, the national language. Both scripts should be officially recognised and the choice should be left to the people concerned. In fact, this policy is being pursued by the Congress Ministries.

(xi) The Congress has long been of opinion that joint electorates are preferable to separate electorates from the point of view of national unity and harmonious cooperation between the different communities. But joint electorates, in order to have real value, must not be imposed on unwilling groups. Hence the Congress is quite clear that their introduction should depend on their acceptance by the people concerned. This is the policy that is being pursued by the Congress Ministries in regard to local bodies. Recently in a bill dealing with local bodies introduced in the Bombay Assembly, separate electorates were maintained but an option was given to the people concerned to adopt a joint electorate, if they so chose. This principle seems to be in exact accordance with No. 5 of the Fourteen Points, which lays down that "representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorate as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate." It surprises me that the Muslim League group in the Bombay Assembly should have opposed the Bill with its optional clause although this carried out the very policy of the Muslim League. May I also point out that in the resolution passed by the Muslim League in 1929, at the time it adopted the Fourteen Points, it was stated that "the Musalmans will not consent to join electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate Province and reforms in fact are introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces." Since then Sind has been separated and the N.W.F. Province has been placed on level with other Provinces. So far as Baluchistan is concerned, the Congress is committed to a levelling up of this area in the same way.

(xii) The national tri-colour flag was adopted originally in 1929 by the Congress after full and careful consultation with eminent Muslim, Sikh and other leaders. Obviously a country and national movement must have a National Flag representing the nation and all communities in it. No communal flag can represent the nation. If we did not possess a National Flag now, we would have to evolve one. The present National Flag had its colours originally selected in order to represent the various communities, but we did not like to lay stress on this communal aspect of colours. Artistically I think the combination of orange, white and green resulted in a flag which is probably the most beautiful of all National Flags. For these many years our flag has been used and it has spread to the remotest village and brought hope and courage and a sense of All India unity to our masses. It has been associated with great sacrifices on the part of our people, including Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and many have suffered lathi blows and imprisonment and even death in defending it

from insult or injury. Thus a powerful sentiment has grown up in its favour. On innumerable occasions Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali and many leaders of the Muslim League today have associated themselves with this flag and emphasised its virtues and significance as a symbol of Indian unity. It has spread outside the Congress ranks and been generally recognised as the flag of the nation. It is difficult to understand how anyone can reasonably object to it now. Communal flags cannot obviously take its place for that can only mean a host of flags of various communities being used together and thus emphasising our disunity and separateness. Communal flags might be used for religious functions but they have no place at any national functions or over any public building meant for various communities. May I add that during the past few months, on several occasions, the National Flag has been insulted by some members of volunteers of the Muslim League. This has pained us greatly but we have deliberately avoided anything in the nature of conflict in order not to add to communal bitterness. We have also issued strict orders, and they have been obeyed, that no interference should take place with the Muslim League Flag, even though it might be inappropriately displayed.

(xiii) I do not understand what is meant by our recognition of the Muslim League as the one and only organisation of Indian Muslims. Obviously the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such. But we have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not determine the measure or importance or distinction they possess. There are a large number, about a hundred thousand, of Muslims on the Congress rolls, many of whom have been our close companions, in prisons and outside for many years and we value their comradeship highly. There are many organisations which contain Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, Kisan Sabhas, Debt Committees, Zamindar Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Employer's Association, etc., and we have contacts with them. There are special Muslim organisations such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the Proja Party, the Ahrars and others, which claim attention. Inevitably the more important the organisation the more the attention paid to it, but this importance does not come from outside recognition but from inherent strength. And the other organisations, even though they might be younger and smaller, cannot be ignored.

(xiv) I should like to know what is meant by Ministries. A Ministry must have a definite political and economic programme and policy. Any other kind of Ministry would be a disjointed and ineffective body, with no clear mind or direction. Given a common political and economic programme and policy, cooperation is easy. You know probably that some such cooperation was sought for and obtained by the Congress in the Frontier Province. In Bombay also repeated attempts were made on behalf of the Congress to obtain this cooperation on the basis of a common programme. The Congress has gone to the Assemblies with a definite programme and in furtherance of clear policy. It will always gladly cooperate with other groups, whether it is in a majority or a minority in an Assembly, in furtherance of that programme and policy. On that basis I conceive of even coalition Ministries being formed. Without that basis the Congress has no interest in Ministry or in an Assembly.

12. I have dealt, I am afraid at exceeding length, with the various points raised

in your letter and its enclosures. I am glad that I have had a glimpse into your mind through this correspondence as this enables me to understand a little better the problems that are before you and perhaps others. I agree entirely that it is the duty of every Indian to bring about harmonious joint effort of all of us for the achievement of India's freedom and the ending of the poverty of her people. For me, and I take it for most of us, the Congress has been a means to that end and not an end in itself. It has been a high privilege for us to work through the Congress because it has drawn to itself the love of millions of our countrymen, and through their sacrifice and united effort, taken us a long way to our goal. But much remains to be done and we have all to pull together to that end.

13. Personally, the idea of pacts and the like does not appeal to me, though perhaps they might be necessary occasionally. What seems to me far more important is a more basic understanding of each other, bringing with it the desire and ability to cooperate together. That larger cooperation, if it is to include our millions, must necessarily be in the interests of these millions. My mind, therefore, is continually occupied with the problems of these unhappy masses of this country and I view all other problems in this light. I should like to view the communal problem also in this perspective for otherwise it has no great significance for me.

14. You seem to imagine that I wanted you to put forward suggestions as a petitioner, and then you propose that the Congress should officially communicate with you. Surely you have misunderstood me and done yourself and me an injustice. There is no question of petitioning either by you or by me, but a desire to understand each other and the problem that we have been discussing. I do not understand the significance of your wanting an official intimation from the Congress. I did not ask you for an official reply on behalf of the Muslim League. Organisations do not function in this way. It is not a question of prestige for the Congress or for any of us, for we are keener on reaching the goal we have set before us, than on small matters of prestige. The Congress is a great enough organisation to ignore such petty matters, and if some of us have gained a measure of influence and popularity, we have done so in the shadow of Congress.

15. You will remember that I took the initiative in writing to you and requesting you to enlighten me as to what your objections were to the Congress policy and what, according to you, were the points in dispute. I had read many of your speeches, as reported in the Press, and I found to my regret that they are full of strong attacks on the Congress which, according to my way of thinking, were not justified. I wanted to remove any misunderstandings, where such existed, and to clear the air.

16. I have found, chiefly in the Urdu Press, the most astounding falsehoods about the Congress. I refer to facts, not to opinions, and to facts within my knowledge. Two days ago, here in Calcutta, I saw a circular letter or notice issued by a Secretary of a Muslim League. This contained a list of the so-called misdeeds of the U.P. Government. I read this with amazement for there was not an atom of truth in most of the charges. I suppose, they were garnered from the Urdu Press.

Through the Press and the platform such charges have been repeated on numerous occasions and communal passions have thus been roused and bitterness created. This has grieved me and I have sought by writing to you and to Nawab Ismail Khan

to find a way of checking this deplorable deterioration of our public life, as well as a surer basis for cooperation. That problem still faces us and I hope we shall solve it.

17. I have mentioned earlier in this letter the critical international situation and the terrible sense of impending catastrophe that hangs over the world. My mind is obsessed with this and I want India to realise it and be ready for all consequences, good or ill, that may flow from it. In this period of world crisis all of us, to whatever party or group we might belong and whatever differences might be, have the primary duty of holding together to protect our people from perils that might encompass them. Our differences and arguments seem trivial when the future of the world and of India hangs in the balance. It is in the hope that all of us will succeed in building up this larger unity in our country that I have written to you and others repeatedly and at length.

There is one small matter I should like to mention. The report of my speech at Haripura, as given in your letter and the newspaper article, is not correct.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. See No. 210 *supra*.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, Roll No. 48

8 April, 1938

SECRET

No. U.P. 64

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

2. A new development [in the United Provinces] which might perhaps grow in importance in its effect on communal relations, and even on the general political situation is the re-emergence of the Hindu Mahasabha influence. This was almost completely submerged at the time of the general election, but Savarkar has been touring in this Province and, I am told, has addressed big meetings both in Cawnpore and in Lucknow. His policy is violently anti-British, but the support he receives is probably mainly based on Hindu communal feeling. He has been attacking the Congress for neglecting the interests of the Hindus, and has been trying to rouse Hindu feeling in just the same way as the Muslim League has been rousing Muslim feeling. The Congress, of course, though consisting predominantly of Hindus, always professes and to a large extent pursues a non-communal policy. But, as I suggested in my letter of March 23rd, the idea of *Hindu Raj* appeals strongly to the Hindus, and

if the Hindu Mahasabha comes out with a strong Hindu communal policy, they may gain some support at the expense of the less communal Congress. At present however the Congress predominance is firmly established.

3. A development in Muslim politics of some interest took place recently. As I think I have told you before, the opposition in the Assembly consists of two parties of approximately equal strength, one being the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, the other being Chhatari's Independent Party, which includes a number of the more conservative Muslims of the landed type and a small number of Hindu landlords and conservatives. A move was made from the Muslim League side to insist on the Muslims in the Independent Party transferring their allegiance to the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, and a meeting of the Muslims was held to decide on their policy. Chhatari appears to have expressed his readiness, and even eagerness to join the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, and thus to unite all Muslims under one banner for purpose of parliamentary opposition. This readiness to fall in with their own proposals somewhat alarmed the Muslim Leaguers. They felt that perhaps Chhatari and his followers were anxious to displace them in their leadership of the Muslim League Party. Consideration was given to the obvious fact that if Chhatari's party was broken up, the handful of Hindus would be left in the air, and finally it was agreed unanimously that the two opposition parties should remain as they were and that the idea of Chhatari Muslims joining the Muslim League Parliamentary Party should be given up. Chhatari is very pleased with this result and, I think, considers that he has outmanoeuvred his opponents.

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Jinnah to Nehru

Congress Government I, pp. 252

BOMBAY, 12 April, 1938

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th April, 1938. I sent you extracts from the Press which had recently appeared because I believed you when you repeatedly asserted and appealed to me that you would be grateful if I would refer you to any recent statement made in the Press or platform which would help you in understanding matters. Those are some of the matters which are undoubtedly agitating Muslim India, but the question how to meet them and to what extent and by what means and methods is the business, as I have said before, of every true nationalist to solve. Whether Constitutional changes are necessary, whether we should do it by agreement or conventions and so forth, are matters, I thought, for discussion; but I am extremely sorry to find that you have in your letter already pronounced your judgement and given your decisions on a good many of them with a preamble which negative any suggestion or discussion which may

lead to a settlement, as you start by saying, "I was so much surprised to see this list as I had no idea that you wanted to discuss many of these matters with us; some of these are wholly covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion," and then you proceed to your conclusion having formulated the points according to your own notions. Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and militant spirit as if the Congress is the sovereign power, and as an indication, you extend your patronage by saying that "obviously the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such, as we have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not measure the importance or distinction they possess," and then you mention various other organisations. Here I may add that, in my opinion, as I have publicly stated so often, unless the Congress recognises the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will "determine the measure of importance or distinction it possesses." Having regard to your mentality it is really difficult for me to make you understand the position any further. Of course, as I have said before, I do not propose to discuss the various matters referred to by you, by means of or through correspondence, as in my opinion, that is not the way to tackle this matter.

With regard to your reference to certain falsehoods that have appeared about the Congress in the Urdu Press, which, you say, have astounded you, and with regard to the circular letter referred to about the misdeeds of the U.P. Government, I can express no opinion without investigating, but I can give you any number of instances of falsehoods that have appeared in the Congress Press and in statements of Congressmen with regard to the All India Muslim League, some of the leaders and those who are connected with it. Similarly, I can give you instances or reports appearing in the Congress Press and speeches of Congressmen which are daily deliberately misrepresenting and vilifying the Muslim composition of the Bengal, Punjab, Sind and Assam Governments with a view to breaking those Governments, but that is not the subject matter of our correspondence, and besides no useful purpose will be served in doing so.

With regard to your request that our correspondence should be released to the Press, I have no objection provided the correspondence between me and Mr. Gandhi is also published simultaneously, as we both have referred to him and his correspondence with me in ours. You will please, therefore, obtain the permission of Mr. Gandhi to that effect or, if you wish, I will write to him, informing him that you desire to release the correspondence between us to the Press and I am willing to agree to it provided he agrees that the correspondence between him and myself is also released.



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*Nehru to Jinnah**The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Part-I, pp. 375-76*

ALLAHABAD, 16 April, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of April 12th has just reached me. I am exceedingly sorry that anything that I have written to you should have caused you pain. It seems to be true that we approach public problems from different standpoints and inevitably I try to place my viewpoint before you and seek to gain your appreciation of it. To say anything that might pain you would defeat my own purpose even apart from its impropriety. At the same time I owe it to you and to myself to endeavour to place frankly before you how my mind works and what my views are on the subject matter under discussion. Our viewpoints might differ but I do believe that the margin of difference can be lessened by a frank approach on either side. I have sought to make this approach in all sincerity and with every desire on my part not to say anything that might come in the way. In my last letter I dealt with the various points mentioned in the extracts you have sent me, as I presumed that as you had drawn my attention to them, they might to a large extent represent what you had in mind. As you know I have been trying to get at these points of difference and when I saw something concrete, I wanted to give my reason to it. I tried to state what the Congress opinion has been in regard to them. There is no finality in day to day policies. It is for the Congress if it so chooses, to vary any policy. All I can do is to state what the past and present policy is.

I regret that you think that I write in an arrogant and militant spirit and as if I considered the Congress as the sovereign power. The fact is it is circumscribed in a hundred ways and further it may have to go through the wilderness many a time again before it achieves its objective. You have referred to my obsession with the international situation and the sense of impending catastrophe that possess me. If I feel that way as I do, I can hardly grow complacent or imagine that the Congress is sovereign. But when I discuss Congress policies as a Congressman, I can only repeat what these are and not bring in my own particular view on the subject, if these happen to be at variance with Congress resolution.

You point out that the Congress Press contained numerous falsehoods in regard to the Muslim League and some of its leaders, as well as the Provincial Governments of Bengal, Punjab, Sind and Assam. I entirely agree with you that falsehoods, misrepresentations and insinuations are to be deprecated and countered wherever they might occur in the Urdu, Hindi or English Press, or whatever the political complexion of the newspaper. There is no such thing as the Congress Press over which the Congress has control, but it is true that many newspapers generally support the Congress. But whether we can influence them or not, we certainly want to stop all such false and misleading statements and to express our disapproval of them. In this matter, I can only beg of you to point out specific instances so that we might take necessary action.

I note, what you say about the publication of our correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi. I am, therefore, writing to him to seek his permission as suggested by you. I am afraid it will hardly be possible for me to visit Bombay in April or May. Early in June I intend sailing for Europe. In case I go to Bombay earlier, I shall inform you so that we might have the opportunity of meeting. I understand that you will be meeting Mahatma Gandhi in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Proceedings of the Special Session of All India Muslim League

The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Part-I, pp. 377-81

The special session of the All India Muslim League commenced in Calcutta on the 17th April, 1938 under the Presidency of Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the open flood-lit amphitheatre of the Mohammad Ali Park, accommodating over 15,000. There were several women on the dais, and over 2,000 delegates from different parts of India, British Baluchistan and Burma attended the session. Three Provincial Premiers, the Hon. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan (Punjab), the Hon. Sir Muhammed Saadullah¹ (Assam) and the Hon. Mr. A.K. Fazlul-Huq (Bengal), were given an ovation when they took their seats side by side on the dais. Other prominent persons attending the session included Begum Shah Nawaz,² Maulana Shaukat Ali, the Raja of Pirpur,³ the Raja of Mamdot,⁴ Sir Sultan Ahmed,⁵ the Hon. Sir K. Nazimuddin,⁶ the Hon. Mr. Abdul Matin Choudhury⁷ and Mr. Aurangzeb Khan, Leader of the Opposition in the Frontier in the Frontier Assembly.

Fazlul Huq's Welcome Address

"Brethren in Islam, I have great pleasure in extending to you on behalf of the Reception Committee, a most cordial welcome. We offer you all our most grateful thanks for having taken the trouble to come over to our Province to participate in the momentous deliberations of this special session of the Muslim League.

Perhaps in the whole history of the Muslim League never before have such weighty issues awaited the deliberations of the representatives of the Muslim people as will come up before the present one. Gentlemen, we are passing through times which are extremely critical for the Muslims of India. On one side we find the Congress with all its might, organisation and resources, determined to crush and subdue the Muslims and on the other side we find the Hindu Mahasabha with all its communal bigotry, characteristic intolerance, narrow political outlook, and unholy intentions, devoting its energies to the frustration of Muslim hopes and the suppression of the legitimate rights and liberties of the Muslim community. The Hindu Mahasabha has never made any secret of its intentions. On the contrary, its leaders have repeatedly proved by speech and action how deep-rooted in them is their antagonism to Muslim aspirations.

The time has come for us to review what steps the Muslims have taken so far to counteract these sinister forces which aim at the complete enslavement of the Muslim people of India. We must ask ourselves whether we are as yet sufficiently organised, united and prepared or whether we are still divided amongst ourselves and, therefore, unprepared. If we could lay our hands on our hearts and say that we, as a community, are organised and united and that our ranks are sufficiently consolidated to enable us to resist the onslaughts and defeat the dangerous machinations of our highly organised political antagonists, then well might we have rested content. But gentlemen, are we convinced of the strength and solidarity of our defences? If not, is it not our supreme duty to marshall all our scattered forces and assemble them under the banner of our one and only representative organisation—the All India Muslim League? Is it not our duty also to prove to the world that the Muslims of India have not yet forgotten the command of their Holy Book which sayeth: “Hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and do not create dissensions amongst yourselves”.

Gentlemen, in the whole of Eastern India Bengal is rightly regarded as the stronghold of Islam. The population figures perfectly justify Bengal's claim to this position. Let me present before you some facts and figures to show the numerical strength of the Muslims of Bengal as compared with other countries and Provinces of India. In the whole of British India the total Muslim population is 67,058,610 of whom twenty-seven and half millions have their habitation in Bengal alone. The Muslim population in Bengal is nearly half of the entire population of Great Britain, and also of France; it is seven times as much as that of Turkey, three times as much as that of Iran; four times that of Arabia, and three times that of Afghanistan and Egypt taken together. Muslims in Bengal alone number four millions more than the total population of the Punjab, eight times more than the total Muslim population of Madras, and four times more than that of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. One would have thought that in a land within the confines of which one single community had such numerical superiority, that community would hold absolute sway and its culture and traditions would prevail. But it is a thousand pities that due to certain circumstances regarding which the world at large has little knowledge, the actual conditions are entirely different. Gentlemen, time and occasion do not permit me to go in detail into an analysis of the cases which have reduced the Muslims of Bengal to the present deplorable state,—causes which stand as impediments in the way of their prosperity and progress, but with your permission I shall briefly mention a few of them.

First of all, let me tell you of that chapter of the political history of Bengal which commenced with the battle of Plassey. Immediately after their success at Plassey in 1757, the East India Company not only set themselves to advance their commercial interests but they also had recourse to every possible means calculated to bring this country under their political sway. Of the various policies which they adopted in order to gain this, the first and foremost was the suppression of the Muslims in every way to them and to the utmost limit of their power. The heartless methods which the East India Company adopted and the cruel treatment which they meted out to the Muslims in pursuance of this deep laid policy, have no parallel in the whole history of the civilised world. Steadily but persistently and with grim resolve, the East India

Company pursued that policy, the sole aim of which was to reduce the Muslims to greater and greater depths of poverty, illiteracy and emasculation. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century this policy continued to operate with increasing rigour and was fruitful of dire consequences to the Islamic people. Soon the national existence of the Muslims as a distinct race was almost at an end, and the object with which that policy had been initiated was all but fulfilled. But, gentlemen, the cup of Muslim suffering had still in it some dregs which they had yet to drain. Fresh weapons were forged to impoverish, emasculate and even annihilate their national existence. In 1819 a new Regulation was enforced which is known as the Resumption Regulations. This regulation empowered the East India Company to resume all *lakhiraj* lands, which the Moghal Emperors had bestowed or settled upon their subjects. It must be remembered in this connection that the Company had, in the year 1765, secured from Emperor Shah Alam⁸ the right to the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and, therefore, they were perfectly entitled to fix, in their own right, the rents of big zamindaries and small holdings alike. But their object was not to systematise the land tenures in Bengal but to deprive the Muslims of their supremacy in the country by depriving them of their landed possessions. At the time when the Resumption Regulations were enforced, ninety-five per cent of the zamindars of Bengal were Muslims, but within ten years after the completion of proceedings under these Regulations the position was completely reversed and the number of Muslim zamindars fell from ninety-five to five per cent only. I cannot do better than quote in this connection the remarks of Sir William Hunter in his well-known book called "The Indian Musalmans" where he describes the death-blow which the Muslim community received with regard to its position as a political entity in consequence of the ruthless manner in which the Resumption Regulations were carried out. Sir William Hunter says: "A large part of this sum was derived from lands rent-free by Musalmans or by Mohammadan foundations. The panic and hatred which ensued have stamped themselves for ever on the rural records. Hundreds of ancient families were ruined and the educational system of the Musalmans, which was almost entirely maintained by rent-free grants, received its death-blow. The scholastic classes of the Mohammadans emerged from the eighteen years of harrying, absolutely ruined. Any impartial student will arrive at the conviction, that while the Resumption Laws only enforced rights which we had again and again most emphatically reserved, yet the Resumption Proceedings were harsh in the extreme, and opposed to the general sense of the Indian people. Prescription cannot create rights in the face of express enactments but seventy-five years of unbroken possession give rise to strong claims on the tenderness of a Government. Our Resumption offices know no pity. They calmly enforced the law. The panic of those days is still remembered, and it has left to us a bitter legacy of hatred. Since then the profession of a Man of Learning, a dignified and lucrative calling under Native Rulers, has ceased to exist in Bengal.

The Mohammadan foundations suffered most; for with regard to their title deeds, as with regard to all other matters, the former conquerors of India had displayed a haughty indifference unknown to the provident and astute Hindu. We demanded an amount of proof in support of rent-free tenures, which in the then uncertain state of real property law, they could not have produced in support of their acknowledged

private estates. During seventy-five years we had submitted under protest to a gigantic system of fraud and the accumulated penalty fell upon a single generation. Meanwhile the climate and the white-ants had been making havoc of the grants and title-deeds which might have supported their claims. There can be little doubt that our Resumptions fell short of what had been stolen from us but there can be no doubt whatever, that from those Resumptions the decay of the Mohammadan systems of education dates. The officer now in-charge of the Wahabi prosecutions cites them as the second cause of the decline of the Musalman community in Bengal."

Shortly after this yet another terrible blow was aimed at the life of the Muslim as community,—a blow which laid the community absolutely prostrate and helpless. In 1835, the Court language was suddenly changed from Persian to English, in flagrant violation of the East India Company's treaty with Emperor Shah Alam. This change deprived Muslims of their language of culture and sustenance, and at one blow the entire Muslim people was relegated to the position of backwardness. Muslims of those days, as the East India Company knew very well, were disinclined towards English education not only because of their disgust at the cruel and barbarous treatment to which the English had subjected them but also because in the whole country there was not a single educational institution where they could acquire such education in an atmosphere of their own culture and civilization. Such schools or colleges as then existed for the imparting of English education had been established by Christian missionaries and the teachers were either Christians or Hindus. In this connection the well-known historian Sir William Hunter has depicted the feelings of the Muslims of those days in these significant words: "The language of our Government schools in Lower Bengal is Hindu, and the masters are Hindus. The higher sort of Musalmans spurned the instructions of idolators through the medium of the language of idolatry."

Gentlemen, my narration of this tale of sorrow has not yet reached its conclusion. During the middle of the nineteenth century still further blows were struck at the Indian Muslims which completed their downfall. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 which kindled the fire of revenge in the hearts of the British against Indians in general and the Muslims in particular had its repercussions in Bengal also. Into that woeful chapter that followed the Mutiny I shall not enter here. Suffice it to say that things came to such a pass towards the end of the nineteenth century that the hearts of even a few justice-loving Britons were moved. Some of them who were eminent writers and historians, felt impelled to draw the attention of the outside world to the plight to which the Muslims had been reduced. But by then the victim was at his last gasp and the very people who had made India so great and so glorious had been forcibly reduced to the position of helots in their own land.

So much for the historical past. Coming to more recent times, we find that even after the British policy in India had undergone a reorientation there was considerable unwillingness to concede the Muslims their rights in full, much less to make atonement for the past. Great injustice was done in the matter of allocating seats to Muslims in the Councils under the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution.⁹ The subsequent Communal Award has to some extent made up for that injustice, but we are still the victims of a grave wrong because although the Muslim population in Bengal is about fifty-six per cent of the whole, yet not more than forty-eight per cent of the seats in the Legislative

Assembly have been allotted to our community. The result has been that the Muslims cannot run the administration of a Province in which they are in an unquestioned majority without entering into coalition with or depending on the support of other parties. In other Provinces, however, where Congress has secured majorities it can and has formed Ministries of its own without caring to take into account the wishes or the feelings of the Muslim Minorities. Therefore, gentlemen, our first problem is to find some means of getting redress for the wrong done to us by the Communal Award, which has reduced Muslim majorities to minorities. Our second problem is to devise ways and means to bring their folly and their guilt home in Muslims who have been deceived by the high sounding but insincere promises of the Congress or who have betrayed the Muslim cause by deserting the community and joining hands with its avowed opponents in order to serve their own selfish ends. Through the conduct of some of our own men are Muslim ranks being thus disintegrated. If it had been a question of fighting the Congress and the Mahasabha only, then surely all their designs and all their tactics would have been of little avail against the united front of Islam, and this humbler servant of yours would have smashed through the network of Congress and Mahasabha viles as easily as one sweeps away fragile gossamer. But the conduct of these dupes of the Congress and these betrayers well-nigh dishearten me, and I sometimes ask myself if a community which can still produce so many foolish or treacherous men is worth striving for, praying for and weeping for. Yet gentlemen, we must not, we cannot and we will not yield to despair. It is of the very essence of the spirit of Islam to persevere the more there are dangers, difficulties and impediments in the way. It is our incumbent duty to bear constantly in mind that in India we hold the integrity and safety of Islam as a sacred trust. We are born unto these traditions inherited from generation to generation, and the sacred duty to protect Islam and uphold its traditions devolves upon us a heritage from our forebears. Shall we be found wanting in the fulfilment of the duties of this glorious trusteeship? Shall we allow our cherished national, cultural and social traditions to be thus resolutely and ruthlessly assailed and yet do nothing to prepare ourselves and marshall all our resources to resist the onslaught and maintain and preserve our national rights and our cultural heritage?

Speaking particularly of Bengal, let me now ask a few questions of those misguided Muslims who are trying to build a house apart from the united house of Islam and who have, through their action, jeopardised the solidarity of Musalmans.

Where is the difference between the published programme of the seceders in Bengal and the programme which the Coalition Party has placed before it and working out with all earnestness and promptitude? What justification, then, had these seceders to break away from the Coalition Party¹⁰ of Bengal? Do they not see that the Congress in its own majority Provinces, has not admitted any other party into coalition with it, and that in any case coalition with it can be only on such terms as amount to the virtual effacement of the Muslims as a separate political entity? Even our Coalition Party, in spite of its numerical strength, has been forced to enter into alliance with certain other groups. The Krishak Proja Party and the Independent Proja Party¹¹ together number not more than 30 in the Bengal Assembly and the Bengal Council. How, then, can they hope to form a Ministry in Bengal without the aid of such parties

as the Congress? And if they attach themselves to the Congress, how can they for a moment hope to achieve anything that will confer any real benefit upon the Muslims and the masses of Bengal?

Gentlemen, I have already taken much of your time, but before I resume my seat I wish to make here and now a revelation to you and to the world at large. The Congress has during recent months again and again made overtures to me offering me the premiership in a Congress Coalition Cabinet in Bengal. If I had responded to those overtures I would have still been the Premier and continued to be perhaps for an indefinitely long period. But such a Premiership would have been no better and no more real than the Kingship of Shah Alam or the Nizamat of Mir Jafar.¹² Had I thus signed with my own hands the death warrant of Islam, with what face would I have stood before my Maker and His Prophet on the day of final reckoning? But let it not be supposed that I am against an honourable agreement with the Congress. I declare that consistent with the Islamic principles of peace and toleration I am prepared to agree to work with the Congress on the following terms. First, the Congress should come to an honourable mutual understanding with the Muslim League, and reshuffle its Ministries in the various Provinces in coalition with the League parties in the respective legislatures. Second, the Congress should come to an honourable agreement with the League in matter of appointments to public services and in matters pertaining to the social and cultural life of the Muslim people. Third, the Congress should mediate in the Shahidganj question between Muslims and Sikhs and bring about a settlement which will be acceptable to both the communities and which will ensure peace and the cessation of the present unrest.

But gentlemen it is useless in the light of past experience for Muslims to expect from the Congress anything like fair and equitable treatment. I shall give you one typical example of the callousness of Congressmen towards Muslim sentiments. The other day when Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was reciting in the U.P. Assembly the tales of oppression on the Muslims in different places and was even giving concrete instances in support of his allegations, what were the Congressmen in the House doing? They were laughing and ridiculing him. Here were indeed not one but many Neros all fiddling to express their unholy glee at the burning of Rome. If a hundredth part of such oppressions had been visited on the Hindus then indeed would the Ganges have been afire from end to end. But, the sufferings of Muslims are to Congress matters for mockery and laughter.

Let us contrast the plight of the Muslims in the Congress Provinces with the conditions of Hindus living in non-Congress Provinces. In this Province for instance, there has neither been communal rioting nor can any one cite a single instance of oppression on the Minority community. In Congress Provinces riot had laid the countryside waste. Muslim life, limb and property have been lost and blood has freely flowed, but here in Bengal not one head has been broken nor one drop of blood has been shed. There the Muslims are leading their lives in constant terror, overawed and oppressed but here the Hindus are leading perfectly happy peaceful lives—a circumstance that delights and gratifies us. There mosques are being defiled and the culprits never found nor is the Muslim worshipper unmolested, but here worship proceeds unhampered in Hindu temples and none dare defile them, because

we resolutely set the law in motion against any evil-doer who would defile or desecrate any community's places of worship. There you will find many instances where Muslim officers have been unjustly treated or deprived of their legitimate rights; here I defy any one to cite a single instance where a Hindu officer has been unfairly treated by us. I assure you that our treatment of the Minorities in our charge is such that the Congress Ministers may well take a leaf out of our book and emulate our example.

The Congress loudly proclaims itself to be the friends of the tenantry. And yet, what has the Congress Ministry done in Bihar for the Kisans as compared with what we have done for the Projas in Bengal? Let me give you a few salient points of contrast. In Bihar "*salami*"¹³ has been retained at eight per cent while in this non-Congress Province of Bengal it has been abolished altogether. In Bihar the right of zamindars to realise rent through certificates still obtains, but here it has been done away with. Here in Bengal we have also stopped enhancement of rent for a period of ten years but in Bihar no such relief has been given to the poor tenants. That is the picture in Bihar and this is the picture in Bengal. And yet Congressmen call themselves better friends of the masses than we of the Bengal Coalition and the Muslim League.

Gentlemen, I wish I could conclude, for already I have taxed your patience enough. But before I sit down, I must frankly and freely express my conviction that we the Muslims of India must stand on our own legs and fight our battles alone. Let us once and for all abandon all hope of protection through the so-called safeguards in the Constitution. We must shape our own destiny unaided by any outside authority and in spite of our political opponents. British authority in India has indeed ceased to function and the sceptre is slipping fast from British hands. True that the British still hold sway in Delhi and Simla but that sway increasingly lacks reality and is becoming more and more like that of the successors of Aurangzeb. After all, the British came to India as traders and as traders they are now anxious to remain, they would sooner part with power than with trade. They believe that their commercial interests will be best served through an alliance. Their guarantees to the Minorities and particularly to the Muslims of India have proved to be shallow through and through. The sooner we cease to rely on them the better. We must fight the battle of Islam alone and without our resources. Let us resolve to fight it to the bitter end, relying on the justice of our cause and undaunted by the gathering forces against us. Let us prepare to fight, if need be, on a double front and with our backs to the wall. If Panipat and Thaneswar must repeat themselves, let the Muslims prepare to give as glorious an account of themselves as did their forebears.

Gentlemen, I apologise for the length of this speech but I have done no more than to give you a recital of bare facts which I challenge any one to contradict. I am deeply grateful to you for the patient hearing you have given me and I once more make you welcome to Bengal to deliberate upon the momentous issues that are before our community today. May the all-merciful God guide these deliberations on the right lines and may your decision bring nearer the day of deliverance in India.

1. Sir Syed Muhammad Saadullah (1885-1955); Member, Assam Legislative Council, 1913-20 and 1923; Minister for Education and Agriculture, Assam, 1924-29; Member, Executive Council

- Assam Government for Law and Orders & PWD, 1929-30 and for Finance, Law and Order, 1930-34; Member, Assam Legislative Assembly, 1937; Prime Minister, Coalition Ministry, Assam 1937-38; again Muslim League Prime Minister, 1939-42; Muslim League Member, Assam Legislative Council, 1946, Leader of Muslim League Party in the Assembly; attended the Muslim League Legislative Convention Delhi, April 1946.
2. Begum Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz (1896-1979); first woman member, All India Muslim League, Member, Indian Round Table, 1930-32; Member, Legislative Assembly, Punjab, 1937 and Parliamentary Secretary till 1943; Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly.
 3. Syed Muhammad Mehdi, Raja of Pirpur (1896-1947); Taluqdar of Pirpur; Member U.P. Legislative Council, 1930; attended Round Table Conference, 1931; Member U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1937; Honorary Secretary, British Indian Association of the Taluqdars of Awadh; author of '*Pirpur Report*' 15 November, 1938.
 4. Nawab of Mamdot, Sir Shah Nawaz (1883-1942); joined police service of Hyderabad; succeeded to the estate and title, 1931; President, Punjab Provincial Muslim League; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1935-42; President, Pakistan Conference, Lucknow, 1941.
 5. Sir Sayyid Sultan Ahmed (1880-1963); delegate to Round Table Conference, 1930-31; Acting Member, Governor's Executive Council, Bihar and Orissa, 1932 and 1937; delegate to the League of Nations, 1938; Law Member, 1941-43; Adviser to the Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, 1945-47.
 6. Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894-1964); Member, Bengal Executive Council, 1934; Home Minister; Government of Bengal, 1937-41; Leader, Muslim League Parliamentary Party, Bengal and Leader of Opposition in Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1942-43; Premier, Bengal, 1943-45; represented India at League of Nations, Geneva, 1945; Deputy Leader, Muslim League Parliamentary Party in Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946; Member, AIML Working Committee, 1947; Prime Minister, East Pakistan, 1947; Governor-General, Pakistan, 1951; Prime Minister, Pakistan, 1951-53.
 7. Maulvi Abdul Matin Choudhury (1895-1949); joined Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement and imprisoned, 1921; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926-37; Secretary, AIML, Central Parliamentary Board, 1936-37; Member, Assam Legislative Assembly, 1937; Minister, Government of Assam, 1938-39; General Secretary, Assam Provincial Muslim League, 1940 and Assam United Party in Assam Legislative Assembly; re-elected 1946; Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947-48.
 8. Shah Alam (1759-1806); king of Delhi; granted the East India Company the Sanad of the Diwani of Bengal in 1765.
 9. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, embodied in the Government of India Act, 1919, were a continuum of the historic declaration of 20 August, 1917, envisaging 'the progressive realisation of responsible Government.' The Central Legislature was reconstituted and made bicameral. The franchise was restricted but the principle of direct election was recognised. The Governor-General still remained responsible to the Parliament and was empowered with the power of "certification." The Provincial Legislatures were enlarged and were to be unicameral. Separate electorates were maintained for Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, Sikhs and Christians, as also for non-Brahmins in Madras. The outstanding new device was dyarchy, demarcating control of administration into "transferred" and "reserved" subjects. The reforms demonstrated half-way house British approach between responsive autocracy and responsible Government. The Muslims were not completely satisfied but they did not reject the Constitution as Congress did. The Swarajists advocated 'responsive cooperation' but, if they entered the Councils, "it was only with the object of trying to put the machinery out of gear."
 10. Following the refusal of Congress to form an alliance with the Krishak Proja Party, A.K. Fazlul Huq established the Proja-League Coalition Ministry in April, 1937, with the support of a conglomeration of divergent parties, groups and individuals labelled as the Coalition Party.
 11. The Independent Proja Party, formed on 15 March, 1938, was a breakaway faction of the Coalition Party.

12. Mir Jafar was made the Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa after the defeat of Nawab Siraj-ud-daula in 1757 but deposed in 1760.
13. A fee levied annually on the holders of rent-free tenures as a quit-rent.

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Jinnah's Presidential Address [Extract]

Nation's Voice, pp. 241-46

17 April, 1938, Calcutta. Numerous representations and complaints have reached the central office of hardship, ill-treatment and injustice that is meted out to Musalmans in the various [Congress] Government Provinces, and particularly to those who were workers and members of the All India Muslim League, and, therefore, the Council were obliged to appoint a special committee, under the Chairmanship of Raja Sahib Mahomad Mehdi Sahib, to make all necessary inquiries and to take such steps as may be considered proper and to submit their report to the Council and the President.

Although some of the pronouncements of the President and other leaders of the Congress at Haripura created an impression of a really genuine desire for the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question and in pursuance of that Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru have written to me and I have replied to those letter and the correspondence is going on, yet there is no slackening on the part of the Congress in the determination of their set purpose to annihilate every other party and particularly the All India Muslim League.

The Congress attitude so far as can be summed up is first that the Communal Award must go lock, stock and barrel; secondly that there must be no separate electorates, and thirdly that there must be no differential franchise and if possible there should be no reservation of seats for any community.

The result of this will be obvious, viz. that Musalmans will be wiped out from securing any adequate representation either in the legislatures or in the municipal, local and district boards, as it happened in Bihar recently since the Government have removed even the existence of commutative voting which existed before they assumed office.

The Congress resolutions about fundamental rights and declarations with regard to religion, culture and language are nothing but paper resolutions. There is not the slightest doubt that most aggressive attitude was taken up by the Congress Government on the threshold of their assuming office and they endeavoured to impose the "*Bande Mataram*" song in the Legislatures and after much bitterness and opposition it has been dropped. They are pursuing a policy of making Hindi a compulsory language, which must necessarily, if not completely, destroy, at any rate vitally undermine the spread of the development of Urdu, and what is worse still is that Hindu with its Hindu Sanskritous literature and philosophy and ideals will and must necessarily be forced upon the Muslim children and students.

In various parts of India, serious difficulties are put in the way of Muslims enjoying

liberty of observing their religious rights freely. It is one thing to make every high sounding declaration such as the Congress are in the habit of making and the Working Committee repeating them, but it is another thing how to translate them into action, and so far the Congress are preaching one thing and practising just the contrary.

The President of the Congress Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose having quoted these paper resolutions about so called protection of religion, culture and language proceeded to state:

"The time is opportune for renewing our efforts for the final solution of the problem. I believe I am voicing the feeling of all Congressmen when I say that we are eager to do our very best to arrive at an agreed solution consistent with the fundamental principles of nationalism."

Here I wish he was speaking on behalf of all the Congressmen as he believed he was. It is no use masquerading under the name of nationalism. Congress is a Hindu body mainly. It is begging the whole question to say that we are eager to do our best to arrive at an agreed solution and qualify it by saying consistently with the fundamental principles of nationalism. Muslims have made it clear more than once that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there is another question equally of life and death for them and that their future destiny and fate are dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the national life, the Government and the administration of the country.

They will fight for it till the last ditch and all the dreams and notions of the Hindu Raj must be abandoned. They will not be submerged or dominated and they will not surrender so long as there is life in them.

The Muslim League claims the status of complete equality with the Congress or any other organisations and we have our problem to solve. We have under the present conditions to organise our people for building up Muslim masses for a better world and for their immediate uplift, social and economic, and we have to formulate plans of constructive and ameliorative character which would give them immediate relief from the poverty and wretchedness from which they are suffering more than and other sections of the people in India.

I welcome a policy of live and let live. I welcome an understanding in matters economic and political. But we cannot surrender, submerge or submit to the dictates or the ukase of the High Command of the Congress which is developing into a totalitarian and authoritative caucus functioning under the name of the Working Committee and aspiring to the position of a shadow cabinet of a future Republic.

The Muslim League is not only carrying on a struggle for the Muslims but it maintains that all other important Minorities must have the same sense of security and a place in the sun of India where they will enjoy the rights and privileges a free citizens and not be ground down by caste tyranny and caste rule.

In my opinion the Congress is making one of the greatest blunders by pursuing its present policy. The High Command of the Congress has no policy except opportunism and arrogance and are utilising their organisation, because it happens to be the largest and most powerful to treat every other party with contempt and they imagine that they have already become the rulers of India. It is astounding that they believe that they have conquered six Provinces absolutely and in the seventh they

have a dominant voice as the majority in the coalition of the North-West Frontier Province are Congressmen and they talk of drum beating and they believe that it won't be very long before the remaining four Provinces will fall before the conquering heroes of the High Command of the Congress.

But to the Musalmans I say that they must realise that there cannot be honourable settlement between two parties when one claims to be superior to the other and has for its aim and object the dominations and dictation of the other. Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other there is no solid ground for any settlement.

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S. Sardar Singh to Gandhiji [Extract]

Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. II

LAHORE, 21 April, 1938

My dear and respected Mahatmaji,

3. Notwithstanding that we do not hear of many serious Hindu-Muslim riots these days, the vocal section of the Muslim Community was never before so bitter against the Congress as is the case today. I do not think you know at first hand or so well what is written these days in the Muslim Press against the Congress or what is being spoken against it from Muslim platforms. You might have received reliable reports about it, but it is doubtful if these reports could convey the same strong and sad impression on your mind as the actual writings and speeches would do when read or listened first-hand. Events and accidents generally do not disturb me; but what I have read in Muslim papers, and heard from Muslim platforms during the last six months has greatly disturbed my patience; sometimes it has taken me many a day and night to bring round my mind to its usual calm.

4. Muslim leaders may be blamed for their short-sighted policy in not cooperating with the Congress in the attainment of *Swaraj*; but I regard Congress leadership equally responsible for the present tension.

5. Congress move to win over the Muslim masses may perhaps in the long run be the only solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, but for the time being not only it has failed; it has created reactions which may prove disastrous. Politically-minded Muslims were never before so united in their antagonism towards the Congress as is the case today. The Congress efforts to come in touch with Muslim masses have won us a good many friends, but it has created many more active and bitter enemies; even those who were formerly apathetic or sympathetic have now become actively hostile.

6. But our greatest mistake has been the careless, if not the supercilious, manner with which Congress Ministries have dealt with the Muslim League representatives in some of the legislatures. It is a good principle that when responsibility of the Ministers

is joint, the ministry should consist of a compact body of workers feeling and acting like one party. But is it not a negation of representative Government when as in Bombay or U.P., Congress could not in the first instance, win even a single seat, it should when forming Ministries, ignore the Muslim League, altogether? We have now Muslim Ministers in these Provinces but how many Muslim papers in the Legislatures support such Ministers? When we have accepted separate electorates, how can we ignore the Muslim League demand to be represented in the Ministries, specially when Congress has not been able to win any respectable number of Muslim seats on its own ticket?

7. I was told by Maulana Azad that unless Muslim League representatives could agree to work the Congress programme in the Assemblies how could they be taken up in the Congress Ministries without injury to the principle of joint responsibility? Their submission was that it would not be difficult for the Congress to find men amongst Muslim League representatives in the Assemblies who would work practically whole-heartedly with the Congress without asking them to formally subscribe to the Congress programme. But seeing the evil which has resulted from antagonising the Muslim League, I would even suggest that we should not hesitate to win over the Muslim League with this concession even at the risk of some danger to the principle of joint responsibility. Coalition Governments are only second best Governments, but there is nothing extraordinary in the political world sometimes to rest contented with something that is second best. If under the present circumstances, we have to rest contented with less compact cabinet than we can have by having only such Muslims included in Congress Ministries as formally accept the Congress programme, it may be unfortunate, but is certainly not so disastrous as is the case otherwise.

8. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the Punjab Ministry. The Muslim majority in the Punjab is working from the point of view of communal peace, more tactfully and more successfully than our Congress Ministers. They have with them cooperating almost whole-heartedly with the Hindu Sabha party and the Sikh Nationalist party; they have completely won over, by their tact, the Hindu and Sikh communalists. There is communal trouble in the Punjab but reasons for that trouble are to be sought elsewhere. Muslim Ministers are not much responsible for it.

9. Another cause of the growing Muslim bitterness against the Congress is the effort of Congressmen in Bengal, Sindh and Assam to create or to take advantage of dissensions amongst the Muslim majorities in those Provinces. If the alliances were to be sought after amongst political parties on political grounds it would not be objectionable, but when efforts are made to exploit personal jealousies and ordinary human weaknesses of the members of the majority parties, communal bitterness is bound to be the result. I do not know if it has been brought to your notice or not that much of good work, that was done during the past few months by Congress workers amongst the Muslim masses in Sindh, is in danger of being destroyed by a counter Muslim League Movement in Sindh consequent upon the overthrow of the Hidayat Ullah¹ Ministry there.

10. In short, aggressiveness of the Congress Muslim mass contact movement has resulted in more active Muslim bitterness towards the Congress than any gain we might have secured by the accession of numerical strength. Exclusion of Muslim League

representatives from Congress Ministries or insistence of their inclusion only on the basis of their formally accepting the Congress programme, even when the Congress had practically no Muslim support in the Legislatures, has not only accentuated communal differences, but has made Muslim intelligentsia actively hostile. Efforts to exploit Muslim weakness in Provinces where Muslims are in a majority, has further made a bad situation still worse.

11. Responsibility for this deterioration in Muslim-Congress relations is directly due to the present policy of the Congress. I do not suggest that Congress leaders have deliberately chosen this path, and had any desire to injure the Muslim interests, but it would be difficult to deny that in pursuing the present policy sufficient tact and far-sightedness have not been displayed. If the Congress does not soon retrieve its steps and modify its present policy, growing communal tension in the country is bound to result in a more acute and permanent cleavage between the two major communities. It may result in the utter destruction of much of the good work done under your inspiration by the Congress during the last twenty years.

Yours very sincerely,
S. SARDAR SINGH

P.S. 2. The letter was written just before the Muslim League Session at Calcutta. The proceedings of the League meeting have confirmed me in the views expressed above.

(Sd/-) SSS

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1. Hidayat Ullah, Sir Shaikh Ghulam Hussain (1879-1948); Member, Bombay Governor's Executive Council, 1928-1934 and later its Vice-President; delegate to the Round Table Conference, London, 1930-31; nominated Member, Council of State, 1934; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935; joined Jinnah's Independent Party; Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937; first Premier of Sind, 1937-1938; resigned from Muslim League; Home Minister, Sind, 1941-1942, later its Premier on the fall of Mir Bundehali Khan's Muslim League Ministry; rejoined Muslim League and Muslim League Premier Sind, 1942-47; attended Simla Conference, 1945; attended the League Legislator's Convention, Delhi, 1946; Governor, Sind, Pakistan, 1947-48.

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Jayakar to Ganapat Rai [Extract]

Jayakar Papers

22 April, 1938

My Dear Mr. Ganapat Rai,

The reason for writing now is that you must have read in the Press Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi are meeting for the purpose of settling the Hindu-Muslim question. Consistently with the attitude which your Sabha has taken, it will be necessary and

advisable for the Sabha to call immediately a special session with the double object of providing against any one-sided compromise between the Congress and the Muslim League and also to insist upon your Sabha representatives being invited to take part in the negotiations. It will be unwise to let your case go by default.

The political situation clearly discloses that Mr. Jinnah will have the whip hand in these negotiations with Mr. Gandhi and it is difficult to foretell what compromise Mr. Jinnah may be able to force upon the Congress. All the greater reason why you should call without any delay a special conference of the Sabha and make your demands clearly known to the country in the light of which the merits of the proposed compromise may be judged. Please consult your co-workers including Bhaiji and take the necessary steps in this matter. You have sat idle too long and there is no intensive propaganda on your behalf so far as one can see. You must alter this attitude and place prominently before the country your views in this matter. This can be best done through the medium of a conference and its resolutions. You need not make the conference a very big one. It will suffice if it is fairly representative.

Hoping you are doing well. With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
JAYAKAR

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Lothian's Statement

The Sunday Observer, 24 April, 1938; The Congress Government II, p. 38

The Muslim League has also recently declared that India's goal is "Independence." But the Muslims can never forget that, whatever the non-communal professions and the real desires of enlightened Congressmen may be, the vast majority of Congress members are Hindus, who look forward, after many centuries of British and Muslim rule, to the re-establishment of *Hindu Raj*.

Fear as to their future as a Minority and the fact that Congress is making a vigorous drive to capture the Muslim youth for its creed of Indian nationalism and the Muslim villagers by its agrarian programme, have consolidated the great majority of Muslims into a revived party—the Muslim League led by Mr. Jinnah. In essence the position of the Muslims in India is not unlike that of Ulster¹ in Ireland. Differences in religion is the real basis of their organisation as a political Minority, and unless all European experience is falsified, it will be long before the communal factor disappears from the Indian scene. The only Muslim objection to Federation is that it will, despite all safeguards, consolidate a permanent Hindu majority in Delhi.

1. The analogy is related to the violent sectarian conflicts between the Protestant Ulster State in the North and the Catholic region in the South of Ireland.

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*Lothian's Observations**The Asiatic Review, April, 1938; Congress Government II, p. 37*

The second great political party in British India is the Muslim League. This organization is the only other All India Party. The Sikhs only operate in the Punjab, and the other minorities represented in the Legislatures can wield little real political power. The Muslims, I found, were profoundly disturbed from one end of India to the other. Though under the new Constitution they were given in effect control of four Provinces and had separate electorates and had weightage in the other Provinces, the advent of Congress to power in most of British India made them feel for the first time what it was to be a Minority in Provinces in which political responsibility had passed out of the hands of Great Britain into that of the Hindu majority. They had become acutely aware of the rising tide of Hindu rule, and that produced a consolidation of political opinion and the political organization in India. There used to be two main Muslim parties. They are now united in the Muslim League under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah.

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*George Cunningham to Linlithgow**Linlithgow Papers, No. 24, pp. 53b-53d*

PESHAWAR, 26 April, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. No. G.H-115

Dear Laithwaite,

1. I send, herewith, for His Excellency's information, a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 23rd April 1938, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the first half of April 1938.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL.

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report No. 8, dated 23rd April 1938. [Extract]

5. The Muslim League leaders who attended the recent session at Calcutta¹ have returned. They are pleased at Mr. Jinnah giving precedence to the resolution condemning the anti-Muslim activities of

the Congress Ministry in this Province. Mr. Jinnah promised to send Shaukat Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad to tour in this Province next month and also to assist financially if possible, as he realises that, without help, the Muslim Party here cannot compete with the heavy subsidies received by the Provincial Congress Party from their headquarter funds. Our Muslim League protagonists were much encouraged by the enthusiasm aroused by the session and the strong line taken by the Premier of Bengal. They formed the opinion that the Congress Party is losing ground in Bengal, despite Mr. Gandhi's efforts, and that the Ministry will not agree to any release of political prisoners on a wide scale. Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander Hayat granted personal interviews to our leading representatives. The impression gained is that there is little likelihood of the forthcoming conversations between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah at Bombay resulting in any rapprochement over the communal questions. I have been told that one of the conditions which Mr. Jinnah proposes to insist on is that the Congress shall not put up any Muslim candidates for election in a Province where there is a Muslim majority. Sir Sikander Hayat expressed considerable concern over the visits of Abdul Ghaffar Khan to the Punjab. He was advised against exercising any official pressure on Abdul Ghaffar Khan as such action would tend to enhance his importance unduly.

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1. The reference is to the special session of the Muslim League held at Calcutta on 17 April 1938.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers Roll, No. 5, pp. 294-303

VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRADUN, 27 April, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

13. I asked Sapru to come to spend the night at Delhi just before I left, primarily to discuss certain matters in connection with the Boy Scout position. I took the opportunity to talk general politics to him and found him very interesting. There have, as you know, been serious communal riots in Allahabad, and his criticism of the United Provinces Government and their handling of the situation was very severe. He had not, he told me, hesitated to tell Dr. Katju,¹ who was an old friend and came to see him when the riot was still proceeding, that he, Sapru, was an ordinary tax payer who paid his rent and his land revenue; but that it was no thanks to the Government that he, his children, and his grandchildren, had not already been slaughtered. He emphasised the increase in communal tension which had resulted (and was likely to become still more marked) from the political competition between the Congress with their programme of mass contacts, and their claim to speak on behalf of India as a whole; and the Muslim League, with its improving organisation and its determination not to be ousted by a predominantly Hindu body; and he underlined that it was in his judgement no longer so much a religious question—in his own words “cow or pig”—as essentially a political fight, in which Congress had behaved with no small lack of foresight.

He went on to complain bitterly of the tendency on the part of the United Provinces Government and of Congress generally to undermine the prestige of the Magistracy and of the High Court by their remissions of sentences and the like. His general attitude was definitely pessimistic, and he clearly looks forward to a deterioration of the machine of Government and the prestige of Government so marked that things could not go on the present basis. He recognised that it was a mistake to reach premature conclusions in this matter; that we must have patience with these new and Autonomous Governments; and that a year (indeed less than a year) represented a very short period in which they could buy their experience and make their mistakes. But for all that, his outlook was definitely gloomy to a degree and he made no bones about stating that he was ready to postpone any further instalment of Reforms for an unspecified period so long as administration could be carried on and the security of life and property guaranteed! *Experientia docet!*

14. The communal situation generally (or perhaps I ought rather to say the Hindu-Muslim situation) continues indeed clearly to be somewhat tense. You may have seen reports in the English Press of the speeches made by Jinnah and Fazlul Haq at the Muslim League meetings in Calcutta, which, particularly in Fazlul Haq's case, were very outspoken in character (I may add that he proceeded to animadvert somewhat unsympathetically on my having invited Gandhi to come and see me, and commented adversely on my having expressed my satisfaction "that in seven Provinces the Congress Ministries were functioning." There is no foundation whatever that I can trace for the suggestion that I have said anything of the sort, and I have asked Brabourne to draw his attention to this; for it is intolerable, even if the Viceroy's name is to be drawn into this type of controversy at all, to which I myself see the strongest objection, that allegations should be made entirely devoid of foundation and calculated to give rise to a misleading impression in the country in statements made by the Chief Minister of a Province. I have no doubt that the two sides are manoeuvring for position; and that that is largely the explanation of Jinnah's uncompromising attitude as regards Muslim demands (the copy which I enclose of the letter I have received this morning from Craik about Sikander's impressions of what took place in Calcutta is of interest in this connection) Hindu opinion, on the other hand, is equally considerably worked up; and I was interested both in the observations as to the strength of Hindu religious feeling, contained in Haig's personal letter of 23rd April, No. U.P. 72 which has been repeated to you direct by him, and by the remarks in Bomford's² report, of which I enclose a copy,³ on the recent Jubbulpore riots, about the immense and unprecedented scale of the Holi processions in Jubbulpore. In Bombay, as you will have seen, there has been serious communal rioting, arising out of some quite petty incident, and the situation in Allahabad is still very far from easy. Gandhi and Jinnah are having a meeting at Bombay on 29th April, and it will be interesting to see what if anything, emerges from it, though given Jinnah's 21 points on the one side and the depth of feeling on the other, I would not myself judge that there is much chance of any positive result, or even if an apparently positive result is achieved, of its permanence.

Enclosure 1

From H.E. Sir Henry Craik, Bart., K.C.S.I., Governor of the Punjab.
Govt. House, Lahore, 25 April, 1938.

SECRET

D.O. No. 65

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I had a long talk this morning with Sikander about the Muslim League meeting in Calcutta, and he gave me some information which may be of interest to Your Excellency.

The opening (public) session of the League was held on the evening Sikander and his party arrived in Calcutta. The tone of Fazl-ul-Haq's address of welcome to Jinnah (which was printed in Urdu and also recorded for radio purposes) was, in Sikander's view, completely irresponsible. Sikander himself listened to it with increasing embarrassment and so, I gather did the Bengal Home Minister, Sir Nazim-ud-Din. Indeed, the latter expressed the opinion to Sikander afterwards that the speech offended against about six Sections of the Indian Penal Code! This was not the speech which contained certain very impertinent references to Your Excellency as regards the praise you had bestowed on Congress Governments and your invitation to Gandhi. These references were contained in a later speech by Fazl-ul-Haq delivered after Sikander had left Calcutta.

At the opening session Jinnah's speech was also calculated to keep the communal temperature at a high level. Sikander thought the speech a bad one and I rather infer from something he said that he had remonstrated afterwards with Jinnah, but Jinnah explained that he had deliberately adopted this tone, as he thought it might secure him some tactical advantage in his approaching conversations with Gandhi. Incidentally I may mention that Sikander has very little hope that anything will come of these conversations.

The heat generated at the open session was in Sikander's opinion, calculated to produce a very unfavourable atmosphere for the Shahidganj discussion, which took place in the Subjects Committee next morning. The Subject Committee's discussion was, of course, not open to the public or reported in the Press. As Sikander had anticipated, the discussion started with feeling generally hostile to any settlement of the Shahidganj dispute except by "direct action." There were between 250 and 300 delegates present and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, the leader of the Ittihad-i-Millat, and Barkat Ali, the author of the notorious Bill, spoke in a sense strongly hostile to Sikander. Other speakers in this sense were one Lal Din Kaiser, a third rate agitator from the Punjab, a Maulvi from Bihar whose name Sikander did not remember, and another whom he described as "some other non-descript." Sikander's position during this session must at first have been very unhappy, as before the discussion began some of the Bengal delegates had suggested some kind of a compromise resolution, which Sikander considered most unsatisfactory from his point of view, and even Jinnah was in two minds whether it would be possible to pass any resolution that would leave the settlement of the matter in the hands of the Punjab Ministry. However, after these three or four hostile speeches, Sikander himself spoke at great length and apparently with such success that in the end Zafar Ali, who was the protagonist of direct action, only secured four votes and the resolution that was eventually adopted and passed next day in the open session of the League without any dissent was, from Sikander's point of view, highly satisfactory. I gather the general line which Sikander took in his speech in the Subjects Committee was to make it plain that no "half way house" measure was possible and that only two courses were open to the League—(a) direct action, which must lead to an aggravation of bitterness between the two communities and eventually to bloodshed, or (b) to express confidence in the line taken by the Provincial Government and to encourage them in their efforts to bring about an amicable settlement. Sikander was particularly pleased that his speech commanded general support, especially from the North-West Frontier Province delegates and from those representing the United Provinces, the leader of the latter being Khaliquzzaman, who eventually moved in the open session the adoption of the resolution approved by the subjects Committee.

I think it is probable that the so-called civil disobedience on the part of the Ahrars and followers of the Ittihad-i-Millat will now stop. An Ahrar deputation has gone to see their leader, one Mazhar Ali,

who is now in the Shahpur Jail. No arrests were necessary either on Friday or Saturday last.

Sikander told me he had a very good reception at Lyallpur yesterday from the local Sikhs of the Khalsa National Party, who presented an address to him, in which he was described as the "first ruler of the Punjab since Maharaja Ranjit Singh⁴ who enjoyed the confidence of the Sikhs and Muslims alike!" I told Sikander that I hope this would be published and he said it surely would be. One Gyani Sher Singh, a leader of one section of the Akali Party but not friendly to Tara Singh,⁵ made a speech in somewhat similar terms, and the general atmosphere was extremely friendly. Sikander replied to the address in Punjabi, which pleased the Sikhs, and the speech was punctuated with cheers and shouts of "Sat Sri Akal."

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1. Kailash Nath Katju (1887-1968); Member, U.P. Provincial Congress Committee, 1935-37; Minister for Justice, Industries and Development, U.P., 1937-39; became the Governor of Orissa and then of West Bengal; became Central Minister for Home and Defence; was also Chief Minister, Madhya Pradesh.
 2. H. Bomford, Acting Governor of C.P. and Berar, 3 March-27 May, 1938.
 3. Not available.
 4. Ranjit Singh Maharaja (1780-1839), Founder of Sikh Kingdom of Punjab.
 5. Master Tara Singh (1885-1967); leader of Sikh Akali Dal; opposed inclusion of Punjab in Pakistan; after independence led the movement for the creation of a Punjabi speaking State in East Punjab.

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Jinnah's Discussion Notes

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 40/10-12

28 April, 1938

(1) Communal award to stand till substitute is agreed upon. (2) There should be a pact between the Congress and Muslim League which will include a solution of all the questions outstanding. (3) There should be a formal meeting between Abul Kalam Azad—myself and Mr. Jawahar. This I was not prepared even to consider and the matter was dropped. That Muslim members of the Congress shall not be considered to represent the Muslims—but there should be no bar to their becoming members if any one so desires. That Mr. Subhas Bose and I should formally meet and that he would come down to Bombay, and see me as soon as possible for a formal talk. That thereafter to set up a machinery consisting of the representatives of the Congress and Muslim League who should meet to hammer out the solution of all outstanding questions and ways and means of cooperation—between the two—That Mr. Gandhi and I should be present at the meeting of the representatives of the Congress and League and assist them in arriving at settlements.



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*Ziaud Din Ahmad¹ to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1090/39-40*

ALIGARH, 7 May, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am sending you a copy of the Rules and the list of the members who have joined the Muslim League Party. Mr. Nauman² and some other members are likely to join. If we could get 20 members in our party, we will always be able to influence effectively the voting in the Assembly.

The Congress Government is now playing about Educational system in this country. The so-called Wardha Scheme is very fantastic and I am writing articles on this scheme. The United Provinces Government have issued a communique which will seriously affect the Muslim education in these Provinces. This communique will set back the progress that we have made during the last quarter of a century. It seems very desirable that educational questions should receive serious attention. I suggest for your consideration that you may appoint a sub-committee which will work under the Council of the Muslim League whose duty will be to look after the educational interests of the Musalmans. We have at present the All India Muslim Educational Conference, but it has no sanction behind it and its resolutions are not considered seriously by the Government. It will also be desirable to organise similar committees in each province which will work under the Provincial Muslim League. The question of education is a very important one and I apprehend that Muslim education will be seriously effected. European education has already been safeguarded by the Government of India Act and the Congress will look after the interest of the depressed classes under the apprehension that they will join the Musalmans if their interests are not properly safeguarded. The Musalmans are thus isolated and we cannot remain idle spectators at present.

Yours sincerely,
ZIAUD DIN AHMAD

M.A. JINNAH, Esq., Bar-at-Law, M.L.A.,
Little Gibbs Road,
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

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1. Sir Ziaud Din Ahmad (1878-1947); Principal, MAO College, Aligarh; First Pro-Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University, 1920-28 and Vice Chancellor, 1935-47; Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1924-26; Member Central Legislative Assembly, 1931-35 and 1946; Member Committee to chalk out Five-Year Plan for the educational, economic, social and political advancement of Muslim 28th Session, Madras, April, 1941.
 2. Muhammad Nauman; Member, All India Muslim League Council and Member of Legislative Assembly.

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Jinnah's Statement

Civil and Military Gazette, 10 May, 1938; Nation's Voice, p. 255

Bombay, 9 May, 1938. "Like a poor man who has come by a lot of money in a lottery, the Congress is intoxicated with power," told Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, addressing a large meeting at Mahim, Bombay, last night (8 May).

Because of the Congress majority in the various Provinces, he continued, they were forcing upon the Muslims things like the singing of the *Bande Mataram*. Without unity, the Muslims could not do anything to make known to the Government their disapproval of such things. Mr. Jinnah referred to treaties entered into by Nations in Europe and their complete disregard by some nations and said that he was not in favour of pacts between Hindus and Muslims to be treated in the same fashion. He appealed to Muslims to muster [courage] under the auspices of the Muslim League and stand up as one solid unit in order to exercise their right to live in the country as a distinct entity. The Musalmans in India were never behind the others in their readiness to fight for the freedom of their motherland but freedom should not be the monopoly of a few, like the Whites in America to the exclusion of the Red Indians and Negroes. The negotiations for unity between the two communities, he hoped, would fructify so that country as a whole might be benefited. Peace could only be possible among equals.

Turning to critics who referred to him as a pleasure-loving man and a communalist, Mr. Jinnah said "that the very critics would have no compunction in electing him the President of the Indian National Congress if he joined that organisation." Mr. Jinnah deplored the absence of sufficient organisation among Muslims which had resulted in the community having very few educational institutions, hospitals and other amenities. He appealed to Musalmans to join the League and work for the advancement of their community in the educational, economic, social and other spheres. (A.P.)

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Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 204/12

CALCUTTA, 11 May, 1938

Dear Sir Jinnah,

I beg to submit to you a cutting from the *Star of India* dated May 11, 1938. The cow-music question is very important and the Muslims are anxious to see that this

should be settled on the basis of the Unity Conference formula of 1927,¹ which was signed by Mr. Srinivas Ayengar,² the then Congress President.

I will send you the exact text of the formula tomorrow.

Yours-in-Islam,
RAGHIB AHSAN
Secretary

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1. The Unity Conference was held at Calcutta on 25 June, 1927 with Srinivasa Ayengar in the Chair and worked out an agreement between Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Muslims.
 2. S. Srinivasa Ayengar (1874-1941); Advocate General of Madras who resigned in 1920 and joined the Congress; presided over the Gauhati Session of the Congress in 1926; left the Congress in later years due to differences with Mahatma Gandhi.

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Ziaud Din Ahmad to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 203/2

ALIGARH, U.P. 11 May, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I sent you a letter few days ago in which I requested you to appoint a special sub-committee of the Council of the Muslim League to look after the educational affairs. The pronouncement of Mr. Gandhi and the actions taken by the Provincial Governments are very alarming and we should be alert. This educational sub-committee is also important in the United Provinces. The other important question is the fight between Sunnees and Shias and this fight, I understand, is being engineered by the Congress Government. It is now time that the Muslim League should rise to the occasion and make full effort to set the things right. The fighters on the two sides are all Members of the Muslim League and they should show some sacrifice. It is very desirable that the officers of the Muslim League, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman and others should take prominent part in putting down these fights. They will have the unanimous support of the Provincial Council.

Yours sincerely,
ZIAUD DIN AHMAD

M.A. JINNAH, Esq.,
Bar-at-Law, M.L.A.,
Malabar Hill, Bombay.



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*Jinnah's Discussion Notes**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 40/13-18*

BOMBAY, 11 May, 1938

Federation:

Election must be contested while the representatives are returned. The Congress attitude of opposition.

Will the Muslim League also join the opposition, and refuse to form Ministry?

What about the present Muslim Ministers?

What about the Jamiatul Ulama?

What about Ahrar?

What about the Musalmans continuing to be members of the Congress and joining the Congress.

Mass Contact to cease

The Flag: to be resolved

The Hindi or Urdu: both to be made compulsory.

Bande Mataram: not to be sung in mixed gatherings Services

Grants in aid: Muslims share to be defined.

Ministries: Coalition to work inside and outside the Legislatures. Muslim League to be recognised as the only authoritative representative body of Musalmans of India. Congress as representatives of Hindus.

Conclusion: On the whole the matter was generally discussed. No definite point was taken up.

8.30 to 2 p.m. Thursday, 12th May. The points were taken up 1st the question—That Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans is willing to enter into a Pact with the Congress as authoritative and representative organisation of the solid body of Hindu opinion.

Mr. Bose was not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative organisation of the Musalmans of India. At any rate nothing should be said about it. After long discussion Mr. Bose said he would consult his colleagues and let me know.

Saturday: 14th May. Mr. Bose brought me in writing the difficulties and viewpoints of the Congress as to the status of the Muslim League but there was no alternative suggested except his reasons for the formula on the (points) suggested by me. He was requested to send an alternative proposal and not merely stating reasons and grounds against the proposal:

He promised to consult his colleagues and the Working Committee and send me his formula as an alternative for consideration—He also was to convey to Mr. Gandhi that before they formally decide, I should like to see him.

15th May:

Next day, 15th May I received his letter of regret.

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Note handed over by Bose to Jinnah

Congress Leaders Correspondence, pp. 5-6

14 May, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

In the course of the talks between the Congress President and Mr. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah suggested that any agreement that might be arrived at should be based on a clear understanding of the position of the Congress and of the Muslim League. He proposed that the conversation should proceed on the following lines:

The All India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Indian Muslims and the Congress as the authoritative and representative organisation of the solid body of Hindu opinion have hereby agreed to the following terms by way of a pact between the two major communities and as a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.

After further consideration a somewhat different wording was suggested by him as follows:

The Congress and the All India Muslim League, as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India, have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact.

This second statement, though shorter, apparently embodies the same idea which is given in the first—that is, that the Congress should represent the Hindus and the Muslim League the Musalmans.

The Congress cannot possibly consider itself and function as if it represented one community only even though that might be the majority community in India. Its doors must inevitably be open to all communities and it must welcome All Indians who agree with its general policy and methods. It cannot accept the position of representing one community and thus itself becoming a communal organisation. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and cooperate with other organisations which represent Minority interests.

It is obvious that the Musalmans of India, though a Minority in the whole country, form a very considerable part of the population and their wishes and desires must be considered in any scheme affecting India. It is also true that the All India Muslim League is an organisation representing a large body of Muslim opinion which must carry weight. It is for this reason that the Congress [is willing] to come to an understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have cooperated with the Congress in the past. Further, in the event of other group or Minority interests being involved, it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests.



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*Bose to Jinnah**Congress Government I, p. 257*

BOMBAY, 15 May, 1938

Last night I gave you a note explaining our position. You asked me what constructive proposals we had to make. I think the note is self-explanatory. Having made known the Congress reaction to your suggestion, according to us, it remains now to proceed to the next stage, namely, appointment of respective committees which will jointly settle the terms of understanding.

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*Jinnah to Bose**Congress Government, I p. 257*

BOMBAY, 16 May, 1938

I acknowledge the receipt of a note you handed over to me on behalf of the Congress on 14th, and also I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15th of May, 1938. The matter will be placed before the Executive Council and the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League at a meeting to be called in the first week of June,¹ and I will communicate to you the decision as soon as possible.

1. See No. 282 *infra*.

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*Henry Duffield Craik¹ to Linlithgow**Linlithgow Papers, No. 45, p. 95*

BARNES COURT, SIMLA, 20 May, 1938

SECRET

D.O. No.71

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I had an opportunity today (the first since the beginning of this month) of having a talk with Sikander and think one part of it may be of some interest to you.

I asked Sikander if he had any information about the Jinnah-Gandhi conversations

and he said he had none at all. The reports that have appeared in the Press about Jinnah consulting Sikander on the telephone are entirely untrue and Sikander does not think that Jinnah has in fact consulted any one so far. He did have some talk with Sikander when they were both at Calcutta in April about his forthcoming conversations with Gandhi, and Jinnah then, I gather, expressed the view that the conversations would lead to no real result. Sikander, speaking to me this morning, told me that his own view was, and still is, identical.

You may have noticed a statement in the Press that Jinnah has called a meeting of the Muslim League Executive at Bombay early in June. Sikander will probably have to attend this meeting. He agreed with me that Jinnah had appointed a very unrepresentative Executive Committee. The Punjab has only two members, Sikander himself and Barkat Ali, M.L.A., the author of the notorious Shahidganj Bill, who is a bitter opponent of Sikander.

Sikander volunteered that his main object in going to the Bombay meeting would be to keep Jinnah straight on what he described as "Defence." In reality what he means is that there must be no agreement on Jinnah's part with any proposal for a reduction in the representation of the Punjab martial classes in the Army. This is a point which Sikander considers of primary importance from the point of view of both Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab, and I gather that he doubts whether Jinnah appreciates how much importance Punjab opinion attaches to this question. Sikander evidently anticipates that the Congress will press for the abolition of the distinction between the martial classes and other classes and for recruitment to the Army being spread more or less evenly over all Provinces. Should I hear anything more of interest about this matter? I will, of course, let Your Excellency know.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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1. Sir Henry Duffield Craik (1876-1955); Chief Secretary, Punjab, 1922-27; Home Member, Governor-General's Executive Council, 1934-38; Governor, Punjab, 1938-41; Political Adviser to the Viceroy, 1941-42.

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Brabourne to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 63, p. 95

20 May, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Linlithgow,

I am writing in reply to your confidential letter, dated May 7th, on the subject of

Federation.¹ I fear that there is really very little information that I can give from this Presidency because it is perfectly clear that my Ministers have, up to now, taken very little interest in the whole matter and that the ideas, in future, will probably be taken from Jinnah. My Mohammadan Ministers take the line that the present scheme of Federation is unacceptable to them because the Mohammadan representation in both Chambers at the Centre is too small. Their line may be summarised rather as follows: "we really have not studied the question in any detail, but if the number of Mohammadan seats at the Centre could be considerably increased we would probably not oppose the scheme, but we cannot really express any opinion on the matter until we hear what view the Muslim League finally take and also what steps Congress really envisage."

I fear that all the above is really quite useless, but I can assure you that it gives a very fair picture of how my Ministers are regarding this subject at present.

Yours ever,
BRABOURNE

1. Not Available.

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Jinnah's Discussion Notes

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 40/20

BOMBAY, 20 May, 1938

2.30 to 3 P.M.: 1. The Congress must recognise the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India;

2. That Muslim mass contact movement, on behalf of the Congress, should cease;

3. The League cannot recognise any other Muslim organisation or individual Musalman as representatives of the Musalmans;

4. *Bande Mataram* should be abandoned in all public institutions;

5. *Bande Mataram* should not be sung in mixed gatherings;

6. Hindi should not be made compulsory;

7. Congress Flag should not be forced on any public institutions;

8. The Muslim members of the Congress should not be considered to represent the Muslims;

9. Stop persecution of the Muslim press and members and workers of the League.

1. *Bande Mataram*

2. Flag

3. Hindi

4. Mass Contact
5. Ill-treatment and persecution and • suppression of Press.
6. Separate electorate to remain where they exist in local bodies and restored where they may be demanded.

That Muslim League should be recognised as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India and the Congress representing the Hindus. That if the settlement formed should be between the Congress and Muslim League.

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R.N. Reid¹ to Linlithgow

V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 2A, D.O. No. 28

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SHILLONG, 23 May, 1938

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is in reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 7th May on the subject of Federation. I find it difficult to arrive at any very clear picture of how opinion is trending in this matter. There is, it seems to me, no widespread interest among the people in general on the question and one is thrown back therefore on an estimate of what views are taken by the leaders of public opinion. Among the Hindus, of course, the dominant point of view is that of Congress, and those of them in Assam naturally conform to the attitude adopted by the High Command in Congress. Those views are well-known and need not be repeated. As regards the Muslims, I take it that the views of Muslims in general will follow those adopted by their leaders. The Muslim members of the Ministry are followers of Jinnah and the Muslim League and all three of them are emphatic in their opposition to Federation as proposed in the Act on the ground that Federation of that type means the swamping of the Muslims by the preponderance of the Hindu element in the States. They would apparently favour a Federation of British India, excluding the States, because they feel that in those conditions they would, though not in a majority, be in so strong a position that they could not suffer any harm. There is little doubt, I think, that here in Assam there are many Muslims who hope, in course of time, to have a definite majority of Muslims in the Province by way of the steady immigration of Mymensingh Muslims into the Assam Valley.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd/-) R.N. REID

His Excellency

The Viceroy and Governor-General of India

1. Sir Robert Neil Reid, Governor of Assam, 1937-42.

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Maulana Ahmad Saeed to Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Ludhianvi [Extract] D-Urdu

Habib-ur-Rehman Ludhianvi Papers

DELHI, 24 May, 1938

4. If we want to take advantage of the Congress Government, then it could be done either by sycophancy or by bullying. The British position is well protected. Whenever, we think of starting any agitation, the Ministries of Pandit Pant and Sir Sikandar intervene. In these circumstances please enlighten me as to what should be done.

7. You have rightly observed that the League indeed is the remedy for the Congress. This is absolutely true. This remedy is analogous to mangoose and a snake. But this is possible only if you don't intervene. You do not allow the physician to undertake treatment, but whenever, the physician wants to undertake the treatment, you and I stand in between. The meeting is not likely to be held in June. But God-willing you will certainly participate and that depends upon God . . . (Quranic Verse).

Yours sincerely,
AHMAD SAEED

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, p. 404

VICEREGAL LODGE, Simla, 24 May, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

18. I do not gather that the Hindu-Muslim unity talks are making any very rapid progress, nor have I at all varied in my own estimate of the improbability of anything, or anything substantial, coming out of them. My earlier impression has been more than confirmed by a letter, the original of which I have seen and of which I enclose copy,¹ received from an entirely reliable source, from Jinnah to a person who he proposes to include in the personnel of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League. It is perfectly clear that the examination of credentials is still at an early stage, for the Congress is reluctant to recognise the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslims, and conversely is not prepared to regard itself as representative of Hinduism only!

1. Not available.

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*Lancelot Graham¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]**V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 2A, p. 225*

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI, 26 May, 1938

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

1. I have, I fear, been slow in answering your letter of May the 7th, and the reason for this is that the question is really not ripe for answer in Sind. I have discussed the prospects of Federation with my Ministers, with my officers, and with a Congressman with whom I have established friendly relations. So far as the general public is concerned, it can safely be said in Sind that Federation is not a live issue. It is not dead but it has never lived. The only Indian State which is within the borders of the Province is one of no significance; and generally speaking, it would be true to say that the people of Sind are exceptionally indifferent to anybody or any country outside Sind. In spite of this insular, or rather exclusive, attitude which prevails among the people generally in Sind, there is a trading class in Sind which carries its goods all over the world and is to be found trading under the flags of all nations. These Sindhi merchants, however, take no interest whatever in politics and all they are about is that the British Empire should be strong enough to afford protection when the foreign countries, in which they have locked up their money, are politically disturbed.

2. I have always understood that Federation as designed in the Government of India Act, 1935, was objectionable to Congress because it provided a block of reactionary voters nominated by the Rulers of Autocratic States. On the other hand, Federation was stated to be objectionable to the Muslims because the bulk of the population in the States is Hindu and by the admission of the States to the Federation the Minority of the Muslims will become more pronounced. None-the-less, even though the opposition of advanced Hindu thought to Federation is based on grounds conflicting with those on which the opposition to Federation among the Muslims of India is based, I understand that the purpose of the latest Hindu-Muslim talks between Gandhi and Subhas Bose on the one hand and Jinnah on the other is to establish a united front against the British on the subject of Federation. You, of course, are far better informed about these matters than I can ever be; but you have asked for my opinion and it may be that some of the information which I am now giving you may be of some use.

3. The position as I envisage it is that Congress realising their power and being under the impression that they have got the British on the run, intend, if they can secure the support of the Muslims, to deliver an ultimatum to the British Government requiring the amendment of the Government of India Act in such a way that Federation shall in the first instance consist of the Provinces of British India and that it shall rest with the Parliament of the Federation so constituted to decide on the subsequent admission of any Indian State to the Federation. The question which I put to my Chief Minister was whether in the event of this demand being made and refused, and the Congress Ministries

being called on to resign and the non-Congress Ministries being called on to follow their example, he would as my Chief Minister be in a position to remain in office and work the Constitution. He naturally found the problem somewhat difficult and said that he could not see himself standing alone and his attitude must depend on what the attitude of the other non-Congress Provinces might be. When I asked him whether he would stand by me if the Punjab Ministry refused to resign on the Federation issue, he replied quite definitely and confidently in the affirmative. The debate on the Federation resolution has not yet come up in the Sind Assembly, but I am told that it is expected to come up on one of the non-official days this session. I have advised my Chief Minister to take up the attitude that Government are not at this stage particularly interested in the Federation issue and that the members of Government will not take part in the debate and that the supporters of Government will speak and vote for themselves.

6. To sum up then, I think it is correct to say that outside the Congress camp there is real no interest taken in the Federation issue in Sind. The thoughtful people, however, realise that Congress are convinced that Federation as designed by the present Constitution provides them with a good stick with which to beat Government, and that further if the Muslims can be brought in to take part in the beating of Government with this particular stick, a great victory can be gained. It cannot be pretended that even in non-Congress circles there is any positive enthusiasm for Federation as proposed to be set up by the Government of India Act, 1935.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) L. GRAHAM

His Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India.

1. Sir Lancelot Graham; Governor of Sind, 1936-41.

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M.A. Baris Proposals

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1122/341-42

29 May, 1938

1. Firstly that no legislatures, law making or rule making body or person, whether Federal, Central, Provincial, Municipal, Local, or otherwise shall have the power to make any laws, affecting, modifying, altering or changing in any manner whatsoever the personal and religious laws of the Muslims, or restricting in any manner any religious usage, custom or worship of the Muslims, and no judicial tribunal, court or authority shall administer the Muslim law except as it is interpreted by the authoritative Islamic jurists.

2. Secondly that no religious ideas, practices, prayers or programmes shall be imposed by the Congress, or the State in the conduct of any public or national proceedings, occasions, meetings or State ceremonies, unless and until such form of prayer has been by a united and combined approval of all communities and parties agreed upon to be acceptable to all.

3. Thirdly that the Muslims shall have the same civic rights and civil liberties decided and agreed upon, no language other than the one that is at present in vogue in the various Provinces, shall be given any preferential encouragement by the State by means of any Legislative measures or by way of State support for its propaganda.

4. That until *lingua franca* for the whole of India is unanimously decided and agreed upon, no language other than the one that is at present in vogue in the various Provinces shall be given any preferential encouragement by the State by means of any legislative measures or by way of State support for its propaganda.

5. That adequate arrangements shall be made to allow the Muslims to receive education in Urdu, their mother tongue, if they so prefer and all schemes of State education shall contain provision for the same.

6. That in all Legislatures, Municipals, and Local bodies, and the services Muslims shall be represented on the basis of the Communal Award and in the selection of Ministers and office-bearers from amongst the Muslims, the candidates set up in the Muslim League shall only be taken as the Muslim representatives and they shall hold such offices as representing Muslim interest.

7. That the Muslim League only shall be recognised by the Congress as the spokes man of the Indian Muslims for the purpose of enforcing the above conditions and for pointing out and getting rectified any breaches thereof, in all programmes of political, economic, social and material progress of their common motherland to attend the freedom for which they are already pledged and shall remain always pledged.

"The Deccan Times,"

(M.A. BARI)

182, Musjid Bunder Road, Bombay 3

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George Cunningham to Linlithgow

V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 2A

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. No. GH-142.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NATHIAGALI, 30 May, 1938

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

1. Will Your Excellency please refer to your letter of May 7th, in which you asked me for an estimate of the local feeling regarding Federation.

2. I have talked to one or two people about it, including Dr. Khan Sahib, and I think it is clear that Congress supporters here, as a whole, take only a minor interest in the question. I am afraid the truth is that we are very parochial, and even the more intelligent of our people hardly appreciate the importance of big movements until they are past. At any rate, I do not think that any opposition of real substance need be anticipated from Congress in this Province; they will, no doubt, follow the All India Congress Committee, if it gives them definite line to go on, but they are not likely to initiate anything serious themselves. I think that Dr. Khan Sahib's own interest in the question is somewhat academic; indeed, he did not seem to me to have thought much about it. He told me that the matter had hardly been discussed in his presence while he was in Bombay, and he said that, so far as he knew, the only point of importance was the question of franchise in the States.

3. Abdul Qaiyum, who represents Congress as the elected Member for the Province in the Central Assembly, says that he thinks Congress will ultimately work Federation. He says that he understood that Gandhi had approached Your Excellency with a view to amend the Act so as to allow the popular election of the State Members of the Federal Assembly; his only other comment was that Congress expected to have more say in Defence matters than is at present contemplated by the Act.

4. Rai Bahadur Mehr Chand Khanna,¹ the Hindu Minister in the late Ministry, who may be said to represent advanced Hindu opinion in this Province (though) he still opposes Congress, supports Federation as provided for in the Act. His principal comment is that Federation would afford safeguards to the Minority communities in the Frontier Province. Mehr Chand is a communalist, and probably follows the Hindu Mahasabha.

5. The Muslim politicians, in which I include a good many of our Khans and those who support the Muslim League, are against Federation, for the obvious reason that the Federal Legislature will be predominantly Hindu. One of the most intelligent of our young Muslims, however, seems to have taken very little real interest in the question, and gave as his reason for opposing Federation the fact that Mr. Jinnah did not think it a good thing! So I do not think that, from the Muslim side, any serious opposition is likely to be shown in this Province.

6. At the last session of our Assembly a resolution was passed in the following form:

"This Assembly recommends to the Government to convey to the British Government the definite opinion of the people of the N.W.F.P. that the proposed Federation is not at all acceptable to them, and that nothing less than a Federation of free India comprised of democratic units with adequate safeguards for all Minorities can satisfy them." The full debate has not yet been printed and I have not read it. I will send Your Excellency a copy as soon as it is ready. I do not think, however, that anyone here took the matter very seriously— whatever may have been the actual tenor of the speeches.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) G. CUNNINGHAM

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

1. Mehr Chand Khanna (1897-1970) : Finance Minister, NWFP; 1946-47; migrated to India after partition; Adviser, Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1948-54; Minister of Rehabilitation, 1954-62; Minister for Works, Housing and Rehabilitation, 1962-64.

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S.M. Amin¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 867/257-61

31 May, 1938

Dear Sir,

1. It is with feelings of great diffidence in my ability that I take the liberty to address a suggestion to you, and my only excuse for this is the thought that you may consider it worthwhile to develop it.

2. The Middle class Muslims and the masses often taunt the Leaguers that the Muslim League has put forward no "Constructive Programme" for the economic amelioration of the Muslims; that the Leaguers are not patriotic in as much as most of the high lights of the League themselves use foreign cloth and other necessaries and that their policies are directed only to bring cheap fame to a few selfish armchair politicians. I respectfully assure you that it is only an extremely small Minority who appreciate the value of what you are doing. The masses join the League procession etc. because they want to make a show against the Congress, but their murmurings as to what the League is doing of practical value are there. The use of Indian-made things, especially cloth, is certainly very glamorous, and if only a little propaganda in the line is done promises to win to the League lakhs of adherents.

3. Another point which has been most forcibly striking my mind is that the Muslim as a Nation must be taught to buy their necessaries from Muslim shop-keepers. This will at once give a fillip to Muslim trade, give more food to the Muslim labour and save the immense wealth daily passing from their hands into the hands of their enemies.

4. The Muslim League, of course, for obvious reasons, cannot openly propagate the economic boycott of the Hindus. But nobody would deny that if there is any weapon which can at once bring the Congress to its knees, it is the economic boycott of the Hindus.

5. A scheme which may at once remove the complaint mentioned in para 1, save some of the immense wealth passing into the hands of the Hindus and also make the Congress feel the power of the League without the League being dubbed as a communal body strikes my mind. In every corner of India there are cloth factories of Hindus but on Bombay side there are, I understand, a few Muslim cloth factories too. The Muslim League should, I think, therewith appoint a trading Body which should take monopoly of the output of these factories and start shops throughout

India on commission basis. This will result in a mushroom growth of Muslim shops, as Muslims of all classes will certainly patronise these shops. More Muslim factories will learn to use Muslim made cloth, made by the Muslim labourers and by Muslim capital. The Muslim League will have good income for its propaganda business and the Hindus won't be in a position to complain that they are being boycotted economically. And above all, the English will be hit, of course, to the extent that this experiment succeeds.

6. Similarly other industries can be brought in the line.

7. This is, I realise, a crude scheme, but I earnestly hope that your fertile genius can make out of it a well planned feasible scheme.

With prayers that God Almighty may spare you for long long years to save your community and country.

Yours faithfully,
S.M. AMIN

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1. S.M. Amin, MLA, Punjab and Member All India Muslim League Council.

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*Secretary, Political and Economic Information Department, A.I.C.C. to Publicity
Officers, Information Department, Seven Congress Provinces*

All India Congress Committee Papers, B 8/1938

1 June, 1938

Dear Sir,

I am enclosing herewith a note on some of the communal speeches delivered by Muslim League leaders and some of their writings which have appeared in the Muslim communal papers from time to time. I hope you will find it useful for purposes of reference and record.

Yours sincerely,
SECRETARY,
Political and Economic Information Department

1. Publicity Officers, Information Deptt., Seven Congress Provinces.
2. Secretaries, Orissa, Bihar, U.P. & N.W.F.P.Cs.
3. Secretaries, Congress Assembly Party, C.P., Bombay and Madras.

Some Notes on the General approach and the propaganda methods of the All India Muslim League with special reference to inter-communal relations.

In dealing with this subject it is important to bear in mind that even when leaders of the Muslim League do not carry out a distinctly communal and provocative line of

propaganda they invariably build up a theory which necessarily results in communal bitterness. The general argument of the Muslim League is something like this: "The Congress is composed of the Hindus and, therefore, stands for Hindu culture and Hindu domination over all other Minorities especially the Muslims. With the assumption of Ministerships this Hindu Congress is now eliminating Muslim culture and Muslim religion with the help of the administrative machinery. The only course for the Muslims is to organise in defence and to prepare for a fight with Hindus. All Muslim Congressmen at this juncture are consciously or unconsciously traitors from the Muslim camp, the absolute homogeneity and solidarity of which is sanctioned and enforced by the Holy Book." It is sad to reflect that the leaders of the Muslim League are invariably most aggressive exponents of this outlook. They use the most solemn occasions to pronounce these views vehemently and take a biased view of everything that goes on in the country, especially under the Congress Governments. They have an exceptional opportunity of propagating their ideas because every effort on our part to curb communalism is immediately represented as a breach of the elementary right of free speech and our Governments are fighting shy of strong measures.

1. Muslim League Annual Sessions: At the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League Mr. Jinnah in his Presidential Address referred to the Congress leaders as follows: "The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Muslims of India more and more by pursuing the policy, which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Government in six Provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fairplay at their hands." Referring to Muslim Congress Ministers, Mr. Jinnah said "These men are allowed to move about and pass off as Muslim Ministers for the 'loyal' services that they have rendered to the Congress by surrendering and singing the pledge unconditionally and the degree of their reward is the extent of their perfidy." Again referring to the Minority safeguards contained in various Congress resolutions Mr. Jinnah commented as follows: "It does not require political wisdom to realise that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper unless they are backed up by power, politics mean power and not relying only on cries of justice or fairplay or goodwill. Look at the nations of the world, and look at what is happening everyday. See what has happened to Abyssinia, look what is happening to China and Spain, not to say of the tragedy of Palestine. . . ." Again, referring to Muslims joining the Congress Mr. Jinnah said, "It is the height of defeatist mentality to throw ourselves on the mercy and goodwill of others and the highest act of perfidy to the Muslim community, and if that policy is adopted, let me tell you the community will seal its doom and will cease to play its rightful part in the national life of the country and the Government. The Congress attempt under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Musalmans is calculated to defeat and weaken and break the Musalmans and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders."

On the same occasion Mr. Fazlul Huq threatened to retaliate against the Hindus of Bengal for the supposed danger to Muslim interest under the Congress Governments. In a statement issued from Lahore on October 17, the general trend of discussion on the Lucknow Session was characterised by Pandit Jawaharlal as "the last ditch of

political reaction." Even the '*Pioneer*' of Lucknow in a leading article on October 17, entitled "Muslims against the world" ridiculed the medieval outlook of the leaders of the Muslim League.

The position in the next session of the Muslim League at Calcutta did not materially improve. Some quotations from Mr. Jinnah's address at Calcutta are as follows:

Referring to the recent communal riots and the attack of Dr. Kailash Nath Katju in the U.P. Assembly on the attitude of the Muslim League towards these riots, Mr. Jinnah characterised these allegations "as a blind against the incapacity of the Congress Government in these Provinces to protect the lives and property of the people of the Province." In this connection it is worthwhile mentioning that the Calcutta Session of the Muslim League passed the following resolution on the communal riots: "This special Session of the All India Muslim League views with alarm the large number of communal riots which are taking place in U.P., Bihar, C.P., Bombay and other Provinces resulting in loss of life and property of the Muslims. In the opinion of the League the Congress Governments have signally failed to discharge their primary duty of protecting the Muslim Minorities in their Provinces and it declares that if immediate steps are not taken to protect the Muslims by the Congress Governments the consequences to the country as a whole will be disastrous. The League congratulating the Muslims in the villages and towns and cities on patience and forbearance that they have shown during these occurrences. The League calls upon the Provincial Leagues to collect all necessary information about all these instances and to submit their reports to the council of the All India Muslim League at an early date." The mover of the resolution Mr. Zahur Ahmad, M.L.A. of Allahabad gave gruesome details of the last Holi riots in Allahabad and said that it was after consultation with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that the police was allowed to fire upon Muslim crowds. Proceeding, he said that the Hindus of the United Provinces are behaving in a manner which shows that they have already become the masters of India. There were reasons to believe, said the speaker, that all these riots had been organised and planned on an All India basis because such riots had taken place almost simultaneously in various parts of India on the occasion of the Holi.

A C.P. Muslim M.L.A. seconding the resolution said that in Jabulpore one morning ten thousand Hindus over-ran the town from end to end and beat four Muslims to death. He also said that Muslim officers had been terrorised and not only failed to help the Muslims but out of fear of the Hindu higher authorities even did harm to their community.

At this stage Mr. Jinnah announced a Committee to collect facts and figures regarding the oppression of the Muslim Minorities under Congress Raj and he appealed to everyone to make it a duty to send any information that he might possess to that Committee. When the report of the Committee and its findings were received the matter would be taken up and they would know how to deal with it. "The League" said Mr. Jinnah, "would not rest content until it had completely vindicated the Muslim position and made it impossible for the majority to tyrannise over the Muslim Minorities (*Star of India*, Calcutta, April 20, 1938).

We do not know its terms of reference or the scope of its enquiry but recently a Committee appointed by the U.P. Muslim League visited Allahabad and even before it completed its investigations, Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan, one of its members declared in

a public meeting that after making enquiries about the Allahabad riots he was obliged to say that Musalmans are in danger, their creed is in danger He warned the Congress not to oppress the poor Musalmans since all of them whether poor or rich were tied by the closest ties of blood. They were angels of peace but not the followers of *Abimsa*. "If you will oppress us," said the speaker, "we will fight that out". (*The Star*, Allahabad, May 3, 1938).

Again, in his Presidential Address at Calcutta Mr. Jinnah characterised the Congress as a "Hindu body which may not be trusted by the Muslims." "Muslims have made it clear more than once" said Mr. Jinnah "that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws there is another question equally of life and death for them and that their future destiny and end are dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the national life, the Government and the administration of the country. They will fight for it till the last ditch and all the dreams and notions of the *Hindu Raj* must be abandoned. They will not be submerged or dominated and they will not surrender so long as there is life in them. The Muslim League claims the status of complete equality with the Congress or any other organisation and we have our problems to solve . . . they may practice tyranny and may prosecute us but I am confident that we shall march out of that mass ordeal better [and] stronger than we have ever been."

Mr. Fazlul Haq on the same occasion characterised the position of Indian Muslims as critical. They were faced on one side by the Congress "with all its might, organisation and resources determined to crush and subdue the Muslims" and on the other side by Hindu Mahasabha "devoting its energies to the frustration of Muslim hopes and the suppression of the legitimate right and Press of the Muslim India." "The time has come for us," said the speaker, "to review what steps the Muslims have taken so far to counteract these sinister forces which aim at the complete enslavement of the Muslim population of India."

He then went on to the criticism of the Congress Muslim and said:

"If it had been a question of fighting the Congress and the Mahasabha only then surely all their designs and all their tactics would have been of little avail against the United Front of Islam and this humble servant of yours would have smashed through the network of Congress and Mahasabha wiles as easily as one sweeps away fragile gossamer. But the conduct of those dupes of the Congress and these betrayers well nigh disheartens me and I sometimes ask myself if a community which can still produce so many foolish or treacherous men is worth striving for, praying for and weeping for. . . . If I had responded to these overtures (of the Congress for a coalition cabinet) I would have still been the Premier and continued to be so perhaps for an indefinitely long period. But such a Premiership would have been no better and no more real than the Kingship of Shah Alam or the Nizamat of Mir Jafar. Had I signed with my own hands the death warrant of Islam with what face would I have stood before my Maker and Prophet on the day of Final Reckoning. (*The Hindustan Standard*, April 10).

In the same Special Session the Muslim League passed the following resolution on the Bengal and Assam Ministries:

"This Session of the All India Muslim League passed the following resolution on the Bengal and Assam Ministries:

"This Session of the All India Muslim League places on record its sense of appreciation of the efforts of the Ministry in Bengal and the Saadullah Ministry in Assam particularly for resisting the machinations of the Congress to break through these fronts and appeals to every Muslim to accord whole-hearted support to the Ministries in Bengal and Assam".

On the position in the North-West Frontier Province the following resolution was moved and adopted:

"This meeting of the All India Muslim League calls upon the Muslims of India to take special steps to combat the Congress anti-Muslim activities in the Frontier Province."

The mover in his speech said that the Congress spends a lac of rupees a year on its propaganda on the Frontier and it is through Congress money that Muslims are being reduced from their allegiance to Islam. Congress money is working for the destruction of Muslim unity. He also said that although the Frontier was a Muslim majority Province still the first thing that the Congress Ministry did was to cut down the grant to the Islamia College¹ by Rs. 40,000. After that it tried to introduce a Bill in the Legislature the object of which was to bring the control of the Islamia College in Congress hands. Then again when an important appointment in the Police Department fell vacant the so-called Muslim Premier of the North-West Frontier Province was so anxious to appoint a Hindu that he over-ruled the recommendation of the Public Service Commission who had selected a Muslim as the best candidate. Recently the Premier had fined the Muslims of a village to the extent of Rs. 4,000 under Frontier Regulation and had taken away all the arms from the Muslims and handed them over to the Hindus.

The seconder Mr. Aurangzeb Khan, M.L.A. referring to the Khudai Khidmatgars said:

"What Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress leaders were trying was that the stalwart Pathans who had for ever been the defenders of Islam in India should be converted to their mercenary soldiers through whom the Muslims in general might be oppressed and suppressed." He said that "with Congress money, Congress propagandists and with the help of such persons as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Muslims of the Frontier were being de-Muslimised". . . . "The Khudai Khidmatgars were an All India danger. Much more dangerous than the Hindu soldiers who would be turned out by Dr. Moonje's Military College." The speaker concluded by saying: "Come to our help, make us free from the tentacles of the Congress octopus and we will be your gate-keepers."

At the concluding stage of the Session Mr. Fazlul Huq referring to the recent interview of Mahatma Gandhi with the Viceroy said:

"His Excellency might not know but let me make it clear that no problem worth the name connected with the administration of India can be solved without reference to the All India Muslim League. The League may not be properly organised today but even as it is today it is worth hundreds of Congress. We may not be vocal but each and every one of us is a tiger and each one of us is a lion, ready to shed the last drop of blood in the defence of Islam." Mr. Jinnah winding up the proceedings said that "time was coming when higher authorities than even the Viceroy would have to consult the League" (*Star of India*, April 20).

II. Speeches of Muslim League Leaders on other occasions

(a) *Mr. Jinnah*: In his address at the Second Session of the All India Muslim Students Federation held in Calcutta last December Mr. Jinnah said: "I want to tell the Muslim community in India that they must not be left in the position of the Negroes of America. We want the Government which Abraham Lincoln wanted and that was a Government of the people, by the people, for the people. But when Abraham Lincoln conceived that noble form of Government he excluded from its people the Negroes of America. Many of my Hindu friends who talk of nationalism and freedom and independence exclude the Muslims from its domain. That is the fundamental and vital difference between the Congress High Command and the Muslim League....The High Command of the Congress must be brought to sense. Before the Muslim League came into field the Congress took no special interest in the Muslims in the countryside. They had started what they call the Muslim Mass Contact but which really was a 'massacre contact'. . . . Only a few days ago while coming to Calcutta a Hindu gentleman was telling him that a nameless gentleman had contributed more than five lacs of rupees for the Congress work. Concluding his address Mr. Jinnah said: "All that I have done is that I have the alarm bell. The bell is still ringing but I do not yet find the fire brigade. I want you to produce this fire brigade, and with them, God willing, help to extinguish the fire" (*The Light*, Lahore, January 8, 1938).

In his speech before the Aligarh University Students Mr. Jinnah said: "The Musalmans have suddenly and aimfully realised that they are treated not only with indifference but with contempt. They complain that they have been thrown to the wolves. The Congress after its unexpected victory at the polls has been intoxicated with power and its administration in the Provinces where it is in power has given the Musalmans a rude shock....

"The Congress Muslim Mass Contact movement has set the Muslims against each other and the Congress has supported the deserters of the Muslim camp. Joint electorates are being thrust upon Musalmans. . . . I am convinced that the nationalism of the Congress merely and positively means Hinduism and Hindu-dom. How is it possible for the Musalmans to repose trust in a prominent political majority the religion and culture of which is different from ours and which has behaved in a manner that ill-becomes it?

". . . . Everything is in the melting pot. I see grave dangers to the very existence of the community and as I warn every Musalman to the dangers ahead I fervently appeal to him that if he wants his community to lead an honourable life in this country he must work for the unity and solidarity of the community and help the Musalmans to stand, speak, and act like one man" (*The light*, February 8, 1938).

(b) *Maulana Hasrat Mohani*: At the Calcutta Muslim League Conference held in the last week of September 1937 Maulana Hasrat Mohani of Cawnpore supporting the resolution on Federation said:

"The Government of India and the Congress under the inspiration of Mr. Gandhi had entered into a secret agreement the terms of which were, (1) That the Congress gives up the goal of complete independence and the idea of seceding from the

British Empire and the method of revolutionary action in the attainment of that ideal and (2) that the Government of India in return for this has agreed to give full power and freedom to the Congress in all matters which fall below the standards of complete independence." "The British Government," said the Maulana, "was anxious that this pro-Hindu policy should be maintained at least up to the time of the next Delhi Durbar of the King Emperor and till the inauguration of Federation. . . . The British wanted it for the continuation of its own domination and the Congress was prepared to acquiesce in it because it will enhance Hindu power and influence at the Centre. This was, therefore, the basis of the Anglo-Hindu or the Anglo-Congress Alliance" (*The Star of India*, September 29, 1937).

The same conference passed the following resolution on the by-election in U.P:

"This Conference congratulates the Muslims of the Jhansi Constituency (U.P.) for electing the Muslim League candidate and frustrating the Congress designs to swamp Muslims as an organised group. It further requests the Muslims of Bijnor Constituency (U.P.) to stand by the Muslim League and vindicate the honour and prestige of Islam in India by defeating Mr. Ibrahim, the U.P. Congress Minister who was elected on Muslim League ticket but joined the Congress party after getting a Ministership, as the freedom and independence of the Muslims as a distinct political entity in India largely depends on the success of the Muslim League in this great contest" (Ibid).

Under these conditions it is not surprising to find that the following terms were proposed by the Calcutta Khilafat Committee for an understanding with the Congress:

1. The Congress must ceasefire, suspend hostilities and stop all frontal attacks on the Muslim League and League leaders. There can be no peace with a revolver point at the head of the League.

2. The Congress must disband the Muslim Mass Contact Committees. There can be peace with Congress but not with the rebels and the deserters and traitors of the Muslim Camp.

3. The Congress must dismiss the Muslim Ministers who are an affront to Muslim Public opinion and an insult to the Muslim Parties in the Provincial Legislatures" (*The Star of India*, Calcutta).

C. *Maulana Zafar Ali Khan*: It is remarkable that immediately after the recent communal riots had taken place in Allahabad Maulana Zafar Ali Khan came to the town and delivered one of the most provocative speeches of his life. He is usually unrestrained in his utterances but the occasion he chose in Allahabad was exceptionally unfortunate. The communal feelings in the town were high, and there was every danger of another riot taking place. The general treatment of the subject will be gathered by the basic position which the Maulana took in his speech. In his public speech the Maulana declared there can be no compromise with the Congress until the Hindus admitted the existence of a distinct Muslim Nation in India. He asserted that as long as Muslims lived in India they could not accept joint-electoralates under any conditions. "Under the heel of joint-electoralates," said the Maulana, "the Muslims would be exposed to the danger of losing their entire existence and of being devoured by Brahminism." Among other conditions of a compromise he mentioned the demand for the appointment of the Ministers of half the number of Muslims and half of Hindus and for a similar distribution in the matter of high services also. He advised

the Muslims to purchase from the Muslims until they could stand on their own legs (*Star of India*, April 30, 1938).

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan commented as follows on the anti-Muslim activities of the Congress in a Lahore public meeting: "The Congress is secretly conspiring against the Muslims. The only way to meet this menace is to organise the Muslims. With this end in view we have repeatedly asked the Ahraris to support the Muslims in this hour of trial and to abandon the Congress. Musalmans are being terrorised today in Fatehawal (Punjab) and its neighbourhood by Congressmen. They say that if the Musalmans do not submit we will invite the Red-Shirts from the Frontier.

The speaker then passed on to the criticism of the Ulamas and concluded:

"Muslim brethren, the enemies are preparing to destroy your religion. They are conspiring to snatch from you your political rights. Do you want that Fatehawal should be repeated all over India? Know how to distinguish between the truth and untruth" (*The Zamindar*, Lahore, 5th April, 1938).

III. Propaganda in Bye-elections

As a rule it is difficult to confine political propaganda at election time to strictly defined limits. But the Muslim League exults in deliberately carrying on false and malicious propaganda to provocative lengths.

In Bijnore election, for instance, Khwaja Hasan Nizami of Delhi accused Congress Muslims and Congress Urdu papers of getting money from the Congress and the Muslim League distributed thousands of leaflets to circulate these libels. Although Khwaja Hassan Nizami recently withdrew those accusations and made a public apology in the columns of the '*Madina*,' Bijnore, the effect of these statements on the course of the elections can be imagined. The propaganda emboldened the Muslim League workers to beat a number of our volunteers during the elections and in one case to stab a prominent Congressman with impunity.

Responsible leaders of the Muslim League went on accusing Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru of tearing away the slogans of Islam from the Congress standards and in spite of repeated contradictions that belief is being still propagated by Muslim League newspapers. Leaflets were distributed reminding the Muslims that they will be relegated to the position of untouchables and the untouchable was painted in medieval colours.

In a cartoon officially distributed in the last U.P. by-elections on behalf of the District Muslim League of Meerut, the Congress candidate, Maulana Bashir Ahmad² was depicted as being carried on a Hindu bier for cremation. The cremation scene was depicted by burning logs of wood and the fire was being ignited by the Hon'ble Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and the Hon'ble Mohammad Ibrahim. The bier is being conducted to the burning ghat by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal, Pandit Govind Pant and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. Maulana Shaukat Ali in the centre of the cartoon is depicted as exclaiming "contrast the beginning with the end," meaning thereby that a Muslim by joining the Congress ends up by being a Kafir in after life. In a second cartoon the Congress leaders are depicted in humiliating positions after being beaten by Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders. In a corner the kings of Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan are shown acclaiming the victory.

Our office has collected numerous posters and leaflets issued on various occasions

in U.P. by-elections and I dare say that some of the most astounding and baseless charges and allegations figure in these publications under the signatures of some of the most responsible leaders of the Muslim League. Curiously enough none of these allegations have been withdrawn by the Muslim League in spite of repeated reminders.

The case of Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim: The facts about the Hon. Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim are more or less universally known. Originally elected on the Muslim League ticket he decided to seek re-election after being taken into the Congress Ministry. In the re-election he beat the Muslim League candidate by a clear majority of about 5,000 votes. But in spite of this clear verdict of the electorate the Muslim League propaganda was not relaxed and practically every leader of the Muslim League went out of his way to antagonise the Muslims against him in U.P. As a result when the Hon'ble Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim went to Cawnpore on an official visit, attempt was made by the local Muslim League to beat him up in the procession. Maulana Habibur-Rahman who accompanied the Minister accused the Muslim League of a plot to kill the Minister in a Press statement which was issued in the second week of February from Lucknow. Hafiz Ibrahim Sahib fortunately escaped but a number of Congress men and other citizens including Pandit Hariharnath Shastri³ and Mr. Saghir Nizami of Meerut were badly wounded. In spite of being challenged Mr. Jinnah did not contradict the allegations of Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman. The Muslim League papers, the *Zamindar* and the *Ehsan* of Lahore actually approved of these attacks on Hafiz Ibrahim and Congressmen in Cawnpore. For instance the *Ehsan* wrote as follows: "The Congress by patronizing such Mir, Jafars and renegades wants to show to the world that the majority of Muslims in India have bowed before her. It wants to popularise these traitors among the Muslims and just as the U.P. Government unduly influenced the election of Hafiz Ibrahim by bringing about official pressure, similarly the Congress wanted to show through official pressure and officially conducted visits that Hafiz Ibrahim was a popular man among the Muslims after being accepted into the Congress Ministry. For this purpose a number of processions were organised and an attempt was made to secure a befitting reception for him in the name of Muslims of Cawnpore. . . . This is not the first occasion when the Musalmans have been tormented by the Congress Government in U.P. Attempts have been made to establish *Hindu Raj* even before and the Congress has earned a certificate of 'good conduct' by firing on the Cawnpore Mill workers. In fact the policy of the Congress Government vis-a-vis the Muslims has put before the latter a very serious question viz. whether their life was at all safe in this country and if there are dangers to their very existence, what steps the Musalmans should take to defend themselves. The only way out is to create Muslim public opinion and to rally the Muslims under the Muslim League Flag. Thus alone can the Musalmans of India be saved from the dangers of a *Hindu Raj* and the mischiefs of treacherous Muslims" (*The Ehsan*, 10th February, 1938).

V. *Congress Ministries*: Muslim League criticism has been uniformly very bitter against the Congress Ministries. They have complained against our Ministers on many grounds. The general complaint is that Muslim Leaguers have been excluded from the Ministries. As a rule the Congress Ministers have been characterised as definitely communal. It is curious to find that the Chief Secretary of the Punjab Unionist Party, Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana has been writing to the papers frequently against

Congress Ministries. He recently contributed a series of articles in the *Star of India*, Calcutta, entitled "Congress Communalism and Muslim Minorities Driving India to the 'Pakistan Idea'."

I have asked the Information Departments of the various Congress Governments to furnish me with a note on instance of aggressive and malicious criticism of the Congress Ministries and I will forward these notes as soon as they are received in the office. The general impression which the Muslims gather from the comments in the Muslim League Press and from the speeches of the leaders of the Muslim League is that the Muslims are now definitely living under Hindu domination and British Imperialism because of its world position has laid them down and has come to terms with the Congress. Almost all the vernacular papers of the Muslim League are full of bitter criticism against Congress Ministries. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Syed Mahmud, of course come in for most malicious criticism. The recent statement of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad saying that the Congress Ministers were working as trustees of the Minorities was answered by innumerable false allegations of tyranny over the Muslims from almost all Provinces. The '*Aftab*' of Aligarh made out a list of no less than 46 odd headings of the various forms of persecution under which the Muslims laboured in Congress Provinces. The '*Albilal*' and the '*Khilafat*' of Bombay, the '*Zamindar*', '*Ehsan*' and the '*Eastern Times*' of Lahore, the '*Wahdat*' and '*Alaman*' of Delhi and the '*Star of India*' of Calcutta have been most violent in their criticism.

VI. General Incitement to Violence

I give below typical comments which have appeared in the following leading dailies of the Muslim League:

The Star of India, Calcutta—writing in an editorial entitled "Muslims Beware" the paper comments as follows: "Bengal and the Punjab appear on the Congress map of India as Ulster in Ireland. The Congress leaders in these two Provinces will never enjoy a night's rest till the Muslims [words left out] under-dogs again and once again under the Hindu rule and repression."

Under the caption "The Future" the same paper comments as follows: "If justice and fairness characterise the fairness of Congress Governments, all will be well. If, on the contrary, the worse fears of Muslims are realised, let us state plainly that Maulana Shaukat Ali envisaging of a possible civil war in future may not prove to be a mere effusion of an angry moment. One thing at least seems certain. Great Britain, ever opportunist, cannot be relied upon to stick to pledges or even to provisions embodied in solemn enactments in the shape of safeguards for Minorities. The traditional urge to weigh down their own advantages and disadvantages before precipitating a conflict with a powerful organisation, they increasingly fear, merely to save a community like the Muslims from being down-trodden will, we are afraid, imply British statesmen to jump the last ditch to safety when the time comes, leaving the Muslims and other Minorities to fend for themselves on the other side. The remedy for any future tyranny or oppression at Congress hands must, therefore, ultimately lie in Muslim hands alone. It is true that Muslims should keep wide awake and prepare from now to protect themselves by all means. In the alternative, they must be prepared to live in danger, economic, political and cultural, in this land

which they ruled for six times the period which the British from across the seas have taken to get politically demoralised in."

Writing on the recent election of the Muslim Mayor of Calcutta Corporation at the suggestion of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the same paper, in an editorial entitled "The Congress Joke on Calcutta" writes:

"It is a triumph in adding to communal bitterness in Bengal for nothing more could have been done to widen the growing separation evident between the two communities in this Province. The Congress had deliberately flouted Muslim opinion in Bengal by appointing a 'Muslim' as Mayor who, they know full well, represents only himself in the Corporation and that nothing will tend to divide the two communities more than this action of theirs.

"While Mr. Gandhi is negotiating for communal amity his avowed disciples seem to be doing everything possible under the sun to make communal harmony impossible. . . . There was deep design in this move and it would appear that by giving Mr. Jinnah an additional grievance in his already lengthy catalogue Congress in Bengal desire as the last thing, the Hindu-Muslim working unity."

The Musalman, Calcutta.—Commenting in an editorial on the "Congress and Muslims" the *Musalman* says:

"There are two imperialisms in this country, the inner and the outer, the imperium and imperio. The outer imperialism which dominates the inner also is administered by a foreign agency. The inner one is administered by Hindus. Both are detrimental to the Muslims They are being crushed under both. It is for the Hindus to realise that the Muslims should be given a reasonable satisfaction of their demands before the real progress is made towards India's freedom" (*The Musalman*, May 21).

The Zamindar, Lahore—Writing on the "Question of Cow Slaughter" in its issue of 30th April, the Editor says:

"Take for example the question of cow slaughter. The Congress was on the whole fair in its attitude sometime ago but now its recent activities clearly point out that it wants to stop cow slaughter all over India. In pursuance of this Gandhiji held a cow conference side by side with the cow exhibition at Haripura. Speaking in this conference Gandhiji asked the Hindus to adore the cow and to consider cow protection as their foremost religious duty. Sometime after the Haripura Congress in Ballia District in U.P. and in several other places the Hindus snatched cows forcibly from the Muslim butchers and spilled human blood with impunity. It was further learnt in these cases that Congressmen were carrying on vigorous propaganda for cow protection in Melas. Incidentally the upshot of the Congress attitude was so malicious that comparatively serious communal riots broke out on the occasion of the last Bakrid

"Because of this encouragement at the hands of Congressmen the Hindu Mahasabhaitees have taken a more aggressive attitude than before and their activities are soon going to assume a menacing attitude. In a recent cow conference at Hardwar, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya delivered a passionate oration, in the course of which he said : The time has come when all slaughter houses must be closed down all over India."

"It appears that the Congress has entered into a secret agreement with the

Mahasabhaites for closing down the slaughter houses in India and a vigorous agitation is soon going to be launched by the Hindus. . . . The conclusion is obvious. In the seven Congress Provinces the Congress will take undue advantage of its official position and will forcibly stop cow slaughter. The Hindus will be instigated to overawe the Muslims by a sheer force of numbers and threats of violence and will compel them to desist from cow sacrifice. It is obvious that the aims of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha are dangerous to the Muslims. If they insist on forcibly stopping cow sacrifice terrible communal riots will follow and the peaceful atmosphere of India will be violently disturbed."

The Wahdat, Delhi—Commenting on the withdrawal of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad from nomination to the Congress Presidentship the paper wrote as follows:

"When the Maulana found out that the Hindu Congressmen were essentially communal and the majority will not support him he wisely chose to withdraw and saved his face We do not know what disqualifications the Maulana suffers from which make him unworthy of being elected to the Congress Presidentship. Narrow-mindedness is the heritage of only one community and the results of this outlook are bound to be disastrous" (Editorial 3rd February).

Commenting on Jawaharlal Nehru—"Nehruji is both a socialist and a Hindu fanatic. . . . He believes in the Moscow brand of atheism. He denies God and is an enemy of the Creator. He has sacrificed religion to bread and he is so bitterly opposed to religion that he does not tolerate the name of God being mentioned in his presence" (6th January 1938).

"From the very day of the Congress Ministry taking office in U.P. the poor Muslims of the Province are being subjected to all sorts of injustice and harassments" (8th February).

Alaman, Delhi—Writing under the title "The Blood thirstiness of the Congress Hitler" the paper says:

"In U.P. where *Brahmin Raj* has been established one needs stone in place of heart to listen to the excess which have been perpetrated there over the Muslim Minority. The shameful rape of Muslim women in Moosapur (Bijnore, U.P.), the loot and burning of 30 to 40 houses, the murderous attacks are nothing shameful for Congressmen who are intoxicated with power. The Congress on the other hand in his militancy was announcing like Hitler the establishment of Nazi rule in India. This new Hitler is Jawaharlal who repeats meaningless slogans of Moscow brand of socialism. But in the depth of his heart there is the spirit of Italian Fascism and German Nazism. We Muslims must be prepared for wars and more menacing events to follow in future" (5th April).

Commenting on the Holi riots under the title "Muharram and Holi played with Muslim Blood," the paper writes as follows:

"Just as the lovers of Congress rule stopped on the occasion of the last Bakrid from carrying out their religious duties and their legitimate right and the Congress Government encouraged them, similarly on the occasion of Muharram many provocative things were done and Tazias were stoned at" (17th March).

The paper gives the following headlines in one issue: "Has *Vedic Raj* been established in U.P.," "The Congress Flag ceremony substituted for Morning Prayers."

Commenting on the Cawnpore Municipal Board affairs the paper writes:

"It appears that the Congress is especially concentrating in Cawnpore in its anti-Muslim activities. When the Mill workers resorted to strike and Muslim political workers started a struggle in support of the strikers even then the Congress blamed them. Attempt was then made to split up the Muslims, the Muslim ranks by bringing in the Ahrar lackeys. Of course, the Muslim League was accused and threats were held out. As if this was not sufficient provocation, Hafiz Ibrahim was invited to Cawnpore and his procession was forcibly taken out in the city so that the Muslims may fight one another. Now the majority of Congress members in the Cawnpore Municipal Board have decided that aid not be given to all those institutions which do not agree to the hoisting of the idolatrous flag of the Congress. . . . This proposal of the Municipal Board is an open challenge to the religious integrity of the Muslims" (Editorial March 1). Referring to a recent speech of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on May Day in Allahabad, the *Zamindar* of Lahore in an editorial note writes thus:

"Gandhi, Jawaharlal, and other Congress galaxies claim to fight for the economic rejuvenation of Muslims. Good! But in practice without any regard to the bankruptcy of these Musalmans, they force them to consume meats worth Rs. 10 per seer instead of enabling them to consume as cheap meats as Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per seer. Not content with this, they even go to the length of arresting and imprisoning the consumers of such cheap meats. This implies that if meat is to be consumed at all it should be that which is sold at high prices or Muslims should rest content with '*Vaishno Bhojan*'. Musalman who is used to meat since his very infancy cannot live on '*Vaishno Bhojan*' hence, being driven to utter helplessness, he has to live on dear meats, or '*Vaishno Bhojan*', according as his circumstances suit him, in all Congress ruled Provinces" (May 6, 1938).

Note: *The Zamindar* is edited by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan himself.

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1. The reference is obviously to the Islamia College, Peshawar.
 2. Maulana Bashir Ahmad (1885-1955) a leading member of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind; Member, U.P. Council, 1948-55.
 3. Hariharnath Shastri (1904-1953); Congressman from U.P.; President, All India Trade Union Congress, 1933-35; President, Indian National Trade Union Congress, 1947-49; President, National Federation of Indian Railwaymen, 1953; elected to the Lok Sabha, 1952.

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Jayakar to Ganpat Rai [Extract]

Jayakar Papers

2 June, 1938

Dear Mr. Ganpat Rai,

I shall meet you on my arrival in India and return to Delhi in the beginning of October. But I am hoping that you will not remain inactive during the interval with

reference to the attempts which are being made at the Hindu- Muslim Unity. It is desirable that the Hindu point of view should be placed before the public as often as possible.

Yours sincerely,
GANPAT RAI, Esq., (M.R.J.)

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Minutes of the Muslim League Council

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 40/28-32

BOMBAY, 4 June, 1938

Khalique: Their concern is illogical and silly. Proposed that we should appoint Committees.

Sikander Hyat: Defence Services existing: The present proportion of Minorities should be maintained; (2) Unitary form of Government cannot be accepted; (3) Residuary power in the Provinces or units federating.

Nawab Ismail Khan: Why should we deal with the Congress if they do not represent Hindus and the All India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such Minorities and any other interests as may be involved when necessary.

The Council have also considered the letter of Mr. Gandhi dated, the 22nd May, 1938 and are of the opinion that it is not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed Committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the Muslim League that all other Minorities should have their rights and interest safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence. The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League has considered the note handed over by the President Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All India Muslim League on the 14th May and his letter of 15th May, 1938, and find that it is not possible for the All India Muslim League to treat or negotiate the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement with the Congress except on the basis that the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India.

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Jinnah to Bose

Congress Leaders Correspondence, pp. 8-9

5 June, 1938

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am enclosing herewith the unanimous opinion of the Executive Council of the

All India Muslim League as promised by me in my letter dated 16th May with reference to the note given to me by you on behalf of the Congress on the 15th May, 1938.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

Resolution No. 1: The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League has considered the note handed over by the President, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All India Muslim League, on the 14th May and his letter of the 15th May, 1938, and find that it is not possible for the All India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India.

Resolution No. 2: The Council have also considered the letter of Mr. Gandhi, dated the 22nd May, 1938, and are of opinion that it is not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

Resolution No. 3: The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the All India Muslim League that all other Minorities should have their rights and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such Minorities and any other interest as may be involved when necessary.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

V.P. Menon Papers Roll, No. 2A, pp. 1-10

CONFIDENTIAL
D.O. No. 74

BARNES COURT, SIMLA E., 5 June, 1938

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I owe Your Excellency an apology for not having replied earlier to your confidential letter of May the 7th, in which you asked for an appreciation of the atmosphere and the position, as I judge it, in the Punjab in regard to the introduction of Federation. The delay was in part due to the fact that although the question of Federation was debated in the Punjab Assembly on the 8th of April last, I have only recently succeeded in obtaining a typed copy of the official report of the debate, which has not yet, so far as I am aware, been published in print.

2. The debate took place on a resolution tabled by a non-official member of the Congress Party. The resolution recommended the Assembly to record its "firm resolve to be no party to the inauguration of the proposed Federation." It contained a further recommendation "that no money be spent out of Provincial revenues and no further

arrangements be made by the Provincial Government in connection with the inauguration of the Federal Scheme, whether in the matter of holding elections to the Federal Legislature or in any other matter connected with it."

The mover made a speech on the lines of the conventional Congress opposition to Federation. He attacked in particular the method of indirect election to the Lower House; the nomination by the Princes of the representatives of the States; the limitations on the financial powers of the Legislature and on its power of control over the Railways and the Reserve Bank. He further criticised the protection given to British capital invested in India and the provisions regarding the security of the services. Curiously enough, he made no reference to the reservation of Defence or External Affairs.

Several members had tabled amendments to this resolution but to the only one moved was that of the Premier, which was in the following terms:

"This Assembly considers that the Federal Scheme formulated in the Government of India Act, 1935, is unsatisfactory, and in view of the urgency of the problem recommends to the Government that the earliest possible steps should be taken radically to revise the scheme in full consultation with all sections of the people concerned."

I understand that this amendment was framed after protracted private discussion between the Premier and his supporters in the House. It was eventually adopted by 99 votes to 32, the voting being apparently strictly on party lines.

3. Sikander's speech in moving this amended resolution is of considerable interest. It began with an expression of his scepticism as to the genuineness of the Congress opposition to Federation. He twitted the Congress with its original opposition to and ultimate acceptance of office in the Provinces and expressed the view that "there is a large section of bonafide opinion in the country which suspects that after using this opposition or criticism as a lever for getting certain concessions from the British Government the Congress may again agree to work the Federal portion of this scheme." He then went on to say that although the scheme as at present formulated does not come up to the expectations of the people of this country and every possible effort should be made to have it modified in accordance with their aspirations, yet some sort of Federal Government at the Centre is necessary, and he expressed the belief that there was general agreement on that point. After some somewhat academic remarks on the objections to what he called a "unitary form of Government" for the whole country (by which he seems to have meant a strong Central Government with the Provincial Governments relegated to the role of mere administrative agent of the Centre), he observed that "no patriotic citizen today will welcome any proposal which is likely to impair the power of the units and the autonomy of the units as constituted under the Government of India Act," and he further emphatically opposed the view that the Indian States can be omitted from any federal system.

Then followed a somewhat ambiguous passage about the reservation of certain important subjects such as Defence and External Affairs. In this connection Sikander observed—"I think that from a purely national point of view the criticism about the exclusion of these subjects from the purview of the Centre is most unsatisfactory. But practically all constructive public men in India have expressed their willingness to

some sort of a differential treatment with regard to these subjects, provided it is on a specified transitional basis with possibility of growth from precedent to precedent." I imagine that in this passage Sikander meant to hint his personal agreement with the reservation of Defence and External Affairs.

4. As regards the method of election to the Federal Assembly the Premier expressed his "individual personal point of view" in favour of indirect election on the ground that the Federation should be truly representative of the various federating units. The following is an interesting extract from this part of his speech:

"We should have representatives of the various federating units with a view to bring about solidarity and cohesion. Unity of voluntary cooperation should not be superimposed by anybody. If you superimpose any conditions, then you may be sure that instead of bringing about that cohesion and solidarity, which we all desire, it would engender conflict and unfavourable conditions, which unfortunately are even now perceptible. What we want to avoid is a domineering Central Government, a Central Government which is likely to interfere with the Provinces so as to put the Provinces in a position where they may eventually find it difficult to take any big action because of the conflict with the Centre. This is a thing on which every patriotic citizen and everybody who has considered this question carefully will agree with me. That is the position which I take. I visualize a federation in which the representatives of the various units will constitute the Central Government with a view to see that Provincial autonomy is not in any way trenched upon by the Central body; and with the safeguarding of the interests of their respective units or Province, they may also serve the common interests of the country as a whole in the federal sphere If you have direct election, what would happen? You will be sending in representatives chosen by an electorate with higher franchise, than at the moment. Unless you get down to the level of adult franchise you will be sending an independent body of men who are likely to think differently from your Provincial Legislature. What would happen in that case? Nothing but a tug of war between the two and a break."

5. As regards the method of securing some modification of the Federal Scheme, Sikander poured scorn on the Congress suggestion for a Constituent Assembly based on universal adult franchise. He quoted, with apparent approval, the view of one of his supporters Raja Narendra Nath that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Act should be worked to the best advantage of the country, while efforts should continuously be made to improve the Constitution, both Federal and Provincial, and he went on to say—"I am almost certain that I am voicing not only the opinion of this House or the majority of this House, but the Province as a whole or the majority of the Province as a whole, when I say that we should not irrevocably commit ourselves to any action at this stage which we might have to set back later on. The Congress did it last time. They ate back their decision. We do not want to take that position. I am prepared to work for the earliest possible revision of the present scheme which nobody seems to like in its entirety and which I do not like either in all its bearings, but, as I have said, there are differences of opinion, differences on detail, and it may take time to get that revision. I think that in the meantime my amendment makes the position of the Province quite clear and I think that in this I am reflecting the opinion of the Province as a whole. We do not like the scheme, we should like it to be

revised as soon as possible in consultation with all sections of the people and we want it to be challenged radically". After alluding to the fact that he had prepared an alternative scheme of Federation, which he would be prepared to put forward at the proper moment, he concluded his speech with the following passage :

"But for the moment I would content myself by saying that I cannot possibly associate myself and my party, knowing the views of the various sections of the people in the province, to an absurd position or commit them to any step which might either lead them into the wilderness of destructive criticism or the barren and arid deserts of non-cooperation. We are not prepared, at any rate the Punjab is not prepared, to take that attitude at the moment. But at the same time I am not going to commit this Province that we will work the federal portion of the Constitution whether it is revised or not. (An Hon. Member: Neither one way nor the other?) Yes, for the simple reason that I should like to be quite clear in my mind what kind of revision the various schools of thought want. If that revision suits me and my Province, we will support whole-heartedly that body which puts forward that revision. If the revision proposed is something different from what I think will suit our Province, then we will have to oppose it and support an alternative scheme. In view of all these circumstances I cannot at this moment, as I said, commit the Province or this House to any irrevocable decision."

After the speech of the Premier a Congress member followed and criticized Sikander for sitting on the fence. The last speech was delivered by Malik Barkat Ali, who won a seat at the general election on the Muslim League ticket and is usually a strong opponent of the Premier. On this occasion, however, he endorsed the Premier's attitude and gave his support to the amended resolution.

6. I think it may be taken that the resolution passed correctly represents the general attitude of the Party now in power in the Punjab to the Federal scheme, embodied in the Act. The Unionist Party do not like the scheme, because they apprehend that it will mean a Congress Government in power at the Centre or, at any rate, a predominantly Hindu Government with a strong Congress tinge, and they anticipate that such a Government would be strictly controlled by the Congress High Command and would be inclined to interfere in Provincial matters and to impose its authority on the Provincial Governments, and more particularly on the Punjab Government with a view to strengthen the Congress hold on the Punjab. On the other hand, I think it is clear that the Unionist Party has no intention whatever of opposing the introduction of Federation by any form of direct action, nor would it countenance or sympathise with the direct action by any other party in the Province.

7. I have already reported to Your Excellency the substance of two confidential conversations I have recently had with Sikander on this subject and you have yourself had a talk with him and are aware of his views. But it may be convenient for your purpose to have them in written form, and I accordingly summarise below the gist of what he has said to me on this subject.

8. He began by saying that his original impression was that the Congress opposition to the Federal Scheme was not genuine and that they would in the end be prepared to accept it. He now takes a somewhat different view and thinks that the Congress are waiting to see how strong the Muslim opposition to the Scheme will be.

The more Muslim opposition intensifies, the higher will the Congress demands for modification be pitched. But he adheres to his view that in spite of their protestations, the Congress oppositions to the introduction of the scheme will not take the form of direct action.

9. As regards his own objections to Federation, these are founded on the apprehension that it will place the Hindus permanently in power at the Centre (in this connection he put forward an interesting but academic point that apart from the depressed classes the Hindus are not a majority in India as a whole). Judging by what has happened in the case of the Congress Provinces he apprehends that a Hindu Ministry at the Centre will be predominantly a Congress Ministry and will be very rigidly controlled by the Congress High Command. The tendency will be for the party in power at the Centre to interfere in Provincial matters, and their efforts in this direction are likely to be specially directed against the Punjab as being the one Province in India where at present the Congress exercises comparatively little influence. He thinks it likely that this interference will be specially aimed at "clipping the wing of the Punjab as the dominant partner in the Indian Army." Although, "Defence" will be a reserved subject, he feels that a Congress Ministry at this Centre will be continually trying to make its influence felt in regard to Defence questions and will work steadily against the reservation of the existing large share of recruitment for the martial classes of the Punjab. The Congress have already made it clear that their policy is to make the Indian Army a truly national army, i.e. to open recruitment to all classes and to spread it more or less evenly over all Provinces. This policy is obviously most strongly against the economic interests of the Punjab peasantry, whose prosperity is so largely due to its connection with the Army. He pointed out that in taking this view he was not making a communal point and he was confident that Sikhs, Dogras and Hindu Jats would stand by the Punjabi Muslim in this matter.

(I may here add that another of my Ministers, Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram, who represents the Hindu Jats of the south-east Punjab, takes the same view as the Premier in regard to this point.)

10. Sikander's next point was that, while he recognises the anomalies and difficulties of the existing situation, i.e. the combination of autonomous Provinces with an irresponsible Executive at the Centre and an even more irresponsible Central Legislature prepared to refuse all supply on the flimsiest pretext, he was disposed to think that under the Federal Scheme there would be an almost equal possibility of crisis and difficulties. He felt sure that a Congress Ministry at the Centre would be continually pressing for the establishment of a convention by which the Governor-General would be bound to accept the advice of the Ministry even in regard to reserved subjects. He evidently visualises a situation when the Ministry would threaten to resign whenever the Governor-General took his own line on such subjects. The only safeguard against such a situation that he could see would be "a Central Executive so constituted as to reflect the opinion of those elements who are not prepared to surrender completely to the Congress or purely Hindu policy."

He went on to say that if His Majesty's Government and the Government of India feel that they are strong enough to resist such encroachment by the Central Ministry on the reserved side and to face the inevitable crisis which such resistance would

provoke, then let them go ahead with the introduction of Federation. If, however, they are not prepared to face such a crisis, then in his view it would be better tactics to postpone the introduction of Federation, taking advantage of the Congress claim that the Constitution must be revised, and to carry on for sometime longer as at present. In spite of the anomalies of the present Constitution it has worked for more than a year and can continue to work for sometime longer. His view seems to be that His Majesty's Government would be committing a tactical mistake in insisting on the introduction of Federation in the near future in face of general opposition. He expressed his belief that should His Majesty's Government decide that revision of the Constitution is desirable, they would find a large volume of opinion, both in British India and in the States, which would support revision on what he called "sound lines." He was not very clear on what he meant by this expression, but I rather gathered that he would be in favour of giving the Central Executive a certain share of responsibility for the subjects now classified as reserved, provided the Federal Scheme was so recast as to secure a Federal Executive that would be more representative of the stable elements in the country and would not be almost inevitably of a predominantly Congress character.

In this connection, he mentioned that he regarded the following as the vital Central subjects—and I think his view is that these should be the only subjects with which the Centre should deal:

1. Defence;
2. Customs, because they pay for Defence;
3. External Affairs;
4. Relations with the States; and
5. Communications.

11. Sikander then unfolded to me in outline his own ideas on the subject of Federation. His main purpose is to secure a Centre in which both the Legislature and the Executive would be really representative of the different federating units, i.e. each Federal unit would have an equal share of representation both in the Legislature and in the Ministry. For this purpose he would divide the whole of India into the following 7 units with a total population of roughly 5 crores each:

1. The Madras Presidency and the Southern India States other than Hyderabad;
2. Bombay, the Central Provinces and the Hyderabad State;
3. Bengal;
4. Bihar, Orissa and the Eastern States;
5. The United Provinces and the States within the borders of those Provinces, such as Rampur, Tehri-Garhwal and Benares;
6. A central unit consisting of the Rajputana and Central India States;
7. A north-western unit consisting of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Kashmir and the Punjab States. It might be desirable to add to this unit one or two of the Rajputana States bordering on the Punjab, such as Bikaner and Alwar, in order to avoid the appearance of creating a "Pakistan" or too predominantly Muslim unit.

He claims that an incidental advantage of this system would be that it would tend to blur the line of cleavage between British India and the States. He also claimed that it would tend to secure a stable Federal Government in as much as the central and the north-western units would be definitely conservative in their outlook; the Bengal unit would be, from the communal point of view, a stabilizing element, while none of the other four would be of a purely Hindu or Congress complexion, as all of them would include a moderating State element.

12. Sikander concluded his observations by saying that he thought His Majesty's Government should decide at an early date (but should not necessarily publish their decision) whether they are prepared to give India Dominion Status and within what period. When this vital question of policy has been decided, they should then devote their attention to a revision of the Federal Scheme so as to secure a Government at the Centre that could be relied on to maintain the British connection which, in his opinion, all the Minority communities desire to see maintained.

13. I must apologize for the length of this letter. Much of its contents are, of course, already within your knowledge but I thought it best to record Sikander's views and projects at length. One must, of course, recognise that in many respects they are impracticable and indeed visionary. Nevertheless, they deserve serious consideration on account of the influence and personality of the man who puts them forward and the importance of the interests which he represents. He is in my judgement by far the most thoughtful and far seeing Muslim in public life at the moment and his criticisms and suggestions are actuated by the most sincerely friendly feeling to ourselves.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd/-) H.D. CRAIK

His Excellency

The Viceroy and Governor-General of India

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Maurice Hallett¹ to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 65, pp. 125-28

CAMP, 6 June, 1938

SECRET

No. U.P. 80

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I find that Haig had not sent a reply to your letter of May 7th, 1938, about "Federation." I think one of his reasons was that Federation is not a live issue in this Province and that he had not been able to collect much information about the views held about it. That too is my difficulty and I think that in the short reply which I sent

to your letter from Patna I took the view that in a Congress Province people are more concerned with their domestic problems. These are sufficiently serious and it is hardly surprising that tenancy questions, communal questions or labour questions attract attention to the exclusion of other problems.

2. It is, no doubt, true that any statements regarding the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Federation, such as that made in the Legislative Assembly, or the more recent statement of the Secretary of State excite comment and criticism in the Press, but the criticisms as far as I have been able to follow them are all of an adverse nature. Politicians also take interest in the intention of the British Government in this matter, not because they approve of Federation but because they anticipate that Federation will be forced upon India.

3. I have examined carefully the discussion in the Provincial Legislative Assembly on a resolution moved by the Secretary of the Muslim League regarding Federation, on January 20th 1938 (see proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the United Provinces, Volume III, No. 4). The resolution was as follows:

"This Assembly recommends to the Government to intimate to the Central Government its firm resolve to be no party to the inauguration of the proposed Federation" and "That this Assembly further recommends that no money should be spent out of the Provincial revenues and no arrangements should be made by the Provincial Government in connection with the inaugurations of the Federal Scheme, whether in the matter of holding elections to the Federal Legislature or in any other matter connected therewith."

4. The second clause is rather significant; whether similar recommendations have been made in other Legislatures, I am not aware, but as far as I recollect the resolution moved by the Prime Minister in the Bihar Assembly did not contain this suggestion of a boycott of the federal elections. If a Provincial Government did refuse to cooperate over the elections, it would create a difficult, not to say impossible, situation.

5. The main point put forward by the mover of the resolution was that though the Muslim League had made its opposition to the Federal Scheme clear, the attitude of Congress was more indefinite and he was apprehensive that Congress might be prepared "to accept Federation and to combat it by accepting office under it in the same way as it is professedly doing in the Provinces. Unfortunately, many of the subsequent speeches were in the vernacular, but I gather that at one stage the debate degenerated into rather an acrimonious fight between the Congress and the Muslim League Party. It is significant however that Kunwar Sir Maharaj Singh² speaking on behalf of the Indian Christians supported the resolution and pointed out that that community had always regarded the Federation proposals as inadequate. Towards the close of the debate the Hon'ble Minister for Justice (Dr. Katju) fully supported the resolution and asserted that Government would adopt the methods suggested, and if necessary other methods, for stopping the system of Federation.

6. I do not think a debate of this kind can be disregarded, especially in view of the fact that similar debates have taken place in other Legislatures. When questions are discussed in Provincial Legislatures, as at present constituted there is usually

some opposition, but in regard to Federation there was complete unanimity that the present scheme is unacceptable.

7. I have recently discussed the position with the Nawab of Chhatari; he referred to the consistent opposition of the League and of Mr. Jinnah to the scheme; he even suggested that the late Sir Fazl-i-Hussain was opposed to it. He also pointed out how the League had increased its strength as a result of the support given to it by the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hayat Khan and the Hon'ble Mr. Fazlul Huq. The League, he contended, would only be content with some form of Federation of the Muslim Provinces which might later be united with a Federation of Hindu India. Even if this was not possible, they would press for one-third or at least one-fourth of the total number of seats in each of the Houses of the Federal Legislature.

8. On the attitude of Congress, I am not really competent to speak; I have not discussed the question with my Ministers and I do not think discussion would serve any useful purpose; they would merely reiterate in general terms their opposition to the scheme, emphasising in particular their opposition to the proposal regarding Defence, External Affairs, Finance. They would also no doubt, as did the Hon'ble Minister for Justice in the debate to which I have referred, point out that Federation presupposed equality of citizenship and that such equality did not exist so far as the Indian States were concerned, but that the scheme gave the States a very strong, if not a dominating position. Congress might, of course, be prepared to bargain and might try to secure at the same time a modification of Provincial Autonomy. Further it is probable that those members of Congress who are sympathetic with the Hindu Mahasabha would accept Federation even if it was not substantially modified.

9. It may be thought that Congress realising the power which it has, in particular in the Congress Provinces, would be reluctant to surrender that power in order to fight the Federal Scheme. This no doubt, would be true if there was any chance in these Provinces of getting an alternative Ministry, but if Congress Ministries went out over Federation, they would have the support of the Minority parties and suspension of the Constitution would be even more inevitable than it would be if they went out for any other reason. Suspension of the Constitution on the Federal issue would suit Congress policy and as far as I can see would be almost certain to lead ultimately to a modification of the Constitution, with all its attendant difficulties.

10. The comments made in the last paragraph are based on the assumption that the attempt to introduce Federation will be made in the near future. If it is made in the near future, it will be at a time when Congress Ministries are still firm in the saddle. If, however, the introduction of the scheme is postponed, if Provincial Autonomy is allowed to continue as at present for sometime longer, Congress may lose credit; the Opposition may grow in strength and we may have a split between the right and left wings of Congress. If the political situation develops on those lines Federation may then become possible, provided of course that the communal question can be solved. Provincial Autonomy has, it is true, been started without any very serious difficulties, in spite of the opposition to the scheme, but it cannot be inferred from this that Federation can also be thrust upon India. The opposition to Federation seems to me far stronger than the opposition to Provincial Autonomy, mainly because of the attitude of the Muslims, and it will be admitted, I think, even by the opponents

of Provincial Autonomy that the present Constitution has enabled the Ministries to implement their election pledge and to rectify many real grievances; Federation will give them no such opportunity.

11. I regret that I have felt bound to give at this stage a view, based possibly on very inadequate information, which is so hostile to the immediate introduction of the Federal Scheme. There is one further point which I would make; it is based on conversations with some of my District Officers. The services have had a difficult time during these early months of the new Constitution, but every month that elapses seems to me to improve the position, though there are still many threatening clouds on the horizon. If Federation is attempted in the near future, their position will become far more difficult, I would almost say impossible. The services may make a success of Provincial Autonomy, if we carry on as at present; if we provoke a controversy, I cannot see what the final results will be.

Yours sincerely,
M.G. HALLETT

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1. Sir Maurice Garmier Hallett (1886-1960); Home Secretary, Government of India, 1932-36; Governor of Bihar, 1937-39; Governor of United Provinces, 1939-45.
 2. Kunwar Sir Maharaj Singh (1878-1959); Commissioner of Allahabad, 1927, 1929 and 1931; Home Member, U.P. Government, 1935-37; Governor of Bombay, 1948-52.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 48, pp. 106-08

BARNES COURT, SIMLA, E., 10 June, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

D.O. No. 76.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am glad to say that Sikander was well enough to have a talk with me today. He caught a chill after being drenched at a public meeting held in pouring rain in Bombay.

2. I gather that the only business put before the Council of the Muslim League at Bombay was the correspondence between S.C. Bose and Jinnah, the purport of which you already know. The main point for decision by the Council was whether the League should insist on the position that it must be regarded as the sole representative of Muslim opinion. All members present in Bombay were agreed that the League must take up this attitude, and eventually a resolution was passed containing the following three parts:

(a) An answer was to be sent to Bose's note to Jinnah, stating that the Muslim

League was agreeable to continue the negotiations with Congress, but only on the clear understanding that Congress should recognise the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslim opinion.

(b) Gandhi had written to Jinnah, suggesting that Jinnah should see and deal with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who is, of course, a member of the Congress Working Committee. (I am not sure whether Azad was to take Bose's place, or whether the idea was that both should represent the Congress.) As regards this suggestion, the Council of the Muslim League considered that it "would not be desirable" to deal with any Muslim representative of Congress, should the negotiations eventually reach a stage at which a conference between Congress and League representatives would be useful.

(c) The third part of the resolution was suggested by Sikander himself. It was to the effect that since the Muslim League is committed to the policy of safeguarding the interests of Minorities other than Muslims, it should be made clear to Congress that the League would consult other Minorities and other interests should negotiations with Congress be resumed. (I asked Sikander if he had in mind the Sikhs as one of the other minorities, but I gathered that the reference was rather to the Scheduled Castes, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. It appears that there is a Clause in the Constitution of the Muslim League pledging it to safeguard the interests of all other communities.)

3. I asked Sikander whether Bose and Jinnah had really got to grips with the problem of an agreement between Congress and the League, i.e., whether any specific terms for such an agreement had been discussed. Sikander thought that there had been no discussion at all of detailed terms, but he gathered from Jinnah that Bose had told Jinnah that Congress would be prepared to go a very long way towards meeting Jinnah's demands, should the League agree to join a "united front" with Congress in its opposition to Federation.

Apparently this was as close as the two negotiations got to the real question at issue. The comic part about it is that there is, of course, a "catch" in the "united front" condition, the League's main objection to Federation being that it will put the Congress in power at the Centre.

Anyhow, this was as far as the two negotiators got before they fell out on the question whether Congress could accept the League as the sole representative of Muslim opinion.

4. I asked Sikander what was the point of summoning the whole Executive Council of the League to Bombay and what was the net result of its meeting. To this his reply was that the meeting merely endorsed the attitude already taken up by Jinnah in the conversations and threw the onus on the Congress of breaking off negotiations.

5. I then told Sikander I had been rather puzzled by Jinnah's savage attack on Congress at a public meeting in Bombay held (I think) on June the 6th. Sikander was present at this meeting and said that Jinnah's attack was quite deliberate. Jinnah considers Congress is suffering from swollen head and that the only way to deal with it is to adopt a truculent attitude, or, in other words, to treat Congress as *de haut en bas*. Evidently there is no genuine desire on the part of Muslims to come to terms.

7. Sikander mentioned an interesting piece of news about Sind, where he thinks there is likely shortly to be a change in party alignments. Sir Abdullah Haroon,¹ who is a supporter of Allah Bakhsh,² the present Sind Premier, was at Bombay and so also was Abdul Majid,³ who is by common repute a close supporter of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. Abdullah Haroon said there was a possibility of Allah Bakhsh trying to reconstitute his Ministry so that it would rely mainly on the Muslim vote (I take it this means discarding the present Congress element in the Ministry). Abdul Majid announced on behalf of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah that the latter would support such a re-arrangement. Haroon suggested that Sir M.A.K. Dehlvi, a Bombay ex-Minister, should be sent to Sind to prepare the ground for this change, and I gather that Abdul Majid agreed to this.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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1. Sir Abdullah Haroon (1872-1942); Merchant and Industrialist; joined Congress, 1917; President, Sind Provincial Political Conference, 1920; President, Sind Provincial Muslim League from 1920; Member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1923-26 and Central Assembly, 1926-42; Member Working Committee, Muslim League, 1930-42.
 2. Allah Bakhsh (1897-1943); represented Sind in the Bombay Legislative Council, 1926-1936; formed the Ittehad Party (United Party) to fight the election to the Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937; Premier of Sind, 1938-39 to 1940-42; presided over the All India Azad Muslim Conference in Delhi, April 1942; assassinated on 14 May, 1943.
 3. Abdul Majid Sheikh, Sindhi (1888-1978); edited Sindhi daily *Al-Ameen*; collaborated with Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi in Silk Letter Movement; convicted and jailed for three years 1916-19; detained for involvement in Khilafat movement; Presided Azad Sind Conference at Karachi 1930; pleaded for Separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency; Member, All India Muslim League 1936; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee 1938-42; Minister for Revenue and Education, Sind 1938; left Muslim League and joined All Pakistan Awami Party 1949; later joined National Awami Party.

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V.P. Menon to Laithwaite [Extract]

V.P. Menon Papers

15 June, 1938

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Laithwaite,

Many thanks for your letter of the 13th June and for the opportunity afforded to me of seeing His Excellency's letter to Governors and of the Governors' replies on the question of Federation.

2. A preliminary reading of the correspondence confirms my personal impressions

that the Congress mind on the Federation issue is not yet made up; but that there is an influential section of the Congress right wing who might be prepared to work the Federal Scheme envisaged in the Act. At the same time, there is little doubt that the occasion will be made one of bargaining with an attempt to secure as much concession as possible.

3. The final attitude which the Congress is likely to adopt with regard to Federation obviously depends a great deal on the extent to which they are able to carry Muslim opinion with them. That is probably the main reason underlying its recent overtures to the Muslim League. Should Congress succeed in carrying the Muslim League with it, there is likely to be strong demand for fundamental change in the federal structure as contemplated by the Act. On the other hand, should Congress fail to win the support of the Muslims, which is more likely since the latter would be in no anxiety to hasten the advent of [what] many of them would regard as a "*Hindu Raj*" at the Centre, the Congress will in all probability prefer to await further developments without taking any definite decision.

4. The next opportunity for the Congress will be at the crucial stage when the draft Instruments of Accession became known. If the quantum of accession can be represented as of an unsubstantial character, the position of the left wing, whose tactics it is to upset the Constitution, will be considerably strengthened; and it might be difficult for the right wing to pursue any plan in the direction of accepting the Federal Scheme.

5. It is true that the Congress has put forward a demand that the representatives of the States in the Federal Legislature should be elected; but following Earl Winterton's¹ statement there seems a disposition in Congress circles to regard this matter as one for the States themselves.

6. I have set down these first impressions in a somewhat hurried fashion for want of time, but I hope to have an opportunity later to discuss the matter personally with His Excellency.

Yours sincerely,
V.P. MENON

1. Edward Turnour Winterton, VI Earl of M.P. (Unionist) for West Sussex, Horsham and Worthing.

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Abdur Rab Nishtar to Jinnah [Extract]

Abdur Rab Nishtar Collection, F. A-I-a-1

PESHAWAR, 22 June, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thanks for your letter. I was about to start for Abbotabad in connection with a case when I received it, hence a few days delay in reply.

6. I have been trying to persuade Nationalist Muslims who have either joined the Congress or are outside the Congress to join en bloc the Muslim League and if I succeed in that there will be nothing in my way to actively work with the Provincial Muslim League because then my voice will not be a voice in the wilderness. I want that Muslims should neither become the slave of Hindus nor Englishmen. This is my lifelong principle and the fact that I fought single handed the Congress and the late Sir Abdul Qaiyum is an ample proof of it.

Excuse me for this long letter.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,
ABDUR RAB NISHTAR

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Jinnah to Abdur Rab Nishtar

Nishtar Papers, F. No. A-1-15

LITTLE GIBBS ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 2 July, 1938

Dear Mr. Nishtar,

I received your letter of the 22nd June and I am very pleased to read it.

I wish you all success. All I want is solidarity and unity amongst the Musalmans, which is most essential at this moment and key to the situation.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

A.R. NISHTAR, Esq.,
Pleader and Municipal Commissioner,
Member, Legislative Assembly,
N.W.F. Province, Peshawar.

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Nehru's Speech at the Left Book Club Rally

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IX, pp. 48-50

LONDON, 6 July, 1938

2. What have you to say about the Minority question, the communal problem and religious rights ?

JN [Jawaharlal Nehru]: About the Minority question, I find a number of people have asked me about religious rights and the communal problem. First of all, there is no religious problem in India. What you might perhaps consider a religious problem is somewhat different.

It is communal problem. The religious problem arises from a conflict between religions and there is no such problem because there is the completest freedom assured to all the groups and sections. The Congress has especially laid it down as its fundamental policy that there should always be complete freedom of religion and its practice, of course, so long as this is compatible with public morality and order.

It may be that in a vast country like India there might be a petty quarrel somewhere—that is not a matter for debate. But this communal problem is not a religious problem. It is partly political and partly economic and partly personal. At the present moment, you will find Provinces in India which are entirely Muslim, like the North-West Frontier Province, being on the side of the Congress. It is true that owing to certain historical background of hostility, it is not very difficult to raise some communal prejudices and passions. And do not for a moment imagine that I am trying to minimise this problem or its importance for us. But do not think of it in terms of religious strike or riots. In a vast country like India, if sometimes we hear that there has been a riot in some town or the other, we also find that the rest of the country is unaffected by it. We should not, therefore, lose our sense of perspective.

Then, this communal problem again used to be considered as a problem of representation in the legislatures. So far as that is concerned, it has for the moment been settled or decided by a certain decision of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald when he was Prime Minister. It was criticised very strongly, and it was never agreed to, but, nevertheless, the Congress attitude has been that we do not desire any change in it except with the consent of the parties concerned. If it is by consent, we agree.

So, in a certain way, this communal problem is an economic problem. In some places, like Bengal, the peasantry is largely Mohammadan and the landlords are Hindu. It is not a communal problem at all, but a tenant-landlord problem. But, in order to hide the main conflict, the colour of communalist and religion is given to it. In the United Provinces, it is slightly the other way round : the peasantry is largely Hindu and the landlords, Muslim. But the landlord, not wanting to be considered as a landlord, while coming into conflict with his tenants, will say the Hindu elements are in conflict with the Muslim. And today, apart from certain trivial personal factors, one sees that an attempt has been made by reactionary and semi-feudal elements—both among the Hindu and the Mohammadans—to take shelter behind the name of religion to prevent the people from joining the progressive forces, and consequently also to prevent the real problem—the economic problem—from being tackled.

If I go to the Punjab and address a meeting and may I tell you that the meetings in India are enormous as in a meeting there may be present fifty to sixty thousand people comprising Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs—then among the questions which are put to me, no one asks me about the communal problem. What they are interested in is when is their water rate going to be reduced or when will they get relief from their tax burden? Now, can these problems be treated as communal problems? There may

be a conflict between the landlord and the tenant, but there is the same conflict between the Hindu landlord and the Hindu tenant.

Remember this, there is the question of the unity of India which I referred to. It is an interesting question and I wish I could tell you something about this fascinating aspect of the Indian situation. People have an astounding conception of India's history of the past. They seem to think that before the arrival of the British people in India, the only occupation of the Indian people was to cut one another's throat, and since the Englishmen established themselves there, everything has been well. Well, it is true that except for certain periods of history when Indian political unity was established, if you look at this enormous country, you would realise that it was not easy to keep such a country in political unity before modern transport and modern communications and the rest came into existence. In the past, big empires broke up because the industrial revolution had not come. But what is important is this: that India has had cultural unity for thousands of years, and I want to put before you one or two instances of this.

The basic language of India, of the whole of India, was Sanskrit—one elementary language—out of which so many languages of the present day India have grown. Do not imagine there are hundreds of languages in India. There are ten languages which are all intimately connected with each other. Those in the North are derived from Sanskrit, and others in the South were powerfully influenced by it. One of the languages, which is the Hindustani language, is spoken by 130 million people, and it is understood by a fairly large number of others. I have no doubt that it will become the main language, not replacing the great languages, but becoming the main link between them.

There also take place in India huge conferences where representatives from all parts of the country gather and they discuss questions affecting them all. Now, this idea of holding a conference of representatives from all parts of the country gather and they discuss questions affecting them all. Now, this idea of holding a conference of representatives of All India is a very old idea. Representatives go from the South all the way to Kashmir to attend a conference. You find from the most ancient times the most famous places situated—one in Cape Comorin in the extreme south, another on the western coast, the third in Puri, the extreme east, and the fourth in the extreme north in the Himalayas—and there was a constant going to and fro between these places, and a constant inter-change of ideas. And when a new idea took birth, it spread immediately all over India through controversy, talk and discussion.



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George Cunningham to Puckle

Linlithgow Papers, No. 84, p. 95a

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NATTIAGALI, 8 July, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. No. G.H.-170

Dear Puckle,

I send, herewith, for His Excellency's information, a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 7th July, 1938, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the second half of June, 1938.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report No.13, dated 7th July, 1938 [Extract]

6. The agriculturists, Debtors Relief Bill, which I mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of my last report, continues to be the subject of considerable contention. The Hindus of Peshawar are organising opposition to the best of their ability and are making the position of the Congress M.L.A's of their community very difficult. On one side these M.L.A.s. are restrained by the call of party discipline as the Bill is a party measure; on the other they are threatened that, if they do not protect the interests of the people they represent, they will be asked to resign. It seems that a similar situation will arise to that which followed the agrarian legislation sponsored by the Punjab Government recently, though in our case the landlords will join the Hindus in opposition for the reason that the Bill, in addition to controlling mortgages and discharging usurious loans, aims at releasing tenants from the payment of arrears of rent.

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Nehru to Bose

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IX, p. 58

LONDON, 14 July, 1938

My dear Subhas,

I wanted to write to you at some length about what I have done here but this must wait for the moment.

Kripalani sent me the Muslim League resolutions in reply to the memorandum to Jinnah. These resolutions are absurd and preposterous and it is impossible to agree to them. I suppose you have already come to your decision.

Yours affectionately,
JAWAHARLAL

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Fortnightly Report on the Situation in the Punjab for the First Half of July, 1938 [Extract]

Home-Poll., F. 18-7/38, pp. 1-2

1. *Political-General.* The Progress of Government business in the Punjab Legislative Assembly was steady, if somewhat slower than was anticipated and the session which was to have concluded on the 8th of July was extended by another ten days. The Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Bill, the Registration of Money-lenders Bill and the Alienation of Land (Further Amendment) Bill passed through the Select Committee stage without any material alteration and, at the time of writing, were being finally considered by the House. The Agricultural Produce Markets Bill was referred to a Select Committee and is not likely to be taken up again during this session. In pursuance of an undertaking given by the Government that the agriculturist money-lenders would be placed under the same disabilities as non-agriculturists in respect of permanent acquisition of land in settlement of debts, the Alienation of Land (Third Amendment) Bill will be introduced in the House during the current session. While these measures command the full support of agriculturists of all communities, they have met with considerable opposition from some of the urban Hindu members on the Government benches in the Assembly and there has been an outcry against them from the more vocal Hindu non-agriculturist and moneylending classes. A number of meetings were held in several cities and towns of the Province to condemn the bills as discriminatory legislation, to protest against the way in which, it is alleged, they are being rushed through the Legislature, and to appeal to His Excellency the Governor to exercise his special powers of intervention. The attendance at the meetings except in Lahore and Amritsar, where about 1,500 to 2,000 persons were present, was however small. Hartals were also observed in Hindu business quarters in many towns on the 10th of July as a mark of protest. An All-Punjab Non-Agriculturist Association, with Mahasha Krishen of the *Partap* as President has been organised at Lahore to agitate against the Bills. The Association, which includes many wealthy and influential Hindus, aims at a membership of 25,000 and the collection of a sum of Rs. 25,000 for the furtherance of its agitation and proposes to hold big conferences at Lahore and Lyallpur during the second half of the month. The Congress Party, both in and outside the Legislature, has found its

position extremely difficult. It has been strongly urged by urban Hindu organisations to oppose the bills, but under pressure from above has found itself unable to show itself hostile to measures which are clearly intended to benefit the masses and are popular with the great majority of electors. The Congress members of the Assembly have, therefore, adopted a vacillating attitude which has evoked the severe condemnation of the Hindu nationalist papers, the Hindu Mahasabha leaders and a number of Congress workers who disapprove of the new legislation.

7. The All India Majlis-i-Ahrar Conference which was held at Batala in the Gurdaspur district from the 10th to the 12th of July, was attended by about 1,000 persons only. Chaudhri Afzal Haq¹ was present but did not make a speech, while Mazhar Ali Azhar, M.L.A.,² another important Ahrar leader, did not attend the conference at all. The advisability of the Ahrars joining the Congress was discussed at some length at a private meeting of the leaders, but no decision was reached, the majority of those present being opposed to the Ahrars relinquishing their separate entity.

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1. Afzal Haq Chaudhri, (1895-1942); Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1924 and 1926; took part in the Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930; associated with All India Muslim League (Shafi Group), 1927-28; a die-hard Ahrar and the party ideologue.
 2. Mazhar Ali Azhar (1895-1974); Khilafatist and Member, AICC; One of the founders of Ahrar Movement, 1929; supported demand for Pakistan.

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Sri Krishna Sinha to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, II, pp. 71-72

PATNA, 19 July, 1938

My dear Rajendra Babu,

We intend to bring in the winter session of the Assembly a Bill to amend the L.S.G. Act.¹ By one of the provisions of the Bill seats will be reserved for Musalmans in the Local Bodies, but the election will be joint. This appeared in the Press and Maulana Azad on seeing it wrote to me that before such Bill was actually brought, it would be better that an attempt was made to talk with the Musalmans and tell them that Government would be prepared to concede to reservation of seats through joint electorate if they agreed to it. He thinks that if such a course was adopted the Musalmans of Bihar would be agreeable to it. He further thinks that if an attempt was made to make the Musalmans agree to it after the Bill had actually been brought, then we would fail to make them agree to it. The Musalmans in that case would feel that Government stood committed to that extent and they would fight for separate electorate. He has offered to come to Patna and negotiate with the Musalmans but before he does so he wants to know your opinion. I hope Maulana Sahib will be

going to attend the meeting of the Working Committee. You will kindly talk with him and let me know accordingly.

Yours sincerely,
S.K. SINHA

BABU RAJENDRA PRASAD,
Camp : Wardha

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1. This perhaps refers to the Local Self-Government Act.

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Fortnightly Report on Political Events in Bihar during the first half of July, 1938 [Extract]

Home-Poll., F. 18-7/38
Government of Bihar, Political Department, Special Section

PATNA, 25 July, 1938

The Legislature—The disagreement between the landlord party and the Ministry over the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Bill and the Bakasht Bill has now been received as a result of the mediation of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. As a result of the agreement provision will be made that orders for distraint passed by the civil courts in rent suits will be transferred to revenue courts for execution. This is expected to help speedy realization for the landlords. Provision will also be made that where a *raiyat* is declared by the court to be a habitual defaulter his entire holding may be sold and not only a part of it as provided in the new Amendment Act. If a *raiyat* is in arrears with his rent landlords are to be entitled to appropriate towards outstanding arrears any payments on account of rent made by the *raiyat* even if he declares that the payment is made towards current dues. In view of the contemplated reduction of rents under section 112-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act legislation is to be introduced to reduce correspondingly the assessment of cess on landlords. The Assembly will meet again on the 25th of July and Government will then move amendments to their Bills which will implement the agreement that has now been made.

2. *Communal*—In the Bhagalpur Division there has been a considerable number of small incidents but elsewhere the fortnight has been comparatively quiet. In the Bhagalpur Division there is extreme sensitiveness and both Hindus and Mohammadans show an inclination to make trouble over the most trivial incidents. Muslim League activity continues in many districts but appears to show a slight slackening. At the same time it is certainly stiffening the attitude of Mohammadans in communal disputes. Meetings of Momins continue to dissociate themselves from the Muslim League and there was a

meeting of Jamiat-ul-Ulama at Bettiah which condemned the activities of the League. A new Urdu paper entitled *The Muslim League* appeared on the 1st of July and it is reported that the League will shortly start an English paper entitled *Muslim India* under the editorship of Mr. Saiyed Mahmud Raza, nephew of Mr. Saiyed Abdul Aziz. There has been a further report of the formation of Muslim League Volunteer Corps from Muzaffarpur. During the rains the holding of *Mahabiri Jbanda* [Hanuman Flag] processions has in recent years been the occasion of much communal trouble particularly in Champaran. Last year an attempt was made to get the Hindus to agree to hold their processions on one fixed date. The attempt was partly successful. This year the local officials with the aid of several prominent members of the Legislature have obtained an agreement that all such processions shall be taken out on the *Nagpanchami* [Snake Worship] day. If the public abide by the decision it should make the situation much easier to control and lessen the chances of communal trouble spreading.

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Bose to Jinnah

All India Congress Committee Papers, F. No. G-59, G. 60 1/4 1939

CAMP WARDHA, 25 July, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

The Working Committee has given all the attention it was possible for it to give to the resolutions of the Muslim League you were good enough to enclose with your letter of the 6th June 1938. The first resolution of the League Council defines the status of the League. If it means that, before we proceed to set up a machinery for considering the terms of settlement of the Communal question, the Congress should recognise the status as defined in that resolution, there is an obvious difficulty. Though the resolution does not use the adjective 'only,' the language of the resolution means that the adjective is understood. Already the Working Committee has received warnings against recognising the exclusive status of the League. There are Muslim organisations which have been functioning independently of the Muslims League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen, some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier Province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and which is solidly with the Congress. You will see that in the face of these known facts it is not only impossible, but improper for the Congress to make the admission which the first resolution of League Council apparently desires the Congress to make. It is suggested that the status of organisations does not accrue to them by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organisation has dedicated itself. The Working Committee, therefore, hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that the Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and to come to an

honourable understanding over the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question?

At this stage it may perhaps be as well to state the Congress claim. Though it is admitted that the largest number of persons to be found on the numerous Congress registers are Hindus, the Congress has a fairly large number of Muslims and members of other communities, professing different faiths. It has been an unbroken tradition with the Congress to represent all communities, all races and all classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it has often had distinguished Muslims as Presidents and General Secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and of the Country. The Congress tradition is that though a Congressman does not cease to belong to the Faith in which he is born and bred up, no one comes to the Congress by virtue of his faith; he is in and of the Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress, therefore, is in no sense a communal organisation. In fact it has always fought the communal spirit because it is detrimental to the growth of pure and undefiled nationalism. But whilst the Congress makes this claim, and has sought, with more or less success, to live up to the claim, the Working Committee asks for no recognition from the League Council. The Committee would be glad if your Council would come to an understanding with the Congress in order that we might achieve national solidarity and whole-heartedly work for realising our common destiny.

As to the second resolution of the Council, I am afraid that it is not possible for the Working Committee to confirm to the desire expressed therein.

The third resolution, the Working Committee is unable to understand. So far as the Working Committee is aware the Muslim League is purely a communal organisation, in the sense that it seeks to serve Muslim interests and its membership too is open only to Muslims. The Working Committee also has all along understood that so far as the League is concerned, it desires, and rightly, a settlement with the Congress on the Hindu-Muslim question and not on questions affecting all Minorities. So far as the Congress is concerned, if the other Minorities have a grievance against the Congress it is always ready to deal with them as it is its bounden duty to do, being by its very Constitution and organisation representative of All India without distinction of caste or creed.

In view of the foregoing I hope that it will be possible for us to take up the next stage in our negotiation for reaching settlement.

It is suggested that as the previous correspondence has already been published, it would be wise to take the public into confidence, and publish the subsequent correspondence between us. If you are agreeable, these documents will be immediately released for publication.

Yours sincerely,
S.C. BOSE



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*Jinnah to Bose**Congress Government I, pp. 260-262*

LITTLE GIBBS ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 2 August, 1938

I placed your letter dated the 25th of July, 1938, before the meeting of the Executive Council of the All India Muslim League.

The Executive Council gave its earnest attention and careful consideration to the arguments which were urged in your letter for persuading it not to claim the status it has done in its resolution No. 1. already communicated to you. I am desired to state that in defining the status the Council was not actuated by any motive of securing an admission, but had merely stated an accepted fact.

The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Musalmans of India. This position was accepted when the Congress League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since, (and) till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad conversations took place, it has not been questioned. The All India Muslim-League, therefore, does not require any admission or recognition from the Congress and nor did the resolution of the Executive Council passed at Bombay. But in view of the fact that the position, in fact the very existence of the League, has been questioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress, in one of his statements wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in the country, viz., the British Government and the Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the negotiations between the two organisations could proceed.

Besides, the very fact that the Congress approached the Muslim League to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question (means that) it presupposed the authoritative and representative character of the League and as such its right to come to an agreement on behalf of the Musalmans of India.

The Council are aware of the fact that there is a Congress coalition Government in the North-West Frontier Province and also that there are some Muslims in the Congress organization in other Provinces. But the Council is of opinion that these Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Musalmans of India, for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that as members of the Congress they have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim community. Were it not so, the whole claim of the Congress alleged in your letter regarding its national character would fall to the ground.

As regards "the other Muslim organisations" to which reference has been made in your letter, but whom you have not even named, the Council considers that it would have been more proper if no reference had been made to them. If they collectively or individually had been in a position to speak on behalf of the Musalmans of India, the negotiation with the Muslim League for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question would not have been initiated by the Presidents of the Congress and Mr. Gandhi.

However, so far as the Muslim League is concerned it is not aware that any Muslim political organisation has ever made a claim that it can speak or negotiate on behalf of the Muslims of India. It is, therefore, very much to be regretted that you should have referred to "other Muslim organisation" in this connection.

The Council is equally anxious to bring about a settlement of "the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question" and thus hasten the realisation of the common goal, but it is painful to find that subtle arguments are being introduced to cloud the issue and retard the progress of the negotiations.

In view of the facts stated above the Council still hopes that the representative character of the Muslim League will not be questioned and that the Congress will proceed to appoint a committee on that basis.

With reference to the second resolution the Council wishes to point out that it considered undesirable the inclusion of Musalmans in the Committee that might be appointed by the Congress, because it would meet to solve and settle the Hindu-Muslim question, and, so in the very nature of the issues involved, they would not command the confidence of either Hindus or the Musalmans and their position would indeed be most embarrassing. The Council, therefore, request you to consider the question in the light of the above observations.

With reference to the third resolution it was the memorandum of the Congress referred to in your letter dated the 15th of May, 1938, in which mention of other Minorities was made and the Muslim League expressed its willingness to consult them, if and when it was necessary in consonance with its declared policy.

As regards your desire for the release of the correspondence, including this letter, for publication, the Council has no objection to your doing so.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow

Political Department (Special)

PATNA, 5 August, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

Report on political events in Bihar during the second half of July, 1938 [Extract]

2. *Communal*: The communal situation shows a progressive deterioration. Muslim League activities continue and appear to be concentrated particularly on the Bhagalpur Division where communal incidents have increased. These culminated on the 29th and 30th in a serious outbreak of rioting in Bhagalpur town. The disturbance arose out of a *Rath Jatra*¹ procession which was taken out on the 28th of June. The *Rath Jatra* festival is normally a very minor one in Bhagalpur, but on this occasion the

communal tension which has been marked in Bhagalpur for the last three months, gave it an undue importance. The trouble arose out of a *Rath* procession taken out by one Chotey Lal. In former years this man had taken out a procession regularly in mohallas Sujaganj and Kaziwali Chak. Last year he went to live in another mohalla named Husainabad which is predominantly inhabited by Mohammadans and he proposed to take out his procession from his new residence. He obtained a licence but it is not certain whether he took it out. This year he again obtained a licence and when the procession was organized, the Mohammadans of the mohalla opposed it in a body. Trouble was avoided for the time being by an agreement made between the leaders of the two communities and the Subdivisional Officer that the procession would be allowed to go out provided that it started not from the mohalla itself but from the adjoining district board road. The procession took place peacefully under these conditions. Dispute then arose regarding the return procession which was to take place on a subsequent date. The Mohammadans contended that the procession should be prohibited on the ground that it was the declared policy of Government to adhere to custom in such matters and that the procession had never passed by this route before. They remained adamant on this point in spite of the fact that they had already agreed to the outward procession. The Hindus, on the other hand, contended that they had an inherent right to take out the procession on a public thoroughfare. Negotiations were carried on by the local officials for some time without result and meanwhile both the parties held repeated meetings which intensified the excitements. Government finally discussed the matter with the District Magistrate and decided that while it would be undesirable to allow a procession in such circumstances, it was a religious necessity that the idol should be returned to its home. They, therefore, approved the District Magistrate's proposal that the idol should be returned privately without a procession to its home under police protection, if necessary. At the same time, they gave the District Magistrate discretion, if this course failed, to take any measure that he thought necessary to deal with the situation. The District Magistrate carried out his original proposal and the customary *Rath* processions were taken out in Bhagalpur town on the 29th afternoon. After the customary processions in mohallas Sujaganj and Kaziwali Chak had been completed, the disputed *Rath* of Chotey Lal was then taken without any procession and drawn only by four coolies to its home in mohalla Husainabad. The *Rath* reached its destination without any disturbance of any sort but shortly afterwards when darkness fell, sporadic assaults began to occur in by-lanes and alleys all over the town. The police forces which had been concentrated for the processions were quickly redistributed under the emergency scheme devised for such contingencies and the reserves were called out and the town was patrolled all night. Further large reinforcements of police reached Bhagalpur during the next 24 hours. Assaults, however, continued sporadically though on a decreasing scale and the total casualties up to date are four Hindus killed and 29 wounded, one Muhammadan killed and 27 wounded. Orders under Section 144 and a curfew order were immediately issued and day and night patrolling of the town continues. There have been no further casualties since the night of 31st, and the position seems to be well in hand. But the situation is likely to remain dangerous for sometime.

3. There was a motion to adjourn the Assembly yesterday in connection with

this matter and the motion, was talked out. During the past fortnight Garhi Nabiganj in Monghyr where it was alleged a Hindu village had combined to ill-treat and expel a few Mohammadan householders. The facts of the case were that the Hindus objected to the innovation of sale of beef in the village and boycotted the Mohammadans who are few in number. Ultimately through the intervention of the local Sub-Inspector of Police the two communities agreed to restore *status quo*. The incident occurred six months back and there is no agitation now left in the village. A third motion was in connection with a dispute that arose in village Diwawan in Patna district where two Hindu idols were found when a grave was being dug in a Mohammadan graveyard. The Muhammadans attempted to have the idols removed through official intervention while the Hindus meanwhile installed them in a neighbouring plot of land in a Mohammadan village where they propose to erect a temple. The incident has attracted large Hindu crowds to the village since then and the matter has not yet been finally settled. The Mohammadans and in particular the Muslim League have been agitating publicly for sometime on the question of cow sacrifice and are insistently demanding that an unrestricted right to cow sacrifice should be recognised. The matter may come to head over a dispute in village Amin in Monghyr where the Mohammadans claim the right to make sacrifice in a neighbouring Hindu village not only during the Bakr-Id but also at other times. Their right to sacrifice during the Bakr-Id has been recognised but the claim to sacrifice on other occasions produced such a situation that it became necessary to issue orders under Section 144 and the dispute continued with such heat that Government were compelled to extend the validity of that order for six months. It has been necessary to keep a force of police in the village and it is possible that the case may have further repercussions.

4. The Muslim League continues to attack the Congress Government bitterly and the *Star of India* has even gone so far in recent articles as to espouse the cause of Swami Sahajanand. A recent development is that League meetings are now being held mostly in mosques and Imambaras presumably to avoid the attentions of reporters. Reports say that Mr. Jinnah contemplates holding the All India Muslim League Conference in Bihar. The date and venue of this conference were to have been fixed at a Provincial meeting on the 25th July, but the decision is not yet known. In view of the separatist movement among the Momins, the League is now devoting more attention to the lower classes of Mohammadans and sponsored a conference of Kunjras recently at Bihar. Mr. Aziz at a meeting in Muzaffarpur on the 21st stated that he saw no harm in the Muslim League joining the Congress in a body after they had united and made their strength felt, but that he deprecated the idea of Muslims joining the Congress separately and individually.

1. Hindu festival when Gods seated on a Chariot are carried in a procession.



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*Fortnightly Report on Punjab for the first half of August, 1938**Home-Poll, F. 18-8/38, pp. 1-2*

CONFIDENTIAL

Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of August, 1938.

1. Political—*General*—Further reports regarding the non-Agriculturists Association Conference held at Lyallpur at the end of July confirm the previous impression that it was only a partial success. An appeal for funds realised only Rs. 1,600, although Rs. 11,000 were promised, while the leaders of the Association were reluctant to accept the responsibilities of office-bearers. Propaganda in the Hindu Press against the agrarian legislation of the Unionist Party has, however, grown steadily in volume and intensity and has been supported by Hindu sectarian organisations. In the early stages of the agitation the Bills were attacked in the Hindu press as communal measures. Criticism was then directed towards discrimination which they were alleged to show against non-agricultural tribes and the attitude of Congress towards them. The proceedings of the Lyallpur conference merely embodied the proposals of the Hindu Press. Since the conference the Press has asserted that the object of the Bills is to create a set of big landlords who will dominate the political and economic life of the Province, and has tried to convince its readers that the Unionist Party is a Muslim League Government bent on crushing non-agriculturists. The Punjab Hindu Sabha has declared that it has no confidence in the Unionist Party. Bhai Parmanand, M.L.A. (Central), writing in the "*Tribune*" of August the 5th, deprecated direct action as impracticable and suggested attacking the Land Alienation Act with a view to including those who till the land themselves in the definition of agricultural tribes. His suggestion was supported in a leading article in the "*Tribune*" of August the 7th, on the grounds that the Land Alienation Act had been introduced to strengthen British imperialism and prevent an accretion of strength to forces likely to be inimical to British interests. This view, however, was opposed by the "*Daily Herald*" as likely to divert attention from the Bills themselves. The statements issued by Dr. Gopi Chand and Dr. Satya Pal in defence of the Congress Party's attitude of neutrality were very unconvincing and have received a bad Press, but in spite of the disappointment and resentment, amounting in some quarters almost to a feeling of betrayal, which undoubtedly exist among Hindu non-agriculturists towards the Congress, there is no likelihood at present of a break between them. Meanwhile, the Association has been busy preparing plans for organised agitation. On August the 4th there was a meeting of Secretaries at Lahore at which Sub-committees were formed for purposes of propaganda. These committees include editors of several well-known Hindu Nationalist papers whose policy was previously strongly pro-Congress. It was decided to follow Constitutional methods of agitation first and then, if these failed, to resort to non-cooperation and possibly direct action. The agitation has been adversely criticised by all Muslim papers which have strongly supported the Bills. The Sikh papers have refused to take any

part in the agitation. The socialist members of the Legislative Assembly have decided, under instructions from the Congress Socialist Party, to give their qualified support to the Bills. The popularity of the Bills among all classes of agriculturists has been strikingly illustrated by the enthusiasm of the many thousands of peasants, who assembled to welcome and listen to the speeches of the Hon'ble Minister for Development during his recent tour of districts in the South-west and Central Punjab. The "black flag" demonstrations organised by non-agriculturists at some places during his tour necessitated police action for the protection of the demonstrators, action which has been distorted in the Hindu Press into allegations of lathi charges.

Congress.—The reactions of the Hindu non-agriculturists to the Congress attitude of neutrality towards the recent agrarian legislation have shaken the confidence of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee in regard to its resources of men and money, and an intensive campaign, to be conducted, if possible, by Congress leaders of All India reputation, is contemplated to explain and justify the Congress attitude. At Lahore, on August the 5th, Dr. Gopi Chand and Dr. Satya Pal defended the Congress attitude of neutrality towards the Bills in a public meeting attended by some 4,000 people. Their defence was virtually an attack on the Unionist Party and there were frequent interruptions from Muslims and Hindu non-agriculturists. Similar meetings have been held in other parts of the Province, the most important being at Hafizabad in the Gujranwala district, where again the Unionist Party was accused of deliberately causing a split between agriculturists and non-agriculturists.

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Jamil Ahmad Khan's¹ Statement

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, II, pp. 278-279

15 August, 1939. I want to draw the attention of the High Command of the Congress towards the activities of the Congress leaders of Bhagalpur regarding the communal riots in this town. Had the local Congress leaders been acting like true Congressites, and followed strictly the Congress creed, such a sad catastrophe would never have come to pass. But they instead became out and out communal and spread communalism both by their conduct and speeches.

2. (For) a month before it was evidently known to all that the feelings of both of communities have swelled high, and it required merely a slight prick to burst, but no attempt was made by the Congressites to pacify and soothe the feelings of the people. But, on the contrary, they openly joined hands with Hindu Mahasabha, and attended meetings convened by the Mahasabha and delivered inflammatory speeches rousing the feelings of the masses. Our leaders have completely remained communal before, during and after the riots. Communal attitude of the Congress leaders gave much impetus to the persistent demand by the masses for the grant of licence for the *Rath Yatra* procession through the disputed route. It is the constant endeavour of the Congress authorities which succeeded in securing licence for the same. During the

riots also they totally failed in the discharge of their duties and proved their unfitness and incompetency.

I also very much regret for the wrong and one-sided reports supplied by the Congress Office, and I especially draw the attention of the people towards the statement issued by the Secretary of the District Congress Committee published in some Hindi papers in which the evacuation of the terrified and helpless Moslems of Mirjanhat has been described as the preparation for attack by them in that locality.

3. I hear that the Assistant Secretary of the Provincial Congress Committee is present here, but he is sitting tight in the Dak Bungalow and granting interviews to his avowed disciples. His activities are merely confined to his dancing attendance of the big officials. But he is not kind enough to take the pains of inspecting the affected areas and of sympathising with the sufferers and injured persons.

4. If such remains the mentality of the Congress people I don't know how far it can succeed in enlisting support and cooperation of any other Minorities who cannot think for a moment that their interests are safe in the hands of the Congress.

5. The failure of the local Congress leaders to calm down the communal agitation, their inability to avert a riot, and their carelessness to give relief to the sufferers make one believe that the Congress is still unfit to shoulder responsibilities of the children of the soil.

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1. Jamil Ahmad Khan, Leader and Municipal Commissioner, Bhagalpur.

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Rammanacharya to Bose [Extract]

Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. 42, pp. 128-30

15 August, 1938

My dear President,

3. Jinnah's party in the Central Assembly has come out in its true colours; it is no longer the Independent Party.¹ It is now the Muslim League Party. The first defeat of the Congress was due to Jinnah's absence and related to the appointment of the British experts. In one of his recent speeches, Jinnah gave a fresh argument against Congress-League compromise which might interest you. He suggested that a compromise between a strong and a weak organisation would be of no use, as there was no guarantee that it would be carried out faithfully, and the Muslim League was the weaker organisation.

Yours affectionately,
RAMMANACHARYA
Allahabad

The Independent Party was formed in 1924 soon after Jinnah's entry in the Indian Legislative Assembly. Its members joined Muslim League in 1938.

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Fortnightly report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of August 1938 ***[Extract]***

Home-Poll., F. 18-8/38, pp. 1-4

4. *Communal.* The chief event was the decision of Government to withdraw all pending prosecutions arising out of the Jubbulpore riots. In a communique announcing the decision, Government stated that it hoped that the action taken would help to restore goodwill between the two communities at Jubbulpore. Government also took the opportunity of appealing to the communities not only to forget and forgive the past and to refrain from indulging in activities calculated to excite or increase communal tensions but also actively to cooperate with one another in the further measures that may be found necessary or desirable in order to promote cordiality of communal relations. Government's action has been appreciated by the Hindus of Jubbulpore, but some Muslims condemned it at two meetings, largely because, although the number of Muslims released is much greater than that of the Hindus, the released Hindus include persons who were charged under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the alleged causing of the death of four Muslims. The Government had, however, carefully examined the materials available and was convinced that charges of murder could not be judicially proved. There is a demand for the release of three persons still undergoing imprisonment in connection with the Dasehra disturbances, one of whom is a Mohammadan sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The matter is under the consideration of Government. The Commissioner reports that the general Hindu and official opinion is that the Muslim agitation against the withdrawal of prosecutions is, to some extent, artificial and will die down quickly. The Hon'ble Prime Minister is shortly proceeding to Jubbulpore to study the situation personally.

5. The communal tension at Patansaongi in the Nagpur district, to which reference was made in the last report, still continues. It appears that the Hindu Mahasabha is keeping the agitation alive. Action has been taken under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code against the leaders of both parties, and the District Magistrate is deputing a Subdivisional Magistrate once more to the spot with a view to bring about an amicable settlement, if possible. The Muslim League held two meetings at Nagpur. On the 5th August, an audience of about 1,500 was addressed by Messrs Natique, Abdul Rauf Shah and Abdul Majid Khan. Mr. Abbas Ali Kamal¹ presided over the meeting. The speakers accused the Congress of trying to crush Maharashtra and of converting the Urdu schools into Vidya Mandirs. Mr. Abdul Majid Khan is reported to have said that the Muslims are prepared to flow rivers of blood if Mr. Jinnah, their leader demands it. At another meeting held on the 10th August, resolutions were passed condemning the activities of the Hindus of Patansaongi, protesting against

the imposition of Vidya Mandirs and the withdrawal of the Jubbulpore riot cases but congratulated the Muslims accused on their release.

6. A branch of the Hindu Mahasabha has been formed at Betul, while a branch of the Muslim League has been established at Chikhli in the Buldana district.

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1. Abbas Ali Kamal; Member, All India Muslim League Council, CP and Berar.

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B.S. Moonje's Press Statement

Moonje Papers

17 August, 1938. Having carefully read the correspondence between Mr. Jinnah as published in the Press today and having taken note of the determined insistence of Mr. Jinnah on getting the Congress recognition for the League as the only authoritative organisation representing the Muslims of India which Mr. Bose is not at present willing to admit, it is really inexplicable why room is left for further correspondence and consideration of the matter. Perhaps the Congress may be intending in its heart of heart secretly to accept eventually Mr. Jinnah's claim, as it has accepted the Provincial Autonomy of the Constitution and is working it constitutionally, though it has not given up its attachment to the use of language of wrecking, of which demonstrative parade is made both in season and out of season.

2. Let, however, the Congress do whatever it likes; but let there be no delusion or misunderstanding of the fact that the Congress does not and cannot represent the communal interests of the Hindus, as the Muslims won't admit its authority to represent their communal interests. Hindu Mahasabha will fight to the bitter end, as the Muslim League will, for their respective rights, if assailed by the Congress. Let Government take note of our determination and not be misled by wrongful assumptions.

By and by, it is really amusing to note how, Mahatma Gandhi having weeded out all skill and intellectualism from the Congress by his purges of Love and Non-Violence as Stalin has done in Russia by his purges of Violence, the Congress now finds itself hopelessly outmanoeuvred in skill of argumentation by Mr. Jinnah.

For favour of publication.

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Jinnah's Statement

Nation's Voice, p. 266

Simla, 18 August. Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, has issued the following statement:

1. "My attention has been drawn to a speech of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani delivered at Ghaziabad on August 15 in which he is reported to have stated as follows":

"The reason why we did not oppose the League candidates at the general elections was that Mr. Jinnah had assured us then that the policy of the League had changed and the League was pledged to complete independence. But we were soon disillusioned when after the elections we were told by Mr. Jinnah that talk before the elections was merely a political stunt."

2. "The whole of this statement is entirely untrue. As to why some members of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind joined the League in 1936 and whole-heartedly supported the League candidates and they soon after suddenly left the League still remain a mystery to me." (A.P.)

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Jayakar to the Hindu Herald [Extract]

Jayakar Papers

WINTER ROAD, MALABAR HILL, 20 August, 1938

The Manager,
The Hindu Herald,
Presidency Insurance Building,
Bombay.

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter dated the 15th. I thank His Holiness¹ for his kind wishes as expressed in your letter, but I regret that in consequence of my present position as a judge of the Federal Court it is not possible for me to publicly associate my name with endeavours like those mentioned in your letter.

Yours truly,
(Sd.) M.R.J.

The name of the new party should be either "Hindu Nationalist Party" or "Anti-Communalism Nationalist Party"²

Nation: The definition of the Nation to be accepted from the 'League of Nation' conception.

Aims & Objects: (A) to explore and oppose each and every move of any religionist which will tend to spread to strong (sic.) them the communalism and thereby be injurious to the National progress and solidarity and thus try to frustrate the poisonous work of communalism and demolish it altogether for the well-being and healthy and rigorous life of our Nation.

(B) to spread the real and pure idea of Nationalism unpolitical and uninfluenced either by the communalism or the perverted idea of Nationalism; to enlist active support to this pure form of Nationalism of each and every citizen of Bharat;

(C) to help and get cooperation of such institution in Hindustan which stand for pure nationalism without the least . . . communalism.

II. Thus, strengthening the hands of Nationalism in the country to create a very strong organization throughout the length and breadth of Hindustan through which we shall march ahead towards our goal of National Freedom with surest steps, by all just and legitimate means in your power.

The Pledge of Membership

- (A) Hindustan is my holy motherland and to her alone my Loyalty is due.
- (B) I am a National of Hindustan and, therefore, I shall not tolerate anything that will . . . or be infurious to, the purity and . . . of Nationalism.
- (C) In all the feeling of National things I shall not allow anything communal which would tend to create communal tendencies in the minds of the Nationals of Hindustan.
- (D) The solution of the most distingushed problem of Minorities in Hindustan should be arrived at on the lines of the League of Nations which has become the guiding principle for all other countries of the world and is recognised as the " World Law."
- (E) The objects of this "Anti Communalism" National Party (or whether name may have been given...) is to root out the poison of communalism, which is eating away the very vitals of Nationalism, from amongst the minds of the communalism-fed-up-community and make all loyal Nationalists.
- (F) I achieve this pledge word of honour by the name of god and shall do my best to fulfil my pledge of those work devotedly for the National Freedom.

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1. The reference is to Shankaracharya (Dr. Kurtkoti) message to the Hindu Mahasabha its 19th session at Ahmedabad, 30 December, 1937 to 1 January, 1938.
 2. The manifesto of the "Anti-Communalism Nationalist Party" is written in a very faulty language. It is indeed amazing to note that a man of Jayakar's stature taking a manifesto like this seriously as he tends to suggest in his letter.

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Iqbal to Jinnah

Shamsul Hasan Collection

MAYO ROAD, LAHORE, 23 August, 1938

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I hope my letter reached you alright. There is now talk of an understanding between the Punjab Parliamentary Board, and the Unionist Party. I should like you to let me know what you think of such a compromise and to suggest conditions for the same. I read in the papers that you have brought about a compromise between the Bengal Proja Party and the Parliamentary Board. I should like to know the terms and conditions since the Proja Party is non-communal like the Unionist, your compromise in Bengal may be helpful to you.

Hoping you are well,

Yours sincerely,
MUHAMMAD IQBAL

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Thomas Alexander Stewart¹ to Brabourne²

Brabourne Paper, No. 2, pp. 2-4

24 August, 1938

SECRET

NO. 965-G.B.

My dear Lord Brabourne,

3. The Hindu-Muslim situation is causing me some perturbation. The rights and wrongs of the two communities are being argued with heat both in the Press and on the public platform and the activities of the Muslim League still further prepare the ground for trouble. The Prime Minister [Sri Krishna Sinha] is very nervous and his apprehensions are shared by his senior officials who are preparing a demand for 250 additional armed Police as a measure of precaution. Mr. Muhammad Yunus³ Prime Minister in the Interim Ministry and no supporter of the Muslim League—is reported to have said that two more outbreaks like Bhagalpur would consolidate the Muslim front in Bihar. He made no secret of his fears when he came to see me a few days ago. He had appealed personally to Gandhi to intervene and he showed me copies of the correspondence which had passed. Gandhi's reply to his appeal is characteristic. It runs—

“Dear Friend,

I thank you for your letter of 29th July. The question of Hindu-Muslim unity is not for any single person to settle. Let us all hope that the negotiations going on between the Congress and the League will bear fruit. In any case we shall have no peace in this unhappy country of ours unless we discard the law of the jungle and cease to vindicate rights, supposed or real, by taking the law in our own hands and breaking one another's heads.

Yours sincerely,”

To this mild evasion Yunus replied at some length pointing out in effect that his appeal was not to the individual Gandhi but to the Mahatma who exercised quasi-dictatorial power in Congress circles. He asks whether Gandhi refuses to discuss the question with any body other than the Muslim League—a very pertinent question in view of the attitude of Congress *vis-a-vis* Jinnah. Yunus proposes to see Gandhi when he goes to Wardha to discuss the Bengali- Bihari question with Rajendra Prasad.

4. Rajendra Prasad, very wisely, is endeavouring to arrive at a compromise on that vexed question on as broad a basis as possible. He has not constituted himself as a Court to hear P.R. Das⁴ on the one side and the Ministry on the other. Amongst others he has invited Muhammad Yunus and Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha⁵ to meet him. The latter on various pretexts found himself unable to go to Wardha and suggested

that the discussions might take place in Ranchi. I suspect that Sachchidananda feels, as indeed does Rajendra Prasad, that the Rajendra award will not settle the matter but will simply provide a starting point for fresh controversy in which he does not wish to be involved. Meanwhile the debate is being carried on quietly and in gentlemanly terms. The Ministry, however, continue to give practical effect to their views and one hears of negotiations with business firms for the 100 per cent employment of Biharis in return for favours received or to be received. In parenthesis I would add that this is not an isolated instance of "racketeering". Tatas have "given" Rs.10,000 to the Mass Literacy Campaign and a few days ago the Manager of the Indian Cable Company informed me that it had been suggested to him that a substantial subscription to Congress funds would ensure his securing contracts for the supply of material for the Bihar electric grid scheme.

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1. Sir Thomas Alexander Stewart; Governor of Bihar, 1939-43.
 2. Baron Brabourne; officiating and temporary Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1938.
 3. Muhammad Yunus (1884-1952); joined the High Court of Judicature in London and later Calcutta and Patna High Courts; Member, Indian National Congress and its Subjects Committee, 1909; submitted his suggestions on constitutional reforms to Lord Minto and worked for the creation of separate Province of Bihar; elected to Imperial Legislative Council, 1916 and to Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council, 1921; participated in the Khilafat movement and Non-Cooperation Movement; Premier of Bihar, 1937; started *Patna Times*.
 4. P.R. Das; Member of Judicial Department, Bihar and Orissa; Judge, High Court, Patna from 1919.
 5. Sachchidanand Sinha (1871-1951); President, Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, 1916-20; founded the newspaper *The Search*, 1918, Editor, *Hindustan Review*, 1901-21, and 1926-50; President, Bihar and Orissa Legislature Council, 1921-22; Vice-Chancellor, Patna University, 1936-44; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; presided over inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly.

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Brabourne to Henry Duffield Craik [Extract]

Craik Papers, No. 3, p. 8

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 27 August, 1938

D.O. NO. 3810-G.G.

My dear Craik,

2. If my information is correct, Sikander's influence was probably the deciding factor in inducing Jinnah to bring the Muslims in the Assembly to the support of Government over the Dissuasion from Enlistment Bill. I gather that Sikander told Jinnah that the Punjab wanted the Bill and, if Jinnah wanted the Punjab's support for the League, he had better see that the Bill was passed. You may be interested to learn that Bhulabhai Desai is reported to have said that the one good point about the Bill

was that it would make it very easy to cause trouble in the Punjab! This was said after dinner and it is possible that the proverb "*in vino veritas*"¹ applies. I suppose he meant that it would be possible to force the Punjab Government to take action under the Bill by an organised campaign of anti-recruitment speaking, and so to raise an agitation.

Yours ever,
BRABOURNE

1. Latin proverb means 'drunkenness makes a man let out the truth.'

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Henry Duffield Craik to Brabourne

Brabourne Papers, No. 2, pp. 4-5

BARNES COURT, SIMLA, 27 August, 1938

PRIVATE

D-O. NO. 88.

My dear Brabourne,

You have doubtless noticed that there has recently been a marked tendency towards the intensification of agitation about Palestine on the part of certain Indian Muslim bodies, the most prominent among which are the Ahrars and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. The Punjab C.I.D. received a day or two ago from the Central Intelligence Bureau a copy of a note on the "attitude of Muslim organisations towards the Palestine problem." After perusing this, Sikander has sent me a note of which I enclose a copy.

I venture to think that the suggestions made in Sikander's note deserve careful consideration. I am doubtful of the practicability of the suggestion that His Majesty's Government should receive a small deputation of Indian Muslims, but I see no strong objection to the alternative suggestion, viz., that Jinnah should be asked to prepare a representation to be forwarded to His Majesty's Government. Jinnah's attitude on the Palestine question at the Delhi meeting of the Council of the Muslim League held at the end of last month was distinctly moderate. In fact he made it plain that he was not prepared to admit the expediency of either non-cooperation against Government or the boycott of British goods, on the ground that he saw no reason why Indian Muslims should invite trouble for themselves over Palestine when such other Muslim nations as Iraq and Afghanistan were doing nothing.

I agree with Sikander that the adoption of his suggestion will do nothing to placate the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, as the object of both these bodies

in taking up the Palestine question is merely to rehabilitate themselves in popular favour as champions of their "persecuted" co-religionists. On the other hand, the knowledge that His Majesty's Government had agreed to give careful consideration to the views of the more moderate Muslim opinion might do something to steady that section of opinion which is inclined to be restive as the result of long drawn-out disturbances in Palestine.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

Enclosure

I wonder if it would be possible to persuade His Majesty's Government to receive a small deputation of Indian Muslims and allow them to represent the views of Indian Musalmans. Failing this the Government of India might perhaps ask Mr. Jinnah to prepare a representation on behalf of the Muslims in India, which could be forwarded to His Majesty's Government through the Secretary of State. This might to some extent allay genuine Muslim feeling, though it is not likely to have any effect on political adventurers who are out to exploit the situation for other purposes. My recollection is that action similar to what I have suggested above was taken when the Lausanne Treaty¹ (with Turkey) was under consideration. The course I have suggested might strengthen the hands of Mr. Jinnah and other responsible Muslims leaders in their efforts to keep the agitation within constitutional limits.

SIKANDER HYAT KHAN
26 August, 1938

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1. The Treaty of Lausanne signed in July 1923 permitted Turkey to retain Eastern Thrace (including Adrianople), established demilitarised zones on both sides of Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and opened navigation of the straits to all nations in time of peace, and for neutrals in time of war involving Turkey and to warships of all nations in time of peace and Turkish neutrality.

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Jinnah's Speech

Nation's Voice, pp. 267-270

Simla, 28 August, 1938. "Can democratic parliamentary Government succeed in India? Is it suited to the conditions of the country? It is not the democratic majority that has formed the Government in the seven Provinces; it is the permanent Hindu majority which cannot be altered by any change whatsoever and hence it is a travesty of the system which may be worthwhile in England." Thus observed Mr. M.A. Jinnah at a party given in honour of the newly-formed Muslim League Party in the Central Legislature by the Anjuman-e-Islamia, Simla on August 13. The audience which numbered about 500 included the intelligentsia of Simla and Northern India who are at Simla and all the Muslim members of the Central Assembly.

Thanking the Anjuman for the honour, Mr. Jinnah said that "today in seven Provinces there are Congress Governments and there are great powers entrusted to the Ministers.

It is indeed deplorable that the little power they have got are used against Musalmans and the Congress High Command mindful of it tolerated it."

The Four Forces

"In our country," he continued, "we have got four main forces that are sitting at the chessboard. One is the British Government, the most organised force which is still ruling this country. The other is the Hindus, a great community most organised and most powerful. Today unfortunately they are in the hands of the Congress High Command which is going wrong. The third force are the Musalmans. A year ago the Musalmans were like orphans, homeless, shelterless, scattered, divided and broken, demoralised and degenerated, particularly due to their own fault because they were indifferent and careless. We were divided and that was our condition a year ago. Today, the Musalmans have awakened and are a third force and we mean to remain as a third force (cheers) and we are going to play our part, worthy of our past heritage. There is yet another force which is not quite visible at present but is a very big force—the Indian states."

Commenting on the attitude of a few educated Musalmans, he emphasised, "India is not a nation State; it is a State of nationalities. That being so, the more you ignore it the more you try to mislead yourselves."

Parliamentary System Suitable

"The Hindus who are very loyal are blindly guided by the Congress High Command; and of course there is a natural feeling that a Hindu must stand by a Hindu and, therefore, they believed in whatever that High Command of the Congress is doing or saying for them. But this High Command of the Congress is the body that has got to be brought to its senses and they can only be brought to their senses by us, and I am sure our Hindu friends will realise that the High Command is doing them the greatest possible harm in pursuing the policy they are following today. Therefore, the question is this: What next? We are now trying an experiment. Is that experiment? The mighty British Government naturally cannot think of any other system of Government because their Government is on the lines of democratic parliamentary system of the Government and, therefore, they cannot think of anything else. It is the growth in England of six centuries which is suited to the genius of their people; and it has been developed for the last 600 years. But the question is 'Can this democratic parliamentary Government succeed in this country? Is it suited to the conditions of this country? Is it suited to the genius of this country?' From the first contact it is not a democratic majority in the seven Congress Provinces. It is not a democratic majority that has formed the Government and is carrying on; it is the permanent Hindu majority which cannot be altered by any change whatsoever and, therefore, it is the travesty of the system which may be worthwhile in England. But when it is planted here, you see, that it is a failure. What is the result—the permanent Hindu majority and the Ministry that is a Hindu Ministry. And naturally what else could you expect? It must pursue the policy and the programme which necessarily is a Hindu policy and it must, therefore, bring everybody down to submit to that programme."

"I do not know how far this machine which is now planted here when every

other country in Europe has given it up will succeed. Therefore, I say to you, my friends, come on one platform, stand under one flag. It is not a question of today, it is not a question of tomorrow. A statesman looks at least 25 years ahead. I want you to organise yourselves and prepare yourselves to be ready for defence and if necessary to resist any encroachment upon our rights and to play your part in emergency that may arise at any time in the course of next 25 years. This is the task before you”.

Communalist Bogey

“Nobody has ever helped not even this mighty High Command of the Congress. What interests have they taken in Musalmans’ welfare, economic, social, political and educational? Hundreds and hundreds of schools are going on among the Hindus. Many are the institutions of economic uplift of the Hindus. During the last 30 years what special interest was taken for this backward community, numerically small, financially bankrupt, economically nil and educationally most backward? On what occasion the Congress really took up any real and particular question of special interest to the Musalmans so that they may be encouraged? When we say we want to organise our people because under the present condition Musalmans must organise themselves not to fight anybody but to cooperate. We are ready to cooperate and in fact we are anxious to cooperate and want cooperation. We want to serve our motherland just like any other body and organise ourselves. And we thought it was high time if we tried to put our house in order. And when our representatives were returned on the ticket of the Muslim League what was the answer? The answer was “Surrender, sign our pledge, agree to our programme, liquidate the Muslim League and we will give you some Ministries.” This is the answer. While I am trying to raise this one big wonderful part of India, this great community which is adrift, when I am trying to put life into them to organise them and bring them together, this is the attitude that is adopted. And in conclusion I am told I am a communalist. The answer was if I am communalist because I am doing all this I am very proud to be a communalist”. (Cheers)

Defence of Congress Attack

“When the Congress Press was exhausted by repeating and calling me communalist, they thought they will find out some other slogan. It is getting stale because this fellow says I am proud to be communalist. Well they found out another slogan. Muslim League is reactionary where there are so many toadies. There may be some toadies, I do not deny. But let me tell you these people who attack us today know perfectly well that it is absolutely untrue to blame the Muslim League and call it reactionary. There are lakhs and lakhs of people who are members of the Muslim League and it is in their hands to direct it, it is their right to choose their leaders or dismiss their leaders. It is in their hands and I hope that we shall soon be able to show that we are in a position now to choose our leaders, our office bearers and choose our men according to our own choice. They will be the representatives of the Musalmans and command their respect. But when we say we have got some toadies I would like to know how many crooks and cranks there are in the Congress. Well they are also getting tired now of repeating the slogan that we are reactionary because

(they know) what, after all, is the good of shouting that which is not true. So now the latest slogan is that we are fanatics and we are encouraging fanaticism. While the answer to every grievance, every complaint, every criticism is that Musalmans are fanatics, they are goondas and they are out to create disorder. This is the answer now. We have come to this state. We have gone through three stages—communalists, reactionaries and now fanatics. Well let us hope that we shall live down this charge also and show them that we are a disciplined, well organised people and we can be equal to anybody else in organisation.”

“In conclusion,” he said, “look far ahead. You have to play a big part in the destinies of this country. We love this country but as a free citizen along with other free citizens not as a subordinate or a slave to anybody else (cheers). I am sure and I am confident that it will be realised and I feel confident that our Hindu brethren will join hands with us and smash this High Command which is the greatest enemy of this country. I do not want to say anything more today. Talk less, let us work, work, work, organise ourselves, harness our resources, create solidarity and unity, make sacrifices in the right sense and I say there is the finest and brightest future for the Musalmans in this country.” (Cheers)

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Abdus Salam Khurshid¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, p. 30

LAHORE, 29 August, 1938

Sir,

I, in connection with the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation have been in very close touch with the Muslim students. I always try my best to make them believe in the justification of the existence of the Muslim League. They agree with me. They express full confidence in your leadership. What makes them revolt against the League is the presence of “title-holders” in your Working Committee. They say and, to a great extent, I agree with them, that these title-holders will never take part in any direct action against the British Imperialism, which may be launched by the Muslim League.

The British Government always consults the Congress leaders about the important political problems of the day but never consults the Muslim League leaders. The attitude of the Government is too hostile towards us. In spite of this, that element dominates the League which has eternal relations with the British Government. These people should either renounce their titles or should quit the League.

Moreover, the Working Committee of the A.I.M.L. does not contain a sufficient progressive element. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan is mainly responsible for the popularisation of the League in the Punjab. Still he has not been taken. Maulana Hasrat Mohani is another example. No organisation of the Muslim masses can live without having a firm

belief in resorting to "direct action" and two above-mentioned personalities will be extremely helpful to the League in this connection.

It is against my conscience to bring these things in the Press or on the platform. As a true and sincere Leaguer I must come to you. I assure you that I am a Leaguer first, a Leaguer last and none but a Leaguer. For this very reason I wish you to reply to this letter and thus satisfy me for this question is puzzling my mind a great deal. Moreover, I would like to know your views about the Pakistan movement, for it is getting a great prominence in the Punjab Province. The scheme seems to be quite plausible.

Yours sincerely,
ABDUS SALAM KHURSHID

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1. Abdus Salam Khurshid, General Secretary, Punjab Muslim Students' Federation.

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Report on political events in Bihar during the second half of August, 1938 [Extract]

Home-Poll., F. 18-8/38, pp. 1-2

1. There has been a further deterioration in the communal situation since my last report. A riot took place at village Konand in the Bihar Subdivision on the 16th instant. The trouble arose out of the decision of the local Mohammadans to open a slaughter house in the village and in the ensuing riot 6 Hindus received gun shot wounds and one a removed wound while one Mohammadan died of injuries received and a number of others received minor injuries. This incident caused acute tension in Bihar town for both sides began to collect arms in anticipation of the coming Ganesh Puja festival and it became necessary for the authorities to take drastic steps including the impounding of all arms in the town. Apprehension then spread to Patna where there have been persistent rumours for the last fortnight of preparations for violence. This necessitated unusual precautions for the Ganesh Puja festival on the 31st. The emergency scheme was put into operation and forces of armed and mounted police were drafted into the city. The District Magistrate invoked the aid of leading members of both communities and delegates from each side accompanied all processions and were posted at all mosques. Steps were also taken to round up goondas. As a result of the precautions the festival passed off yesterday, 31st August, without incident. There is also some apprehension at Giridih where the Muslim League has been very active. The position at Ekaria in Monghyr district continues to cause anxiety. Leaflets have been distributed in the neighbourhood announcing that if the order promulgated by Government under Section 144 is not withdrawn by the 31st of August, the Mohammadans will defy it and kill cows. A force of 30 armed police and two troops of mounted police have been on the spot for the last 10 days and some arrests have been made under Section 107 Criminal Procedure Code. A feeling of apprehension

of communal conflict exists throughout the Province but at the same time good sense seems to have dawned in several parts after the sad spectacle of the Bhagalpur riots. On the 15th at Kishanganj (Purnea) where largely attended processions organised by Muslim League volunteers are a weekly feature, one Jahan Ali moved about with an axe in hand proclaiming that he would commit suicide if the two communities did not become friends. On the 24th, a peaceful Muslim League procession shouting unusual slogans e.g., Hindu Muslim Ittihad and Police Zindabad moved about the town. In the town of Muzaffarpur where communal tension prevailed, the leading Hindus and Muslims assembled together in a public meeting and decided to maintain peace and concord. The Hindu processions such as Janmashtami, the Behula, the Ganesh Puja and the *Mahabiri Jhanda*, which fall in this part of the year passed off peacefully. A joint appeal has been made by the leaders of both communities in the Province urging their followers to remain peaceful.

2. Muslim League activity has increased generally and enrolment is proceeding in nearly all the districts. In Saran intensive organisation has been taken up in the Gopalganj Subdivision under the leadership of Ghazi Abdul Samad of Hardoi (United Provinces) who is reported to have been creating trouble between Mohammadans and Hindus and trying to bring false allegations against Hindu officials. Early in the month he took out a procession at Gopalganj singing slogans which were very objectionable to the Hindus. In Bhagalpur district League volunteers in uniform have started visiting villages for propaganda and enrolment of volunteers. In Saran district a leaflet has been distributed on behalf of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama of Delhi asking Muslims to start civil disobedience if attention is not paid to their protests on the Palestine question. In Monghyr district of Teghra, hand-written leaflets, purporting to have been written on behalf of the Muslim League, were found asking people to renounce Hinduism or get out of India and threatening that there would shortly be no trace of a Hindu temple left in this country. Attempts are now being made to win the Momins back to the Muslim League fold. Recently in Saran 50 Momins declared their allegiance to Congress while in Darbhanga a meeting of 250 resolved that they had nothing to do either with the Congress or the Muslim League and decided to ignore politics. These signs of defection are worrying the Muslim League and an appeal has recently been issued by some leading Mohammadans of Bihar and Bengal stressing the danger of a split in the Mohammadan ranks and urging all Momins to stand together with the League. But the most dangerous and difficult feature of the Muslim League activities is their holding their meetings in the mosques where shorthand police reporters cannot be sent to report speeches. About 2,500 Muslims assembled at the Juma Mosque at Gaya on the 13th August where Mr. Ashique¹ told them that some mosques were taken possession of by Hindus and that Messrs. Gandhi and Nehru were determined to have cows protected at any cost. He referred to the Tilokri incident which is subjudice. At a meeting held inside the Fataullah mosque in Ranchi the audience was told that the lives and properties of Mohammadans were not safe in the hands of Hindu Executive officers. At Qilaghat mosque in Darbhanga the audience was told that the Hindu, who had killed some Mohammadans with a revolver at Bhagalpur and whose case was subjudice, had made a confession that several Hindus had been selected for killing Mohammadans.

In meetings that are held outside the mosque the Muslims resent the presence of police reporters. In one of such meetings a C.I.D reporter was roughly handled.

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1. Ashique Hussain; Member of the Council of All India Muslim League.

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Thomas Stewart to Brabourne [Extract]

Brabourne Papers No. 6, pp. 12-14, Bihar Report

7 September, 1938

SECRET

NO. 985-G-B

My dear Lord Brabourne,

1. The Communal situation continues to be a source of anxiety though the decisions taken in the Council of Ministers last week encourage me to think that it will not get out of hand. Hindu-Muslim antagonism is, of course, always with us though for a long period it may lie dormant. That this antagonism should be so pronounced at the present time I attribute to the following causes. The advent of a Congress Ministry has been regarded by the Muslim as the institution of Hindu—and therefore anti-Muslim—Raj and the time was, therefore, propitious for the campaign which the Muslim League has launched with great vigour—and, I fear, venom—in order to foster the “class consciousness” of the Mohammadans. Muslim League activities have ostensibly been political in their aim but it has been impossible with a comparatively uneducated, and certainly fanatically inclined following to keep on the purely political plane. The principal manifestation of Muslim class consciousness has been the traditional effort to exalt the Muslim religion at the expense of Hinduism by asserting an unrestricted right of cow-slaughter. On the Hindu side there has been no similar widespread organisation against the Muslims. On the contrary the Hindu Sabha has been strangely quiescent in the face of grave provocation from the Mohammadan side. At the same time the coming of the Congress Raj was interpreted by the Hindus as it was by the Muslims and they have become individually, and in local informal associations, much more assertive of their rights *vis-a-vis* the Muslims. In other words the Hindus have “got their tails up.” This attitude of the Hindus has been encouraged by the lack of discipline within the ranks of Congress in this Province. On their own dunghills individual M.L.A.’s crow loudly with a fine disregard of the policy of their leaders and the tension leading to the recent riot in Bhagalpur was probably due as much to the incitation of the Hindus by local Congressmen as to the machinations of the Muslim League. The general result is that in many places throughout the Province the two communities are straining to be at one another’s throats and elsewhere are in that state of apprehensiveness which on the slightest provocation may change to positive aggression.

2. That was the appreciation of the situation which was laid before the Council of Ministers for their consideration. Some slight attempt was made to whitewash the Hindus and to place a greater responsibility on the Muslims (my Muslim Minister was absent) but on the whole no serious objection was taken to this outline of the situation and it was agreed that the Ministry must at once take stock of the position and formulate a plan of campaign. To begin with, it was pointed out to me that the methods of moral persuasion and conciliation had achieved great success in Patna only a day or two before, but when I invited the Ministers themselves to embark on a Province-wide conciliation movement the Prime Minister expressed¹ himself as sceptical of its success and finally it was agreed that District Magistrates should be asked to convene informal conciliation committees whenever any shadow of communal differences was apparent. (Later in the meeting the Prime Minister asked that effect should not be given to this decision until it had been considered by the absent Minister, Dr. Syed Mahmud.)

3. I, thereafter, reminded the Ministers that whereas moral persuasion and conciliation might prove effective in cases such as Patna where there was merely apprehension of trouble on both sides similar success was not necessarily to be expected in other places where both parties were inclined to be aggressive. There were two principal occasions on which outbreaks of disorder were likely to occur: (a) processions and (b) cowslaughter. My Chief Secretary had prepared a note showing what had been the policy of Government in the past in dealing with such occurrences. (I forward the note as an appendix to this letter.) I asked the Ministers whether they considered it desirable to make any modification in the policy of their predecessors but they showed no hesitation in endorsing past practice. They declared themselves as liberally minded men who would not personally object to open cowslaughter; but they were realists enough to see that recognition of such a practice by Government would invite the most serious results.

1. The reference is obviously to Shri Krishna Sinha who was Prime Minister of Bihar from 1937 to 1939.

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Chief Secretary to the Government of Sind to Thorne [Extract]

Home Department (Special), F. No., P-25-H(S)/38

SIND SECRETARIAT, KARACHI, 16 September, 1938

My dear Thorne,

2. Mr. V.D. Savarkar, President of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, visited Sind during the fortnight. During his stay for about a week, he visited Hyderabad, Karachi and Sukkur. In his speeches he appealed to the Hindus to join and strengthen the Hindu Sabha, describing it as more nationalist in its outlook than the Congress,

which, he thought, was bargaining at the cost of the Hindus and allowing Muslims an undue advantage through Mr. Gandhi's policy of continued surrender.

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Muslim Chamber of Commerce to James B. Taylor¹

Freedom Movement Archives (Karachi), No. GI.8-2/38, dated the 20 September, 1938

I am directed by the Committee of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce to invite your attention to the Deputy Governor's letter No. C.O.R.654/937-37, dated the 25th June, 1937 and to point out that although assured that Muslim representation in the vacancies and promotion in the Bank's service would receive due and fair consideration, nothing tangible has been done so far by you to give effect to this assurance. On the contrary we have reason to believe that the situation has deteriorated since then, and claims for promotion of qualified and senior Muslims have been systematically ignored. Representations made by Muslim employees drawing your attention to their legitimate claims for promotion have received no consideration. If a just and equitable settlement of this question is not arrived at soon the suspicion that it is the policy of the Central Board of Directors to restrict Muslim recruitment in the Bank as also to supersede claims of Muslim employees for promotion is likely to gain substantial force.

You will appreciate that Muslim employees ask for no special favour in claiming their legitimate rights for promotion after having given ample testimony of their fitness in the Bank's service. The question of "undue preponderance in any office or category of staff" referred in the letter quoted above does not arise considering that Muslims have been denied even their due share in the Bank's service.

It is difficult to ignore facts. There are only 2 Muslim Officers against 34 Non-Muslims. My Committee are not prepared to believe that no Muslim can be found fit enough to hold the post of a Senior Superintendent nor can it admit that only one Muslim has so far been found fit to be promoted a Junior Superintendent, as against many non-Muslims. The Calcutta Office has no Junior or Senior Superintendent despite the fact that senior and qualified Muslims are available.

Instances can be cited where non-Muslims recruited on Rs. 45 and Rs. 60 have been given rapid promotions and made Senior Superintendent and Accountants drawing salaries of Rs. 300 and Rs. 400 each. This has not been possible for Muslim employees of the Bank for reasons which are patent and require no elucidation at this stage.

Muslims have been given no scope or opportunity for training. They have been tied down to one particular type of work and thus deprived of gaining experience of other work in the Bank so that when the time for promotion comes the blame, that no experienced Muslim is available, is laid at their doors. My Committee are satisfied that there is no dearth of qualified Muslims fit for special training, and yet it has taken the Bank three and half years to select one solitary Muslim for training.

It is requested that you will be good enough to initiate special inquiries as regards the recruitment for and the promotions in the service of the Bank and it is hoped that unjust obstacle in the way of Muslims will be removed at an early date.

Questions in the Council of State

104. The Honourable Mr. Abdur Razzak Hajee Abdus Sattar: Will Government be pleased to state:

(a) The number of clerks employed in each of the upper and lower divisions of the clerical cadre of the Reserve Bank of India in each of the areas of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay?

(b) How many of the clerks in each division (upper and lower) and in each area, are Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and Anglo-Indians?

(c) Whether the orders of the Government of India providing for the appointment of Muslims in all branches of public service has been given full effect to in filling the posts of clerks on all the branches of the Reserve Bank of India? If not, why not?

The Honourable Mr. A.J. Raisman: (a) and (b) Government have no information.

(c) The recruitment of the staff of the Reserve Bank is entirely a matter for the Central Board of the Bank.

The Honourable Mr. Hossain Imam: Will Government get the information from the Reserve Bank? Have they asked for it and have they been refused.

The Honourable Mr. A.J. Raisman: No Sir, I see no object in obtaining that information.

The Honourable Mr. Hossain Imam: Is it a fact that this is a statutory body and the Government of India are the residuary legatees of the Reserve Bank?

The Honourable Mr. A.J. Raisman: A body created by Statute need have nothing to do with Government. I do not say that is the position of the Reserve Bank but I would not accept the statement that Government is the "residuary legatee" of the Reserve Bank.

Questions in the Legislative Assembly (Central):

182. *Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi:* Will the Honourable the Finance Member be pleased to state:

(a) the number of clerks employed in each of the higher and lower divisions of the clerical cadre of the Reserve Bank of India and in each of the areas of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay;

(b) how many of the clerks in each division and in such areas are Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and Anglo-Indians; and

(c) whether the Government of India circular for providing Muslims against 33 per cent of the vacancies has been acted upon in filling the posts of clerks in the Reserve Bank's Branches all over India? If not, why not?

The Honourable Sir James Grigg: (a) and (b) Government have no information.

(c) The recruitment of the staff of the Reserve Bank is entirely a matter for the Central Board of the Bank.

Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad: Will the Government collect the information on this point?

The Honourable Sir James Grigg: No, Sir.

Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad: Why?

The Honourable Sir James Grigg: Government have no responsibility for the staff and it would be rather a waste of money to collect information which in any case so far as Government action is concerned can never have any relevance.

Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad: May I draw the attention of the Honourable Member of the assurance given by the then Finance Member while discussing the Reserve Bank Bill that the Government will see that the interests of Minorities will not suffer in regard to employment in the Bank.

The Honourable Sir James Grigg: Will the Honourable Member show me the exact terms of such assurance?

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1. Sir James B. Taylor, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta.

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Matin (Abdul Matin Chaudhary) to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 160/50

SHILLONG, 22 September, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I sent you a wire a few days ago but could not write to you in detail.

I am sending herewith two statements, one from Subhas Bose and another from our combination which will explain the past developments. The position at present is this. Congress Coalition has 51 members, we have 53. They are still short of three to make up their majority. This is why they are making desperate attempts to capture three members from our group. They have reserved three Ministerships for any three Musalmans who would care to desert us and join them. So far even the bait of a Ministership each has failed to tempt the Musalmans. We think the 31 Musalmans (out of 34) that we have got in our combination (22 Muslim League, 9 United Muslim) will stand firm and united.

Congress is afraid of facing the Assembly with their Minority of 51 as against our 56. This is why the Congress Speaker of the Assembly adjourned it *sine die* on the 19th, while the present session according to the list of business would have terminated on the 22nd. The Puja holidays begin from the 27th September to 10th October and the Speaker proposes to hold the adjourned meeting on the 12th October. To even this, the Congress is opposed, as they want to delay the holding of the session as long as they can to continue their attempt of securing adherents. Fifty-six of us have submitted a requisition to the Speaker, giving notice of No Confidence Motions, also requesting him to summon the Assembly not later than the 12th October, as offices report after Puja holidays on the 11th.

MATIN

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*Minutes of All India Congress Committee**The Indian Annual Register, 1938 Pt. II, p. 279*

The following resolutions were moved by the members of the A.I.C.C. held on 24-26 September, 1938.

(1) Hindustani

Whereas the question of a common language for the whole of India is of supreme importance and whereas the Hindi-Urdu controversy has taken a very communal turn and whereas the position taken up by the Indian National Congress is not properly appreciated, this Committee reiterates that the Indian National Congress stands for Hindustani written in both Devanagari and Persian scripts as the National Language of India and directs all Congressmen to popularise Hindustani and to desist from taking part in the Hindi-Urdu controversy. The A.I.C.C. hereby appoints a 'Hindustani Board,' with powers to co-opt, consisting of the following to prepare an exhaustive scheme for the development of Hindustani and submit their report to this Committee before the next annual session of the I.N.C.:

1. Dr. Rajendra Prasad (Chairman), 2. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 3. Acharya Narendra Deo, 4. Babu Purshottam Das Tandon, 5. Prof. Abdus Sattar Siddiqi,¹ 6. Dr. Tara Chand,² 7. Dr. Syed Hussain, 8. Dr. Abdul Aleem, 9. Pandit Sunderlal.³

The Working Committee accepted the resolution on Hindustani minus the Committee portion of it. Several amendments were moved to the main resolution but all were defeated as also the main resolution.

(2) *Congress-Muslim League Negotiations*: This meeting of the All India Congress Committee strongly disapproves of the policy of certain prominent Congressmen including the Congress President to start negotiations with the President of the All India Muslim League, as the move has served, without any redeeming feature, to enhance the prestige of anti-national and reactionary forces in the country and to undermine the influence of the nationalist Muslim wing in the circle of organising the masses on a national and economic basis.

The resolution was defeated by a heavy majority.

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1. Prof. Abdus Sattar Siddiqi; General Secretary, Reception Committee, All India Muslim Students, Federation, Nagar; Secretary, Editorial Board, *The Awakening*, an organ of Students' Federation.
 2. Dr. Tara Chand (1888-); Vice-Chancellor Allahabad University, 1947-48; Education Adviser, Government of India, 1948-51; India's Ambassador in Iran, 1951-56; Member of Parliament, 1957-67; a well-known historian and author of several books including *History of Freedom Movement* in four volumes.
 3. Pandit Sunderlal (1886-); participated in the freedom movement; President, U.P. Provincial Political Conference, 1930; Vice-President, UPPPC, 1931-36; President, All India Peace Council, 1959-63.

*Wali Hasson Duraini's Statement**Jayarakash Narayan Papers*

Bhagalpur, 27 September, 1938. Really it is a theme for us that we Hindus and Musalmans instead of freeing our motherland from iron grip of Imperialism and capitalism are fighting and killing together for cow sacrifice and music before mosque question, while the world is labouring hard for freedom, power, supremacy and bread.

We are daily reading in the papers that imperialist, Fascist powers of the world are brutally killing and bombarding to usurp the freedom of China, Spain and Palestine. Yet we Indians are strengthening imperialism by our action, policy and deeds, although this is the best time for achieving the freedom of our motherland. India got this opportunity in 1914 but the British diplomacy beguiled and entrapped us and we played into the enemy's hand. But again after a long time the present international situation has placed India into the same advantageous position, Chamberlain or Daladier¹ or Halifax or Runciman² may bow before Hitler³ or Mussolini, the British Conservative Party may surrender but no one can check the European War. War must come.

So this time we should avail of the opportunity and free our motherland. We know like Mr. Lloyd George⁴ the present Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, will also promise to give India everything but we should not be entrapped this time in the spider's web. We should unite and adopt the same policy as Lenin⁵ did in Russian Revolution of 1917 when Nicholas II, the Czar of Russia, was entangled in the World War. There are two most fundamental points to deal, consider and to act. First of all to solve the present internal unrest and communal feeling for ever, that is the cow sacrifice and music before mosque problem and secondly to unite all the communities and political parties of India to make a united anti-imperialist Front as Mr. Azana and Chiang-kai-Shek⁶ have organised to save the freedom of their countries. Regarding the first point our veteran patriot like Dr. M.A. Ansari, Pandit Motilal Nehru,⁷ Mr. Srinivasa Ayengar, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. Rangaswami Ayengar and others by their far-sighted statesmanship and hard labour been able to make a constructive proposal to wipe out bitter communal feeling for ever from India. Their suggestions were unanimously adopted in the form of resolution in the opening session of the Madras Congress that was held in 1927 under the Presidentship of Dr. A.M. Ansari. The resolution runs thus: "this Congress resolves that without prejudice to the right that the Hindus and Musalmans claim, the one to play music and conduct procession wherever they please, and the other to slaughter for sacrifice for food where they the Musalman appeal to the Musalman to share Hindu feelings as much as possible in the matter of cows and the Hindus appeal to the Hindus to share Musalman feeling as much as possible in the matter of music before mosque, and, therefore, this Congress calls upon both Hindus and Musalmans not to have the course to violence or to law, to prevent the slaughter of a cow or to playing music before mosque."

This historic resolution of the I.N. (Indian National) Congress of 1927 retranslated into legislation. There should be definite clause that anybody breaking this law or doing against it, by his action, deeds, speech or writing, will be liable to suffer imprisonment for three years or more and a fine of Rs. 500 or more. When this resolution will be translated into law, the communalist, selfish and the allies of the imperialist, will not be able to do any mischief in India, and thus India will be free from communal feeling, fight and bloodshed for ever.

The second is that we should launch an All India Programme within and outside and unite all the extremist, Radical Socialist element on one platform and make a united front in the same way as the China, Palestine, Spain, Czechoslovakia have done and they give a bold and united fight to British imperialism and capitalism. These are the only practical constructive solution for programme for us to free our motherland from the firm grip of imperialism and capitalism.

Yours sincerely,
WALI HASSON DURAINI
Bhagalpur

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1. Daladier, E. (1884-1970); French Politician; Member, Radical Socialist Party for many years; Prime Minister and Minister for National Defence, 1938-40; arrested in September, 1940 and deported to Germany; freed by Allies, 1945; Member National Assembly of France, 1946-48.
 2. Walter Runnican (1870-1949); British Conservative politician; acted with little success as mediator between the Czech Government and the Sudeten Germans in August-September, 1938.
 3. Adolf Hitler (1884-1945); leader of National Socialist German Workers Party; appointed Chancellor of the German Reich, 1933; Head of the German State, 1934; Commander-in-Chief of German Fighting Forces, 1938; Supreme War Lord of Germany since 1942.
 4. David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, 1916-22.
 5. Lenin (1870-1924); The architect of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia of 1917.
 6. Generalissimo Chiang-kai-Shek, President of the National Supreme War Council of China; Member of Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
 7. Motilal Nehru (1861-1931); leading advocate of Allahabad High Court; President of the Congress 1919 and 1928; participated the Non-Cooperation movement, 1920 and served several terms of imprisonment; founder with C.R. Das, of the Swaraj Party and its leader in the Central Assembly, 1923; attended All Parties Conference, Delhi, 1928; appointed its President and author of Nehru Report.

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Moonje's Statement

The Amrita Bazar Patrika, Moonje Papers

27 September, 1938

"In reply to the Congress offer for cooperation in the formation of a Ministry in

Assam, my friend and former colleague of the Central Assembly, Mr. Abdul Matin Chaudhury, Secretary of the Assam Muslim League, has given a spirited reply in the negative. I admire the grit and the acute sense of communal self-respect of the Muslims," says Dr. B.S. Moonje in a statement to the Associated Press.

He adds, "Muslims have proved and demonstrated their innate worth and determination for preservation and dominance of their communal life in the world's hard struggle for existence on the well-known principle of the survival of the fittest. The Muslims and their Muslim League disdain to treat with the Congress until the Congress would come down to admit their claim, as formulated by Mr. Jinnah of complete equality of status with the Congress as the sole representative of the Muslim nation in India, competing with the Hindu nation for recognition and dominance. "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has already injured the interest of the Congress, on the issue of the Constitutional principle of joint responsibility of Ministries by agreeing to reserve two seats in the Assam Ministry for the majority party of the Muslim League to be selected by themselves. Now what is left for the nationalists Muslims of Assam? Is this not tantamount to driving them straight into the parlour of the Muslim League? What is the meaning and worth of the Muslim Mass Contact Movement? Who will have the courage to face the peril of the Muslim wrath? The next step in the downward incline plane towards complete surrender to Mr. Jinnah is not now very far and difficult journey.

"There is yet another aspect of the question. The demand of complete equality of status with the Congress, coupled with the mentality as exhibited in the opposition of Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League in respect of the recently passed Anti-Recruitment Bill for the maintenance of their percentage of 60 to 70 in the Army, as viewed in the light of events happening in Czechoslovakia ought to open the eyes of the Hindus; for human nature, in its essence is the same, whether in Europe, or in India or in Asia. No people can brave the risks of struggle for existence, who have not developed the strong exclusive sense of their communal separateness and identity as the Muslims, the Sudetans, or the Czechs have. But who can extricate the Congress from the mire of inferiority complex and surrender to rank communalism into which it has most unfortunately sunk.

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Bose to Jinnah

Congress Government, p. 263

2 October, 1938

Your letter of the 2nd August, 1938, has been placed before the Working Committee. After due deliberation it has resolved to reply as follows:

"Though there are inaccuracies in your letter no purpose will be served by dwelling upon them. The substance of your letter seems to be that the League does not expect

the Congress, whether implicitly or explicitly, to acknowledge its status as the authoritative Muslim organisation of India. If this view is accepted by the League, I am authorised to state that the Working Committee will confer with the Committee that may be appointed by the League to draw up the terms of settlement. The Working Committee will be represented by at least five of its members at the sittings of the Conference. As the previous correspondence has already been released for publication, I am taking the liberty of issuing this to the Press."

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Minutes of Melapalaiyam Adidravidas Conference [Extract]

Freedom Movement Archives, F. 469

GANESAPURAM, 7 October, 1938

Resolutions passed at the conference of the Adidravidas of Tinnevely, held at Melapalaiyam on 7 October, 1938, under the Presidentship of Janab R.M.A.L. Farouk Sahib, Secretary, Muslim League, Tinnevely.

4. This conference is of opinion that the Tamilnad Harijan Seva Sanghs are bogus institutions in the name of which the Brahmins and Caste Hindus exploit the depressed classes to their advantage and this meeting requests the Government and H.E. The Governor of Madras to dissolve the Harijan Seva Sangh used as subterfuges for the political exploitation of the unfortunate dumb millions of the depressed classes, if the system of their working is not revised so as to be useful entirely for the welfare and benefit of the depressed classes.

5. This Conference, while placing on record their deep sense of gratitude for the unmitigating labours of Janab M.A. Jinnah, M.L.A. in the cause of the poor people apart from the Muslims, earnestly requests him not to enter into a pact with the Congress unless and until the Poona Pact¹ is abrogated and separate electorate is restored to the Scheduled Classes.

6. Whereas this Conference is of opinion that Mr. Gandhi has done incalculable and irreparable injury to the cause of the depressed classes by depriving them of the separate electorate conferred on them by His Majesty's Government and substituting joint electorate for them by resorting to hunger strike and Machiavellian strategy and political subterfuge for which no one is equal to him in this country, and whereas this conference expresses its distrust and disappointment in the Congress, with having secured political power and supremacy is utilising them for defeating the aspirations and ambitions the dumb millions it resolves to request H.E. The Governor of Madras, H.E. The Viceroy of India and His Majesty's Government to abrogate the joint electorate resultant from the Poona Pact and restore separate electorate at once on which alone their redemption and political emancipation depend, till equality of social status is achieved by them.

7. Whereas this conference is of opinion that the measure of the Government in

compulsory Hindi in Hindustani schools with the ulterior purpose of making it a national language is likely to prejudice the progress and education of the depressed classes pupils of this Presidency, this conference requests the Government to drop it altogether at as an early date as possible.

8. This conference enters upon an emphatic protest against the action of the Congress Government in having resorted to the use of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in dealing with the *Satyagrahis* of Anti-Hindi agitation.

S. Periaswamy,
Organising Secretary
(Sd/-) R.M.A.L. FAROUK,
President

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1. When, in August 1932, the British announced the 'Communal Award' Gandhiji rejected separate electorates for 'depressed classes' and went on a fast unto death. The imbroglio was ended by the Poona Pact, which modified the Award. B.R. Ambedkar, a spokesman of the untouchables, agreed to it with great mental reservations which turned him increasingly critical of caste Hindu chauvinism and not overtly averse to Pakistan.

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Resolutions adopted at the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference

Pakistan Movement, pp. 193-196

KARACHI, 7 October, 1938

Whereas the refusal on the part of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress to negotiate a communal settlement with the All India Muslim League, on the plea that the All India Muslim League is not the sole representative body of the Musalmans of India, indicates the Congress resolve to perpetually divide and rule the Muslim community, and thus once more the prospects of an amicable and peaceful solution of the Indian Minorities problem, for which the League has tried in vain for more than 15 years.

Whereas the Congress by means of its powerful Press and purse, launched a campaign of Muslim Mass Contact to cause disruption and division in the Muslim community with the object of deceiving the world into the belief that it is the sole representative organisation of entire India.

Whereas it has deliberately established purely Hindu rule in certain Provinces by forming Ministries either without Muslim Ministers or with Muslim Ministers having no following among Muslim Members, in direct and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Instrument of Instructions.

Whereas the Ministries so formed have established a sort of rule which has for its aim the intimidation and demoralisation of Muslims, the extermination of the healthy

and nation building influence of Muslim culture, the suppression of Muslim religious customs and their religious obligations and elimination of their political rights as a separate community.

Whereas it has, in open defiance of the democratic principles, persistently endeavoured to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and impotent in the North-Western Provinces, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind by trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition Ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslim members and the Muslim masses of those Provinces.

Whereas Congress has superimposed the authority of its High Command, a sort of Fascist dictatorship, over the working of the Congress Ministries to prevent the healthy growth of parliamentary conventions and establishment of constitutional traditions, to deprive the Muslims of their due share and have refused to reconstitute ministries in consonance with the Constitution, having due regard to the rights and interests of Muslims.

Whereas the Congress have decided (a) to enforce Vidya Mandir Scheme in the teeth of Muslim opposition; (b) to foist the *Bande Mataram* on Muslims and others as a National Anthem in callous disregard of the feeling of Muslims who consider the song as not only idolatrous but it is in origin and conception a hymn of hatred to Muslims; (c) to make Hindi with Devanagiri script as the *lingua franca* of India in total defiance of the protests and wishes of the Minorities with a view to inculcate Hindu religious ideas, philosophy and culture and establish dominance of Brahmanic culture in India; (d) to introduce and enforce joint electorates in local bodies with the strength of their majority and thus deprive Muslims of securing their true representation; (e) to close Urdu schools wherever possible and discourage the teaching of the Urdu language and thus ultimately wipe it off; (f) to suppress freedom of Press and freedom of speech and legitimate action under the pretext of preventing incitement to violence and maintenance of law and order; (g) to interfere with the age-long religious privileges and usages of the Muslim community by force of arms and resort to repressive measures.

Whereas the majority community of India has fostered and maintained since thousands of years a rigid caste system of theirs which is a negative of nationalism, equality, democracy and all the noble ideals that the modern world aspires to and stands for and which system has further superimposed social and economic inequalities upon a vast body of the people of this country and reduced millions of them to the position of irredeemable helots.

And whereas the evolution of a single united India and united Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and common ideals being impossible of realisation on account of the caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim policy of the majority community, and also on account of acute differences of religion, language, script, culture, social laws and outlook on life of the two major communities and even of race in certain parts.

This Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interest of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to All India Muslim

League to review and revise the entire question of what should be a suitable Constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status due to them, and that this conference, therefore, recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence.

Further this conference records its emphatic disapproval of the scheme of the All India Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, and is opposed to its introduction and urges upon the British Government to refrain from its enforcement as it considers the scheme to be detrimental to the interests of the people of India generally and those of the Muslims in particular.

That this conference further declares that no Constitution by whomsoever framed will be acceptable to the Muslims of India unless it conforms to the principle enunciated above and is prepared in consultation with and accepted by All India Muslim League.

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Jinnah's Presidential Address at Sind League Conference [Extract]

Nations Voice, pp. 282-286

Karachi, 8 October, 1938. "The struggle that we are carrying on is not merely for loaves and fishes, Ministerships and jobs, nor are we opposed to the economic, social and educational uplift of our countrymen as it is falsely alleged. We want to make every contribution to the uplift of our people particularly the Musalmans. Do not believe when you are told that the policy and programme of the League is reactionary. No honest man who has studied the policy and programme of the League can conscientiously and truthfully say that it is anything but fully national and most progressive. Yet Muslim League and its leaders are daily misrepresented and vilified. Truth is suppressed and falsehood is broadcast in the Congress Press and news agencies; of course, we having no Press. But the greatest misfortune of India is that the High Command of the Congress has adopted a most brutal, oppressive and inimical attitude towards the All India Muslim League since they secured the majority in the six Provinces."

"After they decided to accept office and work the Constitution when we were ready and offered our hand of cooperation as we had already made it clear before and after the elections also, the first demand was that the League must liquidate itself and we were told that it represents nobody except few estimable middle class gentlemen. And secondly the decision was taken that we must be treated as an anathema and the League groups in the various Legislatures were boycotted by the Congress. And the members of the League party in the Legislatures were to be treated as untouchables and that no one was to be included in the Ministry of those Provinces from amongst the representatives of the League party unless they unconditionally signed the pledge, the policy, and the programme of the Congress which, honestly speaking, is much worse than that of the All India Muslim League and more communal, in fact, except that we stand for the adequate and effective

safeguards for the rights and interests of the Musalmans and that we do not agree with false creed of 'truth and non-violence' which is observed and honoured more in breach. They were asked to abjure their party and forego their creed, policy and programme which is far more honest and straight forward and practical."

"They started in the Legislatures with a song of *Bande Mataram* which is not only idolatrous but in its origin and substance a hymn to spread hatred for the Musalmans. And they in their wisdom tried and are persisting now and compelling the school authorities to sing *Bande Mataram* at congregations and school gatherings although it is admitted that it is not a National Song. They have persistently hoisted tri-colour flags in a most aggressive and offensive manner on all Government and public institutions irrespective of the feelings of others although it is admitted that it is not a National Flag. They started 'the Muslim Mass Contact' which is not only silly but dangerous and some wiseacre amongst them think that this will bring about the destruction of the Communal Award or at any rate nullify its object and destroy the true strength of Muslim representation in the various Legislatures and further thereby force every Muslim to submit to the membership of the Congress. They have been forcing radical changes in the educational system of the Provinces and to run the department on Wardha Scheme which has assumed the name of Vidya Mandir and make Hindi compulsory in the guise of Hindustani but highly Sanskritised as '*lingua franca*' of India and leave no stone unturned to suppress Urdu which is the language of the largest number of Musalmans in India and thus give a death-blow to their culture and their solidarity."

"Every available post or job is reserved for the Congressmen or those Musalmans who are prepared to desert or vilify the League. The 'Civil Liberties' has assumed new definition. That in the absence of Swadeshi laws, 'lawless and reactionary laws' such as the 'Criminal Law Amendment Act' and 'Section 144' are to be freely utilized against those persons who disobey or differ from the Congress Ministries and particularly in the case of the members of the Muslim League. Measures are brought in, bills have been passed and laws have been enacted which are obviously highly detrimental to the interests of the Musalmans, for instance amendments of the franchise system of voting and representation of Minorities in Municipal, Local and District Boards. The Muslim Press is terrorized under threat of penalty of forfeiture of securities and in some cases the obnoxious executive orders have been passed and securities of some Muslim Urdu papers have been forfeited. Is this the national programme that is being pursued for the advancement of the people of this country which will achieve freedom and independence of India? If this is the foretaste on the threshold of the limited and restricted authority and power enjoyed by the Congress, I shudder to think what would be the fate of ninety millions of Musalmans in this country if the Congress were in-charge of full and plenary powers of the Government of India; and yet the other day the President of the Congress had the temerity in speaking at the Haripura Congress Session in February 1938 to solemnly ask, 'I would put it to the members of the Minority communities in India to consider dispassionately if they have anything to fear when the Congress programme is put into operation.' So far I have not dealt with the cases of maltreatment and tyranny and persecution regarding which columns and columns have been filled by newspapers—specially in three

Provinces of Bihar, U.P. and C.P. and we are awaiting the report of the committee that has been appointed. I hope that the report will be out before the next session of Muslim League in December 1938."

"It is common knowledge that the average Congressman whether he is a member by conviction or 'convenience' arrogates to himself the role of a ruler of this country and although he does not possess the educational qualifications, training and culture and traditions of the British bureaucrat, he behaves and acts towards the Musalmans in a much worse manner than the British did towards Indians. The Supreme Command may well deplore corruption, untruthfulness and violence and may further deplore the faked register of membership of the Congress by 'convenience.'"

"These are a few characteristic features of the Congress programme so far regarding the Musalmans. But we are told very recently in your city by a high authority that surely the fact that the Governors have not yet thought fit to interfere or exercise their special powers is a proof positive and shows that the Musalmans are not only justly and fairly treated but they are dealt with handsomely and generously. I know that Governor and the Governor-General have failed the Minorities and specially the Musalmans. But on the other hand, we are told that there is a gentlemen's agreement and a secret understanding between the British Government and the Congress in consequence of which assurances were given that such powers will not be exercised, and so it is obvious that the Congress Ministries are getting the longest rope with the result that the foolish policy of the Congress is responsible not only for intense bitterness between the two sister communities but among the various classes and interests. It has resulted in serious clashes and conflicts and ill-will which are bound to recoil in the long run on the progress and welfare of India. It seems that Congress is only tumbling into the hands of those who are looking forward to the creation of a serious situation which will break India vertically and horizontally. But this is not all."

"Now let us turn to Bengal, Punjab and Assam. In these Provinces there happens to be a predominant Muslim voice in the Ministries and hence they are made the target and the object of final destruction by the Congress High Command. In Bengal the move to defeat Fazlul Huq Ministry has ignominiously failed. In Punjab various efforts are made to weaken the Ministry of Sir Sikander Hyat. But in Punjab they have not yet dared to table a No-Confidence Motion because Punjab Ministry cannot yet be bent. In Assam Mr. Saadullah's Ministry resigned. Immediately the Congress President went post-haste with other henchmen and agents to help the birth of a so-called Congress Ministry in utter disregard of all their previous professions and declarations and contrary to their avowed determination to have nothing to do with coalition and he gathered together various groups all and sundry. But in forming the Ministry, Mr. Bordoloi was not able to announce the name of even one of the three Muslim Ministers who were to be included in the Ministry. Apart from the methods adopted further to move the President for adjournment of the Assembly *sine die* was hardly creditable, and for a great party not to face the Legislature knowing full well that they had not the majority at their back was sheer cowardice. It is under threat of suspension of oath-taking ceremony that the President and Congress party agreed to the sessions of the Assembly being called at an early date, and up to the present moment Mr.

Bordoloi has not been able to get more than one of the three Muslim Ministers, and he is still hunting for the remaining two Muslim Ministers. When 56 members of the Assembly out of 107 are not only against the so-called Congress Ministry but have tabled the vote of No-Confidence, I congratulate the President, Mr. Bose, for his statesmanlike achievement for this still-born child which he is now anxious to feed by means of oxygen and bring it to life by appealing to the European planters to come to his rescue."

"The Congress High Command is obsessed with one idea and determined to divide the Musalmans and particularly to break the solidarity of the Muslim League no matter how low they may have to stoop. They have no scruples or any standard or principle in their methods. Their policy is based on arrogance and opportunism and unfortunately they are at the present moment getting the support of a large body of Hindus who have respect for the Congress and they are being fully exploited. Not only that but even Mr. Gandhi who has acquired the spiritual influence over a large body of the Hindu public and with his halo of Mahatma is used by those who surround him. He often tries to get out of the awkward corners by falling back upon his inner voice or the voice of silence and relies upon the fact that he is not even a four-anna member of the Congress: and he deplores corruption, untruthfulness and violence and pleads to his utter helplessness for the decisions of Congress High Command, this grand Fascist Council, the Working Committee which is named 'the shadow cabinet' of a parallel Government of India is supposed to speak on behalf of 'the Indian nation.' Some of its antics remind one of a clown imitating the artist in a circus. During the critical situation about the end of September last this so-called shadow cabinet continually sat in sessions and kept vigil as the All India Congress Committee had entrusted them with a power to take such decisions as they thought proper with regard to the question of India's part in the event of the war breaking out."

"So, to begin with, a sympathetic message was sent by the High Command to the Government of Czechoslovakia and the Mahatma and the Working Committee were continuing the vigil waiting for the Whitehall to approach Mahatma Gandhi. But the war is averted and soon now the vigil will terminate and India must breathe a sign of relief as we are saved from the Congress decision with regard to the war for the moment. So now this is the situation and position that we have to face. It is no use relying upon anyone else. We must stand on our own inherent strength and build up our own power and forge sanctions behind our decisions. Today we are told that even for the purpose of a settlement of Hindu-Muslim question we do not represent the Musalmans of India and we are required to prove the position and status of ours by 'service and merits' before the mighty High Command. Gentlemen! the meaning is clear. It is no use our blaming others, it is no use our accusing our opponents only, it is no use our expecting our enemies to behave differently. If the Musalmans are going to be defeated in their national goal and aspirations, it will only be by the betrayal of the Musalmans among us as it has happened in the past. For the renegades and traitors I have nothing to say. They can do their worst. But I appeal most fervently to those Musalmans who honestly feel for their community and its welfare and those who are misled or misguided and indifferent to come on to the platform of the

Muslim League and work under its flag, and please close your rank and file and stand solid and united at any and all costs and speak and act with one voice."

"Here I wish to make it clear that I am not fighting the Hindu community as such nor have I any quarrel with the Hindus generally for I have many personal friends amongst them; but the Congress 'High Command' is in my opinion the greatest enemy of India's progress and for the matter of that even of the interests of Hindus. Although there are many Hindus who entirely condemn them and are completely fed up with them yet a large body of the Hindu public is still hypnotised and mesmerized by them by their seductive and abusive propaganda and disingenious catchwords and slogans. Will they get their freedom of judgement and action!"

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Jinnah to Bose

Congress Leaders' Correspondence, p. 21

BOMBAY, 9 October, 1938

I am in receipt of your letter dated the 2nd October which was placed before the Executive Council. I am authorised to state in reply as follows:

The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League regrets very much that the Working Committee of the Congress should have entirely misread my letter dated the 2nd of August, 1938, which is quite clear and does not require any elucidation or further interpretation. The Muslim League are still ready to proceed with the negotiations for settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis defined by my letter referred to above and would appoint its representative to meet the Congress that may be appointed by the Congress on the footing indicated by us in our three resolutions of the 5th of June, 1938, already communicated to you.

As all the correspondence so far in this connection has been published, I am issuing this to the Press.

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Rajendra Prasad to Sardar Patel

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents I, pp.103-05

HARIJAN COLONY, KINGSWAY, DELHI, 11 October, 1938

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have been feeling for sometime that the policy (the) Congress Party has been following in the Legislatures of Provinces where the Congress happens to be in minority has been not as it should be. In the first place there is no definite policy

which has been followed consistently in all such Provinces. In the second place whatever policy there has been, has not been such as either to serve the interest of the people of those Provinces nor such as to enhance the reputation of the Congress. In Provinces where we are in minority one would naturally expect the Congress Party to act as opposition. The opposition in all countries where Parliamentary Government prevails has a definite role and purpose. Its function is to point out the shortcomings in the Government policy, to be vigilant and keep watch on Government actions and generally to get its own programme accepted as far as possible by the Government of the day. If in course of time there is dissolution it gets an opportunity of winning an election. If it succeeds it forms the Government; if it fails it continues as opposition. It criticises the Government but seldom if ever tries to win over members of the other party and thus overthrow the Government and take its place. Congress opposition on the other hand has never really acted as opposition in this sense in any of the Provinces except perhaps Sind to some extent. The attempt of our Party in most Provinces has constantly been to win over members of the Government Party and thus secure a majority for itself so that it may form a Ministry. In effect its action has been not so much to consider and criticise Government measures on their merit and secure the adoption of its own programme by the Government but to try somehow or other to oust the Party in power. The result as was to be expected has been to create much bitterness against the Congress without any corresponding gain. We have been more anxious to become Ministers than to get our programme adopted. My feeling is that if we had acted purely as an opposition accepting the party in power for the time being as the Government and ourselves as the opposition we would have commanded more respect and we would have succeeded to a great extent in getting our programme acted upon by the Ministry in power and we would have thus served the people much better. Instead of doing this we have been wasting all our time and energy in trying to win over people of doubtful integrity by doubtful means. This has had its reactions and created prejudice against our organisation. Even a good suggestion from us is apt to be looked upon with suspicion and hardly any chance of being accepted. It has had its effect in Congress Provinces so that even good things done by Congress Ministries are discounted and suspected. The Musalmans as a body have been alienated and in spite of all that Congress Ministries have been doing to be just and even generous to them there is not only no recognition but positive opposition to even a good scheme like the Wardha Scheme. I think if we had not been engaged in breaking or at least discrediting Muslim Ministries in non-Congress Provinces the position would have been different. The Muslim League propaganda has gained much strength on account of this attitude of Congress in Muslim Provinces. I, therefore, think that the policy which we have so far followed needs to be considered and revised. The Congress must decide definitely to act only as opposition in a constitutional way in those Provinces. It may move votes of No-Confidence as every opposition does but only for the purpose of voicing its protest in an emphatic way in case the Ministry does anything particularly objectionable. It should not try to win over members from (the) other party simply to be able to secure the Ministry for itself. It should definitely give up the attempt of wrecking Ministries and securing them for itself. This can be done if we decide that we can

form a Ministry only if we had definite reliable majorities. It may, of course, happen that a Ministry may become so unpopular that its supporters may withdraw their support and when that happens the Congress may be asked and may even consent to form a Ministry. That will, however, be a very different situation from what we see when definite attempt is made on behalf of the Congress to obtain a Ministry for itself. I think our policy of drift has created a very unenviable situation. I am very uneasy about the position in Assam. I do not know how we can justify the action of a Speaker in adjourning the Assembly and thus enabling the Congress Ministry there to function until the 1st of December by avoiding a vote of No-Confidence. The *ad interim* Ministries did no more than this and we rightly blamed them. Then again I do not know what a Prime Minister can do with five non-Congress colleagues in the Cabinet and a very doubtful majority if at all in the Assembly. It is doubtful how far even those members are dependable who are in the Congress at present. If the Congress succeeds at all in breaking the Bengal Ministry it will be in a worse position there. It will form a Ministry but a majority in the Cabinet will be a non-Congressmen and a majority in the party may also be of non-Congressmen. I do not know of what use such a Ministry will be [from] the Congress point of view. These have been the considerations that have been troubling me and I would request you to give your thought to them and if you consider proper to put them up before the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and the Working Committee of the All India Congress Committee.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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News Report

Star of India, 13 October, 1938, Nation's Voice, p. 296

Karachi, October 12: Twenty-six out of 35 Muslim members of the Sind Assembly met today at the residence of Sir Abdoola Haroon to decide the question of joining the Muslim League and working under the League banner. After continuous sitting for over eight hours the meeting concluded. Mr. Jinnah told the waiting journalists that no settlement had been arrived at and he was issuing a statement tomorrow morning. Pressed to give some particulars of the meeting, Mr. Jinnah firstly refused adding "you will hear the full story of the treachery tomorrow."

League circles maintain that the Premier, Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, definitely agreed on October 9 in writing to sign the League pledge but he has gone back on his plighted word attested by the Premiers of Bengal and the Punjab and say that Mr. Jinnah in tomorrow's statement will fully bear out this position. Approached by Press representatives, Khan Bahadur Allah Bux declined to say anything at present.

Prominent among those present at the meeting were Khan Bahadur Allah Bux (Premier), Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Mr. G.M. Syed, Sheikh Abdul Majid and

Khan Bahadur Khuhro. Those who attended included also the Speaker (Mr. Miran Muhammad Shah) and Mr. Amin Khoso, a Congress member of the Assembly, and Mrs. Allana, a nationalist Muslim member of the Assembly. Mr. Jinnah who presided, at the outset requested the members to sign the Muslim League pledge. At 5 p.m. the Premier and Minister Pir Illahi Bakhsh hurriedly left the meeting but Sir Abdoola Haroon, with two supporters of Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, dashed in a car after the Premier and brought him back and the deliberations were resumed. It is stated that as the negotiations have now broken down, the question of referring the assessment proposal to Sir Sikander Hyat Khan for arbitration does not arise. Premier Khan Bahadur Allah Bux and Pir Illahi Bakhsh, Minister, looked worried when they left the meeting. When approached by the Press they expressed inability to reveal anything.

Congress leaders here have been closely watching the developments and it was even stated that the Congress High Command may now be disposed to give freedom of action to Congress members of the Sind Assembly. (API)

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J.H. Garrett¹ to Brabourne

V.P. Menon Papers, Roll 2 A, No. 393

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI, 13 October, 1938

Dear Lord Brabourne,

The visit of Mr. Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslim League to Karachi has completely occupied my Ministers since last Friday. I have not until today invited Allah Bakhsh or the other Ministers to meet me as this might have given a handle to suggestions of influence being used.

2. On October 12th the day was fully occupied with discussions between Jinnah and the Members of the Allah Bakhsh party.

3. Jinnah pressed Allah Bakhsh and his supporters to form a League Ministry with six Ministers. The names of additional Muslim Ministers were discussed, but Allah Bakhsh has kept to the position that the proposed additional Ministers would not have his confidence. Jinnah promised his full support and his personal authority in aid if any of the Ministers should give trouble. Jinnah also told Allah Bakhsh that the Congress Party in Sind had wired to 'High Command' for permission to support the present Ministry at all costs and had received the permission asked for.

4. Allah Bakhsh saw me in the afternoon and told me that the discussions were to continue and that he with his supporters was unwilling to accept Jinnah's proposals. He says that Jinnah is using every effort to avoid the loss of prestige which he, personally, will suffer if he fails to secure the formation of a League Ministry in Sind. Allah Bakhsh is not a strong character, but his views are moderate and he has scruples about throwing over his Hindu supporters. He is, of course, under very severe pressure and is much worried; but he will, I think, hold to his present views.

5. I have told him that in my opinion to introduce colleagues such as those suggested would be very unsafe and that such a Ministry would inevitably split from within. I expressed my agreement with his attitude towards Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) J.H. GARRETT

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1. Sir Joseph Hugh Garrett, Acting Governor of Sind, 1 August-1 December, 1938.

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Jinnah's Statement

Times of India, 14 October, 1938; Nation's Voice, pp. 297-300

Karachi, October 13: Mr. Jinnah this evening issued the following statement:

"On my arrival it was made clear to me that there was a universal desire for solidarity among the Muslims of Sind. Whoever came to see me expressed most fervently the desire to bring about unity. I saw various Muslim leaders and no less than 20 Muslim members of the Sind Legislative Assembly. That was the prevalent sentiment not only among Muslims, but also among the thinking men of other communities, Hindus, Parsis and Europeans. They all desired that there should be stable Government in Sind. I may at the very outset deprecate the false and discreditable propaganda carried on by a section of the Press and Congressmen that we are aiming at constituting a purely Muslim Ministry in Sind. In the first instance, we thought of bringing about unity among the various Muslim groups in the Assembly, as there were at least four such groups and once we were able to put our house in order we could approach the other groups in the Assembly.

In response to the universal desire I carried on conversations with Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, who had come to see me, and his colleague, Pir Illahi Bakhsh. He also endorsed the view that there should be one solid united Muslim party and most cordially assured me that he desired nothing else if that could be achieved, that he did not wish to continue as Chief Minister and that he did not care for any office. Similar views were expressed by his colleague, Pir Illahi Bakhsh. I gathered that there were about seven or eight members with the Chief Minister and his colleague. Thereafter I saw Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, and he also expressed the same views and assured me his full support. His group consisted of thirteen members. I next saw Mir Bunde Ali Khan, Leader of the Baluch Group, which consists of about seven members. Lastly, I saw Mr. G.M. Syed who has a following, it is understood, of six members. They also expressed the same desire and gave me the fullest support.

"Thereafter I suggested to each one of them that they should all meet together and that Mr. Fazlul Huq and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, with whom also they had interviews, should be present. Accordingly, the Bengal and the Punjab Premiers and

myself met the leaders of all four groups on the afternoon of October 9. After prolonged discussion and exchange of views the following agreement was arrived at and signed by Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, Pir Illahi Bakhsh, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Mir Bunde Ali Khan, Mr. G.M. Syed and Sheikh Abdul Majid. The terms of the agreement were as follows:

1. One solid party of Muslim members of the Sind Assembly should be formed as the Muslim League Party within the Legislature and all members who join the Party will become members of the Muslim League and sign the creed and accept the policy and programme of the Muslim League and sign the usual pledge.

2. In order to facilitate the formation of a new Ministry, the present Muslim Ministers agree to tender their resignations and these resignations will be tendered to the Governor simultaneously with the proposal of the Leader of the Muslim League Party to constitute the new Ministry.

3. A meeting of those members, who have already joined the League or who may agree to join the League Party should take place on October 12, and those members who are not in Karachi at present are to be requested to come to Karachi—there are already 27 members present in Karachi.

4. Khan Bahadur Allah Bux and Sir Ghulam Hussain are to intimate those Muslim members who are not in Karachi already and ask them to attend the meeting fixed for October 12.

5. The Leader of the Party should be elected by the unanimous vote of the party; in default, he should be nominated by Mr. Jinnah, and the party will abide by his choice.

6. The personnel of the Ministry to be formed shall be determined according to the same principle, namely, that the party should accept it unanimously; in default, the party should abide by the decision of Mr. Jinnah as to the Muslim personnel of the Ministry that the leader should submit to the Governor.

7. With regard to differences of opinion relating to the question of assessment and the revision settlement within the Barrage area, the matter is to be referred to Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to examine the question and advise on the course and attitude which the party should adopt, that the proposal be placed before the meeting of the party on October 12, and that the party should accept the findings and recommendations that may be made by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan.

"In accordance with this agreement, telegrams were sent to those members who were not in Karachi over the joint signatures of Khan Bahadur Allah Bux and Sir Ghulam Hussain, requesting them to attend the meeting fixed for October 12. Almost all members were present with the exception of three or four who sent messages to the effect that they would abide by the advice. It was in these circumstances that the meeting of Muslim members of the Assembly was called on October 12.

Early in the morning at 8 o'clock I received from a responsible and reliable source, the following information:

'The Leader of the Congress Assembly Party has wired to the President of the Congress Parliamentary Board that, in view of the danger of a League Ministry being formed in Sind, the proposed No-Confidence Motion should not be made a party question and freedom of voting should be permitted to the members of that party. If

that were done, of course, all the ten members of the Congress Party would vote against the No-Confidence Motion. Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel has sent out telegrams to the members of the (Parliamentary) Board, soliciting their views I am aware of the contents of the documents in your (Mr. Jinnah's) possession signed by six gentlemen on the evening of Sunday, October 9, but I thought that you (Mr. Jinnah) ought to know about this new move. Any attempt to gain time today (October 12) may, therefore, not be permitted.'

"When we met on October 12, much to the astonishment of everyone, Khan Bahadur Allah Bux backed out of the agreement and took up the unabashed position that he and his supporters would join the League Party only if he was assured beforehand that the Party would agree to elect him leader and allow him to continue as Chief Minister. An overwhelming majority of the members present at the meeting objected to this attitude on the ground that it was contrary to the very conception of the formation of a party that any individual member or group should hold the pistol and impose a condition precedent before joining the party. Every effort was made to persuade Khan Bahadur Allah Bux and the six or seven members who were inclined to support him. Finally, he left the meeting after several hours' discussion and after unsuccessful attempts by various members to induce him to give up such an attitude and abide by the agreement which he had already signed."

"Meanwhile, those who were inclined to join the League Party signed the pledge and handed them to me, accepting the creed, policy and programme of the League. As the result of this 27 members made it clear that they would come under the banner of the League. Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, however, was adamant and left with an ultimatum that unless his condition, namely, that he should be accepted as leader and allowed to continue as Chief Minister, was agreed to he was not prepared to proceed any further. On his taking up this extraordinary attitude, some of his own supporters also signed the pledge and remained in the meeting. The 27 members present considered that the attitude of Khan Bahadur Allah Bux was most improper and unjust and that he was guilty of a gross breach of faith in resiling from the agreement which he had already signed in the presence of Sir Sikander, Mr. Fazlul Huq and myself."

"Nevertheless, without hesitation—as the words of my address to the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, namely, 'Unity at any cost' were fresh and ringing in their ears—they showed a wonderful spirit of sacrifice and rose to the occasion and agreed to accept even this unreasonable condition in the hope that Khan Bahadur Allah Bux would be prepared to come in and work whole-heartedly under the banner of the League. When this decision of 27 members was communicated to him about 8 p.m. by Sir Abdoola Haroon and others who went to his residence, he replied he would consider the matter and let us know 'tomorrow morning,' that is, today, although he had promised to come to the meeting immediately if his condition was accepted. In the meantime it has become public property—and newspaper reports clearly show that Khan Bahadur Allah Bux was in the hands of his Congress Party and was marking time to receive instructions from the Congress 'High Command'."

"I regret to say that he had not even the courtesy to give me his promised reply this morning. I waited the whole day before issuing this statement. One can only

draw the inference that he has been given an assurance by the Congress 'High Command,' who seem to me to be obsessed with the one and only idea of destroying any effort which will bring solidarity among Muslims at the sacrifice not only of the vital interests of the country at large and Sind in particular where it is essential to have a stable Ministry for the welfare and progress of the people and who do not seem to hesitate to sacrifice all their principles and professions and the interests of the people which they claim so loudly to serve."

"So far as we are concerned, I am glad we have formed the Muslim League Party in the Assembly consisting of an overwhelming majority of Muslim members of the Sind Legislature and we shall carry out our programme for the social, economic, educational and political uplift of the people of Sind generally and Muslims in particular. Our party in the Assembly will always be willing and ready to cooperate with any party or group notwithstanding the Muslim majority, for the advancement and welfare of the people of Sind; but we cannot accept the position of subordination as Khan Bahadur Allah Bux has chosen to do."

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Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents II, pp.109-10

PURUSHOTTAM BUILDING,
OPP. OPERA HOUSE, BOMBAY-4, 13 October, 1938

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I got your letter of the 11th October. Khwaja Abdul Majid wired to me also today and to the same effect. I had received a letter from Nawab of Chhatari (a) couple of days ago saying that he will place that matter before his Council and communicate to me its decision as soon as possible. It is difficult for us to ask for the postponement of legislation on the strength of Khwaja's telegram; besides, it is evident that they are not united.

I had tried to get you on the phone about the Sind affair, but you were asleep and I talked (to) Devidas about it. I got your wire just now and as Maulana is sticking to Wardha decision nothing can be done in that matter.

I have also received your other letter regarding our attitude in the Minority Provinces. I shall discuss that when we meet next time. Although I do not agree with you in your analysis of the situation, the aggressive attitude of the Muslim League is not the result of our policy of drift, resulting in the Congress Parties in Assam and Bengal trying to break the Muslim Ministries. What they want to do is to have the League Minister in the Congress Ministry and as they could not succeed in that they got angry. However, I shall talk about it when we meet next time.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI

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*Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents II, pp.112-114*

CAMP: BARDOLI, 15 October, 1938

My dear Rajendrababu,

I sent you a scrappy reply to your letter of the 11th October, 1938. I feel I must answer you more fully. It is not true that our difficulties have arisen on account of our people being anxious to become Ministers in Minority Provinces. It is true that attempts to win over people from the opposition would necessarily expose the Ministry in those Provinces to the danger of a fall and thereby we incur their odium and enrage them, but this is inherent in the situation of our country where communal electorates have been the basis of the Constitution. In my opinion, if our people were to remain merely in opposition in those Provinces, the Minority community would be terribly injured at the hands of the Congress. It would be proper then not to have anything to do with the Legislatures in those Provinces, in which case the Minority would be able to look after itself and we would not be dividing its forces. Take for instance (the) Province of Sind. Today in the name of Congress principle which, in my opinion, (is) not at all an issue, the Congress Party of ten members divides the Hindu strength in the Province and makes the group of Hindu representatives absolutely ineffective. If we were to withdraw our members from the Assembly nine more members would be returned on the Hindu ticket to make its strength complete. They would then be free to form a coalition with a less reactionary group of Muslims and form their own Ministry. Today we are deliberately driving the Hindu community in a corner and force a rank reactionary communal Ministry on the Province. Poor Allahbakhsh has been crying hoarse for our help. We prefer to stand as ineffective spectators, but indirectly bringing down his fall, so as to facilitate the formation of a League Ministry, which has not existed in India anywhere up to now. In my opinion, it is nothing but a process of suicide. The Muslim communal leaders have not spared us for our obliging attitude towards them. The Premier of Bengal and other Muslim leaders have made speeches in Karachi for which they would be liable to be held up under Sections 153-A and 124-A of the I.P. Code in any Province.

It is not true that we have no policy in the Minority Provinces. The fact is that on the communal question our decision in all matters rests with Maulana Saheb and these Provinces are also under his charge. In Punjab we have done nothing to guide or advise in any matter and we have left the decisions of the Province entirely to Maulana Saheb. He has even directed the Congress Party to vote with the Government on (any) obnoxious measure. In Bengal Mr. Huq meets him almost (every) other day and he himself being on the spot naturally is in sole charge. There is no other Minority Province so far as I know.

Recently trouble has arisen in Assam, but Assam is not a Minority Province. We have got the biggest single group in the Assembly. The Hindu community is not in a

minority there. If we were not to form a coalition Ministry like this we would be surrendering the Province to the tender mercies of communal, reactionary, corrupt groups and we would be guilty of doing (a) grave injustice to the majority community there. In our country where the Constitution is based on communal electorate, we cannot expect to have peace with the Minority, which is aggressive and which is bent upon coercing the majority and to compel it to accept its own terms. In fact the Communal Award was intended for that purpose. If your suggestion is to be accepted, we must clear out from Bengal, Punjab, Sind, and perhaps Assam. I would prefer that course rather than compel our groups in the Assemblies there to be mere critics. Once it is known that our people can only criticise and can never accept Ministries in those Provinces, either on their own responsibility or by coalition, the other groups in the Assembly, will cease to take them seriously at all. There would, therefore, be no dissolution of the House on any occasion.

If you suggest that we have been adopting means which are doubtful in winning over people (to) our side, undoubtedly it would be wholly wrong, but if you say that we succeed in winning doubtful people, I do not think our people are in the wrong, because almost the whole lot of them are doubtful people and it is up to us to prevent the Province being ruled by the people of doubtful character either by taking them under our control or by influencing them.

The Muslims as a body have been alienated and they are opposed even to our good (schemes), not because we are opposing them in Minority Provinces, and make their position precarious, but because they feel and rightly feel that in spite of the Communal Award they have not been able to prevent the formation of Congress Ministries in seven Provinces without or in spite of them. They expected to rule the country, but they have been sadly disappointed. If you accept Muslim Ministers in the seven Cabinets from the Muslim League groups, you will soon find that they would not oppose schemes like the Wardha Scheme, but the price that you will have to pay for it will be to abandon nationalism once for all. You say that the Congress must decide definitely to act as opposition in a Constitutional way in the Minority Provinces, but we do not act unconstitutionally at all, nor do I know what you mean by those Provinces. Do you suggest that in Sind or in Assam we must not disturb Ministries or if they are disturbed by our votes we must not do anything further? If this is your view, indeed our policy must be clearly defined. I can understand our not taking the responsibility of forming the coalition Ministry, though I do not consider it a wise thing, but I cannot understand our refusing to lend our support to a less reactionary Ministry when we have to choose between two evils.

I do not think that you should be uneasy about our position in Assam. On the contrary, if we had left the field open after defeating the previous Ministry, we would have succeeded in establishing the old reactionary, corrupt Ministry more firmly than before. Why was the vote of censure moved at all by our people if that was our object?

In my opinion this is committing suicide with vengeance. Whether the conduct of the Speaker in the Assam Assembly is fair or unfair, is not an issue at all. It is a separate thing which can be considered separately. I see no serious objection in a Congress Prime Minister taking other non-Congress colleagues with him and run the

administration with confidence if he is allowed a free hand. But I see serious objection in having even one non-Congressman in any Cabinet composed of Congress members, if the one non-Congressman tries to influence successfully the policy of the Congress Ministry according to his will.

In Bengal also the condition is different. Many responsible non-Congressmen have told me that if Bengal is to be saved at all, we must form a coalition Ministry soon. I see your point of view fully, but the present state of things, if allowed to continue, will ruin Bengal for ever. You must see the other side and then make your choice between two evils.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI

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*Fortnightly report for the Central Provinces & Berar for the
first half of October, 1938 [Extract]*

Home-Poll, F. 18-10/38, pp. 1-3

SECRET

Communal. Dussehra passed off peacefully throughout the Province. There were rumours of trouble at Jubbulpore, and police arrangements were made on a most elaborate scale. The local officers were throughout alert. A few isolated assaults took place between the 29th September and the 3rd October, but the culprits were promptly arrested in almost every case. This maintained an atmosphere of general confidence, and the main Dussehra procession on the 4th, consisting of about 30,000 people, and the Bharat Milap procession on the following day, passed off without any breach of the peace. Government have conveyed its appreciation to the local revenue and police officers for their good work during Dussehra. There was some tension at Saugor and Mandla, but here too the vigilance of the officers prevented any mishap. In Berar, special precautions had to be taken at Murtizapur and Barsi Takli, where changes in routes and timings gave rise to resentment among certain sections of the Mohammadans, and the situation at Murtizapur was such as to require the presence of the Deputy Commissioner and the District Superintendent of Police.

4. Muslim propaganda against the Vidya Mandir scheme continues, and meetings condemning the scheme were held at Nagpur, Chhindwara, Balaghat, Dhamtari and Wun. At a meeting at Nagpur held on the 1st October, Maulana Israr Ahmad, whose name has figured in previous reports, announced that a Council of Action had been formed to fight the scheme. The Hindu Mahasabha is also active. At a meeting at Bhandara on the 17th September, Mr. Balaji Hardas Shastri belittled the Congress creed of non-violence, and stated that without bloodshed no drastic changes in the Government of a country were possible. He also expressed somewhat similar

sentiments at meetings at Hinganghat and Wardha during the fortnight, adding in his speech at Wardha that the Government of India should be entirely in the hands of the Hindus. At a meeting held at Mangrulpur in the Akola district on the 26th September under the auspices of the Varnashram Swaraj Sangh, one Bhagwati Prasad Sharma of Khamgaon made a strong anti-Congress speech, in which he condemned Mahatma Gandhi's political activities and referred to the Congress workers in very uncomplimentary terms. Government has noted the growth of communal propaganda with concern, and has now decided to ask the District Magistrates to warn communal speakers not to transgress the law.

5. Branches of the Muslim League have been formed at Mandla, Tumsar in the Bhandara district and Saoner in the Nagpur district. The Hindu Mahasabha has established branches at Hinganghat in the Wardha district and Bhandak in the Chanda district.

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J.H. Garrett to Brabourne

V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 2 A No. 395

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI, 17 October, 1938

Dear Lord Brabourne,

My last letter on Sind politics was No. 393 of October the 13th.

2. The conversations in Karachi led by Mr. Jinnah have now come to an end and will be renewed on his return from a rapid tour round Sind.

3. On Saturday, October 15th, Jinnah asked me for an interview. I enquired of Allahbaksh if he had any objection and with his full concurrence I gave Jinnah an interview which lasted for an hour.

4. He said that his reason for asking for an interview was, first, to pay a courtesy visit; and secondly, to inform me of the course and outcome of the conversations. He gave me a full account of what had taken place; but I do not propose to relate this, as it was substantially the same as the Press accounts.

5. He claims to have formed a Party of some 25 members and to have obtained a large measure of agreement from the Independent Hindus and Europeans. My Hindu Minister, Nihchaldas, is ready to join a Muslim League Ministry at any time. Though Jinnah was extremely courteous and restrained, he complained that Allahbaksh had acted unfairly in first accepting the Muslim League in the presence of leaders like Fazul-ul-Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan and then repudiating his admissions on the next day (October the 12th).

6. He explained his indignation at the Congress party for giving blind support to any Government which was not Muslim League. He stated that the Muslim League did not seek to follow the Congress method of controlling a Ministry from outside by a Higher Command. Each Muslim League Ministry would be autonomous and in the

event of violation of Muslim League principles, the only action to be taken would be expulsion from the League.

7. He argued that if Allahbaksh and his followers had joined the Party there would have been certainty of a stable Ministry. He stated that he had no desire to exclude Hindus, but that he objected to the present position in which the Government in Sind was carried on not by the predominant Party, but by Hindus through a small and unrepresentative section of the majority community.

8. He then referred to the necessity of summoning a session of the Assembly at an early date.

9. My conclusions are that the reasons which led Jinnah to see me are:

- (i) to get an early session while the impression caused by his visit is still fresh and
- (ii) to convince me that Allahbaksh is not deserving of confidence.

10. I am considering the question of the date for the next Session. It will not in any case be later than December 7th, but Allah Baksh is likely to suggest an earlier date in November. He does not, however, wish to commit himself until Jinnah has left Sind.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) J.H. GARRETT
His Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India

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(Abdul) Matin Chaudhari to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 160/170

SHILLONG, 21 October, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You must have received my last letter on your arrival at Bombay. Since I wrote to you last, there has been no change in the situation except that Ali Hyder Khan, one of the three Muslims, who had been with Congress Coalition has accepted Ministership. Though our party as a whole is still solid, I am not surprised that the bait of Ministership attracting a few to the Congress Coalition. These temporary secessions do not worry us very much. We too are expectant of getting accession of strength and we still feel confident of ultimate victory. Position in Assam is very much easier than in Sind. The very announcement that you are visiting Assam towards the end of November will immensely strengthen our position. We are anxiously waiting for an announcement from you that you propose to visit Assam towards the end of November. I cannot urge too strongly the urgency and importance of this.

Mr. Griffiths will tell you at Delhi the exact situation here in details.
Hope you are keeping well. My compliments to Miss Jinnah.

Yours Sincerely,
MATIN

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George Cunningham to Brabourne

Brabourne Papers, No. 10, pp. 24-26 NWFP Report

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 23 October, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. G.H. 244

Dear Laithwaite,

I send herewith, for His Excellency's information, a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 22nd October 1938, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the first half of October 1938.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report, No. 20, dated 22nd October, 1938 [Extract]

5. An interception of great interest in regard to the Mahatma's impressions on the political situation in the Province has come to hand in the shape of a letter written by his Secretary, Piari [Peare] Lal, to Devadas Gandhi¹ in Delhi. The gist of this letter is that the Mahatma is dissatisfied and that he is inclined to the view that on the Frontier, as in the other Provinces, the best way to retain power may be to renounce it.

6. Meanwhile the Muslim League is watching events with quiet satisfaction. Encouraged by the tepid attitude of the Congress Party to their leader, the League has now decided to stage a Political Conference at Mardan on October 22nd and 23rd. This is a bold move, as Mardan is one of the strongholds of the Red Shirts;² it would not have been conceivable a year ago.

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1. Devadas Gandhi (1900-1957); Youngest son of Mahatma Gandhi and Editor of the *Hindustan Times* from 1939 till his death.
 2. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan founded the Pakhtoon Jirga (Afghan Youth League) in 1926 as Khudai Khidmatgars, (Servants of God) and soon designated them as Red Shirts. It was at the instance of his elder brother, Dr. Khan Saheb, in 1931 that this organisation of non-violent volunteers became part of the Congress organisation.

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*Bose to Rajendra Prasad [Extract]**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. 2, p. 122*

SWARAJ BHAWAN, ALLAHABAD, 24 October, 1938

My dear Rajendra Babu,

When I was at Bombay Sardar Patel showed me your letter to him about the work of the Congress Party in the Minority Provinces. He has also sent me a copy of his reply to that letter. I agree with what he has said. I should only emphasise the fact that the Muslim League is violently angry with the Congress, not so much because of the activities of Congressmen in the Minority Provinces but because of the activities of Congressmen and Congress Ministries in the majority Provinces.

I have been feeling worried over the situation in Sind. I am inclined to agree with our party in that Province and to hold that we should lend our support to the Allahbaksh Ministry. On this point Sardar and I are in perfect agreement.

Yours sincerely,
SUBHAS C. BOSE

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*Nehru's Statement**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 361-363*

Bombay, 25 October, 1938. 2. Q. What is the Congress attitude towards the claims of the Minorities?

JN: Everybody recognises the importance of the communal issue in India, but the way it is being pushed forward, as has been pointed out by the Congress Working Committee, it is a screen to avoid difficult questions. The Congress is perfectly prepared and willing to face the question in all its aspects but the approach of the British Government to this question is to make the communal issue an excuse for avoiding political progress.

It is said that the Congress does not represent the whole of India. Of course not. It does not represent those who are opposed to it. But what has been said in regard to the Congress is that it tries and claims to speak for India as a whole which is a different matter. That is to say what it demands is not for any particular group or community but for the nation as a whole. It is inconceivable to me how any Indian can take exception to this demand, although it is open to people to say that within the framework of that Indian demand special interests like those of the Minorities should be protected.

The Congress demand is based on democracy as it aims at the establishment of a democratic state in India. Democracy certainly does not exclude full protection to Minority Rights and interests. But it becomes an absurdity if on the plea of Minority rights democracy itself is abandoned.

3. Q: What are the alternatives to democracy in India?

JN: The alternatives to democracy in India are Fascism, the Soviet form of Government or India's continued subjection to foreign rule. I cannot think of any other way out. I take it that we are all agreed that we do not want foreign rule in India; so the only alternative left is the Soviet form of Government which may or may not approach democracy. Recently the democratic ideal has been criticised by various people in India. I do not know if they have thought of the inevitable consequence of giving up that ideal. I cannot conceive of any objective other than democracy in the present state of India. With proper protection and safeguards for the Minorities this will be fairest to everyone concerned.

Of course, the majority will remain a majority, as nothing can convert a majority into a minority except a rule by a Fascist or military clique. So far as the Muslims are concerned it is a little misleading to talk in terms of majorities and minorities. A religious group, seventy million strong, cannot be considered a Minority. As they are spread out in India, in certain Provinces they are in a majority, and in such Provinces the Minority issue is entirely different from the rest of India.

It is quite inconceivable to me that in these circumstances either the Hindus can tyrannise over the Muslims or the Muslims can tyrannise over the Hindus or, I would add, both the Hindus and Muslims together can tyrannise over anybody else. The Sikhs are very small in numbers, but I do not think there is the slightest chance of their being tyrannised over by anybody. It is unfortunate that this communal question has taken this new shape and is being used as a barrier to India's freedom.

Nothing has astonished me and pained me so much, during the last year or two, as the amazing charges brought against the Congress and the Congress Governments of suppressing Muslims and committing atrocities against them. The Congress Governments have made many mistakes, as was natural, in regard to various departments of Government but I am personally quite convinced that, in regard to the treatment of Minorities they have taken the greatest care possible not to offend against any Minority Rights or privileges.

We have so often asked for an impartial enquiry into the vague charges brought forward and our offer still remains unaccepted and yet totally unfounded statements continue to be made. So far as the Congress is concerned it is prepared today, as it has always been prepared, to consider the communal or Minority question in all its bearings so as to put an end to all misapprehensions and suspicions and arrive at a satisfactory settlement. But the Congress cannot consider any proposal which goes against India's unity and freedom and which is opposed to all democratic ideals.

4. Q: What does the Congress propose to do about the propaganda carried on by the Muslim League?

JN: Our fight is against British imperialism. We do not propose to fight any countryman of ours or any organisation of Indians. It is the misfortune of India if any Indian or any organisation in India allies itself with British imperialism; but I am sure

India will survive such a misfortune. One of the greatest advantages of the present crisis is that it forces people and organisations to show up their real cards. It becomes impossible then to play with vague phrases and indulge in brave talks because such talks have then to be followed by action. So, in the present instance, this crisis will result in removing this fog from Indian politics which has confused the issue for so long and the public will understand what the real objects of individuals and organisations are.

5. Q: Does the Working Committee resolution mean that they stop with the resignation of the Ministries or do they have plans for future action?

JN: It is obviously difficult for me to discuss the future. It depends on various factors. The resignation of the Ministers in itself is a tremendous step. It need not have been a tremendous step but in the particular context in which the decision was taken, it is a big step towards non-cooperation with the whole apparatus of British imperialism. Big consequences will follow from it and we want the country to be prepared for those consequences. When and what those consequences will be it will not be proper for me to discuss at this stage. In circumstances like the present, a bald neutrality is an almost impossible proposition.

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Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 130-131

BOMBAY, 3 November, 1938

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter from a friend along with extracts from his letter to Sir Sultan Ahmed and his reply thereto. If it is possible I should like you to approach Sir Sultan with a request to explain to you the reasons which have led him to be so bitter against the Congress Ministries and to give specific instances within his knowledge and real complaints against them if he can do so. You can do so as soon as you are out of the hospital.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI

Babu Rajendra Prasad
Sadaquat Ashram, Patna

Enclosure 1:

[Extract from a letter to Vallabhbhai Patel].

BOMBAY, 28 October, 1938

My dear Sardar Saheb,

I venture to send you extracts from a letter, which I wrote to Sir Sultan Ahmed, and his reply thereto. Sir Sultan is a very patriotic Musalman and is also much trusted by Rajen Babu. Within two

weeks of assuming power, the Bihar Government asked for his resignation as Advocate General, while an English Advocate General continued in Bombay. But that is an old story and did not change his opinion. I do not know what has recently happened, but I thought it my duty to send you this information privately.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

Enclosure 2:

(Extract from Shri ...'s letter dated Patna, the 19 October, 1938, to Sir Sultan Ahmed.)

"I think it is very high time that somebody intervened between the Congress and the League. Without any desire to apportion blame, it is possible for one to deplore the trend of development. I understand that the Muslim members are throwing in their whole weight in the Income Tax Select Committee with Government even on Clauses which discriminate between Indians and Europeans, to the serious (sic) advantage of the latter. This is only the beginning but this sort of things in the open House will involve the Muslims into a position a lot more serious than at the time of the Recruiting Bill. If the Muslims have decided to sell this country to the Europeans in all respects, why don't they say so? This is the kind of the question which will be asked."

Enclosure 3:

(Extract from Sir Sultan Ahmed's letter dated 26 October, 1938 to....)

"I entirely agree that the bitterness of feeling between the Congress and the League is increasing daily with the only possible result that independence of the country for which both of them stand, is going further and further away from us. You know my views. I believe that the freedom of the country cannot be had by any act of Parliament or by any foolish notion such as the one that some people entertained that with the war in Europe, India will get freedom. The freedom of the country depends entirely upon our own settlement and once we settle our differences no power in the world can prevent us from getting all that we want. So far, I had blamed the Musalmans for their hot-headedness, impracticable suggestions and unreasonable demands, but after having seen the working of the Congress Ministries in at least two or three provinces I am veering round to the view that the apprehension of the Muslims is justified. The meanness to which some of the Congress people can stoop when power has been given to them, has been an eye-opener to me. Their tall talk of nationalism is a perfect humbug and I find that in the chair of authority they are guilty of bias, bigotry, inequities and meanness which are absolutely astounding. For a man with my mentality and sincerity and anxiety for the good of India, which I hope you know better than many people, the use of such strong expressions as I have done may be surprising, but I am afraid I am being forced to come to these conclusions. I am still, however, reluctant to join actively any Party which may make any intervention between the Congress and the League later impossible. I would like now, if possible within a few weeks, to intervene and see if I can be of any service. I have had long talks with His Highness the Agha Khan on the subject and I am anxiously awaiting his arrival early next month."

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Shankar Rao Deo¹ to Bose

Shankar Rao Deo Papers, F. 1, Part I

DEHRI-ON-SONE, (SHAHABAD), 6 November, 1938

My dear Subhasbabu,

I have received your letter of the 21st October. The points raised are important

and I would like to discuss them fully. That is why I did not reply earlier as I had too many things on hand. I have a day free in Patna where I have come in connection with the labour dispute at Dalmianagar and I intend to put you in touch with the various difficulties which stand in our way in the matter of the volunteer organisation.

It is a fact that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R.S.S.) has a fairly well organised volunteer corps throughout Maharashtra and C.P. and it is also true that it is predominantly under the influence of Hindu Mahasabha. As a consequence they are strongly anti-Muslim and anti-Congress. This bias is the result of two factors one of which is historical. As the majority of its supporters belong to the middle class, it must also be remembered that its basis is narrow and its appeal exclusive. These people have not as yet forgotten that they have effectively resisted Mohommadan aggression in the past and the present leadership of this volunteer force wants to make a capital of this fact. Secondly those people who have remained unaffected by Gandhiji and have withdrawn themselves from Congress activities in recent times are anxious to keep the growing young minds away from the Congress. No doubt that they are trying to broaden their base by attracting the non-Brahmin element within their fold. But this makes it all the more anti-Muslim. The bottom cannot be knocked out of this movement as long as these two impulses are not successfully counteracted. The older politicians are engaged in a life and death struggle and this seems their final effort at re-establishing their hold on young India and they are distorting the past making Shivaji a communal leader. Thinking as I do, therefore, I do not think that their strength chiefly comes from their uniforms and organisation. The growing democratisation of the Congress is driving out a small portion of the sophisticated middle classes. This we see happening [in] every volunteer force on this side. That is the only difference.

I am, of course, aware that we must not allow the young boys to join the R.S.S. merely by the absence of a similar organisation of ours. There are financial difficulties but they are not very important. The more serious obstacle is the existence of a variety of political schools among Congressmen and the desire of their adherents to make a volunteer corps their exclusive recruiting ground. Unless such an organisation is made, as I remember you suggested during your last visit to Poona, non-political, it cannot be made stable and effective. Therefore, such an organisation must swear by the official policy of the Congress alone and must loyally execute its programme. Competing political groups are bound to affect the discipline and effectiveness of such a body and as long as it is not made impossible for them to carry on their propaganda through this body nothing can be done to raise its status and strength.

You will be glad to know that the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee has already moved in the matter and has passed a resolution more than a year ago asking the District Committees to raise volunteer patrols. A special committee with Sjt. P.H. Patwardhan of Ahmedabad as the Chairman was appointed to carry out this work and train organisers by holding training camps at different places. More than twenty such camps have been held.

But I would like to draw your attention to the need of a unity of command. The strength of R.S.S. comes more from this. Uniforms and parades attract young boys no doubt, and it is necessary to have a well-equipped organisation of ours. But discipline

and effectiveness are more the result of their unity of command and the absence of rival ideologies each of which considers the other as its enemy. If you make a statement clearing this point, it will be very useful.

I hope your tour in Assam has achieved its purpose and that you are in good health.

Yours sincerely,
SHANKAR RAO DEO

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1. Shankar Rao Deo (1894-1974); Member, Congress Working Committee, 1938-50; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; later joined the Sarvodaya movement.

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J.H. Garrett to Linlithgow

V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 2 A, No. 405

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI, 15 November, 1938

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I last wrote about Sind politics in my letter No. 400 of November 4th.

2. Yesterday Allahbakhsh came to consult me regarding an invitation which he had received from Vallabhbhai Patel to meet him, Bose, and Abu[l] Kalam Azad in Bombay. The object of the meeting is that Allahbakhsh should help the members of the Congress High Command to persuade Abu[l] Kalam to withdraw his objections to the proposals for re-grouping in the Barrage Settlement.

3. The local Congress members have, it seems, been pressing strongly to be allowed to support the Allahbakhsh Ministry in the event of a 'No Confidence' motion being moved. They are not at all satisfied with the order to remain neutral. The Hindu members of the High Command, and particularly Vallabhbhai Patel, seem to be ready to allow this; but Abu[l] Kalam does not yield. Naturally, they could overrule Abu[l] Kalam by majority or by referring the matter to the A.I.C.C. This, however, would result in the resignation of Abu[l] Kalam, the only Mohammadan of importance in the Congress. The High Command is, therefore, in a difficult position.

4. I gave Allahbakhsh my views on the situation, which are as follows :

- (i) the Congress Party in Sind is likely to vote with the Ministry rather than with a purely Mohammadan or Muslim League Ministry.
- (ii) A visit by the Chief Minister to Vallabhbhai in Bombay will be widely published and is likely to shake some of his non-Congress supporters.
- (iii) The Ministry is now in a fairly strong position and need not go out of its way to canvass Congress support.

5. Allahbakhsh, however, wanted to go and expressed his intention of adhering firmly to the Settlement as it at present stands.

6. I warned him that the High Command would certainly try to exact some consideration in return for a promise of full support of his Ministry, and he should on no account commit himself to any promises. To this he agreed, and he has today gone by air to Bombay.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) J.H. GARRETT
His Excellency
The Viceroy & Governor-General of India

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***Fortnightly report for the Central Provinces & Berar for the
first half of November, 1938 [Extract]***

Home-Poll, F. 18-11/38, pp. 1-4

SECRET

2. *Communal.* Muslim protests against the Vidya Mandir scheme continue. Khan Bahadur Siddique Ali Khan presided at a meeting of the Muslim League Council of Action Nagpur, at which a resolution was passed resolving to launch disobedience at an early date. Committees have been formed for the four divisions of the Province, and pamphlets distributed calling for volunteers. 200 persons have so far volunteered, but the launching of Civil Disobedience is likely to be postponed in view of the impending visit of Maulana [Abul] Kalam Azad to Nagpur. Khan Bahadur Siddique Ali Khan has also issued a Press statement on the subject in which he states *inter alia* that he has been asked to approach the executive council of the All India Muslim League to obtain sanction for starting Civil Disobedience against the Vidya Mandir scheme. In the Jubbulpore division Maulana Yakub Ali Qureshi spoke at Jubbulpore on the 5th November. He advocated unity among Muslims and said that, if they were united, neither the Congress nor the British Government could turn them out of India. He stated that the Vidya Mandir scheme was intended to do away with Islamic culture and religion. He prayed for the end of the Congress organisation and remarked that the Indian Army was 70 per cent Muslim. Maulvi Mohammad Gulam Mustafa of Raibareilly spoke at another meeting at Jubbulpore on the 7th. His speech was critical both of the Congress and the British Government, whom he described as the enemies of the Muslims. In Berar, it is gratifying to note that one Syed Abdul Jabbar of Hyderabad spoke at a meeting at Karanja in the Yeotmal district, advocating Hindu-Muslim unity.

Propaganda by the Hindu Mahasabha also continues. Mr. J.P. Verma has again made two objectionable speeches at Nagpur, and Government has asked the District Magistrate to consider the question of taking action against him under Section 117 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Chhattisgarh division, Dr. Munje addressed a meeting at Balaghat on the 20th October. He stated that 28 crores of Hindus should

not worry about the Mohammadans. Mahatma Gandhi had tried his best to placate Mr. Jinnah, but had not succeeded. In the coming Federation, the Hindus should see that the Muslims do not form a majority. The Muslims should not be given anything more than their proper rights.

There is some communal tension at Adar in the Bhandara district, Kurha in the Amraoti district and Fulsaongi in the Yeotmal district.

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Pirpur Report [Extract]

Pakistan Movement, pp. 198-203, 15 November, 1938

Extracts from the Pirpur Report issued in November 1938 by a committee appointed by the Council of All India Muslim League to inquire into the serious grievances by the Muslims against Congress Ministries in various Provinces.

Whereas numerous complaints have reached the Central Office of the hardship, ill-treatment and injustice that is meted out to the Muslims in various Congress Government Provinces and particularly to those who are workers and members of the Muslim League, the Council resolves that a special committee be appointed consisting of the following members to collect all information, make all necessary inquiries and take such steps as may be considered proper and to submit their report to the President and the Council from time to time: Raja Syed Mohammad Mehdi¹ (Chairman), Mr. A.B. Habibullah (Secretary), Khan Bahadur Haji Rashid Ahmad, Syed Ashraf Ahmad,² Moulvi Abdul Ghani, M.L.A., Mian Ghyas-ud-din,³ M.L.A., Syed Zakir Ali,⁴ Syed Hasan Riaz,⁵ Syed Taqi Haji Naqvi.⁶

The attitude of the Congress, however, made it impossible for the League to cooperate with it in spite of the efforts of a number of League leaders to maintain cordial relations. The just and legitimate demands of the Muslims were regarded as an inconvenient feature of political life. Contemptuous offers were made to the leaders of the Muslim League. They were asked to liquidate the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, disband the League parties in the Legislatures and to sign unconditionally the Congress pledge. To the patriotic Muslims such a course meant the denial of their right to organise themselves in order to maintain their separate identity and preserve their culture, and a complete surrender to the party which, on its own admission, was mostly composed of Hindus and which had failed to win the confidence of the Muslim voters in the general election.

The Congress parties adopted the very methods for which they had hitherto condemned the British Government. Rival Muslim organisations were started and spoon-fed by Congress Cabinets and Committees. Attempts were made not only to disregard the true representatives of the Muslims, but a virulent campaign of vilification was started against the Muslim League and its leaders with the help of a few Muslims who signed the Congress pledge. The temptation of office was held out to those who joined the Congress and a few Muslims who had been returned to the Legislatures on

the ticket of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, were persuaded to sign the Congress pledge and were given places in the Ministries as representatives of the Muslim masses.

The last Provincial election brought home to the Congress High Command the fact that the prestige of the Congress as a national organisation was in danger. The decision of the Congress not to contest elections in Muslim constituencies generally and the overwhelming defeats of its Muslim candidates in the very few elections that it contested completely exposed the hollowness of its pretensions to represent the Muslim masses.

The significance of the Congress defeats becomes more pronounced in view of the fact that the Congress possessed an unparalleled and a most powerful organisation in the country and that no Muslim party was in a position effectively to offer any strong opposition to it. The statement of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the defeats of the Congress candidates in the general election clearly shows that the Congress leadership was greatly alarmed at the opposition. But, unfortunately, the Congress High Command launched the Muslim Mass Contact Movement.

It was but natural for patriotic Muslims to feel aggrieved at the attitude taken up by the Congress High Command. The change in the attitude of the Congress leaders, specially those of the United Provinces, was simply a revelation. Though the Mass Contact Movement was on the programme of the Congress no one heard about it until the general elections was over and Congress majorities was assured. Even then the Congress leaders, who made and unmade Cabinets and who appointed and dismissed Ministers avoided the Muslim masses and employed Maulvis to convert the Muslim masses to the Congress creed. The Maulvis, having no voice in the moulding of the Congress policy and programme, naturally could not promise to solve the real difficulties of the masses, a promise which would have drawn the masses toward the Congress. The Maulvis and others employed for the work adopted the line of least resistance by creating a division among the Muslim masses by carrying on a most unworthy propaganda against the leaders of the Muslim League. Under these circumstances it was natural for the Muslims to conclude that this movement was directed only to lure the Muslims into the Congress fold and a policy of "divide and rule" was being followed by the Congress to avoid a settlement with the Muslim community on the real issues.

When the Congress Governments were formed direct conflict with the British Government ceased. The chief objective, which had so far brought together the different elements within the Congress fold, was lost sight of in the general scramble for power and the ideal for which the people had worked since 1920 was abandoned, at least temporarily. The course of true statesmanship for the Congress Cabinets lay in creating a calm and peaceful atmosphere and class wars and defiance of lawful authority were the last things to be encouraged at this juncture.

Unfortunately, these were the things which were encouraged most. The authority of the police and other Government agencies, which were so far responsible for the maintenance of law and order, was defied. People of a particular community were encouraged to believe that the Government was now theirs. Instances of intimidation and defiance of lawful authority increased in number everyday.

Communal riots have unfortunately become more frequent in the Congress Provinces and they have been largely the natural outcome of the disregard for law and order and disrespect for life and property preached by irresponsible Congressmen. It is a lamentable fact that not only have the occasions when communal tension has resulted in violent out-breaks increased to an extent hitherto unknown, but fresh causes of friction have arisen as a result of the policy adopted by the Congress Government.

The Karachi Congress resolution on the fundamental rights of Minorities only guarantees them their rights so far as their observance does not lead to breach of peace. Thus it is only natural that this provision should be utilised by the Congress Ministers to deprive the Muslims of their civil rights.

The Muslims knew that they were powerless and all that they could do was to adopt a policy of self-preservation based on peaceful relations with the majority community. It was the failure of the Congress Governments which largely depended on the support of the Hindu members to take strong measures against Hindu aggressive elements that resulted in the crop of communal disturbances all over the country.

We may point out that the Urdu language came into existence as the result of an attempt to take a purely Aryan language and turn it into a common language so that both Hindus and Muslims may understand each other. It is not a purely Muslim Language as the modern champions of Hindustani would have us believe nor is it spoken or understood in Islamic countries. The Muslims who came to India spoke either Persian or Arabic. There was no reason why they should have adopted an entirely new language if it was not for the purpose of having a common language with the inhabitants of the country. Urdu is thus the *lingua franca* of India. . . the great binder of different peoples

We may further point out that the Muslims having decided to have Urdu as their mother-tongue, took to the language in right earnest and their entire literature, including all branches of knowledge, has been built up in this language. As such they attach great importance to the preservation of Urdu as written in the Persian script and would stoutly resist all attempts to destroy it...

Various methods are employed to stop the slaughter of cows. We have received information that butchers, while returning with cattle from market places, have been assaulted. For instance, a few butchers were bringing cattle from village Kali, Sub-division Jehanabad. They were attacked by Hindus at village Durmi in the Sardar Subdivision of District Patna, and one of them was severely wounded with a spear and was admitted into hospital

It is a national tragedy that at no time in the modern age certain minorities, particularly the Muslims, have felt so unsafe and so aggrieved as they do now under Provincial Autonomy by the unwise policy and unjust action of the present Government which has surrendered to militant mobs, composed mostly of ignorant, biased and intolerant people and assembled to prevent Muslims on various occasions from performing certain religious acts and exercising their civic rights

Before the Congress took over the Government of the Province, there was a provision in the budget of the interim Ministry for grant of scholarships to Muslim students as the Muslims are backward in secondary education. The Congress Cabinet

cancelled this provision in the budget. This is one of the examples of how much the Congress cares for the educational advancement of the Muslims

1. Syed Mehdi Ali Khan, Raja of Pirpur (1896-1947); Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1930; attended Round Table Conference, 1931; Member, U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1937; Honorary Secretary, British Indian Association of the Taluqdars of Awadh.
2. Syed Ashraf Ahmad; Member of the Council of All India Muslim League.
3. Mian Ghyas-ud-din; Member of the All India Muslim League Council; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly.
4. Syed Zakir Ali; coopted member of the Central Parliamentary Board of the All India Muslim League from United Provinces.
5. Syed Hasan Riaz; Member, Council of All India Muslim League.
6. Syed Taqi Haji Naqvi; Member, Council of All India Muslim League.

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Malik Barkat Ali to Abdur Rab Nishtar

Nishtar Papers

19, TEMPLE ROAD, LAHORE, 16 November, 1938

My Dear Sardar Sahib,

I regret that I have not been able to acknowledge your kind letter of the 17 December, 1937, earlier.

On 20 December, 1937 I left for Bombay and returned on the 3rd of January 1938. Since then I was busy with the Shahidganj case. Under the circumstances I hope, you will excuse the delay that has taken place in acknowledging your kind letter.

With reference to the information that you desire all I have been able to find is that the understanding between the Ministry is that the recruitment of the various communities in the services should be in the following proportion:

Muslims	3
Hindus	2
Sikhs & Others	1

The population percentages are as follows:

Muslims	56 per cent
Hindus	28 per cent
Sikhs	11 per cent
Others	5 per cent

A few posts are thrown open to competition but there is always provision for adjusting the inequalities by means of nomination.

With all regards,

Yours sincerley,
BARKAT ALI

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*Sultan Ahmed to Rajendra Prasad**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. I, pp. 161-62*

PATNA, 16 November, 1938

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Many thanks for your kind letter of the 7th instant which I received only day before yesterday on my return from Bombay. I tried to get into touch with you here but I was told that you were again indisposed and had to leave for your home.

Believe me, I had nothing but the love of my country which compelled me to write to my friend in the strain in which I did and though I did not think that he will send a copy of my letter to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, I am glad that he did so, as the latter has sent on the same to you. I claim that when the Congress decided to accept office last year no one outside the Congress circle was more pleased than myself. I felt that the Indians had got power to do good to the people of the Provinces and those who were assuming office had tremendous responsibilities to discharge and needed our best support in spite of our differences of opinion. I felt that their action should not be criticised with hostility and that the criticism should always be constructive and not destructive. I wrote a letter to the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga in that light and begged of him to do all that he could to help the Ministry and make it a success. For a long time and even now I feel that those who are opposed to the Congress indulge in exaggerations and tall talks and for a long time I attached no importance to the catalogue of grievances placed before me but within the last few months I was compelled to study the attitude of the Congress Ministry towards the Muslim community and other Minorities and I have been led to most depressing conclusions.

The sentence that you have quoted in your letter from my letter is strong, but believe me it pained me more than you can imagine when I used it. At times I wondered if I was swerving from the path of impartiality and getting into that groove of exaggeration in which some of my Muslim friends have been indulging, but I am convinced that it is not so.

However, even now, I shall be happy if I can be of the slightest service in bringing about an improvement in the conditions prevailing. Please let me know when you are likely to come to Patna and I should like to have a couple of hours with you quietly without anybody in the world to know anything about it and I shall give you the details upon which my conclusions are based.

I hope you are feeling better on your return to the village. I feel so sorry that of all persons in the world you should be suffering from ailments. If you had just a little better health what greater amount of good you would have been able to do. As it is I know the claims on your time are tremendous but I hope that if you and I discuss matter for a short time, the time so spent will not be wasted. In the meantime please

put yourself only the following questions as I put to myself in order to decide whether a detailed enquiry is not clearly indicated. There is no doubt that the Muslims in general are up in arms against the Ministry, the Bengalis have no good words to speak about them, the Kisans have nothing but abuses, the landlords are dissatisfied, and the services are not happy.

1. Can all these be due to unreasonableness on the part of the whole lot of them, or is it that things have been managed in none too satisfactory a way?
2. Is the Ministry above communalism by which I mean not only Hindu and Muslim troubles but also Bhumihar Brahman, Kayastha, Rajput, Bengali or Bihari?
3. Are services being filled on the basis of one's political convictions or irrespective of them?
4. Is the Ministry really living up to the life which the Mahatma or yourself intended them to live up to?

With affectionate regards,

Yours very sincerely,
SULTAN AHMAD

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Sir Akbar Hydari to Jamnalal Bajaj [Extract]

Jamnalal Bajaj Papers, VI, No. 343

HYDERABAD, DECCAN, 16 November, 1938

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Seth Jamnalal Bajaj,

2. I have, on different occasions, both in my letters and in our talks, pointed out the essentially communal nature of the State Congress despite all that it may profess and despite its name which is deliberately designed as a mask to win sympathy. We here are fully aware of the persons who have inspired it throughout and are inspiring it today; despite the semblance of having separate movements in the case of each, we fully know that they are at the same time guiding the parallel activities of the Arya Samaj¹ and the Hindu Civil Liberties Union. You also know that the State Congress precipitated the situation, took the law into its own hands and has defied it on several occasions, besides committing other provocative and unseemly acts and engaging hirelings for the purpose. While it made no move to purge its ranks of persons with a distinctly communal record and convert itself into a national instead of a communal organisation, it broke its own word that there would be no Satyagraha during the continuance of the Unity talks. It was perfectly well aware that Government was at the moment, having just been presented with the report of the Iyengar Committee, giving final consideration to a scheme of reforms embracing legitimate civil liberties and representative

institutions for the furtherance of the political ideals of the people and their more effective association with the Government. What was the occasion for it to have picked up this quarrel at this particular juncture? With such a body and the idea of lifting the ban now imposed on—it a ban throughout accompanied by the assurance that the State is not averse to political organisations provided they are non-communal and have no associations with outside bodies—I feel you can have no sympathy, unless it is the name which attracts. Yet, if I understood you rightly, you yourself told me that you had from the outset thought that the use of that name was inappropriate for the State organisation and that your advice would have been that the name should be changed.

3. We believe—a belief to which I gave expression when I met you—that, apart from the *Mulki* (indigenous native) sentiment and pride which is hurt by any suggestion of mediation or interference in the internal affairs of the State by persons or bodies owing no allegiance to the State, there is a still more fundamental objection, namely that it is inconsistent with the basic idea of the sovereignty of the State that such persons or bodies should come between the Ruler and his subjects. It is as inconceivable for us to think of our interfering or allowing our people to intercede in such a manner, for example, between the strikers and the Government which recently fired on them in Bombay, as to permit similar intercession by others in our affairs. Differences between us and our people can be better resolved and must continue to be settled as hitherto between ourselves. Interference of this nature would be alien to the traditions of the state and be resented by our people. Not having lived in the State and, therefore, relying on insufficient information supplied by interested persons, you may be convinced that you are helping what you deem and what may sound to be a national cause, but you will in reality be assisting and associating yourself with communal agitators and communal aspirations and ambitions of an unworthy type. As such, any visit of yours, even though it can in any case be only in your private and personal capacity, will have the effect of encouraging communalism and associating you and the organisation which you represent with communal activities; it is bound to increase the prevailing tension and cause a set-back in the work of restoration of the traditional relations between the communities on which all the energies of the Government are concentrated. It may lead to far graver consequence for which I am certain neither you nor anyone else in your position would like to assume responsibility. Above all, at a time when the Unity talks between the two communities are proceeding, it may create controversies and be used by either party for the adoption of an extremism which may prevent the attainment of a solution of the communal problem on the only possible basis of mutual agreement and compromise.

4. For these reasons I considered that this particular time would be most unsuitable for you to pay a visit to the State which, in circumstances other than those in which we now find ourselves, I might have welcomed. As promised, however, I consulted my colleagues upon my return to Hyderabad and they agree with me in advising you for the same reasons to postpone your visit for the present, even though they appreciated the assurance you gave that you would

not deliver public speeches or permit demonstrations or processions of any kind.

Yours sincerely,
AKBAR HYDARI

SETH JAMNALAL BAJAJ,
Wardha

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1. Rated as one of the most powerful Hindu revivalist movements in modern India, the Arya Samaj was founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-83) in 1875 with the object of changing Hindu religious and social behaviour. It opposed the hereditary aspect of the caste system and idol worship. The desire of the Arya Samaj leadership to establish Hindu nationalism on the foundation of religious and social unity resulted in the formation of *Shuddhi Sabhas* or Conversion Councils and the organisation of the All India Shuddhi Sabha in 1909.

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Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. II, pp. 135-37

WARDHA, 16/17 November, 1938

My dear Rajendrababu,

The Hon'ble K.B. Allahbaksh arrived here this morning. He expected you would be here according to our original programme. I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter which he delivered to me this morning on his arrival together with my reply to it. I have carefully gone through the relevant portion of our decision by which we suggested the postponement of the operation of the entire revenue proposals including grouping for one year. I am sure that you have got the original decision, but for your ready reference I am enclosing a copy of the relevant extract of our decision. The Sind Assembly Congress Party has pressed this viewpoint on the Ministry in accordance with our advice and the Ministry desire to know whether the Sind Party's resolution is in conformity with our decision in order that they can place it before the Sind Governor when he returns and advise him to accept it. They wanted our confirmation in order that there may be no difficulty or misunderstanding afterwards.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI

Enclosure 3:

(Extract from the All India Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee's decision)

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee has come to the conclusion that unless the Ministry agrees to postpone the operation of the orders in their entirety for one year, which they had promised to do before the orders were issued, to enable the Province and the Assembly to consider and discuss the

question in all its aspects, it must advise the Congress Party in the Assembly to withdraw its support from the Ministry, which it had conditionally promised, and revert to its freedom of action.

It considers the attitude and action of the Ministry in this respect highly objectionable, but the Congress Party, composed as it is in the Sind Assembly of only ten members in a House of sixty, should not take upon itself the responsibility in an important matter like this of turning the scale in favour of one party or another.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee, accordingly, advises the Congress Party to remain neutral in the next session of the Assembly when a vote of No-Confidence is brought against the Ministry. If, however, the Ministry accepts the suggestion and postpones operation of the orders for one year, conditional support promised by it will continue to be given. In that event the Congress Party will help in every way in securing a discussion of the proposals in all their aspects within the twelve months, so that whatever proposal may emerge will be after a full and frank discussion of the question on its merits.

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George Cunningham to Laithwaite

Linlithgow Papers, No. 16, pp. 39-41

PESHAWAR, 21 November, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. G.H. 257

Dear Laithwaite,

I send herewith for His Excellency's information, a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 21 November, 1938, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the first half of November 1938.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report, No. 22 dated the 21 November, 1938 [Extract]

Confidential

5. In regard to the work of the Ministry, Mr. Gandhi went out of his way to explain to his audiences the difficulties confronting the Ministers, and the impracticability of carrying out the Congress programme under the limitations imposed by the Government of India Act. Though all communities aired their grievances, Mr. Gandhi never criticised the Ministers in public; it is said, however, that he took them to task privately for not working in accordance with the instructions of the All India Congress Committee. I think the Mahatma has rightly concluded that any other Congress Ministry would be much less stable than the existing one, particularly if it did not contain Dr. Khan Sahib. As to the future, it is possible that in view of the waning popularity of the Congress and the growing strength of the League, Mr. Gandhi might prefer to call on the Ministry to resign rather than to have to

acknowledge defeat in a Muslim Province. But, knowing the store which the All India Congress Committee sets by having a Congress Ministry in the Province, it is difficult to believe that Mr. Gandhi would advice resignation unless he meant at the same time to call out remaining Congress Ministries and to produce an All India crisis.

6. During his tour the Mahatma gave much time and thought to a study of the Red Shirt Organisation, and in every public speech he emphasized that his main object in visiting the Province was to study the Red Shirt Organisation and to find out whether the Red Shirts were capable of following his creed of non-violence. It has been suggested, and the suggestion deserves consideration, that he wants, if possible, to use Red Shirts to further his plan of forming a National Non-violent Guard, or, if not actually to use Red Shirts, to consider whether the system of their organisation can be used for his project. He must have been disappointed with what he saw for at the moment the Red Shirt Organisation is not at its best. The party is full of faction-feeling, and discipline is anything but good. Further, I feel Mr. Gandhi must by now be satisfied that the Pathan mentality is not susceptible to non-violent methods.

To sum up the visit has in my judgement been a failure from every point of view. It had produced no concrete results to benefit the Congress Party, and has only served to show the weaknesses in its position. Lastly, the general atmosphere of disappointment has tended to vitalize the Muslim League.

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Savarkar's Press Statement

Savarkar Papers

25 November, 1938

The Following statement is issued to the Press by Mr. Savarkar, the President, Hindu Mahasabha:

"From more or less reliable reports it seems that Sir Akbar Hydari and some other Muslim gentlemen in the confidence of the Nizam are busy negotiating with some of the leaders of the Indian National Congress to find out a way to allay the Civil Disobedience Movement in the Bhaganagar State (Hyderabad State). If the Nizam Government have really seen the wisdom of consulting the Hindu Civil Registrar, it is a welcome change. But then he must make it plain to Sir Akbar Hydari that he is directing his negotiations to a wrong address.

For it is the Hindu Sanghatanists inside and outside the State that have been agitating for years against the fanatical oppression directed against the Hindus in the Nizam State. It is again the Hindu Sanghatanists who have launched the campaign of defying the tormenting anti-Hindu Laws and rules in that State and are bearing now the brunt of the fight. The Indian National Congress cannot claim to be even a sleeping partner in the concern. It has never uttered even a word of protest against the Muslim tyranny in the Nizam State and is still persisting in this guilty silence and apathy. Not only the Hindu Sanghatanists but even the State Congress that is putting in a fight, has nothing in common with the Indian National Congress but a party of the name and has publicly disowned any connection with the latter; while the few honest patriots who happened to be members of the Indian Congress and yet have joined the Civil Disobedience campaign led by Senapati Bapat of Poona are not owned by it in this activity of theirs.

Under these circumstances, if fighting shy of approaching the Hindu Sanghatanists, Sir Akbar Hydari hopes to bring about settlement with the Congressite leaders only he will be counting without his host. The Hindu Sanghatanists are the party aggrieved, it is they who must receive satisfaction. They place no faith whatever in the Congress leaders of the Gandhist brand so far as Hindu interests are concerned. Just as Gandhiji assured the Frontier Hindus only the other day that they could safely rely on the Khudai-Khidmatgars for their protection against the outrageous raids of the Muslim tribes, even so, who knows if his henchmen like Mr. Bajaj may not advise the Hindus in the Nizam State to rely on and trust to the tender mercies of the Khaksars in the Nizam State.

Consequently, if Sir Akbar Hydari wants really to come to terms and is not trying to use the Congress leaders as an eyewash, he should forthwith approach the Hindu Sanghatanists leaders representing the Hindu Mahasabha, Arya Samaj, Sanatan Sangha and the Hindu Swatantrya Sangha in the Nizam State. Their terms also are definite. The Nizam Government must guarantee, not in words but in practice, full and equal civil liberties to the Hindus along with other communities in the State and at least a 75 per cent representation in the public services and in a responsible Legislature which should (be) immediately granted.

We assure the Nizam Government that the Hindu Sanghatanists are as eager to welcome peace if it is honourable as determined they are to carry on the struggle if it is inevitable.

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Brabourne to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 57, pp. 107-09

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 4 December, 1938

REPORT NO. 23

My dear Linlithgow,

This is my report for the second half of November 1938.

10. I had some apprehension personally that the Id-ul-Fitr in Calcutta might give rise to trouble as the Muslim League were determined to oust from his position Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had hitherto led the prayers but whose pro-Congress politics were not to their liking. Actually matters went off peacefully owing to the overwhelming success of the Muslim League propaganda and the withdrawal by the Maulana of his claims to lead the prayers. Whatever religious arguments may have been put forward, there is, in fact, no doubt that the whole affair was a successful trial of strength by the Muslim League and the supporters of the Ministry in Calcutta.

Yours ever,
BRABOURNE

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*All India Muslim League Council Resolution**Congress Government I, p. 164*

NEW DELHI, 4 December, 1938

Resolved that this meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League appoints a Committee consisting of the gentlemen noted below who shall report on the following points at the next meeting of the League at Patna:

1. Whether the Wardha Scheme¹ would have the effect of preventing or circumscribing the progress of the Urdu Language and Urdu script and whether it would tend to obliterate or weaken the religious traditions and culture of the Indian Muslims so that they might lose their separate national identity and be moulded according to the political ideals of the Congress.

2. Whether it is essential that the Muslims should have their own separate organisation for education which should be under their own control and how this could be effected.

It was further resolved that within three months the Committee shall submit to the All India Muslim League an educational scheme which should provide such education for Muslim boys and girls as would create in them an Islamic mentality, strengthen the Islamic characteristics, and at the same time, fully equip them to meet the exigencies of the present age.

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1. The Wardha Scheme of Education outlines Gandhiji's idea of self-supporting primary education centred round some form of manual or productive work related to the socio-economic environment of a child. The syllabus, prepared by the Zakir Husain Committee, sought to project among the students the idea of *Ahimsa* and territorial nationalism. It was introduced in the Congress-ruled Provinces in March, 1938. In the prevailing discontent over Ministry formation and the performance of Government in the Congress-ruled Provinces, Muslims rejected the Wardha Scheme and the *Vidya Mandirs* under it as an attempt to impose Hindu ideology and culture on them.

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*All India Muslim League Council Resolution**Congress Government I, p. 165*

NEW DELHI, 4 December, 1938

Resolved that the following proposed resolution be forwarded to the Propaganda and Publicity Committee for such action as it thinks proper:

That in order to counteract the Muslim Mass Contact Movement launched by the Congress, the following measures be adopted:

- (i) In every Province and district where the spiritual influence of the *Ulama* could be utilised for the purpose, brief *Fatwas* and manifestoes should be issued on behalf of the *Ulama* in which the Muslims should be warned against joining the Congress, and the disadvantages from the religious point of view of any association with the Congress should be clearly and emphatically explained to them. These *Fatwas* should be published under the authority of the All India Muslim League through the agency of the local League in the Language of each Province or district.
- (ii) In consultation with the *Ulama* some suitably qualified Muslims should be appointed to address Friday Congregations and other Muslim gatherings and also meetings held in rural areas on the subject of the religious turpitude and secular harm which is likely to result for the Muslims by their joining the Congress.
- (iii) Having regard to the fact that in certain public offices undue pressure is put on Muslim subordinates by their official superiors in order to make them join the Congress and similarly in certain mills and workshops with Congressite owners and managers Muslim workmen and labourers are compelled to join the Congress, the Council of the All India Muslim League should direct influential and leading members of the League to move Government officers responsible for the maintenance of law and order to check such unlawful abuse of power.

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M.A. Khuhro¹ to Jinnah

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. II, pp. 154-60

124 MUSLIM COLONY, KARACHI, 4 December, 1938

Dear Sir,

I enclose herewith copies of my two letters which I have addressed to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in reply to his letter of the 19th November, with regard to the Sind Ministerial tangle. As the things are being generally misrepresented by interested persons I would request you to read the letters carefully and consider their importance in all their respects.

Enclosure 1

(From Khan Bahadur M.A. Khuhro, Secretary, Sind Muslim League Parliamentary Section, Karachi, to Vallabhbhai Patel)

There was no effort on the part of the Muslim League to force a League Ministry on Khan Bahadur Allahbaksh. The offer came from K.B. Allahbaksh himself when Mr. Jinnah came to Sind, and even the idea that he should join Muslim League had emanated from him, without any move from our side. A few

days before Mr. Jinnah was due to come here, K.B. Allahbaksh and his another Muslim colleague had begun making overtures to the League leaders. Two Ministers uninvitedly came to the station to receive the League President and the Revenue Minister sent an invitation, on behalf of Premier and himself, to Mr. Jinnah for Tea which, however, was refused. Then they came and saw Mr. Jinnah and gave him in writing that they had decided to join the League and that if the League so desired they would even resign.

After such an agreement was handed over by them to Mr. Jinnah, the League Party followed the usual procedure, the one agreed to by K.B. Allahbaksh as well of consulting its absentee members. Meanwhile they received some offer from the local Congress people and as they were not sure as to what would be their fate in the new dispensation of things, they resiled from their agreement, so late as on the 12th October. As a matter of fact the present Ministers do not believe in placing themselves under any well-disciplined Party and, therefore, they having no fixed principles of their own are playing one Party against another and befooling all. I do not think it is proper or honourable on the part of any Party to sell its principle, for the sake of, and descend so low as to devise subterfuges in order to keep such a Ministry in office which has neither Party nor any policy, nor any programme.

The question of assessment was not referred to Sir Sikander Hayat Khan at the initiative of the League Party. The move was made by K.B. Allahbaksh himself and as the League was sure of its case it had no hesitation in having it reviewed by anybody.

Enclosure 2

(From Khan Bahadur M.A. Khuhro, Secretary, Parliamentary Section, Sind Muslim League, to Vallabhbhai Patel)

124 MUSLIM COLONY, KARACHI, 28 November, 1938

Dear Mr. Patel,

I got your letter of the 19th instant on 25th here, in which, firstly, you have made a grievance of the fact that "although the Parliamentary Sub-Committee had made its position clear in this matter and published its decision in the Press, I and my friends of the Muslim League continued to misrepresent your attitude, both in Press and on the platform, when all our efforts failed to form a League Ministry," and secondly, you have endeavoured to know as to what is the position of my Party with regard to the assessment question.

Let me first of all make it clear that much of what has been broadcast by the Sind Hindu Press, which for communal considerations is personally interested in the retention of the present Sind Ministry, with regard to Karachi League Conference, is incorrect and misleading. It is our legitimate grievance that the Hindu Press has in some cases been fabricating news in order to misrepresent our side, and engender an atmosphere of unnecessary alarm and suspicion. It is, however, correct only so far, that, there was a resolution passed in a meeting held in Karachi, in which Congress had been condemned on the following counts:

1. That it had not carried out the promise it had held out to the country in the Sind Congress Party's statement of July 16 and 25th.

2. That in spite of such unequivocal statements, which were said to be conclusive and final and left no room for the subsequent inactivity, passivity, and opening up of secret negotiations, the Congress Party entered into a secret pact with the Ministry to ratify which you and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were subsequently invited.

3. That the Sind Congress Party was not satisfied with the conduct of the Sind Ministry even before the assessment issue had cropped up, as was evident from the letters addressed by some prominent Congress Assembly Party members to Mr. G.M. Sayed² in June 1938, and yet it played many somersaults, even after the assessment issue had arisen and the Ministry had invoked the Congress condemnation. This change in the attitude of the Congress Party towards the Ministry was attributed to the communal colour lent to the Ministerial question by the Hindu Press on this question.

4. That the Wardha decision of neutrality was unsatisfactory in as much as it had deprived ten constituencies, who were represented by the Congress members and who were affected by the assessment proposals, of the opportunity of having their say on the assessment question in the Assembly when No-Confidence Motion was to be moved. The Sub-Committee having held that the conduct of the Ministry was most objectionable there was no sense in its having ordered the local members to desist from voting against the Ministry on the day of reckoning.

5. That when K.B. Allahbaksh and his Muslim colleagues had signed an agreement to join the Muslim League, the Congress Party, influenced by extraneous considerations, reopened the matter with the Khan Bahadur after the lapse of nearly two months' time, called a couple of meetings of its own to find out a formula whereby the Ministry should anyhow be saved from defeat. This conduct on the part of the Sind Congress was characterised as carrying something incompatible with the position of a body which claims to stand firm for the principles.

6. That even though the Ministry had failed to summon any session of the Assembly, after the brief session of May last, yet the Congress Party had remained completely silent over it, in spite of the fact that as early as in July last, Mr. B.K. Sidha, the Secretary of the Congress Party, had written to the Ministers that the session must be called latest in August. It was greatly surprising that a Party which was so keen on having a session in July or August had ceased to realise the importance of such a clear violation of the Constitutional rights of the people, when the Assembly was not called even so late as in November. In the opinion of the meeting it revealed the fact that the Congress Party wanted to give time to the Ministry to consolidate its position by means and methods which were not in any way in keeping with the Congress standards of morality.

7. That the Congress Party directly and indirectly wanted to make the wishes of the Muslim majority ineffective.

You will, I hope, agree with me that this indictment of the Congress policy was based on sound reasons and cold logic, and if the Congress can concede to its adversaries also the right of the free speech and unfettered expression of opinion there will not remain much substance in the grievance which you have made in your letter. But why should it worry you what the Muslims have said in their meetings? Is

the Congress going to measure its sword with other organisations even at the cost of its own principles, declarations and manifestoes?

As to the second point, you are not unaware of the attitude we have adopted with regard to the assessment question. I do not think we have given you any reason which you may use as an additional ground for showing still more relaxation and concessions to the present Ministry. We have been carefully watching the Congress proceedings and I can assure you that my Party is not going to do anything which is against the interests of the country. I would only request you to decide the question on its own intrinsic merits and not allow extraneous considerations and side issues to twist and warp the judgement of the Congress High Command.

I am glad to hear from you that you are not unaware of the attitude of Musalmans of Sind regarding Allahbaksh Ministry. What the Muslims of Sind demand from the Congress is that it should adhere to the statement made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in the course of his talks with the Muslim members of the Sind Legislature here. He had very clearly said that in the Muslim majority Provinces the Congress did not want to divide the Muslims or do anything which may make the Muslim majority ineffective. If the Congress High Command stands by that statement of Maulana Saheb and if there is no pulling of strings on communal lines even inside the High Command, the Congress on that one ground alone must not support Allahbaksh Ministry which is opposed tooth and nail by the Muslim majority in this Province.

Before this one ground alone, which involved the question of principle, all other matters including the assessment issue, should sink into oblivion. The Muslims of India are keenly watching whether the Congress High Command is prepared to honour the understanding given to the Muslims by the Maulana Saheb.

You have not been pleased to allow me to have an idea of the formula into which must have crystallised the recent conversations between the Sind Premier and the Congress leaders at Wardha.

The Sind Observer, which for all practical purposes is an organ of the Ministry, has published a summary of the latest agreement between the Sind Congress Assembly Party and the Ministry which provides that if the latter postponed the assessment scheme for 12 months, and brought forward same or any other measure for enhancing assessment after the lapse of that period, the Congress Party shall support the Ministry in enforcing it; because it is said that the Congress High Command assumes that Sind is a deficit Province, that there is a lot of room for increase in the land taxation and that, therefore, the High Command has promised that in case Allahbaksh Ministry proposed any increase in assessment hereafter they would not enforce the Haripura (or Karachi) resolution of the Congress on this issue.

I do not know how far this statement is correct but in case there is some substance in it I cannot help observing that the Congress would be practising deception on the people if it secured the postponement merely with a view to assist the Ministry to enforce it after twelve months. It will even mean that the Congress decision against the assessment scheme and its demand for postponement was a mere hoax to hoodwink the people and pull them into a false sense of security for the present. There is no ground for the Congress to assume that there is any scope for increase in

land taxation in Sind. The Congress is already committed to the opposite view, through its Karachi and Haripura resolutions, through the statements of its members on the floor of the Sind Assembly in August 1937, and through Mr. Jairamdas Doulatram's³ statement of July 3, 1938.

I am,

Yours sincerely,
M.A. KHUHRO

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1. Muhammad Ayub Khuhro (1901-80); Member, Legislative Assembly, Bombay, 1924-37; Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1940-41, 1942-44 and 1946-47; Chief Minister, Sind, 1947, 1951 and 1954; Defence Minister of Pakistan, 1955.
 2. Syed G.M. (1904-1995); first Muslim President, Karachi Local Board; Member, Sindh United Party; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee, 1938; Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937 and 1946; President, Sind Provincial Muslim League; introduced resolution on Pakistan in Sind Assembly, 1943; Collaborated with Hindu members of the Assembly to cause downfall of League Ministry under Sir G.M. Hidayatullah; Chief Sind Awami Party, 1950-55 and 'Jiya Sind' movement; was under House arrest till death.
 3. Jairamdas Doulatram (1892-); leading Congressman of Sind; Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1926-1929; Secretary, All India Foreign Cloth Boycott Committee, 1929; Member of AICC, 1917-1941 of the Working Committee, 1928-1941, and General Secretary of the Congress, 1931-1934; participated in the Non-Cooperation Movement; Governor of Bihar, 1947; Minister, Government of India, 1948-50; Governor of Assam, 1950-1956; Member Rajya Sabha.

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Rajendra Prasad to Sardar Patel

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. II, pp. 170-71

P.O. ZIRADEI (SARON), 10 December, 1938

My dear Vallabhbhai,

3. We had set up a candidate at a by-election in a Muslim constituency. We have lost heavily against the Muslim League candidate. We were told by all the Congress workers there that there was a very good chance of our candidate winning and there was practically no Muslim League in existence in that district. But somehow or other all those calculations (have) turned out to be false. There is a large population of Momins (weavers) in the district (of) Hazaribagh and as Momins have been keeping aloof from the League it was hoped that they would support the Congress candidate. Some of their leaders had approached Maulana also with promise of support. It seems in the end they voted against our candidate although our candidate Maulvi Razak was a local person and has been working ever since 1920 and claimed to (be) a Momin while his rival was a Khan Bahadur Zamindar from the district of Patna. We could not have lost unless the Momins voted against us as about 80 per cent of the

voters belong to that community. The exact figures are not known but it seems our candidate secured about 800 as against over 3,000 votes in favour of his rival.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

To,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
(Camp: WARDHA)

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Moonje's circular letter to Vijayaraghavachariar

Vijayaraghavachariar¹ Papers

NAGPUR C.P., 10 December, 1938

We have pleasure in informing you that the 20th Session of the Hindu Mahasabha will be held this year in Nagpur during the Xmas week, on 28th, 29th and 30th December. The arrangements for holding the Session are now in full swing.

This Session bids fair to be a memorable one for more reasons than one. It will be memorable, however, we are afraid, most unfortunately not in a happy sense. In view of the Muslim demand for division of India into Muslim Hindustan and Hindu Hindustan an era of bitter controversy and struggle may be ushered in, if it should be intended to fight the crisis which the Muslims appear to be bent upon organising with studied wilfulness. It needs no special mention here that the crisis, if allowed to develop, is pregnant with potentialities of all kinds of mischief, animosities and violence.

The Congress, during the last 50 years, and more, has been doing all that was humanly possible for placating the Muslims and further political emancipation of Hindustan without considerations of caste, creed, colour. Mahatma Gandhi, since he assumed dictatorial powers in the Congress, has gone, in his pro-Muslim mentality, to the farthest limit conceivable in the matter, by offering blank cheques to win their love and cooperation in the national struggle for the establishment of *Poorna Swaraj* in Hindustan. The Congress has even acquiesced in the Communal Award, which it had, in the beginning, justly condemned as anti-national and subversive of all possibilities of Hindu-Muslim Unity of the heart-to-heart type. Further on, no less a person than Mahatma Gandhi approached Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, with bended knees and folded hands, for cementing brotherly love between Hindus and Muslims. But all these attempts proved of no avail. They were all spurned with calculated contempt. In its intransigence, the Muslim League has dealt a blow to the Congress from which, it is feared, there is no hope that it will be able to recover. It may prove even a mortal blow, if the Muslim League were not to reconsider or the Congress were not to surrender unconditionally.

In its session recently held at Karachi, the Muslim League has adopted a Resolution, which runs thus:

"This Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interest of the abiding peace of the vast Indian Continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two Nations as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two Federations, viz., the Federation of the Muslim States and the Federation of Hindu States."

"This Conference, therefore, recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslim majority Provinces, Muslim Native States, and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full Independence in the form of Federation of their own with permission to any other Muslim State beyond the Indian Frontier to join the Federation and with such safeguards for the Non-Muslim Minorities as may be conceded to Muslim Minorities in the Non-Muslim Federation of India."

In support of this Resolution, Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, and Haji Sir Abdulla Haroon, M.L.A., one of the most prominent leaders of the Muslim League, say:

"As long as the Congress does not come to us as equals, there can be no peace in the land. It is a matter of life and death for the Muslims. If you Muslims will not see the danger, I now give you the alarm." Mr. Jinnah.

"Democracy is not suited to the Indian soil, tradition and environments."

"The object of this Congress politics is to place the whole of India under the sway of one particular group of political exploiters. In their mad craze for power, they lose sight of the consequences and, unless checked, may plunge India in Civil War," Sir Haroon.

Here we cannot avoid taking note of the grim fact that Mr. Jinnah promises that there will be no peace in the land; and what is more—Sir Abdulla Haroon hurls a threat even of Civil War, if the Muslims are not propitiated by the quiet and unquestioned acceptance of their demand.

In view of these facts of the situation, let us see how does the Congress stand. It won't be an exaggeration to say, in brief, that the Muslims have crashed to pieces the entire edifice so labourously built by Mahatma Gandhi of *Swaraj* through love and non-violence and Hindu-Muslim Unity. Though Mahatmaji is still swearing by love and non-violence in his message delivered to the people after his return from his pilgrimage to the Pathan country, Pandit Jawaharlal, on the other hand, is emphasizing the need of "the possession of Military power to guard and defend ourselves" in his first message similarly delivered to the people, after return from his European pilgrimage. Besides all his disciples and lieutenants, working in the Congress Ministries of the 7 Congress Provinces, have never scrupled to requisition the services of the British Police and Military, when need arose, for the maintenance of law and order. It must particularly be noted here that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru gives the very first place to the Military, which is the direct antithesis of Love and Non-violence. Is it not a cruel blow, however, least expected, to the life-long dream of Mahatma Gandhi?

Similarly another pet dream of Mahatmaji of Hindu-Muslim Unity has been sent to its grave by the resolution of the Muslim League of a separate Federation of their own. This demand of the Muslims cuts at the very roots of all hopes and ambitions of

evolving a common Indian Nationalism and common *Poorna Swaraj* for the whole of Hindustan as one nation.

Thus these, the very fundamentals, of the Philosophy, Policy and Programme of work conceived and planned by Mahatmaji for the early realisation of *Poorna Swaraj*, having been destroyed under the very first touch of Realism, both by the Muslims and the Congressmen themselves, it is now quite pertinent to ask—what is there that is now left for the Mahatmaji and the Congress to function for?

Now the question is: What should the Hindus do? They are on the horns of dilema (dilemma). If they accept the Muslim demand of a separate Federation of their own, all their life-long dream of a common nationalism and united Hindustan from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin vanishes in the air; and if not, then they are to face with the fierce and deadly prospect of a Civil War, culminating in rivers of blood being shed on both sides. Let us analyse the situation further and see where we will stand ultimately. If, out of fear of the threat of Civil war, the Hindus were to succumb and silently accept the Muslim demand of dividing Hindustan into Hindu Hindustan, and Muslim Hindustan, these divisions will soon develop into two separate neighbouring Nations like the German and French Nations on the European continent, ever ready to jump at each others throats and fighting like cats and dogs on the least possible excuse. Thus chicken-hearted surrender at this stage will surely lead in the near future to the most vicious circle of constant warfare alternating with temporary truce with its inevitable concomitant of race for armaments. We will thus enact Europe, as it is, on the Indian soil. What is the alternative?

This is the problem before the Hindus. We are passing through a crisis, the like of which has not been witnessed ever since British Rule was established in Hindustan more than 150 years ago.

Can the Congress of Mahatma Gandhi solve the dilema [dilemma] and help us? No, obviously not. In fact, if the Congress, from the beginning had taken a realistic view of politics in Hindustan and had shown appreciation of human nature as it is, perhaps there may not have arisen an occasion for such a crisis to develop at all.

We (who) can then help and guide us? Obviously, no other organisation except the Hindu Mahasabha, in spite of the legacies of bad blood and communal misunderstanding left by the Congress by its manner of dealing with the communal problem, and particularly the Hindu-Muslim problem.

Thus, for Hindustan as a whole and for the Hindus particularly there is now no politics other than that of Hindu Mahasabha, which stands for:

1. *Poorna Swaraj* by all legitimate means.
2. Unalloyed nationalism and Nation democracy on the basis of one person one vote, irrespective of all considerations of caste, creed, or colour.
3. Maintenance of one united nation of Hindustan and uncompromising opposition to any scheme of dividing Hindustan into Hindu Hindustan and Muslim Hindustan.
4. Protection for all religions and for the personal laws of several religious communities owing Hindustan as their motherland.

We, therefore, invite your particular attention to this aspect of the problem, in the hope that, if our fears are found to be justified, you will be pleased to take lively interest in the affairs of the Hindu Mahasabha.

May we here request you to depute some persons holding responsible positions

in the Hindu life of the State to watch the proceedings personally of this year's session of the Hindu Mahasabha; so that they may report to you their personal impressions; thereby they may serve to obliterate the artificial distinction between Hindus of Indian Hindustan and the British Hindustan, so far our vital interests, political, religious and cultural, are concerned. We are sure it will soon be appreciated that the two stand together in the same boat and that we will swim or sink together.

We hereby extend our cordial and respectful invitation to them to attend the forthcoming session of the Hindu Mahasabha.

Yours Sincerely,
B.S. MOONJE

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1. C. Vijayaraghavachariar (1852-1944); Member, Madras Legislative Council, 1895-1901 and of Imperial Legislative Council, 1913-16; President of the Indian National Congress at its Session in Nagpur in December 1920; presided over Hindu Mahasabha, 1931.

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Bose to Jinnah [16 December, 1938]

Congress Leaders' Correspondence, p. 22 n.d¹

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

The Working Committee have considered your letter of October 9, 1938, and regret the decision contained therein. Since the Committee do not find it possible to agree with the Council of the Muslim League as to the basis of the negotiation and since the Council insist that an agreement as to the basis is a "*sine qua non*" of any negotiations between the Congress and the League, the Working Committee regret that they are not in a position to do anything further in the direction of starting negotiations with the League with a view to arrive at a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter but I did not want to say anything till the Working Committee met and considered the matter.

Since the previous correspondence has been published already, I am taking the liberty of issuing this to the Press.

Yours sincerely,
SUBHAS C. BOSE

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1. The editor of Congress Leaders' Correspondence refers to file No.122 of Karachi Archives, but does not give any date which obviously appears to be much posterior to 9 October—Ed.

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*Congress Resolution [16 December, 1938]**Jayaprakash Narayan Papers*

1. The move on the part of the Indian National Congress to start a special campaign for spreading the influence of the INC (Indian National Congress) among the Muslim masses and to start Muslim Mass Contact Committee for that purpose has evoked a controversy. It is argued by some that it is a wrong move in that it involves the recognition of the division of the masses on communal lines. Others argue that the organisation of the Muslim masses individually in the Congress would cut across their organisation in workers and peasants unions and the collective affiliation of these unions to the INC.

2. The fact that the exploited masses of the Muslim community are politically backward, that they do not yet join in large numbers progressive political organisations (such as the INC) and the class unions of workers and peasants is due to the reactionary feudal (religious-communal) influence which the exploiter section of that community is still able to exercise upon them. This reactionary influence can finally be broken by the growth of the organisation and struggle for the class demands as workers and peasants which cut across all communal divisions. But nationalist agitation based on the fundamental antagonism between the Indian people and their foreign imperialist exploiters also plays a great role in the shattering of this influence.

3. The Nationalist agitation for Hindu-Muslim unity of the earlier days was an effort at achieving top unity. The attempt to bring the Muslim masses in the Congress was based on arriving at an understanding with the bourgeois-landlord section of the community. This method of approach still finds favour with the right wing leaders of the INC. The present campaign of Muslim Mass Contact has nothing in common with this top unity move. The present campaign is a direct approach to the Muslim masses on the basis of nationalist-anti-imperialist propaganda—a frontal campaign to counteract the influence of the reactionary pro-imperialist Muslim leaders on the Nationalist plane. The formation of Muslim Mass Contact Committees, as temporary committees of Congressmen for the purpose of carrying on an intensive campaign of political propaganda among the Muslim masses, explaining to them the fundamental unity of the Indian masses in their political and economic struggle against foreign imperialism—counteracting the ‘imperialist’ allegation, that the INC is a Hindu organisation and making clear how it stands for the preservation of the culture, language and the script of the minorities—is undoubtedly a progressive

4. The campaign of propaganda on behalf of the [illegible] Committee . . . on right lines, as indicated above would go a long way in overcoming the relative political backwardness of the Muslim masses with reference to the INC. But it cannot completely smash the reactionary influence of the pro-imperialist communalist leaders of both the communities. This campaign progressive as it is cannot be a substitute for a radical cure of communalism, viz. the development of the class-organisations and struggle of the toiling masses.

5. While supporting this campaign, it is necessary to bear in mind [illegible] precautions: (a) The Muslim Mass Contact Committee must not be formed [words left out] of Muslim Congressmen. It must be borne in mind that they are tempo [temporary] Committees for a special campaign. This will prevent them from degenerating [into] 'communal committee'—(b) The economic question must be placed in the front of the propaganda. The basic unity of the economic and political struggle of the toiling masses against Hindu, Muslim as well as foreign exploiters must be stressed. The need for being organised in workers and peasants unions must be stressed.

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Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1090/87-88

NAPIER ROAD, KARACHI, 16 December, 1938

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I enclose herewith for your perusal a copy of the letter that I have just addressed to His Highness Sir Agha Khan.

Yours sincerely,
(sd/-)

For SETH HAJI SIR ABDULLAH HAROON

MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH, Esq., M.L.A.
Malabar Hill, •BOMBAY

Enclosure 1

From,

Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon, Kt., M.L.A.
Napier Road,
KARACHI

Your Highness,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your very kind letter from England, which I received in Delhi. The Assembly Session is just over and I have reached Karachi only this morning.

Your Highness must have read the proceedings of the recent meeting of the All India Muslim League Council recently held at Delhi.

We have read with considerable attention your recent statement on the Indian situation broadcast from Bombay. You have been pleased to say perhaps that the British Government should introduce direct elections in the Indian States in order to solve the present unpleasantness between the Government and the Congress. Your Highness will bear in mind the fact that if the State subjects get direct representation on the Federal Legislatures, it will result in the Congress being able to establish a full Hindu majority at the Centre, an object to achieve which the Congress has now been struggling. The Muslim League wants to avoid the establishment of Congress rule all over India as we have learnt an abject lesson at their hands during these two years that the Congress has been in office.

I have also noted your views about Hindu Muslim unity. Every one of us is anxious for it, but the

Congress has closed its door against the Muslims by refusing to deal with the Muslim League as the sole representative body of Indian Muslims. I do not think much headway can now be done with the work of Hindu-Muslim reconciliation under these circumstances.

I shall be grateful if you kindly take all these factors into consideration and favour me with your views for my own guidance.

I should really be very happy to meet your Highness at the earliest opportunity and as such I would like to have a copy of your programme of your Indian tour.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) H.A. HAROON

HIS HIGHNESS SIR SULTAN MUHUMMED SHAH AGHA KHAN,
G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O.,
BOMBAY.

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Muslims of Nagpur to League's Secretary

Shamsul Hasan Collection

C.P. & BERAR I:5, 16 December, 1938

To

The Honorary Secretary,
All India Muslim League,
On-visit to Nagpur.

Dear Sir,

We, the Muslims of Nagpur—members and sympathizers of the League, hereby approach and lay before you the following facts about the gravity of the situation regarding the Vidya Mandir Scheme and request that the conclusion to which we have arrived at should kindly be paid serious attention before it is too late.

Brief History of the Scheme.

The Hon'ble Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla,¹ the then Education Minister and the Present Premier, has drawn up a scheme for the spread of free and compulsory mass education in the rural areas of this Province subsidised on the endowments of lands and other minor sources of income by introducing 'Vidya Mandirs' in the villages where 40 boys and girls of school-going age are available.

The Chief Muslim Objections to the Scheme.

(i) *Name:* The word '*Mandir*' may have many definitions of their choice, meaning anything else; but in common parlance it does mean a place where images are worshipped. Therefore, this communal name must be changed. Even Pandit Shukla, the learned framer of the scheme, admits that "the name is attractive in more ways than one. To the 99 per cent of the population in villages, it will be a source of inspiration and it is hoped that it will appeal to their generous and charitable minds."

From the aforesaid remark it is quite obvious that to the remaining 1 per cent population in the villages (if the Premier's calculation is correct) i.e. Muslims it will not be a source of inspiration nor will it appeal to their minds. In spite of having a full knowledge about this, the framer of the scheme has deliberately given the communal name.

(ii) *Medium of Instruction*: The recent Government Communique lays down that education will be imparted to the pupils in the Vidya Mandir through the 'mother-tongue of the area in which it is situated and the Premier defines the mother tongue of the area as 'the language spoken by the majority in area.' This observation plainly proves that the Premier has no regard for the mother-tongue of the Minority. It clearly shows the dominance of one language over the other. The Muslims wish that Urdu should be the medium of instruction for them and no other.

(iii) *Establishment of Vidya Mandir*: The condition precedent to the establishment of such schools in rural areas is that 40 pupils should be available to start with. When Muslims are very thinly populated in rural areas it would be nearly impossible to gather up 40 pupils at any single place. The only alternative for the Muslim pupils will be to join the Vidya Mandirs to learn through the 'mother-tongue of the majority in the area' and lose every attachment to their own mother-tongue and culture or to go without education. Hence Muslims demand that where 15 Muslim pupils are available a village school should be opened for them and where there are less number and are obliged to seek admission into the mixed school, every facility should be provided for their training through Urdu.

(iv) *Co-education*: Clause (i) of the details of the scheme, lays down that "every village where about 40 boys and girls are available of school-going age should have a Vidya Mandir." It is clear that there should be co-education of boys and girls and, as the education is compulsory the Muslim girls will have to sit with boys which is highly objectionable from the Muslim point of view. The Muslims desire that there should be a separate arrangement for their girls or the education should be made optional for them.

(v) *Vidya Mandir Teacher*: Pandit Shukla in his scheme states, "A Vidya Mandir is generally expected to be a one-teacher institution." This teacher will have a five months' training at Wardha having the credit of learning Urdu in only 25 periods in the whole course. The following extract from the Vidya Mandir Syllabus Page 7 will speak for itself:

(Sub: No) IX—Knowledge of basic Hindustani—Reading and writing through Devanagri and Urdu Scripts—fifty periods. Need it be mentioned that the teacher will have only an idea about Urdu and will be quite incompetent of teaching it? The Muslims demand that there should be a separate Urdu teacher for the Muslim pupils or such teacher should be appointed who should not only be conversant with the mother tongue of the area but also possess adequate knowledge of Urdu.

(vi) *Textbooks*: The textbooks prescribed at present for study applaud exclusively the glories of Hindu divinities and Hindu heroes and saints ignoring any such references to the great Muslim personalities. In certain books attempt is made to malign the Muslim heroes and great men. Examples can be amply supplied to prove the truth. Muslims demand that they should have separate textbooks or the textbooks should be such as may satisfy adequately their cultural needs and should dwell on the

achievements of the Muslim and Hindu cultures so that the Muslim and Hindu children will develop the necessary mutual love and respect.

Peaceful and Constitutional Agitation by Muslims for the Redressal of their grievances:

From the time when the scheme was in print the Muslims of C.P. and Berar are carrying on agitation through Press and platform condemning the communal nature of the scheme and impressing upon the Government to see its way to accept the Muslim demands.

(a) The Muslim League organisations all over the Province condemned the scheme in the most emphatic terms and declared in most unequivocal terms that they will have to resort to Civil Disobedience unless their grievances are redressed.

(b) The Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu in its various sittings passed resolutions condemning the communal nature of the scheme. Even Dr. Maulvi Abdul Huq² waited upon the then Education Minister and acquainted him with the Muslim agitation. The Minister did nothing except the usual way of assuring to consider the grievances. Also Maulana Israr Ahmed saw Mr. Gandhi at Saeogaon in this connection. Gandhiji admitted that the name was not a happy one and assured to acquaint the C.P. Premier about this but nothing came out of it so far.

(c) The All India C.P. & Berar Sirat Conference, the C.P. Muslim Students Federation and various other Muslim bodies strongly condemned the scheme with no result.

(d) Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, the Congress President while returning from the Haripura Congress Session was waited on by Mr. P.K. Salve, the President of the Mass Contact Committee and acquainted him with the prevalent situation. He admitted the grievances to be genuine and assured to exert his influence upon the Premier but unfortunately his influence had no bearing upon the existing conditions.

(e) On 15th September 1938, a huge procession of about 20 thousand Muslims marched to the Assembly. The Premier invited the deputation and did nothing except giving a patient hearing to the various Muslim grievances.

(f) The so-called Nationalist Muslims also joined in the general chorus of condemning the scheme but it seems that their voice was not loud enough or the Congress ears were not sound enough to hear their distressful cry.

Civil Disobedience the only Remedy: From the above mentioned facts it will be quite clear that the Muslims of C.P. and Berar have employed every legitimate and peaceful means to have their voice felt in the counsels of the Congress Government. They have held meetings, passed resolutions, submitted memorandums, staged demonstrations, sent deputations and made use of every available opportunity to put forth their claims, hoping that better sense will prevail and the wrongs will be redressed but the so-called popular Government turned a deaf ear to all this.

Now Sir, we think that all our patience is exhausted and there would be absolutely no use to beg any further. Therefore, the only course left open is to launch Civil Disobedience and we will be fully justified to do so since nothing short of this will induce the Government to consider our legitimate demands.

Civil Disobedience an Act of Prestige to Muslim League: Civil Disobedience will not only have a direct bearing upon the Government policy regarding the scheme but also it will serve as an eye-opener in as much as it will serve as a controlling force

over the future conduct of the Congress Government towards the Minorities.

Secondly if the All India Muslim League officially permits such Civil Disobedience, its prestige would be considerably enhanced in as much as it will establish quite a happy precedent in the life history of the League for encouraging direct action as time demands.

Thirdly it will be a great uniting and binding force to the Muslims since it will be an occasion for sinking the petty differences.

Above all majority community will be persuaded if not compelled to create conditions under which the Minority should have confidence and the Congress Government will think twice before arrogating itself with the majority might.

Now Sir, considering all the pros and cons of the problem it is quite imperative that the All India Muslim League should permit the C.P. Muslims to adopt such a course and all of us press for the same.

Yours faithfully,
SADIQ ALI KHAN
(Member, Central Assembly)
and others NAGPUR
Dt. 16/12/38.

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1. Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla (1877-1956); Premier, Central Provinces, 1938-39 and Chief Minister, Madhya Pradesh, 1946-56.
 2. Dr. Maulvi Abdul Huq, Secretary Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu.

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Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 1094/432-33

16 December, 1938

My Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I hope you must have seen the latest move of the Wardha in having the Muslim League as a communal body. The reaction of Calcutta and Bengal is that this is an affront to Muslim India and Muslims should not now enter into any negotiations with the Congress.

You must have read in papers regarding our war on the "*Imamat*" of M. Abul Kalam Azad and our monster meetings, processions, demonstrations and Press propaganda in this connection. This was done solely because Abul Kalam has taken the position of the holder of the portfolio of Islam in the Congress and the Muslim League refuses to accept any one except Mr. Jinnah. It is very strange, however, to see that Nawab Ismail Khan recently went out of his way to pay a visit to Anand Bhawan and meet Mr. Azad. What is this? The Muslims strongly resent this move. Will

you kindly explain, whether this interview was authorised by you or not? We in Calcutta believe that our work in connection with the Revolution in Calcutta Maidan *Imamat* has been undone by Nawab Ismail. This has given us very great pain.

Please write to us regarding this matter and oblige. We are at present engaged in organising the Muslim League in Calcutta, the Industrial area of Bengal.

Yours-in-Islam,
RAGHIB AHSAN

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Brabourne to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 66, pp. 120-23

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 19 December, 1938

REPORT NO. 24

My dear Linlithgow,

This is my report for the first half of December 1938.

2. The Cabinet. Two measures under discussion during the last fortnight brought out, once again, the deep lines of cleavage between Ministers.

One was a proposed Bill to amend the electoral system of the Calcutta Corporation so as to give separate electorates to Muslims. Hindu Ministers are prepared to realise that this is inevitable but the real tussle will come over the numbers of seats for the respective communities. There was also a proposal to create separate electorates for Scheduled Castes: on this matter there was obviously very strong feeling and, although, the discussion proceeded largely in terms of principles and precedents, everybody fully realised what the real issue was, and will continue to be, namely, how far Muslims will succeed in ousting Hindus from their strongholds of political power, among which the Calcutta Corporation is one of the most important.

3. The other measure was a Bill to provide for the establishment of Government markets and the licencing of private markets for agricultural products—a very necessary measure with strong Muslim support: clearly, however, the landlord Hindu Ministers are convinced that the real intention of this measure is to give the Muslims the power to expropriate or break up markets of private land-owners by indirect means.

5. Interviews with Subhas Bose and Sarat Bose—I have, since writing my last report seen both Subhas and Sarat Bose. These interviews were fixed up at extremely short notice and they came about in the following way. Muirhead,¹ on arrival, expressed a strong desire to see Subhas Bose. I ascertained that Subhas Bose would be prepared to accept an invitation to come and see Muirhead, so I arranged it for the same evening. As the interview was to take place in Government House it seemed a very good opportunity for me to see him too on the ground that I could hardly let him come into my house without saying “how do you do” to him. The process of saying

"how do you do" took no less than 1 hour and 20 minutes as I found him most ready to talk on many subjects.

7. We discussed the dangers of communal troubles in Bengal and, towards the end of the interview, he brought the conversation round to the question of the future of my present Cabinet. He actually asked me to advise Fazlul Huq to throw his present Ministry overboard and form a coalition with Congress in which he, Fazlul Huq, would be Chief Minister. I pointed out that he was asking me to intrigue with my Chief Minister against most of my other Ministers; that I had no intention whatsoever of doing so and that if I did do so and he came into power he would obviously mistrust me from the very beginning—a comment to which he had no reply. The conversation was most friendly throughout. He obviously wanted to go on talking about the Ministerial question but I thought it was well to bring the interview to an end as there was nothing to be gained by further conversation on this point.

8. I saw Sarat Bose, the Leader of the Opposition in the Bengal Assembly, the next morning under precisely similar circumstances. He, again, wished to spend most of the time talking about the Bengal Ministry and he was clearly anxious to find out what I thought would be the attitude of the European Group towards a change. Needless to say, I gave him no indication on this point (I had no difficulty in so doing because I really do not know what line they would take. I imagine it would depend on the personnel of the Ministry and their published programme). Sarat Bose hinted strongly that, if they did succeed in bringing about a change and setting up a coalition between Congress and Fazlul Huq's followers, they would be prepared to include Nazimuddin in the Ministry.

Yours ever,
BRABOURNE

1. Lt. Col. Muirhead; Under-Secretary of State for India.

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Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, Jammu and Kashmir State,¹ to Rajendra Prasad [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents I, pp. 314-17

JAMMU, 19 December, 1958

With reference to the statements issued in the Press regarding the recent events in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the publicity that has been and is being given to them in British India, I wish to bring to your notice certain matters which those of us who live in the State and are conversant with the affairs of the State feel are being concealed from you. Before dealing with the subject matter of my letter, I should like

to introduce myself to you. I am an elected Member of the State Legislative Assembly and the leader of the biggest non-official group in it, that is to say, I am the Leader of the Opposition in the Assembly. My group comprises Hindus including Harijans, Muslims and Sikh members in the Assembly. By profession I am an agriculturist and a landowner belonging to the Province of Jammu and Kashmir and come of a family of agriculturists and landowners.

As regards the reasons which have induced me to address you, I wish to say that the recent reports in the Press, which may be right or wrong, state that certain persons who are wanted by the police in the State for fear of being arrested are issuing statements purporting to be the substance of their talks with you in which they state that they explained the miserable conditions of the people of the State who are striving for a responsible Government and that you have given them promises or assurance of your sympathy and help in their so-called struggle for freedom and that you are likely to issue your statement to this effect shortly. The true position in the State has been more than once made clear by statements issued in the *Tribune* under Professor Gulshan Rai's² signature and other similar statements and the history of agitation in the State is still fresh in the minds of outside public as well as inside public.

The Muslim Conference³ which came into being after the agitation was carrying on agitation on identical lines⁴ till the present agitation. Seeing that the present Government means business, the leaders came forward in different roles and began to preach nationalism on their own account without taking into confidence the Minorities who live in the State always in great harassment of the major community. Even this movement has not received any support from the Muslim community. The so-called present national agitation in Srinagar started in sympathy with a Muslim agitator who delivered a seditious speech against the Government for which he was tried and convicted, which conviction was upheld by the State High Court. On this meetings were held throughout which became violent. The Prime Minister's car was attacked and an attempt was made to murder him. Hooliganism and vilification were the order of the day. The few Hindus who joined this agitation were a few Kashmiri Pandits who had their own axes to grind against their own community. These non-Muslims have been repeatedly disowned by their communities. All responsible organisations in the State know that the agitation was started by the Muslim Conference for its own ends and that the Hindus and Sikhs as communities had no part in it because they knew the tactics of the Muslim Conference which was being backed by the Muslim League in India, with the object of building up a solid Muslim bloc all over North-West India. In point of fact Muslim League workers were with the agitators. After the agitation had subsided, and I must bring it to your kind notice that the agitation did not last more than a few days because the people as soon as they learnt that the Government meant business on this occasion and refused to be cowed down by the threats of the agitators, most of whom were arrested, and those few of them who escaped the law by absconding into the British territory started writing articles in the Press in the Punjab and actually have issued printed posters in the State inciting the Muslims to rise in rebellion against the State Government. These posters are in our hands and are signed by Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi⁵ who poses as a

nationalist leader and has, as it appears from the Press reports, interviewed you. So much for the non-violent and nationalistic character of the agitation.

As regards the question whether we, that is, the Hindus and Sikhs and the moderate elements amongst Muslims do not want responsible Government, of course, there can be only one reply to it. We do want it. People who have the interests of the country at heart and have a stake in the country naturally want to have the control of their destinies in their own hands, but the point is how we can approach that very important problem in which not only the extremists, who exploit and are exploited by interested parties inside and outside the State, are concerned but also those who form the real backbone of the State, the agriculturists and the professional classes, Hindus and Muslims. Our experience of the past seven years has been that the Muslim Conference led by the agitators have adopted the most unreasonable attitude and wherever a question of principle has arisen with regard to the preservation of the rights and position of the Minorities they have tried and in a large measure succeeded in destroying those rights. The State Government until last year, for reasons which it is not necessary to enter into here, has always acceded to the wishes of the Muslim Conference, however unreasonable they might be. So far as the interests are purely economic, there is no difference between the Hindu and Muslim agriculturists and Hindu and Muslim non-agriculturists, but where the dividing line is based not on economic grounds but on purely religious grounds the position of the Minorities becomes impossible in the State. For four years we have had the Legislative Assembly in the State. It has done useful work. It has extensive powers on the lines of Minto-Morley Reforms and in some respects it is more advanced than the Legislative Council Assembly of Mysore State. What we Minorities and the moderate people of all communities desire is that, instead of being thrown to the wolves, we should progress step by step towards responsible Government. Today, though the Government is not responsible to the Assembly, the Government is definitely responsible in the sense that we can make it very hot for the administration in the Assembly if we find that they have made a mistake and there have been several such instances. Unless the majority community and the extremists amongst them learn to behave with moderation and tolerance towards others who, though fewer in number, are not only good subjects of the State but have for other reasons much greater interests and stake in the welfare of the State, it is impossible for the Minorities to accept the position of permanent subservience and servility to the majority community. I would, therefore, request you either to visit the State personally or through an emissary of yours and study political conditions of the people and find out yourself what Government would suit the people and what time is needed to prepare ground for responsible Government. There is nothing to conceal. You can see what the condition of the people is. My suggestion to you would be that before you give any kind of assurance to the class of people represented by Ghulam Mohd. Bakshi and P.N. Dhar the latter entirely unknown in the State, and the former known mainly as a protagonist of the Muslim Conference—or issue any statement regarding Kashmir State, you should study the political conditions of the communities and see for yourself whether there exists ground for the establishment of responsible Government in the State. Your advice in the matter will be welcome.

1. Neither the *Rajendra Prasad Papers* nor Valmiki Choudhary in *Dr. Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents*, Vol I gives the name of the Leader of the Opposition and the date of the letter. Similar letter dated 19 December, 1938 was addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru by Gangaram Wazir, President Dogra Sabha, Jammu see *infra* No. 345.
2. A Journalist of Lahore.
3. The Muslim Conference launched by young graduates including Sheikh Abdullah in 1932 was six years later renamed the National Conference. Its leader Sheikh Abdullah developed close contacts with anti autocratic P.N. Dhar in Kashmir and R.N. Bazaz in Jammu.
4. The inevitable confrontation between an overwhelming Muslim subject population and a Hindu Dogra ruling dynasty was given a communal tinge. The agitation culminated in a mass attack on Srinagar jail on 13 July, 1931 when 21 were killed in police firing.
5. Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi (1919-1971); Member Kashmir National Conference; Member, Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, 1951-67; Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir, 1953-63, Member, Lok Sabha, 1967-71.

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Linlithgow to Henry Craik [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 82, pp. 60-61

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 20 December, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Craik,

4. I have seen a variety of reports on Subhas Chandra Bose's visit to the Punjab, but I would judge that it has hardly been outstanding success from the point of view of the general public, and that, if anything, it has aggravated rather than reduced internal differences among Congress supporters in the Province.

5. I was very glad to have Sikander's own account of what took place at the Muslim League meeting in Delhi, for, naturally enough, the *Hindustan Times*¹ and similar papers have done their utmost to discredit Sikander and to represent Jinnah as having administered a public rebuke to him. But I have every confidence in Sikander's ability to hold his own whether he is dealing with the Congress or the Muslim League.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

1. *Hindustan Times* dated 5 December, 1938 reported that at the Muslim League Council meeting at New Delhi on 4 December Jinnah issued a stern warning to Sikandar Hayat Khan for his speech at Simla making an unconditional offer of support to the British Government in the event of war breaking out Jinnah said, "he must be careful in making offers to the British Government and the Congress."

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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, pp. 573-79*

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 20 December, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3. You will, I think, be interested in the note,¹ which I send you with this letter, of a long talk I had with Birla on the 14th. I will not comment on it; but I frankly found his approach, both on the general federation issue and on the matter of the States, of profound interest. I had also yesterday a long and friendly talk with Mr. T.K. Ghosh, Editor of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*. He too confirmed the anxiety of Gandhi and the right wing of Congress for Federation, though, like Birla, he urged that certain conditions, not too precisely stated, were a prerequisite to Congress acceptance.

1. Not available.

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*Aga Khan to Abdoola Haroon**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, No. F. 274/15
(Copy)*

LAND'S END, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 20 December, 1938

My dear Haroon,

Many thanks as now I got your letter. Do please read carefully what you see in the Press. What I said in reply to a question, did I believe in early Federation? Yes or no, my answer. The only possible early Federation is either British India Federation or with elected members from States. This is a statement of fact, not approval or advocacy. About Hindu Muslim relations we would all welcome a possible solution. Is your League likely to advocate Pakistan as the final policy of Muslims? If so the sooner public opinion is prepared gradually the better.

All good wishes for New Year.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) AGA KHAN



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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, No. 584, pp. 584-86*

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 26 December, 1938

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

5. I am glad that you took the line you did with Firoz¹ about the Pakistan movement. I suspect that Congress are beginning to take this a little more seriously than in the past, and that it will emerge rather more prominently as we come nearer to Federation.

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1. Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon (1893-1970); Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1920-36; Minister for Local Self-Government in the Unionist Ministry, Punjab, 1927-1930; Member, AIML Council, 1927 and 1946; Minister for Education, Punjab, 1931-36; Indian High Commissioner in London, 1936-41; Member for Labour, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1941-42, Defence Member July 1942-August 1945; delegate to U.N. Conference, San Francisco, 1945; ML Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1946; Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly and Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1947-50, Governor East Pakistan, 1950-53; Chief Minister, Punjab, 1953-55; Prime Minister, Pakistan, 1957-58.

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*Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League [Extract]**Historic Documents, pp. 245-253*

PATNA, 26-29 December, 1938

Ladies and Gentlemen,

5. I will now refer to the position of the Muslim League. It was only three years ago that we laid down the policy and programme of the All India Muslim League at Bombay. The position at that time was this. Of the intelligentsia of the Muslims who were in the forefront of what is called political life, most, I do not say all, were careerists. They chose their place according to their convenience either in the bureaucratic camp or in the other camp, that is the Congress camp. Those who thought that they could better their position by joining the bureaucratic camp joined the same. The others thought that they could get position and power in the Congress camp and joined that camp. Their object was how best to make careers for themselves. So far as the masses were concerned and so far as my dear young friends the Muslim youth were concerned, they were all hypnotised by the Congress falsehood. The

youth believe in slogans and catchwords. They were caught right in the net that was spread for them by the Congress. They were led into the belief that the Congress was fighting for the freedom of the motherland. Being most honest themselves they could not believe that other people could be otherwise. They were led to believe that the question was really an economic one and that they were fighting for *dal bhat*, for the labour and the kisans. Their pure untutored minds became easy victims of the Congress net. When we, who saw through the game and understood the inward meaning of the Congress leaders move, tried to make them understand that they were being misled. We were dubbed reactionaries, communalists and much else besides.

6. That was the position in 1936. I am glad to say that things have now changed. One thing has been demonstrated beyond doubt, namely, that the Congress High Command wanted the Musalmans to be a mere understudy of the Congress, mere foot-pages [pads] of the Congress leaders, to be used, governed and brought under the heels when they had served the purpose of the Congress. The Congress leaders wanted them to submit unconditionally to the *Hindu Raj*. That game has now been fully exposed. We have got ample proofs of it. The Chairman of the Reception Committee has some of those proofs in the address. I congratulate him for his most eloquent exposition of the true state of affairs in this country and also of the aims and objects the Congress.

7. The Congress has now, you must be aware, killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of Fascism. The Congress does not want any settlement with the Muslims of India. As the Chairman of Reception Committee has said in the address, the Congress wants the Muslims to accept the settlement as a gift from the majority. The Congress High Command makes the preposterous claim that they are entitled to speak on behalf of the whole of India, that they alone are capable of delivering the goods. Others are asked to accept the gift as from a mighty sovereign. The Congress High Command declared that they will redress the grievances of the Muslims, and they expect the Muslims to accept this declaration. I want to make it plain to all concerned that we Muslims want no gifts. The Muslims want no concessions. We Muslims of India have made up our minds to have our fullest rights but we shall have them as rights, not as gifts or concessions.

8. As I have said before, there are four forces at play in this country. Firstly, there is the British Government. Secondly, there are the rulers and people of the Indian states. Thirdly, there are the Hindus, and, fourthly, there are Muslims. The Congress Press may clamour as much as it likes, they may bring their morning, afternoon, evening and night editions, the Congress leaders may cry as much as they like that the Congress is a national body. But I say it is not true. The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body. That is the truth and the Congress leaders know it. The presence of the few Muslims, the few misled and misguided ones and the few who are there with ulterior motives, does not, cannot make it a national body. I challenge anybody to deny that the Congress is mainly a Hindu body. I ask, does the Congress represent the Muslims? I ask, does the Congress represent the Christians? I ask, does the Congress represent Scheduled Castes? I ask, does the Congress represent the non-Brahmans? I say, the Congress does not even represent all the Hindus. What about the Hindu Mahasabha? What about the Liberal Federation? The Congress, no

doubt, is the largest single party in the country. But it is nothing more than that. It may arrogate to itself whatever titles it likes; the Congress High Command, in the intoxication of power, like persons who are drunk, may make any claims it pleases them to make. But such claims cannot alter the true character of the Congress. It remains what it is—mainly a Hindu body.

9. Such claims might have hoodwinked some people for sometime but they cannot hoodwink all the people all the time, and can certainly not hoodwink the Muslims any longer. I am convinced—I think you are also now convinced, and many who are not yet convinced will soon be convinced and those who are honestly mistaken now—not those who are dishonest in their conviction—will also be convinced that the Congress is not a national body. It is a misfortune of our country, indeed it is a tragedy that the High Command of the Congress is determined, absolutely determined, to crush all other communities and cultures in this country and establish *Hindu Raj*. They talk of *Swaraj* but they mean *Hindu Raj*. They talk of National Government, but they mean only Hindu Government. But the bubble has been pricked too soon. Intoxicated with power gained under the new Constitution, with the majority in six or seven Provinces the Congress game has been exposed a little too soon. What did the Congress do when it got the power? With all its pretensions of nationalism, it straightway started with the *Bande Mataram*. It is admitted that *Bande Mataram* is not the National Song, yet it is sung as much and thrust upon others. It is sung not only in their own gatherings, but Muslim children in Government and Municipal schools too are compelled to sing it. Muslim children must accept *Bande Mataram* as their National Song, no matter whether their religious beliefs permit them to do so or not. It is idolatrous and worst, a hymn of hate against Muslims.

10. Take the case of the Congress flag. Admittedly it is not the National Flag of India. Yet that flag must be respected by everyone and hoisted on every Government and public building. It does not matter if the Muslims object to it, the Congress flag must be paraded as the National Flag of India and thrust upon the Muslims. Take next the case of Hindi-Hindustani. I need not add to what has already been said on the subject by the Chairman of the Reception Committee. Is there any doubt now in the mind of anyone that the whole scheme of Hindi-Hindustani is intended to stifle and suppress Urdu? Take next the Wardha Scheme of Education. Were the Muslims taken into confidence when the scheme was under preparation? The whole scheme was conceived of and its details worked out behind the back of the Muslims. Who is the author of the Scheme? Who is the genius behind it? Mr. Gandhi. I have no hesitation in saying that it is Mr. Gandhi who is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism. His ideal is to revive Hindu religion and establish *Hindu Raj* in this country and he is utilizing the Congress to further this object.

11. The reaction of the Muslims to such a scheme of education could not but be what it has been all over the country. You have seen the Pirpur Report and I need not add to what has been described in that document. The position may be summed up in one sentence. Today Hindu mentality, and Hindu outlook, is being carefully nurtured

and Muslims are being forced to accept these new conditions and to submit to the orders of the Congress leaders. This Hindu outlook is daily interfering with the normal life of the Muslims. The Musalmans are being forced to accept the Hindu ideals in their daily life. Have Muslims anywhere done anything of the sort? Have they anywhere sought to impose Muslim culture on the Hindus? Yet whenever Muslims have raised the slightest voice of protest against the imposition of Hindu culture on them, they have been branded as communalists and disturbers of peace, and the repressive machinery of the Congress Governments have been set in motion against them. Take the cases that have occurred in Bihar. Who have suffered suppression of culture under the Congress Government? It is the Muslims. Against whom, are the repressive measures taken, prohibitory orders issued and among whom are arrests made? It is the Muslims. I should like to know a single instance—I am prepared to learn and correct myself—a single instance where the Muslim League or Muslim individuals may have tried to force their own culture upon the Hindus in the last eighteen months.

12. I do not wish to dwell any longer upon this. I have done with it so far as the Congress is concerned. As regards the Musalmans I can say that it is a matter of great congratulation to the All India Muslim League that it has succeeded in awakening a remarkable national consciousness among the Muslims. Muslims, as I said before, were like men who had lost their moral, cultural and political consciousness. You have not yet got to the fringe of acquiring that moral, cultural and political consciousness. You have only reached that stage at which there has come awakening—your political consciousness has been stirred. Today you find—apart from the fact whether the Congress claims are right or wrong—today you find that the Hindus have to a very large degree acquired that essential quality—moral, cultural and political consciousness—and it has become the national consciousness of the Hindus. This is the force behind them, that is the force I want the Muslims to acquire. When you have acquired that, believe me, I have no doubt in my mind, you will realise what you want. The counting of heads may be a very good thing, but it is not the final arbiter of the destiny of nations. You have yet to develop a national self and national individuality. It is a big task and, as I have told you, you are yet only on the fringe of it. But I have great hopes of our success. The developments that have already taken place are almost miraculous. I never dreamed we could make this wonderful demonstration which we see today. But even then we are only on the fringe of the problem.

14. Another question that will come up for consideration is the situation that is developing in the Indian States. You have heard the Chairman of the Reception Committee on that subject. One point I would like to add to his observations. As you are all aware, we are in fullest sympathy with the aspirations of the States people. I am convinced, however, as I am convinced about the real objects of the Congress, that the motive of the Congress championing the rights of the States people is far from what is made out to be. I would like to put only one question. Why all this agitation in the States? Why are all the forces being let loose in the name of the Arya Samajists and the Hindu Mahasabha in Hyderabad State? I would ask the Congress, what is it doing in Kashmir? The Arya Samajists, the Hindu Mahasabha and the

Congress nationalists, as also the Press, the subservient Press of the Congress, why are they silent about the affairs of the Kashmir State. Is it because Kashmir is a Hindu State? Is it because the vast majority of the Indian subjects of Kashmir State are Muslims? I have no doubt about the real meaning of the Congress solicitude for the people of the Indian States. Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose has said in one of his speeches that the Congress wants to make an alliance with the people of the Indian States. May I ask, do they want to make an alliance only with those who are Hindus or also with the Musalmans? According to the present Constitution of Muslim League, the League cannot interfere in the affairs of the Indian States. But I want to make it clear that if the Congress pursues its campaign in Muslim States like Hyderabad with the ulterior motive which undoubtedly is inspiring it at present, the Muslim League would have to consider afresh the question of interference with the affairs of Indian States. We cannot leave our Muslim brethren in the Hindu States at the tender mercies of their oppressors and those who wish to exploit them.

15. The next question that you will have to consider is that of the Federation. Let the Congress continue to say that they will never accept the Federation. But I tell you, I do not at all believe in the professions of the Congress. The Congress will tumble into it just as it tumbled into the Provincial part of the Constitution. Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose was loud in his declaration the other day that whatever individual Congressmen might say here and there, the Congress as a whole was determined to reject the Federation lock, stock and barrel. I do not believe in such declarations. I know another Congress leader has said that revision and modification will satisfy them, and if the elective principle was accepted, it would appease the Congress, and yet another leader declared that if the Federal scheme could be so altered as to give them the substance of independence, the Congress might work it and in that way the undesirable and unworkable Federal Constitution might be made a desirable and workable one. I say the whole idea behind the Congress leaders move is once again to deceive the Muslims. I want to tell these leaders, however, that they cannot deceive the Muslims any more. The Muslims are not what they were three years ago. The whole game of the Congress is and has been to get a substantial majority in this wretched, highly objectionable and rotten Constitution which they want to enjoy. If they get a majority, they will accept the Federation with utmost glee, and then they will begin to pursue their nefarious scheme of destroying the Muslim culture and organisation and to build up the Congress organisation as the one and only totalitarian organization of the Fascist brand. And then they will be able to establish their ideal of *Hindu Raj* in Hindustan.

16. The Congress leaders know what they are aiming at. They have got their majorities in seven Provinces and have Congress Governments there. There are only four Provinces left. The covetous eyes of the Congress leaders are now cast upon these Provinces. Every now and then they declare that the non-Congress Governments in these Provinces are tottering, in spite of their majorities, struggling on their last legs. The Congress leaders think that in these four Provinces the Ministries are not very strong. But it is not difficult to see through the Congress game. They want to see a Congress Government in whichever of these Provinces they can. I had a talk with some friends of the North-West Frontier Province. I am told that in that Province our

co-religionists—credulous Pathans as they are—have been told that the Congress is for the good of the people, that the Muslim League is the supporter of imperialism and an ally of imperialism! I say there cannot be a greater falsehood than the allegation that the Muslim League is an ally of imperialism. Inside the Legislature or outside the Legislature, have I on any single occasion supported imperialism, not to speak of proving myself an ally of imperialism? I am sure even if there were a few amongst Muslims who had thought in the past that the Muslims might gain their end by alliance with British imperialism, they have now been thoroughly disillusioned. I say the Muslim League is not going to be an ally of anyone but would be the ally of even the devil if need be in the interest of Muslims.

17. It is not because we are in love with imperialism; but in politics one has to play one's game as on the chessboard. I say the Muslims and the Muslim League have only one ally and that ally is the Muslim nation, and one and only one to whom they look for help is God?

18. The Congress game with regard to Federation is very clear. If the Congress can gain the control over the Federal machinery, then, by means of direct and indirect powers vested in the Federal Governments, the Congress would be able to reduce to non-entity the Governments of the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in the Punjab. So in the end the Congress will have seven Provinces where they enjoy overwhelming numerical majority as a gift of God, and the other four Provinces where Muslims dominate will be the feudatories of the Congress High Command. If I am right in my judgement, that is the objective of the Congress. Therefore, I say the Congress opposition to the Federation is not honest. Am I to blame for it? Am I wrong?

Resolution on Direct Action adopted

That having regard to the atrocities that have been committed and that elementary rights of the Muslims have been trampled upon in a systematic manner in Bihar, U.P. and C.P. and that the Government of these Provinces have failed to redress their grievances or protect even the elementary rights of the Musalmans in these Provinces in spite of all Constitutional methods adopted so far by the Muslims, this session of the All India Muslim League is, therefore, of opinion that the time has now come to authorise the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League to decide and resort to "Direct Action" if and when necessary.

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G.V. Ketkar¹ submits report to the President Hindu Mahasabha

Savarkar Papers, Roll No. 4, pp. 66-70

27 December, 1938

On 11 October, 1938 a huge mass meeting was held at Poona on Shanwarwada Ground. Senapati Bapat and Swatantryavir Savarkar addressed the meeting on the movement of *Satyagraha* in the Nizam's State.

Savarkar announced in that meeting that a Committee of Action has been formed for launching a campaign of civil resistance to the religious and communal tyranny in Hyderabad State. The committee was formed with the consultation of several Hindu Sabha workers. Amongst those consulted were Senapati Bapat, Mr. V.M. Bhuskate (a social worker), Mr. Davare of the Varnashrama Sangha, Mr. R.G. Bhiday, General Secretary of Hindu Mahasabha and others. Savarkar announced in the Shanwarwada meeting names of persons and Office bearers of this Committee of Action, which was called "Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) Hindutyanishta Satyagraha Mandal." For the purpose of brevity it was called "Hindu Satyagraha Mandal." The following were the office bearers.

1. G.V. Ketkar, Editor '*Mahratta*,' President.
2. Nathuram Godse,² Secretary.
3. Members: Mr. S.R. Date,³ Mr. V.B. Davare, Maharashtra Varnashrama Sangha, Mr. Chitrav Shastri, Mr. Masurkar Maharaj,⁴ Mr. S.L. Karandikar, Editor *Trikal* with powers to add.

This Committee of Action or Hindu Satyagraha Mandal was authorised to organise branches in several Districts in Maharashtra.

The Committee of Action at once sat to work. Hindu Satyagraha Mandals were formed at Dadar, Sholapur, Nasik, Barsi, Pandharpur, Chalisgaon, Dhulia, Akola and other places and commenced the work of propaganda and enlistment of Satyagrahis and volunteers. They were authorised to collect funds for the purpose.

Mr. V.B. Davare, visited Sholapur, Pandharpur, Barsi, and other places and delivered speeches before mass meetings.

Mr. Nathuram Godse, the young energetic Secretary of the Committee, visited Sangli, Miraj, Kolhapur and other places.

Shri Masurkar Maharaj and the workers of his Ashram made extensive tours on the border line of Nizam's Dominions, in Ahmednagar and Khandesh Districts.

Mr. S.R. Date with the help of the workers of Barsi and Pandharpur Centre organised a tour in the villages in Barsi *Taluka* which bordered on the Nizam's Dominions.

The Committee viewed the struggle from the Hindu point of view. It maintained continuous consultation and connection with the internal Movement of *Satyagraha* organised by the Hyderabad Hindu Civil Liberties Union under the enthusing leadership of Vir Yeshwant Digamber Joshi⁵ B.A., the first dictator in their *Satyagraha* which was launched on 21st October.

Mr. L.B. Bhopatkar, President of the Maharashtra Hindu Sabha, guided the movement and addressed mass meetings in Poona, Sholapur and other places.

Mr. Nathuram Godse immediately organised a batch of 11 Satyagrahis who started from Poona on 7th November, under his leadership. They were given an enthusing [enthusiastic] send-off at Shanwarwada Grounds and Poona Station. This batch included Shri Kalvankar Shastri B.A., a worker of the Varnashrama Swarajya Sangha, Mr. Gharpure, B.A., L.L.B, Pleader of Jalgaon, Mr. Gangurde, a Harijan and Secretary of the Harijan Defence League, Poona. The batch contained Brahmins as well as Mahrattas and Lingayats.

Shri Masurkar Maharaj presented them with a copy of *Shri Dasbodha* of Ramdas.⁶ Mr. L.B. Bhopatkar gave them hearty blessings.

They were given a rousing reception at Dhond Kurduwadi, Sholapur, Barsi, Pandharpur, and other places on way. They reached Hyderabad onth November and were immediately arrested. They were all sentenced to one years imprisonment. The second batch of eleven *Satyagrahis* started from Poona on 21st November under the leadership of Mr. Khadiwale Vaidya. This batch visited several places and did wonderful and enthusing propaganda. They visited Lonavala, Thana, Kalyan, Dadar, Girgaon, Nasik, Igatpuri, Chalisgaon, Jalgaon, Bhusaval, Amalner, Pathora, Dhulia. They organised *Prabhat Pheri*, in every place and held rousing mass meetings in which the Satyagrahis were welcomed and honoured with great enthusiasm.

Satyagrahis of this batch entered the border villages of the Nizam's Dominions in Khandesh District, distributed pamphlets, and held meetings. Eight *Satyagrahis* out of this batch went to Aurangabad, where they were kept in police lock-up for a day. They were released late in the evening. They went straight to Hyderabad and put up in the Gonliguda Ram Mandir. In two batches of four each they offered *Satyagraha* on 11th and 16th December, on behalf of the Hindu Civil Liberties Union. All of them were arrested and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment ranging from 2 months to one year. The number of Satyagrahis of the Hindu Satyagraha Mandal, now in jail in Hyderabad, is 19.

A third batch of Satyagrahis started from Poona on 25th. They are expected to reach Hyderabad on 26th and offer *Satyagraha* on 27th. The news of this 3rd batch will be received at the Nagpur session. A fourth batch has been organised and ready to start from Bijapur in Karnataka, news that the batch has started, will probably reach Nagpur Hindu Sabha Session.

The Hindu Satyagraha Committee has collected about 3,000 Rupees and practically exhausted the amount for the work of propaganda and *Satyagraha* contributions to the *Satyagraha* fund are pouring in from all places, contributions have been received from Africa, Bihar, Karnataka, Berar, Gujarat and other places.

Satyagraha Camps or *Shibirs* have been opened at Poona, Sholapur, Chalisgaon, Barsi and other places. Shet [Seth] L.R. Tairsee has promised a donation of Rs. 25 for each batch of *Satyagrahis*. Messrs M.N. Talapade and Jamnadas Mehta⁷ has promised Rs. 10 and Rs. 5 respectively for each batch. Others have promised monthly contributions, which are to continue as long as the *Satyagraha* Campaign lasts.

The Hindu Satyagraha Committee declared 21st of every month as the Hindu "*Sangram Day*" to commemorate the 1st *Satyagraha* by Vir Yeshwant Rao Joshi, on 21st October. Thousands of leaflets, placards and photographs of Dharmavir Wamanrao⁸ Naik and Vir Yeshwant Rao Joshi have been distributed throughout Maharashtra and in spite of vigorous censorship and searches they have reached several places in the Nizams Dominions. The Committee organised sympathetic strikes of students at Poona, Sangli and other places to support the struggle of the Hindu students of Osmania University and its Colleges and Schools. The *Hartal* of students in Poona was most successful.

The Hindu Satyagraha Committee has through agents collected news of the misdeeds and aggression of Muslim officers and *Goondas* in the Nizam's State and distributed the news to the Press in Maharashtra and outside.

The Committee is working in Cooperation with Hindu Sabha and Arya Samaj

workers. It organised meetings condemning the atrocities committed by the Nizam's officials on the brave workers of the Arya Samaj.

The Committee has tried to rouse Andhra and Karnataka to take active part in the struggle of Hindus against the Communal oppression of the Nizam's Government.

All this work has been done in [the] teeth of the bitterest opposition from the Congress Workers in Maharashtra. Congress journals have done the utmost to ridicule, vilify and misrepresent the Hindu Satyagraha Committee and its work.

In spite of the abrupt suspension of the *Satyagraha* by the State Congress, the Hindu Committee is not going to discontinue its *Satyagraha*. The Committee expects, however, that a Committee of Action on an All India basis will be appointed at the Nagpur Session of the Hindu Mahasabha and that this A.I. (All India) Committee of Action will immediately take up the threads of work already achieved and proceed vigorously to gather support from all quarters and launch a Satyagraha on a mass scale from all sides of the Nizam's State. As soon as this All India Council of Action is formed the Hindu Satyagraha Committee will work under its directions.

POONA G.V. KETKAR

President Hindu Satyagraha Committee

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1. G.V. Ketkar was an activist in public life during 1920-37 and Editor of *Mahratta*.
 2. Nathuram Vinayak Godse; a worker of the R.S.S. and later a prominent member of the All India Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha and a staunch Savarkarite; Editor of Marathi *Daily Agni*, later called *Hindu Rashtra*, shot Gandhiji on Friday, January 30, 1948 at Delhi; for which he was hanged after trial.
 3. S.R. Date; *alias* Mamrao Date; one of the leaders of Hindu Mahasabha who led battalion of civil resisters into Hyderabad state.
 4. Maharaj Musarkar stands for one Vinayak Maharaj Musarkar who was connected with the Ratnagiri Hindu Sabha and associated with reconversion movement in Goa, under the direction of V.D. Savarkar.
 5. Yeshwant D. Joshi; the leader of Hindu Mahasabha in Hyderabad.
 6. Ramdas, the celebrated Marathi saint poet.
 7. Jamnadas Mehta; Revenue and Finance Minister, Bombay, 1937; Member, National Defence Council; sometime Member, All India Congress Committee and Working Committee.
 8. Waman Rao Naik (1878-1936); a follower of Tilak; deported for seditious meetings, 1907; established the Hyderabad Social Service League 1918; presided over the Third Conference of the Hyderabad Social Service League, held at Nanded in 1920; along with Keshev Rao Koratkar founded the Marathi paper *Nizam Vijay*, 1920; was a prominent Congress leader in the State; endeavoured to establish Maharashtra Sangh, 1935; his efforts bore fruit only after his death, when the Maharashtra Parishad was formed in 1937.

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*Savarkar's Presidential Address*¹

The Indian Annual Register, 1938, II, pp. 317-342

Nagpur, 28 December, 1938. I gratefully acknowledge the confidence you have

placed in me in calling upon me to preside over this Twentieth Session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha. I promise you in all sincerity that I will try my best to deserve the trust you have thus placed in me, by exerting in full the limited strength which an individual like me can possess. But you will excuse me if I call upon you in all humility to bear in mind that the only way of justifying yourselves in placing that trust in me can be no other than exerting yourselves in full in striving and fighting heroically to defend and consolidate Hindudom in such wise as to compel Near Future to herald the resurrection of a Hindu Nation rising out of the tomb of the present and grown even greater and mightier and more resplendent than it ever had been in the past in the days of a Chandragupta² or a Vikramaditya³ or the Peshwas⁴ at Poona. It is nothing short of a political miracle that we Hindus of this generation are called upon to work out, and no individual howsoever great can accomplish the task unless and until the whole Hindudom rises like one man to dare and to do and to march on unvanquished through the unavoidable valleys of bitter Disappointment and valorous Death—through which alone lies the path to the ultimate triumph of such great causes, of Nation's resurrections. If we quail we are all lost beyond redemption: if we but dare we are sure to win; for, even today, we possess the power, the volcanic fire within us. We only know it not. Rouse it confidently—and it shall burst forth like the column of the sacrificial Fire which led the Aryan Patriarchs of our Hindu Race from victory to victory.

2. When I said that it is out of the tomb of the present that we have to resurrect Hinduism I said it deliberately; so that I may not be guilty of belittling the overwhelming difficulties we have to face today. The Present is indeed a veritable sepulchre into which they have buried our Hindu Nation after crucifying it on the charge of committing the crime of claiming to be a nation by itself. It is needless for me to depict to you, brothers and sisters, who have attended this session, to depict the ghastly picture in details of the dreadful calamities which the Hindus from Peshawar to Rameshwar have to face from day to day. The Session of the Hindu Mahasabha is about the last place today where mere sightseers or job-hunters can find anything attractive enough to attend it here. All avenues to power, self, popularity lead but elsewhere. To be a Hindu *Sanghatanist* today is not a paying concern. To be a willing delegate to the Hindu Mahasabha session today is to incur the wrath of powers that be, to invite the dagger of a non-Hindu assassin—some 'brother' Abdul Rushid, to be slaughtered by some "brave Mopla patriots"⁵ and what is more poignant and unbearable than even the dagger of a non-Hindu assassin,—to be hunted and ostracized by millions of one's own Hindu kith and kin for no other fault than of daring to love and defend the Hindu cause and the Hindu people as devotedly and as humanly as the English do the English Race, as the Germans do the German cause, or the Japanese love the Japanese self, the Muslims do the Muslim religion and community. To raise aloft the Hindu banner has become today an act of high treason in Hindustan in the land of the Hindus themselves, to assert one's self as a Hindu is being dubbed as mean by millions of Hindus themselves. The very fact that under such conditions you all have gathered together here as delegates to this session of the Hindu), D and dared to rally round this Pan-Hindu banner proves it to the hilt that you could not have done so unless impelled by an overwhelming sense of duty, fully conscious of and touched

to the quick by the unbearable humiliations to which our Hindu race is subjected to from day to day and fully prepared to defy the intolerable demands of the so-called Indian Patriotism seeking to smother unto death our very existence as Hindus, as a nation unto ourselves.

3. I shall not, therefore, go into any current and detailed grievances or local questions affecting Hindu interests today but leave them to be dealt with severally in the resolutions and speeches on them to be passed and delivered in this session later on. I shall restrict myself to the two outstanding questions: "What is the root cause that has landed the Hindus in this present predicament striking the life growth of our Hindu Nation with a sudden atrophy, and the immediate remedy that is sure to rescue the Hindu cause even yet from being lost beyond recovery?"

4. Nevertheless in as much as this address is meant for those millions of Hindus also who still remain outside the pale of the Hindu and who in spite of their devoted allegiance to Hindutva in general are but imperfectly aware of the dangers that beset it today on all sides and wonder, therefore, why the Hindu Sabhaites should make so much do about nothing or little things here and there, I feel it incumbent upon me just to denote a few points in passing to acquaint them with the real gravity of the situation at least sufficiently enough to set them athinking and in a mood to realize the import of what I have to say later on during the course of the address. Let us just take the Constitution in force today. The British have deliberately deprived the Hindus of the political predominance which was their due as the overwhelming majority in India by denying them representation in proportion to their population on the one hand and on the other loaded the Muslims, Christians, Europeans with weightages, preferences, securities and what not, so as to invest them with political power immeasurably more than what was their due. They broke up the Hindu electorate into watertight compartments with a view to prevent the growth of their political solidarity amongst themselves, why, the very recognition of the Hindus as an electoral unit themselves is altogether and deliberately denied in the electoral scheme of our country. Spacious apartments well furnished and honourably named are reserved for the Minorities. The majority, the Hindu, the host, is crowded into the lumber-room, the general electorate, unnamed and unrecognized. With a set purpose to starve out martial qualities in the Hindus, the British Government have been curtailing their recruitment in the army and in the police with the effect that the Muslim Minority preponderates in those two vital forces of the nation. In the Punjab and some other Provinces measures like the Land Alienation Act seek to crush the Hindus economically while in Bengal an unabashed Act is passed to reserve some sixty per cent of posts for the Muslims in Government services. In the Muslim States of Hyderabad, Bhopal and others the religious and racial persecution of the Hindus is carried on so relentlessly as to remind one of the days of Aurangzeb⁶ and Allauddin.⁷ In cities and villages all over India their civil and religious rights are daily trampled under foot to allay the fury of Muslim mobs. The bloody orgies to which the Hindus were subjected by Muslim fanatics in Malabar and Kohat⁸ are enacted on the scale or that even in the Presidency towns all over India every now and then. The Frontier Muslim tribes carry out raids and perpetrate unnamable atrocities on the Hindu people there with a set purpose of exterminating the *Kafir* in that region. Only the Hindu merchants are looted, only the

Hindus are massacred and only the Hindu women and children are kidnapped and held to ransom or converted perforce to Islam. On the top of it all comes in the Psuedo-Nationalism of the Congressites who practically condone and explain away these Muslim atrocities by inventing such lying excuses—"There is nothing anti-Hindu in these Muslim raids! It is only economical and sexual starvation of the tribes that goads them on to these crimes. Let us feed those starved souls and they will be good citizens!" But it is curious that these starved poor raiders leave the rich Muslims in the Frontier towns unlooted, find no young Muslim damsels to kidnap, burn no Muslim houses and go about assuring the Muslims by beat of drums that they shall not hurt a hair of any Muslim provided he shelters not a Hindu *Kafir*! Witness only the latest case in the Dadu District in Sindh. The Muslim raiders attacked an absolutely unoffending archaeological party under Mr. Mazumdar. They asked each one—"Are you a Hindu?" If he said "Aye" he was forthwith shot dead. One Hindu pretended to be a Muslim and he was let to go alive and unmolested. This case is only a typical one illustrating thousands of such dreadful happenings all over India and is the order of the day during all Muslim riots and raids from Malabar to Peshawar, from Sind to Assam and year in and year out. Add to this the activities of the All India organizations of the Christian missionaries and the Muslim organizations from the Agakhanis, Hasan Nizamis, Peer Motamias to the very village Muslim goondas all seeking and succeeding in converting millions of Hindus to foreign faiths by peaceful or fraudulent or forceful means throughout the length and breadth of India undermining the religious, racial, cultural and political strength of the Hindus. Add again to all this the political activities of the Muslim Leaguers and the Muslim States that have already culminated into open resolutions first to divide India into a Muslim Federation and a Hindu Federation and then to strike down the latter by inviting invasions from outside India by some alien Muslim powers. Such is the present state of the Hindus in Hindustan, their own land! And yet the worst factors remain to be told. For, even to refer to these calamities to which the Hindus have fallen a prey is damned as a national sin by that new cult which calls itself 'Indian Nationalists' and leads at present the Indian National Congress. Offering a blank cheque to the Muslims by one hand they deliver ultimatum to the Hindus by the other. "Get looted but don't report, get stabbed but don't shriek, get repressed as Hindus but don't organize to resist it as Hindus or else you will be damned as traitors to the cause of our Indian Nationalism!"

5. In the face of these facts who else but a fool or a foe can accuse the Hindu Mahasabha of making much ado about nothing or fancying grievances where none exist or dealing only with some superstitious and empty contents of religious or racial slogans?

(a) Again, in the face of these facts, what is there that, leaving aside those who continue to be counted amongst Hindus but whose hearts have ceased to respond to their Hinduness or who openly disown any allegiance to Hindudom, we find crores of Hindus all over India every fibre of whose life vibrates with the racial, religious or cultural consciousness of being Hindus, sorely afflicted to see our Hindu race beset by all these calamities and subjected to such unbearable humiliations. On all sides today the anxious question is asked by crores of Hindus—How are we to remedy this evil? How is it that that we fell? How are we Hindus to rise again as Hindus and

recover our position as a Nation great amongst the nations in the world? This recent searching of heart is one of the most encouraging signs to show that the soul of our Hindu race is roused again from the deadly swoon of self-forgetfulness. It is natural that on its return to self-consciousness it should raise these bewildering questions as to its whereabouts.

(b) Although it is not possible to deal exhaustively with these anxious questions that are daily pouring on us from all sides in the limited compass of an address like this, yet I feel that if but I can succeed in pointing out the root cause which has landed us on this sad plight and the immediate step which we must and fortunately we also can take with a view to come out of it, my address will serve its purpose fairly well.

6. (a) In order to find out the root cause, the first initial error which leading us into a series of all derivative errors rendered us Hindus insensible to the very fact that we had a national being at all, we must first have a hurried peep into our racial history.

A Peep into Our History

(b) It is at least some 5,000 years ago, to the Vedic age that the beginnings of our Hindu Nation could be historically and undeniably traced. Our national ancestors lived and flourished then on the banks of the seven Sindhus and were laying the foundations of a nation that destined to grow later on into a mightily Hindu Nation. Racially and culturally they are called Aryans; territorially they bore the name of the Sapta Sindhus⁹ or Sindhus. One of our Provinces and its people on the banks of the Sindh River bear the very same name down to this day and are called Sindh and Sindhus respectively. They crossed the Ganges, the Vindhya, the Godavary in their vigorous and valorous course of colonization and conquest till they reached the Southern and the Eastern and Western limits of India. By an admirable process of assimilation, elimination and consolidation—political, racial and cultural—they wielded all other non-Aryan peoples whom they came in contact with or conflict with through this process of their expansion in this land from the Indus to the Eastern sea and from the Himalayas to the Southern sea into the mighty centralised empires of Chandragupta Maurya, Chandragupta the second, Vikramaditya, Yashovardhan,¹⁰ Pulkeshi,¹¹ Shri Harsha¹² and such other great *Samrats* and *Chakravartis* added to this consolidation of our people and made them vibrate with the stirrings of a common political and national being. Powerful invasions of the Greeks, Shakas, Huns and such other foreign races which threatened our people with a common danger and the mighty conflicts they had to wage to overcome that danger by presenting a common front to it lasting sometimes for centuries vatted all the more their consciousness of cultural, political, racial and religious oneness, making them out as a national unit by themselves in spite of their internal differences in relation to other non-Indian National units. The long period of peace unmolested by external political danger worth the name then intervened between the ultimate triumph of the Hindus over the Huns and the invasion of India by Muslims was pre-eminently devoted to the further consolidation of our people and their religious, cultural, racial and political oneness grew so pronounced, definite and conscious that by the time the Muslims

came in, they found India full grown into a homogeneous Hindu people.

(c) Under the pressure of the Muslim invasions and their consolidation into a powerful Muslim Empire at Delhi political unity of the Hindus from Kashmere to Rameshwar and Sindh to Bengal intensified still more and the name Hindu derived from Vedic Sapta Sindhu became the honoured and beloved common appellation of our race ever since the days of Prithviraj.¹³ Thousands of our martyrs embraced death as 'Hindus' to vindicate the honour of Hindu religion. Thousands upon thousands, princes and peasants alike revolted and rose as 'Hindus' under Hindu flags and fought and fell in fighting with their non-Hindu foes. Till at last Shivaji was born, the hour of Hindu triumph was struck, the day of Muslim supremacy set. Under one common name 'The Hindus,' under one common banner, the Hindu banner under one common Hindu leadership, with one common ideal the establishment of 'Hindu-Pada-Padashahi' (The Hindu Empire), with one common aim the political liberation of 'Hindustan,' the emancipation of their common Motherland and Holy land the Hindus rose from Province to Province till at last the Maratha confederacy succeeded in beating to a chip the Muslim Nababs, the Nizams, Badshahs and Padshahas in a hundred battlefields. The Marathas advanced victorious East-West-North-South dropping their secondary capitals at Tajavarat [Tanjavur], Gunti, at Kolhapur, at Baroda, at Dhar, at Gwalior, Indore, at Jhansi, till they reached the Attock. They ruled at Delhi and held the Muslim Mongol [Mughal] Emperors as prisoners, as pensioners and paupers in their camp. The Gurkha Hindus ruled in Punjab, the Gurka Hindus in Nepal, the Rajput Hindus in Rajputana, the Maratha Hindus from Delhi to Tanjore, Dwarka to Jagannath. Thus at last the Vedic Sindhus had grown into a mighty Hindu people. Hindu nation, a Hindu-Pada Padashahi,¹⁴ which is a word used by Bajirao¹⁵ the First himself. If you wish to realise fully how the mighty movement was surcharged with the intense consciousness of Hindutva, how are our martyrs, heroes, victors from Prithviraj, Pratap, Shivaji, Guru Govind Banda down or to the days of Nana Fadnavis¹⁶ and Mahadji Shinde¹⁷ owned and gloried in their National and Religious oneness as Hindus and gloried in the name you may do well to read, for want of a better book, my historical work named 'Hindu-Pada-Padashahi.' Here owing to limited space I quote only a stanza from out of a letter, by way of illustration, written so late as in 1703 to Nana Fadnavis by Govindrao Kale, the Maratha Ambassador to the Nizam so that you may listen to their thoughts in their own words: "From the river Attack to the Indian Ocean extends the land of Hindus, Hindustan, no Turkestan. These have been our frontier from the times of Pandavas¹⁸ to Vikramaditya. They preserved them and enjoyed Empires. After them came effete rulers and the Muslims conquered our Kingdom and but now everything has been restored to us and re-won under the Peshwas and by the valorous sources of Mahadaji Shinde, the Hindu Empire is established, fame of our victories goes resound all-round."

Hindu Nation is an Organic Growth and No Paper-make Makeshift

7. (a) It will be clear from this hurried peep into our history that ever since the Vedic ages for some 5000 years atleast in the past our forefathers had been shaping the formation of our people into a religious, racial and cultural and political unit as a

consequence of it all growing organically the Sindhus of the Vedic time have grown today into a Hindu Nation, extending over India and holding India in common as their Father-land and their Holyland. No other nation in the world, excepting perhaps the Chinese, can claim a continuity of life and growth so unbroken as our Hindu Nation does. The Hindu Nation is not a mushroom growth. It is not a treaty nation. It is not a paper-made toy. It was not made to order. It is not an outlandish make-shift. It has grown out of this soil and has its roots struck deep and wide in it. It is not a fiction invented to spite the Muslims or anybody in the world. But it is a fact as stupendous and solid as the Himalayas own that border our North.

(b) It matters not that it had and it has sects and sections, dissimilarities and differences within its fold. What (which) nation is free from them? A nation is not marked out as a separate unit because its people have no subdivisions and diversities amongst themselves but because they as a whole present a more homogenous unity amongst themselves than they have with all other alien national units; because they differ definitely and immensely more from all other people in the world than they differ amongst themselves from each other. This is the only test that marks out nations in the world. The Hindus having a common Father-land and a common Holyland and both identified with each other have made their nationality doubly sure and stands this test doubly well. As the running outline of our history sketched above unmistakably reveals, for thousands of years our Hindu people had been definitely conscious of their religious and cultural, political and patriotic homogeneity as a people by themselves, as a Nation unto themselves. What is to be specially noted here for the argument in hand is the fact that down to the fall of the Maratha Empire our people, princes, patriots, poets, preachers and statesman, all and together strove consciously and continuously to develop and intensify the conception of Hindu nationality and exerted their mighty best to establish 'a Hindu-Pada-Padashahi,' a Hindu Empire in India, which they called Hindustan, the land of the Hindus.

(c) I shall leave the thread of this argument here to be resumed later on when I shall have to point out its special significance in relation to the problems we have to face today.

The Rise of the Concept of an Indian Nation

8. (a) We have traced the organic growth and development of our Hindu Nation to the fall of the Maratha Empire in 1818 and the consequent advent of the British rule in India. The fall of our Sikh Hindu kingdom also in Punjab enabled the British to establish an unchallenged supremacy throughout our country. The British had found that all the bloody wars they had to fight in the course of their Indian conquest were with Hindu powers. Muslim as a political factor was nowhere to be faced. The Muslim as a political power was already smashed by the Marathas. The only fight the British had to face single-handed with the Muslim was at Plassey. But it was such an easy affair that they say the British Commander won it while he was asleep! Consequently the first anxiety of the British was to see that the Hindu Nation must be undermined, their solidarity as a religious and political unit must be broken. The Muslims came in the picture as a mere handy tool in the hand of the British to

compass their design. The British even tried the obvious means of converting the Hindus to Christianity by lending political support of the State to Christian missions in India. But the Revolutionary Rising of 1857 led mostly by Hindu leaders opened the eyes of the British to the dangers involved in any open attack against the religion of the Hindus and Muslims alike and the British State ceased to lend any open support to the Christian church. Then they initiated a policy to undermine the very concept of a Hindu Nation amongst the rising generation of the Hindu youths by introducing a denationalizing scheme of Western Education in India. We have the word of Macaulay¹⁹ himself for that. He points out in one of his private letters to his son-in-law that if his scheme of Western education is put into force, Hindu youths would of themselves love to get converted to Christianity, to get Westernized and consequently affiliated and attached to the British people. Unfortunately for the Hindus his expectations did not altogether miscarry and the first generations of the Hindu youths who took to Western Education with avidity were on the whole cut off from their old moorings of Hinduness, of *Hindutwa*. They knew next to nothing of Hindu history, Hindu religion, Hindu culture and all that they knew of *Hindutwa* was only its weak points which were deliberately represented to them as its essence in such wise as to make them ashamed of being Hindus at all. The Muslims on the contrary kept at a hand's distance from this education and consequently, it could not undermine their communal solidarity at all.

(b) But the introduction of the Western education in India did not prove an unmixed evil. Contrary to the expectation of its initiators it soon brought in new forces into action which were destined to defeat the purpose it was meant to serve and add to the strength of the Hindus in the long run. But here we are dealing with its immediate effects only.

(c) And the immediate effect of the Western education was that the two first generations of Hindus who were influenced by it were totally carried off their feet, they fell in love with everything Western. They looked upon the British rule as a God-send. They prayed for its permanence. Fed on the Western literature and history and cut off from any contact with Hindu thoughts and Hindu policy, they naturally came to the easy conclusion that if but they imitated the West and especially England in every detail of individual and collective life they and their country would be benefited and saved.

(d) Not that they were not public spirited or intellectual men. On the contrary, these first batches of English educated Hindus were allowed to rise very high in the social and official scale by England and were deliberately taken to be the spokesmen of Indian People—of the "Natives." They got every facility to wield tremendous influence over their own people so that they might import their admiration about the British people and their loyalty to the British rule to their 'Native Community.' They too, with best of intentions wanted to do good to their people and their nation. But their idea of doing good and even their notion of what was good for the nation were entirely outlandish—British having no relation with the realities obtaining in India.

(e) That was the reason why they naturally thought that their nation mean their country. Like all other ideas and sentiments, their notion of patriotism also was borrowed ready-made from England. They found that the English meant by patriotism,

love for their country, the geographical unit England, which they inhabited. All those who lived in England were united into a nation irrespective of religion, race, culture and that was the reason why England had become so consolidated and powerful a nation. The analogy was as simple as attractive. If they too could unite India irrespective of race, religion, culture, caste, creed, their people too might grow into a consolidated and powerful Indian nation. They found that in Europe of their days a national unit meant a territorial unit. All those who inhabited the territorial unit France were French, Germany were Germans, Spain were Spanish, England were English and each respectively an Unitary nation by itself. So they thought, or rather believed, without thinking at all, that the only bond of a territorial unit, the only fact of residing in a common geographical unit, was by itself the most efficient, may be the only efficient factor to mark out a people into a nation by themselves.

(f) "Well, then, all people in India Hindus, Muslims Christians, Parsis and others, had been inhabiting the territorial unit called India for centuries together. Therefore, all these people must be a nation by themselves. What if they differed so much in religion, language, culture, race and historical development? Those things had nothing to do with a common nationality. Territorial unit, a common country, was the only foundation required to support and induce a common nationality. Territorial unit must be a National unit. "Look at England, France, America," thus they argued.

(g) The corollary derived from the assumption was also inevitable. If India, because it was a territorial unit and called a country, must be a national unit as well, then all of us must also be Indians only and cease to be Hindus and Muslims, Christians or Parsis. So they, the leaders of those first generations of English-educated people, being almost all Hindus, tried their best to cease themselves to be Hindus and thought it below their dignity to take any cognisance of the divisions as Hindus and Muslims and became transformed overnight into 'Indian Patriots' alone.

(h) It was also very easy for them to cease to be Hindus. The Western education had taught them and they had no other education, that *Hindutwa* meant nothing else but Hinduism which to them meant a veritable bundle of superstitions. They had no occasion to stop and think of the other and most fundamental contents of *Hindutwa*, of Hinduness, in all its racial, cultural and historical bearing.

(i) As they found it so easy for them to renounce their Hinduness and merge themselves at a thought into being Indians and Indians alone they expected that it would be as easy for the Muslims too to forget that they were Muslims and to merge themselves entirely and totally into the Indian people, the Indian Nation, which to those 'Indian' patriots seemed already a fact as tangible as the territorial unit India.

(j) It must be emphasised here that all these our remarks are true in their collective sense only. It is not possible to deal with details and exceptions either individual or actional in such a short address as this.

(k) As the Western education went on spreading rapidly amongst Hindus the idea of an Indian Nationality also continued to find a larger and larger following; inversely, the solidarity of the Hindus as Hindus, as a political unit, as a nation by themselves, grew feebler and feebler and at last grew unconscious of itself through sheer starvation.

(l) The British rejoiced at the turn events had taken. They knew that under

those circumstances the only danger to their political supremacy in Hindustan could come from the revival of the political consciousness of the Hindu Nation and the re-emergence of the ideal of a Hindu sovereignty. It is a fact that even after 1857 a Hindu politically proud of his being a Hindu was a suspect. For he brooded over the loss of his Hindu kingdom and was watched as an incipient revolutionist. The armed rising of Ramsing Kooka²⁰ in Punjab and Vasudeo Balwant Phadke²¹ in Maharashtra, even after the defeat of the revolutionary war in 1857, with a view to drive the British out and recover the lost Hindu Kingdom, only confirmed the British in their suspicions.

The Birth of Indian National Congress

9. (a) It was just after the suppression of the rising of Vasudeo Balwant Phadke at Poona who aspired to revive an independent Hindu Kingdom, even as Shivaji did that the birth of the Indian National Congress took place. It is to be noted that the British Government favoured the movement and it was Viceroy who sponsored it. Many a prominent British civilian like Mr. Hume,²² Wedderburn²³ and others led it for a long time. Great Hindu leaders from the most public spirited motives nuers [sic.] it and it became the organised and authoritative spokesman of the new cult of Indian Patriotism.

(b) The British, too, while they favoured this Indian movement as an antidote to any possible revival of Hindu Nationalism, took good care to see that the Muslim solidarity as Moslems did not suffer in any way by catching the contagion of this new Indian Nationalist cult. For the British knew that if the Muslims also joined the cult as whole-heartedly as the Hindus did, then there would really be a united Indian Nation—a contingency likely to prove perhaps more dangerous to British supremacy in India than a Hindu revival could single-handedly prove to be. The British dreaded and hated any real, genuine and fruitful rise of Indian Nationalism as much—if not more—as they did any revival of Hindu Nationalism. So they on the one hand, encouraged and helped surreptitiously the fanatical hatred, enmity, distrust, which the Muslims ever bore to the Hindu Nation, thus rendering any efficient Indian National unity as delusive as a mirage and on the other hand encouraged the Hindus, at least in the beginning, to pursue that mirage of an Indian Nationalism with avidity so that the rise of a Homogeneous Hindu Nation might be ruled out of practical politics. Of course, it is another matter that the result of this British policy of encouraging Indian Nationalism in the beginning did not altogether fulfil their expectations and they had to change it later on. But that does not belie the fact I have referred to it above.

The Ideal of Indian Nationalism was in Fact a Noble One

10. The Hindus found nothing objectionable in the ideal of uniting All India into a consolidated political unit and very naturally so. For it suited well with the Hindu mentality with its synthetic trend, always prone to philosophy with a universal urge. It is also true that the ideal of politics itself ought to be a Human State all mankind for its citizens, the earth for its motherland. If All India with one-fifth of the human race could be united irrespective of religious, racial and cultural diversities, merging them all into a homogenous whole, it would be but a gigantic stride taken by mankind towards the realization of that human political Ideal. So far as the ideal language and

picture of this conception went, it could not but be attractive to a people like the Hindus with a religious and cultural ideology preaching—‘all this is but one and indivisible Brahma.’ But Brahma, even in its political aspect, like its philosophical one, has for its counterpart a Maya, the principle of division! And this fact those Hindu patriots overlooked in their enthusiasm for the ideal—If India was united! — Yes, but the ‘If’ was what mattered most. The new concept of an Indian Nationality was founded on the only common bond of a territorial unit of India, the Hindus for one found nothing revolting even in that assumption to their deepest religious or cultural or racial sentiments. Because their national being had already been identified with that territorial unit, India which to them was not only a land of sojourn but a home, their Fatherland, their Motherland, their Holyland and all in one! Indian Patriotism to them was but a synonym of Hindu Patriotism. Even the territorial unit was as intimately identified with their racial, religious and cultural unit that an Indian Nation was but a territorial appellation of the Hindu Nation. If Hindustan was called India but continued to be a Hindustan, it made no difference in essentials and for practical purposes might be overlooked.

11. That is the reason why, later on, even those Hindu leaders who in spite of their being highly educated in the Western lore were also deeply imbued with Hinduness, were proud of being Hindus by religion, by race, by culture and joined the Indian National Movement for political purposes and worked whole-heartedly with the Congress and even led it so long as it continued to be a purely political body, striving assiduously to wrest political power out of the hands of the British Government with a view to establish a real Indian commonwealth, to be held in common with other non-Hindu Minorities in India on equitable footing and in honourable company.

12. But although the Hindus on the whole rallied round the Indian National Congress with unsuspecting enthusiasm and lent their honest devotion to the principle of a Territorial Nationality that underlay it, that principle seemed to fail miserably in appealing to the Muslims in India. As a community they held back from the very beginning and by and by began to resent it altogether. The more insistent the Congress demand grew in calling upon All Indians to merge their racial and religious individuality into an Indian Nation at any rate for forming themselves into a political unit, the more distrustful and enraged the Muslims grew. For they instinctively felt that Indian Patriotism as defined by the Congress was sure to deal a death blow to Muslim patriotism which was the be-all and end-all of their Racial, Religious and Cultural ambitions. The British Government for their own end encouraged them in this their anti-Congress attitude. The higher the Congress rose in political importance through the strenuous efforts of our Hindu patriots and the more insistent grew its demands and stronger its power to back them up, the more outspoken and determined became the Muslim opposition to it, and the more assiduous grew the encouragement and surreptitious assistance to it on the part of the British Government who came to realize to their discomfiture that their policy of bringing into being the Indian National Congress movement had in the long end miscarried their expectations in a large measure.

13. I am the last man to ignore the benefits that even we Hindus reaped from

the Indian National Congress movement even from the Hindu point of view. It had, though only consequentially and without that special end in view, contributed immensely to the consolidation of Hindudom as a whole by rubbing off their Provincial, linguistic and sectional angularities, divisions and diversities, provided them with a common political platform and animated them with the consciousness of a common National being with a definite common goal of an united and Central State. Errors that crept in may be rectified but the good that came out need not be disowned. Nor do I decry the introduction of Western education in India. In spite of the questionable intentions of the British in its inception, we Hindus have succeeded in turning the tables in the long run and are now in a position to give a good and profitable account of our contact with the West.

14. But the point to be specially emphasised here is the fact that just as the benefit we Hindus reaped out of our contact with the West or the reviving English education through the Government universities, was in spite of the evil intentions of the British Government, even so the good that accrued to us Hindus contributing to the further consolidation of our Hindu Nation was not in virtue of the new cult of Indian Nationality or the proclaimed intentions of the Indian National Congress but in spite of its efforts direct or implied to suppress our racial and religious consciousness as Hindus. The territorial patriots wanted us to cease to be Hindus at least as a national and political unit. Some of them actually gloried in disowning themselves as Hindus at all! They were merely Indians, thinking that they had set a very patriotic example in that which they fancied would persuade the Muslims, too, to renounce their communal being and also merge themselves in that territorial Indian nation beyond recognition.

15. But the Muslims remained Muslims first and Indians never! They sat on the fence as long as the deluded Hindus kept struggling with the British to wrest political rights for All Indians alike going to the prisons in lacs, to the Andamans in thousands, the gallows in hundreds. And as soon as the unarmed agitation carried on by the Congressite Hindus on the one hand and the more dreadful and more effective life and death struggle carried on by the armed Hindu revolutions outside the Congress on the other, brought sufficient pressure on the British Government and compelled them to hand over some substantial political power to the Indians—the Muslims jumped down the fence and claimed “they were Indians they must have their pound of flesh!” Till at last things came to such a pass that the proposal to divide India itself into two parts—the Muslim India and the Hindu India was blatantly put forward, and their readiness to ally themselves with non-Indian Muslim Nations against the Hindus was avowed by no less a representative Muslim body than the Muslim League. This was the sorry fate of the hopes of these Hindu patriots who from the best of motives but with a thoughtless belief and the blindest of policies persisted in their efforts of consolidating All Indians into one undivided and indivisible Indian nation, irrespective of religions, races and cultures based only on the common bond of a territorial unity!

16. (a) What was then the root cause which brought about this miserable failure of the efforts of the Congress during the last full 50 years to placate the Muslims to allow themselves to be merged into an united Indian Nation? To persuade them to be, at any rate, Indians first and Muslims afterwards? Not that the Muslims do not like

to form an united Indian Nation. But their conception of unity, national unity of India is not based on her territorial unity at all. If any Muslim had given out their [his] mind and in the most intelligible terms possible, it was Ali Musaliar,²⁴ the leader of the Mopla rebellion. In justification of his atrocious campaign of forcibly converting thousands of Hindus or putting them to sword—women, men, children at a stroke, he proclaimed that India must be united into a Nation and the only way to bring about lasting Hindu-Muslim unity could not be other than that all Hindus should become Muslims! Those Hindus who refused to do were traitors to the cause of Indian unity and deserved death! Thus the unsophisticated Ali Musaliar spoke bluntly in his mother-tongue: Polished Muslims like Mahomed [Muhammad] Ali and others speak in elegant Latin and Greek, but the purport is the same. Not territorial unity but it is the religious, racial and cultural unity that counts most in the formation of a National unit. Congress failed to realise this and this was the root cause of its failure in this matter.

(b) Congress committed the serious mistake at its very start of overlooking this fundamental social and political principle that in the formation of Nations, religious, racial, cultural and historical affinities counted immensely more than their territorial unity, the fact of having a common habitat. That alone is one of the factors but in almost all cases cannot be the only factor. The example of England and some other European national units which put the Hindu founders of the Indian National Congress on the wrong track and as we have explained above in the section 8 of this address, were not rightly understood. England has not grown into such an homogeneous national unit only because it is a clear-cut territorial unit. Their territorial patriotism is not the cause but a consequence of their other social and political affinities. England, for example, was as clear-cut a territorial unit in days gone by. But when their religious susceptibilities were highly irritable the English Catholics and Protestants felt themselves drawn more to their respective co-religionists outside England than their own countrymen in-side it. The English Catholics cared more for the Pope in Rome than their Protestant English Sovereigns in England. The English Protestants invited William from Holland to rule over them instead of an English King of Roman Catholic persuasion. Take again the case of Holland. The Hollanders in spite of their territorial unity, during the Religious phase of their history, could not be united into a homogeneous nation. The Catholic Hollanders joined Spain against their own Protestant Prince William of Orange. Take the case of Austria-Hungary. There was nothing notable to divide them territorially. They were welded together into an imperial unit and continued to be a political unit under a common state for centuries. But here there were no racial, cultural, linguistic or historical affinities to draw them towards each other as to be a nation in heart. So they separated as national and political units as soon as favourable opportunities arose.

(c) Nor could it be said, "Oh this your racial and religious bosh is already a thing of the past. The world is grown wiser since. No up-to-date man cares a fig for them today." To this common place exclamation we rejoin: Are the Hindu and Muslim Indians more up-to-date than the Germans or the Irish of today? Are not the latter amongst the most advanced, educated and up-to-date nation of the world? But do you find that territorial unity counts with the Germans or the Irish more even today than the affinities of a common race, language culture or history?

(d) The Latest Cases of the Sudetan Germans and Ulsterites

The Sudetan Germans and say the Prussian Germans knew no common political nationality for a long period. They were not a common people as a State. When the enemies of Germany hit her hard they cut her into pieces and created a patchwork of a "Nation" and compassed it into a territorial unit called Czechoslovakia, making a mess of the Sudetan Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks etc. Did they form a Nation? Sudetan Germans longed to be one with the Prussian Germans in spite of their being mapped out of it as a territorial unit and revolted against the Czechs who were their next door neighbours in spite of their being mapped together into a territorial and political unit and went over to the Prussians even at the risk of their life—why? Not because the Sudetan Germans had a more definite territorial affinity with the Prussian Germans than they had with the Czechs or Slovaks but because they had linguistic, cultural, racial and historical affinities with the Germans in Germany and gloried in being a part and parcel of the German people. Note on the other hand that the German Jews had been not only inhabiting the German land for centuries together with Germans, bound together with the Germans by the common bond of a territorial unit, but had been actually incorporated into a common State, were actually Germans in political parlance, exercised equal rights as citizens of Germany—nay dominated the German State as members of the National German Legislature and executive.

18. Have the Indian Muslims, then, that will to be one with the Hindus? That is the question of questions and the Congressite Hindus in the beginning of the Indian National movement never waited a minute to ponder over it nor do they even today take it into their head even during the interval when they adjourn the National Congress for hours in deference to the Muslim prayer times. It is useless simply to declare the Muslim League communal. That is no news. The fact is that the whole Muslim community is communal including the Congressite Muslims. The question that ought to be understood is why are they so communal. The Congressite Hindus from the very beginning simply dare not study that question. Because they fear that such a study would compel their fad of a territorial Nationality, of Indian unity in a sense they understand it, to give up the ghost "Fanaticism-Folly." You exclaim? But Fanaticism or Folly it is to the Muslims a solid fact. And you cannot get over it by calling it names but must face it as it stands. To my mind for reasons alluded to above, it is quite human for the Muslims to bear instinctive apathy to the idea of a territorial nationality, as envisaged by the Congressites who in general are totally ignorant of Muslim history, theology and political trend of mind. This antipathy of the Indian Muslims can be seen through right perspective if you bear at least the following facts in mind.

(a) The Muslims in general and Indian Muslims in particular have not as yet grown out the historical stage of intense religiosity and the theological concept of state.

(b) Their theology and theocratical politics divide the human world into two groups only: the Muslim land and the enemy land.²⁵ All lands which are either entirely inhabited by the Muslims or are ruled over by the Muslims are Muslim lands.

All lands which are mostly inhabited by non-Muslims or are ruled over by a non-Muslim power are enemy lands and no faithful Muslim is allowed to bear any loyalty to them and is called upon to do everything in his power by policy or force or fraud to convert the non-Muslims there to Muslim faith, to bring about its political conquest by a Muslim power. It is no good quoting sentences here or there from Muslim books to prove the contrary. Read the whole book to know its trend. And again it is not with books that we are concerned here. It is with the followers of the books and how they translate them in practice. You will then see that the whole Muslim history and their daily actions are framed on the design I have outlined above. Consequently a territorial patriotism is a word unknown to the Muslim—nay is tabooed, unless in connection with a Muslim territory. Afghans can be patriots for Afghanistan is a Muslim territory today. But an Indian Muslim—if he is a real Muslim and they are intensely religious as a people—cannot faithfully bear loyalty to India as a country, as a nation, as a state because it is today “An Enemy Land” and doubly lost: for non-Muslims are in a majority here and to boot it is not ruled by any Muslim power, Muslim sovereign.

(c) Add to this that of all non-Muslims, the Hindus are looked upon as the most damned by Muslim theologians. For Christians and Jews are after all “*Kitabis*,” having the Holy Books partially common. But the Hindus are totally “*Kafirs*,” as a consequence their land “Hindustan” is pre-eminently an “Enemy Land” as long as it is not ruled by Muslims or all Hindus do not embrace Islam. This is the religious mentality of the Indian Muslims who still live and move and have their being in religiosity. There are some of them like Mahamed [Muhammad] Ali and others who, in their individual capacity, are not so religious-minded but who nevertheless encourage mentality in their masses as a very suitable political, racial and cultural weapon. What wonder then that the Muslim League should openly declare its intention to join hands with non-Indian alien Muslim countries rather than with Indian Hindus in forming a Muslim Federation? They could not be accused from their point of view of being traitors to Hindus then. Their conscience was clear. They never looked upon our today’s “Hindustan” as their country. It is to them already an alien land, an enemy land.

(d) This is the religious and living mentality of the Muslims. Consequently their political and cultural mentality also is essentially anti-Hindu and is bound to be so as long as they continue to be Muslims and ‘the faithful.’ They are vividly conscious of the fact that they entered India as conquerors and subjected the Hindus to their rule. They are also gifted with a curious memory that is supremely oblivious of all events which remind them of their defeats and discomfitures. They will never remember that the Hindus beat them like a chip in hundred battlefields in India and had in the long run freed All India from the Muslim yoke and re-established *Hindu-Pad-Padshahi* as indicated above in section 6 of this address. They know, they form a powerful minority in India. Their population is growing in every successive census report. What is to be especially noted by our Hindu Sanghatanists Party is the fact that some of our Hindu superstitions and suicidal, social customs like the untouchability, the ban on Shudhi, on widow remarriages etc. offer them a fertile field for Muslim proselytisation and conversion. So under the present circumstances they rightly hope to increase their population and decrease Hindus with equal rapidity. They know

that the British are sure for a long time to come to offer them every facility and help to strengthen the Muslim position against the Hindus whose rise and political ambitions the British whole-heartedly dread. They are also sure that the Congressite Hindus in their pursuit of the silly fad of bringing about a Hindu-Muslim unity in India based on the impossible common bond of a territorial unity only are certain to yield to Muslim demands with an amount of Muslim browbeating as regards weightages, special and larger representation, etc. and especially in suppressing the Hindu Sanghathan movement that is at present the only thorn in their sides. They realise that in the Indian Army and the armed Police they, the Muslims, in spite of their being in minority, are already the predominant factor holding some 60 per cent jobs. With all these factors in their favour, they are fully confident wisely or unwisely, that in case the British are overpowered in some big world war the Muslim with the help of the non-Indian Muslim powers, bordering our country, may snatch out the political sovereignty of India out of British hands and re-establish a Muslim empire here. Then alone they can and will love India as their own country, as the "Muslim land" and sing wholeheartedly by themselves "*Bharat hamara desh hai!*" or "*Hindustan hamara desh hai.*" But till then it must remain "an enemy land" to the Muslim—to the faithful.

I wish the British also to take a serious note of the fact indicated at the close of this last paragraph and curtail their policy of encouraging Muslims too much in their anti-Hindu activities. In view of the open declaration of the Muslim League to divide India into two parts, inviting the alien Muslim nation from outside India to form a Muslim Federation and raise an Independent Muslim Kingdom in India, the British also should think twice before they trust their "favoured wife" too much just to spite the Hindus. The intrigues in Muslim history are all well-known and the British may find in the end that in their attempt to encourage the Muslim separation movement, just to spite the Hindus, the British have but succeeded in spiting themselves. Nevertheless that concerns the British and they can take care of themselves. What concerns us Hindus is the fact that we get determined not to play the part of an handmaid either to the British or to the Muslims but are masters in our own house, Hindustan, the land of the Hindus.

With this End in View what should be Our Immediate Programme?

19. Knowing it then for certain that the Indian Muslims, for reasons some of which are referred to above, are about the last people to join the Hindus in forming any common political Nation on equal footing in India based on the only common bond of our territorial unity, out of a merely territorial Indian Patriotism, let us Hindu Sanghathanists first correct the original mistake, the original political sin, which our Hindu Congressites most unwillingly committed at the beginning of the Indian National Congress movement and are persistently committing still of running after the mirage of a territorial Indian Nation and of seeking to kill as an impediment in that fruitless pursuit the lovegrowth of an organic Hindu Nation. Let us Hindus resume the thread of our national life where, as I have shown in section 7 of this address our grandfather left it at the fall of our Maratha and Sikh Hindu Empires. The life and organic growth of the self-conscious Hindu Nation that was suddenly struck with an atrophy of self-

forgetfulness must again be revived, resurrected. Let us, therefore, boldly reproclaim even in the words of Govindrao Kale who wrote them so early as in 1793 in his letter quoted in section 6 above that the land which extends from the Indus to the Southern seas is Hindustan—the land of the Hindus and we Hindus are the Nation that owns it. If you call it an Indian Nation, it is merely an English synonym for the Hindu Nation. To us Hindus, Hindustan and India mean one and the same thing. We are Indians because we are Hindus and *vice versa*.

Yes, we Hindus are a Nation by ourselves. Because, religious, racial, cultural, historical affinities bind us intimately into an homogeneous nation and added to it we are most pre-eminently gifted with a territorial unity as well. Our racial being is identified with India. Our beloved Fatherland and our Holyland, above all and irrespective of it all we Hindus will be a Nation and, therefore, we are a Nation. None has a right to challenge or demand a proof of our common nationality when some thirty crores of us are with it.

It is absurd to call us a community in India. The Germans are the Nation in Germany and the Jews a community. The Turks are the Nation in Turkey and the Arab or the Armenian minority community. Even so the Hindus are the Nation in India, in Hindustan, and the Muslim minorities a community.

Referring to the Sudetan Germans the leaders of the Muslim League threatened us the other day at their Karachi Session that if their demands in overriding the Hindus are not granted in India, they would play the part of the Sudetan Germans and call in their Muslim coreligionist powers across the border inside India to their help as the Sudetan Germans called the Germans in Sudetan. To that threat I retort that our friends in the Muslim League should not cry till they are out of the woods. They should remember that their illustration cuts both ways. If they grow stronger, they can play the part of the Sudetan Germans alright. But if we Hindus in India grow stronger in time Muslim friends of the League type will have to play the part of German Jews instead. We Hindus have taught the Shakas and the Huns already to play that part pretty well. So it is no use bandying words till the test comes. The test of the pudding lies in the eating.

Indian Nationalism also is Communalism in Relation to Humanity

20. If to such an outspoken attitude of being a Hindu Nationalist on your part, and Indian Nationalist of the Congress raises the objection “Oh, but do you not see how narrow-minded it is to think of Hindus and Muslims, this race or religion and that in a separate mood? Man to man we all are one. Let us think of universal brotherhood alone.”

Then inquire of him in return “brother, universal brotherhood we Hindus adore even to a fault. But will you tell us, Oh Indian Nationalist, why you think of this nation and that, why think of an Indian Nationality in a separated mood? Is it because India is a territorial unit? But then there are other territorial units in the world. Why are you an Indian patriot and not an Abyssinian one and go there and fight for their freedom? It is precisely because by company and education you feel yourselves more akin to the Indian people in virtue of racial or religious or cultural affinities than you feel at home with other nationalities—although you may not be aware of

this reason verily you worship a God you know not. Nor you know that Indian or any patriotism cannot but be communal in relation to humanity; for, Nationality is as strong a principle of human division as is racial or religious or cultural community.

Hindu Nationalists should not at all be apologetic to being called Hindu Communalists!

21. The fact is that Nationalism and communalism are themselves either equally justifiable and human or not. Nationalism when it is aggressive is as immoral in human relation as is communalism when it tries to suppress the equitable rights of other communities and tries to usurp all to itself. But when communalism is only defensive, it is as justifiable and human as an equitable nationalism itself. The Hindu nationalists do not aim to usurp what belongs to others. Therefore, even if they be called Hindu communalists they are justifiably so and are about the only real Indian Nationalists. For, a real and justifiable Indian Nationalism must be equitable to all communities that compose the Indian Nation. But for the same reason the Muslims alone are communalists in an unjustifiable anti-national and treacherous sense of the term. For it is they who want to usurp to themselves all that belongs to others. The Indian National Congress only condemns itself as an anti-national body when it calls in the same breadth the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League as bodies equally communal in the reprehensive and treacherous sense of that term. Consequently, if to defend the just and equitable rights of Hindus in their own land is communalism then we are communalists *par excellence* and glory in being the most devoted Hindu communalists which to us means being the truest and the most equitable Indian Nationalists.

22. Having determined then once for all to revive the concept of an organic Hindu Nation and regenerate its life growth as the first item of our immediate programme the second and consequent item must be to review every action and every event in public life from the only standpoint of Hindu interests without mincing matters at all. From the local details of the music and mosque questions right up to the question of Indian Federation and from the internal Indian political policy to our foreign and international policy and relations, we shall openly and separately take up a stand as Hindus and support, oppose or take every step in the interests of Hindudom alone. Our politics henceforth will be purely Hindu politics fashioned and tested in Hindu terms only, in such wise as will help the consolidation, Freedom and Life growth of our Hindu Nation.

23. The third item in our immediate programme will be a re-declaration of our attitude to the question of Indian unity even in its territorial aspect. In its own interest the Hindu Nation does not shut the door to any possibility of an united Indian Nation, provided it is based on an equitable and equal footing. The Hindus will ever be ready to grant equal rights and representation to all minor communities in India in Legislature and services, civil and political life in proportion to the population and merit. The Hindus although they are in overwhelming majority, will still waive their right of claiming any preferential treatment, and special prerogative which in fact in every other Nation are due to the major community. But the Hindus will never tolerate the absurd and the unheard of claim of the Minorities to have any preferential treatment, weightages or special favours, over and above what the major community obtains. The Hindu Nation will go so far as to accept the equitable national principle

of "one man one vote" irrespective of religion or race or culture in the formation of common Indian State. But it shall knock on the head any political demand that claims "one Muslim three votes" and "three Hindus one vote!" or any cultural demand that antagonises or insults or suppresses Hindu culture in its historical, linguistic, religious or racial aspect. The Minorities will be free to follow their religion, speak their language, develop their culture amongst themselves provided it does not infringe on the equal rights of others or is not opposed to public peace and morality. If the Muslims join us on these equitable conditions and bear undivided loyalty to the Indian State and the Indian State alone, well and good. Otherwise our formula holds good. "If you come, with you, if you don't, without you; but if you oppose, in spite of you, we Hindus will fight out the good battle of achieving the independence of India and herald the rebirth of a free and mighty Hindu Nation in near future!"

24. Our foreign policy also will be guided from an outspoken and unalloyed Hindu point of view. All those Nations who are friendly or likely to be helpful to Hindu nation will be our friends and allies. All those who oppose the Hindu Nation or are likely to endanger Hindu interests will be opposed by us. All those who do neither we will observe a policy of neutrality towards them, irrespective of any politicalism they choose to follow for themselves. No academic and empty slogans of democracy or Nazism or Fascism can be the guiding principle of our foreign policy. Hindu interests alone will be our test. No more "Khilafats or Palestine afats" can dupe us into suicidal sympathies and complications. Our relations with England also will be guided by the same Hindu policy, having the absolute political independence of the Hindu Nation in view.

25. Towards the Minorities our attitude under the present circumstances must be differential. The Hindu will assure them all that we hate none, neither the Moslems nor Christians nor the Indian Europeans but henceforth we shall take good care to see that none of them dares to hate or belittle the Hindus either, amongst the Minorities, or these latter.

The Parsis are by race, religion, language, culture most akin to us. They have gratefully been loyal to India and have made her their only home. They have produced some of the best Indian patriots and revolutionists like Dadabhai²⁶ and Madam Cama.²⁷ They will have to be and, therefore, shall be incorporated into the common Indian State with perfectly equal rights and trust.

The Christian Minority is civil, has no extra-territorial political designs against India, is not linguistically and culturally averse to the Hindus and, therefore, can be politically assimilated with us. Only in religion they differ from us and are a proselytising church. So in that matter alone the Hindus must be on their guard and give the missionaries no blind latitude to carry on their activities beyond voluntary and legitimate conversion. The Hindus also must continue to reconvert the Christians and carry on the *Shuddhi* movement on the same voluntary and legitimate base. It is only in our Travancore State that the Christians seem to cherish some political design against the Hindu State and it is only there that we shall have to treat them with some political distrust by not allowing them too much latitude in the State of affairs and offices, till they too cease to be political suspects to the Hindus as the Christians in other parts of India have ceased to be.

As to the Jews in India, they too, have given us no political or cultural trouble and are not in the main a proselytising people, they will be friendly towards the Hindus who have sheltered them when homeless and can be easily assimilated in a common Indian State. But this fact must not land us again into the suicidal generosity our forefathers had been guilty in other cases of inviting colonies of non-Hindus to India. With every sympathy with the Jews outside India, the Hindus, therefore, oppose the present Congressite proposal of inviting or allowing any new Jewish colony to settle in India. India must be a Hindu land, reserved for the Hindus. While our own Hindu over-population in some parts of India is hard pressed to find land for extension, how absurd it is to invite non-Hindu colonies to settle our thinly populated parts! How ridiculous it is to find some Congressites preaching birth control to restrict our own population in order to avoid over-crowding and start straightaway to invite Jewish colonies to settle in India. We must exhort our esteemed Diwan of Kochin [Cochin]²⁸ in particular to take a leaf out of the history of Travancore and set his face sternly against any proposal or outside pressure to allow the alien Jews to colonise the lands in Kochin [Cochin].

So far as the Muslim Minority is concerned, I have already dealt with it at length. In short we must watch it in all its actings with the greatest distrust possible. Granting on the one hand every equitable treatment which an Indian citizen can claim in an equality of footing with other, we must sternly refuse them any the least preferential treatment in any sphere of life, religious, cultural or political. Not only while we are engaged in our struggle for liberating India but even after India is free we must look upon them as suspicious friends and take great care to see that the Northern frontiers of India are well guarded by staunch and powerful Hindu forces to avoid the possible danger of the Indian Muslims going over to the alien Muslim nations across the Indus and betraying our Hindus to our non-Hindu foes.

32. (c) Then begin, at least you Hindu Sanghatanists who are determined to see that Hindudom assert itself, begin at once at the beginning, form a united Hindu National front under an unalloyed Hindu National Flag and capture the political power that even today obtains by voting only for a Hindu Nationalist and you will see that the large part of your present local and detailed grievances dissipate like a mist at the very sight of Hindu Nationalist Ministries formed in seven Provinces in India and at the Centre. When you have this much more shall be added up to you and one of these days you shall have heralded an independent and strong and mighty Hindu Nation which is but tantamount with a mighty Indian Nation based on perfect equality of citizenship for all loyal and faithful Indian citizens irrespective of race and religion from Indus to the Seas. Remember "those who have more will be added upto them but those who have not even that will be taken away from them which they have!" This is the inexpugnable law in this matter of fact world! Capture and Have then first the political power that exists! Raise the standard of a Hindu Nation! See to it that India must remain a Hindustan Forever: never a Pakisthan! an Anglisthan never never!!! And let All India resound with

Hindu Dharmaki Jay! Hindu Rashtraki Jay!! Vande Mataram!!!

Resolutions

The following is the text of the resolutions passed on the 29th and 30th December:

VI. Federation: (a) While the Hindu Mahasabha is emphatically of opinion that the Government of India the scheme of Federation adumbrated therein, is a highly inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing measure, the Mahasabha, with a view to secure and maintain the integrity of the entire country, is of opinion that considering the present situation even the scheme of Federation as it stands in the said Act should be worked in order that British India and Hindu States should send to the Federal Legislatures only such representatives as would protect Hindu rights and interests so that the Legislatures may not be misused by the anti-Hindu, Anti-national and re-actionary forces in the country.

(b) The Hindu Mahasabha strongly condemns the attitude of the Muslim League leaders disclosed by them recently at Karachi in proposing two Federations, one of the Muslim States with liberty to join any of the Muslim State beyond the Indian Frontier and another of Non-Muslim States, as not only a serious menace to the growth of Indian Nation but also as a clear indication on their part to establish a full-fledged Muslim *Raj* in certain parts of the country leaving a door open for the future domination of the whole of the Hindustan by their co-religionists, Indian or foreign.

(c) The Mahasabha calls upon all the Hindus to wake up to the realities of the situation and rally all available forces in order to enable them to frustrate this Muslim object.

VIII. Congress and Hindu Mahasabha: (a) The Hindu Mahasabha enters its emphatic protest against the recent declaration made by the Congress to the effect that the Hindu Mahasabha like the Muslim League is a communal organization and warns the Congress that having declared thus, it has forfeited its claim to represent the interest of the Hindus.

(b) That the Hindu Mahasabha representing as it does the Hindus of Hindustan warns the Congress, the Muslim League and the Government that any agreement that may be arrived at between the Congress and the League or any plan of the Congress concerning the rights of the Hindus will not be binding on the Hindu Mahasabha or on the Hindus generally.

(c) The Hindu Mahasabha declares that it is the only national organization in the country and that there is no other national politics than that of the Hindu Sabha for the country as a whole and for the Hindus particularly.

(d) The Hindu Mahasabha calls upon the Hindus to rally round the banner of Hinduism and Hindu Mahasabha.

IX. Communal Award: (a) The Hindu Mahasabha reiterates its condemnation of the Communal Award as it is grossly unjust to Hindus, anti-national and undemocratic in character and as it makes the growth of responsible Government in India absolutely impossible.

(b) The Mahasabha refusing as it does to look upon the Communal Award as a dead issue, calls upon the Hindus to carry on persistent agitation against it, both here and abroad, until it is replaced by a system of really National Representation.

(c) The Mahasabha condemns the Congress members of the Assembly elected from

the Hindu constituencies in the various Provinces, particularly from Bengal, who in working the legislatures have in effect accepted the Communal Award and have been through their activities in the Legislatures, helping the maintenance of the obnoxious Award.

XI. Music before Mosque: (a) The Hindu Mahasabha declares that it is the social and religious as also the civic right of the Hindus to carry without let or hindrance their processions accompanied by music along all public roads at all times. This right has also been, from time to time, upheld by Courts of Law.

(b) The Hindu Mahasabha, therefore, strongly resents the unwarrantable demands made by the Muslim community for stopping music on public roads, in temples and even in private places before and near the mosques in utter disregard of the religious, civic and legal rights of the Hindus and condemns the action of Government in restricting these rights in response to this demand.

(c) The Mahasabha, therefore, calls upon the Hindus to assert and maintain this right in face of all opposition, whether private or official, ignoring all risks involved.

XIII. Cow Protection: (a) The Hindu Mahasabha is emphatically of the opinion that considering the religious sentiments and susceptibilities of the Hindus with regard to cow and also in view of the requirements of their prosperous husbandry, it should be the primary duty of the State to protect cows.

(b) The Mahasabha hereby requests the Government of the United Provinces to take immediate steps to stop at once the slaughter of cows in or near about Mathura—it being a holy city of the Hindus, any cow slaughter-house maintained deliberately in its vicinity cannot but be looked upon as a standing insult to the whole of the Hindu Nation.

(c) That the question of Satyagraha at Mathura should be referred to the U.P. Provincial Hindu Sabha for necessary action.

XIV. Shudhi Movement: (a) With a view to secure the benefits of the noble teachings of the Hindu Religion and Culture to non-Hindus, and in view of the serious inroads that are being systematically made by other religions and cultures upon the Hindudom the Hindu Mahasabha calls upon all sections of the Hindu Nation to organise and consolidate themselves by whole-heartedly supporting the Shudhi Movement by offering all reasonable opportunities to those who desire to be converted or reconverted to Hinduism, by extending to them all the rights and privileges which the other Hindus enjoy.

(b) This Sabha impresses the political significance of the Shudhi movement and is of opinion that when political strength of a community depends on the number of the representatives in proportion to its population, the decrease in the numerical strength of the Hindus caused by conversion to non-Hindu Faiths has told and must tell upon their political strength in the Legislatures as well—therefore, the Shudhi Movement constitutes not only a cultural and religious but a political necessity too.

XVI. National Language and Script: The Hindu Mahasabha declares that Hindi (not Hindustani—rather '*Sanskrit nistha*' Hindi) that is based on and drawing its nourishment from Sanskrit vocabulary is and rightfully deserves to be the National Language and Devanagari as the National Script of Hindusthan. The Mahasabha strongly condemns the overt attempts made by the Indian National Congress in general and the Congress Governments in particular to make Hindusthani as the *lingua franca* of this country in craven fear of, and with a view to placate the Muslim opinion in this behalf. The Mahasabha

calls upon the Hindu community to resist stoutly by all means in its power all such attempts to recognise and encourage Hindusthani in preference to Hindi.

XVII. Indian States: The Hindu Mahasabha declares that the Congress policy of coercion and interference in the internal administration of the Indian States under the plausible slogan of Responsible Government is not genuine and in as much as the Congress activities in the matter are restricted to and concentrated only in the Hindu States to the practical exclusion of the Muslim States like Hyderabad, Bhopal, Bahawalpore, Rampur, Malerkotla etc. and, therefore, it declares that such activities of the Congress are of the nature of harassment and that it is nothing short of abuse of its power to instigate troubles particularly in the case of such advanced and well-governed Hindu States as Travancore, Mysore, Baroda, etc.

XVIII. Travancore: (a) This Session is of opinion that the agitation carried on in Travancore is not political but communal, and is started by Christians with a definite purpose of establishing their communal supremacy in the State and of capturing its Government and calls upon every Hindu to refrain from lending any support whatsoever to this artificial agitation of the Christian community who are up-set by the throwing open of the Hindu temples to Harijans which step has proved to be a death blow to the Christian proselytization.

(b) The Hindu Mahasabha is extremely grieved to see the indifferent attitude of the rulers of Hindu States towards the oppression of the Hindu subjects in the Muslim States and requests the Hindu Mahasabha to put the grievances of such Hindu subjects before the rulers of the Mohammadan States and have them redressed.

XIX. Bhopal Repression: (a) The Hindu Mahasabha expresses its resentment that His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal has turned a deaf ear to all previous resolutions and representations on the part of the Mahasabha calling upon his Government to put an end to all ill-treatment of the Hindus that obtains there. It seems His Highness' Government is determined to continue their policy of harassing the Hindus, denying them their civic liberties, ousting them systematically out of State services, allowing them to be systematically persecuted by Muslim *gundas* and thus forcing them to embrace Islam.

(b) As the very life and property of Hindus in the State there has become insecure and as their sufferings have become intolerable, this Session warns the Bhopal Government that unless this policy of mis-rule is abandoned forthwith and unless the Hindus there are accorded full protection of life, religion and property and unless civic rights and representation proportionate to their population in public services and administrative and legislative bodies are immediately granted, the Hindu Mahasabha will be compelled to embark upon a civil resistance movement against that State to rescue and defend the rights of Hindu subjects in that State.

XXVIII. Policy of the Punjab Government: This Mahasabha strongly condemns the reactionary, one-sided and oppressive policy followed by the Punjab Government in as much as, *inter alia*,

(a) It has failed to repeal or suitably amend the Punjab Alienation of Land Act which by creating an artificial class of agriculturists deprives one half of the population of the Punjab, mostly Hindus, of the right of acquiring agricultural land and is calculated to pamper a class of parasitical landlords at the expense of the poor peasant proprietors.

(b) It has recently passed a series of bills now notorious as Black Bills which are

calculated to do the greatest harm to the Hindus of the Punjab and to destroy their trade and commerce, their freedom and independence by making their business entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the Government and their minions.

(c) It has ruled that 60 per cent of the jobs in some public services would be given to *Zamindars*, which in the peculiar circumstances of the Punjab means practically Musalmans.

(d) In order to conceal its communal activities, nepotism and other irregularities and in order to avoid supplementary questions, it has ruled that no questions regarding the distribution of jobs amongst various communities and other matters affecting their interest shall be answered on the floor of the house of the Provincial Legislative Assembly.

(e) It has by taking frequent action against Newspapers mostly Hindus, seriously impaired the freedom of the Hindu Press and by the introduction of a repressive Bill it is keeping Damocle's sword hanging over their heads.

(f) It has started a campaign of vilification against the non-zamindar Hindus of the Punjab and the Premier and some of the other Ministers have been personally carrying on a mischievous and malicious propaganda against them in the length and breadth of the Province.

(g) It has failed to redress the grievances urged by the peasants of several districts of the Punjab and has on the other hand, subjected them to *lathi* charges and other hardships.

(h) It has taken action against a number of Hindu political workers and has by executive action interned an important Sikh member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and prevented him from attending the meetings of the Assembly although he was elected unopposed by his constituency.

(i) It is generally behaving in an autocratic and despotic manner and making every effort to favour Muslims at the expense of the Hindus and creating a poisonous atmosphere against them in the Province.

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1. The original text, though full of mistakes, has been reproduced verbatim.
 2. Chandragupta Maurya (321-297 B.C.); credited with liberating India from the Greeks and founding an All India empire.
 3. Vikramaditya: traditionally identified with Chandragupta II (376-415 A.D.) whose reign marks the high watermark of ancient Indian Culture.
 4. Peshwas: The hereditary Brahmin Ministers of the feeble successors of Shivaji who directed the Maratha polity in the eighteenth century.
 5. The Mopla uprising triggered off by police raid on Tirurangadi mosque on 20 August, 1921 resulted in attacks on police stations and developed into a struggle of the Muslim Moplah tenants against Hindu Nambudri land owners.
 6. Aurangzeb (1659-1707); the last great Mughal Emperor some of whose policies created mass-stirs which eventually enfeebled the empire.
 7. Alaud-din Khilji (1296-1316); Sultan of Delhi, well-known for his reforms, anti-clergy attitude and southern conquests which attract adverse comments from some.
 8. In the communal outburst at Kohat in the N.W.F.P. in September, 1924.
 9. The geographical area, bounded by the Indus and its five tributaries besides the now-defunct Sarasvati, whose hallowed memories inspired the Arya Samajists and others to re-establish Hinduism on the Vedic bases.

10. Yashovardan (530-40 A.D.); a Gupta feudatory of Malwa who stopped the advance of the Hunas in northern India.
11. Pulkesin II (c 609-642), the greatest Chalukya King, who defeated his contemporary king Harsha of Thanesvar.
12. Harshavardhan (606-647), a patron of Buddhism known from the account of Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsang.
13. Prithviraj, ruler of Ajmer and Delhi, who died fighting Muhammad Ghuri at Tarain in 1192 and is the hero of many folk ballads for chivalry and courage.
14. *Hindu-Pada-Padashahi*.
15. Biji Rao I (1720-40) the Peshwa who contributed towards consolidate in the Maratha State.
16. Nana Fadnavis (1742-1800); Chief Minister of the Peshwas, often called the Indian Machiavelli, was the last genius produced by the Maratha nation of the time.
17. Madhav Rao Sindhia (1727-94), popularly called Mahadji Sindhia was one of the most far-sighted chiefs in the Maratha confederacy.
18. Pandavas were the legendary princes who emerged as victors in the Mahabharat and became the undisputed master at Hastinapur.
19. Thomas Babington Macaulay(1800-1859), English Whig politician, essayist, poet and historian; entered Parliament in 1830; became a member and later the Secretary of the Board of Control for India; in 1834 he accepted an invitation to serve on the Supreme Council of India; inaugurated a national system of education, Western in outlook, as President of the Commission on Indian Jurisprudence he drafted a Penal Code that later became the basis of Indian Criminal Law.
20. Baba Ramsingh, initiator of the Kooka or Namdhari movement seeking regeneration among the Sikhs through a boycott of English institutions for which he was deported to Rangun where he died in 29 November, 1884.
21. Not available.
22. Allan Octavian Hume; founder of the Indian National Congress.
23. Sir William Wedderburn; Congress President, 1889-90 and 1910-11.
24. In the social context of Hindu Nambudri and Nair *Jenmis* exploiting Muslim *Kanamdars* (lease-holders) and cultivators (*verumpattamdars*) locally known as Moplahs a tenant rights agitation was taken up by the Khilafat Movement in 1920 under the Congress and Khilafat leaders like V. Gopal Menon, K. Madhavan and Ali Musaliar.
25. The reference is to the concepts of *Darus Salam* (Peace Territory) and *Darul Harb* (War Territory). The third relevant concept of *Darul Abad* (Covenanted Territory) has been surprisingly omitted.
26. Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917); an affluent member of Parsi community and a prominent businessman of Bombay having trading links with Britain, Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1885; President, Indian National Congress, 1886, 1893 and 1906; First Indian to be elected to House of Commons on a Liberal Party ticket, 1892; a liberal and humanist popularly called the Grand Old Man of India.
27. Not available.
28. The reference is to Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar (1879-19), Diwan of Travancore.

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Hindu Mahasabha's statement

Savarkar Papers, Roll No 4, pp. 59-61

28 December, 1938

A statement issued by Mir Akbarali Khan¹ and the group of Muslim leaders in the

Nizam State who choose to call themselves "Nationalists" deprecates the Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Hindu Sanghatanists against the outrageously communal persecutions of the Hindus carried on in the Nizam State for years in the past. These self-styled Nationalist Muslim gentlemen "fear that the Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Hindus might lead to a breach between the two communities who have lived in harmony for centuries." Their conception of a communal harmony seems to be borrowed from the argument of the wolf in a sheep's skin who remonstrated with its victim for disturbing the peace and public tranquillity of the neighbourhood by raising an untimely hue and cry.

Do they not know that the Hindus are not allowed to hold meetings, to take out the religious or public processions, even to repair their temples, to start schools, to educate their children in their mother-tongue? Is not Urdu which is an alien language to the Hindus who constitute some 85 per cent of the population of the State thrust upon them as a State and court language. Do not the public services contain 80 per cent Muslims who form but some 12 per cent of the population? Are not Hindus converted to Mohammadanism by force and fraud and does not the Nizam finance such and other Muslim proselytizing agencies inside the State and even outside of it spending millions from the State treasury which is replenished in the main by the Hindu tax payers? Are not organised Muslim *Gundas* let loose on the Hindu community perpetrating heinous crimes—dishonouring, kidnapping and outraging Hindu women, desecrating Hindu temples, looting Hindu *bazars* in broad daylight, murdering Hindu leaders and preachers, without any notice taken by the Nizam police—a department again which has 80 per cent Muslims on roll? In the current year alone were not Ved Prakash, Dharma Prakash, Mahadeo and several other Hindu preachers and citizens murdered by—and yet were not the Muslim murderers as a rule let off scot-free? Did not the Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha demand inquiry and send deputations time and again to urge removal of the serious grievances? But did not the Nizam Government refuse even to listen to them in the most high handed fashion possible? Is this then the "harmony" which the Muslim signatories to the statement referred to as one "in which the two communities had lived for centuries" and the "breach" of which they now "fear"? If so the Hindu Mahasabha assures them that it has determined deliberately to bring about the breach of that harmony at the earliest possible opportunity by offering all legitimate resistance that lies in its power.

The Signatories complain that this campaign of civil resistance presumably on the part of the Hindu Swatantrya Sangha in Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) and the Hindu Satyagraha Mandal at Poona presided over by Mr. Ketkar and backed up by the Hindu Sabhaite, is highly communal in nature. We ask what else it can be? Wherever a community is singled out to be tyrannised over by another community, all efforts to defend and liberate the victim must have reference to that singled out community alone and the struggle cannot but be communal in that aspect. Take the case of removal of Untouchability. The Untouchables as a community have to undergo certain disabilities. The efforts to remove them must have reference to that community in the main. But does that make the question of removal of untouchability communal in a reprehensible sense or unholy or anti-national? The same is the case with this movement of the civil resistance campaign started by the Hindu Sanghatanists in Hyderabad.

It is a lie to say that civil liberty is denied in the Nizam State to all communities alike. To the Hindus alone all civil liberties or speech, association, worship are denied. It is the Hindus alone who are banned from having any share in the public services or any voice in the administration of the State. The Muslims enjoy all civil liberties with a vengeance, monopolised public services and offices and control all administration in spite of the fact that not they but the Hindus contribute almost all the revenues and taxes that replenish the State Treasury. It is the Hindus alone who are threatened with extermination as a Race, Religion and Culture. The Hindu Mahasabha, therefore, refuses to fight underlying colours of a common Hindu-Muslim movement and means to enter the list in defence of their Hindu brethren in the State under an unalloyed Hindu Flag. Whether this attitude on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha is called by the tyrants or the pseudo-Nationalist Congressites as anti-national or communal or parochial or otherwise—we care a fig for the name.

If the Muslim gentlemen who have discovered themselves overnight to “National” do really care to avoid a breach and usher in an era of communal unity in the State, then they should forthwith call upon the Muslims to disband their fanatical organizations like the Khaksars *Gundas* and address the Nizam to guarantee equality of treatment to all communities alike not in words but in fact and introduce a fully representative Government guaranteeing at least 75 per cent representation in the Legislature and in the public services as well to the Hindus who constitute 85 per cent in the population of the State. This is the only efficacious and truly national way of avoiding any breach of communal harmony and not the threat which the statement tacitly holds out to the Hindus in case they persist in offering civil resistance.

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1. Akbar Ali Khan (1899-1976); Advocate, Hyderabad took part in freedom movement, Member, Rajya Sabha, 1954, 1960 and 1966; Governor, U.P. 1972 and Orissa, 1976.

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E.V. Ramaswami Naicker's¹ Presidential Address to XIV session of the Justice Party Conference at Madras 29 December, 1938

The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Pt. II, pp. 380-81 [Extract]

Let us now consider our present position. Our opponents say that we are reactionaries, that we are job-hunters, that we are persons who have no national feelings, that we belong to the party of *zamindars*. How are we reactionaries, I ask. Our basic principle in politics is that there should be even-handed justice, equal rights and equality of opportunity to all. I ask whether the Congress which is the extreme political party in this country has adopted this principle. If so, how is it that in the Congress today Brahmins have the dominating position and all others only the right to lift up their hands in agreement whenever they are asked to do so?

3. Mr. Ramaswami Naicker then analysed the meaning of the word “nation” and

pointed out its inapplicability to Indian conditions. As things stand at present, the centrifugal tendencies are greater than the centripetal ones. Burmans raised the cry "Burma for Burmans" and cut themselves off from India. Orissa and Sind had been created new Provinces. Andhras want to have a Province of their own. Muslims of the North-West Frontier got a new Province for themselves. It is strange that the Indian National Congress should give its seal of approval to these fissiparous tendencies and still beat the big drum of "nationalism."

4. If Sindhis, Gujaratis, Bengalees, Andhras, Malayalis, etc., can separate and have their own Provinces and there is nothing non-national in it, why should the demand of Tamilians, "Tamil Nad for Tamilians," be considered to be against "nationalism?" If Tamilians, who cannot tolerate their being exploited by Aryans, ask whether it is just or fair that there should be such exploitation, they are accused of class-hatred, sedition, and treason to the "nation." The question is: Are we to put on the "nationalist" garb and efface ourselves, or are we to get frightened at the state of things and commit suicide?

5. In the political sphere, people are being exploited in the name of "nationalism," even as in the religious sphere the promise of "*Moksha*" is used to delude them.

6. Referring to criticism against the Justice Party,² Mr. Ramaswami Naicker asked what was it that the Party had done during the 17 years it had been in office which stood in the way of getting *Swaraj*, what was the harm they had done to the people and what was the good they should have done, but which they neglected to do? He challenged any one to come forward and reply to these questions.

7. Which was the Party that had worked for the last so many years for the removal of caste distinctions and caste tyrannies? Which was the Party that got for the Depressed Classes the right to walk in the streets where before they were forbidden to walk? Which was the Party that gave communal representation? Which was the party which spread education among Depressed Classes, provided them with all necessary facilities and conveniences and enabled them to get Government appointments? Was it not the Justice Party?

10. Referring to the introduction of compulsory Hindi, he asked why, when the Congress Ministry had been closing down schools on the ground that there was no money, when 93 per cent of the people were not literate in their own mother-tongue, the alien language of Hindi should be compulsorily introduced. Did they promise to the voters at any time that they would introduce Hindi? In spite of the fact that any number of public meetings were held protesting against compulsory Hindi, in spite of the fact that nearly 600 persons, including 75 women, had gone to jail, in spite of the fact that great Tamil scholars had pointed out that Tamil language and culture would be greatly affected by Hindi, still there has been no change in the attitude of Government. I ask, is this democracy?

11. The use of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which they condemned before they took up office, against those who merely shout "Long Live Tamil" and "Down with Hindi" and the heavy sentences and fines imposed on Anti-Hindi volunteers, the ill-treatment meted out to Anti-Hindi prisoners,—all these make us exclaim "Is this democracy?"

12. Referring to the Wardha Scheme of Education, Mr. Naicker said that it was a

strange and novel scheme unknown to the world till now, and its result would only be to ruin education itself. Great educational experts had condemned the scheme, and yet serious efforts were being made to put it into practice.

1. E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, popularly called Periyar (revered elder), Patriarch from Erode, Tamil Nadu, launched a tirade against *Varna-ashrama* or Hindu hierarchical caste system. Persuaded by his friend C. Rajagopalachari, he joined the Congress and shot into prominence during the Vaikom Satyagraha in 1924. Protesting against the ban on the movement of backward castes like the Ezhavas. Disgusted with the obscurantist ways of the Brahmin leaders, he walked out of the Congress in 1925. If Gandhiji's accent was on driving the alien rulers out, Periyar turned his attention to the liberation of the Backwards and to secure for them a share in power that would make freedom from the British meaningful for the mass of Indians. Finding in the Justice Party a reflection of his own social ideas, Periyar joined it and was elected its Chairman in 1938. Later he converted the Justice Party into Dravida Kazhagam and ever since the Kazhagam became a virulent movement of social justice for the backwards and Dravidians.
2. In 1917 T.M. Nair and P.T. Chettiar organised a party named South Indian Liberal Federation later rechristened as the Justice Party, whose aim was to promote the interests of the non-Brahmins. It opposed passive resistance and non-cooperation, stood for communal representation and gradual reforms towards representative Government and worked for the abolition of casteism and untouchability. It assumed Ministerial power during 1920s and 1930s.

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Jinnah's opening speech: The All India Muslim Students Conference

The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Pt. II, pp. 439-40

PATNA, 29 December, 1938

2. Criticising the Congress at length, Mr. Jinnah said that young men had been deluded into believing that the Congress fought for the freedom of the country and the masses, and that the Congress would turn the country into a land of milk and honey. But now it was amply evident that the Congress said one thing and meant another. Mr. Jinnah strongly repudiated the various charges and criticisms levelled against him, such as being a communalist, a fanatic and an ally of imperialism, seeking personal gratification in the face of the gravity of the problem facing the people, especially the Muslims. Referring to the negotiations with the Congress for a settlement of Hindu-Muslim question, and the political status of the League, Mr. Jinnah said that the Congress had offered terms which were unjust and prejudiced: if any were not accepted the Congress was not prepared to come to terms. The Muslims, too, were not prepared to accept the Congress terms. They were not satisfied with anything less than perfect equality. The Congress claim of being the only body to represent the entire country was preposterous. India was not a nation yet, but a counter of nationalities. With regard to Federation, Mr. Jinnah warned young men against being deluded by the Congress declaration that they did not want Federation.

He added that the Congress had declared that it would not accept the new Constitution, but was now embracing it.

3. Proceeding, Mr. Jinnah asked what the Congress had done for the masses. Was the country turned into a land of milk and honey? What had Mr. Rajagopalachari done in Madras? The enforcement of Hindi was strongly resented by the Hindus themselves, and the people resorted to the same *Satyagraha* which the Supreme High Command of the Congress (Mr. Gandhi) preached. This was met by lathi charges. Thus had the Congress demonstrated that it was fighting for civil liberties until they joined the Congress [Governments]. At least, this was what it intended.

4. Reverting to Federation, Mr. Jinnah referred to the observations of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Gandhi, the former saying that the enemies of Englishmen were his enemies, and the latter saying that he would shed his blood if Englishmen's blood was shed. Various Congress leaders had something to say about Federation, but why did not Mr. Gandhi have anything to say? He would answer: because he was not even a four-anna member of the Congress, he did not represent the Congress at all, he was only the "Supreme High Command of High Commands."

5. Proceeding, Mr. Jinnah said that when he (Mr. Jinnah) had started his political career, he was persistently attacked as being a communalist. Later on, when he established a certain amount of contact with the masses, he was criticised as being a fanatic, responsible for exciting communal passions. Later still he was accused of being an ally of imperialists. It was considered a crime to utter the word "Islam". People did not understand the meaning of "Islam" when they criticised him for safeguarding the Islamic religion, which was in danger. Islam was not only a religion but an Institution, comprising a complete code, moral, social, economic and political. He only wanted men to progress along these lines. If he wished for self-gratification and if it was such an honour, he would say he had been offered the Congress presidentship if he joined the Congress. He had once believed that the Congress was carrying on a real national struggle for freedom. But then he was young, susceptible and carried away by catchwords. The Congress placed false ideals before the young men in the country which served as a cloak for its masquerade, but it now stood revealed. He, therefore, reiterated his warning to young men not to be deceived by the empty talks of the Congress.

6. Concluding, Mr. Jinnah appealed to young men not to be deluded, but to assert themselves and be prepared for sacrifices for the advancement of the community and the freedom of the country.

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Gandhiji's interview with H.V. Hodson¹ [Extract]

Congress Government I, pp. 128-29

BOMBAY, 31 December, 1938

Mr. Hodson expressed the opinion that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim question was made difficult by the fact that, owing to its very nature, the Congress tended to

take on the nature of a Totalitarian Party and acted as if it were the one and the only Party in the country that mattered, instead of regarding itself simply as one of the principal parties, to which Mr. Gandhi replied: "It is a very wrong view to take of the Congress. The Congress does claim to be the one and the only party that can deliver the goods. It is a perfectly valid claim to make. One day or the other some Party has to assert itself to that extent. That does not make it a Totalitarian Party. It is the ambition of the Congress to become all-representative of the entire nation, not merely of any particular section, and it is a worthy ambition, in keeping with its best tradition."

"If you have studied Congress history, you will find that since its very inception the Congress has sought to serve and represent all sections in the country equally without any distinction or discrimination. Thus it used to have Rajas and Maharajas on the Reception Committee, and has defended the cause of the States against the Paramount Power, as in case of Kashmir and Mysore."

"It would love to be absorbed in or to absorb the Muslim League so far as the political programme is concerned. For religious and social activity, of course, every community can have its separate organisation."

Asked whether the ambition of the Congress of absorbing other political organisations tended to make it a Totalitarian Party, Mr. Gandhi replied: "You may try to damn it by calling it Totalitarian. Absorption is inevitable when a country is engaged in a struggle to wrest powers from foreign hands; it cannot afford to have a separate rival political organisation. The entire strength of the country must be used for ousting the third and usurping Party. That is what is happening in India today. Where there is no common danger to oppose them, there must be separate parties representing different schools of thought. You should bear in mind that the Congress does not impose its will on others. Its sanctions are non-violent."

Mr. Gandhi's interviewer persisted: "Would not the march to full responsible Government be more rapid if the Muslims were taken along?" "Of course it would be," replied Mr. Gandhi.

"Personally I do not want anything which the Muslims oppose. But I have faith that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim tangle will come much sooner than most people expect. I claim to be able to look at the whole position with a detached mind. There is no substance in our quarrels. The points of difference are superficial: those of contact are deep and permanent. Political and economic subjection is common to us. The same climate, the same rivers, the same fields supply both with air, food and water. Whatever, therefore, leaders, Mahatmas and Maulanas may say or do, the masses, when they are fully awakened, will assert themselves and combine for the sake of combating common evils."

"The effect of the Socialist and Communist propaganda, too, to bring the masses of both communities together by emphasizing the identity of interests. I have my differences with them, but I cannot withhold my admiration from their endeavour to demolish the superstition that keeps the different communities apart."

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1. H.V. Hodson, b. 1906; Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, 1928-35; Editor *Round Table*, 1934-39 and of *Sunday Times*, 1950-61; Reforms Commissioner, Government of India, 1941-42; author of *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*, 1969 (with Epilogue, 1986).

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*Jinnah's Statement**Congress Government I, pp. 173-74*

Patna, 1 January, 1939. I have seen the report of the interview given by Mr. Gandhi to Mr. H.V. Hodson, and it is quite clear that he maintains the preposterous claim of the Congress that it is the "only body that can deliver the goods on behalf of the people of India," and indulges in platitudes and talks about the history of the Congress and its ambition to become "all-representative of the entire nation."

He says that it is a worthy ambition, in keeping with its best tradition, and that "if you study the Congress, you will find that, since its inception, the Congress has sought to serve and represent all sections of the country equally."

Mr. Gandhi is mainly responsible for having destroyed that ideal and the tradition of the Congress, since he has captured it. It is all very well for Mr. Gandhi to say that the Congress would love to be absorbed by the Muslim League if the Muslim League cared to absorb it, or to absorb the Muslim League in its turn, so far as the political programme was concerned. Is it not absurd on the face of it to set the Muslim League the task of absorbing the Congress, the Congress being mainly a Hindu body with a majority of four to one? Mr. Gandhi is quite safe and he knows that the result will be that the Congress will absorb the Muslim League, and he can well afford to talk in this strain.

In fact, Mr. Gandhi proceeded to say, when asked (if) the Congress, in its ambition to absorb other political organisations, "tended to become a totalitarian party": "You may damn it by calling it totalitarian. Absorption is inevitable".

Then Mr. Gandhi hastens to say, "You should bear in mind that the Congress does not impose its will on others." Is this true?

And then he says, "Its (the Congress's) sanction are non-violent." Is this true?

When asked by his interviewer, "Would not the march to full responsible Government be more rapid if the Musalmans were taken along?", his reply was: "Of course it would be. Personally I do not want anything which the Muslims oppose, but I have faith that the solution to the Hindu-Muslim tangle will come much sooner than most people expect."

I am glad that Mr. Gandhi is beginning to see some light through an impenetrable darkness.

But the story of Mr. Gandhi, when he says "I do not want anything which the Muslims oppose," is so old and so often repeated by him that it is not going any longer to deceive the Musalmans. When he talks of his "detached mind," it is difficult to believe it. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, they have been driven to the conclusion that, whatever may be the ideal and theory and however worthy, actual realities show that the Congress has proved in its policy and programme, whenever they have been called upon to act, that they are no better than the Hindu Mahasabha, which openly stands for a *Hindu Raj* in this country, as laid down by them only a few days ago at the Nagpur session of the Mahasabha.

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*K.M. Ashraf's Presidential Address**The Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. I, pp. 462-66**1 January, 1939*

In the course of his Presidential address to the All India Students Conference at Calcutta, Dr. K.M. Ashraf said:

4. "When one hears politicians talking against Russia and the Communist Party, one very much suspects that the lessons of the international struggle have not been imbibed by many of us in this country. The situation in India is undergoing a revolutionary change and the relationship of forces as between the various class groupings in society is shifting from day to day. The political parties and programmes are, therefore, without exception in a state of constant flux. As students of practical politics we must understand the process of history in the making and the exact nature of social science to understand the laws of motions underlying these changes, and to grasp the fundamentals of the Indian situation. Do not forget that the social forces which cease to be progressive do not die out. They too change in reverse. Hence the growing conflict of ideology and its decisive significance in our national struggle. Speaking broadly, all our national struggles develop on the basis of a united front of all anti-imperialist forces in our motherland. But we have to determine from time to time what exactly is the role of a particular social group in a given situation in our anti-imperialist struggle. It is not very long when even political mass consciousness on a communal scale was progressive, even revolutionary and the Hindu revivalist movement, the Pan-Islamic and the Khilafat movements materially contributed to our national struggle. But can we say the same thing today about the present forms of communalism? The message of Mahatma Gandhi was certainly of the utmost revolutionary importance in 1919 and even later, but can we say the same at the time when even according to him constitutionalism has come to stay. During the course of two decades our national struggle has released new social forces and one witnesses millions of peasants and workers joining our national struggle. The people of Indian States are now coming in with a revolutionary fervour which was difficult to visualise even five years ago. The present leadership, developed under very different circumstances, finds itself more or less helpless in the situation, and one gathers the impression as if like King Canute¹ we are trying to control the social forces in spite of consciously developing them. This situation has given rise to the problem of new leadership to correspond with the new social conditions, and it is here that comrades like you are called upon to build up the new front of anti-imperialist forces and an appropriate leadership to suit the present situation. We are suffering from a deadlock in our national movement and it is difficult to visualise how we shall develop an alternative leadership and an adequate programme of struggle except on the basis of the working class, the greatest and the most consistent revolutionary force in the modern society."

7. He pointed out the Wardha scheme of education and said: "The Zakir Hussain

Committee has in fact prepared a new and progressive syllabus but this is just one item of our social programme and if the Congress seriously takes it up the whole of the present Provincial budget will be exhausted by putting it into operation. I do not know how we can get through our national programme reconstruction without a revolutionary capture of power. I do admit that under the Congress Governments, the attitude of authorities towards students has slightly improved, but I may be no more sure that the students can rise to their full stature even under the Congress Governments. We have to function through the old bureaucratic machinery and it is very difficult to make the present instruments of Governments to suit our needs."

8. In connection with hardships encountered by students, Dr. Ashraf stated: "Only the other day we read of hundreds of students being expelled from the Hyderabad College for singing the '*Bande Mataram*' song. You can appreciate from this incident how much we have yet to struggle to establish our elementary rights. Of course the censorship of the imperialist Government and the ban on progressive literature still remain and our chances of cultural development are very meagre indeed."

9. "Among problems the student movement like the national movement is faced with the disruptive forces of communalism," proceeded Dr. Ashraf, while speaking on communalism, "Attempts are being made by both Hindus and Muslim communal politicians to disrupt the national front of the student movement. I will not take your time by discussing communalism in any details on this occasion. Suffice it to say that communalism as a whole is nothing more or less than imperialist conspiracy to disrupt our democratic and national movement. Internationally, communalism is allied today with Fascism. Only recently the representative of the Muslim League met General Franco² and gave him his blessings. We know only too well that Savarkar and Bhai Parmanand are working in India in the interest of Japanese imperialism."

10. He observed, "Again in our class organisation of the peasants and workers, communalism supports vested interests. It is committed to Federation, the *status quo* of the States and in its methods and programmes it stands for constitutionalism as against mass struggle. To elucidate this disruptive role of communalism I can only cite the example of Bengal, which has the good or bad fortune of having a Government by a Muslim League Ministry. Be it recorded to the shame of the present Ministry that our detenus have not yet been released in spite of agitation all over India."

11. Criticising the action of the Huq Ministry of Bengal in this connexion, he said, "Instead of relieving the jute growers, the Huq Government have enforced the Ordinance and the way strikers are being treated is only too familiar to you. The present Government has actually gone a step further and has encouraged communalism in the ranks of labour. As to the general atmosphere in Bengal, I can only say that our tone and behaviour has been deteriorated and that the city of Calcutta has witnessed ugly and shameful demonstrations on more than one occasion. Only on the last occasion when the vote of No-Confidence was being discussed on the floor of the Bengal Assembly, shameful scenes were witnessed in Calcutta and I am not sure they will not be repeated again."

1. King of England (1016-35 A.D.).

2. General Francisco Franco (1892-1975), leader of the rebel forces in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39, and Spanish Dictator.

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*J.B. Kripalani to Rajagopalachari**Rajagopalachari Papers**2 January, 1939*

Dear friend,

You know that negotiations with the Muslim League about the Hindu Muslim relations have now been definitely abandoned. It is, however, proposed that the Congress without waiting for a mutual understanding, should clearly and unequivocally state its communal policy. For this Gandhiji placed the accompanying draft before the last Working Committee meeting at Wardha for discussion and acceptance if need be with such modifications as the Working Committee may think fit. The draft could not however be thoroughly discussed at Wardha. It was, therefore, proposed that as the matter was of a delicate nature and of vital importance, a special meeting of the Working Committee be called for the discussion of the draft. This meeting is fixed for the 11th inst. at Bardoli (Gujarat).

You will find that some items in the draft have reference to our Parliamentary programme and to the formation of Cabinets in Congress Provinces. Your opinion about this as also on the draft as a whole will be of great value. I, therefore, invite you to attend the next Working Committee meeting on the 11th inst. at Bardoli. If for any reasons you cannot be present there to give the Working Committee the benefit of your views, you will please send us a memorandum of your views to reach me here by the 9th inst. or to reach me at the Swaraj Ashram, Bardoli (Gujarat) by the 11th inst.

You will please note that the draft sent to you is strictly confidential and not for publication. You will no doubt agree that any premature publication of the draft may be injurious to the cause dear to us.

Yours sincerely,
J.B. KRIPALANI

Enclosure:

Strictly Confidential. Not for publication.

This is merely my draft subject to alterations and additions.

M.K. Gandhi

Although Shri Jinnah's letter leaves little hope of mutual understanding being established between the Muslim League and the Congress, it is necessary, for the sake of Congressmen whether Hindus, Muslims or from any other community and also for the sake of the millions of non-Congressmen who are allied to no party, who are politically dumb, but whom nevertheless it is the Congress boat, made good on many occasions, that it seeks to represent, that without waiting for a mutual understanding the Congress should state its communal policy in unequivocal terms. For the Congress does not need the spur of mutuality for the sake of doing strict justice without which it cannot exist for a moment. In brief, then, this is the Congress policy on the communal question, in particular here, the Hindu-Muslim question.

1. Bad as the so-called Communal Award is, it stands until it is revised by the mutual consent of the parties concerned.
2. In the Provincial Assemblies (barring the Frontier) where the Congress has majority, the Congress shall have a Muslim member (or members) in the Cabinet chosen from among the largest Muslim group provided that he accepts the Congress programme, both parliamentary and constructive, and loyally abides by the Congress discipline while he remains in the Cabinet.
3. In the distribution of posts, subject to the fulfilment of conditions of merit and efficiency, wherever there is disparity, attempt shall be made to reach the numerical proportion of the Muslims to the Hindus in the respective Provinces. This rule shall apply to all Minorities.
4. Wherever a particular community or class is more backward in education than the rest, it should be the duty of the Congress to make the rest, it should be the duty of the Congress special provision for the levelling up of its educational standard.
5. In the Provinces where the Congress is in a minority and the Muslims are the majority community, the Congress members shall always remain in opposition. But the opposition shall not be obstructive. It shall examine every act of the Government on its merits and support it wherever it is beneficial in terms of the Congress policy and programme.
6. In after where in such Provinces the Muslims are divided in groups the Congress will help that group which, from the Congress standpoint is in every way the best.
7. In order to prevent reactionaries from getting control of the administration—subject to the control and guidance of the Working Committee—Congress members in such Provinces may ally themselves with such Muslim group or groups enabling them to form Ministries irrespective of communal representation thereon. Congressmen were not think in communal terms. Hence they may not cavil not a Ministry composed wholly of Muslims or any other community, the sole test being integrity, ability and robust nationalism according to the Congress ideal.
8. In Parliamentary Muslim elections the Congress should not put up candidates in revelry with other organisations unless the Congress is satisfied that the voters themselves desire to be represented by a Congress candidate.
9. The Congress does believe in Muslim mass contact but at in any spirit of hostility towards any Muslim organisation. The contact that the Congress seeks, however, is not necessarily through making Muslim members of the Congress but by serving them in the eye open to the Congress and acceptable to the Muslims. Thus the Congress has been serving thousands of Muslim sisters and brothers through the All India Spinners Association organising . . . [illegible] and weaving among them.
10. Every Congressman represents in his own person the best that is in Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and other faiths. He will, therefore, sympathise with the Hindu horror of cow-slaughter and respect for all creation symbolised through the cow, he will sympathise with the Muslim in his desire for perfect peace in and about a house of worship and, therefore, his objection to noise in the shape of loud music before mosques at prayer times. These two are taken by way of illustrations in as much as they have actually led and still do lead to deadly feuds between the rival communities. But the Congress feels that respect for other faiths cannot be cultivated by forcible means, much less by mass violence. Hence the Congress cannot regard with equanimity attempts on the part of Hindus to prevent cow slaughter by forcible means nor Muslims stopping by forcible means music or processions before mosques. These must be matters of mutual adjustment between parties. The general rule, however, should be that prevailing custom as to cow-slaughter or processions should be respected and should have the force of law. Where no custom can be proved Muslims should have the freedom to slaughter cows so long as the slaughter is not made purely with a view to offend Hindu susceptibility. Similarly, in the absence of custom, Hindus may play music before mosques during prayer times and loudly at any other time. *Arti* in Hindu temples cannot be interfered with except when it is done so boisterously as wantonly to offend the devotees in neighbouring mosques.

11. As to the Hindi-Urdu controversy, the Congress attitude is plain that its official language is Hindustani as commonly spoken in the North by Hindus and Musalmans and written either in the Devanagri or Urdu script. But the Congress is of opinion that both Hindi, i.e., highly Sanskritised Hindustani written in Devanagri and Urdu, i.e., highly Persianised Hindustani written in the Urdu script must be recognised during the transition stage and it is the duty of every educated Congressman to familiarise himself with both the forms of speech and both the script.
12. As to the singing of the long established National Song, *Bande Mataram*, the Congress anticipating objections has retained as national song only those stanzas to which no possible exception could be taken on religious or other grounds. But except at purely Congress gatherings it should be left open to individuals whether they will stand up when the stanzas are sung. In the present state of things in local Board and Assembly meetings which their members obliged to attend the singing of *Bande Mataram* should be discontinued.
13. The National Flag must find its proper place at purely Congress gatherings. But no attempt should be made to fly it on general public buildings, Municipal offices or school buildings where there is any opposition whatsoever.

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Report on Political events in Bihar during the second half of December, 1938 [Extract]

Fortnightly Reports, Home-Poll F 18-12/38, pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,
SPECIAL SECTION, PATNA, 6 January, 1939

The All India Conference of the Muslim League was the principal event in the province during the Christmas holidays. The meetings were on a large scale and the attendance is reported to have reached 40,000 at times. In spite of prior admonitions from the leaders to refrain from irresponsible oratory, there were many bellicose speeches. The proceedings were inevitably marked by a strong communal note and the lead was given by the opening speeches of Mr. Aziz and Mr. Jinnah, who stressed from the start the separate identity of the Musalmans as a nation. Mr. Aziz stated that the Mohammadans can never agree to merge their identity as a united nation and that the Mohammadans will never make a fetish of "bread" of "the motherland." The result was a very uncompromising debate on the subject of the Federation which was condemned as a conspiracy to establish a *Hindu Raj* with the support of British bayonets. The text of several speakers was that the Nationalism of Congress is Hinduism and that their "*Swaraj*" is *Hindu Raj*. The uncompromising rejection of Federation was, however, ultimately watered down in the Working Committee where Mr. Jinnah was given authority to mould the policy of the League as circumstances demanded and to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative to the present Federation scheme which would completely safeguard the interest of the Musalmans and other Minorities of India. The claim to speak for other Minorities is not a new one. There was a similar retreat from an uncompromising position in the case of resolution on

civil disobedience where the delegates of the United Provinces and Bihar pressed strongly for a definite decision in favour of civil disobedience. The debate led to many accusations against the Congress Governments, the chief objects of attack being the Vidya-Mandir Scheme, the Muslim Mass Contact Movement, *Bande Mataram*, the Congress National Flag and Hindi as a *lingua franca*. Charges of victimization and oppression were freely made; but there was an almost complete lack of specific grievances. In fact hardly any were mentioned with the exception of the incidents at Amin Ekaria and Tilokri in Bihar. These, as it happens, are singularly weak cases on which to attack the Congress Government, for in the Tilokri case the Hindus, who committed the outrage, were promptly prosecuted and 14 of them convicted and imprisoned; while in the Amin-Ekaria case the Mohammadans are making claims which even their own leaders do not support. They claim the right, not to perform sacrifice within their own houses or even their own village, but to kill cows at any time on the lands in a neighbouring village belonging to a Hindu. The debate engendered considerable excitement which was evidently embarrassing to the leaders. Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Premier of Bengal, went so far as to offer to resign his office if the League authorised *satyagraha* and even Sir Sikander Hyat Khan was moved to a speech sympathetic to the resolution. A public resolution authorizing *satyagraha* would obviously have been both awkward and dangerous and the Conference was ultimately induced to leave the decision in the hands of the Working Committee. It seems improbable that the Working Committee will be in any hurry to make such a decision, and one newspaper made the pertinent comment that the resolution as finally passed was like a pistol with the safety catch permanently fixed. Congress interference in the States led to another resolution in which the League declared that it could no longer stand aside if Congress intervention continued. This apparently was not popular with the delegates from Hyderabad who felt as much embarrassed by the prospect of League intervention as they are by that of the Congress. Two interesting features of the Conference were the attempt to form a radical or left wing group which may become a source of trouble to the League leaders and secondly a tendency towards the dictatorial methods of which the League has frequently accused the Congress High Command. This was evident in the resolution on Federation in which Mr. Jinnah was practically given plenary powers and in the debate on Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's promise of help to Great Britain in time of war. It was made clear that no member of the League would, in future, be permitted to give any promises without reference to the Council of the League.

2. The comments of the Bihar Press on the proceedings of the Conference were studiously moderate and the *Searchlight* sought to find encouragement in the increasing organization of the Muslims as a potential asset in the national struggle and emphasized points of agreement between the Musalmans and the Hindus rather than points of difference. It is, however, premature to judge what reaction the speeches will produce on the Hindu public. But the excitement produced by the Conference among the Musalmans of this Province cannot but be disquieting in view of the already unsettled communal atmosphere and the approach of the Bakr-Id festival; and the speeches at the Hindu Mahasabha Conference which was held simultaneously at Nagpur are not likely to improve matters. The resolution passed there in support of Federation can only tend to strengthen the suspicions in the Muslim League.

3. The League Conference was followed by a Conference of the Muslim Student's Federation at which Maulana Zafar Ali Khan made a very wild speech describing the Hindus as unfit to rule and the Mohammadans as the only possible rulers of India. The temperate tone of the All India Shia Conference, over which Sir Saiyid Reza Ali¹ presided, was in marked contrast.

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1. Sir Saiyid Reza Ali (1882-1949), Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1912, 1916 and 1920; took part in the Congress-League negotiations, 1916; Member, Council of State, 1921-26; President, All India Muslim League, Bombay Session December, 1924; Member, Public Service Commission, 1926-31; Member Government of India's deputation to South Africa, 1925-26; Agent General for India in South Africa, 1935-38; Kt., 1935. Member Legislative Assembly, 1939.

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Nehru to Gangaram Wazir¹

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IX, pp. 409-410

ALLAHABAD, 6 January, 1939

I am in receipt of your letter of the 19th December which I have read with care and interest. I have been taking interest in Kashmir affairs for several years and I have followed recent events there. I have read most of the relevant statements that have been issued, including those written by Professor Gulshan Rai. I have no desire to express opinions about matters with which I am insufficiently acquainted. But there are certain general principles applicable to all States in India, big or small. They apply to Kashmir as well as to Hyderabad.

I am afraid that your letter does not keep these principles in view. Professor Gulshan Rai's articles seem to me in conflict with them also and I found it impossible to agree with his conclusions, quite apart from what the facts might be.

It is quite clear to me that the time has come when the ideal of full responsible Government must be accepted by every State and immediate steps should be taken towards this end. I quite understand that these steps might vary in regard to particular States concerned, but they must be substantial steps.

I must condemn all attempts at violence and hooliganism by whomsoever committed and, if any printed posters have been issued as incitement to violence, I should be glad to see them.

The present position is that the State Government has applied Ordinances² which can only be described as monstrous. Any Government which uses such measures cannot claim the slightest indulgence. Further, a large number of people are in prison for political purposes.

I think it is correct to say that the popular movement in Kashmir was communal in its origin. I think it has undergone some change and is definitely seeking a wider platform. But even if it was communal it would not take away from the rightness of

the demand made by it. The fact that few Hindus have joined it does not redound to their credit or to their wisdom. By this communal policy the Hindus would injure themselves more than anyone else. The point is that a demand, if it is right, must be accepted whosoever makes it, and in a state like Kashmir, a popular movement must inevitably be predominantly Muslim, just as in Hyderabad a popular movement must largely be Hindu. It is curious that in both these States the popular movements are dubbed communal by the Governments. The right way to strengthen nationalism in Kashmir is for the Hindus to ally themselves fully with the popular movement and to seek to remove all blemishes from it.

Everyone must realise that the States are going to have responsible Government. If so, the obvious course for Minorities, even in order to protect themselves, is to line up with the popular movement.

I would very much like to visit Kashmir myself and I may do so in the future when an opportunity offers itself.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Gangaram Wazir (1883-1969); Served the Jammu and Kashmir Government in various capacities; President, Dogra Sabha, Jammu, for many years.
 2. An Ordinance, first enacted for a few days on 24 September, 1931 to enforce martial law was again promulgated on 1 June 1933 to suppress the popular movement. It vested the police with wide powers.

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Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. I, pp. 1-6

6 January, 1939

SECRET

NO. 30 G.B.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

4. Muslim League Session. The most important event in recent weeks has been the Muslim League Conference at Patna of which a very good account is given in the Chief Secretary's draft report for the second half of December. Many of their resolutions and discussions are of All India rather than Provincial importance, but I have carefully studied the reports of the Conference appearing in the local Press as well as some very interesting police reports and I feel that I must deal with the position at length. The Chairman of the Reception Committee was Mr. Abdul Aziz who was, as Your Excellency no doubt knows, a Minister just before the new Constitution started. He did not meet with much success in the

elections and there was keen rivalry between him and my "interim" Prime Minister Mr. Yunus. He has always been inclined to be fanatical, and his address at the opening of the Conference confirms me in this opinion. In his historical summary he referred to the "prominent part played by the Muslims in the memorable struggle for independence which took place in 1857." He next attacked the Nehru Report which made it clear to Musalmans that "the demand for independence by the sister community was nothing more than a cloak for wresting political power from the British for their own advancement to the exclusion of the other communities living in the country." He added: "The fear of the Musalmans that the Congress in reality wanted to establish a *Hindu Raj* in India in which the Military and external powers of the British would remain intact, while administrative and internal powers became vested in the Hindu majority which would set about reducing the Musalmans to a state of serfdom have been amply justified and confirmed." He went on to refer to socialism and the attempt to "reconstruct a united Indian nation by obliterating all religious differences," but concluded by stating that "socialism so far as Musalmans are concerned is definitely detrimental to their interests." He then made a statement which somewhat significantly forms a headline in our local Congress paper the *Searchlight*. "Muslims can never agree to merge their identity in an united nation."

5. More important, at least from my point of view, are the further references to "a few of the most glaring instances of the hardships and humiliations to which we are being subjected." He referred to Vidya Mandir Scheme which does not, as yet, affect Bihar so much as the Central Provinces; he mentioned the *Bande Mataram* song which I regard as a matter of minor importance; he went on to refer to the question of Urdu versus Hindi, which I regard as a question which should be capable of settlement. He then went on to deal with a point, which in view of the fact that the Bakr-Id is not far distant, is of great importance,—restriction on cow sacrifice. He referred to the Karachi resolution on fundamental rights and claimed that in accordance with that resolution, it is "the elementary right of every citizen to kill on his own land an animal belonging to him either for good or sacrificial purposes." He went on to point out that the Bihar Government has whittled down this right by enforcing this principle that cow sacrifice can only be allowed in places where the usage has existed in the past; these orders are, as Your Excellency will have seen from Stewart's report on the same line as those previously in force. This part of the speech recalls to my mind a discussion which I had with Mr. Aziz many years ago, when I was Commissioner; I then admitted that in theory this right was justifiable, but that in practice it was impossible to allow it because I had not enough police to prevent bloodshed! He then went on to refer to the "indiscriminate use of Section 144" but only referred to one minor incident in Monghyr where, as far as I know the facts, the use of this preventive measure was fully justified, for Muslims wished to carry out a sacrifice in a Hindu village. This case (The Amin-Ekaria case) is referred to in the official report. In the other case, the Tilokri case, as the official report shows, the attack has very little foundation. All this however is dangerous; the charges against the Congress Ministry are vague and indefinite and I, speaking from my experience

both of Bihar and the United Provinces, cannot see that any orders passed by Government have been really detrimental to Muslim interests.

6. This preliminary address paved the way for the resolution about "direct action": (I am very glad that these words were used in place of the words "*satyagraha*" or "civil disobedience;" we at least know how we stand with the Muslims and it was pretty clear from some speeches that "direct action" meant violence). That resolution started off by saying that "having regard to the atrocities that have been committed and to the fact that the elementary rights of Musalmans have been trampled upon in a systematic manner in Bihar, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces, direct action should be started if the Working Committee approved." It was moved by a United Provinces representative who failed to produce any specific instances whatever of atrocities. He was followed by a Bihar representative who referred to what I admit was a bad case of oppression of Muslim tenants by Hindu *zamindars*, but from my knowledge of the case, I cannot see that my Congress Government did anything unreasonable; the zamindars were prosecuted and convicted. Next came a speaker from the Central Provinces who referred to the Vidya Mandir and *Bande Mataram* policy of that Government and went on to say that the District Boards and Municipalities were being so managed that Muslims might not get beef anywhere in the market. A bill was, he understood, pending in the Legislature which could make the killing of a cow impossible in that Province. Wylie may know about this.

7. Next came the Prime Minister of the Punjab, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and he, much to my astonishment and regret, seems to have accepted the view that the grievances and complaints of the Muslims in these Congress Provinces were fully justified. He apparently considered that the exercise by Governors of this special power was improbable and concluded by saying that "if worst came to the worst, the Muslims would have to be prepared for civil war."

8. The next speaker was Mr. Fazlul Huq, Prime Minister of Bengal, who was inclined to differ from Sir Sikander as to the use of the Governor's powers, but he too concluded by assuring his audience that he would support a civil disobedience movement. A Press comment on his speech is that his style was mellowed owing to Sir Sikander's influence! Representatives of other Provinces made similar complaints of oppression, while the speaker from the North-West Frontier Province made a very vigorous attack on Congress and Mr. Gandhi.

9. I have analysed this report at somewhat undue length, but it may be useful to you and certainly to me to have it on record. These speeches had been subjected to much criticism in the Press. The *Indian Observer* in the *Statesman* last Sunday rightly remarked that though Congress Governments may have committed mistakes, there was not the least ground for holding that they had deliberately adopted an anti-Minority policy. My Government recently published in the Press statistics showing that Muslims had got a fair share of all appointments which confirmed the impression which I had formed. In local bodies Muslims are less well-placed and in the United Provinces in particular I was informed that all appointments were decided on communal lines.

10. I have seen some interesting confidential reports about the Session and

from these it may be inferred that some extremists wanted the right to start direct action to be left to the Provinces concerned. Jinnah was said to be afraid of this because it was bound to lead to violence or even civil war. It may well have been that Sir Sikander supported the resolution leaving the decision to the Working Committee because he felt that this would lessen the risk of direct action being started. I doubt myself whether we have direct action on a large scale, but these speeches make me very apprehensive of a good deal of local trouble at the time of the Bakr-Id. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Henry Craik in the hope that he can elucidate his Premier's action. I hope also to get some information from my Muslim friends in Bihar.

11. To refer to the other resolutions, it looked at first as if the "Pakistan" idea was to be pushed (vide my reference to Aziz's speech at the end of paragraph 4). I hear that one member of the Subjects Committee (Jafar Ali Khan) had drafted a resolution on Pakistan, but the milder resolution accepted was drafted by Jinnah and Sir Sikander, and the reference to the possibility of exploring another "suitable alternative" was inserted to placate Sind North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. It is said that Jinnah will be satisfied if Muslims get one-third of the Federal Cabinet posts and if the States do not elect but nominate their representatives; Baluchistan should be given reforms and representation, and Waziristan should be made a separate State also with representation. Military, Foreign Affairs and Finance should be under the Federation. Again as in the case of direct action, the final decision is left to the Central Command.

12. In regard to Palestine there is said to have been a very heated discussion in the Subjects Committee and it is stated that Jinnah restrained with difficulty the passions of those who were for offering "*Jihad*." It was explained to the firebrands that the first essential was to concentrate on putting their own house in order, before dissipating their energy, on Palestine agitation. As I have observed before, when Muslims are confronted with problems of more immediate interest in their own country, they are not likely to pay much attention to affairs elsewhere, but the speeches and discussions on Palestine evoked a lot of passion.

13. The real danger of the situation seems to me to lie in the fact that the passions have been aroused by this Session; Jinnah and Sir Sikander may have done much to tone down the resolutions; but all Muslims are at heart fanatical. The resolutions of the Hindu Mahasabha Conference tend to emphasize the deep-seated differences between the two communities and any incident may result in an explosion. Here in Bihar we can never forget the Shahabad riots of 1916, and I feel that we may have a lot of trouble at the Bakr-Id, which occurs on February 1st.



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*C. Rajagopalachari to Sardar Patel**Sardar Patel Papers, F. I 40-1/1939*

BAZLULLAH ROAD, THYAGARAYANAGAR, MADRAS, 7 January, 1939

My dear Vallabhbhai,

2. I am sorry I am not able to go to Bardoli. I am sending a note on the subject of Hindu-Muslim proposals, draft of which was sent to me by Kripalani.

Yours sincerely,
C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

Sri Vallabhbhai Patel,
BARDOLI.

Enclosure :

Notes on Gandhiji's Confidential draft.¹

C. Rajagopalachari.

I agree to No. 1.

No. 2 I have grave difficulties in regard to No. 2. I do not know if the full effect of this formula has been realised by the framers or whether I have understood it correctly and have not exaggerated its intention. The consequences which I object to are as follows:

(a) Even where in a Province there is not appreciable Muslim population on which a just claim for special representation in the Cabinet can be made, it will become necessary under this formula to have a Muslim member.

(b) It will follow from this formula that the Muslim member of the Cabinet can never be a Congressman, but shall be a Muslim League man even though there are numbers of very good and worthy Musalmans in the Congress party. The largest Muslim group being always non-Congress, this will result in practically wiping out Muslims from the Congress and creating just the position which Mr. Jinnah most unreasonably demanded, namely that the nation should be divided into two parts for political purposes, Muslim League and Congress, with anti-Congress elements bargaining with either side as occasion demands. This will be an intolerable position and will shatter all hopes of progress towards independence.

(c) It is true that a condition is attached that the man selected from the largest Muslim group should accept the Congress programme and discipline while he remains in the Cabinet. This formula of a condition-precedent will have no practical effect. It will mean either hypocrisy or irresistible further agitation for relaxation. Once we accept the principle that the largest Muslim group should be represented irrespective of known opposition to Congress we cannot resist the claim that the member chosen should really represent it and not be a Congress proselyte for the purpose of getting office. I have no doubt in my mind that the condition will be found unworkable in a genuine manner, and will lead to the abolition of the condition before very long, the result being that in all Congress Provinces even though Congress succeeds in getting a complete majority and will count in its ranks more and more Musalmans in course of time, we are doomed forever to coalition cabinets between Muslim League and Congress. Further agitation will be concentrated on increasing the numbers and abolishing illogical conditions. The Christian and other communities will soon follow up with agitation for similar arrangements and Cabinets will become frankly communal. I am of opinion, therefore, that the proposed formula is disastrous.

No. 3. This is about proportion in the services. All Provinces are struggling to maintain efficiency

and at the same time to do their best to give a just proportion to the Minorities. If Congress formally adopts a formula of this kind, it will lead to greater difficulties in arriving at compromises and tempering the pace in the interest of efficiency. I would, therefore, respectfully urge that this formula should be modified somewhat as follows:

"That the Congress approves of the efforts made in all Provinces to reach the just proportion that Minority communities are entitled to in the distribution of posts subject to the over-riding claims of merit and efficiency and past service of individuals."

It may be mentioned, for information, that in our Province a very rigorous communal rotation and ratio is observed in most departments and it has given satisfaction to all reasonable people. It has been in operation for the last more than fifteen years. But the rule applies only to fresh appointments and does not apply to promotions of those once entertained when they go up to superior grades and categories.

It will be intolerable to allow the communal principle to effect anything more than the first recruitment. The formula enunciated in the draft does not refer to this principle, of detail, but as it is drafted it is sure to mislead and become a starting point for an agitation to apply the communal principles to promotions also which would be fraught with much evil.

No. 5. I do not quite see why there should not be coalition Ministries in Provinces where the Congress is in a Minority, but not in a bad Minority, if we concede the coalition principle where the Muslims are in a Minority.

No. 8. This formula appears to me most dangerous. The terms of the formula also are unworkable for it would be difficult to say before an election whether the voters themselves desire to be represented by Congress candidates or not. This will lead to fruitless and bitter controversy. If worked, it will result in what Mr. Jinnah wanted, namely, in dividing the country into Muslim League and Congress and once for all making it impossible for any Muslims to join the Congress.

No. 10. While I agree that this is absolutely unobjectionable as it is framed, I must say that I believe it will lead to no good now, but much fresh trouble. I feel that people understand the position thoroughly and there is no need for any fresh experience on the subject, and I believe such experiences lead to trouble even where none exists.

No. 11, 12 & 13. I am certainly in agreement, but these concessions will not save the situation. We may act up to this formulae ourselves, but if we set them forth as concessions they will only become points for further agitation and will make no gain for peace. On the other hand, the concessions may give rise to a weakening of Hindu psychology and produce depression all around. I am, however, in entire agreement and would like all Congressmen to follow these instructions in regard to points covered by 11, 12, and 13.

1. The reference is obviously to Gandhi's draft on the Minorities. See No. 342 *infra*.

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Venkatesh Tiwary¹ to Sardar Patel

Sardar Patel Papers, File No. I-40.1/1939

COUNCIL CHAMBER, LUCKNOW, 7 January, 1939

Dear Sardar Sahib,

I understand that the Working Committee at Bardoli is likely to take into consideration the Hindu-Muslim problem as it affects those Provinces where Congress Governments are functioning. As regards one of them—my own Province—I am taking the liberty of submitting herewith for your information the concrete proposals

which, in my opinion, if adopted are likely to go a long way in bringing about a change for the better. In support of my proposals, please find enclosed statistical data compiled in a tabular form.

With apologies for encroaching upon your valuable time and assurance of deep respects.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-)

Enclosure

Proposals:

1. As regards Hindi-Urdu controversy, Government should issue a declaration recognising both Hindi and Urdu languages as well as both scripts as official language and scripts and issue necessary instructions (which must be rigidly enforced) that all Government servants must be proficient in reading and writing in both forms of the script and in the use of both the languages.

Note: It is a mistake to treat U.P. as a unilingual Province. It is a bilingual Province and this fact must be faced. Our Muslim friends fear that the Congress Ministry and its Hindu following are trying to replace Urdu by Hindi. If an authoritative assurance on the above lines is given by Government, they will be satisfied. They are not against recognition being accorded to Hindi; on the other hand, they would favour or at any rate not oppose the ban against Hindi being removed, provided that the removal of the ban on Hindi does not imply an interdict being placed on Urdu.

2. As regards communal representation in public services the spokesmen of the Minority communities should be asked to tell us whether they want the formula adopted by the Government of India in this matter to be applied in these Provinces, or they would prefer the Punjab or the Bengal formula to be adopted.

Note: Hindus should not take the responsibility upon themselves of putting forward any definite proportions. The Government of India as well as the Governments of the Punjab and Bengal are non-Congress Governments. No Muslim has accused the Government of India of being actuated by anti-Muslim bias; and the Premiers of Bengal and the Punjab are described as the pillars of the Muslim League. Both these gentlemen have times out of number taken credit for treating their Minorities with extraordinary generosity. Therefore, it appears to me, if the choice is left to the Muslims or Christians of the United Provinces to decide for themselves whether they would like the problem of communal representation in services in U.P. to be tackled on the lines followed or recommended by the Government of India and the Punjab Government or the Coalition Party in the Legislative Assembly of Bengal and their decision on the point is given effect to by the Government of U.P. our position in that case would become unassailable. If we give to the Minorities in the U.P. what has been granted by the Muslim majority to their Minorities in the Punjab or Bengal with the consent, it appears, of the spokesmen belonging to the various Minority communities, excepting the caste Hindu community of Bengal neither the Muslims nor the Indian Christians of U.P. can have a word to say in protest against such a course.

LIST OF CANDIDATES OFFERING HINDI AND URDU IN THE HIGH SCHOOL EXAMINATION

Year	Total number of candidates appeared	No. of candidates taking Hindi	No. of candidates taking Urdu	Percentage of	
				Hindi	Urdu
1938	13, 091	7, 439	5,652	56.8	43.2

LIST OF CANDIDATES OFFERING HINDI AND URDU IN THE
INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION

Year	Total number of candidates appeared	No. of candidates taking Hindi	No. of candidates taking Urdu	Percentage of	
				Hindi	Urdu
1938	1,887	1,153	734	61.6	38.4

A Note on Communal Representation in Services

Community	Percentage of the total population	Percentage of posts reserved for each community
1. THE PUNJAB :		
Muslims	57	50
Sikhs	13	20
Hindus	27)	
Other Minorities +3) =	30	30
2. BENGAL		
Muslims	55	60
Scheduled Castes	18	20
Caste Hindus	25)	
Other Minorities +2) =	27	20
3. GOVT OF INDIA		
Muslims	25.4	25
Other Minorities	6	8.33

The Punjab and the India formulae are being given effect to by the respective Governments, while the Government of Bengal have not yet declared their policy. The proportions relating to Bengal, given above, are taken from a resolution adopted by the Bengal Legislative Assembly on August 27, 1938.

It will be seen that the Govt. of India have guaranteed to the Muslims of British India representation in services strictly on the population basis, but given weightage of 33 per cent to other Minorities over what they would have got on the population basis. The excess of 33 per cent is to be accounted for by the special concern of the British Government for safeguarding the privileged position of the Anglo-Indian community in the Railways, Telegraph and Postal departments.

If we examine the Punjab formula, we find—

1. That the majority gets 12.2 per cent less than what is entitled to on the population basis, while the minorities, other than the Sikhs, have been guaranteed representation in services strictly on the basis of population and

2. that the Sikhs are given a weightage of a little over 50 per cent.

If the scheme put forward by the Bengal Coalition Party is adopted by the Bengal Government then the majority in Bengal will get more than what it can claim on the population basis. As regards the Minority communities in that Province, only the Scheduled Castes have been given a weightage of 8 per cent while the caste Hindus and other minorities will get representation in services in proportion to their numerical strength.

A study of the above formulae discloses the fact that Minorities, barring exceptions, have not been given, either in Bengal and the Punjab or by the Government of India, representation in services in excess of what they are entitled to on the population basis. Bengal would show a special solicitude for the majority community while the Punjab is content with a little less for the majority community and the surplus thus released has been handed over, on political grounds, to the Sikhs.

In the U.P. the relative strength of the various communities is as follows:

Muslims	14.84 per cent
Other Minorities	.52 per cent
Scheduled Castes	22 per cent (nearly)
Caste Hindus	62.64 per cent

In my opinion, communal representation in services in these Provinces should be on the following basis:

Muslims and other Minorities should be given 20 per cent, while an attempt should be made to secure to the members of the Scheduled Castes representation upto 25 per cent. Caste Hindus in that case will get only 55 per cent. But this will be the ultimate figure. So long as the lamentable backwardness of the Scheduled Castes persists, the Caste Hindus will continue to fill the posts which would otherwise have gone to the members of the Scheduled Castes. In order to hasten the recruitment in increasing numbers of the members of the Scheduled Castes, I suggest that the Provincial Government should adopt special measures for encouraging higher education among these communities. I would, with this object in view, announce the award of scholarships for the members of these castes on the lines noted below:

<i>No. of Scholarships</i>	<i>Value of each scholarship</i>	<i>For students reading in classes</i>
100	Rs.20 p.m.	Matriculation
80	Rs.25 p.m.	Intermediate
60	Rs.30 p.m.	B.A.
40	Rs.35 p.m.	M.A.

In addition, I will award another 50 scholarships of adequate value for students belonging to these castes, who wish to enter either the Roorke Engineering College or the King George's Medical College or other similar institutions for training. Award of these scholarships should, in the first instance, be limited to a period of 10 years, on the expiry of which the matter might be reviewed and such action taken as, in the circumstances then prevailing may be considered appropriate. In the case of the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, no maximum age limit should be insisted upon. If such candidates of the prescribed age are not forthcoming in sufficient number then I would remove the age-bar. Our object should be to recruit every year as many candidates of these castes as possible, provided that they are otherwise qualified. Further, I would not insist, in the case of such candidates, on selection being made by the means of a competitive examination. For some years to come, recruitment of such candidates for public services should be by nomination. If this plan is adopted, I am sure the Scheduled Castes will in the near future succeed in securing adequate representation in public services.

1. He is probably identical with Venkatesh Narain Tiwari; Parliamentary Secretary, United Provinces, 1937-39.



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*Pant to Nehru**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, No. 79*

LUCKNOW, 8 January, 1939

My dear Jawaharlal Ji,

Acharya Kripalani sent me a copy of Mahatmaji's draft of the communal policy of the Congress which is to be discussed by the Working Committee at Bardoli. As our Assembly is in Session I cannot absent myself from Lucknow continuously for a week. It is moreover hardly necessary for me to go to Bardoli since you will be there.

I have sent Acharya Kripalani, as desired by him, a memorandum of my views on the draft, a copy of which I enclose.

Trust this finds you all right.

Yours affectionately,

G.B. PANT

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Sahib,
Anand Bhawan, ALLAHABAD.

Enclosure

Congress Policy on the Hindu-Muslim Question

I appreciate the view that the Congress should declare its policy on communal matters and that it should not worry for any reciprocity or mutual give and take. It should do what is just and fair irrespective of the attitude of the vocal section of other communities. Congress Ministries will, I have no doubt, greatly welcome the instructions of the Working Committee on this ticklish question. The Working Committee will, I am sure, consider whether this is the most opportune moment for a general declaration of policy on communal matters. It is just possible that such a declaration may perhaps be misunderstood and even misinterpreted in certain quarters.

1. This briefly enunciates the Congress policy. The Congress does not accept the award, but a solution can be found only by means of a settlement reached by mutual consent. There can be no alternative to the award until such an agreement is reached.

2. I am afraid that I do not fully grasp the full import and implications of this. Is the Muslim member thus chosen expected to maintain his connexion with the group to which he originally belonged even after his appointment as a Minister? I am not sure if this will always be feasible. The policy of that group as defined in its election manifesto may be different from that of the Congress. It may even be opposed to the Congress programme in certain respects. A member elected on such a ticket will find it difficult to accept the Congress programme or to shift his loyalty from his own party to the Congress even though it be only for the time he works as a member of the Cabinet. I do not feel hopeful that in the present circumstances any member will be allowed by the largest Muslim group to join the Cabinet on these terms. Apart from public considerations, personal ambitions and animosities may further complicate matters. If a member joins the Cabinet in his own personal capacity he will probably be disowned by the group and his action may even be regarded as a betrayal of his own party. I may, however, make it clear that we will have no objection to the admission of any such individual on the terms mentioned if he is otherwise suitable.

3. In our own Province the Minorities are over-represented in important public services. We have been recruiting almost double the number to which the Muslims are entitled on the population basis. On

account of the emphasis which is being constantly laid on the communal questions and proportions the Hindus here have a growing feeling that they are not receiving their due share in services.

4. The Muslims as a class are educationally more advanced than others in this Province. Still we are giving them every assistance in this respect.

5, 6 and 7. These concern the Provinces in which the Congress is in a Minority. If it is intended that in such Provinces the Congress should not assume the responsibility of office but that Congressmen should support the most advanced and incorruptible group I myself think that that would be the best policy. This is, however, primarily the concern of other Provinces and their wishes will no doubt be fully considered by the Working Committee.

8. This presents some difficulty. It may mean that the Congress should not put up any candidate if his success is not reasonably assured. I am not sure if this is the intention. In any case I do not see how the wishes or the preference of the voters can be ascertained definitely before the election. Where the Muslims in a particular constituency overwhelmingly belong to the Congress one may be justified in holding that the test prescribed in this formula has been fulfilled, otherwise one will have to wait for the result. I doubt if it will be fair to impose an embargo of this type on the Muslims belonging to the Congress. If this principle is accepted, no Muslim member of the Congress can serve the public through the Legislature. It may place the Congress at a disadvantage. If all its members in the legislatures belong exclusively to one faith or if all Minorities are returned in the name and on behalf of other bodies it will cease to be a national organization. At least in the Legislatures the Congress party will look more a sectional than a national body. I hope that this matter will be carefully considered.

9. It is not necessary to lay any emphasis on the Muslim mass contact. The Congress aspires to represent the masses of India regardless of caste or creed. While it is desirable that the Congress should serve the Muslims constructively I hope that every facility and encouragement will be given to those who wish to join the Congress or offer to do so.

10. A suggestion has sometimes been made that the inherent rights should not be restricted by custom and that complete freedom should be given to different communities to enjoy and exercise their rights freely. But this is not a feasible proposition and in cases in which the rights are conflicting their simultaneous exercise is bound to lead to embarrassing consequences. I personally think that in the present circumstances there is no alternative to the course prescribed in this paragraph. Its language will presumably be further examined and, if necessary, revised.

11. I have no objection. I find, however, that Muslims generally resent the use of Sanskrit expressions and by Hindustani they ordinarily mean only the high flown Urdu spoken in places like Lucknow and Delhi.

12. This is all right so far as it goes. The Committee might like to suggest some other national songs such as—"Hindustan Hamara," "Jai He" as equally suitable. I have no doubt that "*Bande Mataram*" has taken deep roots and will continue to hold the field.

13. I agree that the National Flag should not be hoisted wherever there is any real opposition.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 3, pp. 2-5

10 January, 1939

SECRET

NO. U.P. 213

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

6. The other Christmas conference, the effects of which are likely to be very

marked in this Province (the United Provinces), was that of the All India Muslim League at Patna. I need not comment on that at length, but I think it is bound to lead to an accentuation of what I have already described as aggressive leadership of the Muslims in this Province. The development is entirely in accordance with my anticipations. Unless the Congress are prepared to come to terms with the Muslim League, I think the communal situation is bound to deteriorate steadily. The Muslims, I should judge, are losing patience and losing temper. They are not prepared indefinitely to remain a minority without influence on the policy of the Government. On the other hand, I see no signs at present of the Congress being prepared to make terms and in effect enter into an alliance with the Muslim League. Pant, when he took office, was I believe very definitely in favour of this line, but the policy in this matter is an all—India one—and Jawaharlal Nehru threw his weight decisively against it. I doubt very much whether he has changed his views. Actually during the last few months, the communal situation in the Province has been reasonably quiet, but we are now coming on to the difficult festivals, the Bakr-Id and the Muharram, and I think we shall be fortunate if we finish the cold weather without serious trouble somewhere and perhaps in several places.

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Ramazanali to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 824/57-61

3, TRAPP ROAD, LAHORE, 11 January, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

In this letter I propose to address you on an important matter, which has been agitating the members of the Council of the All India Muslim League at Patna viz. the launching of civil disobedience against the Congress Governments for the redress of the grievances of Musalmans. After a heated discussion the Council as well as the League adopted a resolution authorising the Working Committee to take direct action against the Congress Governments if and when necessary.

Speeches were made both in the Subjects Committee and in the open session of the League in favour of the resolution. The details of the cruelties and of the oppression perpetrated on Musalmans in the Congress-governed Provinces were described graphically by the various speakers and a strong case was made out for passing the resolution, as was put up by you in the Subjects Committee.

While narrating the particulars of the atrocities perpetrated on the Musalmans some of the speakers referred to the right of the Musalmans to slaughter cows on the Bakr-Id and on other occasions and related how the right to slaughter cows had been denied by resort to Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while in other places the right was denied on the ground that the Musalmans should first establish their right by a decree of a competent civil court.

The question of the right of slaughtering cows has assumed serious proportions on account of certain developments in the U.P., where Maulvi Mohammad Farooq M.L.A., Maulvi Mohammad Rizwan, M.L.A. and several others have been sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment by a Magistrate of Gorakhpur for slaughtering a cow in Zahidabad on the last Bakr-Id. In his judgment the Magistrate held that the action of the accused was not illegal from the religious point of view, but they had to be called to account in view of the danger to peace and order, which their action involved. Other persons will probably come forward and court imprisonment in order to assert their right to slaughter cows.

A leading article has appeared in the local *Zamindar* daily (of the 10th January 1939) in which the view has been expressed that the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League should not neglect its duty, that if on this occasion the Patna resolution is not put into action the passion of the Congress Government for vengeance will exceed the bounds of moderation and that the U.P. Government will consider the resolution in question as a verbal threat only and will practice oppression on the Musalmans as much as lies in its power. Further on the hope is expressed that the Working Committee can at the utmost wait for the result of the appeal of the convicts and that if the High Court upholds the order of the subordinate court, there will be only two courses open to the Muslim League. It can either launch civil disobedience and save God's law from wrong interpretation or advise the U.P. Musalmans to become walking graves of religious zeal. Further the Muslim League is warned to remain ready for the time when it will be called upon to act.

It is clear that a situation will sooner or later arise when the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League will be called upon to consider and decide whether civil disobedience should be launched against the Congress Governments regarding the denial of the right to slaughter cows to Musalmans. I, therefore, take the liberty of expressing my view on this intricate subject in which passions have been greatly inflamed on both sides and shall be grateful if these views are considered along with those of others before the Working Committee comes to a decision on this matter.

I would like to say in the beginning that I entirely agree with the resolution as passed in the open session of the All India Muslim League and would not alter a single word of it. I am however strongly of the opinion that it will be most undesirable for the Working Committee to launch civil disobedience in order to assert the right of Musalmans to slaughter cows on the Bakr-Id and on other occasions and I give my reasons for this opinion in the succeeding paragraphs.

It is not compulsory for Musalmans under the Islamic Law to slaughter cows on the Bakr-Id. They have before them the alternative of slaughtering other animals, to which Hindus raise no objection. Therefore, to insist on slaughtering cows when other animals are available for slaughter and especially to launch civil disobedience in order to assert the right of slaughtering cows would be a most unwise step.

Musalmans have to live in India with many other communities among which the Hindus are the most predominant community in respect of population, wealth and education. It is most essential that nothing be done if possible which may inflame the passions or provoke the anger of the other communities, which inhabit this country. The Hindu holds the cow in great respect. He almost worships it. He becomes simply

mad if he sees a cow slaughtered. This peculiar characteristic of the Hindu is universal from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. In the Punjab a few drops of the cow's urine are sometimes drunk on auspicious occasions. The busy housewife and the devout shopkeeper plaster the floor of the kitchen and the shop daily with cow-dung. This article is placed along with several others before the Brahmin when he recites his mantras on ceremonial occasions. In these circumstances if the Musalmans and the Hindus have to live together peacefully, it is necessary for the Musalmans to abstain from wounding the deepseated sentiments of the Hindus by slaughtering cows and to substitute in place of these other animals for the annual sacrifice. This view is not original and has been expounded before by several theologians (e.g. Khwaja Hassan Nizami) who from the point of view of Islam see not the slightest objection to the substitution of other animals for the cows for the purpose of the sacrifice.

During the discussion of the resolution in the Subjects Committee the argument was advanced by several speakers that Musalmans being poor could not afford to buy any meat other than beef. Great stress was laid on the poverty of the Musalmans and their consequent inability to buy meat other than beef. This argument does not appear to be convincing. The Musalmans who eat beef generally belong to the lower strata of society, but these Musalmans are not poorer than the Hindus of the same class. If the Hindus can do without eating beef, the Musalmans of the same class should be able to do the same, only if they make an earnest effort to do so.

The Musalmans have during their history of 14 centuries often shown generosity and magnanimity to the other peoples of this globe and have thus shed lustre and honour on their name. It is open to them at this critical stage in the history of India to win the hearts of Hindus by deliberately abandoning the cow for sacrificial purposes. If the Hindus respond by showing generosity in equal measure towards the Musalmans in matters which are the subject of dispute between the two communities, the march of this country towards freedom will be greatly accelerated. Even if there is no response from the Hindus, the Musalmans of India will have done a thing, which their posterity will always remember with pride and which will be a shining example of the sacrifice made by 90 millions of Musalmans in order to avoid the wounding of deep rooted sentiments of a sister community.

From a talk which I had with a Minister of the Bihar Government while at Patna it transpired that the principle which guided the local Government in the matter was the same as had been accepted before the present Congress Government came into power viz. that the cows could be slaughtered where a practice to that effect was proved to have existed and that the obstacle in the way of the removal of the ban on the slaughter of cows was the difficulty of maintaining order in the event of riots and murders as a result of the frenzy of mobs in outlying and distant places, where considerable harm might be done by way of destruction of life and property before the arrival of the police or the Military.

I doubt very much whether we shall be able to get the world opinion and sympathy for our side in case we launch civil disobedience in order to assert our right to slaughter Cows. Any movement without the world opinion at the back of it cannot be expected to be attended with fruitful results.

In this letter, I have confined myself only to those aspects of the problem which are

concerned with the relations of the Musalmans with the Hindus, as a wider discussion would be wholly unnecessary for the purposes of this letter.

Yours sincerely,
 RAMZANALI
 (Member of the Council
 of the All India Muslim League)

To
 M.A. JINNAH Esq.,
 Bar-at-Law, M.L.A. (Central)
 and President All India Muslim League.

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F.K. Khan Durrani¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 868/100

13 January, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Mr. Ispahani sent you a typed copy of my Pamphlet "Our National Goal" last December. I hope you have read it. I am very anxious to have your opinion on it. I would have asked you to write a preface for it, but I am afraid I must go without it. It may not be politic for you to agree with me, and if you disagree it will hurt the cause I am fighting for. I have no money at present to publish it with. I am looking around for necessary financial support and as soon as I get it the booklet will be published. I intend to broadcast it. In the meantime I shall be glad to know your reactions to it.

I shall be obliged if you kindly give me a brief note of the conditions on which the League would be prepared to enter into a settlement with the Congress. This will enable me to write a pamphlet on the subject for public education in which I shall incorporate your views as well. I have been thinking long for approaching you on this subject and I hope you will not disappoint me unless you have any special reasons not to say anything on the subject.

Yours sincerely,
 F.K. KHAN DURRANI

P.S. Don't you think it will be useful in awakening national....

1. F.K. Khan Durrani, belonged to district Hoshiarpur, Punjab; joined the Ahmadiya community; and sent as missionary to England, West Indies and Germany, 1920; Imam of the Ahmadiyya mosque, Berlin for some years; founded Tabligh Literature Society, 1930; Founder-Editor, *Truth Weekly*; author of several books.

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*Raghib Ahsan¹ to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 204/23*

8, ZAKARIA STREET, CALCUTTA, 14 January, 1939

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your kind letter dated Bombay 9th January, 1939 which was placed before the Executive of the Calcutta Muslim League. I have been directed by the Committee to further elucidate our point of view. Please permit us to explain our viewpoint on the general question of the League *vis-a-vis*, the Muslim backward classes and sects.

We are glad that you understood us right and appreciated our point. We are deadly against "caste" representation in principle. There can be no two opinions on this question.

Yet the actual facts and realities of the situation: the imperative need of Muslim National solidarity founded on the goodwill and cooperation of all Muslim sections; great importance of tact and political diplomacy at this juncture faced as we are by a formidable enemy commanding enormous resources of men, money, Press Publicity, propaganda and tactics; the vast numerical strength of the Momins in the rural economy of Bengal, Bihar, U.P., C.P. and other parts of India, which makes the Momin question one of special importance and urgency as evidenced by the Congress Governments special attention to them; the unfortunate accident that members of almost all major sections of the Muslims, barring the Momins, already happen to be on the League Executive, (by sheer merit of course), the difficulties of League work amongst the masses which have been increased and intensified thousandfold by the deliberate counter schemes launched by the Congress Governments to divide Muslims and separate Momins and Shias from the general body of Muslims in political matters, all these circumstances have compelled us to offer the suggestion that while always keeping intact the principle of merit, efficiency and loyalty to the League, the League should also give some consideration to the weakness of the Muslim society and to the feelings of the big and important sections of the Muslims in matters of nominations, elections or appointments.

We quite agree that you should consider the particular suggestion on the merits of the individual name or names. That is all right. In fact that is the only thing to do. We, however, all know that under conditions prevailing in India "pure" democracy can never be successful if it disregards the hard realities of the peculiar Indian Sociology which have necessitated special constitutional measures for securing fair deal to the various sections of the Indian population. Unfortunately, the Indian Muslim Nationality although quite distinct from Hinduism, is no more unitary in composition than the Indian population. It is a heterogeneous, federal and composite social phenomenon. Indian Muslims are suffering from all the evils of the pernicious caste system and sectarian disorders of Hinduism. The phenomenon of "ASHRAF and AJLAF"—the

higher and lower Muslim castes—is known to every student of the Indian Census Reports and Indian sociology. These are facts which can neither be denied nor altered at will overnight.

Now what should be the principles which should guide our policy with regard to this social phenomenon? We can (no) more afford to altogether ignore these facts of Muslim sociology than the Indian Constitution can afford to ignore the facts of Indian sociology, namely, the existence of castes, classes and communities.

Let us be honest, courageous and broad-minded enough in meeting the situation in the statesmanlike way and in the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood and idealism.

The Muslim League, which rightly stands for the entire good of the entire Muslim Nation, in India, in my opinion should adopt the following, essential, vital and complimentary principles in its dealings with the various castes and sects of the Muslims and particularly their backward classes.

1. First and foremost is solidarity. The Muslim League should oppose caste representation, as such, in principle. No caste-man can claim representation merely on ground of his being a member of a particular caste. No caste or sect can claim “proportional” representation. This would be disastrous for the unity and the political solidarity of the Muslim nation in India.

This we may call the Principle of Integrity.

The Principle of Integrity, however, should not be allowed to degenerate, in practice, into a mere cover for the monopoly of powers and positions of the higher classes. This is a real danger to guard against in India, the land of castes and caste monopolies. Muslim society and the Muslim League is not immune from this danger.

2. Secondly, the Muslim League, should in “practice” although not in “theory,” adopt the policy of acting in such a way and constituting its committees in such a manner, that all agitations for sectional representations should die natural deaths. The League while following the Principle of Integrity, can easily break the backbone of caste claims by showing practical and “special” sympathy with the backward and poor classes.

We as practical men should recognise that there are millions of Muslims in villages in India who under the influence of medieval Hinduism have been materially segregated, socially separated and culturally cut off from the higher Muslim castes; they have been looked down upon and branded as “low castes” merely for their particular descent and “manual” professions; they have been ill-treated by high caste Muslims; they have been subjected to harsh discriminations, oppressions and economic disabilities; they are socially and educationally very backward and they stand in need of “special” encouragements and “special” measure and “special” endeavours for their upliftment and dissolution.

This we may call the Principle of “Upliftment.”

Requirements of the principle of Integrity: The principle of Integrity will require that all League members should be bound by a pledge to oppose caste cries and sectarian slogans at times of elections and appointments. It is essential, therefore, that one of the conditions of the membership of the Muslim League should be the signing of a pledge to always keep the ideals and interests of Islam and the Muslim League above the interests of self, family, caste, sect or group.

Requirements of the principle of Upliftment: The principle of upliftment will require that in all matters concerning the selection of candidates for elections and appointments, the League policy while keeping the principle of integrity as its sheet-anchor should be guided by the following considerations:

Sympathetic encouragements: (1) Firstly that the League should encourage, as far as possible, and in as many cases as practicable, those able and influential candidates of the backward classes whose loyalty and services to the League are beyond doubt, even though they may be somewhat inferior in comparison with other candidates. The underlined proviso indicates that this should not be allowed to exclude first-class men of outstanding merits. The claims of first-class merits should always override all other claims. (2) Secondly, the President of the All India Muslim League, in consultation with its Executive should issue a circular to all Provincial, District, Sub-Divisional Leagues to make it a point to associate, as far as possible, with the League Committees, the tried and influential *Sardars* and the leaders of the backward Muslim classes on their merits, of course, but with a set purpose, and with the objects in view of: (A) facilitating League Mass contact work, on the one hand; and (B) giving a lift to the backward sections, who require the helping hand of the League for their upliftment (uplift), on the other, and (C) creating opportunities for the various castes, classes and sections of the Muslims of working shoulder to shoulder on the common League platform and thereby effecting their fraternalization through the physical and natural influences both of team work and team spirit. (3) Thirdly, the President of the All India Muslim League, in consultation with its Executive, should issue instructions to the Provincial League Committees to take special steps to study and investigate the economic conditions, social disabilities and educational difficulties of the backward and professional classes of Muslims, in the different Provinces, to collect data; and then to take special measures for their uplift and reform, on Islamic lines, and to report the results of their enquiries and work in this connection to the All India Muslim League for publication in the Bulletin of the All India Muslim League for general information and necessary coordinating action by the Centre.

If the League through your influence (achieve) these dual and complimentary principles of Integrity and upliftment we are confident that all Congress manoeuvre, money and propoganda to divide the Muslims will be futile and the League will not become only an irresistible mass organisation capable of meeting on equal terms, Hindu Fascism and British Imperialism but also at the same time break the backbone of the social problem of the Indian Muslims by practically unifying their castes, classes and sects on a common platform. Common work on common platform engenders a common mind.

True policy of Islamic solidarity: We fail to conceive any other way of meeting the situation and solving the problem. We believe that this policy of work, namely, the tempering of the principle of the integrity of the Indian Muslim nation by the practical considerations of the upliftment of her backward classes, is as much the true policy of the solidarity of Islam as you claim the League policy is the true policy of nationalism in India.

We are confident that you are the one and the only man who can successfully enforce this social policy and programme of the Muslim League.

I apologise for the length of the letter and hope that you will give your sympathetic consideration to its content.

Yours faithfully,
RAGHIB AHSAN

Add :
RAGHIB AHSAN, M.A.
General Secretary
The Calcutta Muslim League
8, Zakariah Street, Calcutta.

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1. Raghieb Ahsan, General Secretary, Calcutta Muslim League and Member, Council of All India Muslim League.

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Linlithgow to Maurice Hallett [Extract]

Hallet Papers, No. 2, p. 2

VICEROY'S CAMP, MYSORE, 15 January, 1939

SECRET

My dear Hallett,

Many thanks for your secret letter of the 6th January, No. 30. G.B., which has just reached me. I greatly appreciate your comment on the meeting of the Muslim League both in general and in its effect in Bihar. I think one has to make a fairly considerable allowance for the anxiety of the Muslims to keep themselves well in the forefront and to avoid any suggestion that they are not able to shout quite as loud as the competing parties. For all that, I was myself a good deal disturbed to think that so many people who have held, or are holding, high office should on a public occasion of this nature give expression to sentiments such as those which marked this meeting. I quite realise that the Muslim League like the Congress must play politics up to a point. But I hoped that some greater sense of responsibility would have been shown and a somewhat greater appreciation of the possible misunderstandings in the minds of students and other impressionable and immature people to which certain of the remarks which were made might give rise. Sikander as you know came to Calcutta from Patna and asked to come to see Laithwaite. I took advantage of this to see him informally myself for a few minutes, but without giving any publicity to the fact that I had done so. I tackled him quite straight on the question of the Patna speeches.

2. His reaction was precisely what I had expected—in other words that, the Muslims felt that from the point of view of their own position and of the public, they had to come out on this occasion in very definite colours. He took credit to himself

for having done a certain amount to damp excitement down and to secure that the wording of certain resolutions was less objectionable than it might otherwise have been. His own general attitude, however, appeared to be substantially the same as it always had been, and indeed he did not for a moment suggest that he had in any way changed his views or his position.

3. Mr. Abdul Aziz's contributions seem to me in many ways, for the reasons you give in your letter and having regard to the fact that he has himself held office as a Minister under the old Constitution, as embarrassing from the local point of view as any; I do not take too seriously the general charges made of discrimination by Congress Ministries against Muslims. I think that here too the conference was talking to the public, and without too close regard for facts; and I welcome your own judgement that both in Bihar and in your experience of the United Provinces orders passed by the Governments concerned cannot be regarded as having been really detrimental to Muslim interests. I shall be much interested to hear Craik's comments (I had already written to him myself some days ago) and I have no doubt that Sikander will have been as frank with him as he was with me.

4. I do not think that the Pakistan proposition can be as easily put aside as Congress would like to suggest. It seems to me a thoroughly unsound one, but that is neither here nor there. I suspect that we are likely to hear a great deal more of it; and it is no doubt inevitable that a Minority so important as the Muslim Minority and so apprehensive that any decline in the degree of our direct control in this country can only be to their disadvantage, should think that the course of wisdom is to develop their own organisation, and to endeavour to emulate the Central control which the Congress have been able to establish and maintain so far as the Congress Provinces and the Hindu electorate are concerned. The possibilities of an increase in communal tension which that type of situation holds out are too obvious to call for any comment. But I see nothing for it at this stage but to watch developments.

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Fortnightly Report of the Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of January, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-1/39, pp. 1-2

SECRET

General Political Situation: At the conclusion of the session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur on the 1st January, Mr. V.D. Savarkar lectured to an audience of 20,000 persons on the Indian Mutiny of 1857. He stated that the Mutiny was in fact a war of independence and expressed his admiration for the brave Indian soldiers who fought the British. Admission to the meeting was by ticket and the proceeds amounting to about Rs.1,000 were handed over to Mr. Savarkar. In the

Chhattisgarh division, Mr. Aney,¹ M.L.A. (Central) addressed a small meeting at Balaghat. He suggested that the Congress Ministries in the eight Provinces should secure the confidence of the masses and should have them completely under their sway. In his view, Federation was of no value unless full popular control was established over army and finance. Every nation in Europe, he said, was busy increasing its military strength, and in the event of war the public in India should refuse to pay taxes to the British Government. Recruits could be induced to join the army, but they could not be fed if the Congress controlled finance. He advocated Hindu-Muslim unity and condemned the Muslim League. He also advised the Congress not to be afraid of the Muslims.

6. *Communal*: Muslim League meetings were held in Nagpur on the 4th and 7th January, both presided over by Syed Abdur Rauf Shah, M.L.A. At the first meeting, the proceedings of the All India Muslim League session at Patna, were explained and attacks were made against the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress, while at the latter meeting, one of the resolutions passed stated that the decision of Government to inaugurate the Vidya Mandir Scheme on the 26th January was a violation of the agreement said to have been reached between the Hon'ble the Prime Minister and Nawab Liaquat Ali Khan, that the Muslim M.L.As. would first be consulted. It may be stated here that there was no such agreement. In the Jubbulpore division, Maulvi Muhammad Gulam Mustafa of Rai Bareilly delivered a speech at Jubbulpore. His speech was not offensive, presumably because he was warned by the District Magistrate in accordance with the standing orders of Government. Mr. Muhammad Ashgar² addressed a large gathering of Muslims at Burhanpur on the 7th and conveyed to them the message of the Patna session of the All India Muslim League. He stated that the Congress is a Hindu organisation. He also criticised the police for taking action against him under Section 108, Criminal Procedure Code and appealed for support to the Muslim League, particularly as the next session was to take place at Nagpur. Khan Sahib Lal Khan presided over a meeting of about 600 Muslims held at Akola on the 5th January, at which one Sheikh Hasan Nizami is reported to have delivered a fiery anti-Congress and anti-Hindu speech. A detailed report is being called for. The Mohammadans in the Basim sub-division are resenting the order of the Local Board that *Vande Mataram* should be sung in the Urdu schools. The matter is being looked into. Tension is reported at Karanja in the Akola district between Mohammadan butchers and the local Congressmen in connection with the auctions of wild cows under a contract given by the Divisional Forest Officer.

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1. M.S. Aney (1880-1968); Acting President, Indian National Congress, 1933; Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1942; representative of the Government of India in Ceylon, 1943-47; Governor of Bihar, 1948-52; Member, Lok Sabha, 1959-67.
 2. Muhammad Ashgar; President, Burhanpur District, Muslim League, C.P.



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*Nehru to Pant**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IX, pp. 358-59*

ALLAHABAD, 16 January, 1939

My dear Pantji,

I do not know what steps you are taking in regard to Jinnah's challenge to you in his last statement.⁴ I suppose you were waiting for his response to my offer. That response has not come yet. I realized when I made the offer that there were some difficulties in the way. But I saw no other way out. We discussed this subject at length at Bardoli. I can only write to you briefly now.

It is obviously necessary for our Governments concerned to issue some kind of a reply to the various definite charges made in the Muslim League report. The Government need not deal with the objections to the flag or to the *Bande Mataram*. But in regard to specific charges made a reply should be forthcoming. A copy of this reply should be sent to Maulana Azad. The Parliamentary Sub-Committee will probably issue its own reply on the greater questions later. It may be that on our own initiative we might ask some impartial person to examine these charges and report. A person who was suggested for this purpose was Justice Devadoss of Madras who is a Christian. There are one or two other high court judges also probably available.

In regard to the flag and the *Bande Mataram*, the Working Committee was of opinion that we should avoid making this a matter of controversy as far as possible, and private instructions to this effect will probably be sent to you by Kripalani.

He will also write to you regarding cow-slaughter and music before mosques. We decided not to issue any public statement in this matter just on the eve of *Bakr-Id*. But our general view was contained in Gandhiji's original draft. This view was that generally speaking the legal right to cow-slaughter as well as to music and processions before mosques should be recognized and given effect to unless there was definite custom to the contrary. This is slightly different from the prevailing practice, the burden of proof being cast on those who want to stop the legal right. We felt, however, that the better procedure would be for us to inform governments of this general policy and leave it to them to give effect to it in such manner as they thought fit. It was thought that the best course would be for the Prime Minister to have an informal conference with representatives of different groups in the assembly and discuss the approaching *Bakr-Id*. This can easily be done without any fuss as assemblies are sitting and the *Bakr-Id* is near. If, as a result of this informal talk, the government made some announcement of a policy or issued instructions to its officers, it would be better if a one-sided announcement was made. In a one-sided announcement that part which favoured one party would be accepted while the other part would be rejected. I trust,

therefore, that it will be possible for you to have some such informal consultation with some leaders of the Muslim League and others.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. In his Statement dated Bombay, 5 January, 1939, Jinnah had challenged Pant's contention that the Musalmans in U.P. were treated not only justly but generously and asked him to mention the instances of generous treatment of the Musalmans in U.P.

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Nehru to Stafford Cripps [Extract]

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. XIII, pp. 708-10

KHALI, 21 January, 1939

My dear Cripps,

9. The second problem before us is the Hindu-Muslim tension. This is certainly an obstruction in our path. The Muslim League is not organisationally strong. It cannot do anything positive or constructive. But it can be destructive and its entire policy consists of inciting Muslim against the Congress. The most fantastic lies are circulated and full advantage is taken of the civil liberties established by the Congress Governments. It is difficult to get at the root of the matter what the basic objection is. It almost seems that Jinnah and the other leaders of the Muslim League object to democracy itself in India for democracy means the dominance of the majority. They object to the people of the Indian States being enfranchised as this means more Hindus voting. Jinnah is really an impossible person to deal with. He has certain lawyer's ability and enormous conceit, but otherwise he is extraordinarily ignorant.

10. There are tendencies in the Muslim League for a left wing to develop and to insist on a positive programme.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU



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*Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 12, pp. 12-14*

24 January, 1939

SECRET

No. U.P. 216

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

8. Another direction besides the Ayodhya Conference in which perhaps I have over-estimated the importance of speeches and resolutions in the All India Muslim League Conference at Patna. During my tour in the eastern districts I questioned a number of District Officers and Superintendents of Police as to whether this Conference had had any effect on the communal situation. They all told me it had not, and in this part of the Province at any rate they do not seem apprehensive about trouble at the *Bakr-Id*. There is a particular local problem in the Gorakhpur district at Zahidabad which has been a centre of difficulty for a long time. I heard a great deal about it while I was at Gorakhpur, but on both sides there was an evident hope that through the good offices of the Collector, who has the confidence of both communities, they would be able to reach some compromise. It did not seem to me that there was any trace of a dangerously aggressive attitude either on the part of the Hindus or the Muslims. I had an interesting talk at Gorakhpur with a young Muslim M.L.A. who has been playing a very prominent part in the Legislature. He said to me quite frankly that what the Muslim League wanted was to have their representatives on the Government. This has always been my view, and consequently I do not think that attempts by Gandhi to reassure the Muslims against unjust treatment in the everyday administration will have any effect.

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*"The Times" Correspondent's Assessment**Congress Government II, pp. 39-40*

London, 28 January, 1939. Minority political groups in India are developing a more aggressive attitude towards the Congress party, whose identification with the Hindu majority becomes of greater significance as Federation approaches.

It is their fear that their traditions, culture, and economic standing may be undermined by Hinduism, that is encouraging present day Muslim opposition to the Congress party The Muslims are apprehensive lest they be segregated into a caste in the political field particularly as Hinduism is a social and economic system as

well as a religion. They realise that such an assimilation, while enabling Mohammanism to adhere to Hinduism, would leave Hinduism radically unaffected by the contact.

This Muslim suspicion of Hinduism greatly weakens what is called the Nationalist front. The Congress party still wants to concentrate Nationalist opposition on the British authority in India, but the Muslims realising that under the Reforms British authority is being relaxed, are consolidating themselves in opposition to the Hindus. It is lamentably true that the Reforms by arousing the ambitions of the Hindus and the anxieties of the Muslims, have given a new emphasis to Hindu-Muslim competition. The canon of tolerance set up by the British in the pre-Reform days, when neutral authority restricted Hindu-Muslim rivalry to narrower spheres, is rapidly being broken down.

...It is true that the majority of Congress leaders condemn the purely religious aspects of communalism; but the eradication of this weakness from Congress thinking derives mainly from a conviction of Hindu strength in other directions.

With Congress Governments in most Provinces, patronage and preferment have largely fallen into Hindu hands, with all that that implies under the peculiar Hindu form of nepotism. So bitter have Muslims become that they have resolved to use the Congress weapon of Civil Disobedience in several Congress-governed Provinces to redress their political grievances. The proposal is disquieting, and its seriousness is not lessened by the scorn which some sections of the Nationalist Press have poured upon it.

Indian nationalists have always contended that British policy has been one of "divide and rule," but it is obvious that the removal of British authority in the Provinces has increased rather than lessened the hostility of the Muslims to the Hindus. . . . The Congress and the Muslim League are drifting farther and farther apart. It is clear, however, that any other form of Constitution than that proposed in the Government of India Act will be looked upon with even less favour by the Muslims, particularly if it should emerge from the deliberations of a Constituent Assembly, which the Congress party continues to favour.

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Akbar Hydari to Moonje

Towards Freedom Papers

January, 1939

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT

Dear Dr. Moonje,

3. The State does not recognise the right of any organization or individual, not owing allegiance to this State or functioning beyond its borders, to represent the

people of the State or to deal with Government in respect of matters concerning the State or its subjects. I think, however, that your object will be fulfilled by my informing you of the plans which Government has in view, the details of which will be announced when the reforms proposals are made which Government has in view, the details of which will be announced when the reforms proposals are made public. I do not think this will take more than a few months. These plans include the establishment of a machinery, which should command the confidence of the public of Hyderabad, to ascertain whatever religious grievances a community may allege and to suggest to Government remedial measures for removing such grievances. As I wrote to Mr. Savarkar in reply to a recent letter from him, our scheme of reforms will not be confined to the constitutional sphere alone but will cover a sphere wide enough to include such legitimate grievances as may be felt by any single community, no matter whether Hindu or Muslim or any other, and which will be confined to it and are not part and parcel of any rules or laws applicable to the whole of the Dominions and to all the subjects of the State without distinction of caste or creed. As regards grievances other than religious, I am certain that the settlement contemplated in the reforms announcement as a whole will satisfy the interests concerned as well as all the requirements of progress.

If, in addition, there is any other matter which you desire to bring to my personal notice, I hope you will not hesitate to write to me about it.

Yours sincerely,
AKBAR HYDARI

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Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri to Jinnah

Afzal Husain Qadri Papers

2 February, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I herewith send you a copy¹ of "The Problem of Indian Muslims and its solution" which embodies my suggestions regarding the future of the Muslims of India. I might need to assure you that I have reached these conclusions after the hardest and most serious thinking that I could afford. To me it is the gravest moment for the Muslims of India which demands an immediate and clear decision on their part whether or not are they to live as a free and honourable nation in India.

The ideal a free Muslim Nation with a free National Home is the only one for which I will struggle to my very last breath. Apart from this I have contemplated this scheme with a perfect fairness to the Muslims as well as to all the other people of India.

I am extremely eager to talk with you personally on this scheme. I shall reach

Delhi on Saturday afternoon and shall stay there for a few days. May I request you if you could grant me some time to meet you?

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
MOHD. AFZAL HUSAIN QADRI

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1. Not available.

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dr. Afzal H. Qadri's Scheme,

The Problem of Indian Muslims and its solution.

The Government of India Act of 1935 and the therein proposed All India Federation as well as the partial working out of it in form of Provincial Autonomy have brought the Muslims of India face to face with the gravest danger, viz., the annihilation of their specific national identity.

There is little need of explaining at length what this Act means. It hurls down the 90 million Muslims of India under the heels of the perpetual domination of a Hindu majority at the Centre, reduces the Muslim majority Provinces to the status of mere vassals and leave the Muslim minority provinces entirely at the mercy of the Hindu majority. Its fundamental fault is that it does not recognise the undeniable fact that the Muslims of India are a Nation distinct from Hindus, vitally opposed to the latter in their outlook and aspirations and incapable of being merged into any other so-called nation, Hindu or no Hindu.

"The London Times" (India No., April 1, 1937) commenting on the Government of India Act of 1935 wrote that undoubtedly the difference between Muslims and Hindus is not merely that of religion in the strict sense of the word, but also that of law and culture—that they may be said indeed to represent two entirely distinct and separate civilizations; however in the course of time the superstitions will die out and India will be moulded into a single nation. To this homily of the "*London Times*" one cannot but demur, for the 'superstitions' that shall have to die out are exactly the characteristic features of the Islamic culture and the contributions of Islam to India; without the shadow of a doubt the All India Federation will, within the space of a generation, bring about total annihilation of the specific Islamic outlook, culture, and language and will mould the Muslims after the will of the Hindus. Unequivocal signs of this are making themselves felt in the Muslim Mass-Contact programme of the Indian National Congress as well as the various educational schemes like the Vidya Mandir and the Wardha schemes, the drive for Hindi, and other urban and rural movements recently inaugurated under the auspices of that nationally-minded (sic.) body.

Therefore, it is absolutely obligatory on us, the Muslims, that we must do our utmost to save our national identity in India and to safeguard our interests. We must win independence and equality for Muslims and should in no case acquiesce in their subjugation whether planned by Hindus or the British or even if agreed to by certain Hinduised anti-British Muslims.

To realise this great object I beg to offer, in the following, a scheme for your careful consideration. But before coming to it I must state the principles on which it is based. I am convinced that we Muslims of India must insist persistently and strenuously on them, namely,

1. That the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves—they have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups; indeed, they are more different from the Hindus than the Sudetan Germans were from the Czechs;
2. That the Muslims of India have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world;

3. That the future of the Muslims of India lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of that, any other people;
4. That the Muslim majority Provinces cannot be permitted to be enslaved into a single All India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre; and
5. That the Muslims in the Minority Provinces shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces.

Now, in order to save the Muslim Nation in India we have to demand a repartition of India on the only fundamental and valid principle of division, viz., Nationality, and to get India divided into Muslim India and Hindu India; further we must do all we can to safeguard the interests of our nationals living in Hindu India. On this principle British India must be divided into three wholly independent and sovereign states.

1. NORTH-WEST INDIA, including the Punjab, the N.W.F. Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan;
2. BENGAL, including the adjacent district of Purnea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam), but excluding the South-Western districts of Howrah and Midnapore (Burdwan) and the North-Western district of Darjiling; and
3. HINDUSTAN, comprehending the rest of British India. Inside Hindustan there must be formed two new autonomous Provinces;
 - (a) DELHI PROVINCE, including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand Division and the district of Aligarh (Agra Division); and
 - (b) MALABAR PROVINCE, consisting of Malabar Coast. Further, all the *Towns* of Hindustan with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a Borough or Free City.

Also, in Hindustan Muslims in villages shall have to live together in considerable numbers.

THE INDIAN STATES: The Indian or native States included inside the boundaries of any of the above three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them, ought to be attached to that State.

Those bordering on more than one of the three States should have the option of joining any of the adjoining States.

HYDERABAD with its old dominions Berar and Kernatik to be a sovereign State.

A map is herewith attached [not available] in which the proposed division of India is visualised. Some explanatory remarks may be added.

North-West India will include several native States, e.g., Qalat, Jammu and Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Patiala, Jhind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Faridkot, and the Simla Hills States. With the inclusion of Kashmir it may well be called "Pakistan" as it has been for some years past.

The Pakistan Federation will be a Muslim State. It will include about 25 millions of Muslims, i.e., more than 60 per cent of the total population. It is a self-sufficient unit on the basis of geographical, economical and political considerations. The realization of this federation will open a new and living future for the Muslims of India and will have a far-reaching effect on the whole of the Islamic world. The Pakistan will form the North-Western wing of Muslim India.

The Hindus and Sikhs are the two non-Muslim Minorities in Pakistan. They will have the same cultural, religious and political safeguards granted to them as the Muslims will have in Hindustan. It will be of greater advantage for the Sikhs to be in this State than in an All India Federation as envisaged by the Government of India Act of 1935, for they will be relatively in much larger proportion in their Province and in the Centre.

The claim of Pakistan to form a separate federation cannot be challenged by anyone on any reasonable ground; and if not conceded, the Muslims of these Provinces will leave no stone unturned and will carry on the struggle by all means at their disposal until their goal is achieved.

The new Bengal will again be a Muslim State. It will contain more than 30 million Muslims, i.e., 57 per cent of the whole population. New Bengal can be entirely self-sufficient on account of its natural wealth and agricultural richness. It will be equal to France in area as well as in population. Because of having no component Provinces, it will be no Federation. However, it will be a Sovereign State, having a status analogous to Burma, and will be the eastern wing of Muslim India.

Hindustan will be a Hindu State. It will have a population of 245 millions. It will include about 23 million Muslims, forming a minority of 10 per cent. It is our duty to safeguard their interests politically as far as it is at present possible. We must consequently insist on the formation of two new Provinces inside Hindustan, one in the north and the other in the south, viz., Delhi and Malabar respectively.

In the newly constituted Province of Delhi there will be more than 3.5 millions of Muslims, forming about 28 per cent of the total population. Indeed they will still be a minority. However they will be such an important minority as cannot easily be swept aside by the Hindu majority. Being highly cultured and educated as the Muslims of these parts are, and having their boundaries close to the Muslim Federation of Pakistan, they will be in a much stronger position to guard their interests than otherwise. Aligarh, the centre of Muslim education, must be included in this province, for we cannot afford to leave it unprotected inside the remaining portion of the U.P. which will be overwhelmingly Hindu.

The southern part of Malabar Province will comprise the southern part of Madras Presidency especially that lying adjacent to Malabar Coast. This part is well populated by Muslims. There are about 1.4 million Muslims in it, forming about 27 per cent of the total population. They have large trading interests in this Province and possess an eminent cultural position. Moreover, they are a virile race and being such an important minority can look after their interests far better than they can at present.

In Hindustan the Muslims largely live in cities and in such considerable numbers that we cannot afford to leave them entirely at the mercy of the Hindu Government. Therefore, it is necessary to protect their interests. Left to themselves they can fight their battle with the Hindus of those towns. All that can be done for them at present is to eliminate the undue interference of the Provincial and Central Hindu Governments. This can well be done by giving the status of Free Cities or Boroughs to large towns of a population of 50,000 and more. They shall have their own police and magistracy, and they may have powers to legislate and execute on local matters to a large extent. In this way the interests of about 1.25 millions of Muslims of Hindustan can be protected.

The Muslims in the rural area of Hindustan must be persuaded not to remain scattered in negligible minorities, as they do at present, in different villages. They must be induced to aggregate in villages with a preponderant Muslim population. In this way alone can their cultural as well as economical interests be protected. A number of useful and constructive programmes for social, educational and economical improvement may at once be launched in rural areas of Hindustan for the sake of this object as well as for the immediate amelioration of the conditions of Muslims residing therein.

The aforementioned three States of Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance on the following bases:

1. Mutual recognition and reciprocity.
2. That Pakistan and Bengal be recognised as the homelands of Muslims, and Hindustan as the homeland of Hindus, to which they can migrate respectively, if and when they want to do so.
3. In Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognised as a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal.
4. The Muslim minority in Hindustan and non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan and Bengal will have (i) representation according to population, and (ii) separate electorates and representations at every state, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three states.

Note: Separate representation according to population may be granted to all considerable minorities in the three States, e.g., Sikhs, non-caste Hindus, etc.

Each of these three independent States, Pakistan, Hindustan and Bengal will have separate treaties of alliance with the Great Britain and separate Crown Representatives, if any. They will have a joint Court of Arbitration to settle any dispute that may arise between themselves or between them and the Crown.

Hyderabad commands a position which is exclusively its [own] amongst Indian States. It is even now recognised as an ally by the British Government, and its Ruler addressed by the distinctive title of His Exalted Highness. In truth it is a sovereign state by treaties. Berar and Karnatak were taken from it by the British for administrative reasons. Now when the British are giving the control of India to its rightful owners, they must return to Hyderabad its territories, and recognise Hyderabad expressly as a

Sovereign State, at least as sovereign as Nepal, Karnatak will restore a sea coast to Hyderabad, and Hyderabad will naturally become the southern wing of Muslim India.

MOHD. AFZAL HUSAIN QADRI,
M.Sc., Ph.D.(Alig.), Ph.D.(Cantab)
Aligarh Muslim University

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1. The All India Muslim League will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.

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Francis Wylie¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 20, pp. 44-47

CAMP, 8 February, 1939

SECRET
NO. R. 28-G.C.P.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

6. Your Excellency will have seen from the Press that the local Muslims here contrary to the advice of the Muslim League have started *satyagraha* against the Vidya Mandir scheme. In paragraph 9 of my letter of the 29th of December I expressed the view that the anti-Vidya Mandir agitation was based on nothing but the general discontent of the Muslim population at having to submit to the rule—and so far as they can see the permanent rule—of a Hindu majority. I still think that this is correct but I find it hard to explain why the local Muslims have gone against the League's advice and started *satyagraha*. Hindu-Muslim tension in Nagpur town is, however, serious and the position has been aggravated by the import of the so-called "*Bande Mataram*" students from Hyderabad. What actually happens is that groups of Muslims come to the Secretariat everyday and attempt to enter the compound. When stopped by the police they demand to be arrested. Under the orders of Government they are being treated very gently. They are arrested and detained for a few hours but no cases against them will be produced in court till Shukla has discussed the whole matter with Nawabzada Liakat [Liaqat] Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary of the All India Muslim League, and our local M.L.A's. These discussions are going on as I write and I hear that Liakat [Liaqat] Ali Khan is displaying a very reasonable attitude and that a compromise may be arrived at. I am unable to say anything further on the subject at present.

Yours sincerely,
F.V. WYLIE

1. Francis Verner Wylie, Governor of C.P. and Berar, 28 May, 1938-40.

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Sikander Hayat Khan to Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. 39, pp. 143-144

1, ZAFAR ALI ROAD, LAHORE, 14 February, 1939

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Jawaharlal,

I have been away on tour and returned to Lahore only this morning: hence the delay in answering your last letter.

I am afraid I cannot quote from memory the definite incidents which were cited by the various speakers at Patna regarding the grievances of the Minorities in some Provinces. Moreover, as far as I can recollect, they never attributed any 'atrocities' to Congress Governments but merely referred to high-handedness of the majority community in some of the Congress Provinces. Two of the incidents, one relating to Bihar and the other to which you have referred in your letter under reply regarding the objectionable circular in C.P., are admitted to be true as the former was referred to a court of law and the latter, i.e. the circular, was condemned by the C.P. Government. I received a letter from Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant also and have sent him a reply on the above lines.

I venture to suggest that it would serve no useful purpose for either side to try to magnify or minimise these incidents. The fact remains that an atmosphere of suspicion and even bitterness pervades in some parts of the country, and what is needed is a concerted effort on the part of everyone who has the interests of the country at heart to try and dispel the doubts and misgivings which are responsible for the present unfortunate tension. So far as I am concerned, I need hardly assure you that you will always find me willing and even anxious to render what little assistance I may be capable of giving in this connection. Indeed, as you may be aware, it has been and still is my greatest mission in life to bring about harmony and goodwill between the various communities in this great country.

Yours sincerely,
SIKANDER HAYAT KHAN

PT. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, Esquire,
Barrister-at-Law,
"Anand Bhawan," Allahabad.

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Nehru's Presidential Address to the All India States People's Conference

The Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. I, pp. 442-44

The Major States

Ludhiana on 15 and 16 February, 1939. 1. The Governments of the major

States have been apt pupils in some ways of British Imperialism. Among other things they have learnt the art of utilising communal differences to check popular movements. In Travancore, a powerful people's movement is opposed and sought to be discredited on the plea that it is a communal movement, consisting mainly of Christians; in Kashmir, the popular movement is called communal because it is largely Muslim in composition; in Hyderabad, it is said to be communal because it is predominantly Hindu. The demands put forward on behalf of these several movements might be, as they indeed are, wholly national with no communal tinge or bias in them but some excuse has to be found to discredit and oppose them and the plea of communalism is a useful one.

2. Hyderabad and Kashmir are the two premier States in India and we might have hoped that they would set an example to the other States by introducing free institutions and Responsible Government. Unhappily both are exceedingly backward, politically and socially. Hyderabad is a predominantly Hindu State with a Muslim ruling class; Kashmir is predominantly a Muslim State with a Hindu ruling class. Both thus present the same type of problems and both have the same background of extreme poverty among the masses, illiteracy, industrial backwardness and undeveloped resources. In painful contrast with this general poverty and wretchedness, the Rulers of both are probably the two richest individuals in India. Kashmir is slightly more advanced politically as it has a kind of Legislative Assembly, but this has little power, and the ordinances that obtain there are monstrous in their severity. In Hyderabad, we have probably the lowest level of civil liberty in India, and latterly attention has been drawn to the prohibition of even certain religious ceremonies. This low level in Hyderabad is not the reaction to any aggressive movement but has been for long the normal state of affairs.

Charge of Communalism

3. It is distressing that in these two great States such conditions should prevail. It was natural that in both of them popular movements should grow up and spread to the masses. This took place in Kashmir first and later in Hyderabad. It was inevitable that such movements should affect the great majority of the population—the Muslims in Kashmir and the Hindus in Hyderabad. If, under the circumstances, they showed a certain communal tinge to begin with, it was not surprising. Even so they did not cease to be popular movements representing the urge of the masses and their objective was a national one, which would bring relief and progress to all. To condemn them as communal movements was to blind one-self deliberately to the facts, and for the minority groups in either State to lend colour to this condemnation was to injure their own cause. For this meant that the minority was opposed to freedom and progress and clung into some petty special privileges which it was thought that the present regime gave it.

4. As a matter of fact the two movements progressively developed on national lines, and in Kashmir, I am glad to say, a number of wise and far-seeing Hindus and Sikhs threw their weight on the side of the popular movement and supported the 'National Demand' which asked for Responsible Government. I am sure that in Hyderabad many far-seeing Muslims will do likewise. The leaders of these movements

in both the States realise the extreme importance of steering clear of communalism and have tried to do so. They must not weaken at any moment in this, or else they will injure their cause. The Minorities must also realise that it is inevitable that Responsible Government will come to the States, and freedom will bring rich gifts for them as much as for the others. To oppose this struggle of the people or to be passive spectators in it is to prove unworthy of and false to the future that beckons to us all. Because Hyderabad and Kashmir have essentially the same problem, though it has a different complexion in each, it should not be difficult to consider the two together and to offer the same solution, in so far as Minority rights are concerned. That solution should be in keeping with the broad principles laid down by the Congress and must fit in with Responsible Government.

Hyderabad Satyagraha Suspension

5. In Hyderabad a peculiar situation arose sometime back which resulted in producing a certain confusion in the public mind. The State Congress was declared an illegal organisation although its activity was the perfectly peaceful and constitutional one of enrolling members and strengthening its organisation. But the State has been nurtured in the traditions of the medieval age and even this was objected to and stopped. The State Congress thereupon justifiably refused to agree to this ban and attempted to carry on their activities. This involved peaceful Satyagraha and hundreds suffered under it. About the same time or a little later, a religious organisation and a communal organisation also started some kind of Satyagraha. In the case of the religious organisation the reason was the banning by the State authorities of certain religious ceremonies and forms of worship which are commonly practised all over India. It is astonishing that the authorities should have taken this step, which strikes at the root of religious liberty in India and goes counter to the professed principles of every one. It was natural that this should cause resentment. But it was unfortunate that *Satyagraha* should have been started on this basis at that time. This confused the issue and gave an excuse to the State authorities to put the demand for political freedom in the background. After careful consideration of all the aspects of the situation, the State Congress was advised to suspend its *Satyagraha* so that the political issue might not be mixed up in with communal and religious ones. The State Congress thereupon suspended their *Satyagraha*. In spite of this, the Hyderabad authorities had not the wisdom or the grace to release the Satyagrahi prisoners or to remove their extraordinary ban on the organisation. Unfortunately the communal and religious *Satyagraha* was continued by the other organisations and the communal aspect of the question became intensified and conflicts took place in the distant parts of India. Those responsible for it paid little heed to the consequence of their action, nor did they realise that a popular movement is an organic growth from below and cannot be artificially imposed from above. As a result of this, the political movement for freedom has received a setback and the communal issue dominates the scene.

6. In Kashmir also, the civil disobedience campaign was suspended last year to give a chance to the State authorities to retrace their steps and remedy some of the evils they had done. But they lack wisdom and grace also and in spite of this suspension, hundreds of Civil Disobedience prisoners, including the leader of the

movement, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah,¹ continued in prison, and the infamous ordinance known as Notification 19-L, as well as the Seditious Meeting Act of 1914, still functions.

7. It is obvious that both in Kashmir and Hyderabad, existing conditions cannot be put up with and if the State authorities continue to act in the manner they have so far done, a resumption of Civil Disobedience will become inevitable.

Constituent Assembly of All India People

9. The freedom of the people of the States is a big enough thing, yet it is part of the larger freedom of India, and till we gain that larger freedom, it is struggle for us. If the Federation is imposed upon us, we shall fight it and sweep it away. Wherever the British Power intervenes against the people in the States, we shall have to face it. The time approaches when the final solution has to come—a Constituent Assembly of all the Indian people, framing the Constitution of a free and democratic India. The State's People Conference has done good work in the past but this has been only a fraction of the work it might have done. It must turn to the efficient organisation of all its activities, so that it might become a clearing house for all that pertains to the States, and a source of help and inspiration to all our comrades in the struggle. It must help in building up *Praja Mandals* or people's organisations in the States. It must take care to steer clear of all communalism, and it must, above all, remember, and make others remember, that non-violence is the basis of this struggle.

10. It is our great good fortune that in this struggle we have the backing of the National Congress and the support of its leaders. Most cheering of all is the thought that we have Gandhiji to guide and inspire us.

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1. Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah (1905-1982); President, Kashmir Muslim Conference founded in 1932 later converted into National Conference, 1938; launched Quit Kashmir Movement, 1946; arrested and sentenced nine times for a total period of 15 years and 7 months, while in jail elected President, All India States Peoples Conference; released on 29 September, 1947; invited by Maharaja of Kashmir to head the emergency administration, 31 October, 1947; Prime Minister of the State, 5 March, 1948-49; dismissed and arrested by the Indian Government 9 August, 1953; released and rearrested several times; author of memoirs: *Aatish-e-Chinar* (Urdu).

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 32, pp. 68-70

25 February, 1939

SECRET

NO. U.P. 227

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

4. When the Cawnpore riots had died down I took the occasion to speak to the

Premier about the general underlying causes of this Hindu-Muslim antagonism, and put to him plainly my own view, that it would continue until the Congress made up their minds to admit the Muslims to some real share of power. I am perfectly convinced that nothing else will change the situation. What the Muslims resent is not any particular injustice or oppression (indeed they find it difficult to allege with plausibility any instance of this), but the fact that they are being ruled by the Hindus. Pant did not really dispute my diagnosis, but dwelt on the difficulties of forming a coalition, which I recognise are considerable. Whatever the difficulties, however, I feel that sooner or later the Congress will have to accept this position, and I have little doubt that Pant will continue to ponder over it.

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*Nehru to Mohammed Azizur Rahman*¹

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IX, pp. 361-62

ALLAHABAD, 25 February, 1939

A short while back, I read in the papers a statement made by Dr. Syed Mahmud, the Minister of Education in Bihar, regarding the National Flag and the *Bande Mataram*. That statement seemed to me an eminently reasonable and sensible one.²

It seems to me that those who object to either the *Bande Mataram* or the National Flag have not considered the question properly and have attached a totally wrong meaning of them. The National Flag has absolutely nothing communal and for a generation now has been used in the remotest villages in India without any complaint except on the part of the British Government. The objections to it are of very recent growth and I have completely failed to understand them. Nothing in India represents the national movement so vividly to scores of millions of people more than the National Flag which has always been considered a symbol of unity for the communities in India. Obviously, India must have a National Flag. If there was no such flag we would have to invent one. For it is patently wrong to use any communal flag when different communities are represented. You will find this National Flag wherever Indians—Hindus, Muslims or others live in any part of the world. They are proud of it everywhere. I have seen it in the remotest corners of Asia and Europe. It has become very dear to hundreds of millions of our people as a symbol of their freedom. It is a pity, therefore, that anyone should object to it and thus put up a barrier between himself and the sentiments of vast numbers of his countrymen.

As regards the *Bande Mataram*, this has been an integral part of our movement since before the present generation was born.

It is quite understandable for some people to approve of it and others not to like it as a song. But to object to an inoffensive song seems to me uncalled for.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. Mohammed Azizur Rahman, Secretary, Bihar Muslim Students Federation.
2. In response to an adjournment motion in the Bihar Assembly, Syed Mahmud stated on 6 February, 1939: "In the Government's opinion there is nothing objectionable in the first two stanzas of the song and the Government has issued instructions that the singing of even those stanzas should not be made obligatory and those who do not like the song should refrain from it. It is in deference to the Muslim opposition that these restrictions are imposed."

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Report on the Political Situation in Bengal for the second half of February, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-2/39, pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

The Bengal Provincial Hindu Conference was held at Khulna from the 17th to the 19th February, 1939, presided over by V.R. Savarkar who was supported by Dr. Moonje. The atmosphere was purely pro-Hindu, anti-Congress as Congress is supposed to be pro-Muslim, anti the Bengal Government on account of pro-Muslim partiality and anti the Communal Award. Dr. Moonje, however, sponsored a motion recording the wholehearted support of the Conference to the Federal Scheme. The local Mohammadans staged a counter-meeting attended by about 2,000 people and a clash between them and the Hindus attending the Conference was only avoided by tactful handling.

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Jinnah's Press Statement

Nations Voice, p. 353

New Delhi, 1 March, 1939. "I am informed by some prominent members of the Muslim League that the organisers of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind approached them to attend their Conference which is to take place on March 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Delhi. Further, a report in the Press that invitations have been issued to prominent members of the Muslim League and myself has been brought to my notice and, therefore, I am obliged to make the position clear.

"I hope that no member of the Muslim League will have anything to do with this Conference because their policy and activities have been hostile and destructive towards the All India Muslim League. These few individuals who are using the name of Jamiat-i-Ulama are, in my opinion, doing the greatest possible harm not only to their community but to the country at large. They are one of the causes of the tension and bitterness that exist between the Hindus and Musalmans today and in no small

degree are the obstacles in the way of the achievement of an honourable understanding between the two communities. I still appeal to them to rally round the Muslim League flag which is the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Musalmans of India."

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Fortnightly Report on Madras for the second half of February 1939 [Extract]

Public (General) Department, F. 18-3/39

FORT ST. GEORGE, 4 March, 1939

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. P. 4-4

On 12th February Dr. Moonje addressed a large gathering in Salem. He disapproved of Mr. Gandhi's attempts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, and complained that the Congress was agitating in Hindu States leaving Muslim States alone. He also pointed out that Hindu-Muslim unity was not necessary for *Swaraj* and that Hindus alone could get it leaving other communities to join them later. He was in favour of accepting Federation and thought that delay would only strengthen the feeling against Federation which would be detrimental to the Hindus.

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Resolutions adopted at Jamiat-ul-Ulama's Conference on 3-6 March, 1939 [Extract]¹

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. III, pp. 294-306

Resolution 8: Having been guided by the light of the divine Shariat, and being fully conscious of the responsibility of holding a holy trust from Almighty God and the Prophet of Islam (Peace be upon him), and for the purpose of protecting this very trust and defending nation and motherland, this Conference of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind declares as follows to enlighten the Muslim masses of India: (I) The Musalmans by their nature and temperament are devoted to the love of freedom and hate the enslavement of men by men. Every staunch believer in Islam is, therefore, always prepared to join any struggle for freedom at the cost of all possible sacrifices of life and money. (II) From the very day of its inception, the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind has placed before it the ideal of emancipation of India from the domination of British Imperialism. (III) It is agreed among all political thinkers and leaders of India that a joint struggle of All Indian communities alone can free India from British domination and achieve complete independence, and that unless the various communities of India present a united front and join together in a common struggle, India can hardly win its political freedom.

(IV) In pursuance of this ideal, the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, while maintaining its independence as an organisation, participated in the past in the national movement conducted by the Indian National Congress and demonstrated in practice its age-long tradition of uncompromising struggle. (V) Unfortunately, our national struggle came to a halt before achieving its goal of Complete Independence and the British diplomacy succeeded in presenting a new Constitution before India in the shape of the Government of India Act, 1935. A few Indians, including some of the members of the Khilafat Committee and the Muslim League, were also co-opted to frame this Constitution. These Muslim members of the Round Table Conferences did not object to the framing of the Constitution on democratic principles; nor did they put forward any demand regarding the separate Islamic State in India. (VI) The Congress, the Muslim League, the Khilafat Committee and other Musalmans decided to work the above defective and unsatisfactory Constitution and accept offices under it. This decision is still being carried out by the Congressites and non-Congressites both in the Provincial Legislature, where they are running the machinery of their respective Governments with their joint efforts. (VII) Although the new Constitution has been enforced, it does not fulfil the demand of Complete Independence. The powers delegated to Indians under this Constitution are so meagre and untrustworthy that it is in perpetual danger of breaking down. (VIII) During this period of truce and constructive activities, it is an important question before the Musalmans whether they should cooperate with the Congress or not. The Jamiat-Ulama, after mature deliberations, has reached the conclusion that in view of the fact that the Musalmans have practically accepted the principles of democracy and joint responsibility, have entered into the Legislatures, despite the majority of non-Muslims, and are working the machinery of the Government by mutual cooperation, it is essential for them, according to Islamic principles and dictates of wisdom and farsight, to cooperate with the Congress also. This Conference emphatically appeals to Indian Musalmans to get them enlisted formally as the primary members of the Indian National Congress in all the towns and villages throughout India and to participate in the day-to-day working of all the Congress Committees as it is the only constitutional way to reach the goal of Independence and achievement and protection of religious and national rights of Musalmans. (IX) But, at the same time, this Conference makes it clear that Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind has never allowed its position of independence to suffer. While during the last struggle for freedom, the Jamiat cooperated with the Congress and, through its successful efforts, the number of the sacrifices of Musalmans reached much higher than that proportionate to their population, it never left its own platform and did all the work under its own banner. The Jamiat is still bent upon to keep up this status of Independence and continue the same policy in future also. (X) It is an extremely false and slanderous imputation against the Jamiat-Ulama that it has invariably supported the Congress on all questions, whether right or wrong. In fact, Jamiat has always criticised emphatically those proposals and actions of the Congress which it has considered as injurious to the interests of Musalmans. This challenge is supported by ample documentary evidence kept in the records of the Jamiat and the back volumes of newspapers. The commentary on the Nehru Report, the note of dissent against the formula of Hindu-Muslim settlement proposed by the Congress Working

Committee, and a new formula put forward by the Jamiat in place of it—all these things may still be found on the files of the Congress. Not a single instance may be cited to show that Jamiat has ever accepted or appreciated anything against Muslim interests. (XI) The Jamiat wants to impress upon all the Musalmans that it has not neglected its original demand of Complete Independence. Such Musalmans as may join the Congress must oppose all the proposals of the Government likely to hinder the progress of the country towards Complete Independence or to affect the Musalmans or Islam injuriously. [adversely] (XII) The Jamiat-Ulema declares that in case of any attempt on the part of the National Governments to cause injury to the interests of Musalmans or to ignore them, the Jamiat would take effective steps to defend such interests. And if the grievances are not redressed, the Jamiat would be the first party to array its force against the National Government and present all sorts of sacrifices to achieve its aim. (XIII) The Jamiat considers the unity of Indian people essential in this sense only that all should cooperate to form a united front against the British Imperialism. This unity does not mean the amalgamation of different types of societies and cultures into one. The Mussalman cannot budge an inch from his own Islamic culture, faith, practices and mode of life. (XIV) The Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind finally urges upon the Musalmans of India that the only way to protect Islam from terrible dangers of future is to strengthen the Jamiat by acting upon the directions of those who are the lieutenants of the Holy Prophet and the defenders of the honour of Islam.

Resolution 9: This Conference of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind adopts the report of the majority of the Sub-Committee appointed for the consideration of the Wardha Scheme of Education and considers the amendments proposed by the Sub-Committee in the scheme as essential and resolves that no scheme of education be accepted unless the defects pointed out in the report are removed and it gets the sanction of Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind.

Report of the Sub-Committee on the Wardha Scheme of Education

We have considered the Wardha Scheme of Education. At first we proceed to discuss briefly its fundamental principles which are as follows: (I) Medium of instruction should be the mother-tongue; (II) Side by side with theoretical knowledge, some basic handicraft should also be taught and this very craft should be the medium of education; (III) Primary education should be compulsory and universal; (IV) From the very outset means should be adopted to inculcate tolerance and enlightenment upon the minds of the children. They should be made good citizens and useful workers after completion of their education.

The first three principles are undoubtedly laudable and may be accepted, but the fourth one requires serious consideration. Had it been in the same form as we have given above, it would have been acceptable to us, just like the other three principles which we have already appreciated. But we regret to point out that the interpretation of this principle given by Dr. Zakir Hussain Khan himself on pages 111, 118, and 119 of his Report (Urdu edition from Jamia Magazine, 2nd print) is quite different. He lays down that the ultimate object of this scheme of education is to produce a class of educated people having the same kind of culture, faith and practices, showing their homage to all religions as true ones without any distinction between them, and also believing in the truth of *Ahimsa* and practising it. Obviously this principle is

neither correct nor practicable. It totally ignores the different religions and tendencies of inhabitants of India. It is one thing to be tolerant of other religions but it is quite another thing to believe them all as true in spite of their basic differences and contradictions. Such a thing does not prevail even among *Sanathan Dharmis*² and Jains who are the followers of two sects of the same religion Hinduism.

As regards non-violence (*Ahimsa*) it is an open fact that the Musalmans have adopted it as a measure of policy on account of their environments in India. But it does not mean that they have altogether forgotten or renounced the verses of Qur'an about the *Jehad*, or consider violence a sin even if it is practised on occasions of emergency. The word *Ahimsa* has been used in such a manner as to engender the fear that it would impress upon the minds of the innocent children an association with killing animals and would directly affect the social and religious custom of animal-slaughter prevalent among Musalmans. It will be a permanent source of trouble and tension in India in future. On the other hand, God forbid, if the scheme succeeds in the above sense and the disgust for the animal-slaughter and the belief in *Jehad* is inculcated in the minds of the young generation and all human beings used to condemn these things, then it would mean a total change in one of the religious beliefs of Musalmans and abolition of one of their social and religious rights, brought about by the new scheme of education. It is true that in India, the land of numberless divergent religions, no life is possible without mutual goodwill and tolerance. But equally impossible it is for Musalmans to give up their own Islamic culture and to get absorbed in a united nation, admitting of no difference between Islamic and non-Islamic cultures. The Musalmans are prepared to adopt an attitude of tolerance towards other religions so that life in itself may be peaceful and satisfactory notwithstanding divergent and contradictory views. They have been doing so in the past as well. If, contrary to this attitude, they are taught the lessons of a unifying nationalism destructive of the characteristics of Islamic civilisation, the practice would be not superfluous but a cause of future calamity and disorder.

The details of the scheme of primary education given in the report of Dr. Zakir Hussain require some amendments. Before suggesting those amendments we wish to make it clear that it is a firm conviction and unshakable belief of Musalmans that Islam is predominant upon their faith, actions and all the principles and details of their social and religious life. Their Islamic civilisation is superior to all other civilisations; and, to preserve it, the protection of Islamic culture is essential. They are not prepared even for a moment to give up their culture for any other culture. They consider freedom of religion to be more important than the political freedom. They would not accept anything having stultifying effect upon their beliefs, practices, or way of life. India has a population of 8 crores of Musalmans. No Government can afford to ignore the needs of such a large community; and if it does it cannot flourish. And education is after all the basic problem upon which depends the intellectual development of the nation as a whole. No scheme of education, therefore, can be successful or popular, if it does not satisfy the Muslim educational institutions and theological doctors. We regret to point out that no efforts have been made to secure the opinion of Muslim theological doctors and educational institutions on the Wardha Scheme of Education and even Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the premier religious body of Musalmans, has not been consulted. This is a fundamental mistake which must be

rectified immediately. In view of the above principle we consider the following amendments to be essential in the Scheme:

1. There should be no co-education.
2. The girls over 12 years should not be compelled to attend even separate girls schools.
3. Music should not be taught to Muslim children.
4. It is not legitimate for Muslim boys or girls to draw or sketch the pictures of living beings.
5. The Muslim boys learning Quran by heart should be exempted from compulsory education.

Besides these amendments, provision should also be made for the religious education of Musalmans. We want religious education to be made compulsory during the age of primary education. In the education of the Muslim girls special attention should be paid to domestic science and home industries. The curriculum should be so arranged as to suit the needs of boys and girls separately in their different circumstances. It is also essential that nothing against the religion of Musalmans should find place in the whole scheme of education, for instance, paying homage to statues, adopting non-Islamic methods for prayers or singing of un-Islamic songs.

In conclusion, we recommend the following resolution be adopted by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama regarding the Wardha Scheme of Education:

The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind considers the Wardha Scheme of education to be open to amendments and demands from those responsible for it to postpone the introduction of any scheme of education for 8 crores of Musalmans until and unless it has received the sanction and explicit agreement of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, otherwise the Muslims would not accept it and the whole responsibility of dissensions and recriminations in the country shall rest with the authors and promoters of the scheme.

(Sd/-) (MUFTA) MOHAMMAD KIFAYATULLAH

(Sd/-) (MAULANA) ABUL MOHASIN MOHD. SAJJAD

(Sd/-) (MAULANA) AHMAD SAEED

The Note of Dissent by Minority

We fully subscribe to all the principles and details given in the above report, excepting the views on religious education. We think that it is of no use to place the religious education in the hands of a joint Government. Instead of having common institutions for religious education, separate arrangements should be made for it by Musalmans themselves. The starting of Islamic *maktabs* should be demanded from the Government. With the introduction of this scheme it should also be made clear that if the private institutions of Musalmans imparting religious education agree to adopt the approved syllabus of the general scheme, then the students of those institutions should not be compelled to join the Government schools.

(Sd/-) (MAULANA) HIFZURREHMAN

(Sd/-) (MAULANA) NURUDDIN

Resolution 10: This Conference of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind declares that it is not advisable for the C.P. Government to insist upon the same Vidya Mandir Scheme, nor is it advisable to solve the question of spreading education on non-communal principles by the permission given to Musalmans of using the name of "*Baituliem*" or "*Madinatulilm*" for their separate institutions. The Jamiat considers that the denomination of the trust established for common education under the Government should be free from any communal distinction whatsoever.

Resolution 11: The President of the Indian National Congress has appointed a Sub-Committee in December 1938 to consider the ways and means of developing Indian industries. Not a single Muslim expert has been appointed on this Committee which is apparently tantamount to ignorance of Muslim rights. The Jamiat deprecates this attitude and, if the mistake is not rectified, it would be forced to declare that justice has not been done to Musalmans and their rights have been ignored in this matter.

Resolution 12: Whereas the Indian National Congress is the common political organisation of different peoples inhabiting India, this Conference draws the attention of the responsible leaders of the Congress to the fact that all objects, expressive of any particular religion or culture, or likely to injure the feeling of any community, should be excluded from the decorations of Congress meetings or processions or other proceedings or programmes or papers issued under the authority of the Congress.

Resolution 13: Whereas the Musalmans are dissatisfied with the attitude of some of the Congress Provincial Governments due to certain complaints received by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, this conference demands from the Indian National Congress that a non-official inquiry committee be appointed to investigate the grievances of Musalmans in Congress Provinces. This committee should also include the representative of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind and after proper inquiry of the above complaints steps should be taken to redress them.

Resolution 14: This Conference of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind deprecates attitude of the Orissa Congress Government, which has excluded Musalmans from the Orissa Cabinet, and the negligence of the C.P. Government which has failed to appoint a Muslim Minister in place of Mr. Sharif. The Conference demands from the Congress President and both of the above Governments to satisfy the Musalmans as soon as possible by making amends for this attitude and negligence.

Resolution 15: The Congress had defined "Hindustani" as the language generally spoken and understood in Northern India. According to this definition, Hindustani and Urdu are one and the same language. But the practice of some of the responsible Congressmen and responsible individuals in Congress Governments is found to be cutting right through this definition. They deliberately use, in season and out of season, such uncommon Sanskrit words as are not spoken anywhere in India, not to say of the Northern Provinces. The general public cannot even understand them. This action leads to the idea that the Congress Governments are trying to adopt clandestine means to mould the "Hindustani" into the pattern of Sanskrit language; and this changes altogether their own definition of the former. This attitude is most regrettable and cannot but result in mutual tension and mistrust of the Musalmans against the Congress. In view of these facts, this Conference demand from the Indian

National Congress to stop the above tendency immediately and make reparations for it.

Resolution 17: This Conference of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind views with horror and contempt the sporadic communal riots in India and regretfully declares that the Governments concerned have failed, to a great extent, to stop these riots and uproot their causes. This Conference appeals to all the Provincial Governments and all the lovers of India to take effective steps to free their motherland from the curse of these communal riots, so that the chains of their slavery may not be strengthened and the country may have an opportunity to live peacefully and make progress uninterruptedly.

Resolution 20: This Conference of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind appeals to all the political organisations and politicians of India to reject the proposed Scheme of Federation which is being forcibly thrust upon India and to make a united front to defend their country against the exploitation by British Imperialism through their continued sacrifices.

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1. The English version of the proceedings of the Conference have been reproduced verbatim in the absence of Urdu original.
 2. The Sanatan Dharma (literally meaning the "eternal religion") denotes congeries of beliefs and practices associated with the traditional form of Hinduism. Arya Samajists usually label traditional Hindus *Sanatanis*.

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Resolutions adopted by Jamiat-ul-Ulama's Central Committee on 7 March, 1939 in Delhi [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. III, pp. 303-304

Resolution 2: This meeting of the Central Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind deprecates the attitude of some of the Provincial Governments which have not yet released the State prisoners despite their hunger—strike, endangering not only their health but life itself. The Jamiat demands that these Governments should release the State prisoners forthwith.

Resolution 7: This meeting of the Central Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind openly declares that the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unacceptable to them, in as much as it goes against their creed of Complete Independence and has been rejected by Indian peoples in spite of the acceptance of offices. The Jamiat cannot agree to any Constitution other than the one adopted by the Constituent Assembly to be elected on the system of adult franchise. The present scheme of Federation is disastrous to the country as a whole and its acceptance would mean the voluntary acquiescence in slavery.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind urges upon the Congress, the Muslim League and other organisations and politicians to reject the scheme of Federation and make a united front to defeat the purpose of Imperialistic exploitation in India.

Resolution 10: This meeting of the Central Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind urges upon the Assam Government to abolish the "Assam line system" as it is contrary to Section No. 13 of the Fundamental Rights vouchsafed by the Congress, and aims at trampling down the Rights of Musalmans.

This Committee is not satisfied with the action taken by the All India Congress Working Committee in this connection as that action too does not conform to Section 13 of the "Fundamental Rights."

This meeting considers that the abolition of the system is the only remedy for the injustice done to the Musalmans of Assam and demands that the All India Congress Working Committee should take the steps to discontinue the system.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 25, pp. 59-60

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 20 March, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

D.O. NO. 130

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I had a talk with Sikander today about the suggestion made in your secret and personal letter to me of the 18th of March that the time has now come when Sikander's Federation scheme should be ventilated.

He asked me to thank you for your message and he explained to me that his scheme has not yet been reduced to black and white in a form suitable for publication. It would take Sikander at least a week to compile a complete statement of the scheme, and he does not anticipate that he will find leisure to do this till the conclusion of our Assembly session about the middle of April. He promised that he would in any case supply a copy of the scheme for your use and one for mine before it is published and will give careful consideration to the question of the manner and occasion to be selected for its release.

Sikander is going to Meerut on the 26th of March to attend a meeting of the Working Committee of the Muslim League. The principal item of the business is the discussion of Sir Abdullah Haroon's scheme of Federation¹ and Sikander hopes to be able to persuade the Muslim League not to adopt this scheme, which he described as "rabidly communal and likely to arouse bitter criticism from Hindus and also possibly to frighten away the Princes." I pointed out that if at the Meerut meeting Sikander strongly opposes the Haroon scheme, he might find himself obliged to announce that he has a scheme of his own and possibly would be questioned about its details. He said that if he were so pressed, he would certainly let it be known that he had an alternative scheme of his own, but he did not intend to reveal its details at Meerut.

I seem to recollect having heard or read of Haroon's scheme, but I do not remember

its details. In the course of our conversation Sikander also mentioned another scheme drawn up, I think by some Muslim subject of Hyderabad State.² I have seen some mention of this in the papers and my impression is that it involves the transfer of large blocs of population from one part of India to another and is on this account alone quite impracticable.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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1. Writing to Aga Khan in November-December, 1938 Abdullah Haroon had pointed out that the League circles had begun to drift in the direction of "a separate federation of Muslim States and Provinces so that we are free once for all, from the Hindu Molestation" quoted by K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 120.
 2. The reference is obviously to Dr. Syed Abdul Latif's scheme *see* 440 *infra*.

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Ahmad Bashir¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 96/63

22 March, 1939

To

The President
All India Muslim League,
DELHI.

Subject: The Pakistan Movement and the Cultural Zones Scheme.

Sir,

I, on behalf of the Pakistan Majlis, Lahore feel concerned with the Cultural Zones Scheme which is going to be shortly considered by the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League to be held at Meerut. As the Scheme is likely to influence the natural boundaries of Pakistan, I feel that the interest of Pakistan and the Movement started towards the creation of an independent State in the North-West of India comprising the whole of the Punjab, Kashmir, the North-Western Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan would materially suffer if the Cultural Zone Scheme is extended towards the North-West of India. I, therefore, earnestly hope that while the Pakistan Majlis recognizes and commends the Principle of the said Scheme as a basis for the Confederation of India excluding Pakistan, it is extremely jealous of preserving the political integrity of Pakistan which is only a step further than the Cultural Zones Scheme. The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League would, therefore, only do justice to the cause of Pakistan if its right of free growth and self-expression is duly recognised.

The Cultural Zones Scheme casts aside the half of the Eastern tracts of Kashmir

and the Punjab and includes Bundelkhand instead. This Eastern portion of the Punjab and Kashmir possesses the richest mineral and economic resources of Pakistan. I may bring it to your kind notice that the Mandi Hydro-Electric Power Station in the Kangra Valley, not only supplies electric power to about three-fourth of the Punjab but is also a potential source of revenue to the Province. If Kangra Valley is seceded from the Punjab it will be a severe blow to its economic order, and a substantial gain of Hindu India. Evidently we cannot afford to leave this great activity of modern economic development in others hand. Nobody disputes the principle of the Cultural Zones but culturally homogeneous States are primarily supposed to be economically independent States. I learn that the scheme does not ignore the regional division of the country, because the fundamental factors which are the pre-requisites of a political entity must conform to make up a whole. To think of a cultural basis alone and to ignore the other vital constituents, such as geographical boundaries, historical background and economic considerations, is not vouchsafed by practical politics. I need not go into the details of the validity of Pakistan as a political conception but it seems worthwhile to point out to the Working Committee that the extension of Cultural Zones Scheme to Pakistan would prove an utter failure. The Pakistan mind is slowly believing in its physical whole and any attempt to disintegrate this natural geographical identity will certainly be detrimental to the cause of Muslim India. It should, therefore, be expedient to allow the Pakistan Movement its own way.

The Commercial interests of the North-Western Zone of India give Pakistan Scheme a firm basis for its political structure. The great handicap which Pakistan would suffer in the proposed All India Federation is not remedied by the Cultural Zones Scheme which totally ignores the fact that the commercial interests of the capitalist India are radically different from those of Pakistan. I am sure that the case of Pakistan will meet justice at the hands of the members of Working Committee at Meerut. I trust that this would materially accelerate the progress of Indian Muslims as a nation and earnestly hope that the Committee will lend a helping hand to Pakistan.

I remain etc. etc.

AHMAD BASHIR
Secretary,
Pakistan Majlis,²
Riyaz Manzil,
Beadon Road, Lahore

Copy forwarded to (1) Mr. A.K. Fazlul Haque, (2) Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, (3) Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, (4) Secretary, Working Committee.

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1. Mian Ahmad Bashir a Punjabi Journalist and President, Pakistan Majlis.
 2. Majlis-i-Pakistan was a society established in Lahore in June or July, 1938 by some young men of Punjab in order to propagate Pakistan idea aimed at separating Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan from India. It had its branches at number of places. The Central body of the movement called Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan coming to existence in January, 1939.

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*Proceedings of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League**The Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. I, pp. 366-70*

The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League which met at Meerut on the 25 March 1939 appointed a committee to examine and report on the various draft schemes of constitutional reforms put forward to secure the rights and interests of Muslims in India.

The resolutions on constitutional changes referred to the League's opposition to the scheme of Federation as proposed in the Government of India Act. The working of the Provincial part of the Constitution, it was stated, had "created grave apprehension amongst Muslims and other Minorities regarding their future, because the Provincial scheme has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of the Muslim Minorities in various Provinces."

The Committee consisted of the following: Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, Syed Abdull Aziz, Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan,¹ Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan. The following is the text of the draft scheme which was prepared by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad and placed before the Sub-Committee of the League:

Whereas the Constitution provided in the Government of India Act of 1935 is not acceptable to the Muslims of India because—

(a) It is framed on the assumption that India is a composite nation which it is not and does not promise to be, so long as the Hindus and Muslims, the two leading or major nationalities of India continue to remain divided into two different social orders drawing direct inspiration in every detail of life from two fundamentally different religions or cultures,

(b) The democratic majority Government which it has established in most Provincial units, and aims to establish at the centre will in reality be a Government of a single majority nationality, viz., the Hindus, on whose sufferance the other nationalities will have to live,

(c) It will reduce the Muslims perpetually to the position of a helpless Minority at the Centre and in most of the British Provinces, as well as in all but a few of the several hundreds of Indian States,

(d) It will deny to them opportunity of economic regeneration and of free and independent cultural development on Islamic lines.

(e) It neutralises their historic importance in the country and eliminates for ever every prospect of their acquiring a status whereby they may exercise a steadying influence on the administration of the country and,

(f) It helps to intensify and perpetuate the prevailing cultural clashes between the Hindus and the Muslims—religious, social, economic, educational, and political,—all operating to put off indefinitely India's attainment to independence.

The Muslims of India call upon the British Parliament to replace the Government of India Act of 1935 by another which should lead the country to resolve itself into an

independent confederacy of culturally homogeneous free States as envisaged in Schedule I to this resolution.

Division into Zones: The establishment of a confederacy of culturally homogeneous States for India will call for the assignment of zones to such cultural units or nationalities in the country as may by virtue of their number and economic position afford to resolve themselves culturally into homogeneous States. Since this condition may be fulfilled in this case of the two leading nationalities of India, the Muslims and the Hindus, the Muslims of India will have to show where such zones may conveniently be formed for them, leaving the rest of the country to resolve itself into Hindu zones, so that self-secure in homelands of their own, the two might freely unite into a confederacy. The smaller nationalities such as the Christians or Anglo-Indians, Buddhists and Parsis who have not so far shown any irreconcilable cultural differences with either the Hindus or the Muslims may continue to live where they are enjoying under the Constitution of the country adequate and effective cultural safeguards, or be allowed, if they so desire, cantonal life, wherever possible, in each zone, whether Hindu or Muslim.

Dr. Latif's Scheme: The formation of such zones will take time as it will have to be effected by exchange of population spread conveniently over a number of years, on lines, more or less, followed by Turkey and Greece in 1923; but the demarcation should be made before the process starts. The exchange of population is ultimately a question of compensation for property in all forms left behind by migrants, and may be settled between the Governments of the areas concerned. The preparation of registers of those who will be involved in the exchange and the determination of the reciprocal financial obligations of the units concerned will have to be done in the transitional period. For the purpose the forthcoming Census of 1941 may do the spadework and furnish preliminary data for the consideration of a Royal Commission which will have to be appointed to demarcate the zones.

Confederacy for India : A lasting confederacy for India will be possible only when these zones are finally formed and rendered culturally homogeneous. This being the goal, and the only solution to the problem of Indian unity a Constitution will have to be devised for the transitional period which, while assuring political unity for the whole country, will allow no single nationality to obtain the upper hand over the other, and yet afford them all every moral urge to work together for the evolution of the needed homogeneous free States.

The transitional Constitution is suggested in broad outline in Part III of this Schedule, and should form the immediate objective.

But before outlining the transitional Constitution, the several zones into which India will ultimately have to be resolved may roughly be indicated here, leaving the final demarcation to the Royal Commission to be. This will determine the goal and influence the transitional stage.

Moslem homeland: As things stand, the following zones be assigned to the Moslems:

North-West-Block—There is at present a great Moslem block in the North-West consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir, Khairpur and Bahawalpur. The whole of this area needs to be converted into a Muslim Zone, allowing over 30 millions of Muslims a free homeland, of their own.

But as several Hindu and Sikh Indian States are situated therein governed by treaty relations with British Paramountcy, the Hindus and Sikhs of this area who materially do not differ from each other in culture, may concentrate into these States with the boundaries of the State of Kashmir and Jammu altered in certain respects to give them a free and homogenous cultural existence. This State has a predominant Moslem population. Its Hindu Ruler is in possession of the territory through a proprietary right acquired from the British in lieu of monetary consideration. In the interests of abiding peace in the land, the transaction may be re-settled with adequate compensation allowed to the Maharaja. This may be done either by transferring to the British Punjab such portions of the State as are predominantly Muslim in population in exchange for the British Kangra Valley which is at present predominantly Hindu, or in any other manner that may be mutually agreed to between the parties concerned in conformity with the requirements of the proposed confederacy of culturally homogeneous States.

It is to be added that Amritsar of religious importance to the Sikhs falling within the Muslim zone may be converted into a free city for the Sikhs.

North-East Block—Right on the other side of India, the North-East, there is a solid block of Muslims in Bengal and Assam of over 30 millions, who may be assigned a free political existence.

Delhi-Lucknow Block—In between the two above mentioned blocks the Muslims are unevenly distributed. Those of this area living close to each of the two blocks should be attracted for naturalization to the one nearer to them. The rest, the great bulk, belonging at present to the United Provinces and Bihar numbering about 12 millions, may be concentrated in a block extending in a line from the Western border of United Provinces to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way. This zone should be contiguous to the Punjab Muslim block but will leave out the Hindu religious centres of Mathura, Benaras, Haridwar and Allahabad.

The Deccan Block—The Muslims below the Vindhya and Satpuras are scattered all over the south in colonies of varying size and exceed 12 millions in number. For them a zone is to be carved. Such a zone the Dominions of Hyderabad and Berar may provide with a narrow strip of territory restored to them in the south, running down via Kurnool and Cuddapah to the City of Madras. There is an influential school of thought among the Muslims who prefer to have an opening to the Western Coast via Bijapur. Such a strip with an opening to the sea will be found necessary to settle the large Moslem mercantile and marine community living for ages on the Coromandal and Malabar Coasts.

Hyderabad has been chosen for the concentration of the Muslim population in the south because it commands a central position and will allow the formation of five autonomous cultural zones for the Hindus—the Mahrattas, the Andhras, the Tamilians, the Kanarese, and the Malayalis with exclusive boundaries of their own. To shift the Moslem zone from the central position chosen will be to push it into one of the five Hindu zones just mentioned. That will bifurcate the Hindu zone concerned and destroying its linguistic or cultural homogeneity. At present, three different Hindu nationalities, the Mahrattas, the Andhras and the Kanarese have overspread themselves on this area from their natural homelands on either side. They will now have to join their respective mainstocks and live a compact life with their own kind in British

India, leaving this neutral ground to concentrate within it the entire Muslim population from all over the Peninsula. It is only a matter of coincidence that this central land happens to be the domain of Muslim Ruler; but the thought of making it a homeland for Muslims is not chosen on that sole ground, although the coincidence may offer considerable facility in the final settlement.

The Muslims living outside of the areas covered by the four main Muslim zones, viz., those living in Rajputana, Gujarat, Malwa, and Western India States may concentrate in the Muslim Indian States situated in these areas, and a newly constituted free city of Ajmer which under the scheme will become culturally homogeneous for the Muslims.

Hindu Zones: The rest of India, will now be in a position to resolve itself into cultural zones for the Hindus according to the several languages spoken by them, viz., Bengali, Hindi, Oriya, Rajasthani, Gujarati, Maharattie, Telugu, Tamil, Canarese, and Malayalam or in any manner the Hindus may decide upon.

It may be pointed out that each cultural zone, Hindu or Moslem, will consist, wherever necessary, of British territory and Indian States grouped together in view of natural affinities. Each such zone will form a homogeneous State with a highly decentralized form of Government within, wherever more than a unit should compose the zone, but fitting along with similar States into an All India Confederacy.

The Safeguards: In the Constitution of the Confederacy the following provisions will need to be made :

Public Law of Indian Nations—1. Individuals belonging to one or other of the several nationalities may for special purposes, live in zones to which they do not naturally belong. Such individuals will be afforded security of person and rights of citizenships under a "Public Law of Indian Nations" to be adopted by the Central Government.

Religious Shrines, etc.—2. All religious shrines, monuments and graveyards belonging to the Hindus or the Moslems and left behind by either will be preserved and looked after by each confederate regional State under the supervision of the Central Government.

Christians, Parsis, Buddhists—3. The smaller nationalities such as the Christians or Anglo-Indians, Parsis and Buddhists will be afforded by each State, Moslem or Hindu, all the necessary religious or cultural safeguards which they may need to preserve their individuality. They will at the same time have the right to ask for a cantonal life for themselves, if they should desire at any time.

Harijans—4. The various depressed classes and untouchables, emphatically styled Harijans, dispersed as they are all-over the country and forming countless racial varieties and possessing no common culture between them, and being mostly landless will be given perfect liberty to choose the Hindu or Moslem zones to form their permanent homelands where they may enjoy the fullest rights of citizenship, even as the Christians or Anglo-Indians, Buddhists and Parsis.

This in broad outline is the form which the idea of a confederation of culturally homogeneous States will assume finally. The transitional period will need, therefore, to be marked by definite stages leading thereto. Part III outlines the immediate stage in the progress.

The transitional Constitution for India will have to fit into the conception of the

confederation outlined in Part II, and must lead to it. It may even take the form of a Federation, provided the residuary powers of the Centre are reduced to a bare minimum, but such federation should consist of units which may conveniently be grouped later on under the desired cultural zones. This will necessitate the creation of certain new Provinces on cultural or linguistic lines without involving immediate exchange of population. The new Provinces may be constituted even piecemeal, but one of them at any rate, should be carved immediately out of the present United Provinces with Lucknow as its centre. It should be formed with a view to resolving it eventually into a Muslim zone, and a permanent home for all the Muslims living at present in U.P. and Bihar.

It is for the constitutional lawyers to work out the details of the transitional Constitution, but any such Constitution should embody the following provisions:

1. In the Preamble, it must be clearly brought out that the aim of the transitional Federal Constitution laid down is to lead India to a confederacy of only culturally homogeneous free States.

2. *Legislation*—(a) The Federal Legislative List should be reduced to a minimum number of items and be confined only to subjects which concern the common political and economic interests of India as a whole.

(b) All other subjects should form the Provincial list subject to the following provisions:

Regional Boards—There may be subjects of cultural and economic importance common to contiguous federal units and it will be found useful to have for them Regional or Zonal Boards to evolve a common line of action, leaving the individual federal units to legislate in the light of the common policy evolved.

Three of the zones may be constituted as follows:

1. North-West Zone composed of Sind, Baluchistan, N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Khairpur, and the Indian States of the Punjab Agency.
2. North-East Zone composed of Bengal and Assam.
3. The Dominions of Hyderabad and Berar.

The above arrangement has two advantages:

- (i) It will remove Cultural Legislation from Federal control.
- (ii) It will develop a zonal or regional sense necessary to evolve culturally autonomous States which the transitional Constitution is to lead to.

Transition Stage: Safeguards for Muslims—Whatever be the nature of the transitional Federal constitution, whether consisting of newly formed units as suggested above or of units in their existing form, the Muslims will need the undermentioned safeguards to be incorporated in the Constitution.

Representation on Legislature—1. The system of separate electorate for Muslims should be maintained, as well as the existing proportion of Muslims in the several Legislatures.

2. The inclusion of the Indian States in an All India Federation should be made dependent upon their returning to the Central Legislatures a sufficient quota of Muslims so as to maintain their present proportion at the Centre.

3. If the proposed Zonal or Regional Boards are established the Muslims should

be allowed adequate and effective representation commensurate with their total strength in the Legislatures of several units composing each zone.

Legislation—All subjects touching their religion, personal law and culture will be the exclusive concern of the Muslim members of the Legislature concerned, constituted into a Special Committee for the purpose. The strength of the Committee should be augmented by a third by co-opting, by means of ballot representative Muslims learned in Muslim Law and Religion. The decision of such a Committee should be accepted by the whole Legislature. If such decisions should seem to affect the interests of other nationalities they may on reference made by the head of the Administration, be reviewed by the Legislature as a whole, but no amendment shall be permissible which would affect the basis of the legislative enactment.

Executive—The Executive Government or the Ministers in each Province or at the Centre should not be drawn from the majority party alone as is the vogue in homogeneous democratic countries like England. Here in India, it is the majority nationality which permanently returns the majority of members to the Legislature and in as much as the majority nationality, namely the Hindus, unfortunately differ from the Muslims, the next largest nationality in the country, not merely in the fundamentals of life and outlook but in almost every detail of domestic and social life, the governance of the country by a permanent majority in the Legislature resolves itself into the governance of the country by the majority nationality only and cannot be expected to be a Government of the whole people.

The Executive that needs to be chosen for every Province and the Centre should in the present stage be a composite executive representing Hindus and Muslims with an agreed policy acceptable to both, and not liable to be turned out by the Legislature. That should be the arrangement, at any rate, until India resolves itself into a confederation of culturally autonomous free States, when alone true democracy may take its birth in the country, and responsible Government justified.

Under the transitional Constitution, therefore, the Executive should be not a "parliamentary executive" in the English sense, but a "stable executive" independent of Legislature as in the great democracy of the United States of America, but the Prime Minister instead of being elected directly by the people as the President in U.S.A., should be elected by the entire Legislature, and should remain in office during the life of the legislature, and will not be removable by it. He will choose his colleagues of Ministers in the interests of good Government from the members of all groups in the Legislature, an equitable number of whom should be Muslims enjoying the confidence of the Muslim members of the Legislature concerned and should be selected from a panel suggested by them.

Of the two Provinces into which Hindustan will be divided, the Prime Minister for the Lucknow Province should be a Muslim, as this area will have in the transitional period to prepare itself to resolve into a Muslim zone, and will have its policy to be directed by a Muslim.

In the case of the portfolios affecting Law and Order and Education which have to deal with problems over which cultural differences arise, provision should be made to have a Minister and an Assistant Minister and to appoint a Muslim to either of the two posts, in order that the Government may have the benefit of his steadying influence.

Public Service Commission—It should be provided in the Constitution that in all Provinces where the Muslims are in a minority and at the Centre, one of the members of the Public Service Commission should be a Muslim part of whose duty shall be to see that the ratio fixed for the Muslims in public services is properly adhered to in practice by the Government.

Judiciary—The Personal Law of the Muslims should be administered by Muslim Judges.

Muslim Board of Education and Economic Uplift—It should be provided in the Constitution that in each provincial unit a Muslim Board should be established to control and supervise the cultural side of the education of Muslims, their technical and industrial training and to devise measures for their economic and social uplift. For this purpose a proper budgetary provision shall be made.

Special Taxation—If for any special object, the Muslims are willing to tax themselves, the necessary legislation should be passed.

Exchange of Population: One of the objects of the transitional Constitution is to facilitate and prepare the ground for the migration of Muslims and the Hindus into the zones specified for them so as to develop them into culturally autonomous States. During the transitional period migration should be on a voluntary basis. For this the necessary legislation will have to be passed for each region, and a machinery set up to organize and regulate this voluntary migration. The proposed Constitution will, therefore, have to provide for the appointment of a Royal Commission to lay down a suitable programme of gradual exchange of population.

The result of voluntary migration may be reviewed from time to time and if it should be found that it has eliminated the cultural clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus to an appreciable extent and given them a sense of security wherever they need it, or has brought about a change of heart in either camp, the question of compulsory migration may be put off indefinitely, and the voluntary method adhered to for a further term.

1. Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Member, Legislative Assembly, N.W.F.P.

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Liaqat Ali Khan's¹ speech

Propounds Partition of India² Nation's Voice, p. 355

Meerut, 25 March, 1939. 'I want an independent India where Muslims have power and freedom, for the Muslims are a nation and not a community. It would be a travesty to dismiss 90 million people with a glorious past as a community. Although Hindus and Muslims live in the same country, they live differently because their religion, culture and civilization are different. Muslims do not favour the pseudo-nationalism that the Hindus have borrowed from Europe. If Hindus and Muslims

could not now live together amicably in India—and it had become almost impossible for them to co-exist under the same regime—then they might be able to do so by dividing the country on a religious and cultural basis.’

1. Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan (1895-1951); Member, U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1926-40; General Secretary, All India Muslim League, 1936-47; Chairman, All India Muslim League, Central Parliamentary Board, Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1940-47; Finance Member in Interim Government, 1946-47; attended London Conference for dividing India, December, 1946; Prime Minister of Pakistan, August, 1946, 16 October, 1951.
2. This is probably the first occasion when suggestion for India's partition was made from All India Muslim League Platform by an important League functionary.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 75-77

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 28 March, 1939

PRIVATE

6. I had a visit some few days ago from the two Indian Muslims who have been watching the proceedings of the Palestine Conference over here, namely, Mr. Siddiqui¹ and Mr. Khaliqzaman.² They talked a little vaguely about the Palestine problem and then turned to what they obviously really wished to discuss with me, namely, the position of the Muslim community in India in the event of a scheme of federation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1935 coming into existence. They spoke very strongly on the question and told me that they did not think that it would be possible for the Muslims to acquiesce in the introduction of the scheme. I asked them whether in these circumstances they had any alternative suggestion of a constructive character to put forward. They replied that they had and that what they would propose would be the establishment of three or four federations of Provinces and states which would be coordinated by a small Central body of some kind or another. The whole object of the scheme, of course was to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the Centre as the Hindus. They were very vague when we came to details, but I rather gathered that what was in their minds was a federation of the Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India; a further federation of Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the east; and a further federation or possibly more than one further federation, of the other Provinces and States in the remaining part of India. They clearly had failed to consider the practical difficulties in the way of such a scheme, but I gathered from them that many Muslims were thinking on these lines and what they told me confirms to some extent the view which I expressed in a letter to you not very long ago to the effect that we should probably have greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into the federation than the Congress.

I must say that as we get nearer to the date when all parties will have to lay their cards upon the table, the difficulties of bringing the federation into existence seem to me to be gaining in magnitude.

1. Abdur Rahman Siddiqui (1887-1953); founding Member, All India Muslim League, 1906; Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937-46; editor, *Morning News*, 1942-48; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1946; Governor, Former East Pakistan.
2. Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui met Lord Zetland in London on 20 March, 1939, the day before they were to return to India.

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Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the second half of March, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-3/39, pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

1. *Political. Congress*:—M. Obaidullah Sindhi¹ arrived at Lahore from Karachi on the 22nd of March and was met by a few Muslim adherents of Congress. He caused some offence to the Khaksars by refusing their salute on the grounds that he did not cooperate with those who abused Maulvis. He was made the guest of honour at a small meeting attended mostly by Ahrar and Congress workers at Lahore on the 27th of March in which he explained that his programme was to unite under one banner all existing political organisations in India.

The members of the Egyptian delegation to the Congress session at Tripuri paid a brief visit to Lahore. In an interview granted to a few journalists they commented on the similarity of the Indian and Egyptian problems and declared that religion and love of country must go hand in hand. Punjabi Muslims looked upon the deputation with great suspicion and regarded their acceptance of the Congress invitation to India as highly detrimental to the best interests of Indian Muslims.

Hindu Affairs—In Hindu circles there has been a continuance and spread of the agitation over affairs in Hyderabad. Local interest has been stimulated by the arrest and sentence of 1½ years imprisonment passed on Mahasha Khushal Chand, Proprietor of the daily "*Milap*" newspaper, who was appointed 3rd Dictator of the Hyderabad Satyagraha Committee. Small parties of volunteers leave the Punjab at intervals to take part in the Civil Disobedience Movement and a considerable sum of money to finance them has been collected from all over the Province.

Muslim Affairs—Activity in the Ahrar camp continued unabated and there have been frequent conferences and meetings of which the Provincial conference at Jullundur on the 25th and 26th of March was the most important. The selection of Jullundur for the meeting was prompted by a desire to support Ahrar candidates in the elections to local bodies there. The Ahrars have been working in close collaboration with Congress and no longer try to conceal their alliance with that body. They have also been arranging to despatch volunteers to take part in the *Madah-i-Sahaba* agitation at Lucknow.

Communal and Sectarian—The general communal situation is still unsatisfactory and Hindu agitation against the Hyderabad State still causes great resentment among Muslims, especially in the Western Punjab. The situation in Amritsar, however, improved sufficiently to justify the withdrawal of all restriction orders under Section 144, C.P.C., except the one forbidding the carrying of arms. But the situation was rendered delicate by attacks of Ahrars on other Muslims who are accused of having been bought over by Hindus so as not to give evidence against them in cases arising out of the disturbances. In a counter-attack by some of these Muslims on Ahrar workers one person was fatally wounded on the 21st of March. A Sikh was stabbed by two Muslims on the 27th March but the reason of the quarrel is not yet known.

Unrest continues in Rawalpindi City. Portions of a calf were found at three different places in or near temples and Gurdwaras.

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1. Obaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944), born near Sialkot, Punjab, in a Sikh family; Converted to Islam, 1887; educated in Sind and at Deoband. Minister in Raja Mahender Prataps, first Provisional Government of India in Kabul, 1915; visited Turkey, Russia and Arabia, 1915-39; author and commentator of the Quran.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 80-83

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 4 April, 1939

PRIVATE

8. I agree with what you say in paragraph 5 *re* "Pakistan" and similar schemes. So far as I know, nothing really concrete on these lines has yet seen the light of day. On the other hand, if the Muslims will not play and the Princes shy off, we shall have to ask ourselves in all seriousness—what next? The recent proceedings in the Legislative Assembly in connection with the Budget and the Trade Agreement demonstrate pretty conclusively to my mind the impossibility of regarding the existing structure at the Centre as anything more than a makeshift, which will not for long stand the strain which must increasingly be imposed upon it as autonomy takes deeper roots in the Provinces. I am becoming a good deal disturbed by the increasing tension between the Muslims and the Hindus. A gloomy picture is painted by Haig in the last Fortnightly Report which I have seen from the United Provinces and I have just read a similar report by Wylie, from which it is clear that the communal problem is as acute in the Central Provinces as it is in the United Provinces. Moreover, I see little prospect of improvement in this respect. Indeed, it seems to me to be more than likely that the tension will continue to grow, at any rate until the issue of Federation is settled.

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*Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 51, pp. 113-16*

6 April, 1939

SECRET

NO. U.P. 240

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. It is difficult to forecast the influence of the acute antagonism at present existing between the Hindus and Muslims; but this is a factor which might have very profound effects on the situation. We may I think start from the premise that the Indian Muslims have no sentimental attachment to the British connection, though the recollection of a long period of friendly relations will not be without its influence. They have at various times supported the British strongly against revolutionary movements, but that support has been given on a calculation of their own interests and was based on the view that a victory by the Congress over the British would mean the establishment of complete Hindu domination in the country. The temper of the Muslims since the assumption of office by the Congress Governments has become not only increasingly anti-Hindu but increasingly anti-British. The reason is that they feel that they have not had the protection against the Hindus which they had expected as a result of their past support of the British against the Congress. The British are accused of having entered into an alliance with the Congress. The Muslims feel to some extent that they have been betrayed. They are in a bad temper, and in such a frame of mind they might take unwise decisions. If, however, it came once more to an open struggle between the British and the Congress, as it well might under the conditions we are considering under head (a) then I should hope it might be possible to rally the support of the Muslims for I think their present master passion is a hatred and distrust of the Hindus. But it is possible that their support would only be given on terms, and the British Government will have to consider very carefully how far they are prepared to make certain political concessions to the Muslims in order to secure that support. We can hardly expect the Muslims to support us, only to find at the end that they are put back again under the domination of the Hindus.

4. An incalculable factor in the Muslim situation is their liability to be carried away by waves of religious fanaticism which may originate with events outside India, which are to some extent beyond our control. The Palestine situation in this connection may clearly be crucial, or feelings might be stirred up by a big pan-Islamic movement, and everything that is likely to sow distrust of the British policy will be sedulously fostered by German and Italian propaganda.

5. Altogether the Muslim situation is in my opinion the key to the whole position, and it seems to me vital to do everything possible to prevent the Muslims siding against us in the event of war. It might seem inconceivable that in the present state of feeling Hindus and Muslims would unite against us. But it is not necessary to

contemplate a Hindu-Muslim alliance. It is not impossible, if the situation were unwisely handled, that we should find the Hindus fighting us on their policy, and the Muslims on theirs. A situation like this would be very difficult to hold.

Yours sincerely,
H.G. HAIG

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 53, pp. 117-21

10 April, 1939

SECRET
NO. U.P. 241

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

2. The acute ill-feeling between Hindus and Muslims continues to dominate the Provincial scene. In Benares, in spite of vigorous administrative measures, occasional stabbings and shortlived panics take place. The Superintendent of Police, an excellent Muslim officer, broke down completely a short time ago and has had to proceed on leave. He was not in a good state of health when the riots broke out and was on the point of proceeding on long leave. The strain of the riots was great, and as soon as the acute phase was over the Hindus started a campaign of attacks on him (quite unjustified) for communal prejudice. I fancy he felt these a good deal. At Allahabad there have been some disturbances and stabbings which at one time created a great deal of nervousness. There again, however, administrative action has been prompt, vigorous and far-reaching, and I hope that the situation has practically returned to normal. You may be interested to read the comment of *The Leader* on those disturbances, and I enclose one of their articles. *The Leader* is of course published in Allahabad, and it is interesting to see how greatly they appreciate the action of the authorities. Cawnpore, I fear, is still in an unsettled state, and there has been great tension in Lucknow, though that is due to the controversy between Sunnis and Shias and not between Hindus and Muslims. I will refer to that later. But the result is that in four out of our five large cities (Agra being the one exception) extreme vigilance is required in order to prevent outbreaks of rioting. I mentioned in my letter of March 25th that there had been some unusual communal outbreaks in the district of Badayun. The situation there has been brought under control, but there is uneasiness in some of the neighbouring districts, and Muslim villagers are said to feel that they may be attacked.

5. While, as I have said, I think the administrative action at present in contemplation to deal with the Hindu-Muslim situation is adequate, my mind runs constantly on the underlying causes. We cannot afford indefinitely to have these conditions persisting; but unless something is done to deal with the underlying causes,

I fear the present feeling will not only continue, but even grow worse. To my mind there is no doubt that the root cause of the trouble is that the Muslims look upon the present Government as *Hindu Raj*, and to a very large extent the Hindus also have the same feeling. In these conditions it does not require any striking and obvious examples of injustice, which indeed are really lacking, to keep alive the flame of communal animosity. The Muslims, feeling themselves politically impotent, stir up religious issues. The Hindus, feeling themselves on top, tend to show an aggressive and intolerant spirit; and apart from these religious irritants the intrigue and petty political jobbery which is so prevalent gives the Muslims a sense of grievance and unfair treatment. As you know I have held these views about the fundamental causes of the Hindu-Muslim trouble for a long time, but I reproduce an extract from the last fortnightly report of the Commissioner of Meerut, dated March 27th 1939, which makes the same point. He wrote: "I would not like to exculpate the organisations of either community. But the root of the matter seems largely to be that the Hindu rank and file think that now they can assert themselves and disregard Muslim susceptibilities to a greater degree than previously because in their view they have now a Hindu Government."

6. I can myself see no cure for these conditions short of admitting to the Government real representatives of the Muslim community. As you know, I have raised this matter with Pant more than once, but he does not seem to be considering it seriously. The point was raised also publicly in the Budget debates and elicited from the Government an unfavourable response. Circumstances have rendered it out of the question hitherto for Governors to take any effective action in regard to including members of important Minority communities in their Cabinets in accordance with paragraph VII of the Instrument of Instructions. The inclusion of two Congress Muslims in my Cabinet is of course not the slightest solace to the feelings of the Muslim community as a whole, who regard the present Ministry as a Hindu administration, the Congress as a Hindu body, and the Congress Ministers as renegades. If, however, present tendencies continue, Hindu-Muslim antagonisms increase, and general opposition to the Government grows, the time may, it seems to me, come when the Governor of this Province may be in a position to insist that the Cabinet should be recast and should include representatives of the Muslim League. Meantime I shall continue to make clear my views to Pant.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 2

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 12 April, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

10. I think that the Pakistan scheme received its first real ventilation at the

recent meeting of the Muslim League at Meerut, but I have no doubt that we shall hear more about it, or its variants, from other sources. I am not unduly perturbed, for I do not believe that any of the schemes that have so far been ventilated have the least chance of surviving critical examination. Their real significance lies in the evidence they give of the increasing uneasiness of mind of the Muslims, an uneasiness which Jinnah, as you know, has already stressed very strongly to me, and which was again brought to my notice by Sir Zia-ud-din Ahmed, to whom I gave an interview a few days ago. Hindu-Muslim tension in the Provinces beyond any question is becoming more and more marked; and I fear that I must share your conclusion also that there is little prospect of improvement, and that the tension is likely, if anything, to increase rather than diminish so long as the Federation issue remains unsolved. Every party and every special interest in India is at the moment, as I see it, busy manoeuvring for a good position under Federation. All the more reason for hoping that Their Highnesses will, in their own interests, make a wise decision and that we may be able to get on with the scheme. In connection with Muslim uneasiness, an intelligence report has just come to hand from Karachi which suggests that Jinnah in communicating with Khaliquzzaman and Siddiqi who, as you know, are still in Europe, and ordering them to get into touch with Hitler and Mussolini to whom they are to put the case of the Muslims in India. Goodness knows what Jinnah and his friends expect to get from this contact, but—while I take the report with a grain of salt—I judge it by no means impossible that there is something of substance in it, given the present mood of acute, but rather formless apprehension, which is at the moment so evident amongst Muslims throughout India.

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*Linlithgow to Maurice Hallett [Extract]**Hallett Papers, No. 26, pp. 20-21*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 14 April, 1939

SECRET

My dear Hallett,

2. What concerns me most at the moment in the general position over India as a whole is, I think, the increasing communal tension and what is quite clearly the extreme disquietude of the Muslims in so many Provinces and at the Centre, as to their position and the course of action and the policy which it would be wise for them to adopt. It is quite obvious that they are very seriously concerned, and that they take what I would judge to be an unduly pessimistic view of the outlook for their community: and I wish I could see some practicable method of reassuring them, without appearing to throw down a challenge to the other side. I have seen a number of prominent Muslims—Jinnah, Yaqub,¹ Zia-ud-Din Ahmad, the Nawab of Chhatari, among others—in these last few days and I have been very anxious to give

them all possible opportunities of stating their case and of putting forward suggestions. But though without exception they have stated their case with great vigour and have left me in no doubt as to their apprehensions, I have found them by no means fertile in expedients for dealing with the situation. Thus it is no good suggesting, as one of my visitors did, that the extended franchise is at the root of the trouble and that what we ought to do is to scrap the existing franchises and go back to the method of election based on Panchayats. Nor is there the least prospect of Parliament considering a radical amendment of the Act so as to put the Muslims in a safe position even if we could hope to get an amendment of that character through without producing the most awkward repercussions here. Nor is the proposal that a Committee of Enquiry should be set up to consider in individual Provinces whether Governors have or have not used their special powers properly for the defence and protection of the Minorities practical politics (I have incidentally endeavoured to draw the attention of those who have put that suggestion to me to the probable attitude of the Muslim Community were a corresponding suggestion to be made in the case of the Punjab or Bengal). I will not develop this point further, for I have sent you separately a note left with me by Zia-ud-Din Ahmad on which I have asked you to be so kind as to comment. But I would greatly appreciate it if when you let me have your remarks on the points he has raised, you would let me have also any comments or suggestions that occur to you in connection with the reassuring of responsible Muslim opinion, and the removal of the misapprehensions under which the community in certain respects unquestionably seems to labour. I would also greatly welcome it if you could give me your personal impression of the extent to which there is any foundation for suggestion which are so frequently repeated to me of indirect oppression of small Muslim Minorities in agricultural districts. I know the difficulty of establishing the facts in cases of that character. But I feel no doubt that Commissioners and other senior officers have a very just idea of the general position in the areas with which they are concerned. What is pretty clear I think is that we are moving into a period in which we may expect communal tension to become if anything more marked than before and in which the relative solidity of the Muslim League and the obvious uneasiness of prominent and responsible Muslims at the general trend of affairs in India is likely to make the situation more difficult from the general point of view of maintaining law and order. If I am correct in that, it goes without saying that it is more important than ever to endeavour to make Congress Ministers and Governments realise the need for walking exceedingly carefully, and for doing everything that possibly can be done to remove misunderstandings and to take action where improper or provocative conduct by either side can be established.

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1. Sir Mohammad Yaqub (1879-1942); President AML Session, Calcutta, December 1927-December 1928; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1924-38; Deputy President, 1927-30, President 1930, Secretary, AML, 1930-35; officiated as Member, Commerce and Industries, Government of India, January-March and June-July, 1938; Member, Council of State, 1938-42; Reforms Adviser to the Nizam Government, 1941.

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Tej Bahadur Sapru to D.G. Dalve¹ [Extract]

Sapru Papers, Series, 2 Roll No. 1

15 April, 1939

My dear Dalve,

11. What the reactions of the international situation may be it is not very easy to foresee. For one thing I feel that in the beginning the Congress will help the Government in their campaign of recruitment etc., but the rank and file will go on indulging in nasty speeches about British Imperialism and things of that kind. The Mohammadans will probably be in an angry mood because the Congress will be helping the Government. A stage may be reached when the British may have to take strong action. They will probably then make up with the Muslims. All this, of course, is mere speculation. The long and short of it is that Provincial Autonomy has brought us not happiness but unhappiness. It has not helped us to compose our difference but widened them and it has shaken the faith of many of us in our capacity for self-rule.

Hoping you are well and with kindest regards,

Yours very sincerely,
D.G. DALVE Esqr.,
Alexandra Road,
Gamdevi, Bombay (7)

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1. Gopalrao Dajiba Dalve (1880-1951); Editor, *Maratha Mitra*, Bombay, 1909-16; Secretary, Madhya Prant Hindu Sabha, 1923-35; left Hindu Sabha and joined the anti-Brahmin movement of Keshavrao Jedhe; Editor, *Janata* weekly.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, pp. 178-81

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 17 April, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

7. I continue to be rather distressed by the Muslim attitude. The community are completely puzzled as to the wise course to adopt and they are not particularly well led, for Jinnah, though clever, keeps things too much in his own hands and is too

much concerned to run a purely personal policy on a basis of mystery. They have clearly a very strong feeling that the ground is slipping from under their feet and that the "arrogant" Hindu majority backed by better brains is engaged in undermining their position; and they are, or profess to be, doubtful as to the extent to which they can really depend upon us. I have given you in an earlier letter Jinnah's views, and I have in the last few days granted interviews to Chhatari, Sir Mohammad Yamin Khan,¹ Sir Mohd. Yakub, Sir Zia-ud-din Ahmad and one or two others, all of whom have had the same tale to tell. When, however I ask them what their remedy is, I get no suggestion that is worth serious consideration. Yakub ingenuously indicated that a restriction of the franchise and an amendment of the Act to take us back to election by panchayats, would be of assistance. Others suggest a committee of enquiry to establish whether or not Governors have failed to discharge their special responsibility towards Minorities; others on amendment of the Act definitely to safeguard the position of the Muslims. None of these, I need not say, is practical politics. But what is clear is that Jinnah is not the only person in the Muslim fold who has come to the conclusion that the demerits of Home Rule from the Muslim point of view substantially outweigh its merits, and that had it been possible to foresee how the situation would develop consequent on the grant to the demand of Indian nationalism of so many of its requests, the Muslims might have adopted a very different attitude! I had a long talk with Zafrullah² and asked him what he thought about the position. He was as sensible and realist as usual, and told me that he was fully familiar with the grievances of his co-religionists, but that while no doubt here and there might be individual cases of oppression by Congress Governments or Hindu officials, he had come across no single case in respect of which Government could be pilloried and that he had so informed his friends. I asked him whether there was anything which he thought I could usefully do. His reply was decisively in the negative, and he agreed that what it came to was that having clamoured for these powers and for this delegation of control by His Majesty's Government the Muslims now found that it was not working out as they anticipated and did not like it. I have been interested in this connection to notice in more quarters than one the tendency to suggest that with the turn the world is now taking all parties here are much more temperamentally inclined to totalitarian Government (with I need not say its implication of the underdog having his head kept well under) and that the attractions of democracy may be rather beginning to wear a little thin.

8. As I read the letters I receive from Governors I find myself asking whether the time may not be coming at which we could begin to encourage them to adopt a rather stiffer attitude as regards both the protection of Minorities such as the Muslims, and as regards service questions. Our policy has, of course, consistently been for the last two years since Provincial Autonomy was introduced to give Ministers every possible chance to settle in and to consolidate their position, and we have, if anything, erred rather on the side of being unduly disposed to find a middle path where individual judgement and the like are concerned. I do not for a moment regret that we have done so. I am sure that the policy which we have followed was a wise policy and indeed the only one; and even today I am inclined to doubt very much whether there is any case as yet for any substantial modification of it.

9. It is arguable on the other hand that Ministers have now had time to settle in; that they have found their feet; that they have realised that the powers transferred under the Act are very great indeed; and that whatever they may say they would probably be reluctant to lose the sweets as well as the responsibilities of office save for some good reason. Equally while there is obviously the risk that the High Command may seek opportunity to reestablish their sadly riven front by uniting Provinces against His Majesty's Government on some issue of common interest, I am a little inclined to doubt whether they will do so unless they too think the case a really good one. And it may be argued that if that is so, we should be justified in urging Governors to take a somewhat stiffer line with recalcitrant-Ministers. The type of difficulty which Wylie has had over postings in the Central Provinces (I am sending you a copy of the papers); the attitude adopted by Shukla as described by Wylie over war preparedness arrangements last autumn; in Bihar the somewhat supine attitude of Ministers and their tendency to divert responsibility on to the shoulders of the Civil servants,—all these are instances of the type of thing I have in mind.

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1. Sir Mohammad Yamin Khan; Khan (1888-1966); Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1921-23; and 1927-45 and of Council of State, 1924-25; Secretary, Muslim League party in the Legislative Assembly, 1938-45.
 2. Khan, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah (1893-1985); belonged to Ahmadiya Community; Advocate Lahore High Court 1916-35; Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1926-35; delegate to Round Table Conference, 1930-32 and to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 1933; President All India Muslim League, Delhi Session, 1931; Member, Viceroy's Council, 1932 and 1935-41; Kt. 1935; Judge Indian Federal Court, 1941-47; Leader Pakistan delegation to UN, 1947, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan, 1947-54; Member, International Court of Justice, 1954-61 and 1963 to April 1970 and its President April, 1970-72; President of the United Nations General Assembly, 1962.

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Francis Wylie to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 66, pp. 138-43

CAMP, CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR, 18 April, 1939

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

6. Interference with the work of the local executive officers is a fair charge against my Ministry, particularly if Hindu-Muslim tension is acute or if a local Congress organisation is in anyway involved. On the whole, however, this interference shows, I think, a tendency to become less—except in the case of Hindu-Muslim tension or a Hindu Muslim fracas—and I am not without hope that the law of inertia will presently affect local Congress bodies and that a *modus vivendi* will be established under which the district officials will be able to carry out at least 90 per cent, of their regular duties without undue interference from any quarter. Already Ministers have had to

put it out that they are tired of receiving complaints direct and the persons who feel themselves aggrieved must go in the first instance to the local officials.

12. Forcing a Hindu and non-Muslim culture on Muslims. I have a strong feeling that Shukhla would gladly give his undoubted tendency in this direction its full bent if he dared. Muslims are, however, very wide awake in such matters and in fact they frequently cry before they have received any real hurt. In the Education Department in the Central Provinces and Berar there is, however, a definite tendency to favour Hindu language and culture—nothing very obvious or palpable, but the thing is quite definitely there and that Shukla encourages it I have no sort of doubt whatsoever. In the meantime he has no intention of implementing his agreement with Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan—about which I told Your Excellency in one of my fortnightly letters—at any time in the near future. I suggested to him secretly the other day that it would be a good plan for him to promote a senior Muslim Inspector of Schools as Deputy Director of Public Instruction and make him Inspector of European, Anglo-Indian and Urdu Schools. He thanked me for the idea, but so far has done nothing about it and probably intends to do nothing. Let us be fair however. This battle of what are called “cultures” is a very pervasive thing and if we are abusing our position to some extent here Hyderabad with their Osmania University and the exclusive use of Urdu as the medium for instruction—in a State where over 80 per cent of the population are Hindus—are manifestly out for the same game only the other way round. I am told that the so-called “*Bande Mataram*” students from Hyderabad to whom we have so hospitably opened our University doors all talk Urdu like Aligarh lawyers!

14. It is true that enquiries are sometimes instituted against Muslim officers which would not, I strongly suspect, have been taken up if the officers concerned had been Hindus. A case in point. An accusation reached Shukla’s ears, no doubt, from the local Congress Committee—that a Muslim Tahsildar in a district called Mandla was going to take a bribe in a certain case. A C.I.D. Inspector was sent immediately from headquarters with a marked hundred rupee note in his pocket. He got in touch with the Tahsildar who accepted the note and was duly run in. Shukla on the file gave explicit orders that the Deputy Commissioner was not to be informed of the plot and the Deputy Commissioner of the district happens to be a Muslim. I protested vigorously against the whole procedure when it came to my notice and all I can hope is that Shukla may be not quite so ready to try it again when another chance occurs. Your Excellency knows the struggles I have had here to prevent penal transfers of Muslim officers—Rahim, Hussain & Co., that Muslim officials have to walk very warily these days there is no shadow of doubt. That so far they have not suffered much is due, I believe solely to the efforts of the Governor—not only myself but my predecessors—but once again I must repeat that where the Governor’s efforts succeed the facts are not usually known while the case in which he fails becomes a *cause celebre*. All Muslim officials are not angels, however, and one or two in this Province who have been rather suddenly transferred have to my certain knowledge deserved it.

15. It is true that we have no Muslim Minister here and I have repeatedly advised Shukla to find himself one. He told me just recently—and for the first time—that his orders are that he may not take a Minister from among our Muslim M.L.A’s unless the

individual selected is in a position to bring a group of his colleagues on the Muslim benches across the floor of the House with him. Shareef, he tells me, is now definitely barred by the High Command. In the present state of communal feeling in the Province while the lure of office would probably be quite enough to win over almost any single individual—the one who is actually to become a Minister—I see no prospect of the latter being able to persuade any of his colleagues to take the Congress pledge for his benefit. What will happen in the end I do not know. Shukla himself admits that he would be better off with a Muslim colleague in the Council, but he is bound by the order mentioned which apparently issued after discussion between Vallabhbhai Patel and Gandhi at Bardoli two or three months ago.

16. It is quite untrue that Muslims do not get a fair share of public appointments in this Province. Due to the composite nature of the Province and to the lack in the beginning of any educated class from which candidates for Government service could be drawn our public servants (sic) are many of them outsiders or the descendants of outsiders and Muslims have a share far beyond the percentage to which they would be entitled on a population basis. I forget the exact figure, but I think that they have some 22 per cent of public appointments in the Province, whereas they form only some 4 per cent, of the population.

17. I am afraid that the above paragraphs will be of little use in the way of providing Your Excellency with material for a reply to Muslim complaints. I do not want, however, to paint too black a picture. Ziauddin has placed his finger on some genuine dangers and in discussing them I have had to admit that there is some truth in his accusations. That is not, however, the whole story. By and large it must, I think, be admitted that our Muslims have hitherto suffered little, if any, serious injustice at the hands of the Congress Ministry. That there are pin-pricks this letter will have made clear, but of really serious injustice there is no evidence as yet. It is the galling thought, however, that their communal opponents are apparently to be in a perpetual political domination over them that hurts most. It is the feeling which leads them to make sometimes quite baseless accusations—as they did in the Pirpur report—and so long as Congress dominates the political field I do not see how in this Province, where they constitute such a small minority of the population, Muslims can expect anything but virtual exclusion from the control of affairs. If some of our innumerable regional groups should ever dissociate themselves definitely from Congress, then we might get a coalition Government in which the Muslims might take a really affective share. That day is probably, however, still distant. Till it comes the Muslims must in my view rely first on the force of public opinion—Congress Ministers will not dare to be too openly and blatantly communal—and secondly on the Governor to save them from anything resembling grave injustice. That Governors can do a good deal will have been obvious to Your Excellency not only from this letter but from frequent references to the same subject in my own fortnightly reports and in those of my predecessors.

Yours sincerely,
F. WYLIE

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*Jinnah to Hassan Ispahani**Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence, p. 129*

NEW DELHI, 20 April, 1939

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Hassan,

In my opinion, the time has come when there should be only one party and that is the Muslim League party so far as the Musalmans are concerned, and I cannot imagine of a coalition between the Muslim League Party and any other Musalman, individual or group of Musalmans or a party of Musalmans, so far as the political life of the Musalmans of India is concerned. How this is to be brought about in your Province (Bengal), and particularly in the Assembly, it is very difficult for me to advise.

Yours sincerely,

M.A. JINNAH

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*Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 48/11-13*

736, NAPIER ROAD, KARACHI, INDIA, 22 April, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

We have been out of touch from each other for sometime. I would like to give you some idea of the activities of my Sub-Committee. The deputation of the Minority Provinces representatives has been finally constituted and it is reaching Lahore on the 10th of May. The accompanying Press Note will give you all the information about it. We are trying just at present to carry on sufficient propaganda in advance to popularise the deputation among the people of the North. A similar deputation is going to Bengal and Assam also as soon as the first deputation has finished touring. I am very confident as to the success of these deputations. At any rate, such a systematic and constant propaganda against the Congress is bound to affect the Congress prestige here.

2. I do not know when the Sub-Committee, appointed for considering various schemes of reforms, is likely to hold its meeting. I had requested Nawabzada [Liaquat Ali Khan] Saheb to consult you whether it would be possible to hold the first meeting at Lahore on the 10th of May. But he has not made any reply to it. Perhaps the Sholapur conference may interfere with the possibility of such a meeting being held. At any rate, I think that Sub-Committee should meet as early as possible so that at this psychological moment one definite goal is fixed before the Musalmans. For the present Dr. Latif's scheme has evoked lot of criticism in the Press in the North. There

is no Muslim paper which has not supported the idea of giving Musalmans separate homelands. And similarly there is no Hindu paper which has not first ridiculed and then characterized it as a dangerous scheme from the Hindu point of view. The Anglo-Indian press is giving publicity to the either sides. Meanwhile, the younger element among the Musalmans in the North has taken up the matter in right earnest and almost everyday I find a branch of the Anjuman Pakistan being opened in one or the other town in the North. The United Provinces has given the movement an organ of its own under the very name of Pakistan. You will perhaps recollect that the "Statesman" had published that scheme in full on the 30th of the last month. I have purchased about 100 copies of that issue and have sent them to papers in various foreign countries. I am sure the controversy will now extend itself beyond even the confines of India. It will at least set the people thinking as to what we stand for. I am communicating with Waras Amirali and few other young Indian Musalmans now in London on the point whether it is possible to have an office of our own in London so that our activities receive sufficient publicity and attention there. I have not yet heard from them. Some papers in Egypt, and in Iraq have already interested themselves in our affairs.

3. I am going out on the tour of my own province from the first of May and will reach Lahore on the 10th morning in connection with the deputation referred to above. I will then go to Simla for a couple of days.

The Rajkot problems have taken a very serious turn and I personally feel that someone of us should go over there to give the Musalmans proper lead. I am confident that you must have considered that aspect of the matter already. It would be more appropriate if some responsible man from Bombay proceeds to Kathiawar.

I shall be grateful if you will kindly let me have some news of your side.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
H. A HAROON

M.A. JINNAH Esquire,
President, All India Muslim League
Malabar Hill. BOMBAY.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 66, pp. 153-55

24 April, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL
NO. U.P. 248

4. With regard to Hindu-Muslim relations he [Jawaharlal Nehru]¹ was disposed

not to take too seriously present conditions which he thought would improve rather than deteriorate. His contention was that on both sides people were beginning to get tired of these conditions. He also seemed to have some belief in the Muslim mass contact movement though we did not actually discuss it, for he said that Muslims in the villages mainly voted for Congress because they supported the agrarian policy of the Congress, though in the towns the Muslims were steadily in favour of the Muslim League. We had some discussion about the possibility of admitting representatives of the Muslim League to the Ministry. He pointed out the obvious objections which I accepted but he said that so far as this Province was concerned the difficulties might not be insuperable, meaning no doubt that some prominent Muslim Leaguers in this Province are very strongly nationalist in their views. But he said it was really an All India problem, and it would be very difficult to handle it on a Provincial basis. We also had some talk about joint electorates, and he expressed a great desire for their establishment in local bodies. I was pleased to find, however, that he had no idea of trying to impose this solution on Muslims (though there have been indications of Congressmen in this Province apparently thinking on those lines). He was quite clear that it could only be done by consent. He spoke also of the problem in the villages in connection with the scheme for village panchayats and said that it would be a deplorable thing to introduce separate electorates in the villages. He stressed the point that the Muslims in this Province are for the most part dwellers in towns and that in the villages they are usually a very small minority.

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1. Harry Haig met Jawaharlal Nehru at Lucknow on 23 April, 1939.

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Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 62, pp. 132-39

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, RANCHI, 8 May, 1939

SECRET

NO. 685-G.B.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is with reference to your letter of 13th April 1939 about Muslim grievances. I dealt with the Muslim League Conference at Patna last Christmas in my fortnightly reports and you will doubtless refer, if necessary, to those reports.

2. I now enclose a copy¹ of the communique which my Government issued to the Muslim League allegations, and refer to it in dealing with some of the points raised in the statement annexed to your letter.

3. It is convenient in the first place to deal with the "Special Complaints of Muslims" as given in the annexure to your letter; the general complaints need a longer exposition of the position.

(a) *Trouble in villages of Muslim landlords with explicit object to harass them or hurt them financially and otherwise*

As far as this Province is concerned, this allegation is untrue. We have, of course, comparatively few big Muslim landholders, but all the agrarian trouble which has occurred has been in the estates of Hindu landholders. I have little doubt that Sir Zia Uddin Ahmad is thinking of Aligarh district; when I was in the United Provinces, I formed the opinion that conditions were particularly difficult there, because of the fact that most of the landholders were Muslims and the tenants Hindus.

(b) *Rewards to Mahasabha officers who have done injustice to Muslims by promotion*

This allegation also seems to me, after consulting my Chief Secretary, to be unfounded as far as this Province is concerned. Both Executive and Police officers seem to me to have done admirable work with, on the whole, complete impartiality. My observations on the general grievances have some relevance to this point, but I feel that I can categorically deny that Mahasabha officers have been rewarded.

(c) *Communal riots are started by Hindus. Investigations are often one-sided. Muslims are arrested in large numbers. Most recent case is Marehra (Etah)*

This charge I also regard as unfounded, so far as Bihar is concerned; it appears to be based on a case in the United Provinces. It is true that in most communal riots, Hindus are the aggressors, but I do not know of any case in which Government or the local officers have failed to take action against the aggressors. In the reply issued by the Bihar Government to the Muslim League Committee's allegations, of which a copy is enclosed, I would draw attention in particular to the cases mentioned under (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) on pages 10 to 12 which show how Hindus have been prosecuted for aggression. This, of course, does not prove the point that in some cases the non-aggressive Muslims have been prosecuted, but I feel confident that there has been no such cases.

(d) *Forcing Hindi and non-Muslim culture on Muslims*

This of course refers to the Wardha scheme of education but that has not progressed very far in this Province; it is proposed to introduce only in one subdivision and I think, though I cannot quote chapter and verse, that the Ministers have said that the system will be non-sectarian. The allegation is too vague to admit of a more detailed reply.

(e) *Wasting enormous sums of money in self-propaganda in the name of village uplift and employing only non-Muslims*

I am prepared to admit waste of money, and possibly use of Government money for party propaganda, but Muslims have been recruited to the Village Uplift staff.

(f) *Unfair enquiries in the case of Muslim Officers*

Neither I nor my Chief Secretary know of any such cases. In cases in which the Ministry has taken possibly unjustifiable action against an officer, the sufferer has been a Hindu.

(g) *Central Provinces and Bihar have no Muslim Ministers*

This is, of course, rubbish; I have a perfectly good Muslim Minister, Dr. Mahmud;

no doubt he, like all Congress Muslims does not carry weight with his community, but that cannot be avoided, unless we have Coalition Ministries.

(b) Muslims do not get a fair share in public appointments under Government and local bodies.

The statement on pages 1-3 of the Bihar Government reply to the Muslim League's allegations shows that Muslims have got more than their share of appointments; of course the statement may not be entirely complete, but as far as my experience goes, in the case of appointments made direct by Government, the Ministers have, if anything gone out of their way to see that Muslims secure posts.

As regards appointments under local bodies, I have no information but when I was in the United Provinces, I was told frequently that in local bodies appointments were made on purely communal considerations, which meant that the Hindus got them. The question of representation on local bodies is different. In this Province we have joint electorates and the Muslim League have made the position more difficult by refusing to contest the elections. This matter is dealt with fully in the part III of the Reply to Muslim League Allegations and I presume the facts are correct.

5. I now attempt the difficult task of drawing some general conclusions from the facts which I have reported and the even more difficult task of making suggestions as to the action to be taken to reassure the Muslims.

My general conclusions are

(a) There is no reason to hold that the Congress Government in this Province have taken any action hostile to Muslim interests: they have been more than fair in the matter of appointments and have shown themselves very nervous of offending the Muslims.

(b) The Muslim League represents mainly the upper class Muslims and the intelligentsia; there is also the so-called Momin community; this originally consisted of those classes whose hereditary trade was weaving, but the term has now been extended to include those classes which might generally be called Peasants and Workers. There has undoubtedly been a struggle between Congress and the League to win over this class who form the great majority of the Muslim voters. The general Congress policy of helping peasants and workers benefits this class of Muslims; Congress also started a Muslim Mass Contact movement; and the Congress Government in Bihar have taken some special steps to help Momins, e.g. grant of scholarships, etc. I cannot help thinking, though I have no direct proof, that the League, realising that the Momins might be won over and realising also that all Muslims are at heart fanatics, have raised and emphasised religious questions.

(c) There is no doubt that in nearly all the riots which occurred the Hindus have been the aggressors; there is no doubt also that this aggressive attitude of the Hindus has been encouraged by the belief that a Congress Government which is predominantly Hindu will treat them lightly; in fact many Muslims with whom I have discussed the position, have urged this point, though they admit their inability to bring any charges of anti-Muslim prejudice against Government.

(d) But though Hindus may have been encouraged to become aggressive for these reasons, the Muslims are by no means blameless; their Press by publishing distorted accounts of incidents have increased communal feeling. Very shortly after

my present Government took office, the *Star of India* made allegations against them for incidents which occurred during the time of the Interim Ministry and I brought this very unfair attack to the notice of His Excellency the Governor of Bengal. More recently my Government addressed the Government of Bengal, bringing to their notice some inaccurate reports published in this paper.

Apart from this, some of the speeches delivered during the League session at Patna were provocative, though I gratefully recognise that leaders such as Sir Sikander Hayat Khan did much to tone down extremists.

(e) Political rivalry between Hindus and Muslims gave rise to communal tension after the reforms of 1919 were introduced; it is hardly surprising that the introduction of far wider reforms has created an even more difficult position.

(f) Muslims probably regard the safeguards as ineffective, and consider that Governors in Congress Provinces should have exercised their special responsibilities. No Muslim leader has ever represented this point to me and as I have shown, my Congress Government have not taken any action hostile to the Minority.

(g) The allegations made against Congress Government by gentlemen such as Sir Zia Uddin Ahmed, Mr. Jinnah, the Nawab of Chhatari, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Sir Muhammad Yaqub and others, all of whom have some experience of efficient administration, are in my view very largely inspired by a realisation of the fact that the Congress Governments are inefficient. Many others, Hindu Liberals, Europeans, Government servants and others, also recognise this inefficiency. I need not stress the inefficiency of my team of four Ministers.

6. I am afraid that I find myself at a loss to suggest what action should be taken to improve the position. A cynic or a die-hard might say "Scrap the Constitution and recognise frankly that India is not fit for democracy." A defeatist might say "Call a Constituent Assembly and let Congress have a straight fight with the League and its other opponents."

7. I hope to meet Wylie this week and possibly a discussion with him may enable me to be more helpful.

Yours sincerely,
M.G. HALLETT

1. Not available.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 107-13

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 9 May, 1939

PRIVATE

3. This brings me to a consideration of your letter to Haig written on April 17th. I have read it with profound interest, and particularly that part of it which touches

upon the steadily widening gulf between the Muslims and the Hindus. I have no doubt at all that for the Minorities, and especially the Muslims, democracy and popular control have lost much of the glamour which they possessed when they were little more than attractive catch cries for stump orators and newspapers knights of the pen. But a recognition of the fact that the application to attractive theories of the touchstone of reality has brought with it a large measure of disillusionment does little to help us to a solution of what is in my view likely to prove to be the main obstacle in the way of the achievement of Federation as provided for in the 1935 Act. The deep-seated dislike and fear of Hindu domination on the part of 90 million Muslims is a thing which we cannot possibly brush aside. You will think that I have been harping unduly perhaps upon this particular problem but, as I have mentioned I think on more than one occasion, I am becoming steadily confirmed in my view that it will be the Muslims rather than the Congress that will provide the biggest obstacle to the early achievement of Federation. In this connection I was sent a day or two ago by Edward Halifax¹ a letter which he had just received from Fazl Rahimtoola.² You will, of course, know how much weight to attach to opinions expressed by the writer, but they do reflect what undoubtedly are the feelings of an increasing number of Muslims at the present time. In his view the main grievance of the Muslims is that the powers given to the Governors under the Government of India Act have become nugatory as a result of what he describes as the "informal pact arrived at between His Excellency the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi." He goes on to say that they did not contemplate that the safeguards provided for their community would be "done away with in this strange manner." Towards the end of his letter he makes a somewhat novel suggestion. He assumes that we, and he is referring to the Cabinet, are aware of the esteem and regard with which Muslims in India look upon His Highness the Aga Khan. He proceeds to say that he understands that His Majesty's Government is shortly going to fill the vacancy created by the death of Lord Brabourne,³ and he suggests that the appointment of His Highness as Governor of Bengal would go a long way to soothing the feelings of the Muslims in India and to restore to some extent the confidence which has been so rudely shaken! If this causes you to chuckle I shall not feel that my reporting of Rahim Toola's views to you has been wholly wasted.

5. I gather from various reports which I have read recently that the volunteer movement is coming to the fore again, and if the account sent to you by Craik gives a true picture of developments in the Punjab, it seems to be assuming a somewhat menacing form. Tara Singh's⁴ declaration that the Sikhs must organise an Akali Fauj because the Muslims are getting too powerful has a sinister sound about it; as has also the fact that a Sikh Member of the Legislative Assembly, Sardar Partap Singh, should have stated publicly that a kindred organisation, namely the Punjab Kisan Fauj, had for its immediate objects the reduction or the abolition of various perfectly legal taxes.

10. So far I have been dealing with the Service problem. As regards the problem of the Muslim and other Minorities, we are more in the dark. I have never been able to find any specific instances of the hardships inflicted on Minority communities in Congress Provinces, but it has been suggested to me that the real trouble is in the matter of jobs. It is said that "tame" Muslims get all the appointments secured to the community by the fixed quotas and it is easy to understand that this is more infuriating

to the "good" Muslim than the appointment of a Hindu. On the other hand, the more belligerent is the Muslim community the greater will be the temptation of the Government to put in "tame" Muslims. This again seems to me to be a matter, in which you might be able to strengthen the hands of Governors, particularly in the United Provinces, by authorising a message from yourself about the dangers of stimulating communal danger by inequitable distribution of appointments, which would make it clear that you would not regard yourself as estopped from using your responsibility for Minorities by the fact that particular sections of a Minority have no cause for complaint. If Ministers appeal to Gandhi against a sermon of this kind, it seems unlikely that they would get much support from him for he, I gather, is becoming more and more apprehensive about the rising tide of communal antagonism.

I throw out these suggestions for your consideration and shall be interested to hear in due course whether you think it is worthwhile following them up. I realise that they are not likely to carry us very far; and I think that we may well have to take a stiffer line than we have hitherto done with the Congress Governments generally. For while it is very desirable to carry them with us so far as we can, we have also to be wary of creating in the minds of the Muslims and others the idea that they have us in their pockets and that we will go to any lengths to keep them happy.

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1. Edward Frederick Lindleywood Halifax (1881-1959); 1st Baron Irwin, 1925; Viceroy of India, 1926-31; delegate to the third session of Indian Round Table Conference, 1932; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-40; Member of the War Cabinet, 1939-45.
 2. Sir Fazal Ibrahim Rahimtoola (1895-1977) Chairman, Reception Committee of Bombay Presidency Muslim Educational Conference; President, Urdu Newspapers Association; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1925-30; Acting President, Indian Tariff Board, 1932 and 1935; elected Member, Legislative Assembly, 1937, Kt. 1946; Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1948.
 3. Lord Brabourne, Governor of Bengal, died on 23 February, 1939 and Robert Niel Reid was Acting Governor from 24 February to 11 June, 1939.
 4. Master Tara Singh (1885-1967); leader of Sikh Akali Dal; opposed inclusion of Punjab in Pakistan; after independence led the movement for the creation of a Punjabi, speaking State in East Punjab.

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 84, pp. 189-93

10 May, 1939

SECRET

NO. U.P. 258

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am afraid I have taken some time to reply to Your Excellency's letter dated April

13, 1939, forwarding Sir Ziauddin Ahmad's complaints against the Congress administrations in the United Provinces, Central Provinces and Bihar. As these complaints ranged over such a wide field, I thought that it might be necessary to deal with them at considerable length. But when I came to look into them closely, I reached the conclusion that they do not really merit any very elaborate answer. The complaints which have been made under the head "General" represent an indictment of the general policy and administration of the Congress Ministry. While I am far from suggesting that there is not plenty of ground for criticism, and indeed many of these matters have caused me at various times and in varying degrees a great deal of anxiety, there is nothing specifically Muslim in all this. The general political criticisms are the stock-in-trade of the opposition, voiced by non-Congress Hindus just as much as by Muslims, while my own anxieties connected with these matters have related to general administrative conditions and not to specifically Muslim problems. They are only represented as Muslim grievances because the Muslim community as a whole is in political opposition. I have dealt with all these matters so constantly in my fortnightly reports that I do not think you will wish me to attempt in this connection the task of a general review of the Provincial administration. I will, therefore, confine myself to a very few remarks under the "General" section.

2. The so-called "dual system of administration" has in my opinion appreciably diminished since the early days when the Ministry first took office. I do not say that local Congressmen have not still more power and influence than is good for the administration, and are not in some districts a considerable nuisance. But they are beginning to be recognised as such by the Ministers. What I reported in paragraph 13 of my fortnightly letter No. U.P. 257, dated May 9th, as regards transfers is of interest in this connection. The real grievance of Muslims under this head is that they have no political pull. That is inevitable in present circumstances, and even if petty political jobbery was reduced to smaller proportions than exist at present Muslims would still feel that they were left out in the cold until they themselves formed part of the Government and could share in the little jobs. In any case they have not the same powerful and widespread organisation in the districts as the Congress, and consequently are bound in the matter of exploiting real or unreal local grievances or personal cases to be at disadvantage.

3. I come to what are called the special complaints of Muslims and deal with them under their separate heads.

(a) There have been troubles in the villages of landlords of all communities. I think it is true that in special cases the Congress have tried to stir up trouble in the villages of those landlords who are their prominent political opponents, and Muslims to a large extent come under this category. But they are not attacked qua Muslims but qua opponents of the Congress. Thus Muslims landlords who choose to pay blackmail to the local Congressmen (and one of the largest of the *Taluqdars* undoubtedly does this) have little or no trouble from their tenants. But Hindu landlords suffer in exactly the same way. It is no doubt possible that in some cases the communal issue is raised as well as the ordinary issue of tenant versus landlord, but I think such cases are rare. On the whole however at present, apart from special circumstances, a sympathetic and reasonable landlord of whatever community can maintain not

unsatisfactory relations with his tenants, though of course they are very different to what prevailed before the general election.

(b) and (c) These are the allegations that are made freely by the communalists on both sides, and considering the volume of the allegations, which incidentally pretty well cancel each other out, I think there is very little substance in them. The Hindu counterpart of Sir Ziauddin is to be found for instance in a long petition I received a week ago from the Hindu Sangh of Cawnpore, one sentence of which ran as follows: "Sir, this is a historical fact that the Hindus are proverbially mild and that the Muslims are blessed with an aggressive mentality." This kind of thing takes us nowhere. As for communal riots being started by Hindus, it was really aggressive action by Muslims which started the chain of events that led straight to the recent Cawnpore riots and judged at any rate by casualties the Muslims had decidedly an advantage over the Hindus. In Benaras on the other hand the Hindus seem to have started the trouble. Sir Ziauddin refers to Marehra, a small town in the Etah district. There the ill-feeling seems to have started through a Congress flag pole having been bent by a *tazia*, perhaps accidentally. The next stage was some brick throwing by Hindus on a *tazia* procession, and then the Muslims broke out, killed several Hindus, looted their shops and desecrated a temple. Whatever the provocation the Muslims were undoubtedly the aggressors in the riot. There are allegations that since the riot the Hindus have been taking revenge on the Muslims in the villages round about by cutting crops and damaging their property. There is probably some truth in this, but the matter has been receiving attention and punitive Police are being imposed. Incidentally the District Magistrate of this district is a Muslim. More serious in my opinion were the incidents which I mentioned in paragraph 4 of my letter No. U.P. 237 dated March 25th, 1939, in the Budaun district, when in a number of cases Hindu crowds collected and threatened or injured Muslims and their property in villages. On the other hand this supervened on trouble in the town of Budaun, where the Muslims have behaved aggressively. The fact is that in the present temper the community that feels itself strong is apt to be assertive. The Muslim strength is mainly in the towns. In the villages they are at a disadvantage.

(d) The Enquiry Report (page 25) devotes some space to this and has produced very little in the way of solid fact in its support as far as the United Provinces is concerned.

(e) There has been a lot of criticism that the Rural Development scheme does too little in the way of practical work and too much in the way of propaganda. I am looking into these criticism, which I am inclined to think are certainly a good deal exaggerated. According to an answer given in the Assembly on the 19th March, 1938, out of 789 rural development organisers 20 per cent are Muslims. This is not a remarkably low percentage seeing that these men have to be taken from the rural classes and that the Muslim population in the Province is so largely concentrated in the towns.

(f) The general remarks under (b) and (c) apply to this. In the case, however, of the enquiries made by the Anti-Corruption Office in the Police department, which have given rise to much discontent and distrust, it was I think the case in the beginning that an unusually large proportion of Muslims were the target of these inquisitions. It was not so much that the officers who got into trouble did not have a reputation for

corruption as that among a very large number of officers of this class those who were selected for attack were usually those who had made themselves obnoxious to the Congress, and these tended to be to a considerable extent Muslims. Direct communal feeling was also not absent. This feature however attracted attention and criticism and I do not think it is true now to say as a rule that Muslim officers are specially attacked. But it is a matter that always requires attention.

(g) In this Province we have two Muslim Ministers out of six, and had at the outset 3 Muslim Parliamentary Secretaries out of 13, though one of them has now resigned. The Deputy-Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the Deputy President of the Legislative Council are also Muslims, and one of the two Deputy Directors of publicity is a Muslim. The Muslim Ministers are certainly not unmindful of Muslim interests, but they are distrusted by the majority of Muslims and denounced by the Muslim League. I dealt with this matter in paragraphs 5 and 6 of my fortnightly Report No. U.P. 241 dated April 10th 1939, and I need not repeat what I there said.

(h) This has been the subject of constant questions in the Legislature and the facts elicited have not substantiated these charges as regards appointments under the Government.

4. In general I think it is correct to say that the Provincial Ministry has done its best to be impartial in communal matters and with very fair success. Their good intentions have not however saved them from ceaseless attacks on communal grounds from both sides, and as I have brought out in my fortnightly report of the 9th May, at the present moment the Hindus are exceedingly loud in their complaints against the Government on the ground that they show undue favour to Muslims. The one substantial grievance of the Muslims is that they have no part in the Government. This is true, and it is a serious matter, but administratively they have little to complain of except that they do not have the general political influence, and the pull in petty local matters, that the supporters of the Ministry have. In essence the grievance is not a religious one though it assumes an intensely communal form. It is political and is due to the fact that the community is in opposition. It would largely cease to exist if the Muslim League had a share in the Government.

Yours sincerely,
H.G. HAIG

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Maulana Hasrat Mohani to Abdullah Haroon [Urdu]

F. 48/36-37

LONDON, 16 May, 1939

Respected Sir,
Assalam-u-alikum

I reached here on 28th April and stayed at the Indian Students Union. Please send

reply to my letter on the same address. Next day I went to India House and met Sir Feeroz Khan Noon. He delivered your letter to me containing. I was happy since you helped me in time. May God bless you. After fixing an appointment I met Lord Zetland at India Office on May 12 and for long tried to put before him the point of view of Muslim League as well as of Muslims. He gave me patient hearing promised to concede all my demands.

2. I told him plainly that the principle of religion majority adopted in conformity based with the Government of India Act (1935) will not work. The Minorities can accept the supremacy of the majority only when it hopes that the same principle will also be applied in their case when they would be in majority and the present majority would turn into minority and would accept the decision to be taken by the then majority. But according to Government of India Act the Muslim minority can never be turned into majority. In such circumstances to make it (Muslim minority) subject to the Hindu majority is against justice and beyond comprehension. They should, therefore, either replace the Government of India Act with an act containing provision for political parties instead of religious parties alongwith the provision in respect of the principal of majority rule or postpone the proposed federation and make such suitable amendments in the Government of India Act as to contain the provisions for the right of self-protection.

3. I made it very clear that the present Act wherein the safeguard for Minorities is in the hands of the Governors but these Governors after entering into gentlemen's agreement have destroyed the Muslims as in Orissa and Central Provinces. Under the Government of India Act there is not a single Muslim Minister and wherever they are, as in U.P., Bihar and Bombay etc., they are not the representatives of Muslims but they are the fellow-traveller of the Congress party. Lord Zetland was impressed with this conversation and took note of it. These points were never placed before them in the form as they ought to be. Many people came here on behalf of the Congress and, put across their point of view. How I wish the Muslim League too had done so?

8. A branch of Muslim League must also be opened in London. Do write to Mr. Abdullah Yusuf Ali to be its President. I will also talk to him. If he accepts its Presidentship may young men here are willing to assist him.

Awaiting reply,
HASRAT MOHANI

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Rajendra Prasad to Nehru [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. III, pp. 77-78
All India Congress Committee

CAMP: RANCHI, 16 May, 1939

My dear Jawaharlalji,

I have received your confidential letter and have seen in the Press that the

negotiations for amicable settlement of Shia-Sunni dispute have terminated without any result. I do not know what is happening . Now, I presume the Shias will continue Civil Disobedience and will be courting jail [portions of letter moth-eaten]. It must be very distressing to put nine thousand people in jail who are apparently not opposed to the Government and many amongst whom are widely respected for one reason or the other. What troubles me even more is the propaganda which is gaining ground that the Congress stands to create division amongst Musalmans and what I apprehend is that after a time both will be more united against the Congress than they have even been before. Shias are a small community amongst the Muslims. They have for some reason or the other taken a more nationalist line than the bulk of Sunnis in the past and their Conference had more than once adopted a line different from that of the others and more in conformity with national viewpoint. I am aware that some of the leaders of the Muslim League are Shias but I think the community as a whole has kept itself aloof from the communalist organisation. This controversy will completely alienate them from the Congress, as the feeling amongst them is that the Congress Government is not acting fairly towards them. It is a most dangerous thing for any Government to allow such feeling to grow in any community and more so in a community sympathetically inclined. At the same time I recognise that the Sunnis are a powerful community and are capable of creating much more trouble for the Government than the Shias. They have done so in the past and most of troubles which we have to face at the present moment is due to them. It is not possible, therefore, to ignore them I do not know what can be done. Sir Sultan Ahmed on behalf of the Shias will now formally approach me as the acting President of the Congress to intervene in the matter [portions of letter moth-eaten].

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Puckle [Extract]

Fortnightly Report Home Department (Special) F. G.D. 1398

BOMBAY, 16/17 May, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. S.D. 1939

HOME DEPARTMENT (SPECIAL)

My dear Puckle,

At a special meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League held on the 4th May under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, a resolution was passed appealing to Musalmans not to have anything to do with the Ahrar and Ulama Conference proposed to be held in Bombay on the 19th and 20th May, on the

ground that "it was being engineered in order to mislead and deflect Muslims from the Muslim League, which is the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Muslims in India." It is understood that the conference will support the Congress against the League and it is possible that ill-feeling between the Shias and Sunnis may be aroused.

The Second Session of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League was held in Sholapur on the 6th and 7th May under the Presidentship of the Honourable Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan. The speeches made by the President and Mr. M.A. Jinnah consisted mainly of criticism of the Congress, Mr. M.K. Gandhi and the British Government and were enthusiastically received by the audience of about 6,000 people. Thirty-seven resolutions were passed covering a variety of subjects. There was no untoward incident. During the period of the Conference, "*satyagrahis*" were sent into the Hyderabad State from Pusa in the Central Provinces, the Arya Samajists abiding by their assurance to Government not to hold any demonstrations or meetings from a week before and till five days after the holding of the Muslim League Conference.

3. *Communal*: Mainly on account of the suspension of Arya Samajist activities during the period of the Muslim League Conference at Sholapur there was a marked decrease in the number of "*satyagrahis*" sent to the Hyderabad State. Although the total collections towards the Nizam Civil Resistance Fund at the Poona centre amount to about Rs.18,400 it is understood that the Mahasabha leaders have begun to feel the strain of the heavy expenditure incurred in connection with the "*satyagraha*." Efforts are, therefore, being made by them to collect more funds on the strength of a recommendatory letter from Mr. N.C. Kelkar.¹

In pursuance of an appeal made by the President of the Maharashtra Yuwak Sangh under instructions from Mr. V.D. Savarkar, to celebrate the 10th May as "Independence Day" in honour of all Hindus who fought for India's independence during the Mutiny of 1857, a poorly attended meeting was held at Poona at which speeches were made praising the Hindus who lost their lives in the Mutiny and advocating the use of any means, whether violent or non-violent, for obtaining India's independence.

1. N.C. Kelkar (1872-1947); Litterateur and politician; presided over Hindu Mahasabha Sessions at Kanpur in 1927 and at Jullundhar in 1929; took part in *Suddhi* and *Sanghatan* work of Hindu Mahasabha.

for two days in Council of Ministers, the differences between Hindu and Muslim Ministers [in Bengal] have been considerably narrowed and position is as follows. Both sides are anxious to reach an agreed settlement, but both are apprehensive regarding reactions on their respective communities. If a decision has to be taken by a majority, the proposals of the Cabinet will be (a) that 50 per cent of all vacancies in every service in each year shall be filled by Muslims provided qualified candidates are available: (b) it being agreed that communal considerations cannot be applied to promotion then if more than 50 per cent of vacancies filled by promotion to any service are obtained by non-Muslims, a correspondingly greater number of Muslims will be appointed by direct recruitment in order that total intake of the service from all sources shall include 50 per cent Muslims.

2. Hindu Ministers are prepared to go as far as agreeing to (a) but not at present to (b) as it stands.

3. Both sides agree that there shall be a reservation of 15 per cent, for Scheduled Castes and a stipulation that candidates from minor Minorities shall be appointed when possible. A 5 per cent reservation for such Minorities was suggested but considered impracticable.

4. Muslim Ministers are prepared to agree to the following modification of their proposals on condition that Hindu Ministers will then accept the whole scheme. When a vacancy in a lower service arises owing to promotion of a person to a higher service that the vacancy in the lower service will be filled by a person of the same community as the one promoted.

5. The effect of the proposal in paragraph 1 would be to ensure 50 per cent Muslim entries into the higher services, but more than 50 per cent of Muslims in total off-take from employment market. Thus if 10 vacancies in a higher service are filled by promotion and 10 by direct recruitment and if the persons promoted are 7 non-Muslims and 3 Muslims, then, of the 10 directly recruited 3 will be non-Muslims and 7 Muslims. But in consequence of promotions 10 vacancies will occur in the lower service. Under the proposal in paragraph 1 these vacancies in the lower service would be filled by 5 Muslims and 5 non-Muslims, giving a result in the total off-take from employment market of 12 Muslims and 8 non-Muslims.

6. If, however, the modification described in paragraph 4 were adopted, the effect would be as follows: Assuming as before the promotion of 7 non-Muslims and 3 Muslims, then 7 Muslims and 3 non-Muslims would be taken into the higher service by direct recruitment. But the difference would be that vacancies caused in the lower service by the promotions will be filled by 7 non-Muslims and 3 Muslims. Therefore, the total number provided with fresh employment, taking both services together, would consist equally of Muslims and non-Muslims, namely, 10 of each.

9. I have agreed to see a deputation of influential Hindus before any decision is announced but shall of course be non-committal.

10. Although the point seems in some quarters to be regarded as open to argument, I propose to proceed on the assumption that my special responsibility for the minorities is involved and to have regard to paragraph 9 of my Instrument of Instructions. I personally am unable to see how in the present political circumstances I can raise any serious objection to the proposal contained in paragraph 1 above as

modified by paragraph 4 and if an agreed solution should be reached on those lines I do not think I could differ from it. I am also inclined to the view that I may have to accept any agreed solution midway between that proposed in paragraph 1 and that proposed in paragraph 2. It must also be recognised that, in default of an agreement, anything less than paragraph I would be a solution that no Muslim Minister could undertake to justify and I should have to consider very seriously in that event whether it would be practical politics for me to override their majority advice.

11. The matter being one of great importance in this Province to which parliamentary interest might possibly attach, I am taking the first opportunity to acquaint you with the position.

Repeated to Secretary of State

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, pp. 217-23

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 19 May, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

5. I read with great interest the reference in paragraph 3 of your letter to the possible threat to the successful introduction of Federation constituted by the attitude of the Muslims. That links up with another aspect of the same question on which you touched elsewhere in your letter—the extent to which it is practicable for us, either on the lines which you yourself have suggested, or otherwise, to dissipate Muslim apprehensions as to the position in the Provinces, and to remove or reduce their fears as to the future of their community under the scheme embodied in the Act. As you know both these aspects of a very difficult problem have been fully present to me, and I have spared no opportunity of endeavouring to probe the minds of influential and representative Muslims of whatever shade of opinion and of ascertaining what, if any, action appeared to be practicable to improve the situation. So far as the Provincial side is concerned, I have in the last few days, as you know, referred to Haig, Hallett and Wylie the specific allegations made by Sir Zia Uddin Ahmed and you will by this mail receive the last of their replies.

6. I do not for a moment wish to minimise the extent and significance of Muslim uneasiness, whether as regards Federation or as regards Provincial Autonomy as operated in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a majority. Let me before I proceed to examine the position as I see it in regard to the Federal issue touch for a moment on the provincial position, and on the specific suggestion which you have made to me in that connection.

7. In the Provincial field the specific grievances of which representative Muslims are disposed to complain are well exemplified by the type of thing contained in Zia

Uddin's memorandum on which I asked the Governor referred to for a report. The somewhat unsubstantial character of a good many of those grievances, not least as regards the Muslim share in appointments, is, I think, adequately exposed by the Governors replies. It is perfectly obvious that in this country, where communal feeling runs so deep, and where with these enormous populations and the slender administrative framework so much oppression and so much unfairness can take place in minor ways without the higher authorities or even the more exalted of the subordinate authorities being aware of its existence, or being competent to do anything to stop it, any political party which sets itself to work can produce at short notice sufficient instances of unfairness, of maltreatment and of prejudice to inflame feeling and to produce the impression that the general situation is much worse than is in fact the case. The fact that a Muslim minority is not, I suspect, much worse off in a Province in which it is a minority than a Hindu minority in a Muslim Province does not meet out problem, which is at the moment how to assuage the grievances of the Muslims. Frankly, on this I am still quite at a loss to suggest any really satisfactory remedy, and as you will have seen, Haig and Hallett, both of them very experienced Governors, with close familiarity with this problem from their time in the Home Department, and equally Wylie, who has applied a fresh and vigorous mind to it, found themselves in the same position. I have carefully considered whether matters would at all be likely to be advanced by action on the lines you have suggested in your letter. My first reaction is on the whole, one of doubt, but I will consult the Governors and see what they think. My feeling is that the Governors concerned are already fully alive to this position, and that they can be relied on, then they think that they can in fact intervene to any purpose, to do so. I am myself sceptical as to whether the added weight of the Governor-General's name (unless, which is not the case, the Governor-General were to be in a position to bring some really effective pressure of his own to bear) would make much difference and for obvious reasons I am not anxious to come in, or to threaten, in a matter of this character unless I can be quite sure that by coming in I can produce some effect and that I shall be ready to go through at whatever cost with whatever threats I may use. But I may be looking on this from too narrow a viewpoint, and I will readily suspend judgement until I know what the Governors feel about it. Subject, however, to the possibility of some move being made in this direction, I see very little for it but to let the situation develop still further, and certainly no ready remedy which I can accept with conviction or confidently recommend. This, as you know does not mean that I do not recognise the seriousness of the position and I am sure that the Governors recognise it too. The fact is that we are confronted with a new variety (or shall I say with an aspect which has been less insistent until the recent past) of the communal problem, and that the difficulties that it presents are fundamental.

8. Let me now turn to the vital question of the reaction of this Muslim uneasiness on Federation. I think in the first place that neither of us need feel any surprise that the near approach of Federation has brought those fears and that uneasiness and their expression to the surface. There is nothing new about them. Their existence was evident right through the proceedings of the three Round Table Conferences and of the Joint Select Committee. I think, too, that it is fair to say that in no stage of

these discussions, throughout which we were continually bombarded by Muslim demands for safeguards of the most excessive character, for exaggerated further by way of meeting Muslim claims, fully present to us and insistently pressed on us, than in the scheme of the Act; and that we were unable to go further not only because we did not feel ourselves justified in doing so on the merits, but because, even had we felt ourselves justified in doing so on the merits, it was out of the question, as a matter of practical politics, given the legitimate claims of other communities and the necessity for getting them into any workable scheme, to go further than we did—even to a minority with so strong and definite a cultural tradition of its own, and with a membership only just short of 100,000,000.

9. Our difficulty is that the root of these Muslim apprehensions is inherent in any system of responsible government at the Centre. It is obvious that attribution of power by count of heads must inevitably be distasteful to a minority. No plan for Federation based upon representative Government can be acceptable to those Muslims who contemplate the future course of Indian politics as an unending communal contest. But I think we are all agreed that an All India-Federation is the only practicable line of constitutional advance and the necessary and inescapable corollary of Provincial Autonomy. We are bound to work for early Federation. No other line of policy is open to us. I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties likely to arise as the consequence of Muslim opposition to Federation. But I do not think that Muslims have it in their power to prevent the attainment of Federation or to make it unworkable—unless indeed they can discover means to prevent a sufficient number of Rulers from acceding. Indeed, I shall be most surprised if when the test comes Muslims do not work the Federal Constitution to the best of their opportunities. I have always felt, too, and I still feel, that it is in the achievement of Federation that there is the best hope of some alleviation of existing tensions. I shall be very greatly mistaken if we do not find that the two communities will work much more closely together with the degree of responsibility at the Centre which Federation involves and with the Centre based to so large an extent directly or indirectly on popular election; and that with the Hindu-Muslim problem transferred in an active form to the Central Government the chance of leaders in either community as represented at the Centre bringing a greater influence than now to bear on the rival ambitions of their communities in individual Provinces is a real one.

10. I am sure we shall have to face a growing volume of Muslim anxiety, complaint, and agitation. I shall certainly do my best to mollify and steady Muslim opinion, and to mitigate in all possible ways their hostility to the scheme. But I think you will agree that we cannot for a moment contemplate substantial modification—much less the jettisoning—of the Federal plan on account of Muslim fears. Indeed, the fact is that no conceivable amendment of the scheme would meet Muslim objections, which are directed against qualities which belong inevitably to any conceivable scheme of Federation. The moment we weaken in our resolution to push Federation through we shall find ourselves without a policy and without a future. Our prestige is deeply involved. If we fail we shall incur the contempt of all parties and (whatever the surface signs) we shall disappoint the great majority of politically-minded Indians. I was struck in this connection by some remarks in Firoz

Khan Noon's address on 3rd May to the 1900 Club of which he sent me a copy. He says "I told them that it would be most dangerous for the British Government to put the Federal part of the scheme into the melting-pot today. The whole of India would begin to blame Great Britain for its uncertainty and to say England never intended Federation to work and they took the earliest opportunity to break it. The best policy to follow at the moment was what the Government of India were doing, for the Viceroy to beg the people on his knees to accept Federation as soon as possible, but if the people refused, it would not be his fault. As a matter of fact, Mr. Jinnah told me that he would be quite happy to mark time as far as the Federal part of the scheme was concerned."

11. I have spread myself on this topic at much greater length than is really appropriate for our weekly correspondence. But I share your own view as to its very great importance, and that is my excuse. I have given you above quite frankly my own reaction to the position, not, you will say, perhaps a very encouraging reaction, since I have made no very positive contribution to the solution of our difficulties. I should welcome it when you do comment if you would let me know in what manner Muslims in your judgement may prove able to hold up Federation, and what policy you feel that it is open to us to adopt if the possibility of Muslim resistance compelling us to abandon the attempt to secure early Federation were contemplated. I will only repeat that my own opinion is that Muslim opposition, while I in no way underestimate its importance, must not be allowed to turn us from our objective of early Federation; I remain convinced that if we show sufficient resolution we shall succeed; and I do attach the greatest possible weight, as I think I have made clear above, to the consequences of failure or of any appearance on our part of a readiness to allow ourselves to be deterred from pursuing, our objective save by circumstances of the utmost gravity, such as we cannot afford to ignore or hope to override.

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Robert Reid to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 117, pp. 52-55

BENGAL, GOVERNMENT HOUSE, DARJEELING, 22 May, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 10 OF 1939

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is my fortnightly report for the first half of May.

2. There is communal uneasiness in the District of Pabna, where in fact tension in the rural areas has been cropping up from time to time during the last few months. There are clear indications that some of the trouble is due to preaching on the subject of alleged "oppression" of Muslims in Bihar. This form of propaganda in turn

may be due to efforts on the part of local Muslim Leaguers to compete for popular favour simultaneously against the wild promises of the Congress left wing and the equally wild promises of the Muslim Krishaks: promise alone being insufficient it has probably been found necessary to appeal to fanaticism as well.

4. Communal percentages in the services—I have telegraphed separately to you regarding this matter and I append for convenience of record a copy of that telegram.¹ I was impressed by the restraint with which discussions on this subject were carried on in Cabinet and by the spirit of accommodation shown by the principal Ministers and the obvious desire of the Muslims to reach an agreed settlement. My latest information is that Hindu Ministers, after a scrutiny of the probable effects of the compromise proposals put forward in paragraph 4 of the telegram, are not likely to agree to them, but I do not know what counter proposals, if any, they will make to bridge the gap. The organisers of the intended Deputation of prominent Hindus have been rather tiresome about the date of its arrival. They were given an opportunity of coming up on May 20th but pressed for a week's delay and were clearly out to provide material for a grievance if a decision were not postponed for their convenience. They are fully aware of the eagerness of the Cabinet to reach a decision and the importance that Muslim Ministers attach to a speedy solution. I have now decided, after further consultation with the Chief Minister, to allow them till the 27th May but to ask for an advance statement of the case they intend to put forward. The Chief Minister also agrees that no final decision shall be taken till I have heard the Deputation on 27th. I have been forewarned that one of the lines the Deputation will follow is to bring legal arguments to bear to the effect that paragraph 9 of my Instrument of Instructions forbids me to agree to any alteration in the percentages of reservation in the public services except in favour of the Hindus. Meanwhile the Hindu Press is of course full of propaganda on the subject under headlines such as the "Loot of the Services."

Politically the position has not been made easier by the antics of Sarat Bose. When the Assembly resolution urging a 60 per cent reservation of Muslims was under discussion, the Congress party would not vote against it, and in his speech Sarat Bose reiterated his willingness to go further than the then existing percentage, namely, 45 per cent reservation for Muslims. He extended to his "Muslim brethren" "his hand of fellowship and that of the party which he had the honour to represent" and offered to participate in an All Parties Conference. Last week when the conference was really coming to business he declined to participate in on the ground that, by their attitude on the Calcutta Municipal Amendment Bill and in other matters, the Ministry had shown itself incapable of doing communal justice. The Congress party of course will not associate itself with any Deputation to the Governor on this question but are of course active behind the scenes in urging it forward. Once again the position is complicated for everybody concerned by the fact that under its present leadership Congress in the Bengal Legislature is preoccupied more with the rancours of the Hindu community than with its interests.

1. For the Telegram referred to here, see document No. 394.

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*Abdoola Haroon to Maulana Hasrat Mohani**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 48/38-39*

KARACHI, 23 May, 1939

Respected Maulana Saheb,

I am in receipt of your letter. Thank you very much I am beholden to you for the services you have rendered to the Muslims of India.

2. I am pleased to learn about your meeting with Lord Zetland. You have put across the right point of view. It would be better if you get an opportunity to meet him again.

4. I will submit at the earliest my report to the Foreign Sub-Committee and will communicate to you its comments.

7. It would have been better if you had also put up the Pakistan scheme before Lord Zetland. This is the only Scheme which can safeguard Muslim interests. The changes in Government of India Act will provide no better safeguards than those contained in the unamended Government of India Act.

Yours sincerely,
ABDOOLA HAROON

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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, pp. 231-33*

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 26 May, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3. I am much interested in the report of your conversation with Maulana Hasrat Mohani.¹ The Nizam is indeed a difficult person when it comes to assessing what his line of action on a particular problem is likely to be and I should not be a bit surprised if the sort of consideration which the Maulana touched on is more present to his mind than one might have hoped. On the main issue of Federation, as I indicated in my last letter, I see nothing for it but to continue to go ahead, though I readily recognise that we must think fairly hard as to what our tactics are to be in the event of the Princes declining to accept our terms, or asking for radical modifications. I am a good deal disposed at this stage to think that the course of wisdom in such circumstances would be to play the fish for a very short further period—three weeks or a month, and then without any final break, to publish the terms; for I shall be greatly surprised if the publications of the terms and (if we were to decide on that) of the nature of the difficulties seen by the Princes in accepting those terms does not produce a fairly considerable clamour from the other parties here, and one such as to make it plain to Their Highnesses that they can look for little support in demanding

further concessions. But that is merely my first reaction on the general question of tactics, which is an exceedingly thorny one, and which we shall both of us have to examine with the greatest care, given the importance of the issues at stake. Like you, I see no prospect of a solution of the communal difficulties in this country being reached within any such measurable distance as would justify us in marking time on our Federal proposals, even if as I have often suggested, it was possible for us to hold the present situation merely by marking time. If it was there might be something to be said for doing it. But this central position becomes more and more out of date and unsuitable every day; and while it may be possible to carry on with it so long as it is public knowledge that we are working to a programme which contemplates its very early termination, things would, I am sure, be very different if the prospect of early Federation were to be allowed to disappear.

4. I asked myself as I read your account of the Maulana's (Hasrat Mohani) views about Muslim representation in Congress Governments whether the conditions which face us here, or which are likely to face us in the future, may not conceivably prove to be such as to justify the breakaway from orthodox constitutional theory which would be involved in requiring Minority representation in Congress Cabinets by Muslims generally acceptable to Muslim opinion as a whole in the individual Province concerned. But, the obvious objections apart (and they are very obvious and their strength I should have said decisive) we have to consider what the reaction of any such provision would be on positions such as those of Sikander or Fazlul Huq. I doubt if our Muslim friends would be very anxious to carry the argument as far as logic would justify! But I fear there is no doubt that on the communal issue the Muslims are tending more and more to get together, one real trouble is the absence of effective leadership or of any constructive and reasonable policy, with the result that the community are perplexed and worried as to the future, and tend to concentrate on the purely communal issue. I do not believe that Jinnah is really trusted, though he certainly has so far been able to have his own way; while Sikander, who in many ways possesses the qualifications one would look for, could not easily be spared from his present Province.

1. Maulana Hasrat Mohani met Lord Zetland in London on 12 May, 1939.

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Linlithgow to Henry Duffield Craik

Linlithgow Papers, No. 44 a

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 3/5 June, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Craik,

Sikander mentioned to me when we were talking after dinner on Tuesday here

that Rajendra Prasad, through an intermediary had quite recently made an offer for an arrangement between Congress and the Muslim League which Sikander thought workable and probably worthy of acceptance. I gather that it was based on an agreed programme of moderate nationalism. I think you should know of this and I should be most grateful if you could keep me in touch with any developments. I should rather like myself, if you agree, to have a talk with Sikander soon. He is more or less due for an interview and if you see no objection I will get in touch with him, for these are various matters in the general field which I should welcome an opportunity of talking over with him. I cannot help thinking, incidentally reverting to the earlier part of this letter, that it is significant that Rajendra Prasad should have gone to Sikander and not to Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Harry Graham Haig to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 98, pp. 212-19

CAMP, 3 June, 1939

SECRET

NO. U.P. 273

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

In paragraphs 5 and 6 of Your Excellency's letter, date 26 May, 1939, you asked my views about the Secretary of State's suggestion that the Governor-General should issue a statement directed to reassuring the Muslims that Government appointments would not go unduly to Congress or "tame" Muslims, but that the non-Congress or "good" Muslims should receive their fair share of what was going. I do not myself think that in the sense in which the Secretary of State views the matter there is really any problem, or injustice. Appointments of any importance are made on the advice of the Public Service Commission. The main function of the Ministry in this connection is to decide how many Muslims should be appointed—a matter on which I can see that decisions are reasonable. The Public Service Commission are then asked to recommend the names of say five Muslims for a particular service. These men are selected by the Public Service Commission entirely on their merits. There is no question of their being "tame" or "good" and the Ministry would be in no position to put forward names of their own in consideration of the fact that they were connected with their supporters.

2. Theoretically in the lower grades of Government service, such as clerks in district offices, which are not recruited through the Public Service Commission, the Ministers could bring pressure to bear of the kind which the Secretary of State envisages.

But in practice they would not do anything of the kind, and I do not think there is any reason to suppose that Collectors and other officers who have the appointment of these lower grade Government servants would be influenced in favour of Congress as against non-Congress Muslims. There may have been some reason for complaint in connection with the appointment of rural development organisers. This, however, was a very special case, in which appointments (not only of Muslims) were admittedly made on improper principles and new appointments have now been put on a proper footing.

3. Any grievance that the Muslim community may have in this matter is not, I think, as regards actual appointments to Government service but consists rather in what I have described in my letter No. U.P. 258 dated May 10, 1939, about Sir Ziauddin Ahmad's complaints as the absence of political pull, particularly in local matters. It is probably the case for instance, that in the selection of honorary magistrates the "tame" Muslims may have an advantage over the "good" ones, but that is not a matter in which it seems to me to be possible for the Governor to interfere.

4. The primary grievance of the majority party among the Muslims in my opinion is not that they do not get their fair share of Government appointments, but that they have no part or lot in the Ministry. I do not remember public complaints that the right type of Muslims are not getting Government appointments. But Muslim League platforms have rung with accusations that the Governors have neglected the duty placed on them by their Instrument of Instructions and have wrongly accepted in their Ministries "tame" Muslims instead of "good" ones.

5. About three weeks ago, I drafted a letter to you discussing the whole situation from the point of view of the composition of the Ministries and making some tentative suggestions for the future. I was doubtful, however, whether this would be of much practical value to you, and I consequently put it on one side. But as it is clear that you and the Secretary of State are closely considering the whole problem of the attitude of Muslims, I think it is worthwhile to send a copy of this draft letter which accordingly I enclose. Though it does not deal with the problem of appointments it does discuss the problem whether the Muslims can be regarded as represented by Congress Muslims which really underlies the present reference of the Secretary of State, and I think it has a good deal of relevance to the general issues which are perplexing us.

6. As you will have gathered from what I have said above, I think that the problem of recruiting particular types of Muslims for Government service is not one which is giving rise to any difficulty and consequently that there will be no advantage in making a pronouncement about it.

Yours sincerely,
HARRY HAIG

Enclosure

SECRET

Draft Letter

In several letters which we have exchanged lately we have discussed the extremely unsatisfactory condition of Hindu-Muslim relations, and the general position and attitude of the Muslims not only to

the Hindus but to the British, and you have asked me more than once whether I have any practical suggestions to make for easing the situation or meeting the apprehensions of the Muslims. The question has arisen in connection with (a) the Hindu-Muslim disturbances in this Province and the possibility of creating some relaxation of tension (b) the All India situation that might arise in the event of war (my letter No. U.P. 240 dated April 6th, 1939, and Your Excellency's reply dated April 12th), and (c) the situation that arises with the approach of Federation.

2. So far as concerns the provincial situation, it has long been my view that the root of the trouble is that the Muslims as a community have no part in the Government. Now it may be argued that there is no reason why they should, that the Government should be formed on party lines based on political or economic principles, and that such parties should receive the support of considerable sections of all communities. That, no doubt, is the ideal, but it is perfectly plain that present conditions are in flagrant contradiction with this theory; and the question is whether there is any prospect of our gradually moving towards it. Jawaharlal Nehru in his recent conversation with me clearly indicated his anticipation or hope that the present acute communal phase would not last, that the economic factors would have their natural effect, and that if we were patient we should find that the present Hindu-Muslim antagonism might cure itself. Hallett in his letter about Ziauddin's complaints which I have seen, seems to think, there is some possibility of the Muslim masses in Bihar being attracted by economic policies and leaving the more communal upper class Muslims stranded. I cannot myself think that such developments are likely in this Province; nor I should have thought in India as a whole. It was recognised when the Constitution was being framed that separate electorates created a very difficult problem in regard to fitting the Minority communities into the general scheme of responsible Government. It was clear enough that separate electorates would tend to encourage communities to think communally and when they think communally with sufficient vehemence, they are not going to be disintegrated by economic or other general policies. That I think is precisely what has been happening ever since the introduction of the present Constitution. There was a time when the Congress Ministry took office in July 1937 when a new direction could have been given to this problem. The Congress had since the general election been flirting with the Muslim League and suggesting some form of coalition. These conversations resulted in the Muslim League holding aloof from my minority Ministry. But when the Congress took office they decided to reject the idea of a coalition with the Muslim League and to pursue instead a policy of direct approach to the Muslim masses. Had they entered into a coalition, I cannot help feeling that Muslim solidarity would soon have been undermined. There are bound to be differences between Muslims on the main agrarian and economic issues. The Muslims in office would have to make themselves responsible for definite policies in regard to these matters; they would have received the support of some Muslims and aroused the opposition of others. Nothing seems to be so effective in disintegrating a party as the taking of office.

3. The Congress, however, chose the opposite course, and from that time it was easy to work up strong Muslim communal feeling; for the community as a whole had a grievance in being excluded from a share in the Government. More and more the Muslims have come to regard themselves as a separate nationality and I do not think at this stage those ideas and that organisation are going to be disrupted by economic policies. The Muslim League have usually an answer to economic policies sponsored by the Congress. They can, being in opposition, go one better. An illustration of this came before me recently. My Ministry introduced a far-reaching Bill for the relief of agricultural and other poor debtors. In the report of the Select Committee, there are a number of Minutes of Dissent by the Muslims who all take the line that this measure is quite inadequate and that far greater relief ought to be given to these debtors. This, of course, is a particularly easy line for them to take in connection with this subject, as the creditor class are Hindus. It is, however, a good illustration of the limitations of the economic appeal to the Muslim masses. A responsible Government can only go a certain distance in proposing measures, and an opposition which has no prospect of coming into power can quite safely advocate and promise far more sweeping measures.

4. My conclusion, therefore, is that the present conditions are not going to cure themselves, or be cured by the process of appealing to the economic interests of the Muslim masses. We can only escape from this dangerous and growing sense of separate nationality based on intense religious

feeling by adopting the course which the Congress rejected in 1937, namely, admitting the Muslim community as a whole to a share of power.

5. The importance of including representatives of the Minorities in the Ministries was presently clearly enough to the minds of those who framed the Constitution. It was not I think merely because the Muslims so vehemently demanded it, but because it was realised that a denial might set up very difficult conditions, that provision was made that so far as practicable the Governor should include in his Council of Ministers members of important Minority communities. It is interesting to look back to the discussions of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. In paragraph 71 the Committee clearly recognised the obstacle imposed by religious antagonisms to majority rule strictly on the British model. The corrective was felt to lie in the independent power of the Governor. But looking back at those ideas in the light of our experience of the actual working of the Constitution, it seems to me that the Committee's report contemplates the Governor being in a much stronger position than in fact circumstances have permitted. The Committee were apprehensive that it might be difficult to establish strong Ministries based on well-organised parties. They recognised in paragraph 112 that the representation of minorities in the Ministry would be an element working against cohesion. They did not wish to rouse the distrust of Minorities and recognised the importance of the provision for finding representation for Minorities in the Ministry. But they were clearly afraid that this might prevent the development of strong and united Ministries, and they were perhaps more impressed with the danger of the Governor by his action unduly weakening the Ministry than by the possibility that by his inaction he would fail to give the Minorities the protection which was required.

6. Actually the Governors in Congress Provinces found themselves faced with a well-organised and homogeneous party with overwhelming strength in the Legislatures and in a position to insist on the Governors accepting the composition of the Council of Ministers which they proposed. If a Governor had stipulated that the Ministry must include representatives of the Muslim League, the Congress would have refused office and he would have found himself without a Ministry at all. Moreover, the wording of paragraph VII of the Instrument of Instructions is very cautious. The Governor is enjoined to include so far as practicable members of important Minority communities. He is not enjoined to include representatives of the preponderating opinion of these Minority communities, and this is a very fundamental distinction. When the Minorities were pressing for this safeguard they probably had it in mind that the members, for instance, of the Muslim community included in the Cabinet should be fair representatives of the Muslim community as a whole. The matter is to some extent discussed on that basis in paragraph 112 of the Joint Parliamentary Committee's report, where they point out that Ministry may be a composite one, and that a Ministry formed in accordance with the Instrument of Instructions must tend to be the representative not, as in the United Kingdom, of a single majority party or even of a coalition of parties but also of Minorities as such. But whatever may have been the intention, it was clearly sufficient compliance with the wording of the Instrument of Instruction if the Governor secured the inclusion in the Ministry of a reasonable proportion of Muslims, whether they were or were not representative of the community. The inclusion of even an unrepresentative Muslim is not without its importance, for whatever his political views, a Muslim remains a Muslim and my own Muslim Ministers have certainly not been unmindful of the interests of the community in such matters as appointments and fair play generally. But the Muslims are now organised as a communal political party, and it is no satisfaction to that party that two Muslims entirely unrepresentative of it are included in the Ministry. At the general election only one Congress Muslim was returned to the Legislative Assembly, and he was returned by a university constituency. It is true that subsequently a certain number of Muslims elected on the League ticket transferred their allegiance to the Congress; but it is clear enough that the inclusion of two Congress Muslims in the Ministry, while it complies with the literal terms of the Instrument of Instructions, does not in any adequate way give representation to the Muslim community.

7. The British Parliamentary system may be said to have worked well under the domination of the Congress party. Indeed in some respects it has worked too well. The majority has been entrenched firmly in power. We have had a homogeneous executive strong in the support of a well-organised party and, therefore, prepared to carry through without hesitation a definite policy. But in proportion

to the exaltation of the executive has been the suppression of the opposition. That would not matter if the opposition were able to profit by the natural fickleness of the electorate and the mistakes of the Government and to look forward to the time when they in turn would be in power. But that is not the case. The opposition is a permanent communal Minority, and faced with this position of permanent political inferiority it stresses more and more its communal unity, its antagonism to the governing community, and the religious claims which give it the enthusiastic support of the masses.

8. If I am right in this diagnosis, there is no cure for the present conditions of Hindu-Muslim antagonism in this Province short of including in the Ministry real representatives of the Muslim community that is at the present time representatives of the Muslim League. Both from the point of view of establishing tolerable and peaceful conditions in the Province and from the point of view of his responsibilities for safeguarding the interests of the Muslims, I think that the Governor should use the influence he possesses in order to work towards that solution. Hitherto I think it has been the accepted policy that Governors should feel that they have fulfilled their obligations if they have secured that a reasonable proportion of Muslims are included in the Ministry. I would suggest for consideration that Governors should now be directed consciously to try and secure that the Muslim members of their Ministries should be really representative of the Muslim community as a whole. I do not say that much, if anything, can be done at once; but I think if that policy were accepted it would not be without its effect gradually. Opportunities arise which might be utilised. In, paragraph 6 of my letter No. U.P. 241 dated April 10th, 1939, I said that if present tendencies continue, Hindu Muslim antagonisms increase and general opposition to the Government grows, the time may come when the Governor of this Province may be in a position to insist that the Cabinet should be recast and should include representatives of the Muslim League. Actually Nehru in his conversation with me indicated that such a development might not cause insuperable difficulties in this Province; but he stressed the point that it was really an all-India problem. Accepting that position it would clearly be easier to gain our end, if that is accepted as a desirable end, if all Governors were using their influence in the same direction.¹

9. I have no further suggestions to make so far as the Provincial Governments are concerned. But it is clear that similar problems are going to arise in connection with the Federation, and it would seem that at present the Muslims will not be prepared to accept Federation if there is to be any danger that the Muslims in the Federal Ministry will merely be Congress nominees. It seems clear that Congress are planning and working to dominate completely the Federal Ministry. It seems doubtful whether the Muslims in view of their experience in the Provinces would be content with any vague assurance that the Governor-General would do his best to secure for them real representation in the Ministry. Practical political forces may render such anticipations impossible to fulfil unless the position is defined more clearly. If, therefore, at a later stage there is any intention of making a concession to the Muslims or reassuring them, it might perhaps most easily take the form of an amendment of the Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions. It might go far to reassure the Muslims if in place of the words "members of important Minority communities" in paragraph VII of the Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions were substituted "representation of important Minority communities." The word "representatives" is already used in connection with the Federated States, and though it may have been used merely as a convenient drafting term, I imagine the States also would regard it as important that the Ministers drawn from the States should be really representative of opinion in the States and not merely be States representatives who are prepared to accept the policy of the Congress. It is in fact as it seems to me necessary to face the question whether in forming the Federal Executive it is intended in spite of the consequent lack of homogeneity to include real representatives of State opinion and of Muslim opinion, or to accept in fact a Congress Ministry with such State and Muslim elements as can most conveniently work in harmony with them.²

1. In his marginal note Linlithgow remarks "And as much in non-Congress as in Congress Provinces."

2. In his marginal note Linlithgow comments "This is interesting, though I find in it no new

ideas, Haig seems to give little or no weight to the possibility that a Congress split may come along the line of "haves" and "have-nots" with the possible result that the right of Congress will have the full support from landlords including Muslim landlords. I suppose he has sent Secretary of State a copy of this draft letter.

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*Robert Reid to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 122, pp. 167-72*

BENGAL, 6 June, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT NO. 11

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

5. *Communal*—The Districts continue free from serious incident, but the general atmosphere of the Press has been saturated with communalism owing to the controversy on the subject of the Calcutta Municipal Bill and the communal ratio in the Services.

6. *Communal Percentages in the Services*—As I explained in paragraph 4 of my last report, the position then reached was that the two sides of the Cabinet were separated by a comparatively narrow margin, the principal stumbling block being the difficulty arising from the fact that for some years to come Hindus are likely to predominate in that element of the Services which is filled by promotion: it has so far proved impossible to hit on a formula which would remedy this disparity without creating others. I am meeting Ministers again in Cabinet on the 6th and 7th of this month but it is too early to say yet what progress will be made and I fear I shall not see a decision before my departure.

7. I received the Hindu deputation headed by the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan on Saturday the 27th and they put their case with ability. Their main suggestion that no action should be taken until an independent Commission had enquired into the whole matter is, of course, quite impracticable, as no such body of supermen could be found whose recommendations on a matter of this kind would be accepted as impartial by both communities. Another of the Deputation's main contentions was that it was not only the Governor's duty to intervene in the matter but his intervention must be solely in the interests of the Hindus. The Muslims have contended with equal show of seriousness that the Governor has no special responsibility in the matter and cannot intervene at all. I shall be writing separately so as to indicate briefly what I conceive to be the extent of my own responsibilities in the matter and the scope within which they ought, if necessity arises, to be exercised but I am still not without hope that given a little time, heads may cool in the atmosphere of Darjeeling where Ministers will be for the next week or so.

8. It is quite clear that on the Hindu side Congress, though they did not for instance appear openly in the Deputation are out to exploit the situation to the greatest possible extent, thereby not only extricating Sarat Bose from the muddle into which he had got himself in this matter, but creating the maximum possible embarrassment for the Ministry in general and the Hindu Ministers in particular. It was, no doubt, necessary for the Deputationists to publish the representation that they had made to me but the publication of this document has not helped to improve the general atmosphere. I gathered from the Deputationists that some of them had been in touch with the Chief Minister privately and that he was at that time in a mood to be more conciliatory on the percentage question. My own discussions with him and my impression of the trend of discussion in Cabinet some days before also confirmed the fact that both Hindu and Muslim Ministers were anxious, if possible, to reach the only kind of settlement worth having namely a settlement by agreement. The Deputationists however, in the course of their published memorandum, alleged that the Ministry had systematically curtailed legitimate Hindu interests; the reference is clearly both to their administrative and legislative policy. This has resulted in a declaration by the Chief Minister, both publicly and privately to me that his hopes of an amicable settlement have now been shattered and he has demanded proof of the implied allegation of communalism on the part of Government.

A fierce controversy in the Press as to whether the allegations of communalism in administration are true or not has naturally resulted. I know that in some instances, at any rate, relating to appointments they are only too well-founded.

Incidentally, Nausher Ali, the ex-Minister who has now signed the Congress pledge and poses as a champion of nationalism against British Imperialism, must have scandalised even some of his own colleagues by the communal havoc he attempted to wreck in the Medical Department in the hope of being able to number in the plural, instead of in the singular, his Muslim supporters in the Legislature.

9. The Press throughout, while doubtless reflecting a good deal of real feeling on the matter, had added seriously to the difficulties of compromise, and indeed the publication in the Press of memoranda about to be submitted to the Cabinet by Muslim and Hindu Ministers respectively has been an unedifying feature of the whole controversy. There has, in fact, been far too much publicity altogether. The Hon'ble Chief Minister's note, for instance, advocating 55 per cent for Mohammadans was in the Press before he handed it out to me and his colleagues at our meeting of May 15th and so it goes on. It is only fair to say that the first memorandum thus to obtain publicity, long before the matter was discussed in Cabinet, was that of the Finance Minister, Sarkar.

On communal matters the point has now been reached where both Muslim and Hindu Ministers are expected frankly to air their propaganda for the benefit of their communities.



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*Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 133-38*

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 6 June, 1939

PRIVATE

3. I had an interesting talk with Raghavendra Rao¹ soon after his arrival and I told him amongst other things that I was a good deal disturbed at the increasing tension between the Muslims and Hindus, particularly for example in the United Provinces. He agreed that the situation gave cause for some anxiety and he told me that Pant's mind was moving in the direction of a genuine Coalition Government in that Province. This he fully realised could only be secured by the inclusion in the Government of really representative Muslims. Raghavendra Rao thought nevertheless that this would require a display of considerable courage on Pant's part and he did not apparently expect to see him take the plunge just yet. As against all this I notice that in a recent report Haig says that the idea of reconstituting the Government with a view to the inclusion of representatives of the All India Muslim League appears to have been dropped.

4. To turn now to letter of May the 19th. I have read without surprise what you say in paragraph 7 as to the difficulty of doing anything effective to dispel the malaise of the Muslims living in Congress Provinces. I fully appreciate indeed the immense difficulty for the failure of the Governors to discover on investigation any real substance for the complaints which have been made shows that the trouble is to a large extent psychological. The uneasiness of the Muslims is obviously caused by the attitude of mind of the Hindus which displays itself in such comparatively trifling manifestations as the singing of the Hindu National Song, "*Bande Mataram*," and there is no means by which we can alter this, for the gulf between the two communities is, as you say, fundamental. Incidentally, I am a little disturbed at the somewhat different example of this eternal communal problem which is at the moment presenting itself in Bengal. I have within the last week or ten days received strong representations from a number of Bengali Hindus protesting against a statutory, or at least a quasi-statutory, provision for securing to the Muslims a majority in the Provincial Service and appealing to the obligation which rests upon the Governor to protect the legitimate interests of the Minorities. I do not know yet what line Reid is proposing to take, though I see that he received a deputation from the Hindus a few days ago. I presume that I shall be hearing from you as to this in the near future.

5. I have, I need hardly say, read with great interest what you say in paragraph 8 of your letter concerning Muslim opposition to Federation. I fully agree, of course, that there is nothing new in the apprehensions which the Muslims feel in face of the prospect of what they describe as a *Hindu Raj*. What seems to me, however, to be a new factor is the extent to which the Muslims are uniting on this issue under the

banner of the All India Muslim League and this in its turn seems to me to be the outcome of the experience so far gained of the actual working of autonomy in the Provinces. There is, I must admit, some foundation for the view which the Muslims clearly now take, that effective intervention by the Governors in pursuance of their special responsibilities can only be expected occasionally and in exceptional cases and that the natural tendency of the Governor is to argue that his special responsibility is not affected by any particular action on the part of his Ministers rather than look for reasons suggesting that it is. A further factor which was not, I think, present to our minds either at the time of the Round Table Conference or during the sittings of the Joint Select Committee, is the growing prospect of a considerable accession of strength to the Congress Party in the Federation as a result of their attack upon the Indian States. The cumulative effect of these things seems to me to have been to add very greatly to Muslim fears and consequently to increase their opposition to the Federal provisions of the Act. It is a considerable relief to me, therefore, to know that you do not think that the Muslims have it in their power either to prevent the attainment of Federation or to make it unworkable. Unless, of course, they can find means to prevent a sufficient number of Princes from acceding. I will not say more here as to the policy to be pursued in that event, since I touched upon it in my letter of May the 22nd and dealt with it more fully in my letter of last week. I wholly agree with you that we should not weaken in any way in our determination to bring the Federation into existence if that is possible. Unfortunately it is the Princes and not ourselves who have the determining voice in the matter and it is because I have been very conscious for sometime past of the extraordinary difficulty of the situation in which we shall find ourselves if the Princes do reject our offer that I have been trying to explore the possibilities which will present themselves to us in that unhappy event. Let us hope that my fears of a setback at the hands of the Princes will prove to be unfounded.

10. I am sorry to hear that Nazim-ud-Din is so pessimistic about the internal situation in Bengal. His views find support in the reports of our own Intelligence Officers, for I noticed in the report of the Central Intelligence Bureau of May the 20th a statement to the effect that both the main divisions of the old terrorist organisations are in a thoroughly dangerous mood. But what is Nazim-ud-Din doing to deal with the situation? I hope that he realises that with the transfer of Law and Order to the Provincial Governments the duty of countering subversive measures by the terrorist organisations now rests upon his shoulders.

1. Dr. Raghavendra Rao (d. 1942); Adviser to the Secretary of States for India, 1939-41; Member, Civil Defence, Viceroy's Executive Council since 1941.



*Maurice Hallett to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 74, pp. 176-80*

15 June, 1939

SECRET

NO. 781. G.B. (BIHAR)

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am as usual most grateful for your comments on my last report and for your letter of June 10th 1939. I hasten to give my comments on the very interesting suggestions made by Lord Zetland about the communal situation but before I deal specifically with those suggestions, there are I feel some general observations which I should put forward for what they are worth by way of a prelude. Possibly I may be repeating views which I have already given, but as they have some bearing on the present question, they may be relevant.

2. There is without doubt a feeling among Mohammadans, especially the Mohammadan intelligentsia from which primarily the Muslim League is formed, that Congress is a purely Hindu organisation and that a Congress Government means a *Hindu Raj*. In this Province also a similar feeling prevails among the aboriginals, and that is one of the main reasons for the development of the Adibasi movement. There is also a somewhat similar feeling among Hindus, and though I cannot claim to know anything of conditions in Bengal, I know from conversations with my Bengali friends in this Province that they feel that not merely are they not getting a fair deal in this Province, owing to the Bengali-Bihari controversy, but also that they are not getting a fair deal in Bengal under a Muslim Ministry; the recent discussions in the Bengal Cabinet about the problem of representation in the Services seem to me to show how apprehensive the Bengali Hindus are.

3. Such being the views of the Minority communities it is desirable to try and give an appreciation of the Congress view. My Prime Minister certainly regards the activities of the Muslim League and of the Adibasi Sabha as "communalism;" he has actually used this expression in regard to the activities of the latter organisation. What he means by "communalism" is a little obscure, but I presume that both he and other Congress leaders feel very strongly that "communalism" is antagonistic to "nationalism" and that if India is split up into communal or regional groups, the chances of obtaining independence for India are lessened. His opposition to these movements, which he characterises as communal, is thus not surprising; it is based on the recognition of a very obvious fact which was fully appreciated by all who had anything to do with the framing of the new Constitution.

4. There is also, of course, at the back of the minds of all Congress leaders the belief that Congress is the only effective political organisation in India; this belief is possibly held even more strongly by the Congress rank and file. There is considerable

justification for this belief, Congress thanks to their effective organisation, swept the polls at the General Elections before the new Constitution started, and in this Province also have been on the whole very successful in the recent District Board elections, in spite of a certain amount of opposition. Congress also have never lost sight of the fact that the final result of the Civil Disobedience Movement was a victory for the Mahatma, or certainly not a defeat. As a result of these triumphs, they have become extremely intolerant of any opposition, whether from their own left wing or from organisations such as the Muslim League. All Congress leaders seem to me to be Fascist in their mentality, they would be prepared to take any steps, fair or foul, to defeat opposition.

5. But when they are faced with the Muslim opposition they recognise that they are up against a more difficult problem, due to the fact that in certain parts of India Muslims are in a majority and that the majority will support the Muslim Minority, in other parts. It is largely in view of this that they feel the necessity of placating or at least of not alienating the Muslims and as I hope I have shown in my general report on this question, my Government have been careful to avoid any action which would antagonise Muslim feeling. But my Ministers see clearly that in a Province such as Bihar there are two classes of Muslims. These two classes will, of course, unite if the cry is raised that an attack is being made on their religion and that is one of the real dangers of the Muslim propaganda. But if religion is left out of account, the Muslim community like all other communities is divided into an upper and lower class. There is no doubt that Congress hope to win over the lower class; they cannot hope to win over the upper class, but they hope at least to avoid antagonising them. Here in Bihar we have the problem of the so-called Momins. A few years ago I would have said that a Momin was a Muslim weaver, but now the term seems to be used to include any Muslim of the lower classes. The word actually merely means a "believer," so there is no great difficulty in any Muslim calling himself a "Momin." The Momin community in view of the new definition is very large in numbers; except in religious matters, its interests are the same as those of the lower caste Hindus and any measure designed to benefit the cultivator, the landless labourer or the artisan will benefit them. Congress, I feel, recognise that, if this large section of the Muslims can be won over to their side, they will cause a split in the Muslim opposition and I think there is no doubt that my Congress Ministry are doing what they can to win over this numerically large community.

6. After this very long prelude, I come down to the point raised by Lord Zetland that the Muslim opposition is due partly to the fact that "tame" Muslims rather than "good" Muslims get jobs. I do not wish to minimise the very important bearing which the distribution of jobs or of the "loaves and fishes" has on political feeling, especially in India where the idea still prevails that a post under Government is the one thing to be secured. But this point must not be over-emphasised, and that is my excuse for my long prelude on the general situation.

7. What is the position as regards appointments? It is, of course, only a small percentage of the total number of appointments to Government service that are made direct—by Government and though possibly subordinate officers are to some extent influenced by Ministers or even by Congress leaders in the districts, I doubt

whether they select "tame" in preference to "good" Muslims. In the case of appointments direct by Government some protection is afforded by the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission certainly is impartial, but as Your Excellency knows I have had difficulty in getting the Ministers to accept the Public Service Commission's recommendations. They insist on a large number of candidates being recommended for each vacancy, at least three for each vacancy so that they may have a power of selection. In some cases that I recollect they have selected a Momin in preference to a high class Muslim and it is difficult to resist any such proposal as it means securing representation for a class not represented in the public services. Whether the Momins so selected have been "tame" or "good" is uncertain, but in giving them this preference they are carrying out their policy of placating this part of the Muslim community. I do not, however, think that on the whole that the action taken by my Government in this matter has been such as to cause any strong feeling of resentment.

11. I now pass on to consider Lord Zetland's suggestions as to possible action. I fully share your doubts as to the advisability of adopting these suggestions. If Your Excellency made any statement about the danger of stimulating communal tension by the inequitable distribution of appointments, Congress would at once cry out that their appointments were not inequitable and it would, as I tried to show in the earlier part of this letter, be difficult to show that they were. They might even go so far as to attack the Muslim Governments in Bengal and the Punjab and to contend that it was their appointments which were inequitable. This would increase communal tension.

12. I feel sure that Your Excellency is right in leaving the matter to Governors. I will watch the situation and if the need arises will point out to my Government that they are making an inequitable distribution of appointments. But more than that cannot and should not be done.

13. I have started this letter with trying to give an appreciation of the reasons for the present tension between the two communities and I will close it by repeating my view that it is largely due to political jealousy. If Congress would take into their Ministries representatives of the Muslim League the situation might be improved but it is very unlikely that they ever will do so. I feel that in this matter we must stand aside; we must see that no grave injustice is done to the Muslims either in the matter of appointments or in other matter, but we cannot take, as far as I can see, any more positive action to improve their relations. Anything we might do might be misinterpreted; our critics will go back to the old cry that our policy is *Divide et impera* and our intervention might make the whole position more difficult.

I apologise for the length of my comments on the points which Your Excellency and Lord Zetland have raised.

Yours sincerely,
M.G. HALLETT



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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 5, pp. 259-61*

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 16 June, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3. Many thanks for telling me about your discussions with Raghavendra Rao, whom I regard as a shrewd and observant commentator. You will remember that in paragraph 9 of your letter of 9th May you put to me a suggestion for dealing with Muslim apprehensions about which I promised to consult the Governors concerned. I am sending you separately Haig's reactions, and you shall have the replies of the other Governors whom I have consulted as they come in. I will postpone comment until the collection is complete, save perhaps to say that I am not altogether surprised at the line which Haig himself has taken. I agree with you that the real trouble is psychological and that makes it all the more difficult to deal with. But I am watching with interest these overtures for a rapprochement between Hindus and Muslims which are apparently being conducted between Sikander and Rajendra Prasad. I am sending you separate copy of a letter from Sikander to a Mr. Shah, who is apparently conducting the correspondence on behalf of Rajendra Prasad, which shows Sikander's attitude. I talked matters over with him a day or two ago on the basis of that letter, but he had nothing material to add to it.

4. I was amused incidentally to find that Sikander has still been unable to find time to work out the detail of his Pakistan scheme on paper. He told me that he thought the Princes' performance at Bombay was singularly inept; and added that he was disturbed as he thought their decision might interfere with his own plans for Pakistan, & Co., as well as with mine. On the general position he commented that he saw alarming indications of possible future trouble in the Punjab; that he thought it difficult to feel any confidence that it would be possible to avoid a major disturbance there for more than five years, and that his fear was that, in his own words "we should have to find our way back through blood." He was beginning to regard the opposition as incorrigible and as entirely unready to listen to reason, while in the services he was having some trouble with Hindu officers—though he added, he was quite ready to believe that Prime Ministers drawn from another community in other Provinces might have similar difficulties with their Muslim officers! The fact was, he said, that the country was faced with a dilemma. Muslims felt that they could not let His Majesty's Government fade away from India but equally it was impossible for them to get up in public and say they did not want Home Rule.

5. I took the opportunity to have a word with Sikander about the Hyderabad agitation. He took the view that there would be nothing really to be gained by applying the States Protection Act in the Punjab as any steps that he might take in this way could be effectively countered by would be agitators taking third class tickets and forming up outside the Punjab. He definitely indicated however, that he thought

that Hydari was being quite unreasonable and was pressing the religious position as against the Arya Samaj rather too hard. He had himself suggested to him that it was time for him to give way, and he had a little the feeling that Hydari might contemplate climbing down to some extent immediately before or simultaneously with his proposed reforms announcement. He, Sikander, had however put it to him that he would be ill-advised to wait so long; and that the course of wisdom would be to take an earlier opportunity to satisfy the more reasonable elements in the Arya Samaj and to remove some of the worst of the religious repression at present existing. I could not but be struck with Sikander's attitude on this matter and I must have another talk about it with Glancy. It is of obvious significance that Hydari's policy should expose itself to criticism of this character from a fellow Muslim of the standing of Sikander.

8. I agree with what you say in paragraph 5 as to the significance of the extent to which the Muslims for the first time for some time are getting together under the banner of the Muslim League. I still do not myself quite see in what way they could effectively torpedo Federation (that is assuming that the Princes are going to allow us to get within sight of a Federation which can be torpedoed) and I do not gather from your present letter that, apart from the general apprehension which, of course, we must both share of their inconvenience which they could cause and the impediments which they might put in the way of the smooth working of Federation, any specific method by which they could make its working impossible has occurred to you either. But I realise the importance of the point, and I am sure that we shall be wise to have considered it as closely as possible in advance. I am, therefore, taking the opportunity of my periodical letters to Governors to put it to them and ask them what their judgement of the position is both generally and as affecting their own Provinces. The only Governor with whom I have so far had a chance to discuss it—Craik—was inclined to pooh-pooh the possibility of any effective Muslim interference. That was in the course of conversation, and I have now asked him to take discreet soundings and thereafter to let me have his views in writing so that I can pass them on to you.

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Liaquat Ali Khan to Jinnah

Freedom Movement Archives, F. 335/21-24

MUSSOORIE, 16 June, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the 13th. Agenda for the meeting on the 2nd of July, as I have already informed you, has been issued. The Raja of Mahmudabad in reply to my telegram says that his mother is not well and if she recovers by that time he shall attend the meeting. Malik Barkat Ali has some engagement on the 3rd and will not be able to attend. Nawab Khan will attend if he is allowed by his doctor to travel. The wound after the operation which he had to

undergo, has not healed yet. I have not so far heard from anyone else. On the receipt of your telegram which you had sent me from Matheran, I had sent a message of hope and encouragement to the Jaipur Mohajareen. I intend meeting them in Delhi on my way to Bombay. Mian Iftikharuddin of Punjab, and Dr. Zaheer¹ and Sajjad Zaheer² all young Congress men have had talks with me up here. They are most anxious that there should be a settlement between the League and the Congress as they feel that the country cannot progress any further without such a settlement. They gave me to understand that the left wing of the Congress is most anxious for a settlement. They say that they will force the hands of the Congress High Command to acknowledge the League as the only representative organisation of the Musalmans but desire that some face-saving device be found. I told them that the League was always willing for an honourable settlement and the responsibility of the present situation rested entirely on the Congress. Some of these youngmen are anxious to have a talk with you. They will be going to Bombay for the A.I.C.C. meeting at the end of this month and would probably see you. I was given to understand that the Hindus of the left wing of the Congress also were most anxious for a settlement. You will be able to know all about it if these young men come to see you.

We all are keeping very fit. With our kindest regards to you and Miss Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT

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1. Dr. S. Husain, Zaheer (1901-75); Son of Wazir Hasan and Scientist; Member, Indian National Congress, 1935-47; courted arrest during Quit India Movement; Director-General, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 1962-66.
 2. Sajjad Zaheer (1905-1973); Son of Sir Wazir Hasan; joined the Communist group in Britain along with Mulk Raj Anand and founded the Indian Progressive Writer's Association, London, 1935; returned to India, 1936; Secretary, Allahabad Congress Committee and founder member of Congress Socialist Party and leader for several years; sent by the Communist Party to Pakistan; implicated in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, 1951 and jailed, 1951, released from 1955, came back to India and organised Afro-Asian Writer's Movement.

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Roger Lumley¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 85, pp. 146-48

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, GANESHKHIND, 17 June, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL
D.O. NO. 131/H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

2. With regard to the Muslim opposition to Federation, it seems clear that in this

Province the Muslim League Party, which at present seems to take its views rather blindly from Jinnah, follows the general Muslim League line of opposition to Federation. I do not feel driven, however, to regard this as anything very serious, for three reasons. In the first place, the Muslim population in this Province is small being little more than 8 per cent of the total, so that whichever way the weight of our Muslims falls it will not make very much difference. Secondly, I think this opposition to Federation is not deep-seated but purely a matter of political tactics. Certainly the average Muslim knows little about Federation except what Jinnah chooses to tell him, and, if either Jinnah should find it advantageous to change his tactics or should lose his hold over the Muslims, I would expect Muslim opposition to Federation here largely to disappear. Thirdly, although the Muslim League has made much headway in this Province and can claim to speak for the great majority of Muslims, I doubt whether there is real unity amongst them. Many of them do not like Jinnah. Many of them, too, are descendants of converted Hindus and not of Muslim conquerors, so that there is not the same racial feeling as exists, I imagine, in Northern India. There are influential sects like the Khojas who follow the Aga Khan, and who seem to prefer compromise with Congress rather than Jinnah's intransigent opposition which seems to them to be leading nowhere. I do not, therefore, think that the Muslims in this Province are sufficiently strong or united to do anything effective against Federation and in fact if Federation became a real possibility I would not be surprised to see a number of Muslims going over to it. Self-interests of various kinds would dictate their attitude, and I do not think Jinnah has a strong enough hold to prevent many of them from following their own interests once it is clear to them where they lie.

3. With regard to the second point, the allegation that "tame" Muslims obtain all the appointments secured to the community by the fixed quotas [quotas] could not be substantiated in this Province. If, as I assume, by "fixed quotas" is meant recruitment to the Public services, that recruitment is governed by selection either by the Public Service Commission or by local officers, and I have never heard it suggested that the young Muslims who obtain these appointments secure any preference because of any political alignments which they may favour. In a different sense than that referred to by the Secretary of State, I would say that "jobs" are one of the main causes of Muslim discontent. Before the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, from Muslims were found many of the principal supporters of Government. In almost every district which I visit no matter how small the Muslim population, I have found Khan Bahadurs and Khan Sahibs who used to be the chief supporters of the district officers, as Presidents or members of local bodies or in other ways. Now, although they retain their relations with the district officers, they find their influence and their status gone,—and it is, I am convinced, the feeling that these local Muslim leaders have lost a considerable influence with Government, which they used to have, which is one of the principal causes of Muslim uneasiness. This feeling is fanned into discontent and alarm when they see the Party in power showing favour to those Muslims who are prepared, mainly in order to advance their own interests, to keep in with Congress. It seems to me entirely natural that Congress, in searching for help from Muslims, should accept help from those who are prepared to give it rather than from those who belong to an organisation which is strongly opposed to them. The kind of

instance which I have in mind is in the appointment of Honorary Magistrates, where it is probably true to say that only those Muslims who are known to be free from the control of the Muslim League have been appointed. Another instance is the appointment last year, as Sheriff of Bombay, of a follower of the Aga Khan's. He was known to be rather antagonistic to the Muslim League and to be what Congress would describe as broad-minded. He was, therefore, preferred to other candidates. In this limited sense, "tame" Muslims obtain advantages over "good" Muslims, but although it is undoubtedly a great source of irritation to "good" Muslims, Congress can hardly be blamed for taking this line.

4. The action proposed by the Secretary of State, that the Governor-General should exert some pressure on the distribution of appointments, seems to me, at present uncalled for. There would be no real justification for it, and it could hardly fail to lead to resentment from my Ministers, who would claim, and not without justification, that the way they have treated Muslims in this matter is the best which they could do in prevailing circumstances. They would also be able to point to a stream of criticism, to which they are being subjected by Hindu papers with Mahasabha leanings, to the effect that the Ministry is pampering Muslims.

5. As I am dealing in this letter with Muslim questions, I might mention that a few weeks ago I asked Jinnah, whom I had not previously met to come and see me. He came and, to my surprise, as I gather that he is well able to take a different line, he was very friendly. We had a long and indeterminate talk, in which he outlined his case for his contention that Muslims were being abominably treated by Congress and let down by us. He had to admit that in this Province things were not so bad as in some other Provinces. At that time he seemed particularly annoyed with Bihar. He had a particular point against this Province in connection with legislation which was passed last year, and about which I wrote to you at the time, which made provision for the exercise of local option by Muslims to choose joint instead of separate electorates for local bodies. So far nothing further has happened about this provision, but it is likely to come up to me in the near future. I do not, however, anticipate that I shall have great difficulty in persuading Kher, who gave a strong and definite undertaking at the time, not to take action which would arouse Muslim feeling. Jinnah also referred to the restoration of forfeited lands, which he regarded as a point of principle on which we should have stood. Where, however, he did impress me was with his account of the difficulties with which small Muslim communities in villages were now faced. Local Congress leaders were taking the opportunity provided for them by the advent of the Congress Government to make things as uncomfortable as possible for these small communities. Complaints of this sort, he said, would never reach me, and did not see that there was anything which I could do to help them; but it was, he maintained, the basis of the feeling that under a Congress Government Muslims could expect no justice. I think he exaggerates and is making the most of a few instances, for I have come across this feeling in districts and I have never been able to obtain concrete evidence of ill-treatment. The feeling, I think, springs from the fear that, when Congress were given power by the British, Muslims would be down-trodden, and this fear has tended to magnify every little incident or rumour. Although as I say, I think he exaggerates, I am convinced that this feeling serves as one of the basic elements in Muslim discontent.

6. I might also mention that I have, in the last few days, heard from a retired Parsi C.I.D. official, who keeps me informed of any matters of interest which he picks up, that Jinnah is sounding Muslim Leaders in India as to whether they would agree to broaden the basis of the Muslim League so as to gather within its fold all Minorities and thus show up the Congress as an entirely Hindu sectarian body. Jinnah appears to have doubts whether the Muslim leaders will consent to this course, and he proposes as an alternative that the Minorities, other than the Muslims, should be gathered up in a Minorities League which would work in coalition with the Muslims and present a united front to the Congress. He expects opposition from Sir Sikander Hyat Khan who is said to argue that such a coalition might cause a disruption in the ranks of the Muslims on account of the inclusion of men of different religions. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of these statements, but it seems a probable and healthy direction in which Jinnah would operate.

Yours sincerely,
ROGER LUMLEY

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1. Sir Lawrance Roger Lumley, Governor of Bombay and author, 1937-1943.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers No. 48, pp. 1-4

"BARNES COURT," SIMLA, 19 June, 1939

SECRET

D.O. NO. 156

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In paragraph 2 of your private and personal letter to me of the 10th of June you asked for a more formal indication of my views on the subject of Muslim opposition to Federation. I dealt with the Punjab aspect of this question in paragraphs 6 to 13 of my letter to you, No. 74 of the 5th of June, 1938. But a good deal has happened since that letter was written more particularly the recent decision of the Princes, and a review of the position may be useful. But I should like to preface what follows with a caution that I put forward my estimate with the greatest diffidence and not in any dogmatic spirit. Such as, it is, it has been formed partly on the reports that reach me from the Central and Provincial Intelligence agencies, partly on conversations with leading Muslims of moderate views (Sikander and other Punjabis as well as a few from other Provinces) and partly on material supplied to me by Moon¹ as a result of contacts with his Muslim friends.

2. To begin with, I agree with your view that we need not take too seriously the

various forms of the Pakistan project. To the best of my recollection the original Pakistan project was conceived, or at any rate sponsored by the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the famous Lahore poet. It visualised an Islamic state stretching from the Ravi to the Bosphorus and uniting the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, possibly also the Kashmir and Bahawalpur States with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and the Turkey. This visionary scheme was at one time given a certain amount of publicity, so far as I remember by a small group of Muslim students in England, but I do not think it has ever been taken seriously by any thoughtful section of Muslims in India.

A modified form of the Pakistan idea contemplates, I believe, the splitting up of India into two separate entities, both of which would remain within the British Empire. Muslim India would include the Punjab, Sind the North-West Frontier Province and perhaps also Kashmir and Bahawalpur. I have never seen any reasoned attempt to define the relations of this Muslim group with the rest of India. But this scheme too is not, to the best of my belief, taken seriously by thoughtful Muslims. Sikander, for example, appreciates that the financial objections alone are overwhelming. As he put it to me, the Punjab already provides nearly 60 per cent of the Indian Army, but only a comparatively small portion of the cost of Defence falls on this Province. Under this scheme a more or less independent Muslim India would have to provide the finance as well as the personnel required for its defence, a burden which it could not possibly sustain.

Then there is the scheme for dividing India into the Hindu and Muhammadan "cultural zones" which has received a good deal of publicity within the last few months. This scheme seems to be gaining a certain amount of favour with the unthinking masses of Muslims, but it is obviously quite impracticable, as it entails the shifting of vast masses of population from one area to another.

Though all these schemes are visionary and ill-defined, it would, I think, be a mistake to assume that the Pakistan idea is dead in the sense that we shall hear no more about it. I feel that it will continue to figure prominently in the columns of the more irresponsible Muslim newspapers and to be ventilated on the platform, but as a possible solution of our present difficulties I do not think it merits serious consideration.

3. I need not say anything about Sikander's own scheme, as I believe he will very shortly send it to you in writing. He has asked me to let him have the services of Moon one day this week to help him to put it into shape. I gave a description of the scheme, as explained to me orally by Sikander a year ago, in my letter to you of the 5th of June, 1938.

4. Muslim opposition to the scheme of Federation contained in the Act of 1935 is, of course, founded on the apprehension that the Central Government under that scheme will be predominantly a Congress Government rigidly controlled by the Congress High Command, that the safeguards provided in the Act by the Governor-General's responsibility for the protection of Minorities and by his control of the reserved subjects will not in practice be effective; and that the Central Executive will be disposed to meddle unduly in purely provincial matters, particularly in those Provinces where Muslims are in a majority. These apprehensions are, I believe, genuinely felt by the majority of politically-minded Muslims. They were not voiced

when the Act of 1935 was under consideration, because before the end of 1936 few foresaw that Congress would obtain overwhelming majorities in 8 Provinces or that the Ministers of these Provinces would contain practically no genuine representation of Muslim interests. In the case of the Punjab there is an additional and special reason for anxiety. It is felt here that a Congress Central Ministry would bring continually increasing pressure on the Governor-General to relax his control in respect of "Defence" and that in course of time this pressure would become irresistible. Sikander and his party believe that a Congress Ministry at the Centre would insist on giving each Province a share in the Defence forces roughly equivalent to its population and that the existing Punjab predominance in the Army, which is, of course, of enormous economic importance to the Province, would gradually disappear.

5. This hostility towards Federation has been considerably intensified since the Patna session of the All India Muslim League last December, at which you will remember, great prominence was given to allegations of oppression of Muslims in the Congress Provinces, allegations which were repeated at length and in detail in the pamphlet recently circulated by Jinnah.² A strong deputation of the All India Muslim League has recently been touring in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, repeating these stories at crowded meetings, and this tour has in my judgment had considerable effect in intensifying communal feeling generally and Muslim determination not to tolerate Hindu domination in particular.

6. As regards the question of the form which Muslim opposition would take if Federation were imminent, as it seemed to be till a few days ago, my own view has always been that if the two other main parties i.e. the Princes and the Congress, were ready to accept Federation without haggling or making difficulties, the Muslim opposition would not in that case take an extreme form such as civil disobedience. One of my Muslim friends, Sir Abdur Rahim,³ surprised me the other day by saying that if Federation were imminent, he would advise Muslims to boycott it, and when I asked what he meant by "boycott," he said he meant a refusal to return Muslim representatives to the Federal Assembly. But Sikander, when I mentioned this view to him, pooh-poohed it as fantastic. Disunity among Muslims reduces the chance of wide-spread unconstitutional resistance on their part. Jinnah is, of course, an uncertain quantity and I would not care to gamble on the line he might take. But he is nearly 70 and I am told losing influence and grip. The Ahrars, who represent, speaking generally, the more uneducated Muslims of the urban lower classes, are in strong opposition to the Muslim League and might quite possibly in the near future join forces with the Congress. They would not, I think, support Muslim opposition to the Federation on a communal basis. Moreover, the Muslim leaders in the North-West Frontier Province and to some extent in Sind would probably be precluded by their close association with the Congress from resisting Federation on such a basis. The Punjab Unionists, who represent in the main the large landholders and other stable elements, would not be disposed to lend their support to any form of opposition likely to endanger public order.

7. But apparently Federation is not at the moment imminent, as the other interested parties—more particularly the Princes—are making difficulties and in view of recent developments the Muslim dislike of Federation assumes very much greater

significance than it did before. I imagine that the shrewder Muslim leaders are well aware that their attitude of opposition is likely in existing circumstances to be of decisive importance and the probability is that they will maintain this attitude, if for no other reason than simply to gain time. It must be remembered that—(a) the existing form of Government at the Centre with an irremovable Executive, anomalous as it is, suits the Muslims at the moment very well. They are in power in four Provinces and can never hope to have power in more than these, and their interests at the Centre are adequately protected by the present form of Government. Sikander, for example, has expressed quite recently his opinion that the existing state of affairs could be carried on for some years without bringing about an absolute deadlock; (b) compared to the Congress, the Muslim political organisation is extremely ill-developed and they require time to improve this; (c) they are by no means united, as pointed out above, and there is a good deal of general uncertainty as to what they really want. Time is required to promote unity among their own ranks and for their objections to take definite shape.

Yours sincerely,

H.D. CRAIK

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1. Penrderal Moon (1905-); joined ICS in 1929; resigned in 1944; author of *Strangers in India*, *Divide & Quit* and *Gandhi and Modern India*; edited Wavell, *The Viceroy's Journal*; Assistant Editor, the Transfer of Power, 1942-47.
 2. The reference is obviously to the Pirpur Report.
 3. (Justice) Sir Abdul Rahim (1867-1952); Member, Bengal Executive Council, 1921-25 and In-charge of Justice and Jail, 1921-25; Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1926-30 and Indian Legislative Assembly, 1930; leader, Independent Party; Leader Opposition, 1933-34; Member, Indian delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1933; President, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935-45; member and leader of Indian delegation to the Empire Parliamentary Conference in London, 1935 and 1937; publication; *Principle of Muhammeden Jurisprudence According to the Sunni School of Law*.

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John Woodhead¹ to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 127, pp. 177-82

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, DARJEELING, 19/20 June, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT NO. 12

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. A further case of interference with meetings took place in Calcutta when the

Jamait-ul-Ulama Conference was broken up by Muslims presumably League supporters. It was believed that Congress was actively supporting, if not financing, the Conference and past experience shows that such attempts to split the Muslims in Bengal are apt to result sooner or later in outbreaks of violence.

4. *Communal reservation in the Services:* This question has overshadowed all others in general interest during the fortnight. It will be recalled that at the close of the discussions in May, Muslim Ministers insisted not only on 50 per cent reservation in direct recruitment for Muslims but also on additional Muslim reservation in direct recruitment to counterbalance, man for man, any excess in the number of Hindus over the number of Muslims who might enter a Service by promotion. They were prepared to modify but not to abandon this latter stipulation provided that their Hindu colleagues accepted the proposals unanimously. When I arrived, Ministers were still fresh from the turmoil of Calcutta and had one day's further discussion in Cabinet. I attended the discussions on the 7th and at the close of the morning meeting matters certainly did not look hopeful. Neither side seemed to budge on the question of Muslim "compensation" for excess Hindu promotions and Sarkar was inclined to go back even on what he had previously agreed to regarding equality of direct recruitment between Muslims and non-Muslims in some of the Services. The Chief Minister was exasperated by recent propaganda in the Hindu Press and it was obvious that, while on one hand there seemed little hope of agreement on the other hand Muslim Ministers could not return to Calcutta and face their party without a definite decision.

5. The one hopeful feature that emerged was that both sides eventually seemed prepared to agree to parity between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Services as an object to be aimed at. An attempt was made to get them to agree to a public statement to the effect that agreement had been reached on that point a course which would have permitted more leisurely examination by the Secretariat of the problem of mitigating the delay in attaining parity that must necessarily result from a probable surplus of promoted Hindus for the next few years. This course proved impossible, but the fact of agreement as to the ultimate objective at least reduced the problem to tangible proportions and within the next day or so we were able to work out statistics which showed, firstly, that only four of the Upper Services were actually affected by the element of promotion, and secondly that the number of posts which would be affected in those Services one way or the other by the application of a formula to "compensate" for promotions was likely to be extremely small in the next ten years, after which the effect of "compensation"—would still further diminish as the proportion of Muslims eligible for promotion increases. We met again after the King Emperor's Birthday and the figures, showing the small number of posts involved in this promotion matter, acted somewhat as a cold douche and allowed the discussions to proceed on a more objective basis.

6. A small Drafting Committee produced during the week-end a draft communique which brought out the practical aspects of the problem and served still further to show how near the two sides were to acquiescence if not to agreement. On Monday morning the 12th the Cabinet met after I had been sworn in and as a result of personal discussions over the week-end, it was clear that one at least of the

Hindu Minister would be prepared definitely to agree to a solution of the promotion problem by which one extra Muslim over and above the 50 per cent should be taken in by direct recruitment for every two Hindus in excess of 50 per cent who entered the Service by promotion from a lower Service. Sarkar, who unlike his two Hindu colleagues probably feels that he has a political future elsewhere was not prepared to go further than acquiescence in a majority decision on that point but agreed to defend such a decision if it were taken by a majority.

7. Notwithstanding the fact that the Muslims had previously been unwilling to modify their full demand except in return for an unanimous decision, they agreed after conferring among themselves to accede to my personal request and accept the formula of one extra Muslim for each extra promoted Hindu instead of one extra Muslim to two excess promoted Hindu. The Chief Minister, who is essentially a sentimentalist and who undoubtedly possesses the gift of graceful English, announced their decision to defer to my views with a quotation to the effect that "on joyous occasions (alluding to my assumption of office) it was fitting to make presents." I confess I was greatly relieved by the result, not only because I had no wish to bring about a difficult situation as soon as I assumed office, but also because the decision, though it represents a considerable advance in some Services on the present position and though also it imports the element of Muslim weightage in direct recruitment against Hindu excesses in the promotion, is one that I personally feel is defensible: it is also inside the limits within which Reid in his telegram of May 17th reported that he would feel constrained to agree, and is a decision which both he and I agreed would not be incompatible with the Governor's special responsibility in the matter.

8. I append to this letter the text of the Communique issued on the subject and also the text of the Cabinet decision which supplements the Communique in certain respects and adds further safeguards. A formal note of dissent was put on record on behalf of the Hindu Ministers headed by Sarkar, with special reference to the "weightage against promotions" and the application of the 50 : 50 formula to technical Services. Having regard to the fact that there are safeguards against lowering the qualifications and that for some of the technical Services Muslims will not be in a position for the present to put forward the requisite number of qualified candidates, I do not think that this latter objection is as material as might seem.

9. The Hindu Ministers generally, and Sir Bijoy in particular, have expressed warm appreciation of the consideration shown to them by their Muslim colleagues and the obvious desire of the latter to make things as easy for them as possible, and I myself have been impressed by the spirit of accommodation that the Muslims have shown bearing in mind the strong views they hold on the matter and the very great pressure to which they are subjected by their followers.

10. *Reactions to the decision on Service ratios:* The reactions in the Hindu Press have, of course, been unfavourable but not as violent as the previous propaganda. *The Hindustan Standard*, while attempting to explain away Sarat Bose's attitude on the matter in the Legislature—an attitude inspired purely by the desire to catch Muslim votes—is naturally most extreme in its condemnation and in its attacks on the Hindu Ministers. *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* attacks the decision as palpably unjust to Hindus and likely to cause deterioration of the Services. It was of course bound to

attack the decision but does not appear to have studied the details. Burdwan on his departure for England is reported to have been gloomy at the prospects of a fair decision but to have said that a 50 : 50 basis was a proper thing to aim at: at that time the decision was not known. One member of the Hindu deputation has denounced the decision in the Press as a "gross betrayal," another, however, has told me privately that he does not think it is too bad.

11. I am afraid it is a fact that the nationalist Press speaks with two voices—one when it is attempting to obtain Muslim support and another when it is forced into the position of defending non-Muslim vested interests. Sarat Bose's attempt to reconcile these two irreconcilable attitudes has on this, as on other occasions, largely nullified the effect of Hindu representation in the Legislature. It came out in the course of Cabinet discussions that although Government remained neutral on the Assembly resolution demanding 60 per cent of the Services for Muslims last year, both Hindu and Muslim Ministers were privy to its being moved with the object of putting Sarat Bose in an awkward position. Ministers realised too late that the trick had recoiled upon them as a boomerang by creating demands that it was impossible to satisfy.

12. The Chief Minister has just written, after his return to Calcutta saying that his party are not satisfied with the decision from the Muslim point of view, and is not unnaturally incensed at the subsequent abuse in the Hindu Press and their misrepresentation of a decision which, to give Muslim Ministers their due, was courageous and not ungenerous.

13. I have written at some length on the subject as it is quite the biggest problem that has confronted the Bengal Government and involves every aspect of the communal question at some point or other.

1. Sir John Ackroyd Woodhead, Temporary Governor of Bengal, 12 June-November, 1939.

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Malik Barkat Ali to Jinnah [Extract]

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 49/51

TEMPLE ROAD, LAHORE, 21 June, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

2. I have not the least doubt that under your guidance the deliberations of the Working Committee will be all to the good of the Muslim community and the country at large. If I may be permitted to make one observation, it is that the League should not allow its vital principles to be in any manner dragged down or side-tracked by any considerations of expediency or the desire to keep, within its folds, those who are really not true to its ideals but are only professing a lip adherence to advance their own ends. I should like specifically to draw your attention to the great need of

the Working Committee clarifying its attitude so far as the question of Muslim India and Hindu India is concerned. It appears to me that a great deal of loose talk is being indulged in on this subject and that in some quarters it is regarded as if the League stands committed to the scheme of Cultural Federation as developed by Dr. Sayyed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad or as fostered by Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon. The Working Committee should see to it that the misunderstandings thus caused in regard to the attitude of the League in this matter are completely dissipated and the League ideal of a Free and United India is restated beyond any possibility of doubt.

With all regards,

Yours sincerely,
BARKAT ALI

M.A. JINNAH Esq ;
M.L.A. (Central)
Bar-at-Law,
Little Gibbs Road
Malabar Hill, BOMBAY

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Zetland to Linlithgow

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 154-55

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 27 June, 1939

PRIVATE

2. The gloomy view taken by Sikander of the future of the Punjab, as described in paragraph 4 of your letter, comes to me as a complete surprise. I had indeed regarded the Punjab as the Province in which the Parliamentary system had most successfully taken root. What does Sikander expect the opposition to do if not to oppose? It is, surely, of the essence of the Parliamentary system that from the point of view of the Government of the day the opposition should appear to be "incorrigible" and "entirely unready to listen to reason;" and because the opposition in the Punjab are living up to this reputation it savours surely of the rankest melodrama to talk of "finding their way back through blood." Incidentally, where is it that Sikander expects to find his way back to along this dolorous way? I must admit to being badly puzzled.

3. On the other hand, I find myself in agreement with him when he says, in connection with the agitation against Hyderabad, that Akbar Hydari is pressing the religious position as against the Arya Samaj too hard. The requests of the Arya Samaj seem to me, as I mentioned in a recent letter, by no means unreasonable. After all, ninety per cent of the population of Hyderabad are Hindu, and even majorities have their rights! However, there must, I suppose, be more in it than appears on the

surface and I have caused a demi-official approach to be made to your Government with a view to ascertaining if possible what are the actual demands which are being made by the Arya Samaj and on what grounds they are being rejected.

4. I had a talk with Reid last week, but did not get a great deal out of him. I gathered that he thought that the agreement of the Bengal Ministry on the question of communal representation in the Public Services in Bengal on a basis of 50/50 recruitment as between Muslims and Hindus ought to satisfy most people; and he added that in his view Burdwan and others had been made to some extent the cat's-paw of the Congress when they had agreed to make formal representations to him on the matter. Knowing something of the feelings of Hindus of all shades of political opinion on the communal question in Bengal, I feel disposed to doubt whether in fact there is very much in this. I asked Reid to let me have his estimate of Bose's position in Bengal, and I gathered that the brothers Bose are almost as unpopular in Bengal on personal grounds as they are in the rest of India. Nevertheless, Reid seemed to think that there would be continued attempts to replace the present Government with a genuine coalition of Muslims with the Congress. I asked him how, so long as the Muslims are in a statutory majority in the Legislature, it was hoped that any such coalition could be brought about? But to this question he could supply no answer, other than that many of the Muslim Legislators were for sale. I ventured to express doubt whether their venality would allow them to go so far as to betray a Muslim Ministry into the hands of a Hindu Congress, or that if they did, it would provide any very sure foundation for those who had suborned them to build on; and with this Reid appeared to agree.

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M.K. Syed Ahmed to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. III, p. 137

DEEVO STREET, KAYALPATNAM, 27 June, 1939

Dear Friend,

3. Will you please let me know when the Congress took the tri-coloured flag as it is now a National Flag? Did the Muslim leaders Maulana Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and Jinnah object to having this as National Flag? Will you please clear out my doubts?

4. '*Bande Mataram*' is a Bengali word. The reactionary groups say that the meaning for this word is we adore to the Goddess of Earth. Is it right? May I please know how '*Bande Mataram*' became a National slogan?

5. The Congress Government of Madras has introduced compulsory Hindustani. The anti-Congress groups oppose it and create violent agitation. To oppress it the Government use the Criminal Law Amendment Act which was vehemently opposed by us. Is it right or not? Is 'Hindustani' a common term for both 'Urdu and Hindi?' Is it not possible to take 'Hindustani' in Roman script as *lingua franca* of India?

6. Is the picture '*Bharatha Matha*' with numberless hands and wings a religious symbol or political?

I am,

Yours sincerely,
M.K. SYED AHMED
Asstt. Secretary,
Congress Committee,
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Sir William Barton¹ article

Congress Government II, pp. 47-52

(Extract from the article "Indian Muslims reject Hindu Tyranny" published in National Review, London, June 1939, pp. 751-758)

British statesmen who modelled that amazing piece of legislation, the India Act, built on the hope that Self-Government would bridge the gulf between the two opposing nations in India, Hindu and Muslim.

The success of the new policy depends on whether that hope is realised. The experience of two years working of the new Constitution has not been encouraging. The hostility between the two great divisions of the Indian people has, on the contrary, been intensified. Hindus and Muslims are farther apart than ever.

The growing tension constitutes a serious threat to the federal scheme. Unless Hindus and Muslims can work in harmony in the Central Government, ultimately some system other than a parliamentary system of Government must be evolved. Muslims now feel that federation is an impossibility; that it would mean for them the dominance of the Hindu, and with it the suppression of Muslim culture and tradition. Leading Muslims, including outstanding Muslim statesmen like Sir Sikander Hayat, Prime Minister of the Punjab, have made it clear that they would prefer civil war to the submergence of Islam in the rising tide of political Hinduism. The establishment of federation is awaiting the adherence of the Princes. For nearly four years they have studied its implications on their sovereignty; they are still reluctant to take that plunge. The attitude of the Muslims must be a disturbing element in their judgement of the situation.

What are the root causes of Muslim intransigence? In examining the question it is necessary at the outset to recall outstanding but easily forgotten facts. Indian Muslims have never demanded democracy in India, for the simple reason that it would mean the political predominance of the Hindus; it is not democracy, in their view, if one nation, the Hindu in this case, should prevail over and govern a smaller nation, the Muslim, even if the two nations are living side by side in the same country. India, now that Burma is a separate political unit, comprises roughly 335 millions of people,

including the dominions of the Indian Princes. Of these between 80 and 90 millions are Muslims; there are four or five millions of Christians and smaller groups; fifty millions of out-castes; the rest, about 200 millions, are Hindus.

The greater part of India is now ruled by Congress, essentially a Hindu political party, though it claims that it alone speaks for India. It refuses to recognise its Muslim counterpart, the All India Muslim League. The immense superiority of the Congress organization and its system of propaganda enabled it to sweep aside the opposition of more conservative Hindu elements, e.g. the landowners, and even in many cases to capture Muslim seats for its nominees, looked on as renegades by the vast majority of Muslims. The success of Congress in capturing the Muslim stronghold of the North-West Frontier is eloquent testimony to its efficient system of propaganda; it looks as if Sind, thanks to Muslim dissensions, might fall into Congress hands; the Muslim Ministry in Bengal is not over stable.

Muslims regard the Congress record in the Provinces as clear proof of their intention to establish *Hindu Raj* throughout India. Muslim interests are, they assert, everywhere disregarded in Congress Provinces. In the Central Provinces, for example, a new scheme of education (the Wardha scheme devised by Mr. Gandhi based on Hindu culture) is being tried out. Muslim boys in the school are expected to stand with folded hands while the Congress National Anthem, *Bande Mataram*, is sung. Hindi, essentially a Hindu language, is being compulsorily introduced in the schools throughout Congress Provinces, while Urdu, the official and cultural language of the Muslims, is pushed aside. No Muslim Minister genuinely representing Muslim interests has ever been associated with the administration in a Hindu Province. In Bombay strong Muslim opposition has been raised to legislation aiming at joint electorates in local bodies, which would almost everywhere mean the exclusion of Muslims from participation in Local Government.

Other Muslim criticisms concern Congress administration and policy generally. There is no trace of democracy in Congress methods. Congress is, in fact, an oligarchy, dominated by Mr. Gandhi, at whose bidding Ministries are made and unmade irrespective of the wishes of the elected representative of the people. The policy of prohibition, with its disastrous effects on provincial finance, is being pushed through under Mr. Gandhi's orders. Respect for law and order is everywhere weakening, especially in Bihar and the United Provinces, largely due to the interference in the administration of Congress Committees in the districts, which seek to influence, and in some cases to terrorise, the local officials. . . .

Congress has, Muslims think, taken on a totalitarian complexion. Its moral standard does not justify its claim to rule India. Even Gandhi indicts it for corruption and graft. He does not hesitate to say that unless it mends its ways its efforts will end in defeat and disgrace. He admits that many of its members have joined it simply in order to exploit the opportunities of graft it offers. Its ex-President, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, criticises its "appalling indiscipline." It cannot control its left wing, which has strong Communist leanings, utterly opposed to Muslim principles. Its declared policy is to take advantage of trouble in Europe to sever the connection with Britain; any attempt of the kind might easily result in anarchy. "Can we," Muslim leaders ask, "be expected to place our fate in the hands of such a body of men?"

In a recent statement to the Press, Sir Abdullah Haroon, a Muslim politician of repute, expressed the view that two years' working of the India Act had proved that democracy was not suited to Indian soil, clime or environment. The purpose of Congress was to establish a *Raj* of one particular community by exploiting the ignorance of the people and fomenting trouble. Nationalism was perverted to set Hindu against Muslim, the people of the States against their Rulers, tenants against landlords, millhands against owners. To bring India under the sway of the political exploiters who dominate Congress would inevitably result in civil war.

The Muslims of India regard the India Act of 1935 as destructive of their hopes of the establishment of a system of Home Rule in which their interests would be protected. For them the much-vaunted Indian Nationalism of Congress is a blind. Bitter experience has convinced them that Congress does not desire to give freedom to India as a whole, but merely to replace British rule by the rule of the caste Hindu. The provincial scheme has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of Muslim Minorities in most of the Provinces.

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1. Sir William Barton, Sir William Pell, Indian Political Service Retd., 1930; visited India with Ministry of Supply Mission, 1940-41.

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“A Punjabi’s¹ scheme² [Extract]

Evolution of Pakistan, pp. 167-72

2 July, 1939

1. The scheme suggests quinquepartite confederacy, according to which the sub-continent of India could be split up into various countries on the following lines and re-assembled in a Confederacy of India :

- (a) The Indus Region’s Federation, with the Punjab (minus its Eastern Hindu tracts), the Sind the N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malerkotla as its federal units.
- (b) The Hindu India Federation with the United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar with some portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian States other than the Rajasthan and the Deccan States included in the State’s Federations, as its federal units.
- (c) Rajasthan Federation with the various states of Rajputana and Central India as its federal units.
- (d) The Deccan States’ Federation comprising the Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar States.
- (e) *The Bengal Federation*: The prominent Muslim tracts of the Eastern Bengal

and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial unit and Tripura and other States lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from the Hindu India, as its state units.

2. Reshaping the map of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with the above suggestion, would necessitate:

- (a) either creation of a new Province consisting of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una and Garh Shankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district, and the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi, etc., or inclusion of all these Hindu areas in the United Provinces;
- (b) inclusion of the prominently Hindu parts of the Western Bengal in Bihar or Orissa;
- (c) inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in the Muslim Bengal;
- (d) leaving a corridor in the North of the present district of Goalpara of Assam in order to connect the Hindu Province of Assam with the Hindu Federation of the Hindu Provinces;
- (e) giving a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu Federation in order to link Hyderabad State with Mysore State; and
- (f) giving a corridor to the Rajasthan Federation to connect with it its federal unit of the Patiala State. Half of this corridor can be taken from Hindu India and the other half from Industan."

3. "In a confederation of India on the lines chalked out above, each federation joining it can have a Governor-General with the Governors of its Provincial units under him, responsible to the Central Confederal Authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the Indian States within the federation. The Confederal Authority can be vested in the Viceroy, assisted by a Confederal Assembly consisting of members drawn from the various Indian Federations. The number of such members to be drawn from a federation can be fixed according to its importance judged from the point of view of its significance to the confederacy as regards its geographical situation in the sub-continent, population, area and economic position, etc. Foreign relations, defence, and matters relating to water-supply from the common natural sources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the Indian States (which may join any of the British Provinces' Federations), can be entrusted to their Governor-Generals, who will be responsible to the Viceroy. The various federations joining the confederacy can either directly contribute towards the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues from some specific heads towards its expenses.

4. We may also point out here that under no circumstances should the Muslim North-West consent to assign customs as a source of the confederal revenues. Such an assignment would mean no control over the tariff policy. In the case of the customs remaining a Central subject, the Muslims of the North-West would permanently ruin all their future prospects of industrialization. It would also adversely affect their other economic interests. . . ."

5. ". . . . We should be separationists-cum-confederationists, and if the Hindus

disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India, and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. We should desire separation simply because we want to evolve a happier and more contented India, whether it be by separation of the Hindu cultural zones and Muslim cultural zones to be linked together in a confederacy, quite independent of and separate from each other except for the confederal bond, or complete separation in order to constitute our regions into federated States independently and separately from Hindu India. The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word "Pakistan"³ and have instead used the word "Industan" to denote the North-West Muslim Block. "Pakistan" is a term which has somehow or other, gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind."

6. "Often the dispirited amongst us allege that separation will offend this party or that party. Are we to be afraid of opposition? We should demand separation as our right and not as a favour that may depend upon the good wishes of anybody. We should be determined to fight for separation and not to beg for it as a special concession. As the position of the Muslims is strong both in the North-West and in Bengal, the questions of their separation from Hindu India, should be taken up simultaneously. In case Hindu India disagrees with the confederacy proposal, we should be prepared to separate our regions, without any link between them and Hindu India. Separation alone can save us and we should be prepared to get it at any cost. No doubt our struggle is difficult but our success is sure."

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1. The Pseudonym belonged to Mian Kifayat Ali (b. 1902) of Batala, Punjab; B.A. from Islamia College, Lahore, 1926; concealed his identity because he was in Government service, held subordinate appointment in the office of the Punjab Legislative Council, 1928-42; Inter-Service Public Relation Directorate, New Delhi, 1942-47; authored several books between 1936-42 and 1955-67.
 2. As the scheme *Confederacy of India* was published Pseudonymously its real authorship has been confused. Some ascribe it to its publisher Nawab Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot while others ascribe it to Mian Kifayat Ali who wrote under the Pen-name of Punjabi. As a matter of fact Kifayat Ali's 3-federation scheme was revised into 5-federation scheme by Nawab of Mamdot who was responsible for the publication of the revised version in 1939.
 3. The rejection of the word "Pakistan" by the author, closely affiliated to Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan established in 1938, is reported to have been done under the instructions of Jinnah who did not like the name, and did not accept it till sometime after the adoption of 23 March, 1940, Lahore Resolution which coming very close to the Punjabi's scheme, was itself worded so confusingly indicate that Jinnah still did not want a clear separation. For details see K.K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, Vol. 2, Lahore, 1987, pp. 534-36.



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Resolutions adopted at the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League held on the 2nd and 3rd July 1939, at Bombay under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah
[Extract]

Freedom Movement Archives, Vol. 128, pp. 9-10

Resolution No. 1: That the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League considered the correspondence that has passed between Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Syed Abdur Rauf Shah Saheb regarding the appointment of a Muslim Minister in C.P. The Committee was of opinion that no individual Province should negotiate or come to any settlement with the Congress with regard to the Hindu-Muslim question in their Provinces and, if any such proposals are received from the Congress, intimation should be sent to the effect that the matter should be referred by the Congress to the President or the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League.

Resolution No. 13: That the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League has received reports and representations of maltreatment and injustice being done to the Musalmans in the various Indian States namely Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bhavnagar, Cutchh and Patiala. The Committee most earnestly urges upon the rulers of the States concerned to redress the grievances and protect the lives, honour, properties and liberties of their Muslim subjects, thereby creating (illegible).

Resolution No. 15: That the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League views with grave concern the situation that is being created by the mischievous activities and propaganda of the Arya Samajists and Hindu Mahasabhaists all over India in organising and despatching Jathas to Hyderabad, with the ostensible object of vindicating their religious rights, in order to coerce the State Administration. The Working Committee warns the Arya Samaj and the Mahasabha organisations that the offensive bearing of these Jathas and shouting of provocative slogans has created intense bitterness among the Muslims and unless these provocative Jathas are stopped forthwith, there is a grave danger of sporadic clashes developing into wide-spread intercommunal strife throughout the country. The Working Committee urges upon the provincial Governments and the Paramount Power to take immediate and adequate action in order to stop this mischief which seriously threatens the peace and tranquillity of the country.

Resolution No. 16: Apart from its origin, conception and communal aspect, there are fundamental objections to the Wardha Scheme of Basic Education, and the Working Committee disapproves the Wardha Scheme and the textbooks which have been prepared in this connection on the following grounds, among others: (I) The Scheme is calculated to destroy Muslim culture gradually but surely and to secure the domination of Hindu culture, (II) It imposes the Congress ideology and aims at inculcating among others, the doctrine of *Ahimsa*, (III) Its objective is to infuse the political creed, policy and programme of one party, namely the Congress, into the minds of the children, (IV) It has neglected the question of providing facilities for religious instruction, (V) Under the guise of name Hindustani the scheme is meant to spread what is highly Sanskritised Hindi and to suppress Urdu which is really the

lingua franca of Indians at present, (VI) The textbooks, prescribed, and provisionally sanctioned by some Provincial Governments, are highly objectionable from the Muslim point of view in that they are not only offensive to the feelings and sentiments of the Muslims, but they are mainly devoted to the praises of Hindu religion, philosophy and heroes, and minimise the Islamic contribution to the world, and India in particular, ignore Muslim culture, history and heroes, and speak of them with scant courtesy.

Resolution No. 17: The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League considered the request of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to launch Civil Disobedience against the Wardha Scheme of Basic Education. The Committee decided that, in the first instance, the Bihar Provincial Muslim League should send a memorial representing their complete case against the Wardha Scheme to the Governor-General, the Governor and the Prime Minister of Bihar, and report to the Working Committee the result of these representations. The Working Committee in this connection also advises all other Provincial Leagues to do likewise.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents

6, COUPER ROAD, LUCKNOW, 7 July, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have your letter of the 4th. I think that the immediate danger of war has probably passed but there is no knowing and the next two and half months are critical. I think that as soon as war seems to be imminent or on the point of being declared, the Working Committee should certainly be called. I agree with you that it would be desirable to invite Subhas Babu, Narendra Deva and Jayaprakash to this meeting. You might perhaps add one or two others such as some prominent Muslims in the Congress, after consultation with Maulana Azad. Even before the Working Committee meeting the imminence of the crisis would require a public statement from you in which you would state the Congress position of non-participation afresh and call upon the Congress Ministries and Congressmen generally to give effect to it. I think in this statement you might also say something to the effect that you would welcome the cooperation of the Muslim League in the joint endeavour. I would suggest your writing to Jinnah and telling him that in view of the grave crisis which threatens the country you would welcome his and the Muslim League's cooperation in the evolution of a common programme of non-participation in the war. I do not think any reference need to be made in that letter to the Hindu-Muslim problems as such. I think it would be worthwhile for you to write to the Congress Ministries now impressing upon them the vital need of their keeping wide awake in this matter and not permitting any entanglement on their part in war preparations and the like. They should make it clear again to the Governors what their and Congress position is.

Perhaps it would be also desirable if you were to issue a general statement on the subject to the Press now.

I am returning to Allahabad tomorrow night and shall remain there till the 20th morning. On the 13th and 14th I shall be in Bombay. On the 15th I leave for Ceylon by air.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. 3, pp. 149-151

6, COUPER ROAD, LUCKNOW, 7 July, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I am writing to you regarding the Minorities problem and how we are trying to deal with it in the U.P. More especially I want to draw your attention to certain difficulties that have arisen on account of the recent changes in the Congress Constitution.

During the last two or three years the U.P.P.C.C. has paid a great deal of attention to this problem. We have not concerned ourselves so much with the wider national aspect of the problem, although we have naturally discussed this also. Mostly we have tried to grapple with the day-to-day aspects. It is true that in spite of our efforts, the situation has deteriorated and it may be said that there is more general ill-will among the Muslim masses towards the Congress than there has been at any time in the past. Nevertheless our record of work in this matter is not negligible. We have as our close colleagues in the Congress a considerable number of Muslims of position who have been doing Congress work with enthusiasm. Indeed we worked together not as Hindus or Muslims but as Congressmen. It has been a privilege to us to have this comradeship in all our work during these dark days of communal reaction. The Muslim membership on our rolls during the past year has been considerable. It is not possible to give the exact number but a rough estimate of one hundred thousand has been made for the U.P. I realise fully that such a membership does not mean very much. Yet it means something. It means that in spite of the aggravation of communal feelings among Hindus and Muslims alike and in spite of the intensive activities of the Muslim League in this Province, we have a solid core of Congress-minded Muslims. This core includes, as I have stated above, some valued colleagues who have been and are a source of strength to the general Congress movement in the U.P. This fact has to be remembered, although there is no doubt that we have been unable to check the growth of communalism and anti-Congress feelings among the Muslim masses.

We have had various sub-committees trying to deal with this problem. Two or

three months back we reorganised our work and put an end to mass contact committees and departments named as such. Instead we appointed a strong Minorities Committee consisting chiefly of leading Muslim Congressmen in the Province as well as some Hindu, Christian and, I believe, representatives of the depressed class also. We started also Hindi and Urdu publicity departments. We wanted to avoid a communal nomenclature. We started a special office of this Minorities Committee in Allahabad in charge of Maulana Muhammad Mian Faruqi.¹ This was in addition to their office connected with our P.C.C. office in Lucknow. We are developing this office under the enthusiastic and able supervision of Maulana Muhammad Mian and various schemes for publicity and propaganda are being developed. This work is not being done in any spirit of hostility to the Muslim League or any other organisation. Our object is not to raise controversies but to explain the Congress position and principles, to remove and correct errors, and to give some elementary political and nationalist education to the Muslims as well as to the other masses. We are appointing a number of inspectors and organisers also. I shall not, however, go into greater details of our work in this connection unless you require them. Our Minorities department and Maulana Muhammad Mian will, of course, keep in intimate touch with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and seek his advice whenever necessary.

One of the problems we have had to face during the past two years especially has been the non-return of sufficient numbers of the Muslims or the Christians during our various Congress elections. We have no means to ensure a proper return. All we could do was to issue repeated circulars to various Congress Committees in the Province impressing upon them the necessity of giving due representation to the Minorities. These circulars had some effect but generally speaking they did not produce much results. There was usually no feeling whatever against the Minority candidates but elections were so keenly contested that the Minority stood little chance. This was specially so in our rural elections, as Muslims and Christians are usually town-dwellers. The result was that there was a total absence of them from most of our rural mandal committees and only a very small number got into most of our district and town committees. The position was some what better in the northern districts where the Muslims formed a large part of the population in the towns. I am glad to say, however, that in our superior committees elections the Muslims on the whole did well, though even there I would have liked them to do better. There are a fair number of Muslims in our P.C.C. as well as in the executive of the P.C.C. and in the A.I.C.C. from the U.P.

During the last year, as I have mentioned above, we enrolled a large number of Muslim members but they were not elected to our district and town committees, apparently because the number of others increased greatly. We have been giving serious thought to it for sometime past. Now owing to the new changes in the Constitution, fresh difficulties have cropped up—the distinction between urban and rural having been abolished and constituencies made permanent. The result is that urban areas are likely to have less representation than rural areas. As the Minorities are chiefly urban they will be affected by this all the more and the poor chances they have so far had of getting elected to our committees, will be lessened all the more. This is a serious matter.

Another point to be considered is that a Muslim who gets elected to a committee

is not perhaps the best candidate in the area among the Muslims. A better candidate gets defeated because he refuses to tie himself to the parties running the election. A non-entity who appears as a party man gets through. This, of course, applies to all Hindus and Muslims and would inevitably be an undesirable development of the democratic method.

We had a meeting of our Minorities Committee today where these various problems were considered at length and I was asked to bring them to your notice. I do not know what exactly can be done in the matter, especially now when the Constitution has already been changed. That is for the Working Committee to consider. But there are some things which perhaps we can do in our own Province so far as our various committees are concerned, from the Province to the mandal. We can introduce clauses in our Constitution permitting of co-option of members to various committees up to a certain prescribed limit. So far as our district, city, town and mandal committees are concerned, I suppose, this is entirely within our competence. So far as the Provincial Committee is concerned, this is formed by the body of delegates. We would like to have the power to co-opt to the P.C.C. also such so-opted members, of course, not being made delegates to the Congress but only remaining members of the P.C.C. If this is possible for us, it might enable us to meet the present difficulty.

This process of co-option might not only help the Minorities but also other important individuals who have been left out in these days of party politics. It is better than reservation of seats for a community or group which is objected to by most people largely on the grounds of principle.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Maulana Muhammed Mian Faruqui; a Congressman from Allahabad; President, Allahabad City Congress Committee, 1947; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-64.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 55, pp. 119-21

"BARNES COURT," SIMLA, 10 July, 1939

SECRET

D.O. NO. 162

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Sikander has just returned to Simla from his visit to Bombay for the meeting of the Muslim League Executive, and during the course of a conversation today he told me something of his doings there, which will, I think, be of interest to you.

2. He informed the other members of the Executive Committee of the approach that had been made to him by Professor Shah on behalf of Rajendra Prasad. Jinnah professed to be as ready as any one else for an understanding with the Congress on the communal issue, and asserted that he was quite prepared to meet Rajendra Prasad on the subject, but Sikander's impression is that Jinnah is not really anxious for a rapprochement, and this impression is, I gather shared by most of the other members of the League Executive. The majority of them according to Sikander, suggested to him that it would be much better if the preliminary negotiations were to be conducted on behalf of the League by Sikander himself and that if these preliminary negotiations seem likely to lead to any really useful result, then and not till then should Jinnah (and presumably the Muslim League Executive generally) be brought into the picture.

I understand that this view was generally accepted and that the question has accordingly been left there i.e. that Sikander is to continue preliminary negotiations with the Congress leaders.

3. Presumably as the result of this conclusion, Sikander had two long private conversations with Gandhi at Bombay. I did not like to press him as to the subjects discussed, but he did tell me that Gandhi is to give him at leisure his (Gandhi's) reactions to the proposals put forward in Sikander's last letter to Professor Shah, a copy of which I sent you under cover of my letter No. 153 of the 12th of June last.

4. Sikander told me that Gandhi seemed to be in excellent physical health and mentally as alert as ever. Jinnah on the other hand, is, in Sikander's opinion, distinctly losing grip. Possibly as the result of advancing years he is apt to get peevish more quickly than he used to, and according to Sikander he is more than ever inclined to be critical of any proposals put forward, but never in a constructive way. Sikander thinks that the confidence which Jinnah commands among the Muslim League leaders is weakening.

5. As regards Sikander's scheme for Federation, he has given copies of this in confidence both to Jinnah and to Gandhi and is awaiting their reaction. He apparently explained the scheme in general terms to his colleagues on the League Executive, probably in somewhat greater detail than in his speech at the Taj Mahal hotel luncheon, which was reported in the Press. He told me that on the whole the reception of the scheme by his colleagues was favourable.

6. Sikander told me that the most interesting discussion at the meeting of the League Executive dealt with the attitude to be adopted by the League should there be an outbreak of war. This was an entirely secret discussion and nothing appeared in the Press about it. I gather that Sikander himself initiated it with definite suggestion that should war be declared, the League should at once make an announcement in terms of its Sholapur resolution (I am not delaying this letter to look up the terms of that resolution; but so far as I recollect it was to the effect that in its own interests Muslim India should support Great Britain in the event of a world conflict). Sikander in support of his proposal said that it was essential from his point of view that the position of the League in the event of war should be clarified. He and his Government were in any event pledged to support Great Britain and so, he added, is Bengal. In case the League did not take the same view, Sikander and his colleagues (and I

gather also the Bengal Muslim Ministers) would have no option but to resign from the League, and their resignation would be a very severe blow to the prestige and influence of the League and to Muslim solidarity generally.

The majority of the League Executive expressed agreement with Sikander's proposal. Jinnah was at first inclined to be obstructive, but eventually modified his attitude in deference to the wishes of the majority. He pointed out, shrewdly enough, that any immediate announcement by the League of its intention to assist the Empire in case of war would be certain to provoke controversy with such Muslim bodies as the Ahrars, & c, which are opposed to the League. Eventually I gather the general view was that while the League was not prepared to make a definite announcement now regarding its own attitude in case of war, Sikander was quite at liberty to make his own position clear immediately war should break out, and apparently he was given to understand that his position would be endorsed by the League. The general feeling seems to have been that an announcement by Sikander would by itself make it clear to the British Government that they could rely on the support of Muslim India and that the League would not use the outbreak of war in a bargaining spirit.

7. I cannot vouch that the foregoing paragraphs are an absolutely accurate account of my conversation with Sikander. It was a fairly long one, lasting for the better part of an hour, and I have, of course, to rely on my memory for what he said. But I think it is substantially correct.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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Rajendra Prasad to Jawaharlal Nehru [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. III, pp. 157-159

BIRLA HOUSE, RANCHI, 11 July, 1939

My dear Jawaharlalji,

2. I am glad to read the interesting note about the efforts being made in the U.P. to tackle the Minorities question. For the last two or three years I have been feeling very much the want of some provision which could ensure adequate representation of Musalmans in the Congress Committees. I had conversation with Maulana Sahib on some occasions but unfortunately we could not find a way out. The grievance of the Musalman Congressmen is that they are not elected to Congress Committees in adequate numbers and that they lose their hold on their own community and are not allowed to play their part in the Congress fully. On the other hand Hindu Congressmen have been working for years together and have a natural desire to be on the District and Provincial Committees and to be elected as delegated or members with them for

years together and they do not like to vote for a person who is comparatively unknown. I have made repeated appeals at the time of election and gone out of my way to use personal influence with Hindu candidates to let the Musalman rivals be elected.

3. I have sometimes succeeded but have also sometimes failed. Anyway I have not succeeded in satisfying the Musalmans. Co-option to redress deficiencies might prove helpful to a certain extent but probably it is only another form of nomination which should be avoided, if possible.

4. The growth of parties within the Congress is another factor which creates great difficulty. A Musalman candidate wants to get elected as a member of a particular party and at the same time he puts forward his claim as a Musalman. The people belonging to the rival party do not like to lose a seat even though it be in favour of a Musalman. After much thought I felt in my Province that the best (way is) to allow things to adjust themselves so that Musalmans may come by virtue of their (merit) alone. Amongst them too there are parties within parties working. It is a question which baffles solution. I have no objection to the U.P.P.C.C. trying the experiment of co-options and we shall see how it works.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bombay to J.M. Sladen

Towards Freedom Papers, No. 517

OFFICE OF THE DY. INSPR. GENL. OF POLICE, C.I.D.,
PROVINCE OF BOMBAY, POST BOX NO. 460.
POONA, 11 July, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL
NO. 12/H.A./37-II.

My dear Sladen,

In continuation of this office No. 12/H.A./37-II dated the 5th July 1939, I attach herewith a transcription of the Hindi speech, together with its English translation, made by Pandit Ramachandra Sharma at Poona on 2-7-39.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) Illegible

J.M. SLADEN, Esquire, J.C.S.,
Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department (Special),
Poona. K/CR

Enclosure: 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Pandit Ramachandra Sharma—the speech of—[Extract] 19. What Sir Sikander Hayat and Mr. Jinnah say? What Fazlul Haq says? This that India should be made Pakistan? My sons, you want to make Pakistan of India? But I want to keep lock-of-hairs on the heads of all Musalmans and I am going to incorporate the whole League with Aryas.

20. Today there are 60 crores of Hindus in Sayam [Siam], China and Japan. They are Buddhist Hindus. In the whole world the “Hindus are 100 crores. The population of the whole world is 205 crores. There are 100 crores of Hindus in it. Germany is also Hindu (speaking in English he said,) ‘Half the world is reserved for the Hindus,’ the remaining for the Christians and Musalmans etc. I say to Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikandar Hayat, You make a League of Muslim countries and I will make a League of Hindu countries. Musalmans! If you want to live in this country, we will consider your daughters as our daughters, your sisters as our sisters, and your wives as our mothers. But if the Musalmans do not consider us as their brothers and want to be our son-in-laws, then we would unite and turn them out of India via the Khaibar Pass. You want to make a Pakistan of India but you should first establish the Mosque at Shahid Gunj in Lahore. The Sikhs say that first you should return our temple of Benaras, then take back the Sahid Gunj. Our Sikh brothers are brave. One Sikh is equal to 10 thousand Musalmans.

21. First of all, we want Guru Govind Singh today. If all the Hindus are one, nobody can oppose them. This Vallabhbhai has drunk the blood of Khare. He has thrown down Nariman, he has thrown down Subhas Bose. He created the question of Gujarati and Marathi in Baroda. He should be removed. We do not want Vallabhbhai and Desai. These people should be removed. We Hindus, Jains, Kabir Panthis and Sikhs should unite and should start ‘*Nishastra Pratikar*’ (opposition without weapons.)

22. Nizam had given 28 months punishment to Laxman Balvant Bhōpatkar. This is a harsh punishment. (The speaker at the top of his voice said, “*Nizam bai- Hinduka nahi- kisike Bapka.*”) (The audience repeated the above sentence.) Musalmans say we are in majority in Kashmir. They want to give pension to the Raja of that place. There are 85 per cent Musalmans in Kashmir. They have made a League of 25 crores and say that they are a nation. We Hindus are a nation of 100 crores. If the Musalmans want to remove the Maharaja of Kashmir we want to remove the Nizam. Our king Usman! May your life be of 100 years. Usman is not the king. Sawarkar and Bhai Parmanand are kings. The Musalmans want to give a pension of 10 thousand rupees to the Maharaja of Kashmir. We will give 20 thousand to the Nizam and will say.

Extract from the Weekly Confidential Report of the District Magistrate, Satara, dated the 5 July, 1939.

27. In the course of the meetings mentioned above Ramchandra Sharma said that 50 years ago there were 30 crores of cows in India but now only 3 crores were left, the remaining 27 having been eaten by the Muslims. The English supported the Muslims and a Govt. under which cows were killed and women were kidnapped was bound to come to an end. The Hindus should unite and stop the slaughter of cows by Muslims. If the Muslims proved traitors to their country by not helping the Hindus to win *Swaraj* they would have to face the same fate as the Jews in Germany. At the Poona meeting on July the 2nd the Pandit condemned the students in local colleges, for eating beef and said that if it lay in his hands he would treat such outcastes as Hitler had treated the Jews. He denounced M.K. Gandhi for showing favour to the Muslims whom he described as scorpions and said that the Mahatma's intellect was failing. Referring to the ‘Pakistan Scheme,’ he said that there were 100 crores of Hindus in the world against 40 crores of Muslims and he would like to establish a League of Hindu Nations against the League of Muslim Nations. He criticised Muslims who were brought up in India for their love of Mecca and Medina and said that if they did not respect the women folk of Hindus the latter would turn them out of India via the Khyber Pass. At a meeting at Poona on the 6th July the Pandit said that Hitler and Mussolini never ate flesh and that Shivaji sacrificed bearded he-goats (presumably Muslims). Summaries of the speeches delivered by Pandit Ramachandra Sharma at Poona have been sent to Government separately.

*Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the first half of July, 1939 [Extract]**Home-Poll, F. 18-7/39, pp. 1-5*

CONFIDENTIAL

Indian States—There has been a noticeable recession in the local agitation against the Hyderabad State, and the numbers both of Arya Samaj meetings held in this connection and of volunteers leaving for Hyderabad have declined. In the Karnal district the application of Section 4 of the Indian States (Protection) Act to Kaithal and Panipat has had a wholesome effect, and the processions which were becoming the order of the day at these places and at Karnal have ceased. The Hindu Press is still devoting considerable space to the agitation and whilst condemning the extension of the Act to the Province has made frequent demand that it should be used against Muslims making counter demonstrations and particularly against M. Zaffar Ali Khan. Whilst Muslim feelings have been largely appeased by the application of the Act, the Muslim Press has been asking that freer use should be made of the powers now bestowed on District Magistrates and complaints that Arya Samajists are still carrying on their propaganda unhindered. M. Zaffar Ali Khan has assumed charge of Muslim counter propaganda. He presided over several meetings held under *Ittibad-i-Millat* auspices in Lahore and delivered a number of speeches threatening Hindus with unpleasant consequences if they did not stop the flow of Jathas to Hyderabad. A batch of twenty volunteers has been despatched by him to Peshawar to conduct anti-Arya Samaj propaganda there as a preliminary to a tour of this Province, and a camp has been set up outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, as a recruiting centre for further volunteers.

Pandit Neki Ram Sharma, who recently made some objectionable speeches at Jhunpa in the Hissar district criticising the administration of Bikaner State, has been served with a notice under Section 5 of the Indian States (Protection) Act requiring him to abstain for two months from making speeches relating to the affairs of any State.

Muslim Affairs—The Ahrars made use of a fair at Gojra in the Multan district to stage a conference from the 30th June to the 2nd of July. Most of the speeches were objectionable. The British, the Punjab Government, Ahmadis, Khaksars¹ and Army recruitment all came in for a share of abusive and threatening condemnation. It was suggested to the audience on more than one occasion that the Khaksars and the Ahmadis had been brought into being by the British Government in order to frustrate the national aspirations of patriotic Muslims. Ahrars who have an eye on the impending Assembly by-election, have also been convening a number of meetings in Lahore and Amritsar, where Ch. Afzal Haq and Ataullah Shah Bukhari have been speaking with even more than usual animosity.

Communal—It will be recalled that the Amritsar Municipal Committee passed a resolution last May to alter in favour of Muslims the percentages of communal representation in municipal services, which then stood at 40 per cent, for Muslims, 40

per cent for Hindus and 20 per cent for Sikhs. This resolution was suspended by the Deputy Commissioner on technical grounds but has recently been brought up by Muslim members for reconsideration. Attempts were made to secure a compromise agreeable to all parties, but Sikhs showed no inclination to accept less than their present proportion of 20 per cent, and the Hindus have also been organising public opinion to resist any decrease. Several meetings of the Municipal Committee were held without reaching any conclusion, but on the 10th of July, after most Sikhs and Hindus had walked out, a resolution was passed fixing the proportions at 48 per cent for Muslims, 37 per cent for Hindus and 15 per cent for Sikhs. The local Hindu Mahasabha has formed a "war council" of eleven members to direct an agitation against this development and the Hindu and Sikh communities have both held meetings expressing resentment at the resolution and urging the Deputy Commissioner to set it aside. The validity of the resolution is also being questioned. A Muslim is at present acting as Chairman of the Municipal Committee, pending the notification of S. Harnam Singh Ramgarhia as President, and it is alleged, inter alia, that only the President has the power to re-open the resolution.

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1. Launched by Inayatullah Mashriqi (1888-1963) in 1931 in Punjab, the militant Khaksar movement aimed to embody the spirit of Islam as a code of action. Although they received little support from Muslim religious establishment which was wary of the movements radical overtones, their commitment to arrange charitable causes won them something of a popular following particularly among the urban poor. Mashriqi believed that the ultimate destiny of Islam as a universal principle could not be realised without the Islamic dispensation of power.

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Vallabhbhai Patel to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. 3, pp. 173-74

PURUSHOTTOM MANSION, OPP. OPERA HOUSE, BOMBAY - 4, 17 July, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Subhas did meet Mr. Jinnah when he was here. Before he went to see Jinnah he came to Bapu and asked him whether he could see Mr. Jinnah and try for a settlement of the communal question so far as his own Province is concerned, leaving aside the All India question which was not likely to be solved in the near future. Bapu, of course, told him that by all means he can do so if he thinks that it is possible and if he can solve that problem in his Province everybody would indeed be pleased. This was the private conversation that he had with Bapu and thereafter he met Mr. Jinnah at his place by asking for an appointment. On his return again Subhas met Bapu and told him that he has got Jinnah's permission to settle the question locally and Mr. Jinnah's attitude was, according to him, very helpful. Then he said that Mr. Jinnah was complaining bitterly about the taxation proposals of the Bombay Government

regarding its prohibition scheme and he said that the tax was invidious and intended to hit the Muslim community hard. Bapu, of course, asked him not to say anything, but to consult the Ministry if he had any doubts. After Bapu left for the Frontier, he came out with a long statement making a vigorous attack on the Bombay Government's prohibition policy. You must have read all that from the Press and I do not wish to repeat here anything about it. He has dug his own grave by meddling with this affair.

This is all the result of his interview with Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI

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Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 274/25-26

786, NAIPUR ROAD, KARACHI, INDIA,
GRAND HOTEL, SIMLA, 17 July, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have reached here yesterday in connection with the Indo-Japanese Trade Talks. You must have already read the numerous statements issued by Sir Yaqub, Shafaat and others and also by some Hindu Leaders. I had, of course, sent in a rejoinder to them all and I enclose herewith a copy thereof.

On arrival in Simla I tried to know as to what were the reasons for these statements to be issued at this particular juncture. I met some people yesterday and they feel most pessimistic as to the future of the Muslims in view of the fact that according to them, the present Viceroy was determined to bring in Federation and during the talks I held with some of them I could see that they were of the opinion that if we approached the Viceroy with some minor demands he might concede them. Evidently the official circles here believe that once the Federation is fully inaugurated the attention of the Leaguers would be diverted towards it and all the present tall talk about radical and revolutionary changes being made in the Constitution will cease. Now we have to guard against this.

My own humble view is that we should at once begin preparing ourselves for the worst that is likely to happen. For achieving that end, we should see that we are able to place before our people some decent ideal, consistently with the aspirations of our people, latest by October. The Constitution Sub-Committee must finish its work by October so that a definite goal is placed before the people which will help them in getting over the temporary demoralisation which is likely to be caused by the inauguration of Federation under the present circumstances. The Muslim Press all

over India, particularly in the North, has considerably aroused the public opinion in favour of the Partition schemes and the present state of public enthusiasm will not last beyond October if we fail to give them the lead regarding the goal, at this psychological moment. In case we succeed in finishing our labours by October it will provide us with opportunities to negotiate with others, including the Viceroy—if necessary, regarding the adjustments to be made for the transitional period—i.e. till we achieve our final goal. Secondly, the Lahore Session of the League ought to be a great success. I had got down at Lahore and had discussed various questions regarding it with the Nawab of Mamdot. I am again getting down at Lahore on my return in order to look into the preliminaries. My view is that we should concentrate on making the session a grand success. I am advising the Punjab League leaders to extend invitations to the leaders of important political parties in the Islamic countries and in England to send their delegations to the session in order to get an idea as to the feelings of the Indian Muslims. I am also requesting them to invite the representative of Foreign Press to attend the session. Lastly, I am also of the view that the efforts to intensify activities for organising League within various Provinces must also be now put in by the Centre, so that before the end of this year the work of internal organisation is completed. If Nawabzadah [Liaqat Ali Khan] Saheb could undertake an All India tour to look into the state of organisation in various Provinces it will greatly stimulate the movement. What I mean to suggest is that before the Federation is inaugurated we should make our organisations flawless and sufficiently strong, so that when the time comes we may combat it effectively.

I hope you have read Munshi, Home Minister Bombay's statement regarding the import of the Simla Home Ministers conference to curb communal activities. In C.P., Berar, and Bihar as also in the U.P. the Provincial Governments have actually begun terrorising the League Press and the League workers and I am preparing a statement which will show how many cases have been instituted up till now.

I am leaving Simla for Karachi at the most within a week's time. I shall be anxiously expecting your reply there.

With best wishes and regards,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) ABDULLAH HAROON

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Sikandar Hayat Khan's Scheme

Evolution of Pakistan, pp. 175-81

20 July, 1939

1. For the purpose of establishing an All India Federation on a regional basis the country shall be demarcated into seven 'Zones' as under:

Zone 1. Assam + Bengal (minus one or two western districts in order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to approximate it to other 'Zones') + Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2. Bihar + Orissa (plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa). This would benefit Orissa which is at present handicapped to some extent on account of its limited resources and area.

Zone 3. United Provinces and U.P. States.

Zone 4. Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg.

Zone 5. Bombay + Hyderabad + Western India States + Bombay States + Mysore and C.P. States.

Zone 6. Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central India States + Bihar and Orissa States + C.P. and Berar.

Zonal 7. Punjab + Sind + N.W.F. Province + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

2. There shall be a regional Legislature for each zone consisting of representatives from both British India and Indian State's Units included in that zone. For the purposes of representation in the regional Legislature, every Unit will be entitled to send representatives in accordance with the share allotted to it in the scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, for representation in the Federal Assembly.

3. The representatives in the various regional Legislatures shall collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly which will consist of 375 members (250 from British India and 125 from the Indian States).

4. One-third of the total number of representatives in the Federal Assembly shall be the Muslims.

5. The other Minorities, also, shall be allotted the share apportioned to them in the Federal Assembly by the Government of India Act, 1935.

6. The regional Legislature shall deal only with subjects which are included in the regional List under this scheme; but may at the request of two or more units included in the zone, legislate with regard to subjects falling in the Provincial List in order to secure uniformity and facility of administration within the zone. Such enactments would, for application in any unit within the region, require confirmation by the Government of the unit concerned and shall thereafter supersede any provincial (or State) legislation on the subject.

7. In the regional Legislature, no Bill or other measure having the force of law, relating to a subject included in the Regional List, shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the representatives vote in favour of the measure. (This limitation is suggested in order to give additional security to the smaller units).

8. The regional Legislatures may by a resolution authorize the Federal Legislature to undertake legislation with regard to subjects included in the Regional and Provincial Lists. But such authorization shall not be effective unless at least four out of the seven zones ask for such action. And unless such authorization is endorsed by all the seven regional Legislatures the enactments so passed shall have force only in those zones which ask for such legislation.

9. Any law, enacted by the Federal Legislature at the request of the zones and by the regional Legislatures at the request of the units, shall be repealed if in the case

of the Federal Legislature at least three zones and in the case of the regional Legislatures at least half the number of units in that zone ask for its repeal.

10. The Federal Executive shall consist of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General as representing His Majesty the King and a Council of Ministers, as far as possible, not less than seven and not more than eleven in number, including the Federal Prime Minister.

11. The Federal Prime Minister shall be appointed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from among the members of the Federal Legislature and the remaining Ministers also from among the members of the Legislature in consultation with the Federal Prime Minister, but subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

- (i) That each zone shall have at least one representative in the Cabinet;
- (ii) That at least one-third of the Ministers so appointed shall be the Muslims;
- (iii) That at least two, if the number of Ministers does not exceed nine, and at least three, if the number is in excess of nine, shall be chosen from amongst the representatives of the Indian States;
- (iv) That during the first twenty (or fifteen) years from the date of the inauguration of the Federal Scheme, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General may nominate two of his Ministers either from among the members of the Federal Legislature or from outside and entrust to them the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. Thereafter all the Ministers shall be selected from among the members of the Legislature.

12. (a) The normal term of office of the Ministers shall be the same as the life of the Federal Legislature (i.e. five years).

- (b) The Ministers will retain office at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e. the Viceroy and Governor-General.
- (c) A Minister representing a particular zone shall be removed if he loses the confidence of the majority of the representatives of his regional Legislature.
- (d) The Ministry as a whole except the Ministers referred to in paragraph 11 (iv) above, shall resign if a vote of no-confidence against the Ministry is carried in the Federal Legislature.

(13) The representatives for the regional Legislatures shall be chosen in the following manner:

- (i) In the case of the British Indian units by the Provincial Legislature in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935, for the election of representatives to the Federal Assembly;
- (ii) In the case of the Indian States, as nearly as may be possible, in accordance with the procedure outlined hereunder:

(a) during the first ten years from the date of the inauguration of the regional and Federal Legislatures three-fourths to be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth to be selected by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institution which shall be set up for this purpose;

(b) during the next five years two-thirds to be nominated by the Rulers and one-third to be elected as in (a) above;

(c) after fifteen years one-half to be nominated and one-half to be elected, as in (a) above;

(d) after twenty years and thereafter, one-third to be nominated and two-thirds to be elected as in (a) above.

14. There shall be a Committee of Defence to advise in matters relating to Defence. The Committee shall consist of:

- (i) H.E. The Viceroy and Governor-General-President;
- (ii) The Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii) The Minister for Defence;
- (iv) The Minister for External Affairs;
- (v) The Federal Finance Minister;
- (vi) The Minister for Communications;
- (vii) H.E. the Commander-in-Chief;
- (viii) The Chief of the General Staff;
- (ix) A Senior Naval Officer;
- (x) A Senior Air Force Officer;
- (xi) Seven Regional representatives, one from each zone;
- (xii) Five official experts to be nominated by the President;
- (xiii) Two non-officials to be nominated by H.E. the Viceroy;
- (xiv) The Secretary to the Defence Department.

15. A Committee shall also be constituted to advise in matters connected with the External Affairs with:

- (i) H.E. the Viceroy as President; and
- (ii) the Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii) the Minister for External Affairs;
- (iv) seven regional representatives (one from each zone) to be selected by the President from among the members of Regional Legislatures;
- (v) four other members (two officials and two non-officials) to be nominated by H.E. the Viceroy; and
- (vi) the Secretary for External Affairs; as Members.

16. The Federal Railway Authority shall be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the seven regional zones.

17. Effective safeguards shall be provided in the revised constitution:

- (i) for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Minorities;
- (ii) to prevent racial discrimination against British-born subjects;
- (iii) against violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the Indian States;
- (iv) to preserve the integrity and autonomy of both the British India and the Indian States Units against interference by the Federal Executive or Federal or regional Legislature;
- (v) to ensure the safety of India against foreign aggression, and the peace and tranquillity of the Units as also of the country as a whole;
- (vi) to prevent subversive activities by the citizens of a Unit or a zone against another Unit or zone;

(vii) to protect the culture and religious rights of the Minorities.

18. The composition of the Indian Army (as on the 1st day of January, 1937) shall not be altered. In the event of a reduction or an increase in the peace-time strength of the Indian Army the proportion of the various communities as on the 1st January, 1937, shall not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency which may arise on account of a threat to the safety of the country.

19. Only those subjects, the retention of which is essential in the interest of the country as a whole and for its proper administration, shall be allocated to the Centre, e.g. Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs, Coinage and Currency, etc. The remaining subjects, at present included in the Federal List, shall be transferred to the Units or zones. Residuary powers, in regard to subjects which are not specifically included in the Federal List, shall vest in the Units, and, in the case of subjects allocated to zones, in the regional Legislatures. The Concurrent List in the Government of India Act, 1935, shall be revised and limited to legislation only subject to the following conditions:

- (a) that the Federal Legislature shall not undertake legislation on any matter within the Concurrent List unless at least four zones have applied for it;
- (b) that any legislation so enacted shall apply only to the zones which have applied for it.

20. In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject is Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial (or State), the decision of H.E. the Viceroy and Governor-General, in his discretion, shall be final.

21. The Federal Legislature shall be unicameral.

22. Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both at the Centre and in the Provinces to look after and protect the interests of the Minorities."

This scheme was rejected by the Working Committee of the Muslim League in a meeting held in February, 1940. Sir Sikander was on the Drafting Committee of the Lahore Resolution. A detailed reference, thereto, is made subsequently.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 6, pp. 20-23

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 21 July, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

10. I have now had from Sikander the Appendices to his scheme and I am sending you a copy of them by this bag. I will, if I receive them in time, add Lewis comments. My earlier anticipation that nothing very much is likely to come of Sikander's contacts with the Congress is confirmed by information received from Ewart to the

effect that the general sense of the Muslim League Working Committee, supported by Jinnah's view, is that the League should not reopen talks with Congress except on the basis of admission by the latter that the League was the sole organisation representing the Muslims in India. That is how I should have expected things to develop. I am interested in the same connection in a recent report from Calcutta to the effect that Bose had urged Jinnah at Bombay that the Muslim League should make an alliance with the Forward Bloc, as both were militant organisations. To this Jinnah is reported to have replied that so long as the Mahatma dominates the Congress, he will have nothing to do with anybody connected with it; that should Bose openly renounce allegiance to Gandhi he might consider the proposal to effect an alliance with the Muslim League and the Forward Bloc. This is an idea likely to be worth watching.

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*Gandhi to Sikander Hayat**Sardar Patel Papers, F. No. I., 38.0.177*

ABBOTTABAD, 24 July, 1939

Dear Sir Sikander,

Pray accept my thanks for your very clear letter of 20th inst. I accept your suggestion that I may consult the Working Committee and give you its opinion. The Committee is likely to meet on the 9th proximo.

As to the Harijan electorates, I do hope that separate electorates will not be countenanced. It is one thing to have separate electorates for Muslims, but wholly different to have such divisions among the same community.

Yours sincerely,
M.K. GANDHI

SIR SIKANDER HAYAT KHAN

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*Sikander Hayat to Gandhi**Sardar Patel Papers, F. No. I-38-0-1939*

SIMLA, 29 July, 1939

My dear Mahatmaji,

Many thanks for your letter of the 17th July which I received this morning. This has crossed my letter of the 18th July.

I am sorry I overlooked to answer your query about the representation of Harijans in the proposed Lahore Corporation. I have made enquiries from the Minister concerned and am informed that no provision has been made in the bill to provide separate electorates for Harijans. The method of election and representation is at present embodied in the rules and it is proposed to leave this matter to the rules in the new measure also. I am almost certain that the question of separate representation for Harijans will be raised in the Assembly when the bill is under consideration as several representations have been received from Harijan organisations. So far as Government is concerned, they do not contemplate at the moment to make a departure from the existing practice unless the Harijan representatives in the Assembly press for a revision and if so it would largely depend upon what view the Assembly takes regarding this matter. Personally as you are aware, I am not averse to joint electorates; but unfortunately the trend of events during the past few years has made it even more difficult to achieve this ideal in the absence of a genuine rapprochement between the two major communities.

I am grateful to you for giving careful consideration to my alternative scheme of Federation. Allow me to remove one or two misapprehensions which seem to have arisen due to the reason that you have not had time to make a comparative study of my scheme with the one embodied in the Government of India Act. My proposals do not contemplate a wholesale rejection of the scheme adumbrated in the Government of India Act. At the most it would necessitate modification of about half a dozen sections in the Act and the addition of perhaps two or three new sections. It would, of course, involve a revision of the Federal, Provincial and the Concurrent lists as you will have noticed from the revised list which I sent with my letter of the 18th July. As regards the 'Zonal' Legislatures contemplated in my scheme, there again seems to be some misapprehension. You must have noticed that I do not contemplate any executive authority for the 'zones' and the Legislative powers delegated to the Regional Legislatures are meant only to bring the various Units in a 'zone' closer together in order to bring about mutual confidence and trust between the various Units. It would not involve any additional expenditure since the members of a Regional Legislature would also be members of the Federal Legislature and will collectively constitute the Federal Legislature. No separate building or organisation will be required. If and when necessary, they will meet together to ratify or pass a measure on which the Units in a particular 'zone' are agreed. As a matter of fact, my scheme would be comparatively less expensive as I have suggested a unicameral instead of a bicameral Federal Legislature.

As regards the composition of the Army, I have suggested no more than retention of the status quo so far as the peace time strength of the Army is concerned. As I explained to you in the course of our conversation, my insistence on this provision is actuated by a desire to create mutual confidence, and in the interests of national harmony and solidarity.

I appreciate your remarks regarding acceptance of Dominion Status. I am aware that all the important political organisations in the country have now adopted 'complete independence' as their final goal. But I am sure you will agree with me that in the circumstances it would be inadvisable to clutch at a shadow and discard the substance

if it happens to be within our grasp. After all, what we want is complete control over the administration and affairs of our country and this will be obtained if we get our Dominion Status. I am fully aware of the fact that some of our fellow countrymen would prefer to chase a will-o-the-wisp rather than give up their demand for complete independence; but it would be for an eminent patriot and leader like you to persuade them to accept the substance and leave alone the shadow.

You mention in your letter that "Yours is the only proposal of a constructive character on behalf of the League." Let me hasten to make it quite clear that my scheme has got nothing to do with the League. It has been formulated by me alone and without consultation with any member of the League or for that matter of any other party in the country. It has been conceived with the intention of providing a solution of our communal and political problems and I trust it will be examined and studied by all concerned in the spirit in which it has been conceived.

As regards your draft solution of the communal problem and my comments thereon, I shall be grateful if you would kindly give me some more definite indications of your views if you desire me to proceed with the matter further. I quite realize that the draft represents only your views; but that is quite sufficient for my purpose provided you approve of my suggestions with reference to the various items of the draft. I can then proceed to sound important Muslim leaders and the Working Committee of the League and let you know their reactions. It would be no use my trying to bring them round to my point of view unless I am assured of your wholehearted approval and support in regard to the points mentioned in my note which I handed over to you at Bombay. I need hardly assure you that the correspondence between us will be treated as strictly confidential. Perhaps, you would like to consult the Working Committee of the League and other prominent Muslims. If there is agreement on these points, then we could bring the representatives of the two Working Committees together to approve and ratify them informally.

As regards services, I do not think we need worry about the number of communities which would fall under the category of Minorities. The obvious course would be to fix the share of the majority community in each Province and leave the balance to be distributed amongst the Minorities. This is what we have done in the Punjab. We have given 50 per cent to the Muslims and 50 per cent to non-Muslims. The proportion (7 per cent) surrendered by the majority community was added on to the share of the smaller minorities in the shape of weightage. So the problem is not so complex as it appears to be at first sight. What we need is a genuine change of heart and once this is achieved there should be no difficulty in adjusting differences. I am afraid my letter has become somewhat lengthy; but in view of the vital issues involved I have taken the liberty of encroaching on your time by answering the points raised in your letter in some detail.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
SIKANDER HAYAT



*Tej Bahadur Sapru to Akbar Hydari [Extract]**Towards Freedom Papers*

(CAMP) CHASHMASHAHI HOUSE, SRINAGAR, KASHMIR, 2 August, 1939

PERSONAL

My dear Sir Akbar,

3. I have read all that has appeared in the papers about the Hyderabad Reforms. It was not to be expected that everybody would be satisfied with those reforms. Taking a broad view of the nature of those reforms they seem to me to make a very distinct departure from the old system and constitute a deliberate move towards constitutional form of Government. The Hindus in British India are displeased with your reforms because they do not go far enough and the Muslims in Hyderabad fear that they have gone too far. As a wise statesman you will, I have no doubt, interpret all this correctly. Of course the functional representation which you have introduced is a novel feature and as an experiment it is worth trying even though it has been subjected to much criticism on the ground that it does not give the majority community the representation to which in view of its numbers it feels it is entitled. I do not think that these reforms are the last word on the subject of constitutional advance and I treat them as the first stage and it would be idle for any one to say what developments may take place after a few years if these reforms are successfully worked. Nevertheless the position in Hyderabad is causing much anxiety to every one as it must be to you. I fear there is room for improvement in your publicity that while the outside public knows what is said against Hyderabad very few know your version.

4. I have been following with much interest all that appears in the newspapers and all that I hear from friends about the Federation. As I wrote to you last you can legitimately criticise the Provincial Governors for their failure to protect the States in the discharge of their special responsibility under Section 52. On the other hand it may be urged that the present position in British India is very peculiar. Eight Provinces are under the control of Congress Governments which work as a single whole and the Governors feel that no alternative Governments are possible. The position will, it may be hoped, be different after the establishment of the Federation and the Governor-General may then feel himself in a stronger position to discharge his special responsibility in this matter. Nevertheless I feel that you will be justified in demanding a clear and authoritative statement to the effect that the protection afforded by Section 12(1) (g) is going to be a real one.¹

5. The Hindu-Mohammadan position seems to me to be going from bad to worse and it is a curious comment on our pretensions of nationalism that each community should be so suspicious of the other. I should have thought that there was plenty of room in this country for both the communities to live and to let each

other live in peace and harmony but when people express their surprise at the present position I am always tempted to ask 'whether we have a right to expect any other fruits when we have deliberately in the past sown seeds of discord? 'In my opinion most of the trouble in the country is due to our psychological attitude and to our perverted reading of history. I shall not, however, trouble you any further with these reflections.

With kindest regards and best wishes for your health,

Yours very sincerely,
T.B. SAPRU

The Right Hon'ble NAWAB SIR AKBAR HYDARI, p.c.,
Prime Minister, H.E.H. the Nizam's Government,
HYDERABAD. DECCAN.

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1. 12(1) (g) of the Act of 1935 relates to the protection of the rights of any Indian State and the rights and dignity of the Ruler thereof.

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Satyamurti to Gandhi [Extract]

Satyamurti Papers, Roll No. I, pp. 1-5

MADRAS, 4 August, 1939

My dear Mahatmaji,

I have read your article as regards Hindu-Muslim unity. I want you to consider whether the abolition of separate electorates is not the condition precedent for real communal unity in this country. So long as separate electorates exist, communal leaders will exist and flourish at the expense of national-minded leaders. It is obvious that an average Hindu will vote for a Hindu who promised to protect Hindu against Indian rights and that an average Muslim will vote for the Muslim who goes to the Legislature to protect Muslim rights as against Indian rights. This is inevitable in human nature. I, therefore, think that the Congress should make the abolition of separate electorates and the substitution of joint electorates with reservation of seats for Minorities for the time being on a just if not generous scale a major political issue. That way seems to lie the chances of real communal unity, and the Congress Provincial Governments must take every possible step in this direction and get the consent of the communities concerned agree to a general arrangement among all communities to get separate electorates substituted by joint electorates that agreement will go a long way towards solving the problem.

S. SATYAMURTHY

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*Usman Ahmad to Liaquat Ali Khan**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 335/33*

LITTLE GIBBS ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 7 August, 1939

My dear Nawabzada Sahib,

I am writing this letter to you under Mr. Jinnah's instructions.

I am enclosing copies of the various schemes which have been sent to Mr. Jinnah for changes in the present Constitution. They are as follows:

1. Confederacy of India by a Punjabi.
2. Sir Sikander Hayat's scheme as published in the *Times of India* dated 31st July.
3. Dr. Latif's scheme
4. Dr. Afzal Qadri's scheme
5. Copy of Zainul Abedin's letter
6. Copy of Abdul Majid Khan's letter.

As you will see, it is the first four that are really of importance, and these only have been emphasised by Mr. Jinnah. He wants you to have copies of them prepared by your office so that one may be sent to each member of the Working Committee and of the Sub-Committee appointed to go into these schemes.

As regards "Confederacy of India," I have further to point out that the theme of the book is not so much the advocacy of any particular scheme as to show that the Hindu-Muslim question is a real one, and that a solution lies only in the direction of a partition. In the introduction, however, the author has ranked the various schemes, discussed them briefly and expressed the order in which he would prefer them. So you will have to decide which portions are relevant and should be reprinted.

The last two are so fantastic that it does not really seem worthwhile to take them seriously. But, if you desire it, you may have reprints prepared of them as well.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) USMAN AHMAD

NAWABZADA LIAQAT ALI KHAN

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*Gandhi to Sikander Hayat**Sardar Patel Papers, File No. I., 38-0-1939*

14 August, 1939

Dear Sir Sikander,

I placed your scheme before the Working Committee. Every one of the members

felt that it could not be entertained, if only because it contemplates British connection. My draft was not discussed because Maulana Abul Kalam Azad could not be present. For myself the more I study your scheme, the more baffling become its implications. I sent you copy of the opinion of a friend who has studied the Government of India Act. I have now got a similar opinion from another close student of politics. For the moment your scheme seems to have added to the existing confusion. I wonder if you have found a way out.

Yours sincerely,
M.K. GANDHI

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Mirza Ismail¹ to Sikander Hayat

Mirza Ismail Papers

BANGALORE, 14 August, 1939

Dear Sir Sikander Hayat Khan,

I am obliged to you for your letter of July 27 sending me a copy of your scheme for an All India Federation which is an alternative to that embodied in the Government of India Act.

I have studied your scheme with the care and attention which both the importance of the subject and the fact that it has been sponsored by one of your high position and prestige demand.

I hope that you will not mind my being quite frank with you in regard to my reactions to the scheme. In the first place, your plan, which envisages a new zonal machinery with its stress on communal and regional divisions, is, I am afraid, not likely to be acceptable to the generality of our countrymen. It is certain that Congress will not take kindly to it. The autonomous Provinces will not and cannot be forced into an alliance with the States which, in their opinion, would mean putting back the clock. Apart from Congress, the scheme might evoke opposition from men of various shades of political opinion and their objections cannot be dismissed as having no weight. One feature, among others which is bound to provoke serious criticism and opposition is your proposal in regard to the composition of the army.

Nor can the scheme be said to have any attraction for the States either. It is no longer possible to consider that States in terms of the Princes only, without taking into account the growth of political consciousness and aspirations among their peoples.

The opinion even among the Muslims will, possibly be divided on the advantages of the scheme both as affecting their own interests and also the larger interests of the country.

Above all the time is long past when a new scheme involving a radical departure from the present Act could have any chance of being seriously considered. It is clear

that discussion of your scheme cannot take place on any but an academic level. Equally it is clear that there are only two courses open at present; either the Government of India Act has to be brought into full operation with minor alterations, if any; or the Federal part has to be scrapped completely, leaving it to the future to evolve a more suitable Constitution at the Centre. It is more likely that the former course will ultimately prevail.

A scheme such as yours may be desirable from one point of view. Yet what it must fail to do is to promote the essential unity of India that should inspire any sound scheme of Federation.

I trust that you are flourishing and that some day in the not too distant future you will give me the pleasure of welcoming you at Mysore.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

The Hon'ble SIR SIKANDER HYAT KHAN, K.B.E.,

Prime Minister of the Punjab
The Boundary, Simla E.

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1. Sir Muhammad Mirza Ismail (1883-1959); *Dewan* of Mysore, 1926-41; attended Round Table Conferences, *Diwan* of Jaipur (1942-46); President of Nizam's Executive Council, 1946-47.

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Jinnah's Public Speech [Extract]

The Nation's Voice, pp. 385-387

Bombay, 16 August, 1939. 2. The first and foremost task of the Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah said, was to organise the Muslims and make them a strong united body. That was essential to enable the community to take its rightful place in the national affairs of the country. Those who took that view might be branded communalists. "So far as I am concerned," he declared, "I am willing to be branded a communalist for doing this duty to the Muslims. I was born a Muslim, I am Muslim and I shall die a Muslim."

3. "Let us be quite clear about this," he added, "what is the average Indian nationalist? Is the Congress really nationalist? You do not become a nationalist by declaring that you are one. In my judgement when the Congress speaks of nationalism, it means Hindu nationalism; when it says nationalist, it means Hindu nationalist. Not only that is their meaning, but they practice it in that sense."

4. Mr. Jinnah asserted that he was forced to that view by the developments after the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy in the Provinces. Before the elections it was his hope that the better minds among Muslims and Hindus would get into the Legislatures and that they would work in harmony for bringing about communal

peace. The Congress answer to that was violent propaganda against the Muslim League during the elections. The Congress declared that the Muslims were reactionaries and were supporting the Imperialist power. The Congress wanted to wreck the Constitution while the Muslim League wanted to utilise it for what it was worth. After the elections were over and the Congress found majorities in some of the Provinces, it decided to accept office. Instead of wrecking the Constitution, they were working it now, and now working it with a vengeance.

5. Instead of accepting the hand of cooperation extended by the Muslim League, the Congress demanded a liquidation of the League and complete subordination to the Congress. That was an attitude unhelpful to Muslims, unhelpful to Hindus and to the country. Mr. Jinnah then accused the Congress of corrupting Muslim members in the Legislatures by offering them Ministerships. Such tactics were not becoming of a mighty organisation like the Congress, he said. Mr. Jinnah next referred to the "machinations and onslaughts of the Congress on Muslim culture and interests in some of the Congress Provinces. Among them he mentioned the flag question, the singing of *Bande Mataram* and attempts to introduce Hindi. The latest anti-Muslim moves were the introduction of textbooks and school uniforms without consulting any responsible Muslim opinion.

6. It was absurd to suggest, he added, that Muslim Minorities in the Congress Provinces were aggressive. They were only trying to defend themselves and their culture. The trouble was with the power-intoxicated Congressmen. They seemed to be under the impression that they were ruling the country and went about flouting the Muslims and taunting them.

7. Referring to the Muslim League programme, Mr. Jinnah asked "Let us know what is the Congress programme? At present great deal of our time and energy are taken up in devising measures of self-defence. But we have done much constructive work. Our membership has gone into lakhs and today we are a force to be reckoned with. I still want to organise the Muslims to make them a greater power to take their proper share in national life. Even if the Muslims had to submit themselves to a *Hindu Raj*, even if they had to petition to the Hindus, still they would carry greater weight if they were united and spoke with one voice."

8. Muslims and Hindus, Mr. Jinnah observed, were poles apart in faith, education, culture and philosophy. They were two distinct races or nationalities. It was a natural thing that whoever had greater power would influence and undermine the other's culture. He wondered how in a country like this democracy could be worked successfully. The Congress was swearing by democracy because it suited the more powerful communities. In his view there was no such thing as democracy in any part of the world today. They talked of democracy in India, because it suited the Hindus. For them it was a matter of counting heads. What they had to consider and ponder over was whether a democratic system of parliamentary Government was suited to such a vast country with different nationalities.

9. In his view, it was an impossibility. What should be the future Constitution was a matter for them to decide. The Muslims did not want to harm the Hindus. In turn they wanted to be left free to develop their interests and culture. They would not countenance any subordination to the Hindus. After criticising the Congress,

Muslim mass contact movement and the efforts to form Congress Governments in Sind, Mr. Jinnah declared: "I say to the Congress 'hands off the Muslims.' Trust us and trust our honour. We do not want to be protected by you. We shall take care of ourselves. We have no designs against you except that we should have proper share in the National Government of this country."

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John Woodhead to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 165, pp. 232-35

20 August, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT [FROM BENGAL] NO. 16

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. *Communal*—My conversations in Pabna confirmed the diagnosis of the communal troubles there which owe their origin to competing political organisations and have been greatly magnified in the "nationalist" Press. The situation became really threatening when there was talk of the boycott of Hindu "*bats*" by Muslims—a much more serious matter than the "defilement" of images about which much more was heard. In nearly all cases these images were the abandoned remains of idols made of straw and mud for village *pujas*. Firm preventive action by the local officers together with the restraining influence of Muslim League Ministers on some of their more turbulent propagandists has undoubtedly brought about an improvement, and I was particularly struck by the level-headed and friendly manner in which the Muslim District Magistrate and the Hindu Superintendent of Police appeared to view the problem. No doubt, this is in part due to the fact that the latter is a young man of some character while the former is an old hand who is not interested in present day Muslim politics.

4. At Rajshahi, there was no sign of overt ill-feeling and no information of actual trouble in the District, but I gathered subsequently that Rajshahi Hindus are in fact labouring under a sense of grievance. The reason is, I think, that the Muslim League has recently begun to consolidate its organisation in the District and this process threatens the general balance of power there. I have since heard that, as a result of elections and long-delayed nominations to the Rajshahi District Board, the Chairmanship, so long held for several years by Hindu *zamindars*, will pass into the hands of a fairly obscure Muslim pleader who is a supporter of Government in the Assembly. When it is borne in mind that Rajshahi is a District where the Muslims form the great majority of the population, while the Hindus as *zamindars* and small *taluqdars* hold nearly all the property and have hitherto had a virtual monopoly of culture and influence, it is not unnatural that the threatened invasion of their preserves should give rise to deep underlying resentment.

5. *The Hindu consolidation*—In the light of the foregoing instances it is relevant—to refer to the merger of the Bengal Hindu Sabha and the Bengal Provincial Hindu Sabha under Sir Manmathanath Mukherji; this took place during the fortnight under report and has been given much prominence in some sections of the nationalist Press. No reference has been made to this in some sections of the nationalist Press. No reference has been made to this in the Home Department report—possibly because the report takes some days to collect and compile. The rallying point is, of course, the Communal Award and what is represented as the consequent general threat to Hindu interests as typified by the Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Act, and so on. There has been a good deal of strong talk very definitely on communal lines but no definite plan of action has yet materialised. It will be unfortunate if this consolidation merely results in uniting Hindus against Muslims. The situation would be entirely altered if there could only emerge a powerful Hindu organisation upon which the Hindu element in the Cabinet could rely for practical and consistent support, in the Legislature and in the country, for a realistic policy of constructive cooperation with the Muslim half of the Cabinet. Such an organisation would give Hindu Ministers a body of Hindu support in the Legislature which no Government could lightly disregard. I believe that there are many Hindus—Sarkar, my Finance Minister, for one—who recognise the need of an organisation such as this, but they are perhaps pinning their hopes on eventually gaining the upper hand in the Bengal Congress, which they regard as the only possible Hindu organisation in Bengal. If so, the outcome of the contest between Subhas Bose and Dr. B.C. Roy's "Right Wing" group may be of vital importance to the future development of the Province; but so far as present indications go, it would seem very optimistic to hope that the Bengal Congress will ever be captured within a reasonable space of time by men of sober and practical outlook, prepared to tell their community the unpalatable truth that it has got to recognise changed conditions and make the best of them by concession and cooperation.

6. *Ministers and Muslim attitude to Federation*—I have already referred to the allegations sedulously put about of a secret pact between Sir Nazimuddin and Subhas Bose on the subject of "political" prisoners. There is no doubt that this has caused considerable perturbation to some members of the Cabinet and their anxieties have been increased by the announcement that a resolution would be moved at a forthcoming meeting of the Muslim League to the effect that the Bengal Government should release the terrorist prisoners as "a gesture of goodwill to the Forward Bloc." I have seen a good deal of "source" information on this matter and have given it a good deal of thought, but I am still definitely of the opinion that the whole picture has been distorted, perhaps intentionally, by the Bose group. Sir Nazimuddin himself has emphatically denied both publicly and privately the existence of any such pact and though I have been keeping a close look out, I have observed nothing that would be consistent with such a theory.

7. I discussed the matter with Ewart when he was here some days ago in the light of all the information at his disposal and mine, and he was inclined to agree with my present reading of the situation which is as follows:

The Jinnah-Bose conversations in Bombay in which, I gathered, Jinnah was hoping

to use Bose as a means of weakening the Congress and combating the "imposition" of Federation, naturally produced a crop of rumours and suspicions. Sir Nazimuddin was present at one of these conversations and this has added to the gossip.

Subhas Bose is clearly anxious to make out that he has got a pact with Sir Nazimuddin and no doubt the rumours of Bombay negotiations lent colour to this suggestion but, as I have said, all the indications lead me to the belief that this allegation of a pact is without foundation; and it may be that Jinnah, in his efforts to exploit Subhas to the discomfiture of the Congress, has encouraged him (Subhas) to think that concessions could be obtained from Nazimuddin and that Subhas is himself putting about these stories of concessions in order to enhance his own position and attempt to create mutual suspicion in the Bengal Cabinet.

8. It may still be asked why Nazimuddin should have mixed himself up with the Jinnah-Bose conversations. On this matter he was quite frank with me at the time and the reason is to be found in the general Muslim apprehensions regarding the "imposition" of Federation. This is a matter on which I had wanted to write to you with particular reference to your letter of the 28th June 1939, but it has been clear from various feelers that I have put out that Bengal Muslims have not thought the matter out at all. They are uneasy about it, and especially about the idea that the Right Wing of the Congress will make an "alliance" with the "British Government" to bring Federation into force and then, being in a position to put pressure on the Princes, will occupy a commanding position to the great detriment of Muslim interests. Politically minded Muslims here have never really got over the shock of the repartition of Bengal and from time to time one sees the idea lurking at the back of their minds that the "Government of India" (by which loose term they presumably mean the Viceroy and the Secretary of State) may at sometime put pressure on the Bengal Ministry to modify their policy in order to accommodate Hindu interests (with which they identify Congress).

9. I am told that this idea has cropped up in the past with reference to such matters as the amendment of the Government of India Act with regard to powers of legislating for the Calcutta University and the Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Bill. The action actually taken regarding the Calcutta University and the complete absence of anything in the nature of thwarting the legitimate policy of Ministers in Hindu interests should have reassured them, but an underlying mistrust of this kind dies hard, and there were hints of it again from the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca in the course of a casual discussion in Cabinet a few days ago on the question of "political" prisoners policy.

10. I doubt whether Nazimuddin shares this feeling of mistrust to the same extent as some of his colleagues but he has certainly got the idea that if Federation is inevitable, the Muslims must somehow try to make terms with the Congress before it comes. He told me this quite frankly sometime ago with reference to his having joined in the Jinnah-Bose conversations; whatever Jinnah's idea was, Nazimuddin's idea was that there could be no question of negotiating with Subhas Bose as a rebel, but only as a possible representative of the Congress. It will be recalled that Sikander Hayat Khan also attempted to open up negotiations though, I gathered, without much success, with the Right Wing of the Congress in Bombay.

I should say that Nazimuddin is much more of Sikander Hayat Khan's stamp than of Jinnah's and I doubt how far he will let himself be entangled in Jinnah's net—but one inference that arises from all this is that if the Right Wing of the Congress will not do business with Sikander Hayat Khan and Nazimuddin they cannot be surprised if Jinnah—and perhaps others—try to do a deal with Subhas Bose.

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Resolution of the Council of the All India Muslim League adopted on 27th and 28th August, 1939, at Delhi

Pakistan Movement—213

(a) Resolved that this Council, while deploring the policy of the British Government towards the Muslims of India by attempting to force upon them against their will a Constitution and in particular Federal Scheme as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, which allows a permanent hostile communal majority to trample upon their religious, political, social and economic rights and the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors, in the Congress governed Provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the Minorities and towards the Arabs in Palestine in refusing to meet their demands, holds the view that in these circumstances if the British Government desires to enlist the support and the sympathy of the Muslims of the world and particularly of the Indian Muslims in future contingencies it must meet demands of the Muslims of India without delay.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 6, pp. 84-91

VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 31 August, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

7. Sikander's admirable statement on Saturday last seems fairly effectively to have spiked the guns of Jinnah and the Muslim League, who had met at Delhi on Sunday. I am sending you separately a copy of a personal letter which I have had from Sikander himself. It seems to me pretty clear that relations between the Muslim League and the Punjab, Bengal and other important Muslim centres are becoming definitely rather strained, and that the chances of a breakaway are considerable. Zafrullah tells me that he has heard that in the secret meeting of the Muslim League which took place at Delhi Jinnah again begged for *carte blanche*, and expressed his

readiness to undergo any possible personal sacrifice, and his entire confidence that if given a free hand he would bring us to our knees in the immediate future. He has now arrived to take part in the deliberations of the Central Assembly; but I do not propose to make any move to him unless and until there is an outbreak of war or some other development necessitating immediate contact with all party leaders. There has been one amusing incident in connection with Sikander's statement and the Delhi discussions of the Muslim League. Fazlul Huq appears to have made an entirely satisfactory statement in Bengal on much the same lines as Sikander. The first news that anyone in northern India had of this was a Reuter's telegram from London indicating with how much satisfaction the statements made by Sikander and Fazlul Huq had been received there! On enquiry being made as to the text of Fazlul Huq's statement, it proved that it had never got beyond the boundaries of Bengal, and that the Muslim League when they held their meeting (at which Fazlul Huq was present) on Sunday the 27th had been unaware of its existence. Abdul Halim Ghuznavi and others have started a mild heresy hunt with the Press as to the reasons for the suppression. But I am given to understand on quite reasonable authority that there is some reason to think that while Fazlul Huq duly issued the statement before himself proceeding to Delhi for the meeting of the Muslim League, he did so on the explicit understanding that it should not be quoted or reproduced outside Bengal, with the object no doubt of leaving his hands a little freer in the Delhi discussions! Further, while he was himself present at the Delhi discussions, where Sikander's conduct in issuing the statement had come under severe criticism, he never mentioned that he, Fazlul Huq, had himself issued a very similar statement! This is not without its amusing side.

16. I had a long talk this morning with Nawab Sir Muhammad Yusuf, who, you will remember, was formerly a Minister in the United Provinces. It was entirely devoted to the communal problem and while I do not regard Muhammad Yusuf as necessarily of the highest quality, he is a considerable *zamindar*, who has had much experience of office both under the old regime and in the "Minorities" Ministry which preceded the acceptance of office by Congress in July 1937. Our discussion concentrated on the communal issue, and on the threat to Islam represented by the Congress, and indeed, by Hinduism generally in this country. He urged that it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to evacuate India, and leave the Muslims to the Hindus; that it was essential that we should continue to look after Muslim interests and protect them against being swallowed up by the major community: and that the fact that we would do so was in no sense incompatible with the achievement on our part of Federation. If we were going to stay in India and retain our position, well and good. If, on the other hand, we contemplated clearing out, then the Muslims must take steps to keep us here if they could. He and his co-religionists being as they were a minority, were frankly worried at the development of democracy in this country, democratic as might be the ideals underlying the theory and the practice of Islam. I asked if he did not fear that Jinnah's public confession of his lack of faith in democracy might damage Muslim prospects at the polls. He replied that he was confident that every seat held by Muslims today, and more besides, would be successfully defended or contested by his community at the next General Election. He added that he gave

full weight to the insistent urge for Self-Government and the unity of India, which, he admitted, underlay in greater or less degree opinion in all parties. But, however that might be, the fact remained that the people of this country were essentially not democratically minded. What they had most in their vision was food and security; and that was what carried, and must continue to carry, most weight with them. I asked him if he could for a moment suggest that it was practical politics for His Majesty's Government to abandon the idea of reforms, of advance towards self-government and the like, which they always set before themselves and which had always been demanded by Indian political opinion, and to perpetuate a communal situation in India and use it for their own ends in this country? He replied that was not for a moment his intention, but that we could make a material contribution towards easing the position if we would give a definite indication that it was not our intention under Federation to leave India to itself.

I put it to him that while the Muslims were, on a mere counting of heads a minority, they were not really a minority in practice given the fact that they numbered almost one hundred millions and that they represented a great and distinct tradition of their own. Sir Muhammad replied that that was perfectly true if the Muslims were left to look after themselves. But what had happened had been what we had tied their hands by the vote and by the scheme of the Act; and that they were now afraid of being left at the mercy of a Centre in which they would by no means be represented in any substantial proportion. I did what I could to lead him to regard this difficult problem on reasonable lines, and I hope with some success, but I think it worth reporting our conversation to you, as it is so characteristic of the attitude of, I suspect, a very large number of Muslims. You know from my private letters to you over the last year, and from reports of conversations I have had with Jinnah and the like, how great is the uncertainty of this community as to the future, and how deep and ill-defined their apprehension as to what may happen to them at the hands of the majority community. I got the feeling, however, that the sky is beginning to clear a little and I think it no bad thing that we should be beginning to move from a stage in which we are merely abused for failing to take an adequate share in the active protection of Muslim interests, into one in which the value of our continued association with Government in this country is more fully realised by them.

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Zafarul Hasan and Afzal Husain Qadris Joint Scheme¹

Freedom Movement Archives; Rare Documents, pp. 257-60

August, 1939

"With a clear conception of the reality of our social and political problems and with inshakable faith and confidence in the future of Islam in India, we beg to offer in the following a scheme for the consideration of the Muslims of India and the rest of the world. But before coming to it we must state the principles on which it is

based. We are convinced that we, the Muslims of India, must insist persistently and strenuously on them, namely:

1. That the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves. . . they have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslims groups; indeed they are more different from the Hindus than the Sudetan-Germans were from the Czechs;

2. That the Muslims of India have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world;

3. That the future of the Muslims of India lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of that, any other people;

4. That the Muslim majority Provinces cannot be permitted to be enslaved into a single All India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre; and

5. That the Muslims in the Minority Provinces shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces.

Now, in order to save the Muslim nation in India, we have to demand repartition of India on the only fundamental and valid principle of division, viz., nationality and to get India divided into Muslim India and Hindu India; further, we must do all we can to safeguard the interests of our nationals living in Hindu India. On this principle British India must be divided into three wholly independent and sovereign States:

1. North-West India, including the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan;

2. Bengal, including the adjacent district of Purnea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam), but excluding the south-western district of Howrah and Midnapore (Burdwan) and the north-western district of Darjiling; and

3. Hindustan, comprehending the rest of British India. Inside Hindustan there must be formed two new autonomous Provinces: (a) Delhi Province, including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand Division and the District of Aligarh (Agra Division), and (b) Malabar Province, consisting of Malabar and adjoining areas on the Malabar coast.

Further, all the towns of India with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a borough or free city.

Also, in Hindustan, Muslims in villages shall have to live together in considerable numbers.

The Indian States: The Indian or Native State inside the boundaries of any of the above three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them, ought to be attached to that State.

Those bordering on more than one of the three States should have the option of joining any of the adjoining States.

Hyderabad with its old dominions Berar and Karnatik (Carnatic) to be a sovereign State.

North-western India will include several Native States, e.g. Qalat, Jammu and Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Patiala, Jhind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Faridkot, and the Simla Hill States. With the inclusion of Kashmir it may well be called 'Pakistan' as it has been for some years past.

The Pakistan Federation will be a Muslim State. It will include about 25 millions of Muslims, i.e., more than 60 per cent of the total population. It is a self-sufficient unit on the basis of geographical, economical and political considerations. The realization of this Federation will open a new and living future for the Muslims of India and will have a far-reaching effect on the whole of the Islamic world. Pakistan will form the north-western wing of Muslim India.

The Hindus and Sikhs are the two non-Muslim Minorities in Pakistan. They will have the same cultural, religious and political safeguards granted to them as the Muslims will have in Hindustan. It will be of greater advantage for the Sikhs to be in this state than in an All India Federation as envisaged by the Government of India Act of 1935, for they will be relatively in much larger proportion in their Province and in the Centre.

The new Bengal will again be a Muslim State. It will contain more than 30 million Muslims, i.e. 57 per cent of the whole population. New Bengal can be entirely self-sufficient on account of its natural wealth and agricultural richness. It will be equal to France in area as well as in population. Because of having no component Provinces, it will be no Federation. However, it will be a sovereign State, having a status analogous to Burma, and will be the eastern wing of Muslim India.

Hindustan will be a Hindu State. It will have population of 245 millions. It will include about 23 millions Muslims forming a Minority of 10 per cent. It is our duty to safeguard their interest politically as far as it is at present possible. We must consequently insist on the formation of two new Provinces inside Hindustan, one in the North and the other in the South viz., Delhi and Malabar respectively.

In the newly-constituted Province of Delhi, there will be more than 3.5 millions of Muslims, forming about 28 per cent of the total population. Indeed they will still be a minority. However, they will be such an important minority as cannot easily be swept aside by the Hindu majority. Being highly cultured and educated as the Muslims of these parts are, and having their boundaries close to the Muslims Federation of Pakistan, they will be in a much stronger position to guard their interests than otherwise. Aligarh, the centre of Muslims education, must be included in this Province, for we cannot afford to leave it unprotected inside the remaining portion of the United Provinces which will be overwhelmingly Hindu.

The Malabar Province will comprise the southern part of Madras Presidency especially that lying adjacent to Malabar coast. This part is well populated by Muslims. There are about 1.4 million Muslims in it, forming 27 per cent of the total population. They have large trading interests in this Province and possess an eminent cultural position. Moreover, they are a virile race and being such an important minority can look after their interests far better than they can at present.

In Hindustan the Muslims largely live in cities and in considerable numbers. We cannot afford to leave them entirely at the mercy of the Hindu Government. Therefore, it is necessary to protect their interests. Left to themselves they can fight their own battle in those towns. All that can be done for them at present is to eliminate the undue interference of the Provincial and Central Hindu Governments. This can well be done by giving the status of free cities or boroughs to large towns of a population of 50,000 and more. They shall have their own police and magistracy, and they may

have powers to legislate and execute on local matters to a large extent. In this way the interests of about 1.25 million of Muslims of Hindustan can be protected.

The Muslims in the rural area of Hindustan must be persuaded not to remain scattered in negligible minorities, as they do at present, in villages. They must be included to aggregate in villages with a preponderant Muslim population. In this way alone can their cultural as well as economical interests be protected. A number of useful and constructive programmes for social, educational and economical improvement may at once be launched in rural areas of Hindustan for the sake of this object as well as for the immediate amelioration of the conditions of Muslims residing therein.

The afore-mentioned three States—Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan—should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance on the following bases:

1. Mutual recognition and reciprocity.
2. that Pakistan and Bengal be recognized as the homeland of Muslims and Hindustan as the homeland of Hindus, to which they can migrate respectively, if and when they want to do so.
3. In Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as a nation in Minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal.
4. The Muslim Minority in Hindustan and non-Muslim Minority in Pakistan and Bengal will have (i) representation according to population, and (ii) separate electorates and representations at every stage, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States.

Note : Separate representation according to population may be granted to all considerable Minorities in the three States, e.g. Sikhs, non-caste Hindus, etc.

5. An accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.

Each of these three independent States, Pakistan, Hindustan and Bengal, will have separate treaties of alliance with the Great Britain and separate Crown Representatives, if any. They will have a joint Court of Arbitration to settle any dispute that may arise between themselves or between them and the Crown.

Hyderabad commands a position which is exclusively its own amongst Indian States. It is even now recognized as an ally by the British Government, and its Ruler addressed by the distinctive title of His Exalted Highness. In truth it is a sovereign State by treaties. Berar and Karnatic (Carnatic) were taken from it by the British for administrative reasons. Now when the British are giving the control of India to its rightful owners, they must return to Hyderabad its territories, and recognize Hyderabad expressly as a sovereign State, at least as sovereign as Nepal. Karnatic will restore a sea coast to Hyderabad and Hyderabad will naturally become the southern wing of Muslim India."

Enclosure: (I) Population Table Map not included in this volume

1. This Scheme was jointly prepared by Dr. Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri and Syed Zafarul Hasan, both Professors at Aligarh Muslim University.

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*John Woodhead to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 167, pp. 241-42*
*Report No. 17**5 September, 1939*

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

3. I must give the Bengal Ministry full marks for their unhesitating attitude in regard to the war emergency and the speed and level-headedness with which they have put through business in this connection. The Chief Minister summed up the attitude of Muslim Ministers by saying that it was no use being blind to Muslim grievances or Muslim apprehensions but the question was whether Muslims would bargain for their support. It must be realised, he said, that the claims of the Congress and the League were at present mutually destructive, but the real question was whether they were friends of Britain or not and for him there could be no question of conditional loyalty. Both he and Sir Nazimuddin expressed their disapproval of the recent resolution of the Muslim League Council which left the attitude of the Muslims indeterminate and were definitely of opinion that it was not representative of Muslim opinion. Hindu Ministers are no less firm in their attitude and Sarkar, while obviously hoping that Gandhi will give a favourable lead, shows no sign of wavering himself and has clearly been at work to help improving the tone of the Hindu Press. He is emphatic that any criticism of Ministers or any one else for supporting the war effort should be silenced and believes that if this can be done, left wing extremists, even if they try such criticism, will be impotent within a month.

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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 6, pp. 92-95**VICEREGAL LODGE, SIMLA, 5 September, 1939*

PRIVATE

6. Now for my talks with Gandhi and with Jinnah.¹ I am sending you the records which I have prepared somewhat hastily of both these conversations by the present bag. I have telegraphed to you a very brief record of the impression left on me of talk with Gandhi, and I am also sending you today a brief telegraphic warning of the general line of a statement which the old man proposed to issue and which he was good enough to send me to look at before its release to the Press. I do not really think that I need add very much to my record of my talk except to say that I could

not help myself being profoundly moved by the emotion which he showed during a considerable part of it, an emotion I see he proposes publicly to mention in his article for the Press. His whole attitude could not have been better, and in his conversation he showed the same breadth of approach and the same disinclination to trouble about minor or subsidiary issues as I have always noticed in him. I felt bound, given the correspondence which has passed between us, to be perfectly categorical with him that there was no commitment of any sort which I could enter into as regards the future; and he took that as I remarked in the note on my talk very well indeed. I cannot believe in fact that he would have been likely to strike a huckster's bargain at this stage. I did, on the other hand, hint as you will see that, to the extent that the circumstances might disclose some necessity for some special arrangements for consultation so as to keep us in touch with public opinion during the war, my mind was open though I thought it far too early yet to consider any such possibility in detail if at all. What I had in mind of course was in particular this matter of defence liaison on which I am not without hope that we may be able to reach some satisfactory arrangement. The Chief has reacted rather better than I thought likely at first, and I am sending you a copy of the interim reply I have had from him by this bag. What effect Gandhi and his views will have on the Working Committee meeting which is not under summons, it is, of course, impossible to say. But I still think that his personal prestige and his authority are so great that he should be able to stand up to very strong opposition. I suspect too that in releasing his statement to the Press he is anxious to pave the way for the Committee's meeting. He has, of course, guarded himself very carefully in that statement, and does not go as far in some ways as he did in our conversation. But I have very little doubt that his tactics are wise ones.

7. The conversation with Jinnah was again characteristic. Sikander had sent me a message shortly before I saw him that nothing should be done to inflate him or make him more difficult to deal with, and repeating that the Punjab and Bengal were wholly behind us in the prosecution of the war, whatever Jinnah and his friends may say. That, of course, I accept as the case. But here as always in dealing with these political leaders, I felt it wiser to be patient with Jinnah and endeavour to lead him into the direction which we desire; and if indeed I can give any help to these Muslim leaders to get more together than they are at the moment, I will do so. But I may remark in parenthesis that I have a feeling that there are a good many hounds at the moment on Jinnah's heels among his co-religionists. That, however, is a matter of internal Muslim politics, and our concern must, of course, be to secure all the support that we can so long as we do so without giving rise to false expectations or misunderstandings in our objective of the conduct of the war. With him also, as you will observe, I was careful to make it clear that I was not bargaining and that I was holding out no hopes of entering into any commitments of any sort. His suggestion that in the interests of securing the support of him, Jinnah and his friends, one should go to the point of driving the Congress Ministries out of office is characteristic.

1. The Viceroy invited the leaders to meet him in Simla on 4 September, 1939 immediately after Britain's declaration of war on Germany.

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*Resolution passed at the Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee held at Bombay under the Presidentship of Br. V.D. Savarkar**Jayakar Papers**10 September, 1939*

4. The Hindu Mahasabha condemns the spirit of bargaining and taking undue advantages of the present crisis for the promotion of purely communal interest at the expense of National well-being such as has been exhibited by the Muslim League in the statement issued by its President Mr. Jinnah after his interview with the Viceroy and warns the Hindus to be on their guarantee [guard?] and to be prepared to fight for their rights and privileges as well as for the defence of Hindustan.

5. The Hindu Mahasabha respectfully brings to the notice of His Excellency the Viceroy that the Congress does not represent the Hindu and that no settlement will be acceptable to the Hindus if arrived at the back of the Hindu Mahasabha in consequence of any bargain between the Government and the Muslim League and/or Congress on the. [blank in the original].

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*Jayakar to Ganpat Rai [Extract]**Jayakar Papers**"ASHRAM", WINTER ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY-6, 12 September, 1939*

PRIVATE

Dear Mr. Ganpat Rai,

Your letter of the 7th reached me yesterday. I appreciate all that you write therein and feel, as you do, that a prominent Hindusabha leader like Mr. Savarkar should not have been left out of account by the Viceroy. But perhaps the fault is Mr. Savarkar's own. It does not look right for a great Hindu leader, as he is, to sit silent for eight to ten days when all important men including communal leaders like Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Mr. Jinnah have made statements to the Press regarding their attitudes towards the war. Mr. Savarkar should have come out immediately after Sir Sikandar had spoken in such clear and persuasive terms. In public life you know people value and esteem you to the same extent as you do yourself and I am not surprised that the Viceroy paid no attention to Mr. Savarkar. Look at the statements of Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. They come out promptly and courageously with their views. They did not wait for the holding of their Party meetings. The same was the case with Mr. Jinnah and it did strike even a detached observer like me that Mr. Savarkar spoke

nothing at the proper time. This, in my opinion, was a grievous failure. A Hindu leader of his importance and influence should have acted with more promptness and courage and let the Viceroy feel that his position in Hindu public life was so eminent that his opinions, though only personal, counted in the matter.

I am hoping to leave for England in a few days by Air.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) M.R.J. GANPAT RAI, Esq., B.A., L.L.B.,
51, Punch Kuin Road,
New Delhi

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Resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, adopted at Delhi

Pakistan Movement, pp. 216-20

17-18 September, 1939

3. The Working Committee appreciate the declaration of H.E. Viceroy, which is in the interest of India and particularly the Musalmans, that the Federal Scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, has been suspended. They wish that instead of its being suspended it had been abandoned completely and desire to convey to His Majesty's Government that they should do so without further delay. The Committee desire to make it clear that they do not endorse the "Federal objective" of His Majesty's Government referred to by His Excellency in his address to the members of the Central Legislature and strongly urge upon the British Government to review and revise the entire problem of India's future Constitution '*de novo*' in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present Provincial Constitution of India and developments that have taken place since 1935 or may take place hereafter.

4. The Committee in this connection wish to point out that Muslim India occupies a special and peculiar position in the policy of India and for several decades it had hoped to occupy an honourable place in the national life, Government and administration of the country and worked for free India with free and independent Islam in which they could play an equal part with the major community with complete sense of security for their religious, political, cultural, social and economic rights and interests; but the developments that have taken place, and especially since the inauguration of the Provincial Constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of Government, and the recent experience of over two years have established beyond doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim Minorities whose life and

liberty, property and honour, are in danger and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated everyday under the Congress Governments in various Provinces.

5. That while Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of "free India," it is equally opposed to the domination of Hindu majority over Musalmans and other Minorities and visualization of Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed to any "federal objective" which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of Government. Such a Constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state.

7. While the Muslim League stands for the freedom of India the Committee further urge upon His Majesty's Government and ask for an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League nor any Constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval.

9. If full, effective, and honourable cooperation of the Musalmans is desired by the British Government in the grave crisis which is facing the world and if it is desired to bring it to a successful termination it must create a sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans and take into its confidence the Muslim League which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 338-40

INDIA OFFICE, WHITE HALL, LONDON, 19/20 September, 1939

PRIVATE

2. I said that this was all very well, but that I found it difficult to discover in the [Congress Working Committee] manifesto itself any basis for the interpretation which she [Agatha Harrison] placed upon the attitude of the Working Committee. We then went over the old ground of what was and what was not practicable. She appeared to think that we might say something on the lines suggested by Kedar to Wylie, namely, a promise of Dominion Status at the end of the war. I asked her if she had ever thought out what Dominion Status actually meant. Did it in her view mean, for example, control of the defence of India by an Indian Ministry responsible to an Indian parliament? Did this in its turn involve the withdrawal of British troops from India and a complete removal of British control from every form of Indian activity, both in the political and in the administrative fields? Had she considered what the attitude of the ninety million Muslims was likely to be towards such a state of affairs

and had she considered the form which the Central Government would take in the light of her own contention that the federal provisions of the Act of 1935 were wholly unacceptable to Indians? It was quite clear that she had not really ever considered any of these things but she urged the right of Indians to decide such questions for themselves. I asked if this meant that the form of the future Constitution of India was to be decided by the Constituent Assembly which played so large a part in the Congress demand. She said Yes. I then asked her if she had considered the nature of a constituent assembly representing 350 million peoples of India, for I assumed that both Muslims and Princes would at least be allowed to figure in the Constituent Assembly itself. I need not perhaps pursue the line of our discussion further; but I will add one observation which she made, as an illustration of the hopeless inability of people of her kind to think things out on a plane of realism. I had told her in reply to her contention that we gave Congress the impression that we did not trust them in the matter of defence, that the leaders of the political parties in the Assembly had purposely been informed in confidence of the despatch of troops from India to Egypt and Singapore. "But," she said, "you mean informed after the decision to despatch the troops had been taken. Were they consulted as to the advisability of the troops being sent?" I asked her if she meant by that that the consent of the Indian Legislative Assembly ought to be obtained before such decisions were taken, and if so, what she would herself think of a suggestion that the Government here, before sending troops to France, for example, should be required to obtain the consent of Parliament, with all the publicity of secret military plans which that would involve? This was an aspect of the case which apparently had not occurred to her. From all of which you will see that she was not really very helpful and that beyond urging personal contact between you and the Congress Triumvirate she had no constructive suggestion to make. For what this suggestion might be worth I telegraphed it to you. It seems to me that what we have got to try to discover is to what extent the manifesto represents a face-saving device or to what extent it is to be regarded as a determined effort to exploit the situation. The commentaries so far received tend to obscure rather than to clarify the situation. So far as I can at present judge, the views of the Congress Ministers oscillate between optimism and pessimism and I shall look forward with immense interest to your appreciation of the situation when you find yourself in a position to let me have it.

3. I have just seen the account of the attitude of the Muslim League which has been telegraphed by Reuter. It at least has the merit of lucidity and if Reuter's telegram contains the whole of it, it would appear to consist of three plain demands:

1. that no promise of constitutional advance shall be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League;
2. that a close liaison shall be established between the Government and the League; and
3. that the Scheme of Federation as provided in the Act of 1935 shall be not merely suspended but finally abandoned.

This, in the light of Jinnah's talk with you and of Nazimuddin's shrewd anticipation of the attitude of Congress combined with his appeal to us to give away nothing to

Congress in return for their support, as set out in the memorandum which he gave to Woodhead, makes it clear, I think, that Muslim dislike of the Congress Ministries, which in Jinnah's case amounts to violent hatred, is a thing which has to be taken into account in a highly complex situation.

5. There is not much ground for gaiety in present developments, but you may perhaps be mildly entertained by the terms of a telegram which I received a day or two ago from the astrologers and astronomers of the All India Astrological and Astronomical Society of Calcutta. They told me in their telegram that in view of the situation of Great Britain and the King Emperor with reference to the present planetary position they were able to predict a successful emergence of Great Britain from the present war with enhanced prestige!

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B. Shiva Rao¹ to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents IV, pp. 91

HYDVALE COTTAGE, SIMLA S.W., 21 September, 1939

Dear Rajen Babu,

I was sorry to see that you have been very ill. I hope you have come back to normal.

My object in writing to you is to take the liberty of making a suggestion. You must have noticed that the Muslim League Working Committee adopted a resolution reiterating its fantastic charge of atrocities in Congress governed Provinces on the Muslims. Each Provincial Government has, I know, issued a detailed statement refuting the charge. That, I feel, is not enough, in the first place all the statements of the Provincial Governments concerned should be brought together in a pamphlet and issued broadcast (sic). Jinnah, for obvious reasons, has not been anxious to give much publicity to the Pirpur Report. Even the *Statesman* this morning comes out with a blunt statement that if that is all the evidence the League could produce, no case has been made out for the intervention of the Governors. *The Hindustan Times* makes a suggestion that Governors and even the Viceroy should come out with statements. Whether they will do so or not I do not know. But in my humble judgement I feel you should ask the Muslim League whether they would be prepared to have a Committee of two or three High Court Judges to investigate the charges.

The singular unanimity with which all newspapers in India, including *The Times of India* and the *Statesman*, should have urged an immediate introduction of responsibility in the Centre has certainly impressed the authorities. But the feelings in certain circles is that the resolutions of the Congress and the League Working Committees tend to cancel out each other. The Congress wants freedom and democracy, but the League wants complete abandonment of Federation, and a free

exercise by Governors of their special powers in Provinces. I do not know what final view the Viceroy will take. I am told he has been greatly moved by Gandhiji's statement;² but whether it will lead to anything concrete, I cannot say.

Yours sincerely,
B. SHIVA RAO

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1. B. Shiva Rao (1891-); delegate to International Labour Organisation Conference, Geneva 1929-30; delegate to the Round Table Conference, 1930-31; member of delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, 1947-50, 1952; member of Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; member of Lok Sabha, 1952-57; member of Rajya Sabha, 1957-60.
 2. On his meeting with the Viceroy on 5 September, 1939 Gandhiji told him that his own sympathies were with Britain. The Viceroy was profoundly moved by Gandhiji's sympathy for England and he hoped that Gandhiji would be able to keep things on the right lines at the Congress Working Committee meeting.

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Henry Duffield Craik to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 68, p. 144

"BARNES COURT," SIMLA, 25 September, 1939

SECRET
D.O. NO. 178

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Sikander asked me today to convey to you the following message in view of the interview which you are going to grant to Jinnah on Wednesday, the 27th of September.

The first point is as regards that part of the recent Muslim League resolution which deals with Federation. The actual wording of the resolution is that "no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval" of the League. Sikander tells me that there was a very long discussion as to the exact wording of this part of the resolution at Delhi, but he is convinced that Jinnah would be prepared to accept "consultation" only, instead of "approval and consent," if the League could also be given an assurance that in any future scheme of Federation Muslim interests would be amply protected.

Secondly, Sikander asked me to suggest for your consideration the advisability of giving Jinnah an assurance that if the Muslim League cooperate fully in the prosecution of the war, you are convinced that their attitude will not be overlooked by His Majesty's Government.

Thirdly, Sikander feels convinced that if in the course of your interview you put to Jinnah the same question as you put to Sikander the other night, viz., whether, if

Congress adopts an obstructive attitude, the Muslims would in that event cooperate with Government then you would receive from Jinnah the same reply as you received from Sikander.

Yours sincerely,
H.D. CRAIK

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Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet

War Cabinet Papers, Copy No. 25, pp. 150-59

INDIA OFFICE, 25 September, 1939

SECRET

W.P. (G) (39) 21

5. I should add that it is not from the Congress alone that an offer of only conditional cooperation is forthcoming. Within the last few days the Muslim League also has thought fit to make demands, though of an entirely different character, as the condition of the support of that community. The Muslim demands may be regarded as almost the converse of those of the Congress, namely that Federation should be definitely dropped (as likely to involve the subjugation of the Muslim Minority to a *Hindu Raj*) and that the Provincial Governors should forthwith exercise the powers they possess, but which it is alleged they have hitherto omitted to use, for the protection of Muslim interests. It will be apparent that the Muslim attitude makes it necessary, in anything which may be said to meet the Congress demands, to avoid further antagonising the Muslim community.

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Akbar Hydari to Tej Bahadur Sapru

Towards Freedom Papers

26 September, 1939

My dear Sir Tej,

Many thanks indeed for your kind letter of the 17th September 1939. I am much encouraged by what you say in it about the Arya Samaj Satyagraha and our own scheme of reforms.

3. The very wordy manifesto of the Congress Working Committee was, I think, the result of some effort by the Right Wing of the Congress to pacify the

Left Wingers and at the same time to leave sufficient margin for a compromise with Government. I am not discouraged by the manifesto and I think they will ultimately be got round.¹ It is unfortunate that the Muslim League also, despite every effort, did not rise to the occasion and has, as in certain other directions, followed Congress policy blindly.

Yours sincerely,
AKBAR HYDARI

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1. Gandhiji issued the following statement from Wardha: 'I was sorry to find myself alone in seeking that whatever support was to be given to the British should be given unconditionally.'

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Jinnah's Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Old Boys Association of the Osmania University on 28 September, 1939

The War! Problems of India's Future Constitution, p. 6; Nation's Voice, p. 390

I did not expect that, even at this festive board where a galaxy of intellects have assembled, I would be involved in discussing political problems confronting India. But as reference has been made to the matter, I must assure you that I yield to none in the determination to safeguard the interests of my country, nor would I yield to anybody in striving for the attainment of freedom for my country.

I am essentially a practical man. I have been in practical politics for over a quarter of a century. The words 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' have undergone many changes in their definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own, but within the honest meaning of the term I still remain a nationalist.

I have always believed in a Hindu—Muslim pact. But such a pact can only be an honourable one and not a pact which will mean the destruction of one and the survival of the other. The Congress High Command, unfortunately, are not prepared to grasp the hand of friendship, but would like to destroy the very hand which offered friendship. One does not see much light at present but you never can say when the two communities would unite. We have a recent example of the German-Soviet pact between two nations which were the bitterest of enemies.

I say to every Musalman that Islam expects you one and all, to do your duty and stand by your people as one nation.



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Telegram from Chimanlal H. Setalvad,¹ Cowasji Jehangir,² V.N. Chandavarkar³ (Liberals); V.D. Savarkar (Hindu Mahasabha); N.C. Kelkar,⁴ Jamnadas M. Mehta⁵ (Democratic Swarajya Party); B.R. Ambedkar (Depressed Classes and Independent Labour Party)

Parliamentary Papers, cmd. 6121 (1939), pp. 19-21 Appendix E.

3 October, 1939

To His Excellency the Viceroy,

11. We only wish to raise our voice to warn His Excellency the Governor-General not to be misled into accepting the position enunciated by Mr. Gandhi or to regard the Congress and the Muslim League as representing the whole or even the bulk of India and thereby prevent the establishment of true and healthy democracy in this country. We, therefore, beg to point out that any constitutional or administrative arrangement arrived at between the Government and the Congress and Muslim League only, cannot and will not bind the Indian people.

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1. Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad,
 2. Sir Cowasji Jehangir (1879-1962); Member, Revenue, Government of Bombay; Delegate to Round Table Conference, 1930-32; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1930-47.
 3. V.N. Chandavarkar, Vice-Chancellor, Bombay University, 1933-39; Mayor of Bombay, 1932-3; Chairman Millioners Association, Bombay.
 4. N.C. Kelkar.
 5. Jamnadas M. Mehta, Revenue and Financial Minister, Bombay, 1937; Member, National Defence Council; sometimes Member, All India Congress Committee and of Working Committee, Indian National Congress.

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Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet

*War Cabinet Papers, No. 26, pp. 191-93
(G)(39) 29. Copy No. 26*

5 October, 1939

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, War Cabinet
India and the War No. 26, pp 191-93
(Previous Reference: Memorandum W.P. (G) (39) (24)*

The following telegram from the Viceroy, describing his interview with the President of the Indian National Congress, Mr. Rajendra Prasad, and with Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet.

INDIA OFFICE, 5 October, 1939

Telegram from Viceroy No. 2157-S, dated 3 October, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I saw Rajendra Prasad and Nehru for 2 ¼ hours today but fear that no advance proved possible. Rajendra Prasad was, I would judge, open to some degree of conviction and was merely repeating a set piece. Nehru was as impervious to argument as Hitler and pretty clearly has made up his mind on demands extensive to a degree which we could not contemplate.

2. I have told them both that I must think the matter over in the light of what they said, and consult with the leaders of the other parties, and that if they wish in those circumstances to adjust their time table and to postpone the meeting of the Working Committee, etc., they would no doubt let me know, though I recognise that the decision on that point must be for them. I emphasised these were matters on which I could not accept the claim of Congress to be the only party or interest to be consulted, and that so far as I was concerned and quite apart from the obligation on me to refer back to His Majesty's Government, I had to ensure that I was in possession of the mind of all the other important parties including the Princes.

3. Claim as stated today with great emphasis by Nehru is briefly for: (a) Declaration which Nehru wishes to be "full blooded, positive and unambiguous," which must use the phrase "absolute freedom" for India at the end of the war, and provide also for her unfettered liberty to frame her own Constitution by means of a Constituent Assembly. (b) Such declaration to be accompanied by the immediate share of power at the Centre though he admitted that he was not too clear as to the precise machinery involved. Neither Prasad nor Nehru displayed the least anxiety to face up to complications of their proposals in terms of reactions on Muslims, Princes etc. It was interesting to see, however, that they are clearly profoundly disturbed by possibility of an all-parties conference. I asked them whether, if I was driven to have one, they thought Congress would attend.

4. They replied that while they could speak only for themselves and (as yet) *ad referendum*, they were disposed to view that Congress would not attend. I will telegraph further as soon as possible in greater detail but think you will wish to have this immediate resume of essentials. Question of representation of India at Peace Conference was mentioned by Nehru but in general terms only, and whole discussion was on general lines.

5. I have had today a long protest from Bombay Liberals, Scheduled Castes represented by Ambedkar, Mahasabha represented by Savarkar, and Parsees represented by Cowasjee Jehangir, against any settlement which does not take full account of their interest and on which they are not consulted. I propose to have representatives of all four up here in the next 4 or 5 days and also to take advantage of the Chancellor's readiness to come and see me again.

6. My impression is still that while there is no real desire on the part of Congress to break, they may find themselves driven into doing so by Nehru's pressure. There is also now I am sure considerable Left Wing pressure from Subhas Bose who has himself

telegraphed to me today protesting against the operation of ordinances in Bengal, and who, I have little doubt, is anxious to make himself a martyr as soon as possible in interests of embarrassing Right Wing. Main general impression left on me by this morning's conversation is of deplorable gap in quality between my interviewers and Gandhi.

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*Rajendra Prasad to Jinnah**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Selected Documents, IV, p. 97*

BIRLA HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 5 October, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

In the resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, passed recently in Delhi, reference has been made to Provincial Governments. It is stated that Provincial Autonomy in several Provinces has resulted in the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim Minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated everyday under the Congress Governments in various Provinces. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has also informed me that you mentioned this matter to him in the course of a recent conversation.

We feel that these charges are wholly unfounded and are based on misapprehension and one-sided reports that might have reached you and the League. The Governments concerned have inquired into the matter whenever such charges have been made and have denied them. On a previous occasion we expressed our willingness to have any specific instances investigated by impartial authority. We feel strongly, and I am sure, you will agree with us, that such charges, when seriously made, should be inquired into and either substantiated or disproved. We would like this course to be adopted in regard to any specific instances that are put forward. If you agree, we could request the highest judicial authority in India, Sir M. Gwyer,¹ Chief Justice of the Federal Court, to inquire into this matter. In the event of his not being available, some other person of a similar status and judicial position might be approached.

I shall gladly place this matter before the Working Committee of the Congress and get them to pass a formal resolution to this effect.

I am leaving for Wardha today and shall be obliged to you if you will send an early reply. I shall be in Wardha for about a week.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

1. Sir Maurice Gwyer (1878-1952); Chief Justice of India and President of the Federal Court, 1937-43; Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University, 1938-50.

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*Jawaharlal Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [Extract], Vol. X, p. 174*

WARDHA, 6 October, 1939

4. The Viceroy was not hopeful of meeting our demands, either in regard to the kind of declaration we wanted or regarding its application in the present. Some declaration of course was bound to be made. But we pointed out to him that unless this went the whole hog, it would not meet the situation. Apart from his difficulty in adjusting himself to any big changes, he was especially worried on account of the princes, the Muslims and Sikander Hayat Khan representing the Punjab. He looks upon it as if he has to choose between these people, who offer to stand by him, and Indian nationalism. It is not an easy matter for him to take the larger view and I suppose it is still more difficult for the present British cabinet to do so. The kind of people the Viceroy sees as a rule are mostly of one type and he gets a very distorted view of things in general. So far as we are concerned we, have made it clear to him that we do not wish to raise the question of Princes at this stage directly, though inevitably the big changes that we envisage will have great effect on the future of the Princes. So far as the Muslims are concerned we are perfectly agreeable to offer reasonable safeguards and compromise. In any event this is a matter between ourselves and does not affect the declaration or its subsequent temporary application. One thing must be made perfectly clear that the British Government has made up its mind completely to run India even in the present with the consent of and with a great deal of control by Indian popular opinion. This would apply not only to the governance of India but also to the conduct of the war so far as India is concerned as well as the defence of India. We did not discuss any further details. But I put to him more or less the scheme that the India League had put forward.

5. The Muslim League is unfortunately misbehaving to an extraordinary extent. Anything more objectionable than their resolution on war I cannot imagine. There is really no question of ill-treatment of Muslims in Congress Provinces. This is all bogus and we have even offered them to refer any specific instances to Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or any other similar authority. What the League is aiming at is Muslim domination even in the Provinces where Muslims are a small Minority. They have gone so far as to repudiate democracy for India. I do not think their resolution reflects the minds of even many of their members. But Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan want to take advantage of the situation. As you might have heard, I had a long interview with Jinnah. It was friendly talk and at least it removed a certain tension that existed between us. But I fear that we are far apart so far as ideas are concerned. Jinnah is exceedingly backward and reactionary and has opinions and thinks in terms of twenty-five years ago. And yet he is more advanced than many of his colleagues in the Muslim League. As he stands at present, we have to give up every principle of nationalism and democracy

in order to meet his wishes. That, of course, is impossible. I think he has overshot the mark.

Yours,
JAWAHARLAL

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Jinnah to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents IV, p. 98

8 B HARDINGE AVENUE, NEW DELHI, 6 October, 1939

Dear Dr. Rajendra Prasad,

I am in receipt of your letter dated October 5, 1939. I beg to inform you that I have already placed the whole case before the Viceroy and the Governor-General and have requested him to take up the matter without delay as he and the Governors of the Provinces have been expressly authorised under the Constitution and are entrusted with the responsibility to protect the rights and the interests of the Minorities.

The matter is now under His Excellency's consideration and he is the proper authority to take such action and adopt such measures as would meet our requirements and would restore complete sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans in those Provinces where the Congress Ministries are in-charge of the administration.

In these circumstances, I do not wish to discuss further the various statements made in your letter as it is unnecessary to do so, but I must say that some of them are wholly inaccurate.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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George S. Arundale¹ to Sardar Patel

Sardar Patel Papers, F. 1-33-3-39

9 October, 1939

Copy of Matter Sent to Press

Sir,

It is impossible to avoid yielding to a sense of shame when one reads the proceedings of a meeting claiming to represent the Non-Brahmins of South India. Doubtless the meeting was right to repudiate the claim of the Congress that it is an

all-inclusive body. We all know it does not at all represent the Mohammadans, nor many other communities. We also know that Gandhiji does not by any means command the confidence of all sections of the community. And we know this party because we are so constantly adjured to have confidence in him, even though he has so far given India practically no clear leadership, but has passed on the responsibility to the Congress.

On the other hand, what are we to think of Sir A.T. Pannirselvam² when he declares he does not concern himself with India's independence but with the independence of the Tamil's. And what are we to think of his statement that he prefers English rule to Aryan rule? What then are the English? Dravidians? Jews? Mongols?

I am one of those who is of opinion that both Gandhiji and the Congress have so far failed India in the great hour of her need for emphatic leadership, and I am not at all moved by the constant appeals for the support of Gandhiji or by the Congress Ministers' constant demonstrations of their self-satisfaction.

But God forbid that Sir A.T. Pannirselvam and his friends should ever take the place of the Congress Government and give us communalism of the worst kind. India needs patriots and the Congress is at least patriotic whatever its other defects.

It is people like Sir A.T. Pannirselvam who are the despair of those who pray for Indian solidarity as an essential prelude to Indian freedom.

Belonging to no political party, I am for the moment hoping against hope that the day will soon come when the Working Committee and the All-India Congress Committee and the Congress itself will awaken to the urgent duty of organising India for a definitely planned freedom. I look with little satisfaction at the almost innumerable parleys at Delhi. They are likely to make the confusion only worse confounded.

From the British standpoint I am clear, as I have written in a letter to every member of the House of Lords and House of Commons, that the Prime Minister should at once declare it to be the pleasure of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and of the British people that the Viceroy call without delay a representative gathering of all communities in India asking it to frame a Constitution for India, India's right to full and responsible Self-Government being recognized without reserve.

In the meantime the Congress and all other authoritative bodies should be busy separately and where possible together in drafting comprehensive proposals, so that a Constitution may become ready whether or not the Prime Minister has the courage and vision to act. And Gandhiji's love for the Musalmans must express itself in exhortations to his Hindu followers to show their true greatness by acceding to the fullest possible extent to the demands of all Minorities. Not through bargaining will any substantial results accrue, but through noble gestures on the part of the majorities.

Sincerely,
GEORGE S. ARUNDALE
Adyar
9 October, 1939

1. George Sydney Arundale (1878-1945); migrated to India 1903; Principal, Central Hindu College, Benaras; interned along with Annie Besant under Defence of India Act, 1917; Principal, National University, Madras, 1917; Head of Education Department, Holkar State, 1920; President, Theosophical Society, 1934.
2. Sir A.T. Pannirselvam, member, Justice Party.

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*Jawaharlal Nehru to Maulana Azad**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, p. 355*

CAMP WARDHA, 13 October, 1939

My dear Maulana Saheb,

You have seen the statement of Sir Sikander Hayat published in the papers which we got this morning. There is a direct suggestion that the Congress should have consultation with the Muslim League regarding the communal question and come to an agreement with it.¹ It is a public invitation. You also know that our suggestion for an enquiry by an impartial judge into the allegations against the Congress Ministries has been rejected by Mr. Jinnah who has practically barred the door for the present at any rate. I should like to have your views in the matter. I had a talk with Mahatmaji. He is of opinion that I should write to Sir Sikander Hayat asking him for definite suggestions and pointing out to him that Mr. Jinnah has practically barred the door at present. But Mahatmaji has said that I should first consult you and get your advice in the matter.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. On 11 October, 1939 Sikandar stated "Both the Congress and the Muslim League are anxious to settle their differences . . . if an informal invitation is extended to Jinnah he will be willing to cooperate with the Congress.

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*Maulana Azad to Jinnah**Congress Leaders Correspondence with Quaid-i-Azam, pp. 1-2*

LUCKNOW, 16 October, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Please do not misunderstand me regarding the Hindu-Muslim problem. I do not

wish for a moment that I should carry the laurels of having attained the Communal unity, nor I had any such desire when I met you in 1937-8, and tried for Congress-League settlement. My only wish and attempt is centred round the idea, that a decent agreement may be reached between the Congress and the League as I am sure it is urgently needed for the Muslims and the country. Delay is detrimental to the interests of both. Here I may mention that under no circumstances would I like to bring to the notice of the Public any one of my efforts in this connection. I only wish to perform my duty according to my belief. Perhaps an occasion may arise in future which may unveil the reality to you. Then alone you will be able to find out that you have been labouring under misunderstanding about me.

As soon as the war news began to pour in during the end of August last, the very first idea which crossed my mind was to utilise the occasion for this purpose. Accordingly, I have been trying to achieve this and since then, I wired to you yesterday, because the situation created by the Delhi talks has progressed no further, and the matter is at a standstill after reaching a certain point. It should proceed on immediately. But what should be the proper procedure in this respect? Should the Congress President write a letter to you? Or, should some such other method be adopted? I wish to know your opinion in this connection, so that I may get the matter proceed on accordingly. I am leaving for Calcutta today.

Yours sincerely,
A.K. AZAD

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Raghunandan Saran¹ to Jawaharlal Nehru

A Bunch of Old Letters, p. 401

DELHI, 17 October, 1939

My dear Panditji,

Promptly upon receipt of your kind letter, I established contact with Nawabzada [Liaqat Ali Khan]. He rang me and said that Mr. Jinnah would like to talk over the matter with me. So I went and had a talk with him. I have just returned and am now writing this to you.

He received me with the utmost courtesy and warmth of feelings and opened the conversation on the note of reminiscence carrying us to the year 1922, when I used to meet him and his wife quite a lot. He spoke feelingly and frankly. He seemed to be in a particularly good mood and humour. At the outset he asked me to warn you against lies and gossip. In so many words he said that not a word of what Subhas and others of his ilk were saying is to be believed. He said that it was simply unthinkable that he should have told anyone that he had no confidence in the members of the Working Committee. On the contrary, he said that he held most of them in high

esteem and regard. Talking about you, he said that he had affection for you coupled with high regard for your character and integrity etc. Then he said to me that having said all that he had to about the Hindu-Muslim problem from his own standpoint to you, the next move lay with you. In fact, he maintained that he definitely requested you to consult your colleagues and, thereafter, proceed further with the conversations. It was in connection with the talks with the Viceroy that he told you that if necessary he would contact you after the interview. He fully expected a further contact with you to discuss the Hindu-Muslim Problem after you had consulted your colleagues. It is a tragedy that the matter could not be settled in a friendly spirit, said he! He went on to say that we were not poles asunder; we were very much closer than we thought we were. He said he would indeed welcome resumption of conversations with you. He would be here at least up to the 22nd. He has called the meeting of the Working Committee at Delhi on 22nd instant. Thereafter he does not exactly know what his movements are going to be.

A newspaper representative had come to him to deliver advance news of the Viceregal announcement—or shall I say—the Viceregal pronouncement to be published tomorrow morning. I had a feeling that Mr. Jinnah was sore and terribly disappointed about it all. It evidently had a chastening effect upon him. I had read it earlier in the evening and I must say that I felt wholly disappointed. It is worse than we expected. It couldn't have been more reactionary and mean. I felt like wrapping up my bedding to go to jail.

I venture to submit that now is the time to forge an understanding. Mr. Jinnah is in the proper mood. Why not write and arrange a meeting with him. Surely any settlement that you two could arrive at would be acceptable to the two organisations!

Trust you are well and strong. With best regards from Nandan.

P.S. I omitted to mention that I did pointedly refer to the two vital points viz. that the Muslim League should support the Congress claim for Independence and secondly, drop the contention that there were two nations—one the Hindus and the other the Muslims. He did not make any specific reply to it. But, as is his wont, he did not express his dissent or disapproval. On the contrary, the conversation continued and grew sweeter and more friendly both in its content and mode of expression. If only one could believe what and how he put the matter to me to represent his real views, there should be absolutely no difficulty in coming to terms with him. Contrasted with other outstanding members of the League, I have not the slightest hesitation in opining that he is altogether superior to them all in every way. I felt I was talking to a man with some 'substance'! He could be trusted and relied upon if only he could be made to see eye to eye with us—is the unmistakable impression I formed about him.

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1. Raghunandan Saran (1897-1953); Congressman and Industrialist of Delhi and personal friend of Jawaharlal Nehru.



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*Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajendra Prasad**Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 115-17*

6 COUPER ROAD, LUCKNOW, 17 October, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I had a talk today with Maulana Azad on the subject of your letter of October 13th. While we were talking, Sir Sikandar Hyat telephoned to Maulana. Maulana is writing to you on this subject and suggesting what should be done. I agree with him and am writing, from my own viewpoint, what the result of our conversation was, so that you might have a clear picture.

I might also mention that two days ago¹ I had a letter from Raghunandan Saran from Delhi. He informed me that Nawabzada Liaqat Ali summoned him by telephone, soon after I had left Delhi, and wanted to know what additional steps were going to be taken in furtherance of my talk with Jinnah. He expressed his eagerness to have the Hindus-Muslim question settled and said that Jinnah having explained his fundamental position to me, the next step lay with us. Jinnah, the Nawabzada added, was in a friendly mood and wanted, as far as possible, to avoid controversies. He, Jinnah, was staying on in Delhi and it was hinted that he would be available there and something should be done before the Viceregal announcement.

Saran also wrote to me about his meeting Subhas in Delhi. Jinnah wanted to meet Subhas before the latter met the Viceroy, but this could not be arranged and Subhas saw him afterwards. Subhas reported afterwards that Jinnah distrusted entirely the Congress 'High Command.'

To some extent, it was hinted, that I might be a suitable person to deal with him, provided I had full authority to do so. It was suggested that there would be little difficulty if Subhas was in-charge of the matter.

I sent a brief reply to Saran pointing out, first of all, that when I was leaving Jinnah I had told him that I would gladly see him again if he wanted me to do so and sent me word. I told him how long I would remain in Delhi. No message, however, came to me from him. Our conversation had been of a general character and was complete in itself.

Further, I added that we have always been eager to discuss and settle our points of disagreement with the League. We are prepared to go far, but we can on no account give up our national and democratic basis or endanger the unity of India. Subject to that, we shall gladly discuss Minority demands and grievances. We could not proceed on the lines of India being two nations etc.

I suggested to Saran that he might inform Nawabzada accordingly in his own language.

So much for Saran's letter and my reply.

Regarding your letter of the 13th, both Maulana and I feel that it will be undesirable for us to treat Jinnah's letter as banging the door to compromise. This letter of Jinnah's was certainly a turning away from a friendly approach and it demonstrated

how his mind continues to work in a way hostile to the Congress. Still it is not meant to end anything.

Now I come to Sikandar Hayat's telephone message today. He said to Maulana that in the course of conversation between him (Sir Sikandar) and Gandhiji last summer in Bombay the difficulty of the Preamble had been got over and no longer presented an obstacle. This being so, Gandhiji might write to Sir Sikandar or Rajendra Babu might write to Mr. Jinnah saying that the Congress and the Muslim League should appoint representatives to discuss the actual matters in dispute. Further that he (Sir Sikandar) was prepared to go to Delhi during the next three or four days to settle details with Jinnah.

Maulana replied that he would consider the matter and get into touch with you. It was a short conversation.

Now it is not clear what Sir Sikandar means by saying that the question of the Preamble was satisfactorily solved last summer between him and Gandhiji and I fear that this has not been wholly disposed of. I do not want anything to be done under misapprehension. Apparently some phrase was used to the effect that the Muslim League was an important (*aham*) organisation. Of course, the League is an important organisation and there can be no objection to saying so. But I doubt if that is what Mr. Jinnah meant. I think this should be cleared up and I have suggested to Maulana to write to Sir Sikandar about it. Gandhiji might also be asked about that conversation of last summer.

At the same time, it is not desirable to delay matters when Sir Sikandar wants an immediate answer. I think, therefore, and Maulana agrees with me, that you should write to Sir Sikandar. You might refer to Sikandar Hyat's public invitation to the Congress and League to come together as well as his telephone message to Maulana, and say that the Congress has always been ready to do so, but unfortunately some obstacles have come in the way. As Sir Sikandar says that the difficulty of the Preamble has been got over; if this is so, you will gladly advise the Congress Executive to take further steps in the matter. If necessary representatives of the Congress and League can meet together. You might add that you do not yourself fully know to remember what the conversation was last summer between Sir Sikandar and Gandhiji but in any event if the difficulty about the Preamble no longer exists, as he suggests, then this need not come in the way and the real questions can be tackled straight away. You should like, however, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding which unfortunately has often occurred in the past and made progress difficult.

I think you might add, if I may say so, that you and your colleagues are anxious that at this moment of national and international crisis, we should all pull together for the good of India. You trust that the Muslim League will give its support to the demand put forward by the All India Congress Committee in regard to a clear declaration of war and peace aims by the British Government, and in particular recognition of India as an independent nation and the immediate implementing of this to the largest possible extent. Within the framework of this demand, it is up to us to settle our problems *inter se* and we should make every effort to do so. In the last A.I.C.C. resolution reference has specially been made to the recognition and full protection of Minority rights.

I do not know if I have expressed myself clearly. You will forgive me for suggesting to you what reply should be made to Sikandar Hyat. I have put it down for your consideration and you will, no doubt, do what you consider proper. It is obvious that some reply must be sent soon and that reply cannot be anything in the nature of shutting the door. I think it is better that you write to Sir Sikandar than to Mr. Jinnah at this stage as the suggestion has come from the former.

I am sending copies of this letter to Gandhiji and Vallabhbhai.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL

P.S. I have shown this letter to Maulana and he agrees with it. He now intends breaking journey at Patna tomorrow night to talk to me [you] further on the subject.

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1. Raghunandan Saran's letter is dated 17th October, 1939. Jawaharlal seems to have mixed-up the dates.

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The Viceroy's Statement [Extract]

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, p. 387

New Delhi, 17 October, 1939. 13. Be that as it may, His Majesty's Government recognise that when the time comes to resume consideration of the plan for the future Federal Government of India, and of the plan destined to give effect to the assurances given in Parliament by the late Secretary of State, to which I have just referred, it will be necessary to reconsider in the light of the then circumstances to what extent the details of the plan embodied in the Act of 1935 remain appropriate. And I am authorised now by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the war they will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests in India, and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Jinnah

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 359-60

LUCKNOW, 18 October 1939

My dear Jinnah,

Nandan has written to me about his meeting you yesterday and his conversation

with you. I am sorry that there was some misunderstanding which led you to think that I would get into touch with you again in Delhi, and made me think that you would ring me up. I was in fact looking forward to meeting you again and waiting for some message from you. It is true that this was in connection with the talks with the Viceroy. Our other conversation, though lengthy, had been general and I wanted to have another opportunity of coming to closer grips with the subject.

I shall gladly meet you again. If I had time now I would have come up to Delhi for the purpose, but I fear this is difficult as I have to go to Allahabad tomorrow and, after a few hours' stay there, to Wardha for the Congress Working Committee. You are also likely to be very busy during the next few days. The situation is likely to develop very rapidly after the Viceroy's statement and it is not easy to make plans for the future. But I shall make every effort to meet you either in Bombay or Delhi, whichever is convenient to you, after the Wardha meeting. If you go to Bombay soon, I can also go there from Wardha. Or I could go to Delhi.

I entirely agree with you that it is a tragedy that the Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way. I feel terribly distressed about it and ashamed of myself, in so far as I have not been able to contribute anything substantial towards its solution. I must confess to you that in this matter I have lost confidence in myself, though I am not usually given that way. But the last two or three years have had a powerful effect on me. My own mind moves on a different plane and most of my interests lie in other directions. And so, though I have given much thought to the problem and understand most of its implications, I feel as if I was an outsider and alien in spirit. Hence my hesitation.

But that does not come in the way of my trying my utmost to help to find a solution and I shall certainly try to do so. With your goodwill and commanding position in the Muslim League that should not be so difficult as people imagine. I can assure you with all earnestness that all the members of the Working Committee are keenly desirous of finding a solution. It is a matter of enormous surprise and regret to me that we have so far failed in this endeavour. For, after all, the actual matters in dispute should be, and indeed are, easily capable of adjustment.

I shall, therefore, try to meet you as early as possible after the Wardha meeting. Will you please let me know your programme? When we meet, I shall gladly discuss all the aspects of the question. But I suppose it will be better at a later stage for some representative of the League to meet Congress representatives.

At the present moment, as you will, no doubt, appreciate, my mind is full of the rapid developments that are taking place. I do not know where they will land us in the course of the next few weeks. The Viceroy's statement has been astonishing in its imperialist challenge to all of us.¹ As far as I can see there is no course open to the Congress except to reject his suggestions in their entirety, and this will necessarily have far-reaching consequences for us as well as others. I do not know what you and your colleagues in the Muslim League will decide, but I earnestly trust that you will also express your strong disapproval of the Viceroy's statement and refuse to cooperate with him on the lines he has suggested. I feel strongly that our dignity and self-respect as Indians have been insulted by the British Government. They take us for granted as hangers-on of their system, to be ordered about when and where they will.

I do not know if you read the National Herald of Lucknow. An article written by me appeared in it this morning and another will appear tomorrow morning. These articles give in restrained language my reactions to the Viceroy's statement. I am enclosing both.

I shall try to telephone to you tomorrow—Thursday the 19th October. My future programme is Allahabad 20th October, Wardha 21st and onwards.

May I say how happy I was to meet you in Delhi.

Yours very sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. In a statement issued on 17 October, 1939 the Viceroy stated that at the end of the War the British Government would be willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such Constitution and modifications as might seem desirable.

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Maulana Azad to Jinnah

Congress Leaders Correspondence, p. 3

LUCKNOW, 19 October, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

The thing which I had mentioned in my last letter need no reply now, as Mr. Nandan has written in detail to Jawaharlal about his meeting with you. Jawaharlal showed me the letters last night, and I advised him to be immediately in touch with you through 'phone' and also send you a detailed letter. He would have tried to meet you sooner, had not the Working Committee been fixed for the 22nd instant at Wardha. However, he will meet you soon after the meeting is over. It is better the matter should proceed according to it now.

The time is ripe, and it is necessary that it should be utilised fully.

Yours sincerely,
A.K. AZAD

MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH Esq.,
New Delhi



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*Nehru's article in the National Herald [Extract]**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 203-205*

What is the theme of Lord Zetland's speech, the main burden of his argument? The root cause of difficulty in India is the conflict between various communities which will not agree in spite of Britain's best endeavours. We know this conflict to our sorrow and cost. But what has been Britain's part in it, what is her part now? During these generations of British rule has she composed our differences or sought always to aggravate them? Every student of Indian history knows how this policy of divide and rule has been followed persistently, and how the seeds of conflict and division have been cunningly sown. As the popular movement has grown and nationalism has become a force, the communal problem has ever been intensified by British policy. Separate electorates were the creation of the British, and favour was shown to this group or that to wean it away from the rising tide of nationalism. The Round Table Conferences were significant examples of the art of meeting a national demand by side-tracking it in favour of communal demands. Invite people the known and the unknown, from all manner of odd groups, see to it that they are of the sort that cannot agree, and then proclaim to the world that Indians cannot agree among themselves.

This is the kind of Round Table Conference to which we are again invited, or rather to which we might be invited "if at the end of the upheaval caused by the war, when circumstances may well differ markedly from what they are today, there is a desire on the part of those concerned of modifications of particular features of the plan," then, in such circumstances, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes, etc. We can well imagine that at the end of the war circumstances will markedly differ from what they are today, perhaps more markedly than the Marquis of Zetland would approve of. But whatever these circumstances might be, we can assure him now with full confidence that we shall have no desire to be invited and that we do not want any "modifications of particular features of the plan," nor are we prepared for any consultations on the proposed basis, now or later. We shall have nothing to do with his Round Table Conference and he is welcome to invite whom he will to them. We recognise no right of the British Parliament or the British people to interfere with our affairs, and we speak to no one except in terms of the independence of India.

5. What was the Congress demand? The independence of India and the drawing up of India's Constitution through a Constituent Assembly freely elected by her people. There was no claim for the Congress or for any community or group. If we believe in democracy, that was the only way. The Minorities may legitimately ask for safeguards and protection. The Congress entirely agrees. Let us sit down and frame them. But that is no matter for the British Government or people. It is our concern.

6. Which Minority, which groups in India, can be or is opposed to this demand?

The Muslim League stands for independence, the brave Sikhs will have nothing else, and so with others. It is true that there are individuals, hangers-on of imperialism or the possessors of special rights created by British imperialism, who fear a change. Is India's progress to be measured by the capacity to walk of the halt or the lame? Are we to wait till we have converted the feudal Princes? That is what the Round Table Conference means. It is the spiritual home of all that has ceased to count in the world and India. But we who breathe the vital spirit of new India and draw sustenance from the awakened masses, what place have we in this assemblage of ghosts and shades?

7. Lord Zetland and his colleagues have conceived a new interpretation of democracy. Before anything is done, everyone must agree, or else the British Government will sit here comfortably and carry off the spoils. It is some such urge, we suppose, that induces them to wage this war.

We are told that some members of the Muslim League consider the Viceroy's statement as a political triumph for the League and a defeat for the Congress. It may be a defeat for the Congress, though we do not think so. We welcome it and are convinced that out of it good will come and the country will pull itself out of the quagmire in which it has got caught. The removal of a vain illusion is no defeat.

But we hesitate to think that any member of the Muslim League, whatever his communal views may be, can consider an insult to India and her people as a triumph for himself and his organisation. The Muslim League has sworn by the independence of India. Can they forget their pledge and take pride in alliance with imperialism?

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Ahmad Bashir¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 96/57-60

21 October, 1939

To,
M.A. JINNAH, Esquire,
President, All India Muslim League,
DELHI

Dear Sir,

Having regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League in Delhi, to discuss the Viceroy's announcement, I beg to present the viewpoint of Majlis-i-Kabir Pakistan, Lahore to the Committee for their valued support and sympathy.

The Viceroy's announcement is disappointing in the extreme. Judging it from the Muslim point of view it fails to abate their doubts and apprehensions regarding the bonafides of the British. Apart from the fact that it has bluntly refused the national demand of the Muslims regarding the recognition of their separate national status, it

has damped the zeal and enthusiasm of the martial races of Pakistan to the great disadvantage of the Government itself. In fact, the Government has weakened its cause by this declaration.

Mutual cooperation exists and flourishes on the principle of give and take. Any attempt to cooperate which disregards this principle is destined to be frustrated. But it trickles down from the announcement of the Viceroy that the British while inclined to "take in" seem averse to "give in." It appears that the Government yearning as it does, for the cooperation of the Muslims,—the most potent martial race, is determined to achieve that end by the mere use of phraseology and even by the adoption of coercive methods. What is the use of that cooperation which is not whole-hearted and spontaneous, we fail to understand.

Yet perhaps, the most important feature of the Viceroy's announcement is his great stress on India's unity. Throughout his statement he seems to be over-conscious of the fissiparous forces at work in India which have consequently made him so emphatic in urging on India's unity.

Nobody questions India's unity but how that unity can be achieved is a matter that deserves special attention of all the parties concerned. It is a matter most vital to both India and Britain, therefore, it must be given precedence to everything else. For, to talk of our goal without determining our course of action is not vouchsafed by practical politics. It is nothing more than groping in the dark, a sheer waste of time and dissipation of energies. It is time that we should cease talking in the air and come to tin-tacks.

His Excellency the Viceroy thinks that this unity can be achieved with the working of the Constitution as envisaged in Government of India Act, 1935. He hopes that the passage of time will harmonize the inconsistent elements in India. May be he holds this view with sincerity, but it is in flagrant disregard to the past history of the sub-continent as well as to the Islamic conception of society. The nationalities which notwithstanding thousand years of close contact, are as divergent as ever, can never be expected to transform into one nationality merely by being subject to the same Constitution. What the Unitary Government in India has failed to bring about cannot be achieved by the imposition of the Federal Government.

It is, however, satisfying to note that His Excellency the Viceroy and the Secretary of State along with the House of Lords are fully alive to the fundamental differences between the peoples of the Indian continent. Yet unfortunately, they are unwilling to recognize their separate national status. It is more than truism to say that the Hindus and Muslims represent two distinct nationalities. Therefore, any attempt to dissolve their present differences which disregards this vital fact is doomed to precipitate. Hindu-Muslim problem is not an inter-communal issue and will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is manifestly an international problem and, therefore, it must be treated as such. It will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any Constitution, be it in the form of Dominion Status or even "Complete Independence," which disregards this basic truth, while destructive for the Muslims cannot but be harmful to the British and Hindus.

If the British Government is really serious and sincere in bringing about peace in the sub-continent, it should not only appreciate the difference but also allow the two nationalities separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous homogeneous

States. These States shall not be antagonistic to each other, they on the other hand, will be friendly and sympathetic to one another; and by an international pact of mutual goodwill and assistance they can be just as united and harmonious as today are France and Great Britain. This is the one and the only way to India's Unity.

We are confident that it shall ensure eternal harmony, calm and friendliness between the Hindus and Muslims and materially accelerate the progress of the sub-continent.

If this method for the salvation of India's problems is not adopted the fate of the Muslims as a nation is sealed in India and no revolution of stars and no rotation of the earth would resuscitate them.

We are sure the case of Pakistan will meet justice at the hands of the members of the Working Committee in Delhi and we sincerely hope the committee will lend a helping hand to Pakistan.

I remain,

Yours very faithfully,
(Sd/-) (AHMAD BASHIR)
Secretary
Beadon Road,
Lahore

-
1. Ahmad Bashir; Secretary, Majlis-i-Kabir Pakistan, Lahore.

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Rajendra Prasad to Linlithgow

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 126-27

CAMP: WARDHA, 23 October, 1939

Your Excellency,

I beg to forward copy of resolution passed by the Working Committee. I regret that the Committee had to pass the resolution it did. After giving the fullest consideration to the announcement the Committee felt it could not do otherwise.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD
His Excellency the Viceroy
New Delhi

Enclosure:

(Resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee at its meeting held at Wardha on 22 October, 1939)

The Working Committee are of opinion that the Viceregal statement in answer to the Committee's invitation for a clear declaration of Britain's war aims, particularly in their application to India, is

wholly unsatisfactory and calculated to rouse resentment among all those who are anxious to gain and are intent upon gaining India's independence. This invitation was made not only on behalf of the people of India, but for millions of people all over the world, who were weary of war and violence, and Fascist and Imperialist systems which exploited nations and peoples and were ultimately the causes of war, and who yearned for a new order of peace and freedom. The Viceregal statement is an unequivocal reiteration of the old Imperialistic policy. The Committee regard the mention of the differences among several parties as a screen to hide the true intention of Great Britain. What the Committee had asked for was a declaration of war aims as a test of Britain's bonafides regarding India irrespective of the attitude of opposing parties or groups. The Congress has always stood for the amplest guarantee of the rights of Minorities. The freedom the Congress claimed was not for the Congress or any particular group or community, but for the nation and for all communities in India that go to build that nation. The only way to establish this freedom, and to ascertain the will of the nation as a whole, is through the democratic process which gives full opportunity to all. The Committee must, therefore, regard the Viceroy's statement as in every way unfortunate. In the circumstances the Committee cannot possibly give any support to Great Britain for it would amount to an endorsement of the Imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end. As a first step in this direction the Committee call upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations.

The Committee earnestly appeal to the nation to end all internal controversies in this hour of grave crisis and to act unitedly in the cause of India's freedom. They call upon all Congress Committees and Congressmen generally to be prepared for all developments and eventualities, and to show restraint of word and deed, so that nothing may be said or done which is not in keeping with India's honour or the principles for which the Congress stands. The Committee warn Congressmen against any hasty action in the shape of civil disobedience, political strikes and the like. The Committee will watch the situation and the activities of the British Government in India and will not hesitate to guide the country to take further steps whenever the necessity for this arises. The Committee desire to impress upon all Congressmen that a programme of resistance commensurate with the magnitude of the issue before the country requires perfect discipline within Congress ranks and the consolidation of Congress organisation.

The Working Committee realise that the non-violent resistance offered by the Congress in the past has sometimes been mixed with violence. The Committee desire to impress upon all Congressmen that any resistance that may have to be offered must be purged of all violence, and to remind them of the pledge taken to this effect as early as 1921 during the Congress session at Ahmedabad and repeated on many subsequent occasions.

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Raza Ali¹ to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 776/72

TELEGRAM, 22 October, 1939

To,
JINNAH
Hardinge Avenue
New Delhi

Suggest Forcible Repudiation Gandhi's Arrogant Extremely Dangerous Claim About Congress Right to Represent All Communities This is Fascism—Raza Ali.

1. Sir Syed Raza Ali (1882-1949); Khilafatist and Swarajist joined Muslim League and presided over its Bombay Session, 1924; Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1912, 1916, 1920; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1938.

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Resolution passed at the Emergency Meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League held at New Delhi on the 22nd of October 1939, under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah

The War Problems of India's Future Constitution, pp. 12-14

Resolution No. 1

After careful examination of the statement of His Excellency the Viceroy dated the 17th October 1939, the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League appreciate that His Majesty's Government have emphatically repudiated the unfounded claim of the Congress that they alone represent All India, and note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government recognise the fact that the All India Muslim League alone truly represents the Musalmans of India and can speak on their behalf; also that the rights and interests of the Minorities and other important interests concerned have been duly recognised.

The Committee, however, feel constrained to state that the points of vital importance raised by the Muslim League in their statement dated September 18, 1939, are not precisely and categorically met. The Committee, therefore, venture to suggest that in order to secure cooperation on equal footing as desired by His Excellency further clarification and discussion of those matters that are left in doubt and have not been met satisfactorily are necessary, with a view to arrive at a complete understanding, which alone would enable the Muslim League to cooperate in the matter which concerns not only the Musalmans of India but the country at large.

The Committee cannot wholly accept the narration of facts culminating in the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, as given in the statement of His Excellency but do not think it is necessary to enter into a controversy regarding those inaccuracies, historic and otherwise. The opposition of the Muslim League is not merely to the "details" of the plans embodied in the Act of 1935 and the reconsideration thereof, but their demand is that the entire problem of India's future Constitution should be wholly examined and revised '*de novo*.' The Committee reiterate emphatically that no future plan of India's Constitution will be acceptable to the Muslim League unless it meets with their full approval.

The Committee also considered the proposal of His Excellency the Viceroy for the establishment of a "consultative group," but cannot at present express any opinion with regard to it until its status, Constitution, powers, scope and function are fully known but welcome further consultation regarding this matter as proposed by His Excellency in his statement.

In view of the urgency of the matter the committee hereby authorise the President to take such steps as he may consider proper to have the doubts removed and secure complete clarification of His Excellency's statement and if the President is fully satisfied the Committee empower him to give assurance of cooperation and support on behalf of the Musalmans of India to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the war.

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*Zetland to War Cabinet**War Cabinet Papers, No. 13, pp. 29-38*

23 October, 1939

SECRET

W.P.(G) (39) 53.

War Cabinet

India and the War

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India [Extract]

I now turn to the other horn of our dilemma; namely, the alternative of going a great deal further towards meeting the claims of the Congress than we have hitherto contemplated. We have actually offered them immediate cooperation in the conduct of the war by means of a broadly based consultative body representative of the various political parties and communities and we have said that at the end of the war we will be willing to consider in consultation with them any modifications of particular features of the Federal plan embodied in the Act of 1935 that may seem desirable. These offers have been rejected as worthless and in their place the demand is for an immediate and effective share in the Central Government and a promise of freedom to devise their own Constitution without external interference at the end of the war.

If it is thought that we must at all costs endeavour to avoid a serious break with the Congress, the question for decision becomes this: How far could we contemplate going in the above directions? A scheme for bringing the political leaders into the Central Government without any necessity for an amendment of the Constitution Act has been submitted to the Viceroy and myself for our consideration by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the Muslim Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Briefly, the scheme proposes that the Executive Council should be enlarged and should consist of nine members, of whom three should be persons with ten years' service under the Crown in India, thus fulfilling the statutory requirement. Of these three, one should replace the Commander-in-Chief as Civilian Member in-charge of Defence, and the other two should hold the portfolios of Home Affairs and Finance. Of the remaining six vacancies, three should be filled by the Governor-General from a panel of nine names to be submitted by the Congress and the allied Hindu parties; one from a

panel of three to be submitted by the All India Muslim League, and two by the Governor-General in his discretion, one of whom the author contemplates would be a Muslim and one a representative of one of the other Minorities or a non-Congress Hindu. Sir Zafrullah Khan makes two postulates: (1) that the political members of the new Executive Council should undertake not to press differences in Council to the point of resignation; (2) that they would guarantee the support of their followers in the Legislature for any action which they took as members of the Government. I should myself doubt very much whether these undertakings would be given, or, if they were, whether they would stand the test of experience. What the Congress really desire is control of Defence and of Finance and it is easy to imagine the sort of controversies which would arise within a Government so constituted over questions of this kind.

So far as the future Constitution is concerned, the demand of the Congress has now been defined by Mr. Gandhi in the following words:

"What Congress wants is the clearest possible acceptance of the fact that India is to be treated as an independent nation. What Congress wants is easy enough to give, if the will is there. It is for a Constituent Assembly to decide whether India is ready for Dominion Status or not. Congress will safeguard the rights of every Minority so long as they do not advance claims inconsistent with India's independence." He added that he missed the will to accept these things in the statement issued by the Viceroy. If we are to assume that this is the last word which Congress has to say, there can be no room for compromise, and I am, therefore, reluctantly driven to the conclusion that we have no option but to take up the challenge which has been issued by the Congress and to take over the Government in the eight Provinces in which Congress Ministries are at present functioning, with the inevitable corollary that should attempts be made, whether by the Congress or by any other party to frustrate by speech or act the war efforts of the Government of India and the Governors and the orderly Government of the country, those attempts will be suppressed, if necessary by the use of force.

The attitude of the Muslims is not yet clear; but it seems likely that they will give us general support.

India Office
S.W.I.

23 October, 1939

Enclosure:

Linlithgow to the War Cabinet

TELEGRAM, 22 October, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I understand that both Working Committees of Congress and Muslim League meet today, Sunday, 22nd. As regards the former, there are pretty definite indications that they may contemplate an immediate [illegible] though I have nothing positive to go on. As regards the latter, Sikandar, this morning, reported confidentially that Jinnah had certain points on which he was anxious to be reassured. These appear to be principally (a) that the phrase "Details of the plan" in paragraph 11 of the statement does not qualify phrase "scheme of the Act" in paragraph 12. In other words, if it

should be made clear that these paragraphs should be read together and that what His Majesty's Government contemplate is that the scheme of the Act will be open to modification at the end of the war in the light of Indian views. (b) That it should be stated, still more specifically than in the statement, that our intention is that the interests of Minorities will be fully safeguarded in any constitutional modification that may take place and that Minorities will be fully consulted in connection with any change and that no change should be made save with the agreement of the parties.

2. I have already put the first of these points to you in my private and personal telegram 2307-S of October 17th. I am sure it is of indispensable importance to clear it, and the debate is the obvious place. As regards the second, I suspect that what Jinnah would really like is a frank acceptance of the principle that any Minority is to be entitled to hold up progress completely. An assurance in that crude form is clearly out of the question. But I would see advantage in drawing pointed attention in the debate to the assurances to Minorities contained in the Statement that full weight would be given to their views and their interests in any modification that may be contemplated and to the fact that the essential thing is agreement between Indians themselves and that His Majesty's Government are anxious now, as in the past, to do anything possible to assist in achieving that agreement which must be pre-condition of constitutional progress.

3. I think further that it would be worth emphasising in the debate: firstly, that we are already formally committed to Dominion Status and that we had again reasserted that as our objective; secondly, that its attainment must depend on the amount of agreement and confidence between the various Indian parties; thirdly, that we have made it clear that the scheme of political advance will be reconsidered after the war with a view to the attainment of our objective; fourthly, it is no good lurking the difficulties. It might well be desirable to bring these latter out in some detail.

4. I do not at all now feel optimistic as to the development of the position. I think that there is a good chance of maintaining normal Government in Assam, possibly the North-West Frontier Province (Sikandar is alive to the importance of this) and Sind, as well as in the Punjab and Bengal. I see little prospect of avoiding a Section 93 situation possibly in the immediate future in the remaining six Provinces. I am clear that, as I have indicated to you on various occasions in the past, if there is a Section 93 situation, it must be very resolutely handled from the start. That the Congress Governments will quit office with great reluctance, I have no doubt. But the demand with which we are now confronted by Congress is one of fundamental importance which could not in my judgement have been avoided by any adjustments of machinery at the Centre or the like. Declaration of freedom or independence raises widest issues in relation to connection between India and Great Britain, and now that demand has been made, no tinkering with constitutional structure, e.g. by expanding my Council or the like would, I feel certain, have met the case. You are fully aware on the other hand of intensity of communal feeling, the claims of Minorities from Muslims downward and the complication presented by the existence of the Indian States. The Princes and Minorities alike will, of course, pay lip service to freedom and independence as ideals and I shall not be in the least surprised if the Muslim League stress this by way of asserting their patriotism in any manifesto they may issue. But it is, I am certain, essential to safeguard their interests and the type of

safeguards which both Muslims and Princes want is quite incompatible with any relinquishment of our control or our interest in the country. It is relevant too that the implications of "freedom" in terms of Great Britain's continued active participation in the Defence of India, do not appear to have been faced from parliamentary point of view. Its implications in regard to commercial discrimination and the safeguarding of India's financial liabilities and of British capital already sunk here are obvious, though I recognise the tactical objections to any undue stressing of those issues in the debate.

5. It would be unwise for us to under-estimate the probability of trouble of a widespread and serious nature in the Provinces in which a Section 93 situation arises, and I have not failed to make clear in my past telegrams how anxious I have been on all grounds to avoid departing from the normal conditions of Government. But pressure looks like being too strong for us, and if it is, I feel certain that I can look for fullest support from you and from the Cabinet in whatever measures may be necessary to hold a situation which we all of us would gladly have avoided, but which we are left with no choice but to accept.

6. The publicity aspect of a break is of course of importance. Is there any further material which you would like from me in connection with it? I take it that consideration has already been given to reactions in America, and trust you will be able to assist me there. It is of value that in Lothian we have someone as Ambassador with full Indian background.

7. I propose, if you agree, to let the Governors know that in the event of a break they can look for the fullest support from you and from me. I have had the situation under the closest review with them, and I think that we are prepared. In the event of a break there will be a great deal to be said for picking up at once the real bad characters of the type of professional revolutionary agitator, but for distinguishing so far as possible and for as long as possible between them and genuine and more conservative Congress leaders and supporters. But I fear that leaders may feel bound to put themselves within the penalty of the law without much delay.

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Zetland's Memorandum to the War Cabinet

War Cabinet Papers, No. 793, pp. 40-47

24 October, 1939

SECRET

W.P. (G) (39) (54).

War Cabinet

India and the War

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.

In continuation of paper W.P. (G) (39) 53, I circulate for the information of the War Cabinet a further telegram just received from the Viceroy.

INDIA OFFICE, 24 October, 1939

Telegram from Viceroy dated 24 October, 1939 [Extract] 2385-S

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Your private and personal telegram 793, 23 October.

4. I have, as you may well imagine, been pondering the whole position with great care in the light of my own heavy responsibility. The Muslim League, the Liberals, and Congress have now of course all taken position, and you will have seen their manifestoes. The Muslim League's, despite the qualifications included in it, makes it clear at any rate that a very substantial body of opinion is prepared to co-operate with us and distinctly emphasises again that the differences which stand in the way of progress are not of our making, but are due to feeling between the two communities. Nevertheless I think we should be unwise necessarily to assume that the present Muslim attitude will long persist. Their platform is essentially anti-national and anti-democratic, and I feel sure their younger leaders will soon grow restive about a policy so utterly sterile. I, therefore, do not regard Muslim support as something upon which, by itself, we can safely afford to build any long-term policy. It would be much easier to deal with the position that confronts us had the Congress claims not been pitched so high. In considering any possible bridge or compromise one has at the moment to give full weight to the risk that it may be met by a reiteration of the demand for a guarantee of freedom or independence either at the end of the war or immediately such as we cannot, as I see it, give.

5. That danger is a serious obstacle to progress; but I have, I need not say, considered all possible alternatives to a complete break with Congress and resignations of Ministries, the arguments for and against which are familiar to us and need not be repeated here. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 1 to 3 I do not regard the suggestion in your telegram 793¹ as a hopeful line of advance. The Course which seems to me to offer the best prospect of our regaining the initiative in constructive policy is that, once the Commons debate is over, I should send for Jinnah with Sikandar, and Gandhi with Rajendra Prasad and point out to the four of them that these two resolutions passed by their constituents now stand side by side; and that they constitute as they stand a full justification of my refusal to disregard Minorities and their claims, and my emphasis on the essential necessity of agreement between parties and interests as a condition of progress. I might go on to say that it seemed to me that in these circumstances all three of us—Congress, Muslims, His Majesty's Government—ran some risk of embarking on a sterile phase which would not be to advantage hereafter and which could only result in leaving them, so far as constitutional progress was concerned at the end of the war probably very much at the point which they had now reached; that before His Majesty's Government made up their minds to accept such a position I felt bound to ask my visitors whether they would not try among themselves to come to some working arrangement in respect of the provincial field; with a view, having achieved a working basis between themselves in respect of the Provinces, to enabling them to give me an indication of what they would together regard as a reasonable scheme for the Centre in respect of the war period, in which

event I should be prepared on behalf of, and in consultation with, His Majesty's Government to examine any such proposals in the most helpful and constructive spirit.

6. Having put it to them in this way, if in fact they were able to come to some arrangement about the Provinces and could put up a workable scheme for the Centre, I would endeavour to bring that scheme within the general ambit of Zafrullah Khan's plan, in particular avoiding a Congress majority, though I think one might very well have to go one further than Zafrullah Khan and contemplate the Defence Portfolio being held by an Indian (not necessarily a member of Congress or the Muslim League—I am thinking of Zafrullah Khan himself as a good choice).

7. I am very conscious of the risks involved, though I suspect that they might prove to be more formidable in appearance than in substance; of the danger that we might prove to have put forward, and had rejected, a further compromise; and if the possible unsettling effect on Muslims and Princes of a further unsuccessful effort to secure Congress support. Nor do I overlook that in such circumstances Congress and Muslims might combine to present us with quite unacceptable demands, and leave us with the odium of rejecting them. But I think we are bound to test every suggestion at this stage, in the interest of leaving ourselves completely clear so far as the public at home and overseas is concerned (United States of America opinion in particular), as well as in the interests of forwarding early and effective prosecution of the war and of securing if possible the full mobilization of India's effort in connection with it. Apart from that so far as changes at the Centre are concerned, while I am of course fully alive to the difficulties involved, which I have frequently emphasised, if the impasse which confronts us could be resolved in no other way than by some adaptation of Zafrullah Khan's scheme, I should say that we ought not to shrink from a situation now which in practice may well prove not to be more dangerous than that which was contemplated in connection with Part II of the Act. The difficulty to which I myself attach most weight is the risk I have already mentioned that Congress might decline to play on anything of the order I now describe without a guarantee of independence, etc., though if they were to decide to run out on that ground only, I think we should be in a pretty strong position from the publicity point of view.

1. Not included.

CABLE, 25 October, 1939

All Congress circle consider that the only course is a complete rejection of the

Viceroy's proposals. Gandhi's condemnation is particularly drastic. Other groups have also condemned it except for some unimportant individuals. Muslim League attitude is uncertain but younger Leaguers are in favour of rejection. Conflict seems inevitable and is apparently desired by the Government of India. No common ground is left after the Viceroy's statement and Zetland's speech. I am going to Wardha.

JAWAHARLAL

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Jinnah's Statement made to the "Manchester Guardian"

The Nation's Voice, pp. 399-400

NEW DELHI, 26 October, 1939

I am obliged to the *Manchester Guardian* for the courtesy shown to me in giving me an opportunity to place my views briefly before the British public. It is difficult to make an average Englishman understand fully the position which is facing us Muslims today. But I shall mention a few salient points which will give some idea of the difficulties that are confronting us.

The Muslims have always had their fears and apprehensions of even a representative form of Government and far more of democracy in its strict application to India. Since the time of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 and the historical Lucknow Pact between Hindus and Muslims in 1916, their insistence on separate electorates, weightage and statutory safeguards have been a clear indication of those fears. But since the inauguration of the New Provincial constitutions, it has been established beyond doubt, particularly by the way in which the Congress High Command has pursued its policies and programmes, that the sole aim and object of the Congress is to annihilate every other organization in the country, and to set itself up as a Fascist and authoritarian organization of the worst type.

Having regard to the 35 millions of voters, the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate and untutored, living in centuries-old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other, culturally and socially, the working of this Constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary Government in India. It has definitely resulted in a permanent communal majority Government ruling over Minorities, exercising its powers and functions and utilizing the machinery of Government to establish the domination and supremacy of the majority communal rule over the Minorities.

Therefore, in my judgement, apart from other reasons into which I need not go in detail, democracy can only mean *Hindu Raj* all over India. This is a position to which Muslim will never submit. Besides there are 60 million untouchables and other Minorities such as six million Christians, Jews, Parsis and the Domiciled British. Therefore, the Muslim League, after very careful consideration, has come to the

conclusion that the entire problem of India's future Constitution must be considered *de novo*; and that no declaration or commitment should be made by His Majesty's Government without the approval and consent of the Muslim League which is the only authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India.

The British public may be misled by certain propaganda that the Muslims are against the freedom of India. We want freedom and liberty, but the question is whose freedom and liberty? Muslim India wants to be free and enjoy liberty to the fullest extent and develop its own political, economic, social and cultural institutions according to its own genius, and not to be dominated and crushed, while wishing Hindu India well and giving it fullest scope to do likewise.

I know that the Englishman who has developed in his own country a system of parliamentary Government cannot think of anything else but what has worked and been developed through centuries as the only pattern for every other country in the world. But he must dismiss from his mind the experiments tried in Canada and Australia, where after all the foundations of Government are suited to the genius of the people, mainly British in stock.

It is very doubtful as to how it will work in South Africa where there are two powerful rival communities like the Boers and the British, and even here the differences between them are not so fundamental as between Hindus and Muslims. Even Ireland, after decades of union, did not submit to the British Parliament in spite of the close affinity with the English and the Scotch. I may refer to Lord Morley's dictum that the fur coat of Canada would not do for the extremely tropical climate of India.

The Congress insistence that they, and they alone, represent the peoples of India is not only without any foundation, but is highly detrimental to the progress and advancement of India. They know that they do not represent the whole of India—not even all the Hindus, and certainly not the Muslims, who are often wrongly described as a Minority in the ordinary sense as understood in the West. They are in a majority in the North-West and in Bengal all along the corridor stretching from Karachi to Calcutta. That part of the Indian Continent alone has double the population of Great Britain and is more than 10 times in area. Until the Congress come down to earth and face realities, they will be wholly responsible for blocking the progress of India, and unless they give up the Fascist and authoritarian basis of their policy and programme which they are vigorously following, there cannot be any peace in India.

(Mr. Jinnah was next asked for his views regarding certain schemes put forward by Muslim League leaders like Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and his proposal for Coalition Ministries in the Provinces, representing the Congress and the Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah said): There are many proposals and schemes and importance is attached to these schemes, particularly to the one suggested by Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan in view of the position he holds in the League and as the Premier of the Punjab. Although his proposals may create an impression that they have emanated indirectly from the Muslim League, I want to make it clear that the League is not responsible for any of them directly or indirectly. As a matter of fact, we have appointed a sub-committee to examine the whole question thoroughly and when this sub-committee has made its report it will be examined by the Working Committee of the League in order to take such steps as it may think proper. Until that stage has been reached, the Muslim

League feels in no way bound by any schemes or proposals that are propounded by various people.

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"The Sind Observer"

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 269-72

KARACHI, 28 October, 1939

The world is not going to be deceived by making too much of the Minorities problem in India either by the Viceroy or the Secretary of State Sir Samuel Hoare.¹ The Minorities are only stalking-horse to deprive the whole country of its birthright of 'Swaraj' and to entrench British vested interests in the name of these Minorities. Great Britain has an enormous financial stake in this country. One in four persons in Great Britain is supported from income derived from India. Anything which interferes with this systematic exploitation is a blow struck on the belly of the British people. The latter, therefore, feel that Dominion Status and fiscal independence for India means starvation at home.

After the War: Great Britain is spending untold millions on this war and is arming millions of people for the defence of its islands and the preservation of its empire. After the war is over there will be an enormous piling up of the national debt, unconscionable burdens of taxation, more widespread unemployment after demobilisation takes place, restricted markets for British trade on account of worldwide competition from industrially well organised countries like the United States of America, Germany, Japan, Italy and even India. It means a steep fall in the national income and a heavy rise in the taxation burdens of the people with the consequent social unrest.

Empire: A Living Reality: After the war to millions of young Britishers the empire is not merely a splash of colour separated by the seven seas. Having died and bled for this empire, it is to them a living reality. They cannot, therefore, easily allow the non-White and the non-self-governing portions of this empire to be free and independent because they will thereby lose extensive fields of exploitation. To say that after the war the British nation will be in a more liberal mood to consider the claims of India for Self-Government is wide off the mark. On the contrary, the reverse will be the case in as much as a hungry lion will be reluctant to leave its ancient forests or diminish in anyway its control and authority over the same.

Congress and Communal Award: It may be recalled that the Congress was not party either to the Communal Award or to the Hoarean reforms of which the award was a part. The Communal Award completely satisfied the Minorities on account of which not only did they get communal electorates but also heavy weightages. The European and the Muslim communities were the most favoured. There were as many as fifteen different kinds of electorates to divide the country into so many warring

sections. Everything was done by Sir Samuel Hoare and his friends under the Communal Award to convert this country into an electoral bear-garden, make a mockery of democracy, pronounce it a failure in India, and thereby strengthen their hold on this country economically, politically and financially by setting up one community against another.

Hoare and Rules of the Game: What happened? The stage was set by Sir Samuel Hoare. The rules of the game were drawn up by him. The elections of 1937 came off. The Congress had to fight within the framework of the Constitution laid down by Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Linlithgow. In six Provinces the Congress secured undoubted majorities and two more Provinces were added to it afterwards. In Sind, the Punjab and Bengal there are Coalition Governments, not Muslim League Governments. And the Muslim League can nowhere carry on with a *pucca* majority of its own like the Congress in the eight Provinces. It was a thundering success for the Congress when millions of voters went to the polls to support it as the defender and the saviour of this country. We say again that all this had happened under the rules of the game prescribed by Sir Samuel Hoare, although he was not himself a sportsman for whom anybody should have any respect.

Muslims—A Majority and Minority: Now with regard to the Minorities about whom the British politicians are again making much ploy. The Musalmans are seventy million in this country. They are in a majority as a religious community in at least four Provinces out of eleven. Seventy millions of people, as many as the Germans, with a majority in four Provinces and effective representation in the Central Government and the defence forces, cannot be said to be in a hopeless and despondent condition to require the support of the British Government. These people have large power to assert themselves even under the present Constitution. As they are a majority as well as minority, all those things that can be made applicable to hopeless Minorities are not applicable to the Indian Musalmans.

Joint Electorates and Minorities: If we grant for a moment that the Muslim League has made itself powerless in the Congress Provinces the fault is the League's and not of the Congress. And there are many non-League Musalmans in the Congress Ministries and the Congress organisations working whole-heartedly with them.

In some of our previous articles we have pointed out how necessary it is for (the) Minorities to demand joint electorates for their very protection whether in Sind or in Madras. Minority representatives returned through communal electorates become an isolated depressed class exerting no influence on the course of the Government because they have condemned themselves to that unfortunate position by thinking that communal electorates will be a blessing to them. Experience has shown that contrary is the case. A Minority like the Musalmans ranging from four to fifteen per cent in the Congress Provinces can by their vote influence every election under joint electorates and thereby make all non-Muslim members responsible to themselves and to take care of their interests in the Legislature and the Government. Communal electorates are not only not a blessing to the Minorities but have become a curse.

Those who still stick to communal electorates are only playing the British game because the Britishers are such microscopical Minority in the country that they cannot exist without communal electorates with heavy weightages for themselves and in

demanding such for themselves they want the support of the other Minorities by promising them separate communal electorates in return.

The Europeans have received the heaviest possible weightages under the Hoarean Act; and they intrigued with Sir Samuel Hoare to give weightages also to minorities to buttress their claim for the same. The Britishers are thus trying to safeguard themselves in this country by creating, maintaining and accentuating communal differences by every means within their power.

British Government out of Count: On several occasions the British Government and the Viceroy made it clear that they would not put their hands to any communal settlement in future having had such a sad experience of the Communal Award of 1932. It is for Indians, they said, to modify or abandon the Communal Award by an agreed settlement among themselves. The Communal Award became also a part of the Constitution of 1935. The British Government washed its hands clean, never to reopen this communal question unless approached by the communities concerned to modify it in the light of their expressed wishes.

It does not, therefore, lie in the mouth of Sir Samuel Hoare or even the Viceroy now to talk of the Minorities. The Minorities question is settled by means of the Communal Award and it cannot be reopened by the British Government at the request of any Minority unless they first agree among themselves on any modifications of the award.

To say, therefore, that the Minorities question had not been settled by the British Government by means of the Communal Award and that it is still a live issue is to fly in the face of the statements made by the spokesmen of the British Government and the Viceroy. The Minorities are being dragged in again and are made much of only to defraud India of its legitimate right of immediate Self-Government at the Centre.

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1. Sir Samuel Hoare (1880-1959); was Secretary of State for India from 1931-35. What *the Sind Observer* obviously means is Lord Zetland who was Secretary of State for India from 1935-40.

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A.M.K. Delhvi's telegram to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 256/ pp. 29

29 October, 1939

The party is of the opinion that if Mr. M.A. Jinnah thinks that in the interest of Muslims to accept Ministry we gave him full power to decide provided he is satisfied that in future Constitution statutory provisions will be made safeguard Muslim Interest all against it.



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*Abdul Qaiyum Ansari¹ to Rajendra Prasad**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. 136*

MORADPORE, PATNA, 30 October, 1939

President.

Mr. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari

To

The President,

The Indian National Congress

Sir,

I, on behalf of the All India Momin Conference, beg to crave your indulgence to permit me to address you on a matter which very vitally affects several crore of Indian Muslims, who, for obvious reasons, form a distinct and separate group or class by themselves and are commonly known as "Momins" or "Ansars." Their number is about half that of the entire Muslims living in India. They are grouped in one single community and are spread all over the country. The chief occupation of this community has been the plying of hand-loom textile weaving industry which is still carried on by a very large section of the Momins in all the Provinces in India.

Since the decline of the Indian textile the Momins (Ahrar) community, which solely comprises of weavers, whose mainstay being, chiefly, the weaving industry, was thrown out of employment and, consequently, became poor and degraded in the eye of the society. Long before this, however, this community, along with other similar Muslim occupational classes in this country, had fallen into (illegible) of certain high-placed sections of the Indian Muslims who brand themselves as the superior creation of God basing their claim, presumably on the theory of nobility of birth.

You must be aware that Islam has abolished and banned for all time to come all Caste-distinctions and declared in unequivocal terms that all men are equal. There is in Islam, therefore, nothing like the caste-system or the doctrine of nobility of birth. However, it is a fact that in India certain powerful sections of the followers of that very Islam that preaches the doctrines of equality of man and brotherhood of all Muslims, owing to their utter selfishness and love of power and domination and for their own interests, cast the laws of Islam to forewinds and, though themselves in a minority, turned a vast majority of their co-religionists carrying on various occupations in this country into low and backward communities, having denied them all facilities of receiving education and shut out to them all the benefits and amenities of good social life. At that time, however, these occupational classes did not care much for these social humiliations and disabilities but kept themselves engaged in their various professional pursuits. The result of all this is that today out of the nine crore of Muslims in India over eight crore are socially fallen and degraded having been classified among the low castes. They have been systematically exploited by the upper class Muslims who had even been demanding and obtaining special privileges from the

Government of the day in behalf of these very eight crore low, poor and backward Muslims but have always usurped what they got to enjoy only themselves.

These upper Class Muslims have for all practical purposes, divided the Muslims of India into several castes and sections, presumably being influenced by the antiquated idea of supremacy and domination.

You will thus find that, in India, the followers of Islam are divided into two main groups, viz., "*SHAREEF*" (Superior or High) and "*RAZEEL*" (Inferior or Low). The Superior Group comprises of the Syed, the Moghal, the Pathan, and the Shaikh castes, while all the other castes or sections of the Muslims, such as Momin (otherwise called "Ansar" and contemptuously dubbed as "*Jolaba*") who are textile weavers; *Rayeen* (Kunjra), who grow and sell fruits and vegetables; Mansoori (Dhunia) who card raw cotton; *Idrisi* (Darzi), whose occupation is tailoring; *Hawari* (Dhobi) who carry on the profession of washermen; Quraishi (*Qasai or Qassab*), who slaughter animals and sells meat; *Salmani* or *Ibrahimi* (*Hajjam*), who are barbers by profession; and many score like classes, whose names I refrain from mentioning here, have been placed in the Inferior Group.

The members of the Momin (Ansar) community alone number about four and a half crores, forming almost half the population of the Muslim India, while the rest of the Muslim occupational classes taken together form over one-third of the total Muslim population in the country. The authenticity of these figures is, however, being doubted and disputed by the Superior-Group Muslims who, to prove that the population of the Momins and others is much smaller than what is given out here, cite in evidence the last census figures of the population of the Momins and other like classes; the figures shown in census records being much lower than what is mentioned above. Anyway, the fact is that the number of the Momins is never less than about four and half crores as stated above; but the reason for the low figures as shown in the Census is that, in order to escape the agonising humiliation and degradation of being counted and classified among the inferior or low castes, a vast number of the Momins and others got themselves recorded in the Census papers as 'Shaikhs,' that is, the fourth or the last class of the Superior Group Muslims, and in a few cases, even as 'Syed' or 'Pathan.' Yet another reason as to why a much lower figure than the actual number of the Momins has been mentioned in the Census Report is that only those among the Momins who were actually engaged in the textile-weaving trade at the time of the Census operations were entered as Momins or Ansar while those others who have taken to some other calling but who form almost a half of the entire Momin population were recorded as other than the Momins or Ansars. Thus, in fact, the Census figures itself are wrong and misleading and do not truly reflect the correct number of the Momins and other Muslim occupational classes.

These groupings or divisions, quite un-Islamic in origin and contrary to the express commandments of Islam though they are, still continue to exist with full vigour and, it seems, have come to stay. Anyway the result of this old schism among the Indian Muslims is the continued dominance of the Superior-Group, who alone are guilty of creating and still maintaining these un-Islamic classifications for their own wordly interests, being more educated and wealthy and having a considerable amount of influence due to the high position they occupy in the society as constituted at present,

have not only usurped and been enjoying the rights, privileges and shares of those Muslims who have unluckily been placed in the inferior-group but have also looked down upon the latter, accorded them a very low and contemptuous treatment and made all endeavours to keep them down in order to monopolise for themselves all positions of vantage. Suffice it to say that through the mischievous machinations of the upper-class Muslims the Momin (Ansar) and other Muslim occupational classes are generally debarred from employment in the Police and the Military Services; have been invariably mentioned and classified among the low castes in the records of the Government, such as the Census Reports, District Gazetteers and '*Wajib-ul-Arz*' (a *zamindari* paper maintained in the United Provinces); are always subjected by the *zamindars* to perform "*begar*" (forced labour) and made to pay toll-tax on each hand-loom in their possession, as in Bihar and the United Provinces; and are, last but not the least, not allowed to buy and possess land for agriculture, as in the Punjab. A number of books have as well been written and published to prove the inferiority of the Momins and other Muslim occupational classes as a whole. To crown all, several '*Ulama*' (divines) belonging to the Superior-Group Muslims have issued '*fatwas*' (religious injunctions) under their pious hands and seals to the effect that the Momins (Ansar) and other like Muslims are much inferior to and lower than the four 'higher castes' of the Muslims in status. As a consequence of all this it will be found that even an ordinary and harmless thing as intermarriage among Muslims which is permitted by Islam and is in vogue in other countries all over the world has been altogether banned in the Muslim India, and a Muslim belonging to the Inferior Group cannot aspire to contract a marriage among the Superior-Group Muslims. Instances of this kind can be multiplied.

In order, therefore, to guard against the numerous injustices, humiliations and indignities meted out to the Inferior-Group Muslims and also to safeguard their rights and privileges, almost every section of this group has each formed a separate organisation of its own.

The organisation of the Momin (Ansar) community is called "The All India Momin Conference" which was started in the year 1925. Since then its branches have been formed in almost every Province in India with numerous district and village organisations affiliated to the parent body. The aims and objects of the Momin Conference are to devise ways and means for the uplift and progress of the Momin (Ansar) community in all respects and to bring the Momins (Ansar) on one common platform to attain their political rights and claims so long usurped and entirely enjoyed by the Superior-Group Muslims.

It may here be mentioned for the sake of clarification that the Momin Conference is quite distinct and separate from the All India Muslim League in which body the Momins (Ansar) as a community have neither faith nor confidence because it (Muslim League) is run, controlled and manned chiefly by such Muslims as belong to the rich section or the Superior Group, whose interests are obviously antagonistic to those of the poorer section or the Inferior-Group Muslims. The Momins, who are poor, backward and down-trodden, can, naturally, have nothing to do with such a body as the Muslim League.

The Momin Conference has recently started a country-wide campaign for obtaining

its political objectives which are embodied in the now famous demands of the Momin community, popularly known as "*NUKAT-I-MOMIN*" or 'The Six Points' of the Momins. These demands, formulated over a year ago by my humble self, have since been enthusiastically and unanimously approved and adopted as its own by the Momin (Ansar) community throughout India. The Momin Movement, as this campaign is otherwise termed, has gained tremendous popularity and success in as much as it has completely aroused the entire Momin community and made it self-conscious.

The Six Points of the Momins demands are given hereunder: 1. One Minister, at least, of the Central (or Federal) Government and of each of the Provincial Governments be taken from the Momin community. 2. Fifty per cent of the seats in the Central (or Federal) Legislative Assembly and in each of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies and Councils reserved for the Muslims be allotted to and reserved for the members of the Momin community. 3. Seats in Local Self-Government and Civic Bodies be reserved for the members of the Momin community proportionate to their population in the area served by such body. 4. Appointments in Government and Semi-Government services be reserved for the Momins in proportion to their population. 5. Special facilities be provided by Government for imparting general as well as technical education to Momin boys and girls. 6. State-Protection and State-aid be provided for the hand-loom textile industry owned and carried on by the Momins.

It is urged by the All India Momin Conference that in view of the backwardness and poverty and the unfortunate and helpless situation of the Momin community as also in view of the community's importance with regard to its occupation as well as its number its demands as contained in the six points may be immediately conceded so that the Momin community, which is today crippled and disabled in many ways, may also have the scope to grow and rise along with other advanced communities inhabiting this land.

I may hereby mention for your information that so far as the Governments are concerned those of Bihar and the United Provinces have been good enough to recognise certain of the claims of the Momin community.

In Bihar, some facilities have been granted to the Momins in regard to their situation, general as well as technical, by providing special stipends and scholarships for them, while they are allowed to receive free education in colleges throughout the Province. The Bihar Government have also issued circulars directing their officers to give preference, while filling up vacancies, in services, to the candidates belonging to the Momin community; appointed Momins to be Members of Local Self-Government and Civic Bodies and provided funds for helping the cottage textile industry.

The United Provinces Government, too, have granted more or less similar facilities to the Momin (Ansar) community.

But, I venture to state, these small concessions do not at all satisfy the real and actual needs of the Momin community. Justice demands that all the claims and rights of the community should forthwith be recognised and conceded.

I may here respectfully point out that the Indian National Congress can extend ample help to the Momin community in its onward march of progress by accepting and conceding to the community its demands as contained in the 'six points of the Momins.' The Congress can have no objection to doing so, for it would mean to it

nothing more than meting out bare justice to the Momin community whose rights and claim have always been systematically denied to it and ignored.

I beg also to draw your pointed attention towards the sad condition of the other Muslim backward classes, who too are unfortunately, placed in the same circumstances as the Momin community. Those classes also fully deserve every sympathy, help and encouragement and I earnestly appeal to you to give a sympathetic and favourable consideration to their case too, so that their interests and rights as well may not be further jeopardised.

It is earnestly trusted that the demand of four and a half crore poor, backward, and down trodden people will receive the attention of the Indian National Congress and all the Congress Governments.

I beg to remain,

Yours truly,
(Sd/-) A. QAIYUM ANSARI

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1. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari (1905-1973); started the Momin movement in Bihar, President, Bihar Provincial Jamiat-ul-Momineen, 1938-47; Minister in Bihar, 1946-52, 1955-57 and 1962-67; President, Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, and Member, Congress Working Committee, 1959-63; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1970-72.

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Gandhiji's article

Harijan, 4-11-1939. Cited in the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. LXX, pp. 318-19

SEAGON, 30 October, 1939

Hindu-Muslim Unity means communal unity. No pact seems to be in front of us. Janab Jinnah Saheb looks to the British power to safeguard the Muslim rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or concede will satisfy him. For he can always, and naturally, from his own standpoint, ask for more than the British can give or guarantee. Therefore, there can be no limit to the Muslim League demands. So far as the Congress is concerned, it does not represent all Hindus or all of any single community except in the sense that the Congress represents all because all are believed to desire independence for the country and the Congress is without a rival in fighting for that goal. In fact the Congress is the only national army the country possesses. It is not the less but all the more an army for its being non-violent. It has been the unbroken tradition of the Congress to refuse to represent any but the national interest. It has certainly never represented the Hindus as such. That function is claimed by the Hindu Mahasabha just as that of solely representing Muslim interests is claimed by the Muslim League.

The only course left open to the Congress, therefore, is to state its own communal

policy for the guidance of Congressmen, no matter to which community they belong. The Congress should have no quarrel with the League for getting all it can through the British Power. An institution that is fighting that power will never put itself in the wrong by fighting the Muslims.

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Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad

Rajagopalachari Papers

43, BAZALULLAH ROAD, THYAGARAYANAGAR, MADRAS, 1 November, 1939

My dear Rajen Babu,

I was one of those who felt at a very early stage, perhaps even before other friends felt it, that we should grant separate electorates to Musalmans as they ask for it. This was rejected as wrong by colleagues, I now think rightly. I see that these separate electorates and all that follows from it, have produced an ever-increasing gulf between the two equally matched communities in India.

Again, I was perhaps the first, among our friends, to imagine that the grant of places in the Congress cabinets to Muslim League representatives might solve and remove the insensate opposition which we are facing and help national progress. I feel, however, on better consideration, that the remedy would be more dangerous than the disease.

Those who have had to deal intimately with administrative affairs can perhaps understand what I feel below better than others. If I feel is correct, it would be indeed a disastrous consequence of the situation that we have ourselves created if, in trying to get something in the clouds of futurity, we lose what we have already acquired for the nation and destroy what we have built towards progress, by agreeing to reconstitute Provincial Governments with representatives of the League even though the Congress has been returned by the electorate.

The Ministry should be related to the electorate and not to particular organisations. The people will gradually lose power and caucuses will take the place of democracy if we enter into an agreement of the kind that may be suggested by cabinet fully, because he will not be independent, but will be controlled by the League leaders and will always dictate terms. We shall ever be in a mess over all important issues. Individual cases will always go up in appeal privately to the League leaders and the Muslim member will dictate in every such case. There can be no joint responsibility and, therefore, no power; and no proper convention can be developed. I have just indicated probable administrative developments. The rest can be imagined.

If we have raised an issue in connection with the war and if we solve it by agreeing to such a term as I have above deprecated, the result will be indeed no real gain but all loss. Jinnah will thrive on this success and bullying will have scored a victory and be more greedy for it. We will not have achieved at the Centre what we

would not otherwise have achieved, but we shall have given away what we otherwise have gained and will gain in the Provinces in all probability in a few more years, namely, complete responsibility without any interference on the part of the Secretary of State. If only we are firm and wait for another election, the Muslim community and their provincial leaders, will see that their present programme of isolation is barren, and that they must fall in line with the Congress in order to get a modicum of power. Their intelligentsia will surely join the Congress in greater numbers and get to exercise power along with Congress. An impatient desire at this stage to solve the problem would lead to a complete abandonment of the prospects of joint responsibility and development of strength as against the British element. Trying to get over the divide-and-rule policy at the Centre by a mechanical agreement and paying this price for it, we shall, I fear, establish for all time a divide-and-rule policy in all the eleven Provinces.

Yours affectionately,
RAJAGOPALACHARI

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Linlithgow to Jinnah

Parliamentary Papers, CMD 6235, pp. 6-8

CMD 6235, 2 November, 1939

You will remember that I agreed during our conversation yesterday to let you have in concrete form the proposition which I put to you and the other gentlemen who were present at the meeting,¹ emphasising that I did so with a genuine desire to help, a desire fully shared by His Majesty's Government.

2. The proposition which I invited you and the other gentlemen present to consider, as leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, was that, given the great importance of ensuring harmonious working at the Centre, you should enter upon discussions between yourselves with a view to discovering whether you could reach a basis of agreement between yourselves in the provincial field, consequent on which you could let me have proposals which would result in representatives of your two organisations immediately participating in the Central Government as members of my Executive Council. I brought out too, that in my judgment it ought not to be necessary absolutely to resolve every detail of such differences as may exist in the Provinces. What was required, as was remarked in the course of discussion, was a degree of agreement in respect of the Provinces to make it possible for my visitors, and the organisations which they represented, to put forward a scheme which could be considered for the Centre.

3. I added in regard to any arrangement at the Centre—first, that one would hope that it might be found practicable to include also one or possibly more representatives of other important groups, and that that was a question on which I should value your advice when we came to grapple with details: secondly, that

the arrangement which I invited you to consider for the Centre would be *ad hoc* arrangement for the period of the war, and quite distinct from the much wider question of constitutional reform at the end of the war; and I mentioned that on the last point my declaration had set out the position of His Majesty's Government. I attach a copy of extracts from that declaration which I brought to the notice of the meeting yesterday; thirdly, that the position of anyone appointed to my Executive Council as a member of a political party would be identical in privilege and in obligation with that of existing members of my Council; and fourthly that the arrangement would be within the general scheme of the existing law. It would be admittedly and inevitably a makeshift arrangement for the duration of the campaign. I brought out that what was required now, if we could get a workable scheme together, was to put it into operation with as little delay as possible, pending the more general review of the whole constitutional position which His Majesty's Government have expressed their readiness to undertake after the conclusion of hostilities.

4. I think the above makes the position clear. Let me in conclusion repeat that, as I said yesterday, I am at any time at your disposal or that of the other gentlemen who attended our meeting, whether jointly or singly, to give any assistance in my power in reaching conclusions on these most important matters. I feel certain, as I said yesterday, that the suggestions I have put to you, reflecting as they do very real and substantial evidence of the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to reach a complete understanding, will receive full and sympathetic consideration from you.

5. I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Gandhi and Dr. Rajendra Prasad.

Enclosure

(Extracts from Statement issued by the Governor-General on 17 October, 1939)

His Majesty's Government recognise that when the time comes to resume consideration of the plan for the future Federal Government of India, and of the plan destined to give effect to the assurances given in Parliament by the late Secretary of State, it will be necessary to reconsider in the light of the then circumstances to what extent the details of the plan embodied in the Act of 1935 remain appropriate. And I am authorised now by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the war they will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable.

I have, I trust, in what I have just said, made clear that the intention and anxiety of His Majesty's Government is, as stated in the Instrument of Instructions to the Governor-General, to further the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within the Empire to the end that India may attain her due place amongst the great Dominions. The scheme of Government embodied in the Act of 1935 was designed as an essential stage in that process. But I have made clear in what I have just said that His Majesty's Government will, at the end of the war, be prepared to regard the scheme of the Act as open to modification in the light of Indian views; and I would

make it clear, too, that it will be their object, as at all times in the past it has been, to spare no pains to further agreement by any means in their power in the hope of contributing to the ordered and harmonious progress of India towards her goal.

I remarked finally, speaking of the demands of Minorities for an assurance that full weight would be given to their views and interests, "It is unthinkable that we should now proceed to plan afresh, or to modify in any respect, any important part of India's future Constitution without again taking counsel with those who have in the recent past been so closely associated in a like task with His Majesty's Government and with Parliament."

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1. Jinnah, Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad met the Viceroy on 1 November, 1939 to try to work out an arrangement for cooperation.

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 279-80

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 2 November, 1939

PRIVATE

2. The decision of Congress to call out the Ministries had the effect here of spurring the Conciliation Group to renewed activity and I received a somewhat plaintive letter from Carl Heath,¹ who urged that an immediate further effort should be made to prevent what he described as an unfortunate and unnecessary break developing into a disastrous chasm. He noticed, he said, that we attributed the failure of our efforts to go further to meet the Congress in the main to Hindu-Muslim antagonism. He also observed that beyond expressing what he described as "a vague hope" that collaboration on the consultative body would tend to diminish the antagonism, we did not seem to have taken any direct action to bring the Congress and the All India Muslim League together. I told him that I was conscious as anyone of the importance of attempting to prevent any further deterioration in the situation which was in any case sufficiently threatening and that he could count on you and me doing all that lay in our power to this end. As to bridging the gulf between the Congress and the All India Muslim League, I asked him if he would feel disposed to let me know what positive action he had in mind which he thought might be effective and I said that if he would be good enough to read the manifesto of the All India Muslim League, which had been printed in the White Paper, I felt sure that he would agree with me that something more was required than a mere declaration by the Congress that the interests of Minorities were safe in their keeping. I have now heard from him in reply. His suggestions are in fact much on the lines of ours, though his proposal for bringing Muslims and Hindus together is of a slightly different character.

He suggests in fact that six Congressmen should be invited to meet six Members of the All India Muslim League under the chairmanship of some neutral person such as Maurice Gwyer. I do not myself see how we could substitute Gwyer or anyone else for you in this task.

3. It looks to me as if we shall have to think over once more the possibility of some mechanical form of safeguard such as a statutory requirement that so far as legislation is concerned no measure objected to by a specified proportion of a recognised minority could become law without a two-third or other appropriate fractional majority of the whole Legislature; but such a device could hardly be brought in as part of our *ad hoc* war-time arrangements though it might perhaps be mooted sometime for the consideration of those concerned as a possibility for the future.

4. Meanwhile, Jinnah's statement to the *Manchester Guardian* has appeared, so far without any comment, in that paper. This should at least bring home to its readers what we have been at pains to try and make clear, namely, that there is a profound difference, which is not of our making, between the viewpoint of Congress and that of an organisation claiming to represent some ninety millions of the Indian people. I heard yesterday that Herbert Samuel² and probably also Snell³ are proposing to raise the Indian question once more in our House today. Samuel has let me know that he has every intention of being helpful and I feel sure that he will be discreet.

1. Carl Heath; Chairman, India Conciliation Group, London.

2. Herbert Samuel, 1st Viscount cr. 1937, Liberal Leader, House of Lords from 1944.

3. Henry Snell, Labour Poet; Under Secretary for India, 1931; Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, 1940-44.

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Rajendra Prasad to Linlithgow

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 217-220

3 November, 1939

Dear Lord Linlithgow

I thank you for your letter of November 2nd embodying in concrete form of the proposition which you had placed before us when we saw you on November 1st. My colleagues and I have given our earnest consideration to it. We have had also the advantage of full talks with Mr. M.A. Jinnah but we find ourselves unable to vary the answer we gave you during the interview. (We are happy to find that there is a substantial measure of agreement between us in regard to the approach to the communal question with a view to removing all causes of friction and misunderstanding between the various communities. We hope to continue these talks to find a satisfactory solution of communal problems). [At the outset I would like to say that both Gandhiji and I missed at the interview any reference to the main and moral issue raised by the

Congress about clarification of war aims without which it was impossible for the Congress to consider any subsidiary proposal.]

The present crisis has arisen owing to the outbreak of the war in Europe and the action of the British Government in declaring India a belligerent country without the consent of the Indian people. This crisis is entirely political and is not related to the communal issue in India. It raises vital questions in regard to the war aims of the British Government and the position of India in relation to them. The Congress Working Committee, as you are aware, issued a lengthy statement on September 14th, 1939, in which they invited the British Government to declare their war aims and, in particular, how these aims were going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present. It was further stated that the Indian people must have the right of self-determination by framing their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly, without external interferences, and should guide their own policy. On the 10th of October 1939, the All India Congress Committee approved of and endorsed this statement and stated that in the declaration to be made by the British Government, India must be declared an independent nation and present application should be given to this status to the largest possible extent. The Committee further added that Indian freedom must be based on democracy and unity and the full recognition and protection of the rights of all minorities.

Subsequent to this, the policy of the British Government was declared in the Viceregal statement, extracts from which you have been good enough to send me. This statement was considered by the Congress Working Committee soon after and the Committee expressed their opinion that it was unfortunate and wholly unsatisfactory. As a consequence of this, they felt compelled to declare that they were unable to give any support to Great Britain and to call upon the Provincial Governments, in Provinces where the Congress is in a majority, to tender their resignations. In these Provinces the Provincial Assemblies have passed and are about to pass resolutions repeating the Congress demand.

(May I venture to point out) [It is worthy of note] that the Viceregal declaration of British policy met with disapproval of the overwhelming body of opinion in India, even outside the Congress. (The Muslim League did not accept it and expressed its disagreement with it in many respects.) Subsequent statements made on behalf of the British Government in Parliament have not made any essential difference to the policy outlined in the Viceregal statement, and as you have rightly pointed out, that policy is still governed by the extracts from it that you have (kindly) sent us. I am afraid it is quite impossible for us to accept this policy or to consider any steps to further cooperation unless the policy of the British Government is made clear in a declaration on the lines suggested by the Congress. (As you are aware, some Provincial Governments have already resigned and others will be resigning soon. In two Provinces the Secretary of State has taken charge of the administration through the Governor.)

(As I have mentioned above) (It has pained us to find the communal question being dragged in, in this connection. It has clouded the main issue. It has been repeatedly said on behalf of the Congress that) it is our earnest desire to settle all points of communal controversy by agreement and we propose to continue our efforts to this end. But I would point out (to you) that this question does not in any

respect come in the way of a declaration of Indian freedom as suggested above. Such a declaration applies to the whole of India and not to any particular community, and the Constituent Assembly which will frame India's Constitution will be formed on the widest possible basis of franchise and by agreement in regard to communal representations. We are all agreed that there must be full protection of Minority rights and interests and this protection should be by agreement between the parties concerned. (The British Government taking or sharing the burden has, in our opinion, made a settlement of the question much more difficult than it should have been. It should allay all real anxiety on the part of the British Government when the Congress declares that it contemplates no Constitution which does not carry with it the protection of real Minorities to their satisfaction.)

It seems to us that a clear declaration of the kind suggested is an essential preliminary to any further consideration of the matter. I should like to add that recent developments in European War have made it all the more necessary for a clear enunciation of War aims. (If such a declaration is made and it is considered satisfactory then we shall gladly discuss with you the other matters arising from it so that effect should be given to it). (If a satisfactory declaration is made, a discussion of the proposal made by your Excellency may be appropriate and useful and we shall gladly discuss it with you.) (It is perhaps unnecessary to state that Gandhiji is in full agreement with this letter. We propose to leave tomorrow evening for Wardha unless Your Excellency desires otherwise).

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Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 100

3 November, 1939

Dear Sir,

In view of renewed attempts for the Hindu-Muslim rapprochement I beg to say in confirmation of my telegram sent to you today that, the forty million Muslims of Pakistan shall not reconcile to any settlement which does not recognise their separate national status, and fails to allot them a separate homeland. They are determined to accept nothing less than that. I need hardly add that, this desire for an honourable existence among the Pakistan Muslims has been lit up and fanned into flame by their religious renaissance which, the passage of time is too weak to dim and adverseness of circumstances unable to damp.

It is, therefore, only natural that inspired with religious fervour they will not agree to any settlement which is not based on the principle of separation. India cannot afford to shelve this issue while it is engaged in exploring the possibilities of internal peace.

Today again I reiterate what I expressed in my previous letters that the Muslims of Pakistan have fullest confidence in your capacity and perspicuity. We earnestly

trust that you will fight for our cause with great vehemence and ardour. If you are successful in this mission (may it be so) it indeed shall be the greatest contribution to Islam in India, unique of its kind.

I remain, dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,
(Sd/-) AHMAD BASHIR
Secretary

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Ziaud Din Ahmad to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 203

LUCKNOW, 3 November, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I came here on invitation from Ahmad Shah for settlement of Khaksar problem. The Congress Ministry refused to settle the matter and lift it on to new Government. The matter is likely to be settled tomorrow. On account of the [illegible] of Congress Ministry and the failure to solve Shia-Sunni question, the aspect of the entire problem is changed.

Agreement is always welcome but you may keep in mind that Constituent Assembly may change the Constitution after a few years even if they agree to all our demands. There should be some guarantee that chances about the protection of Minorities may not be alterable by the votes of majority community. I am coming to Delhi on Monday next.

ZIAUD DIN AHMED

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Nehru's Speech at the Standpoint of the Congress on the Communal Problem and Constituent Assembly [Extract]

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 223-25

NEW DELHI, 4 November, 1939

12. There was nothing to hide from you in the talks that the Congress leaders had with the Viceroy and Mr. Jinnah, yet there are obvious difficulties in giving out a detailed account of it. I would, however, like to make it clear that the question discussed with the Viceroy and with Mr. Jinnah was fundamentally a political question.

The Congress demand that India should be declared an independent country has nothing to do with the communal question. The Congress does not demand for itself exclusively the right to frame India's Constitution. The Constituent Assembly, we want, will be elected on the basis of adult suffrage. If the Congress retains the confidence of the people then the people will elect them. The demand is made on behalf of all communities and people of India. There is no question of the distribution of spoils. The question can rightly be raised as to how the proposed Constituent Assembly is to be convened and how the fear of the suppression of Minorities by a majority is to be removed, but no Indian, who does not fear independence, can help supporting the demand for convening such an assembly. The question as to how Minorities are to be represented in such a body can be raised. The Muslim League has complete independence for its objective and unless it is abandoned, it cannot but associate itself with such a demand. The League has every right to claim that Muslims' rights must be effectively safeguarded.

13. I agree with Maulana Nuruddin¹ that Lord Zetland's statement is an indignified one. The very basis of our movement will go, if we accept that statement.

14. There was a time when the Congress was composed of a handful of delegates, but even then it used to speak on behalf of the country. The Congress is now a powerful organization which has lakhs of people on its rolls and millions among its sympathizers. It would be absurd to suggest that the Congress represents every Indian. It cannot obviously represent those who are opposed to it. It has no communal claims to make. It has always functioned on a broad basis of nationalism. It is quite possible that at times the number of Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs is small, but it represents them. So far as the communal demands are concerned, the Hindu Mahasabha is there which represents, to a large extent, the Hindus. It cannot and does not speak on behalf of the whole country. The portals of the Congress are open to all. The statement of Lord Zetland militates against those fundamentals.

15. There is no communal issue in the present demand for a declaration from the British Government. The Government's reply betrays the same old imperialist voice. They have made an ingenious attempt to give it a communal colour. I do not, however, deny the existence of the communal problem which is quite difficult. We have to solve it and will solve it.

16. The real intentions of the British Government will be known when one notices the British being bracketed with Minorities, vested interests and the Princes whose interests are to be safeguarded. It only means giving the key of progress to the British Government. Freedom will be a meaningless thing without economic independence. Most of the Princes are the creation of British imperialism and depend upon the Government for their existence. It is possible that in a few States the people might tolerate their rulers with certain adjustments, but that is primarily their problem.

17. Lord Salisbury² has stated that the interests of the primitive tribes should be safeguarded.³ We can very well understand the sympathies of His Lordship with these tribes. So far as the Minority problems are concerned, I make it plain that all legitimate rights of the Minorities will be fully safeguarded with statutory safeguards by a Constituent Assembly with the consent of the Minorities concerned.

18. I have played a considerable part in bringing the demand for a Constituent

Assembly to the forefront during the last five years. I recall that when a resolution on the subject as put through in the Provincial Assemblies, the representatives of the Muslim League had sponsored amendments seeking to clarify that the rights of minorities would be safeguarded. In some Provinces these amendments were accepted and in others the Congress Premiers gave the necessary assurance. The communal question does not arise at all. The Congress President's reply to the Viceroy which will be published in a few day's time will make it abundantly clear.

19. During my talks with Mr. Jinnah, no such difficulty as pointed above was felt. I told Mr. Jinnah that we were prepared to discuss all outstanding communal questions and decide them once for all. There are small things which create a lot of bitterness and heart-burning. The first thing that deserved our attention is the constitutional question. Consequently, we postponed our talks for a solution of the communal differences and they will be resumed in a few days. We had talks on the constitutional issue. We were agreed on many things. There were differences also, but they had nothing to do with the communal question. There was a slight difference of approach. At first we had a hope of sending a joint reply on behalf of the Congress and the League. The publication of these replies would show where we stand in our relations. We should not say anything that might increase the bitterness. We have a right to disagree with each other and criticize each other but we should not attribute motives. Today Mahatmaji has further elucidated the Congress position in his interview with the Viceroy. I cannot say what would be the outcome, but we should be prepared for the worst lest it should be said that we were caught napping.

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1. Maulana Nuruddin Behari, President of the Delhi District Congress Committee, who presided over the meeting, had been highly critical of Lord Zetland's Speech in the House of Lords that "Hindus as represented by the Congress and Muslims as represented by the Muslim League have been invited by the Viceroy to interview him."
 2. Lord Salisbury, 5th Marquess of (Robert Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil), Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1943-5; Leader of House of Lords, 1942-5.
 3. On 2nd November 1939, Lord Salisbury had said in the House of Lords: "What did the noble Viscount mean by Dominion Status, what would become of the safeguards? What would we do about the Princes, the primitive tribes, the Scheduled Castes and the Minorities."

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Jinnah to Linlithgow

Parliamentary Papers, CMD 6235

NEW DELHI, 4 November, 1939

With reference to the joint interview which Mr. Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of the Congress, and myself had with you on 1st November and in reply to your letter, dated 2nd November, I beg to inform you that I understood that the Congress leaders and myself were to consider the proposals of Your Excellency,

namely—to quote from Your Excellency's letter—"The proposition which I invited you and the other gentlemen present to consider, as leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, was that, given the great importance of ensuring harmonious working at the Centre, you should enter upon discussions between yourselves with a view to discovering whether you could reach a basis of agreement between yourselves in the provincial field consequent on which you could let me have proposals which would result in representatives of your two organisations immediately participating in the Central Government, as members of my Executive Council. I brought out too, that in my judgment it ought not to be necessary absolutely to resolve every detail of such differences as may exist in the Provinces. What was required, as was remarked in the course of discussion, was a degree of agreement in respect of the Provinces such as to make it possible for my visitors, and the organisations which they represented, to put forward a scheme which could be considered for the Centre," without prejudice to the resolution of the Muslim League of the 22nd October stating that the declaration of Your Excellency on behalf of His Majesty's Government was not satisfactory and required further clarification and assurances, and also without prejudice to the demand of Congress for a declaration as adumbrated in the resolution of the All India Congress Committee on the 10 October, 1939.

In consequence I met the leaders of Congress and I was informed by them finally that they had come to the conclusion that they could not discuss any questions with regard to the matters referred to in your letter of the 2nd instant relating to the Provincial field or at the Centre until the British Government had complied with their demand as embodied in the resolution of All India Congress Committee; hence these two questions were not further discussed.

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Nehru's Speech

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 365-66

Allahabad, 5 November, 1939: I am glad that in my talks with Mr. M.A. Jinnah I found that there was no difference as to the final objective to be achieved by our country even though our political viewpoints differed in detail. There was no difference in what is to be achieved but only in how we should attain it. It is regrettable that we had to decide to submit our replies separately to His Excellency the Viceroy. Consequently Rajendra Babu has submitted to the Viceroy a reply on behalf of the Congress.

My talks with Mr. Jinnah were primarily of a political nature, although the communal problem also came up for discussion. Even as regards this there is not really anything big in the way of its settlement, although, of course, there are a number of minor things that cause a lot of misunderstanding and difficulty. But the British Government has deliberately put this problem to the fore in their declarations. These talks were a continuation of my earlier talks with Mr. Jinnah. I am hopeful that the misunderstandings will be removed and the day is not far when we will be able to take a joint step forward.

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*Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 284-86*

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 5 November, 1939

PRIVATE

4. I have been wondering a little what attitude we ought now to adopt towards the leaders of the All India Muslim League and the other parties who have not thrown in their lot with the Congress. Should we, for example, consider proceeding with the establishment of a consultative body, inviting Jinnah, Ambedkar and others to nominate panels? And if so, should we ignore the Congress on the ground that they have rejected our offer, or alternatively should we send them a similar invitation and leave it to them to decline or to ignore it? And if Jinnah or any of them then asks to be brought into the Central Government should we agree? I suppose that action on these lines on our part would cause the Congress to see red. You will no doubt have been turning such matters over in your mind and you will probably be letting me have your views with regard to them.

5. The possibility of an all-Parties Conference has fallen into the background, if indeed it is not held to have been superseded by the All India Muslim League-cum-Congress talks which have now failed. Gandhi's point seems to be that agreement between Congress and the Minorities is impossible so long as we keep the ring, but that there should be little difficulty in providing safeguards to which the Minorities would agree if only we did not interfere. I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe this. Have you any idea of the sort of safeguards that Congress has in mind? I note too that in his letter to you of November the 3rd Rajendra Prasad speaks of "real minorities." Does he include Europeans amongst the real Minorities? He also says that the Constituent Assembly that they have in mind would be formed on the widest possible franchise and by agreement in regard to communal representation. Have you any reason to suppose that agreement on this point would be likely to be reached with the Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs and others?

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*Jinnah to Linlithgow**V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 3, p. 20*

GUL-I-RAANA, 8-B, HARDINGE AVENUE, NEW DELHI, 5 November, 1939

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I wish to thank you for giving me the interview on the 4th of November as

you had promised in your letter of the 28th of October wherein you stated that you will be glad at some suitable moment to endeavour further to elucidate any points that there may be in doubt as desired by the resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League of the 22nd of October.

In my interview with you on the 4th of November the subject was fully discussed and now, as desired by Your Excellency, I am herewith submitting to you the following points for your consideration and early reply:

1. that so soon as circumstances may permit or immediately after the war the entire problem of India's future Constitution, apart from the Government of India Act, 1935, shall be examined and reconsidered *de novo* ;
2. that no declaration shall, either in principle or otherwise, be made or any Constitution be enacted by His Majesty's Government or the Parliament without the approval and the consent of the two major communities of India, viz., the Musalmans and the Hindus;
3. that His Majesty's Government should try and meet all reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine;
4. that the Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim power or country.

I have already, in my interview, fully explained the reasons and the grounds in support of these points over and above of what is indicated in the statement of the 18th of September and the resolution of the 22nd of October of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, copies of which have already been sent to Your Excellency.

There is one more point which was mentioned in the statement of the Working Committee of the 18th September, viz., the question of securing justice and fairplay to the Musalmans in the Congress-governed Provinces where even their elementary rights were being ruthlessly trampled upon; but as the Congress Ministries have gone out of office I do not desire to say anything regarding this matter at present.

May I inform Your Excellency that I am leaving for Bombay tomorrow morning.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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Jinnah's reply to Gandhi's article on Hindu-Muslim Unity

The Nation's Voice, p. 406

NEW DELHI, 6 November, 1939

I have carefully read the article of Mr. Gandhi on Hindu-Muslim Unity reproduced from the *Harijan* in the local papers of this morning. It has shocked me that the accusation for which there is not the slightest foundation should have been broadcast

in an article penned by Mr. Gandhi. He could not have said anything worse about me or about the Musalmans of India at this juncture.

Mr. Gandhi says, "Janab Jinnah Sahib looks to the British Power to safeguard the Muslim rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or concede will satisfy him; for he can always, and naturally from his own standpoint, ask for more than the British can give or guarantee. Therefore, there can be no limit to the Muslim demands."

This is far from the truth and is a libel on the whole Muslim community of India of which a person in the position of Mr. Gandhi should not have been guilty. Mr. Gandhi further says that "the Congress does not represent the Musalmans and one would like to know then whom it actually represents?"

Mr. Gandhi further says that the Congress had never represented the Hindus as such. "That function is claimed by the Hindu Mahasabha." I have made it abundantly clear on more than one occasion and it has been proved to demonstration that the Congress is a Hindu body. It is the same coin with a stamp on one side of the Hindu Mahasabha and, on the other that of the Congress, and what one speaks out openly the other practices. I assure Mr. Gandhi that the Musalmans of India depend upon their own inherent strength. We are determined to fight and fight to the last ditch for rights to which we are entitled in spite of the British or the Congress. We do not depend upon anybody.

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Governor-General's Announcement

Parliamentary Papers, CMD 6029

6 November, 1939: The discussions which have been taking place between representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League have not ended in agreement. No one can regret more than I do that this should be the case, and I think it is only proper, as the issues involved are so important, to recall the history of the last few weeks.

War was declared on 3rd September. In a broadcast that night I appealed to all parties and sections in India to cooperate in its prosecution. On the following day I saw Mr. Gandhi in Simla and I discussed the whole position freely with him. I similarly took immediate steps to see Mr. Jinnah, as representing the Muslim League. Nor did I fail to see the Chancellor of the Chamber of Provinces.

Thereafter, the general question came for consideration before the Congress Working Committee and the Working Committee of the Muslim League. The Working Committee of the Congress met on 15th September. They condemned Nazi aggression in decisive terms. But they postponed a final decision so as to allow for full elucidation of the issues at stake, the real objectives aimed at and the position of India in the present and in the future, and they invited the British Government to declare, in unequivocal terms, what were their war aims and how those aims would apply to India and be given effect to in the present. Mr. Gandhi, expressing his full agreement

with the Working Committee's statement, remarked that he had been sorry to find himself alone in seeking that whatever support was to be given to the British should be given unconditionally.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League, on 18th September, similarly asked, "If full, effective and honourable cooperation of the Musalmans is desired," that "a sense of security and satisfaction," should be created among Muslims, and referred in particular to the position of Muslims in Congress Provinces, to the necessity for consulting Muslims fully regarding any change in the existing Constitution and securing their consent and approval.

I now again got in touch with Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jinnah and the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. I decided that, given the great divergence of view which clearly existed between the two major political parties in British India, I must satisfy myself as to the trend of feeling in the country. In pursuance of that object, I interviewed over 50 people, representing all parties, communities and interests. While those conversations were proceeding, the All India Congress Committee, on the 10th October, passed a resolution repeating the demand of the Working Committee for a statement by His Majesty's Government of their war aims and peace aims. They demanded, also, that India should be declared an independent nation and that present application of this status should be given to the largest possible extent.

I reported my conversations in detail to His Majesty's Government, who, at a time of overwhelming pressure, have been devoting the closet attention to the problems of India. It was in the light of profound consideration and long discussion that, on 18th October, I made a declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government. That declaration emphasised, firstly, that Dominion Status remained the goal for India; secondly, that His Majesty's Government were prepared to reconsider the scheme of the present Act at the end of the war, in consultation with leaders of opinion in India; thirdly, that His Majesty's Government attached importance to associating public opinion in India with the prosecution of the war and that, for that purpose, they contemplated the formation of a consultative group, the details of which were to be settled after I had further consulted with party leaders.

The announcements in my statement are of great importance. Their importance has been belittled but they represent points of real substance. The debates in Parliament which followed the publication of my statement brought out another important point—the readiness of His Majesty's Government, if certain conditions were secured, to associate Indian opinion in a still closer and more responsible manner with the conduct of the war, by a temporary expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council. But the reception in British India, both of my declaration and of the subsequent debates in parliament, was, so far as the Congress was concerned, definitely hostile. The Congress Working Committee, on the 22nd October, passed a resolution to the effect that my declaration was entirely unsatisfactory, and called upon the Congress Ministries in the Provinces to resign. The Muslim League, on the same day, asked that certain doubts should be removed and complete clarification of my declaration secured, subject to which they empowered their President, if fully satisfied, "to give an assurance of cooperation and support on behalf of the Musalmans of India to the British Government, for the purpose of the prosecution of the war."

I next invited Mr. Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, and Mr. Jinnah to come and see me on 1st November, and I discussed the whole position with them frankly. I had already in my previous conversation discussed with them, as with almost all my visitors, from various aspects the possibility of an expansion of the Governor-General's Council. I now told them that if in regard to association at the Centre we had been unable to go further than the Consultative Group, it was because of lack of prior agreement between the major communities such as would contribute to harmonious working in the Centre. I added that the manifestos issued on 22nd October by the Congress Working Committee and the Muslim League had shown only too clearly the gulf that existed between the attitude of these two great parties.

I begged my visitors in these circumstances to meet and to have discussions among themselves on the Provincial position, with a view thereafter to putting forward in agreement proposals which could be considered for some expansion of the Governor-General's Council at the Centre. I told them that I saw no necessity for every detailed difference between them in the Provinces to be resolved. What was needed was a sufficient resolution of those differences to make the devising of a scheme for harmonious working at the Centre practicable. I begged them in the most earnest manner to spare to endeavour to reach agreement; and I emphasised that this was essentially a question affecting Indians on which agreement between Indians themselves was what I was anxious to secure. I stressed the profound anxiety not only of myself but of His Majesty's Government to leave nothing undone which would contribute to achieve that agreement.

The discussions which I suggested have taken place. The result to me has been a profound disappointment. There remains today entire disagreement between the representatives of the major parties on fundamental issues. All I must say now is that I am not prepared to accept this failure. I propose in due course to try again in consultation with the leaders of these great parties and the Princes to see if even now there may still be the possibility of securing unity.

During all the time I have been in India there is nothing I have been most anxious to secure than unity. And unity matters far more to India than is perhaps always realised. Unity too, means that Indians, whatever their community or whatever their party allegiance, and whether they dwell in British India or in Indian States, must work together in a common scheme. It is worth a great deal to try to bring that about. I may have been unsuccessful so far. But I will try again.

And when I try again, I would ask India to remember my difficulties and give me credit for an earnest goodwill and an earnest desire to assist.

We are dealing with a problem that has defeated the united endeavours of the greatest organisations in this country. There are grave differences of view which have to be taken into account, and which should be bridged. There are strong and deeply-rooted interests which are entitled to the fullest consideration and whose attitude is not a thing lightly to be brushed aside. There are Minorities which are great in numbers as well as great in historic importance, and in culture. Those are all factors to which full weight has to be given. But complex as the problems are, I refuse to regard them as insoluble, and I prefer to believe that, like other human problems, they will yield to patient discussion in a spirit of goodwill. In this belief I

am encouraged by the friendly feeling which has pervaded my discussion with leaders of parties. I would ask the country, and I would ask the leaders of great political parties and their constituents, who I know have faith in those leaders and are ably led by them, to give me the help which I so much need if there is to be any hope of overcoming our difficulties and reaching the result which I am sure that we all of us desire.

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Jinnah's Speech

The Nation's Voice, pp. 410-11

Bombay, 7 November: "I am always willing to come to a settlement with my Hindu brethren on equal terms. I have no ill-will against them" said Mr. M.A. Jinnah, addressing a Muslim meeting this evening in Bombay.

After the declaration of the war, said Mr. Jinnah, a grave situation has arisen in this country. Mr. Gandhi was so moved when he visualised the destruction of Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament that he offered the unconditional support of the Congress to the British cause. But he found himself in a minority of one in this attitude. The Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee passed resolutions demanding that the Congress would not support or co-operate with Britain in the prosecution of the war unless Britain made India a free and independent nation with freedom for the people to frame a Constitution by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the widest possible franchise. But the British Government declared that they reserved for themselves the entire and complete right to frame the Constitution for India, after consulting the various interests in the country. While both claimed the right to be the sole arbiter and judge in the matter, the position of the Muslim League was that they did not recognise the rights of either to foist on the Muslims a Constitution which did not meet with the agreement and approval of the Muslim League. And we shall fight to the last ditch to see that such a Constitution is not foisted on us. The Minorities, added Mr. Jinnah, had a right to see that not only their interests were protected but to know what sort of Constitution was applied to the country.

With Muslim majority in four Provinces, Mr. Jinnah observed, it was wrong to say that Muslims were a Minority community. He was willing to come to an agreement with his Hindu brethren on terms of absolute equality, and not as a Minority community with a majority community. He said he had no ill-will towards the Hindus, but so long as the present High Command of the Congress remained as a sort of "Fascist Grand Council," there was little hope of a settlement. Mr. Jinnah next refuted the cry that the Muslim League had denounced democracy. Democracy in the abstract was quite different from democracy as practised. Democracy was like the chameleon, changing its complexion according to the environment. Democracy was not the same in England as it was in France or America. Islam believed in equality, liberty and fraternity, but not the democracy of the Western type—the democratic parliamentary system in which party Government was the basic principle of the

Constitution. Such a system had failed in India where the Hindus were in a majority of three to one against the Muslims.

Mr. Jinnah next proceeded to examine the democratic nature of the Congress organisation. "Is it democracy if a Grand Fascist Council sitting in Wardha issued orders to Ministers in the Provinces who are responsible to the Legislatures? And the sole and final dictator of this Grand Fascist Council is not even a four anna member of this democratic organisation. I ask those who preach truth to face problems, problems for which there is no parallel in the world. Then will come the charter of freedom." (A.P.)

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Ahmad Bashir to Jinnah

Quad-i-Azam Papers, F. 1097/294-302

MAJLIS-I-KABIR, PAKISTAN, BEADON ROAD, LAHORE, 8 November, 1939

Dear Sir,

I beg to enclose a copy of my letter addressed to Mr. Gandhi for your kind perusal. I hope you will appreciate and endorse the idea contained therein the letter. I may say for your information that copies of this letter are also being sent to Pandit Jawaharlal and Dr. Rajendra Prasad.

I cannot guess what effect will this letter have on Mr. Gandhi and party but it will at least enable them to understand that the Muslims will never accept democracy for India even if it brings complete independence in its trail. The letter will also impress upon their mind our unflinching faith in "separation" as the only solution of Hindu-Muslim problems.

We are fighting the battle single-handed, with no one to support, nor even to encourage us. We have written to you so many times and sent you telegrams to enlist your valued support and sympathy but we are sorry to say that we have not received any acknowledgement not to speak of getting an answer.

We do not ask for any material help, we do not wish to be referred to in your speeches and statements. What we want is your moral help to the cause of Pakistan, which you can so easily, nicely [portions left out] North-West and North-East of India on your part, would redouble our energy and inspire us with new zeal. If you do not encourage us, tell me please, who else is going to do?

I hope this letter will not go unanswered.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) AHMAD BASHIR
Secretary,
Majlis-i-Kabir, Pakistan
Beadon Road, Lahore

Enclosure:

BEADON ROAD, LAHORE, 6 November, 1939

To,

M.K. GANDHI, Esquire,
Wardha, (C.P).

Dear Sir,

At a critical juncture like this when the Hindu-Muslim question is receiving renewed consideration, I, as the Secretary of Majlis-e-Kabir Pakistan, Lahore, beg to place before you the following facts in order to facilitate your task of exploring the possibilities of peace. I hope these facts will receive your kind consideration and full appreciation.

His Excellency the Viceroy's declaration along with the statement of Secretary of State seems to have created queer repercussions and strange quarrels. It is only natural that the Viceroy could not please all the parties in India, their interests being at odds with one another. But it passes one's comprehension how it can be possible for the Government to reconcile their mutual differences when it should be the parties themselves to compose their quarrels and patch up their rifts. Unfortunately, as this vast land does not represent a united house, it is hypothetically wrong to find fault with the Viceroy in so far as he has failed to meet the demand of all the political parties in India.

Nobody, in any case, belittles the importance of India's unity especially at this grave moment, but how that unity can best be achieved is a matter that deserves the special consideration of every thoughtful Indian. This matter being most vital must be given precedence over everything else. For, to talk of your goal without determining your course of action falls short of wisdom. It is time that we should cease talking in the air and come to tin-tacks. India has suffered much by this idle talk and can no more afford to indulge in this causerie.

But it is tragically true that, since the days of Akbar,¹ the Great, every effort to effect unity in India has met with failure, rather has culminated in widening the chasm of difference. Akbar with his absolute power and grandeur was unsuccessful to evolve a monochromatic society (practically on the same lines that are now being pursued by you) and so are the present-day leaders with all their modern tactics. Even the "bread question" raised by Pandit Jawaharlal has been of no avail. Seductive as it was, it has utterly failed to bring the poverty-stricken masses on one platform.

Who knows it better than yourself that the greatest factor militating against the unity of India is the [question] of its territories. I hope you will agree with me when I say, it is a tragedy of the first magnitude that the entire sub-continent of India has come to be regarded as one country. Though, as a matter of fact, ethnically, it is a congeries of races and cross-breeds; linguistically, it is divided into hundred and one parts; geographically, it is a subcontinent, culturally, its people stand poles asunder and economically, unity in pursuit of wealth is extinct. The position is further aggravated by the fact that, two civilizations subsist here side by side, inspired by two separate religions governing almost every action of their respective followers. The very basis and content of national life of Muslims is founded on fundamentals [fundamentals] essentially different from those on which Hinduism lives and prospers. The ideals which move the former to do anything are radically different from those which inspire the latter. In fact, the two religions naturally tend to create the widest possible gulf between the two peoples wholly unbridgeable by any legislation or the severity of foreign yoke. These differences notwithstanding one thousand years of close contact have defied the touch of time. The Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms on the first page of its Report (Sessions 1933-34, Vol. I, Part I) confirms this statement in the following words:

India is inhabited by many races . . . often as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe. Two-thirds of its inhabitants profess Hinduism in one form or another as their religion, over seventy-seven millions are followers of Islam; and the difference between the two is not only of religion in the stricter sense, but also of law and of culture. They may be said indeed to represent two distinct separate civilizations. Hinduism is distinguished by the phenomenon of its Caste which is the basis of its religious and social system and same in a very restricted field

remains unaffected by contact with philosophies of the West; the religion of Islam on the other hand is based upon the conception of the equality of man.

In short, no common moral consciousness permeating the entire body of Hindus and Muslims exists that may be helpful or conducive to their unity, not to say of the evolution of a single nationality.

Leaving alone the fact that, the homogeneity among the members of the State, which is a prerequisite of a democratic form of Government, is extinct in India, Islam does not uphold the modern conception of democracy as imported into India from the West. It is with all its traditional love of liberty, extremely jealous of the preservation of its social order and does not admit any "mixed society." It does not even recognize any such medley. The position of Muslims in India with the relaxation of some cogent factor has become precarious but they will never bow down in the house of Rion for any political expediency, and they are determined to preserve their separate national entity at all costs.

Furthermore, the religious renaissance among the Muslims and the march of events connected with the political struggle in India have made the Muslims believe that on the assumption of a single Hindu-Muslim nationality, the application of democratic principles to India, be it in the form of Dominion Status, or even "Complete Independence," would be fatal to their religious, cultural and economic interests. For, it would mean permanent Hindu majority at the Centre to govern the destiny of ninety million Muslims indiscreetly. Whether the tyranny of the majority is a fiction or truth the fact remains that the Minority does not like the rule of the former even though that were fair and just.

In view of these hard facts it is only waste of time and dissipation of energies to try to unite Hindus and Muslims by any act or measure of the Government of India or by following the primrose path of forming a single nationality. The only feasible solution of this Sphinx riddle is the appreciation of these differences with perfect candour, and then raising the superstructure of India's political edifice on these bases. Or to be more candid, to divide the sub-continent into independent homogeneous states, as it was in the past, so as to allow both the nationalities the right of free growth and of self-expression. This will also afford them an opportunity to strive and aspire for their noble and lofty ideals with much more integrity, security and sincerity of purpose.

The sand has run out and we must not any more be oblivious of this reality that the Hindu-Muslim problem is not an inter-communal issue and it will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is an inter-national problem and it will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any attempt to unite Hindus and Muslims which disregards this basic truth is destined to precipitate. So if the Congress is really serious and sincere in bringing about peace in the sub-continent it must ponder over this question in cool blood free of *parti pris*. I need hardly add that this desire for an honourable existence among the Muslims has been inspired and tinged with their renewed religious fervour and it is, therefore, seemingly impossible to reconcile them to any settlement which is not based on the principle of separation. They have already set on this stupendous task by forming Pakistan Majlis at numerous places in the North-West of India to expedite the growth of politico-religious consciousness among the Muslim masses and to rouse them to the fullest realisation of their capacities. The Congress cannot afford to sleep on this issue and brush aside their just and legitimate demand while it is seriously engaged in forcing something out of the British. Let me make it clear that I am not making any attempt to coerce the Congress by out-heroding Herod² or, to terrify the Hindu with the bogey of Pakistan; it is but a simple narration of uncoloured facts and little more.

The talk of division of India is apt to make many a "nationalist" Indian feel white in the gills. But let them think over this question in calmness that the division of India is something not new. It is not something to be abhorred by the "nationalists" because, it is a division not of a country but of a sub-continent into natural homogeneous wholes on geographical bases, cultural grounds and economic considerations. India has never been regarded as one single country or the home of one nation before the advent of the British. It is, in fact, a designation of State created for the first time by the British. True, the Muslim rulers and some of Hindu monarchs like Ashoka,³ Bikramajit, Chandragupta and Harsha⁴ ruled the sub-continent from one Centre, but it is non-sequitor to assert that the whole of India was considered as one country. As a study of the Memoirs of Babar⁵ or of letters of Aurangzeb would reveal that the Muslims regarded India to consist of the Punjab, Hindustan, Bangla (Bengal) and

Deccan. While according to Rig Veda the Hindus regarded it to consist of nine countries (Rawakhanda).

To insist of India's territorial integrity is, therefore, illogical and not vouchsafed by history and geography. Our goal should not be India's territorial unity but its political unity based on the recognition of separate national status of both Hindus and Muslims. And we can best achieve this end if the sub-continent is divided into independent homogeneous States. These States will not be antagonistic to one another, they will be on the other hand friendly and sympathetic; and by an international pact of mutual goodwill and assistance they can be just as united and harmonious as are today Great Britain, France and Turkey. So far as the Muslims are concerned Hindus should rest assured that the Muslims do never violate pacts. It being incumbent on them by their religion to always abide by their words even in how (sic.) adverse circumstances they are placed. It is not misrepresentation of facts, nor an exaggeration; history stands witness to this statement.

Muslims are fully determined to have a separate homeland of their own, and there is every probability or, shall I say almost a certainty that the British Government will accede to their demand without any extra haggling, they being the fighting force of India. Sir Samuel Hoare has already alluded to this in his recent speech in the House of Commons when he said, "India will emerge out of the present war as a model of League of Nations." Hindus will then bear the brunt of this forced division of India as now they are enduring the stress of the Communal Award. It will enflame their resentment with the result that a war to the knife will ensue in India which may run into rancorous infection. It is, therefore, in the best interest of both Muslims and Hindus that they had honourably settled this issue between themselves without any sort of arbitration. Mutual cooperation lives and flourishes on the principle of give and take, and I am sure if the Congress gives in a little it will receive proportionately greater benefit.

This is the only way to a permanent solution of this age-long Hindu-Muslim tangle, and it will definitely ensure lasting peace and tranquillity in the sub-continent and materially fascinate [facilitate] its progress.

We the Pakistanis have stated our case, and we hold out the olive branch to you. It is now for you to decide how far you can agree with us in transforming this unhappy sub-continent into the land of leal by following the straight path. We look unto your face for your valued support and sympathy.

Wishing you all the best and hoping to hear from you soon.

Yours truly,
(Sd/-) AHMAD BASHIR
Secretary
Majlis-e-Kabir, Pakistan

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1. Jalal-ud-din-Muhammad Akbar, Mughal Emperor of India (1556-1605).
 2. Herod the Great King of Judiea (40-4 B.C.).
 3. Asoka, Maurya Emperor of India (273-32 B.C.); He embraced Buddhism and preached and practised non-violence.
 4. Harsha Vardhana (c. 606-648); king of Kanauj who became the most powerful ruler in North India.
 5. Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babar, 1530, Emperor of India, 1526-30 A.D. and founder Mughal Dynasty of India.



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*Nehru to Krishna Menon [Extract]**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 231-32*

8 November, 1939

My dear Krishna,

6. There is one matter on which I should like you to be clear. This is the communal issue. Though this is undoubtedly with us in a vague kind of way, it has nothing to do with the present crisis, except in so far as the Viceroy and the British Government have tried to foist it upon us. Apart from this, people realise that there are large sections of Muslims with us. There are the Congress Muslims, of course, there is the Frontier Province; a Province like Sind, which is predominantly Muslim, is neutral and is certainly not pro-Muslim League. Bengal and the Punjab are in a sense anti-Congress but they are not in anyway part of the Muslim League. They stand apart but form a kind of Coalition with Jinnah.

7. Then there are the Ahrars, a powerful Muslim organisation in north India which is anti-Muslim League and pro-Congress and which has declared itself against the war and in fact started C.D., in regard to it. So also the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the body of Muslim divines, as well as the Momins, a big though somewhat non-political organisation consisting of Muslim weavers. Again there are the Shias, a sect of the Muslims forming about 20 per cent of the Muslim population. Their political organisation, All India Shia Association [Conference], is itself against the Muslim League. I need not mention young Muslims who are often politically extreme. So you will see that it is quite absurd to talk of the Congress facing the Muslims. I am quite sure that if matters develop, large numbers of Muslims will be with the Congress.

Yours affectionately,
JAWAHARLAL

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*Gandhiji's Statement**Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 414-15*

8 November, 1939: I have read with respectful attention His Excellency the Viceroy's broadcast and his introductory remarks on the correspondence between himself and Shri Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah Saheb released by His Excellency. I welcome His Excellency's refusal to accept defeat and his determination to solve what seems to have become insoluble. I share to the fullest extent His Excellency's anxiety to reach a solution. Without, therefore, waiting for the Congress reaction to

these two declarations and purely for the sake of assisting the common cause, I would like to suggest that no solution is possible unless in acceptable declaration of war aims about India is forthcoming. The pronouncements hitherto made, whether here or in Great Britain, are after the old style, suspected and discredited by freedom-loving India. If Imperialism is dead, there must be a clear break with the past. Language suited to the new era has to be used. If the time has not yet come for the acceptance of this fundamental truth, I would urge that further effort at reaching a solution should be suspended. In this connection I would remind British statesmen that what is wanted is a declaration of Britain's intention regarding her Indian policy irrespective of India's wishes. A slave-holder, who has decided to abolish slavery, does not consult his slaves whether they desire freedom or not.

Once a declaration to free India from bondage, not in stages but at one, is made, an interim solution will be found to be easy. Protection of right of Minorities will then become simple. The game of see saw will cease. The Minorities are entitled to protection, not in stages but to the fullest extent and in one single step. No charter of freedom will be worth looking at which does not ensure the same measure of freedom for the Minorities as for the majority. The Minorities will be full-fledged partners in the framing of the Constitution. How that can be attained will depend upon the wisdom of the representatives charged with the sacred duty of preparing the Constitution. Britain has hitherto held power—this is inevitable in any system of imperialism, by playing the Minorities against the so-called majority and has thus made an agreed solution among the component parts well-nigh impossible. The burden of finding a formula for the protection of Minorities should be thrown on the parties themselves. So long as Britain considers it her mission to bear this burden, so long will she continue to feel the necessity of holding India as a dependency. And patriots impatient for deliverance will fight, non-violently if I can guide them and violently if I fail and perish in the attempt. God's curse of war, I had hoped and still hope, would be turned into a blessing by Britain realising that the one thing needful for her to justify and hasten the end of this war was to free a great and ancient country like India from her yoke.

Believing as I do in the Viceroy's sincerity I would urge fellow-workers not to lose patience. There can be no civil resistance so long as, first, the Viceroy is exploring the possibilities of a settlement, secondly, the Muslim League blocks the way, and thirdly, there is indiscipline and disunity in Congress ranks.

The second condition should not offend Muslim friends. So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League, civil resistance must involve resistance against the League. No Congressman can be party to it. I observe that my note in *Harijan* has shocked Jinnah Saheb. I am sorry for it. But at this stage I would not defend myself. I do not want to mar in any way the negotiations between him and Pandit Nehru which I hope will be resumed soon and pray will lead to communal peace.

Since making the above statement I have read the report of the further statement of the Secretary of State in the House of Lords yesterday. It leaves the main position unchanged.

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*Lord Zetland's Interview with American Journalists [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 298-300*

London, 10 November, 1939. 4. Let me say further that in view of the fact that India has necessarily been brought into the War with Great Britain, we have offered, provided that the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League can compose their differences, to bring leaders of the great political parties in India into the Central Government as an *ad hoc* measure during the period of the war, and we have said further that at the end of the war we shall be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modifications of the Constitution as may seem desirable.

6. Then there are our obligations to the Minorities. Let me mention only two of them. There are, for example, the sixty millions of the Depressed Classes now known as the Scheduled Castes, who for generations have been trampled on by the higher Hindu castes and who, through the mouthpiece of their leader, Dr. Ambedkar, have repudiated the claim of the Congress to speak for them. Then there are the Muslims, constituting something rather different, with their ninety millions, from what we usually think of as a Minority in Europe. True, they are not united, any more than are the Hindus: there are Muslims who support the Congress just as there are Hindus who oppose it. But in the All India Muslim League there does undoubtedly exist an organisation which gives expression broadly speaking to Muslim views. You may perhaps have observed a statement by Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All India Muslim League, which appeared in the pages of the *Manchester Guardian* of 31st October. Let me take only two of Mr. Jinnah's contentions. He protests against the claim put forward by the Congress to speak for the Governments of the great Province of the Punjab, the home of the martial races of India and proudly proclaimed by its Muslim Prime Minister to be the Sword of India, and of Bengal, with its 55 million inhabitants, and of Sind, would be following the Governments of the other Provinces into the wilderness. They are doing nothing of the sort. On the contrary they are offering us their whole-hearted and unconditional support. Mr. Jinnah's other contention is that a system of undiluted democracy can only mean permanent Hindu domination from one end of India to the other, and to that, to quote his own words, "the Muslims will never submit." There, then, is a problem for solution and it cannot be solved by merely ignoring its existence. We have been doing our best to bring the leaders of the Congress and of the All India Muslim League together and if we have not yet succeeded in securing agreement between them we shall not give up our endeavours.

8. I hope that I have not wearied you. I have tried to put before you in a nutshell the salient features of the Indian problem and I hope that I may have satisfied you that the British Government are doing all that is possible to give effect to their promise to India, repeated by me once more in the House of Lords only three days

ago in these words: "to assist India by such means as are in our power to reach without avoidable delay the position in the British Commonwealth of Nations to which we are pledged."

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Edward Thompson¹

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 235-38

ALLAHABAD, 11 November, 1939

Dear Edward,

Your letter from Karachi has just come. The Gwalior letter reached me two or three days ago. I am sorry you saw the Viceroy's statement just before you left and did not see the other statements that followed it. For the Viceroy gave a very misleading account. Or perhaps his slow-moving mind has not yet grasped what we are after, and he and Zetland imagine that a few glittering prizes in the shape of seats in the Viceroy's council will bowl us over. I fear there is little hope of our understanding each other and only the shock of events will decide. You say that we have thrown away our chances. Perhaps. But there never was and there is not going to be an acceptance of such chances. That is one of the fundamental facts of the present situation. Nor is there going to be return to the provincial cabinets such as we had till recently. It may be that we are wrong but, if so, even our error is a factor to be considered.

2. The Viceroy met Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah and presuming that his previous statement had cleared the way and that there was no further necessity for a declaration of war aims and India's position, proceeded to tell them to compose their differences in the Provinces and then discuss the Centre where a few seats on his Council will be offered to them. This was an extraordinary approach for his previous statement had been bitterly criticised by almost everybody in India excepting a few individuals. The Muslim League had not committed itself but had not accepted it. The powerful Muslim organisations had condemned it and lined up with the Congress. The Sikhs condemned it. The Indian Christians did likewise. Even the Liberal Federation criticised it strongly. The Congress took action and asked the Ministries to resign.

6. As for the Punjab, do not run away with the impression that it is hostile to us because Sikandar Hayat functions there. The Punjab is likely to give more trouble to the British Government than any other Province, and what a large number of Muslims will do will come as an even greater surprise to them. Because of our mild language and continuous efforts at compromise, the Muslim League presumes to boss the Muslims. But as I told you, there are powerful Muslim organisations entirely opposed to the League. There is the All India Shia Conference, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the Momins and plenty of young Muslims. The Muslim membership of the Congress runs into hundreds of thousands. The Province with largest proportion of Muslims—the N.W.F.P. is predominantly pro-Congress with its very efficient Khudai Khidmatgars. Sind, a

Muslim Province is favourable to the Congress and the Muslim League was pushed out from there with ignominy. Baluchistan, though politically backward, inclines towards the Congress like its neighbour the N.W.F.P. Assam with a 25 per cent Muslim population had a Congress Coalition Government. Bengal has a strong Muslim party opposed to the Fazlul Ministry which has a majority because of the support of the European businessmen. In other Provinces there are usually Muslim groups in the Assemblies apart from, and sometimes larger than, the Muslim League group, and they often side with the Congress. Did you observe how the Congress war resolutions were passed in the Provincial Assemblies with thundering majorities?

7. There is no greater absurdity than to imagine that the Congress has to face a solid Muslim bloc which opposes it. This was obvious enough before, but since the resignation of the Congress ministries, the Muslim League is rapidly becoming a prey to its own disruptive forces. Perhaps I exaggerate or take from my point of view, too optimistic a view. But all these tendencies are there.

8. The basic factors of the situation are these: We are in deadly earnest and we mean exactly what we say—indeed we mean a little more than we say in our resolutions as we have developed a habit of understatement. We are not going to allow ourselves to be caught in an unknown and dangerous adventure unless we know what the objective is and unless we can really control our policy. So long as we suspect that the aims of the war are imperialistic, we shall keep far away from it, and we shall thus serve not only ourselves but others who want to pull out this war from the old ruts. In India it is essential that real power passes to the people. We do not want it. The Congress can be ignored. Let there be an election for the purpose. And a Constituent Assembly to be summoned later to draw up India's Constitution. This must come from the widest mass franchise. We are not thinking in terms of the elite meeting together and deciding. We are not going to associate ourselves with all parties conferences or a gathering got together by the Viceroy. This Constituent Assembly will be formed by agreement with the principal Minorities and will decide upon protection of Minority rights and interests also by agreement. Both Jinnah and Ambedkar have told us that they have no objections to this, but of course one never knows what Jinnah may say later. The door for the Princes to enter this Constituent Assembly will be open, but only on the identical democratic basis as the Provinces. Or else they can keep out and we shall ignore them for the present. We refuse absolutely to make agreement with them a condition precedent—or an agreement with British financial or other vested interests in India.

Yours,
JAWAHARLAL

1. Edward Thompson (1886-1946); friend of Jawaharlal Nehru and supporter of the cause of Indian freedom; novelist, historian and writer on public affairs; his writings include *The Reconstruction of India*; *Enlist India for Freedom*.



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*Arthur Parsons¹ to Laithwaite**Linlithgow Papers, No. 65, pp. 100-02*

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 12 November, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. G.H. 312

My dear Laithwaite,

I send herewith for his Excellency's information a report (in duplicate) for the period ending 12th November together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the second half of October 1939.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,
A.E.B. PARSONS

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL [EXTRACT]

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report No. 21, dated 12 November, 1939

4. Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikandar Hyat pressed Aurangzeb Khan and the leaders of other parties to establish an alternative Ministry. On being informed of the party position Mr. Jinnah sent the following telegram to Aurangzeb Khan. "Form Ministry any cost, even interim Ministry, waverers and others will come afterwards". Later, on being told that a Ministry with a working majority was impossible, he wired: "Your telegram. Great mistake, missing opportunity, form Coalition Ministry, make every sacrifice, let others be Ministers." The idea of an "interim Ministry," which implies a Ministry without popular support, is contrary to the instructions of His Excellency the Viceroy and is a solution to which I, too, am strongly opposed in principle. Neither Aurangzeb Khan nor any other leader is at present capable of commanding more than about 20 votes, so recourse to Section 93 unavoidable. Aurangzeb tells me he has already secured definite promises of support from two of the waverers: the chief obstacle to his making any substantial headway is the public announcement by Dr. Khan Sahib that he and his colleagues will be back in office within two months. Nobody knows the grounds for this assertion, but it has provided effective propaganda for the Congress. The chameleons are not likely to change their colour until they feel quite certain that there is no chance of the Congress returning to office in the near future. To sum up, there is a chance of a Ministry being formed within four months if outside Muslim League leaders lend a hand to rally the necessary support.

5. It is, of course, impossible at this stage to forecast the reactions to the Proclamation under Section 93. I think however, that it is safe to say that the Congress has not got the following it had at the time of the general election. They have lost ground even in Mardan and Peshawar Districts, and are not likely to make it up quickly if the Muslim League start a propaganda campaign in the rural areas to consolidate their position. The Congress party has issued a pamphlet outlining their policy and explaining the cause of the crisis, but it is too long-winded to be successful. No decision has been made in regard to civil disobedience. The Congress leaders have advised their followers not to invite trouble, but to wait for the Government to take the initiative and then to follow the lead given by the All India Congress Committee.

1. Lieut. Colonel Arthur E.B. Parsons, Acting Governor of N.W.F.P., 1939.

*Carl Heath¹ to Gandhi, Nehru and Rajendra Prasad**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. 32*

INDIA CONCILIATION GROUP, WHITEWINGS, MANOR WAY,
GUILDFORD, SURREY, 12 November, 1939

Dear Friends,

I have been asked by the India Conciliation Group, as Chairman to write to you on its behalf upon some of the matters connected with the present difficulties between the British Government and yourselves as representing the Congress Party.

I do so the more willingly because you do know how deeply we are concerned for the freedom of India, and for a right relationship between India and Great Britain, and India and the world. We have as you know, pursued these things for years in a spirit of conciliation and effort at common understanding; both because they are right in themselves and because they are vital factors in the building up of a New Order in human society—and which latter, in a time of fierce war, we are feeling the burden of more than ever.

We have, as a group, been much occupied in discussions, both verbal and by letter, with Lord Zetland and many other outstanding persons, Members of Parliament, public men, editors and journalists and others. We want at this stage to say the following to you, feeling sure that you will not resent the frankness of friends.

First, however, let me say that we have of course recognised from the beginning the outstanding importance of the Congress demand, both to India, and to Great Britain in the world at large. The unwillingness of the British Government to give a simple, prompt and direct answer, even if such answer did not, in the circumstances of war, meet the full claim made, is one we most deeply regret.

I will now state the points we desire to put to you:

1. *Sincerity of the Government:* We are very much convinced here that whatever the past may have been, the effective Governmental attitude at this time, as concerns India, is not a merely imperialistic one, nor that the Minorities question is simply put forward as a convenient ground for retaining control in India. There is manifest a real desire to come to agreement. It appears to us, therefore, that it is no more a true deduction that the Hindu-Muslim tension is being raised by the Government as a mere means to divide and rule, than it is to suggest that the basic and test question put by the Congress was a mere means of seeking to profit by the British Government's war embarrassments. We are not at all concerned to defend the British Government. We are concerned that the situation be realistically conceived in India and that the Congress policy should not rest on a misconception of fact at so critical a point.

2. *Rights of Minorities:* Here in Europe we are observing the crushing out of all the rights of Minorities. There are none left in Central Europe today. We know the views expressed in Congress gatherings and embodied in resolutions affirming respect for such rights. But what is happening in the world, in Europe and in the Far east,

makes it incumbent on Congress, we feel, to go further, and to state with some precision what it would propose to introduce into the Constitution it aims at that would give the Muslims and other Minorities a sense of abiding security, and to public opinion in Great Britain a confidence now lacking, and the want of which stands right in the way of settlement.

3. *Hindu-Muslim tension*: English feeling is that the opposition of the Muslims (expressed in the White Paper) to all democratic advance, is both a serious fact and a dangerous one, and cannot be simply ignored, or treated as a matter Indians may, or may not, settle somehow but to which Great Britain may disinterest herself and suddenly proclaim that she leave India's future to Indians. Great Britain, it may well be said, ought not to be in the position she is in. But as it is she cannot just put aside as of no account, treaties, understandings and promises made in the past to the Muslim rulers and populations. That of course is no reason for delay in answering the Congress question. Rather it is a call to a prompt settlement of the Congress-Muslim League tension so that the question may be answered affirmatively without delay.

Moreover, as concerns the wider world, British people feel that Great Britain needs to carry the Muslim world with her at this time of immense struggle. Any sense that she was unjust and careless in regard to the Muslims of India would have repercussions of a justly serious order right through the Near East.

Hence we are thankful to note in Mr. Prasad's letter to the Viceroy the assurance that it is your intention to pursue the path of the agreement and understanding as between the Congress and the Muslim League. But we do urge you to realise that this is regarded here as a vital and outstanding problem.

4. *The Muslim League complaints of oppression in Congress-ruled Provinces*: A serious situation has been created here by the allegations of Congress oppression made by the Muslim League and published in the appendices to the White Paper. This, of course, has been circulated to all Members of Parliament and to the Press. Such a document goes also to all parts of the world.

We hope, therefore, that you will feel that in these circumstances there must be a full and impartial enquiry into these complaints and a reasoned reply from Congress.

We note, however, that it is not only the Congress party but also the British Government that is involved in as much as a part of the complaint is against the Provincial Governors, accusing them of failure to use their powers of protection. There must, therefore, be some Government enquiry also. Whilst the complaints are held to be probably great exaggerations yet it is felt that there are causes of irritation that need to be met and eliminated.

The resignations of the Congress party Governments is regarded here as a more serious matter. We understand that the Working Committee of Congress felt that there was no alternative, given the failure of the British Government to make the kind of declaration desired. We trust, however, that this development will not result in an entirely impossibilist position. Without supposing that the Congress will weaken in any way in its demand it may be hoped that, if it can effect an understanding with the Muslim League, the Government will then take a step forward. We have reason to think that this might be so.

These questions are much discussed in England at the present time. We trust that you and we will be so guided that the end of the war will see the end of the Indian-British difficulties and India a free nation. But you will, we think, admit that we can only contemplate one path thereto—the path of understanding, free discussion, and agreement. We are always urging on our fellow-countrymen a deeper comprehension of the Indian struggle, a greater sympathy and a repentance of, and standing away from, the old imperial domination and tradition. In this work we claim your continued cooperation and willingness to seek to understand the better mind of Great Britain, so that there may be joint effort in the spirit of the admirable article by Mr Nehru in the London *News Chronicle* of October 9th last.

With sincere greetings
On behalf of the India Conciliation Group
(Sd/-) CARL HEATH
Chairman

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1. Carl Heath, Chairman, India Conciliation Group.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Fazlul Huq

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 464-65

ALLAHABAD, 13 November, 1939

Dear Mr. Fazlul Huq,

Thank you for your letter of November 4 which I have only just received owing to my absence from Allahabad. I am sorry to learn that you have been unwell.

Like yourself I am eager that charges made against the Congress Ministries should be investigated and so far as I am concerned I shall do my best in the matter. But I do not understand how you propose to deal with the question. In your statement which was published in the Press you accused the then U.P. Government by name and mentioned certain instances which referred to as atrocities for which the Government was reasonable. I completely agree that these charges against the U.P. Government should be inquired into by you and me and I suggested in my letter to you that some kind of charge-sheet might be framed for the purpose by you specifying exactly what was complained against. The next step to this should be to ask the Government concerned for their reply. Having received this material further inquiry should be conducted. Any other course would be most unbusiness like and is likely to lead nowhere. The U.P. Government, as it then existed, exists no more. But the old Ministers still exist and the present U.P. Government will no doubt give facilities to find out the truth of any matter. This present Government will certainly not err on the Congress side and if anything, is likely to incline against the Congress.

May I suggest to you, therefore, that you might take the three U.P. instances to which you had referred and elaborate them, pointing out what exactly the charge is. We shall then send this both to the ex-Ministers concerned and to the present U.P. Government.

After dealing with the U.P. we might proceed with Bihar in the same way. I do not understand how any inquiry can be made without this preliminary investigation and without an opportunity being given to the persons accused of misgovernment to state their case. As Premier of your Province you will no doubt realise that it is unusual and extraordinary for any charge to be made against a Government without that Government being given a chance to explain its position.

While I am perfectly agreeable to spend time and energy on such an inquiry with you, you will appreciate that my time is booked up considerably in advance and during these critical days it is not easy to upset my engagements. But the procedure I have suggested above can be followed in spite of other engagements which might keep you or me occupied.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajendra Prasad

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 376-77

ALLAHABAD, 14 November, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Masani¹ has just given me your letter of the 12th² and I hasten to reply. I am fully conscious of the fears that are troubling you in regard to the communal talks. All the dangers you point out are present. So far as I am concerned, I am certainly not going to fall into any trap. We shall speak about this more later when we meet. Meanwhile my own view is that the communal question does not arise now and Jinnah is not interested in having any talks. His interest in this question was purely political and with the resignation of the Congress Ministries a situation has been created which prevents him from tackling the question in his own way. If he talks to me now I cannot possibly discuss Provincial or Central political matters because all this depends on the British declaration which is not forthcoming. All I can talk is about purely communal questions and this does not interest Jinnah. The result is that he is waiting for political developments before having any talk with me. I am quite content.

I think we should studiously avoid any discussion of the communal problem except on the basis indicated above. Therefore, I do not quite see how we are going to discuss this at the next meeting of the Working Committee. I have not quite appreciated the manner of Bapu's references to the communal problem³ recently as the problem in front of the political problem which we are facing now.

From this point of view there is no point in discussing the communal problem with the Jamiat or with the Sikhs. But it is perfectly true that the Jamiat and other Muslims as also the Sikhs are alarmed and annoyed at our talks with Jinnah while they are being ignored by us. It seems to me necessary, therefore, for us to meet them and to explain the situation fully to them and then discuss the political aspect of the problem facing us.

I would, therefore, suggest to you that Mufti Kifayatullah might be invited as also one or two representatives of the Akali Dal. Also Master Tara Singh to represent the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee which is rather wobbly. They need not be invited to participate in the Working Committee meeting but to meet some of us for a private talk. I think the 20th November will be the right date as Bapu will be silent then.

I am very sorry to learn that you had another attack of asthma.

I am writing this letter in haste but I hope I have made myself clear. More when we meet.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL

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1. M.R. Masani (1905-); Joint Secretary, Congress Socialist Party, 1934-39; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1947-48, and Lok Sabha 1949-52, 1957-62 and 1963-71; President, Swatantra Party, 1970-71; author of *Our India*.
 2. In his letter Rajendra Prasad wrote that by offering not to accept "any Constitution which will not have the support and concurrence of the Minorities and particularly Muslims" they would be placing a veto in Jinnah's hand. As Jinnah had stated that he was "ready to make up with the Congress and Hindus on the basis of equality" which he would interpret as "a division of power on equal shares—half for Muslims and half for Hindus leaving all others to be included in one half or the other." Rajendra Prasad felt doubtful of any settlement. (SWJN, X, p. 376 n. 2)
 3. 14th November 1939, Mahatma Gandhi in an article entitled *Opinions Differ*, said, "British refusal to make the required declaration of Britains War aims about India has perhaps come as a blessing in disguise. It removes the Congress out of the way to enable the Muslim League to make its choice unfettered by the Congress administration in eight Provinces as to whether it will keep the British Yoke by vivisectioning India or whether it will fight for the independence of an undivided India". (SWJN, X, p. 377 n. 3)

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Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 204/28-39

8 ZAKARIA STREET, CALCUTTA, 14 November, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you for your kind letter from New Delhi regarding the need of an independent Muslim English Daily. I will try to meet Mr. Ispahani as advised by you

but I am afraid unless you actively support and sponsor such a plan even morally, there is little hope of its materialization. Sir Adamji Haji Dawood¹ and Mirza Ahmed Ispahani² have made Crores of money in the present boom in the Jute market. Both of them are Vice-Presidents of the Bengal Muslim League and I am confident that if you only convince them of the primary supreme and urgent need of an independent Muslim League Daily in English and show them the way to do it they will be ready to contribute substantial funds for its finance. I had also talks with Mr. Fazlul Huq on the subject. He intends to take over the "*Star of India*" or start a new daily under his own direction with the support of a limited company. In my opinion, the best thing to do will be to equip the *Star* with its own Press, appoint Muslim Editors, liberate it from the clutches of the Anglo-Indians and convert it into a full-fledged Muslim League Daily with closest contact with Muslim feelings and Islamic spirit and culture. It will revolutionise our movement.

The Muslims of Calcutta have listened to your *Id* broadcast with greatest interest. It has been loudly applauded and widely appreciated. Muslims are overjoyed over the fact that their one and accredited leader realizes the real spirit of Islam as a religion of faith, action and a special social world order. I congratulate you on your first and most successful religious sermon.³

There is, however, an under-current of apprehension in Muslim mind including the high League and Ministerial circles. Your references to "Muslim rights and claims in future India" and the words "But we shall not be obstinate about them . . ." have aroused deepest concern in the Muslim mind. They have produced misunderstandings. The Muslims believe in the message of immortal Iqbal "Be hard and work hard for he who is steel is everything."

I hope you will please explain this passage of your most excellent radio speech.

Yours sincerely,
RAGHIB AHSAN
General Secretary,
Calcutta Muslim League

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1. Khan Sahib Sir Adamji Dawood (d. 1948), belonged to Kathiawar, Gujarat; leader of the Calcutta Memon Community; founder of the largest Muslim Industrialist Group in India; founder of Calcutta Muslim Chamber of Commerce and Industry; major financial supporter of Muslim League.
 2. Mirza Abul Hasan Ispahani (1902-81); Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937; President, Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1945-47; Joint Secretary, Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1936-37; its Treasurer, 1936-47; Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee; Member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947.
 3. Jinnah's talk broadcast on 13 November, 1939 laid stress on discipline, love and tolerance and was appreciated by all communities.



Fortnightly Report on the Political Situation in Bengal for the first half of November, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-11/39, pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Political-Public opinion had not expected the Delhi talks to be broken off by a curt refusal of Congress to consider the problems proposed for settlement by the Viceroy. Whilst conversations were proceeding it seemed to be recognised that the object was to achieve some form of communal agreement. Press criticism was for the most part confined to speculations on both sides whether their representatives would give anything away. Failure was from the first announced to be inevitable, but on both sides there was clearly a disposition to expect that some agreement might be reached. This is evident from the fear expressed in Congress and Hindu papers lest the Congress position should be betrayed by acceding to Mr. Jinnah's demands and by doubts of Mr. Gandhi's firmness as a negotiator in communal questions. Muslim opinion on the other hand feared that Mr. Jinnah might not prove firm enough. This line of comment continued for sometime even after the publication of the correspondence had shown that the possibilities of communal agreement had not in fact been effectively discussed. Congress and Hindu papers continued to denounce Mr. Jinnah for his intransigence and for what was represented as a constantly expanding list of demands. It was, however, later recognized that the circumstances in which the talks had fallen through means that attention must be diverted to the wider problems of constitutional advance. In the Congress and Hindu papers the line taken was as usual that the problem of Minorities was entirely factitious, that democratic principles could not be followed except by leaving such Minorities as actually might exist to make their own terms with the majority, and that Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League had no right to claim that they represented unanimous Muslim opinion in view of the substantial numbers of Muslims who repudiated him. Emphasis was laid upon the fact that wrong approach had been made to the problem created by the Congress demand. The Viceroy's goodwill and sincerity in inviting conversations were recognised; but it was represented that he was little more than a puppet of the Secretary of State whose speech in the House of Lords was declared to have closed the door to negotiations, to have indicated that Britain intended to keep India in subjection indefinitely and to have justified the conclusion that one pretext after another would be seized in order to postpone constitutional advance. Approval was given to quotations from Lord Samuel's speech and to an article in the *Manchester Guardian* suggesting that, although communal differences existed, Great Britain might not be guiltless of action which had encouraged their growth to such dimensions. Deep satisfaction however has throughout been felt by Muslims and Minorities that their claims will not be disregarded. Recently moreover there are indications that the importance of a settlement on the Minority question is again being recognised. The

promised resumption of conversations between Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Nehru was universally welcomed, and although some scepticism was expressed at the possible outcome of such negotiations, the *Hindustan Standard* has proclaimed that it will be difficult for the next meeting of the All India Congress Working Committee to ignore the problem of the Hindu-Muslim differences, that "concrete issues must be faced on both sides in a spirit of give and take" and even that an understanding between the Congress on the one hand and the Muslims and the Princes on the other "might make it unnecessary to press for constituent assembly." The view expressed by *Advance* that "British opinion sooner or later is bound to be favouring the idea of a free India" also shows that the door to a further exploration of the position is not thought to be closed and the Viceroy's announcement that he would resume negotiation is generally approved. An interesting suggestion appeared in the *Statesman* that the intractability of the Congress attitude was due to a confusion of democracy with party Government, represented as being unsuited to present conditions, which were moving towards "the older and better wisdom of the East, the Majlis"—this is a neat and tactful allusion to what has elsewhere been characterised as the growing totalitarianism of the Congress philosophy. The proposal of the Radical Congressmen, however, that Coalition Governments should be formed in the Congress Provinces receives no support.

General relief is evident that the termination of the talks at Delhi did not result in any immediate action likely to embarrass Government. Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose indeed has called for vigorous and immediate action. Nor is there any lack of impatience expressed at Mr. Gandhi's inactivity, "uncertainty" and "hesitation" or of appeals to be ready to do something. In fact, however, no definite programme of action has been publicly canvassed.

The prominence given to the communal question has had a reflection in further mutual recriminations between the two communities in Bengal. The Hon'ble Mr. Fazlul Huq's charges against the ministries of the United Provinces and Assam and his announcement of his ambition to retire from politics and devote himself to the furtherance of Muslim interests through the Press have brought down upon him a storm of abuse much of which is in the most deplorable taste. Hindus have repudiated Mr. Gandhi's reference to the communal award and his claim that it has been loyally accepted by the Congress, and the hope is expressed that Mr. Gandhi, who (judged by his attitude to the communal award and the part he played in the Poona Pact) is represented in Bengal as an unreliable negotiator in communal matters, will have nothing to do with any future communal settlement.

In the Rajshahi district disappointment at the failure of His Excellency the Viceroy to bring about an agreement between Congress and the Muslim League has been expressed by the more sober sections of the communities and rejection by Congress of the Viceregal proposals is regarded as a victory for the Left. Some deterioration of the situation is reported from Chittagong where increased activity on the part of ex-detenus is mentioned. There are also indications in the Rajshahi Division that Left Wing Congressmen are making preparations for some sort of anti-war campaign or civil disobedience movement. At Chandpur in the Tippera district Mr. Subhas Bose told an audience of ex-detenus and political suspects to prepare for the coming fight.

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*Fazlul Huq to Nehru**Congress Government, pp. 269-70*

CALCUTTA, 16 November, 1939

Thank you very much for your letter of November 13, from Allahabad. Since I wrote to you last I have been in communication with my friends, both Hindu and Muslim, in the various Provinces in order to collect material for making out an effective tour programme. My idea is to collect reports as much as possible and then select a few typical cases. We can then go to the localities, send for the people, hear them, take evidence, and, if we find a *prima facie* case made out, we shall then decide what to do.

I wish to make one point absolutely clear. It is not from a spirit of vindictiveness or from any feeling of spite against the Congress Ministries that I am insisting on this investigation. I am very definitely of the opinion that there cannot be any lasting peace in the country unless the two major communities learn to trust each other and that they will not learn unless all causes of suspicion lurking in the mind of one against the other have been removed.

If on investigation it is found that the charges were groundless and unfounded, it would be due to the Congress Ministers for the Musalmans to say publicly that the Congress Ministers were not to blame. If, on the other hand, the charges are well-founded, we should take precautions that these things may not happen in the future. At the present moment the position is that Muslims make the charges and the Congress Ministers deny them. There is no adjudication of the points at issue and different people hold different views as to whether the charges are true or not. All this has got to be removed and the question of guilt or innocence definitely cleared and decided.

I feel that if you and I could meet and visit some of the typical localities, we might be able to come to a definite conclusion. If on the whole we find that the Congress Ministers have made mistakes, it would be a graceful act on their part to make a public acknowledgement. If on the other hand we find that the main charges have failed, it will not be necessary to bother about the minor incidents, and we can at once declare that the Congress Ministers stand absolved of all blame.

I have been unwell and I am yet not quite fit for work. I do not agree with you when you say that the present U.P. or other (Section 93) Governments are likely to incline against the Congress. I do not think this is the correct position. Somehow or other the officials from the highest downwards have to bear the brunt of the charges and they are themselves in the position of the accused. They will, therefore, try to belittle the charges and to support the Congress, not because they are in sympathy with the Congress, but because they are both in the dock together.

I am extremely busy at the present moment with the arrival of the new Governor and the opening of the two Houses of the Legislature for the winter session.

Hope you are keeping well.

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*Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Puckle [Extract]**Home Department (Special) No. S.D.-4250*

BOMBAY, 17 November, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Puckle,

I am desired to submit my report for the first half of November 1939.

3. Mr. M.A. Jinnah was accorded a public reception by the Bombay Provincial Muslim League and other Muslim League organisations on his arrival from Delhi on the 7th November. The same evening he addressed a public meeting on "the present political situation in the country." He pointed out that he was always ready for Hindu-Muslim unity provided the unity was based as between equals. The Muslim League was not prepared to accept the claim of the Congress to have the sole right to frame a Constitution for the future Government of India nor the similar claim made by the British Government. He wound up his speech by appealing to the Congress leaders to face realities and to attempt to solve the problems of India in the light of those realities.

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*Nehru to Fazlul Huq [Extract]**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 465-66*

ALLAHABAD, 18 November, 1939

Dear Mr. Fazlul Huq,

I thank you for your letter of November 16, 1939. I note that you are very busy at the present moment and that you will communicate with me again on the subject.

5. The question before us relates to the behaviour of the Congress Ministers and not to local officials and the like. This behaviour of the Congress Ministry depends on their general policy as well as the particular orders issued by them to the local officials. All these can only be got from headquarters and not locally.

6. I am personally quite willing to have the local investigation on a particular case where this is necessary. But this can follow other real investigation.

8. I entirely agree with you that we shall proceed about this business without any spirit of vindictiveness or any feeling or spite, but with a desire to get at the truth and to remove misapprehensions. It is our earnest desire that Hindus and Muslims as well as others who live in India should learn to trust each other and should remove all suspicions which might lurk in their minds of each other's motives.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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*Fortnightly Report on the Political Events of Bihar During the First Half of
November, 1939 [Extract]*

Political Department, Special Section, F. 18-11/39, pp. 1-2

18 November, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

A large section of the public believe that Mahatma Gandhi will soon find some excuse for asking the Congress to accept office again and that as a result of further conversations between Messrs. Jinnah and Nehru Coalition Ministries may be formed in the Congress Provinces.

2. At a Muslim League meeting held in Hathwa in the district of Saran, Mr. Aziz reiterated that Muslims had no quarrel with the Hindus as such and that his only objection was to the present Congress High Command and the way in which the Congress Ministries had treated Muslims. Members of the Muslim League are generally satisfied that the League has been given prominence by the British Government; but not a few among them entertain the fear that the blame for the breakdown of the communal talks will be laid at the doors of the Muslim League and that when the Congress resumes power again it will try to teach the League a lesson. But on the whole Muslims are pleased at the Congress going out of office and even Hindu opinion is divided as to the wisdom of the policy of resignations.

Except a welcome extended to the Khaksars who have returned to their homes from Lucknow, there has been no indication of any other Khaksar activity in the province during the fortnight. The Hindu Sabha has also been fairly quiet except that in a meeting at Monghyr held on the Hindu Nation Day (27th October 1939) there was a good deal of talk of "India for the Hindus."

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Proceedings of the Congress Working Committee [Extract]

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 237-38

ALLAHABAD, 19-23 November, 1939

2. The Working Committee's unequivocal demand was for a declaration of war aims in regard to democracy and imperialism and in particular how these aims were going to be applied to India. These aims could only be considered worthy if they included the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as an independent nation whose policy would be guided in accordance with the wishes of her people. The answer to this demand has been entirely unsatisfactory and an attempt has been

made on behalf of the British Government to create misunderstandings and to befog the main and moral issue. In justification of this refusal to make a declaration in terms of the Working Committee's resolution, communal pleas have been advanced and the rights of Minorities and of the Princes pleaded as a barrier to India's freedom. The Committee wish to declare with all emphasis that no communal considerations arise in meeting the demand of Congress, and the Minorities, whatever their other differences might be, do not oppose India's right to freedom and independence. The Princes are represented by, and are the emblems of, the paramount Power of India. In the end it will be the people of the Indian States who will determine what part they will take in a free India, though the British Government has consistently ignored their wishes in a matter which vitally affects them. In any event the wishes of those who may oppose India's independence are, and must be, irrelevant to the declaration of the British Government's intentions. The Committee can only interpret this attempt to avoid a statement of war aims and Indian freedom, by taking shelter under irrelevant issues, as a desire to maintain imperialist domination in India in alliance with the reactionary elements in the country.

3. The Congress has looked upon the war crisis and the problems it raises as essentially a moral issue, and has not sought to profit by it in any spirit of bargaining. The moral and dominant issue of war aims and India's freedom has to be settled satisfactorily before any other subsidiary question can be considered. In no event can the Congress accept the responsibility of Government, even in the transitional period, without real power being given to Popular representatives. The Working Committee, therefore, approve of and endorse the reply dated November 4, 1939 sent by the Congress President to the Viceroy.

4. The Committee wish to declare again that the recognition of India's independence and of the right of her people to frame their Constitution through a Constituent Assembly, is essential in order to remove the taint of imperialism from Britain's policy and to enable the Congress to consider further cooperation. They hold that a Constituent Assembly is the only democratic method of determining the Constitution of a free country, and no one who believes in democracy and freedom can possibly take exception to it. The Working Committee believe too that the Constituent Assembly alone is the adequate instrument for solving the communal and other difficulties. This, however, does not mean that the Working Committee will relax their efforts for arriving at a solution of the communal problem. This Assembly can frame a constitution in which the rights of accepted minorities would be protected to their satisfaction, and in the event of some matters relating to minority rights not being mutually agreed to, they can be referred to arbitration. The Constituent Assembly should be elected on the basis of adult suffrage, existing separate electorates being retained for such minorities as desire them. The number of members in the Assembly should reflect their numerical strength.



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*Reginald Maxwell to Laithwaite**V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 22-30*

NEW DELHI, 20 November, 1939

My dear Laithwaite,

I am writing in reply to your letter of the 15th November regarding the Muslim claims put forward in Mr. Jinnah's letter of the 5th November. I have obtained the views of Thorne,¹ Puckle and Lewis on these papers, and have also, after reference to you, discussed them with Ewart. I have further consulted His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding Jinnah's point (4). From all these sources I have obtained useful comments and suggestions which I have embodied in my following remarks with such mention of their individual views as appears to be necessary.

2. It is evident that Jinnah's letter raises points of fundamental importance, the full consideration of which would take us to the roots of our constitutional policy in India. This fact gives rise to a preliminary point which has been suggested to me by Lewis as regards the nature of the reply which can be sent to the latter. If Jinnah's points are of extreme political importance to Muslims, they are of equal importance to other communities and cannot safely be dealt with in an *ex parte* reply. Such a reply would itself be a contravention of Jinnah's point No. (2) viz., that no declaration of constitutional importance should be made without consulting both the Muslims and the Hindus, and he cannot, therefore, press for a categorical answer at once. Indeed, if it were proposed that His Majesty's Government should make a statement or declaration on matters of such importance as those referred to in Jinnah's points (1) and (2) [and really also (4)], it would not be in accordance with usual practice to embody it in the reply to an individual letter of this kind. It would more appropriately take the form of a formal statement, whether in Parliament or otherwise, of the policy of His Majesty's Government. We are, therefore, very much limited in the scope of our reply to Jinnah and cannot probe very deeply into all the implications of his points. But a somewhat non-committal reply would be more acceptable if an indication could be given that his requests would form the subject of a further statement to be made by His Majesty's Government in due course. This will be one reason for not entering into much argument in the reply to Jinnah. Another reason is the fact that in advancing any arguments against Jinnah's demands or in stressing the limitations under which they can be accepted we shall, in fact, be helping the Congress case against the Muslim demands: whereas our object at the present juncture is rather to maintain the confidence of Muslims in the intention of His Majesty's Government to give full weight to their special circumstances. Our reply should, therefore, be as encouraging as is reasonably possible.

3. Before examining Jinnah's points individually it may be useful to consider some of the more general aspects of the Muslim attitude towards the present constitutional prospects in India. It is apparent from paragraphs 3, 10 and 11 of your

letter that His Excellency is fully conscious of the fundamental nature of their difficulties and is prepared to enter into discussion with the Secretary of State on this subject. There can be no question, I think, that experience of Provincial Autonomy has not worked quite in the way which we hoped. It has clearly tended to intensify the antagonism between the two major communities and has brought the Muslims to a stage at which they are prepared for open revolt against an extension of Hindu domination to the Central Government. Whether Provincial Autonomy had a longer innings in the Congress Provinces a *modus vivendi* would have been arrived at between the two communities it is difficult to say. It is possible that the real solution would have been joint electorates, but although responsible Muslim opinion is now veering in this direction it would still be impossible to convince the Muslim rank and file. It is doubtful whether Jinnah would even now wish for a revision of Provincial Autonomy in a retrogressive sense, since he must know that any such revision would react against the freedom of Muslim Government in the Muslim Provinces, where the Hindu Minorities, would have to share any additional safeguards or privileges proposed for the Muslim Minorities in Congress Provinces. Jinnah would perhaps say that where Muslim Governments exist superior tolerance has been shown to the Minorities and he might point to the fact that it is only in Congress Provinces that communal tension has been severe. This latter fact may not be true, but in any case it could be explained by the greater aggressiveness of the Muslims where they form a minority. I am inclined to think, however, that the situation in the Provinces is stressed mainly as a reason for Muslim anxiety regarding their position after Federation, and that they, like the Hindus, are chiefly interested in the Federal Constitution. It is the prospect of further developments in this direction which has lately brought things to a head, and we are now confronted with a demand for an altogether different appreciation of the status of the Muslims in these constitutional discussions.

4. This being the position we are, as His Excellency has noted, brought face to face with the two major questions, (1) whether democracy based on majority Government is suited to Indian conditions, and (2) what the real status of Muslims should be in relation to the constitutional problem in India.

On the first point it must be admitted that even in autonomous Provinces conditions for the working of democratic institutions on Western lines do not yet exist. At the outset of Provincial Autonomy we find ourselves faced with a system of permanent majorities and permanent minorities based broadly on communal distinctions and not on party lines as understood in England. There can be no truly responsible Government on such a basis. Moreover, even in so far as Congress represents a political party without distinction of community its identity as a party rests solely on a programme of securing independence for India which on the face of it has nothing to do with provincial problems. In course of time the development of local programmes and possibly the splitting up of the Congress might have led to the formation of real parties, but so far there have been few signs that any such development would eliminate the rival principle of division on the basis of religion or community, and this is a factor which rests outside Western democratic conceptions and makes their true working impossible. If this is really the case, we may have made a false start in imagining that democracy could be applied to India on the lines of the present Constitution.

5. I now turn to the question of Muslim status in India. This is a question which arises rather in regard to the process of framing a Constitution than in regard to the working of a Constitution when framed, and I think a recognition of this fact will be of value. That is to say, if the Muslims were satisfied that in the revision of the present Constitution or in the framing of any fresh Constitution their status as an independent cultural entity would entitle them to an equal voice with the Hindus, it is not unlikely that the communal rivalry which now makes it impossible for them to take a purely national view of any question would tend to disappear. I was interested to find that both Puckle and Ewart had independently arrived at this prescription as a solution of the Muslim demands, and I am inclined to think that this is the real objective underlying Jinnah's second point. The case is well argued in a note given to me by Ewart, whom I had asked to set down his views on this subject, which I reproduce here:

"The historical and political truth about the Muslims in India is that their status depends less on their numerical strength in India than on their being an important element in the Muslim world of Western Asia and Northern Africa. The communal problem in India in both its social and political repercussions is, on the contrary, treated generally from the aspect of counting heads. I think there is one ground for hoping that if we could get the case removed from the counting of heads basis, the Muslim distrust and apprehension could be considerably reduced and as a consequence, concrete demands, such as those put forward by Mr. Jinnah, might be discussed in a more accommodating attitude and might be considerably modified. The real situation is that the Hindus with all their majority have an exclusively Indian influence, whereas the real importance of the Muslims lies not in their numbers in India, or even in their importance as a community from the purely Indian point of view, but in the fact that they represent the influence in India of the world power of Islam. However, more Hindus would dislike a statement on these lines, it cannot be escaped as a fact. There comes a stage when the condition of Muslims in India becomes an important interest of Muslims generally, just as, conversely, the condition of Muslims elsewhere becomes an interest of Muslims in India. No political or constitutional device for allotting spheres and proportions to Hindus and Muslims will remove or alter this fundamental reality. The Hindu conception of their majority status is, in fact, their answer to this Islamic world homogeneousness. His Excellency has noted that Muslims as part of Islam must be a matter of concern to His Majesty's Government. I venture to suggest that not only is this true but the fact must be openly stated to and accepted by the Hindus. It seems to me just possible that the clear statement and gradual acceptance of this position instead of the counting of heads outlook would do more than anything else to ameliorate the communal situation, which is at present founded on inferiority complexes from both sides more than on anything else."

This is clearly a point of view which demands urgent consideration and a decision of policy. It is quite possible that in the constitutional experiment embodied in the 1935 Act we have underrated the solidarity and independence of the Muslim community, and in leaving them in the position of a permanent minority in a number of Provinces and in India as a whole we have asked them to submit to an impossible arrangement. If this is the case, a clear declaration on the subject of Muslim status

and rights would be of profound importance to India and would probably have reactions in other Muslim countries. It is also worth noting that some at least of the Hindu Princes, who interpret Federation as meaning Congress domination, have privately expressed a readiness to join hands with the Muslims rather than trust their destinies to the Congress: just as the Muslims themselves would rather see a perpetuation of British rule than endure Hindu supremacy.

6. The considerations which I have mentioned above have an important bearing on the aspects of the constitutional position brought out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your letter, with which I can only agree. But I would go further than the conclusions suggested in those paragraphs and say that if the premises are granted, they come very near to an indictment of the whole scheme of constitutional progress in India to which Parliament have hitherto pinned their faith. If this is so, things cannot be allowed to drift and we must take stock of the position as soon as possible. That situation, therefore, points to the necessity of a very early and fundamental reconsideration of our whole policy and an announcement of the conclusions reached.

7. I now turn to Jinnah's specific points

Point (1): My impression is that this point is more far-reaching than is recognised in paragraph 4 of your letter. It is nothing less than a demand that the whole of the 1935 Act should be scrapped and that we should start again with a clean slate. It is true that the declaration of His Majesty's Government did not limit the scope of revision, but that revision was clearly contemplated as a process of modifying the scheme of the present Act. Any categorical assent to Jinnah's point would, I think, come as a shock to the Congress, although, as His Excellency has remarked, they have played into the hands of the Muslims in securing a reopening of the constitutional position. At the same time, Jinnah himself is not altogether invulnerable in this respect since he would risk the loss of all the special concessions which the Muslims managed to secure at the time of the constitutional discussions. Moreover, it is not part of the attitude of Muslim majority Governments, or at any rate that of the Prime Minister of the Punjab, that progress in those Provinces should be set back for the sake only of the Muslim minority provinces, on whose support Jinnah, of course, largely relies. It would not, however, I think be advisable that the reply on this point should merely refer to previous declarations or statements of which Jinnah is already aware. We could help him to some extent by not stressing the purely revisional aspect of the promised reconsideration but at the same time we must avoid defining His Majesty's Government's intentions in his words. Perhaps it would be safe to say that His Majesty's Government's declaration does not exclude any part of the Constitution Act from the reconsideration promised at the end of the war, and that the extent to which the whole or part of the scheme of the Act then comes under revision will be determined only by the wishes of the representatives of the various interests to be taken into consultation with His Majesty's Government. Lewis, to whom I have shown this suggestion, agrees entirely with this form of reply.

8. *Point (2):* Close examination of this demand shows that it is so loosely stated (or so dangerously wide) that a precise reply is very difficult. As already pointed out, if it were taken literally it would preclude any reply to Jinnah's own points (1) and (2) without consulting the Hindus also. Again it leaves vague the question who is to

give approval or consent on behalf of the two major communities, or how otherwise His Majesty's Government is to ascertain their consent. It will be noted also that Jinnah does not speak of the consent of the "Congress" (as assumed in your paragraph 5) but uses the term "Hindus." He has not made it clear who is to be taken as representing the Hindus, but it will be seen that he implicitly throws all the non-Mohammadan minorities into the category of Hindus without proposing to give them any separate voice. On his proposal the Depressed Classes would presumably have to be represented by the Hindu Mahasabha. This attitude is of course typical of the Muslim point of view. Jinnah recognises only two categories, Muslim and non-Muslim, and leaves the latter to look after themselves. But even as regards the Muslims Jinnah does not make it clear whether the Muslim League is to be taken as representing the Muslims of the North-West Frontier Province who have hitherto supported the Congress.

9. This question of ascertaining the existence or extent of agreement to any constitutional proposals is really the crux of Constitution-making in this country, and cannot be slurred over. It involves the whole question of the machinery through which the promised consultations can be brought about and an authoritative verdict obtained. If we could find a satisfactory answer we should have solved the whole question of a Constituent Assembly and should very nearly have solved the constitutional question itself. As matters stand, however, the demand for agreement merely carries existing difficulties into another context without solving them. Much preliminary work is, in fact, necessary before we can even set about ascertaining agreement. The various interests whose separate assent is necessary have to be identified; the bodies representing them to be recognised; the leaders qualified to speak for these bodies to be accredited; the relative number of representatives to be settled; and the extent to which each group is to have a decisive voice. It is only after settling all these preliminary procedural questions that we can say what is meant by a veto.

When we have arrived at conclusions on all these points the next question which arises is how far should His Majesty's Government abrogate their responsibilities so far as the acceptance of agreement or veto is concerned? His Majesty's Government have not hitherto limited themselves to the acceptance only of what is agreed upon by all Minorities down to the last detail, and to that extent they have retained more liberty of action than the Congress themselves, in so far as the latter have pledged themselves to proceed only with the agreement of all Minorities. It must, of course, always be an open question how far any minority can be allowed to block progress, but there is little doubt that if His Majesty's Government retained a deciding voice on this point they would in practice be unable to sustain the objections of small Minorities in the face of any substantial agreement between Congress and the Muslim League. This is the danger of accepting any formula depending on either agreement or veto, and it is necessary to save the position that the policy of His Majesty's Government will be determined not solely by agreement or disagreement but also by the merits of the case, including, of course, world factors after the war which are not within the cognizance of politicians in India.

Evidently it would be possible to give Jinnah a reply on this point which would

have considerable propaganda value, but Lewis agrees with me that it would be better and safer not to enter into any lengthy argument, even to the extent of explaining the impracticability of a veto. The issues involved are, in fact, too fundamental to be dealt with in a reply to Jinnah, and as indicated above, the real demand underlying this point is that the status of the Muslims should receive recognition on entirely new lines. I find it extremely difficult to suggest a really useful reply at this stage. Lewis' suggestion is that something general should be said mainly on the procedural aspect e.g., that His Majesty's Government would ensure that the method of ascertaining minority views would be such as to secure full representation of their interests. Puckle suggests a reply to the effect that His Majesty's Government hope that a Constitution will be framed by agreement between the two communities but owing to their responsibility for the whole of India they must be the ultimate judges of the objections of any minority. He would also go further and point out that the fact that a Constitution is intended to take a democratic form does not necessarily mean that the process of forming it must be conducted on the basis of counting heads. Here, however, we should see too near to a commitment on the major question of policy, while the first part of Puckle's suggested reply might, I think, give rise to the apprehension that His Majesty's Government would in the end overrule Muslim objections. I confess that I do not much like either of these lines of reply. We want something more definite and more encouraging. I suggest as a possibility that we might say that while Jinnah's point involves questions which cannot be dealt with in the scope of the present reply, since they concern also other communities, the Muslims may rest assured that in any constitutional proposals which they may frame His Majesty's Government will give the opinion of the Muslims the full weight to which their importance as a community entitles them. I also like a form of words suggested to me by Thorne, viz., that while retaining their own responsibility His Majesty's Government recognise that no Constitution can be workable which is not acceptable to the two major communities of India. Perhaps a reply combining some of the points suggested above might commend itself to His Excellency.

10. *Point (3)*: This point looks simple, but Ewart points out that there may be a catch in it since if His Majesty's Government undertook to meet the reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine, it would be difficult for them, when challenged, to escape a similar undertaking in regard to the reasonable demands of Muslims in India. In Palestine at any rate our view of what is reasonable for the Arabs has been influenced not only by their own merits—for as a community I believe they are deserving of little respect—but by the support which they have obtained from the rest of Islam, and Islam might similarly be invoked to support unreasonable demands in this country. I would, therefore, agree with the somewhat cautious reply proposed in your paragraph 6. Ewart suggests that it might be embellished by some allusion to the peaceful situation at present existing in Palestine which indicates that the demands of the Arabs have largely been satisfied.

11. *Point (4)*: It is clear that Jinnah has not fully thought out the implications of this demand and that, had he done so, it would have been expressed in far more cautious terms. Taken at its face value, it amounts to no less than a denial to India of

the right of defence against any Muslim country except on Indian soil. Moreover, it is clearly inconsistent with Dominion Status at any time, since it contemplates that any future Dominion Government in India would be bound for all time by a declaration made by His Majesty's Government in their present capacity. Jinnah, no doubt, had Palestine primarily in view when he put forward this demand but as Ewart points out, there is the possibility that the Indian troops now in Egypt might be wanted to put down internal disturbances directed against the present Government of that country. Such a situation would give rise to great difficulty since it would be impossible to ask a Hindu or a Sikh Company to take action in which a Muslim Company of the same regiment could not be asked to join. From this point of view it would be a mistake to use Indian troops in suppressing internal disorder in Egypt. On the other hand, it is not impossible that situations might arise in Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan, in which Indian troops might have to be used in support of the existing Government against revolt instigated by Russia, and in some of these eventualities it is probable that the use of Indian troops would have the full support of the Muslims in India. The Commander-in-Chief has explained to me that His Majesty's Government have been specially asked more than once and have undertaken not to employ Indian troops overseas where they would come into conflict with Muslims. Actually at present the only possible theatre is Palestine and His Majesty's Government have, I understand, issued instruction that Indian troops are not to be used for internal security purposes there. The reply suggested in paragraph 7 of your letter would, I think, be quite satisfactory, but it is desired to simplify it in order to make it still more reassuring, it would be possible to say that the question raised is hypothetical, since at present His Majesty's Government are at peace with all Muslim powers. It is impossible to give a guarantee in such wide terms as those suggested, which would have the effect of limiting India's right of using its own army in its own defence in circumstances which cannot now be foreseen; but in the present situation every precaution has been taken by His Majesty's Government at the instance of the Government of India to avoid any risk, of such a contingency arising. This reply has been drafted on lines suggested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and Ewart, to whom I have shown it, thinks it would be satisfactory.

12. There is one more point raised in the penultimate paragraph of Jinnah's letter and referred to in your paragraph 8. On this point Thorne has expressed some doubt whether it would adequately be met by a reference to a post-war settlement i.e. by linking it to point (1). Although Jinnah has agreed that this question should be shelved while Congress Ministries are not in office it is possible, as Thorne points out, that if a prospect appeared of these Ministries returning to office during the war the Muslim League might not tolerate quietly the resumption of Provincial Autonomy on the old footing. It would, therefore, be better to acquiesce tacitly in Jinnah's shelving of "the question of securing justice and fair play to the Musalmans" in the Congress Provinces than to say anything implying the view that the question will not arise until after the war.

13. I have noticed the suggestions conveyed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Secretary of State's letter of the 2nd November to which you draw attention in the first paragraph

of your letter. I do not think that either of these need be considered seriously as offering a solution of the Hindu-Muslim question at the present stage.

Yours sincerely,
R.M. MAXWELL

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1. Sir John (Anderson Thorne), I.C.S., Secretary to Governor-General (Public) since 1938.

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Fazlul Huq to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 281/304

CALCUTTA, 22 November, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I regret I have not been able to write to you so long regarding my proposed tour in the various Congress Provinces to investigate into the causes of oppressions on Muslims and the disregard of Muslim interests. Up to now I have been in communication with Mr. Jawaharlal regarding the general outlines of our programme. My object is to select a few typical instances and take Jawaharlal to the localities to hear from the people affected authentic accounts of all the happenings about which we complain.

I need hardly emphasise that an investigation like this, in the presence of some one representing the Congress, is an essential necessity at the present moment in India. At the present moment, the Muslims are bitter against the Congress administrations and the Congress administrations in their turn have characterised Muslim allegations as entirely baseless. No definite conclusion has been arrived at and the charges and the defence both continue to be in a nebulous state. This is unsatisfactory. No amount of efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity can succeed unless there has been a clear and distinct understanding of what one community expects from the other and this cannot be achieved unless it is settled whether the grievances are genuine or not and the erring community admits the guilt and gives sufficient guarantee that the deplorable incidents may not occur in future. There is another reason why there should be a definite investigation and something like an adjudication. It is clear that after the War there will be great political concessions, and India will have a much larger measure of political freedom than she enjoys at present. At that time we shall have to press for our safeguards and it will strengthen our hands if we can show that the present safeguards proved illusory and that the Governors of the Provinces were found practically wanting in their duty towards the Minorities. From all points of view the investigation is of supreme interest. I am willing to undertake the task at considerable sacrifice of time and money and I am writing to

ask you to let me have your approval. I shall certainly gladly accept any suggestion you can put forward and abide by any guidance that you may be pleased to give me.

Yours sincerely,
A.K. FAZLUL HUQ

M.A. JINNAH, Esq., M.L.A. (Central)

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Roger Lumley to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 176, p. 279

D.O. NO. 167/H.E.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BOMBAY, 25 November, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Linlithgow,

In my telegram No. 263, dated November the 21st, I mentioned that the message which you had asked me, in your telegram No. 2661-S, dated November the 18th, to convey to Jinnah, had been delivered by Low.¹ I have since obtained from Low an account of his interview with Jinnah and, although I believe that Low has already passed it on to Laithwaite, it may be useful if I repeat to you Low's account of his interview as he gave it to me.

2. Jinnah appeared interested in the information about the statement by the India League, and said he would look out for it and would certainly answer it if he thought it needed an answer from him. He said he knew all about Krishna Menon who, he thought, was a relation of Nehru's and was, at any rate, nothing more than an agent of the Congress. I have not yet seen any sign of publication of the India League statement. It occurs to me that it may have been published in neutral countries but may have been held up by the censorship at Home or in India. If that is the position, it would, I suggest, be well to inform Jinnah so that he can have an opportunity of answering the statement if it appears only in the neutral Press.

3. Low found Jinnah in a much more forthcoming mood than usual, and thought he was speaking with much greater freedom. In describing his interview with Gandhi at Delhi, he said that he found it impossible to make any progress and that he and Gandhi were really speaking a different language. Gandhi kept on harping on the need for a Constituent Assembly based on adult suffrage. When Jinnah asked him how he thought the Muslims should be represented, Gandhi replied in general terms to the effect that Congress would always safeguard the interests of Muslims. When Jinnah went on to suggest that he might not be able to agree to the Congress idea about Muslim representation, Gandhi retorted that then Jinnah would be obstructing.

Having got no further on that question Jinnah dropped it, and then raised the issue as to what would be the position if the Muslims did not find it possible to agree with what the majority in a Constituent Assembly wanted. To that Gandhi again replied that the Muslims would be obstructing. In his exposition to Low, Jinnah pointed out that Gandhi's attitude simply amounted to this, that, unless he accepted everything that the Congress wanted about a Constituent Assembly, they would be charged with obstructing the national cause. He remained, therefore, emphatically opposed to any idea of a Constituent Assembly.

4. Jinnah added that he was very willing to cooperate with Hindus if the Muslim positions were safeguarded, but that he was convinced that the Muslims would be squashed if they agreed to the establishment of a *Hindu Raj*. Gandhi he considered to be "the biggest Hindu in India," and he felt convinced that Gandhi, in particular, has as his main object, the domination of India by Hindus.

5. Low has, I think, already passed on his impression that Jinnah was becoming rather impatient for your answer to his request for clarification of the points which he raised with you.

6. This information about Jinnah's attitude is, I expect, already well-known to you, but it may help to confirm what you have heard from other sources.

Yours sincerely,
ROGER LUMLEY

1. Sir Francis Low.

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Liaquat Ali Khan to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 335/40-46

NEW DELHI, 27 November, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I thank you very much for your letter of the 1st which I received on the 21st, the day that I was leaving for Darbhanga. I returned from Darbhanga only this morning, hence the delay in sending a reply. I have thought over the proposal of observing the Day of Deliverance and I am of opinion that this should be done. It can do no harm, on the contrary, it will show to the people in India and abroad that the return of Congress Ministries without a settlement with the Musalmans will lead to great trouble. We should do what we can to keep them out of office until we are made to feel safe and secure. I consulted Syed Abdul Azeez and Mr. Fazlul Huq who had come to Darbhanga for the Conference and they both welcomed this proposal. The Raja of Mahmudabad who arrived here today also agreed with this suggestion. I suggest that

you should issue a statement on the lines of your letter to me and fix the 15th of December as the Day of Deliverance. In the statement you will, of course, mention the other Minorities as you yourself suggest in your letter. The 15th of December will give ample time to me to communicate to all the Provincial Leagues the draft resolution and other instructions and they will be able to send instructions to the branch long before the 15th. I shall have the resolution and the necessary instructions ready by the 29th and shall send them out as soon as I get information from you that the 15th of December meets with your approval. You might inform me telegraphically. You should ask the Musalmans to go *en masse* to the mosques and after the Juma prayers thank for deliverance from this tyrannical regime and that it may never return in the same form. According to religion the thanks giving prayers will have to be offered by everyone individually as it cannot be done by a gathering all together like the Juma or other prayers. I have consulted some *Ulamas* on this point and this is their opinion. However, you need not go into the details, you can only say in your statement that every Musalman should after Juma prayers offer special thanksgiving prayers and after the prayers there should be a public meeting. You should also ask the Musalmans to observe humility and not do anything that is likely to give offence to anyone. I suggest that this should be done all over India and not be confined to the Provinces where Congress Ministries were functioning. The Musalmans in Muslim majority Provinces can observe this day as a token of sympathy for their unfortunate brethren in the Minority Provinces. In your telegram I would like you to tell me whether the day is to be observed all over India or only minority Provinces.

You will be pleased to know that the Conference at Darbhanga was a huge success. It was really wonderful. It was as good as the Patna session in every respect except that you were not there and all that your presence means. The arrangements were perfect, the enthusiasm great and gathering huge. There must have been quite twenty or twenty-five thousand persons. For all the three days there was great interest and enthusiasm shown by the people. I did not expect that it will be such a big show. Syed Abdul Azeez told me that he was having a Worker's Conference at Patna during Xmas holidays and is most keen that you and I should go there for it. It is no doubt an excellent idea. I do not know what your programme is for the next month.

The Jubbulpore people are having a Muslim League Conference towards the end of December and they want me to preside over it. I have told them that I shall let them know later as I am not sure what other engagements I might have for that week. I would decide about it on hearing from you and knowing as to what your programme is. Mr. Azeez told me that you were thinking of going to Madras. Raja of Mahmudabad tells me that the conference in Assam was a very great success. He seems very pleased with his visit and is intending to go there again. I hope you and Miss Jinnah are keeping very fine. With our kindest regards and love from Ashraf to you both.

Yours sincerely
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN



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*Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]**V.P. Menon Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 1-18*

No. 47-H.E./39

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 28 November, 1939

I sent you on 6th November copy of a letter dated the 5th November from Mr. Jinnah indicating certain matters affecting the Muslim community in respect of which we desired a clarification of the position. I enclose with this letter a copy of the acknowledgement which I have sent to him, in which I promised to let him have an answer as soon as practicable. Mr. Jinnah has since raised the question of publishing his letter of 5th November, and my reply; and that the matter has been under discussion between us. In the same connection I would refer to the note of my interview with Mr. Jinnah on 4th November last, a copy of which you have already received, and out of which to some extent his present letter has emerged.

2. The points raised in Mr. Jinnah's letter are of great general importance and I have been in consultation with my advisers as to the line which could best be taken in dealing with them, as to the degree of detail into which it would be appropriate to enter, and finally as to the channel through which, and the manner in which, a reply to them could most appropriately be given. I cannot do better in this connection than to send you the copy I enclose of a letter from my Home Member, dated 20th November which, in addition to examining the questions to which I have just alluded, touches in general terms on certain of the wider considerations of importance which arise in the present connection.

3. In inviting my Home Member and the other officers to whom reference is made in his letter dated the 20th November to assist me with their advice on the points raised in Mr. Jinnah's letter, I indicated that there were two further points which were present to my mind in considering this whole matter. The first, the extent to which the principle that majority rule must prevail is really sound in Indian conditions; the second, the apprehensions which Mr. Jinnah had expressed in his conversation with me on 4th November (apprehensions which in my judgement continue to underlie certain at any rate of the assurances which his letter of 5th November shows him as anxious to secure) as to the possible attitude of future Governments at Home to Constitutional advance in India in its effect on the position of the Indian Minorities. Sir Reginald Maxwell's letter of 20th November touches on those issues, and I deal with them at greater length below.

4. Before proceeding to examine the specific points raised by Mr. Jinnah in any detail, I would take the preliminary point of the method in which any reply on the issues referred to by him had best be conveyed, and the extent to which it is appropriate that in reply to an individual political leader the Governor-General, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, should precisely define the attitude of His Majesty's Government

in relation to issues of such very wide extent. I agree entirely with the view expressed by my Reforms Commissioner, and by my Home Member in his letter of 20th November, that other communities are directly interested in any proposition of broad general importance affecting the Constitutional position; and that there are sound arguments, if it is proposed to make a pronouncement of the first importance, against conveying it in the form of a personal letter from the Governor-General to the leader of any particular political party. For the reasons which I gave later in this letter I have, however, reached the conclusion that, while it is desirable that I should in my present letter set out in some detail my own views on certain aspects of the general political position in this country, particularly in relation to the Muslims, the balance of argument is as yet against any radical change; and that so far as Mr. Jinnah is concerned the wise course will be to send him a guarded and concise reply. I am clear in particular that major Constitutional changes can neither be worked out nor applied in detail at a time when the attention of His Majesty's Government and of Parliament, and the energies of the Government in India as well as in Great Britain are concentrated primarily on the prosecution of the war; and that argument applies with even greater force to any radical readjustment of policy such as might be involved in the acceptance, for example, of Mr. Jinnah's thesis that democracy in India is a failure, and that a complete abandonment of that solution of the Constitutional problems of this country must be contemplated.

5. I am, subject to your better judgement, of opinion in those circumstances that the reply to Mr. Jinnah can appropriately go in the form of a letter from myself, so long as that reply is carefully worded, limited in scope, and guarded in its language. Were it a question of announcing major changes of policy, I should regard it as more appropriate that they should be announced either in Parliament, or in a statement made with the approval of His Majesty's Government by the Governor-General; and that the reply to the leader of the Muslim League should be merely to the effect that, given the importance of the issues raised, it was proposed to take an early opportunity of indicating that they have been raised and of expressing the view upon them of His Majesty's Government. But, if you accept the suggestions I make below, that will not be the case, and a reply can, I think, appropriately issue as a letter from the Governor-General to Mr. Jinnah.

6. I think it will be desirable given the nature of the matters under discussion, that before I proceed to put forward my suggestions as to the line to be taken with Mr. Jinnah I should as briefly as practicable comment on the background of his questions, and on certain of the wider issues implicit in them. I would propose in the first briefly to review the position of the various political interests in India as I see it today, and I would formulate my conclusions in the light not only of the discussions which I have now been having for some considerable time with prominent leaders of political thought in this country, but of the resolution which has emerged from the discussions of the Working Committee of the Congress at Allahabad from the 19th to the 23rd November, of Mr. Gandhi's article in the *Harijan* of 25th November, and of the statement issued on 24th November by the General Secretary of the Muslim League, which latter statement we may, I think, assume to embody a policy which has received the approval of Mr. Jinnah. For convenience of reference, I enclose copies of all those documents.

The Congress Position

7. As between the Congress and the Muslim community the position is briefly as indicated by Mr. Jinnah in his interview with me on 4th November, viz., that Congress are anxious to secure a settlement of the Constitutional issue, and of India's goal, before taking any steps to deal with the difficulties which arise from the existence of Minorities in this country, difficulties which they assert will admit of being disposed of without trouble once the Constitutional issue is cleared. The Muslim community, on the other hand as represented by the Muslim League are strongly averse from any Constitutional advance or move (save of course such advance as might meet with their explicit approval) until a satisfactory settlement has been reached of the problem of Muslim grievances in the Provinces. In general, Congress have made swift progress in the Constitutional field since the outbreak of war. Federation (though there is reason to think that the Right Wing element in Congress appreciate its value and would even now in certain circumstances consider reversion to it) has been relegated to the background: the reopening at the end of the war of the Act of 1935, and its modification in the light of Indian opinion, have been conceded; the principle of the association of Indian opinion with the conduct of the war, through a consultative group, has been admitted; the expansion of the Governor-General's Council to include as a war measure leaders of political parties has been offered and rejected.

8. Congress, encouraged, no doubt, by the success they have so far had and susceptible to the pressure of their Left Wing elements, continue in these circumstances insistently to urge their claim to speak with authority on behalf of India as a whole. They press their demand, which they have backed by the withdrawal of Congress Governments, for a declaration of British Constitutional aims which will represent a recognition of the freedom and the Independence of India, and of the right of India and her peoples (whether in British India or, it would appear, the Indian States) to settle the problem of her future Constitution on the basis and the advice of a Constituent Assembly based on the widest possible franchise and, I see it, without weightage for individual communities or interests. The Constituent Assembly is to frame a Constitution in which the rights of all "*accepted* minorities" (a term not defined, but according to Press comment likely in the first instance to cover Muslims and Sikhs) "could be protected to their satisfaction;" and separate electorates will be retained in the election to the Assembly for such Minorities as desire them "the number of those members in the Assembly to reflect numerical strength." Mr. Gandhi has indicated (*Harijan* of 4th November 1939, page 328) that "a free India will claim to examine every European interest on its merit, and that which conflicts with the national interest will go by the board," and he has repeated, in the *Harijan* of 25th November (page 353), "that European interests are absolutely safe so long as they are not in conflict with the interests of India," a phrase not precisely defined. No special provision is made for what I might describe as the minor minorities; and the Congress resolution referred to in paragraph 6 suggests that they are equally not prepared to make special provision for special interests of any kind. In a different field, the Congress Press has touched on the need for an arrangement between His Majesty's Government and India in regard to the Indian national debt. The problem of defence, vital not only in its

general importance, but in its reactions on the Muslim community and the States, has attracted little attention, and the underlying assumption would appear to be that His Majesty's Government will continue to play their part in the defence of India, and that no insuperable difficulty need arise over the recruitment and control of the Indian Army.

9. As regards the Princely Order, the claim of Congress, even though it may not be stated specifically in those terms, is clearly to be allowed to take over the functions of Paramountcy; and the suggestion has been advanced that what really matters in this connection is the problem of the peoples of the Indian States rather than the Rulers of those States (i.e. Working Committee Resolution of 23rd November 1939) (I may remark incidentally that the question of communal electorates with or without weightage in the States for the representation of States peoples in the Constituent Assembly is going to be no easy one, if they ever reach that stage!). Mr. Gandhi (*Harijan* of 25th November, p. 351) has in the same connection remarked, commending solution by means of a Constituent Assembly, "To raise the question of the Princes is still more untenable. They are part of the Paramount Power. It is painful to think that British statesmen do not so much as mention the millions of people of the States. Have they no voice in their own Government?"

10. The Congress claim is, in effect one for predominant Congress control, reflecting a Hindu population majority over India as a whole, and for an acceptance on trust by all other elements in this country of Congress capacity and willingness adequately to safeguard all communities and interests. As a corollary of that claim, they deny that they are as a body communal in character (and it is the case that Congress contains non-Hindu elements and that the strictly communal Hindu organisations such as the Mahasabha, repudiate its claim to speak for Hinduism). For all that, Congress as a body is essentially Hindu in character, and, whatever criticism Hindu bodies may make of it, there is little likelihood in the last resort of Hinduism generally in British India, with the possible exception of the Scheduled Castes and a very small conservative element, failing to make a solid front with it against either Muslim or European opposition.

The Muslim position

11. So far as the Muslims are concerned, one of the most significant features of the last two or three years has in my judgement been the emergence of the Muslim League, from a position of relatively secondary importance, as an All India political organisation which, whatever internal dissensions may from time to time reveal themselves is second only in importance to the Congress; and in certain respects second not even to that body. The second significant feature in this connection has been the extent to which Muslim demands have expanded and have crystallised during the same period. Those demands in their latest form are well represented by the statement by the Secretary of the Muslim League referred to in paragraph 6 above read with Mr. Jinnah's letter to me of 5th November. They now represent (so far as British India is concerned) neither more nor less than a claim to be treated on a position of "absolute equality" (in the words used by Mr. Jinnah in a speech at Bombay on 7th November) with the Hindu community, despite the fact that the

Muslims are in a numerical minority; a demand for the full safeguarding of Muslim interests in the Provinces; a claim that the prior consent of the Muslim community shall be secured to any further Constitutional advance; and an emphatic repudiation of the idea of a Constituent Assembly in which the vote should go by heads. It would appear to have been over this issue of whether or not His Majesty's Government should be invited to make a statement in regard to Constitutional advance before any settlement was reached between the Muslim League and the Hindu community as represented predominantly by the Congress, that the discussion between Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru which took place in Delhi at the beginning of this month broke-down.

12. I myself feel no doubt that the Muslims are profoundly embittered by 2 ½ (two and a half) years experience of Congress rule in the Hindu majority Provinces; that they are determined if they can to secure some strengthening of their position and their safeguards in those Provinces; and that recognising as they do that what really matters in the future is the control of the Centre, they are deeply apprehensive that by legislative enactment, or by an agreement to which they have not been a party, they may be handed over at the Centre to the control, or the predominant influence of the major community. It is, I think, at the same time fair to say that as I write the Muslims feel for the moment a greater confidence though it would, I suspect, take very little to shake that confidence both in themselves and in the probability that His Majesty's Government will not without their full concurrence conclude a bargain with parties or interests which the Muslims regard as opposed to themselves. I would trace that greater confidence, for what it is worth, not only to the unbending rigidity of the position which Mr. Jinnah has for sometime past maintained but to the fact that the Congress and the Muslim League were treated on an equal footing for the purpose of my recent conversations with political leaders; and that Mr. Jinnah took the opportunity to make it very clear to the public that he expected Congress to come to him rather than that he should go to the Congress. Moreover, the declaration which I issued with the approval of His Majesty's Government on 18th October contained a specific assurance that the scheme of the Act of 1935 will be regarded as open to modification in the light of Indian opinion at the end of the war, and that in planning afresh, or modifying in any respect, any important part of India's future Constitution His Majesty's Government will again take counsel with the minorities. The Muslims can, therefore, point to a definite commitment by His Majesty's Government to consider their views; and Congress insistence on the reconsideration of the scheme of the Act has played into their hands by securing the reopening of the whole scheme of the Act, and so of the Provincial sections which the Muslims wish amended.

Acuteness of divergence between Congress and Muslim positions

14. We find ourselves in these circumstances faced by Congress claims of a sweeping character which are opposed by a Muslim minority, stronger and more self-assertive than in the past, and convinced that if it is to avoid absorption by the Congress, it must be prepared to contest every inch of the ground. But that minority, despite its substantial numbers, its virility, its martial tradition, its geographical position, the capacity, and the readiness, which it has shown in two major Provinces, to work

the Provincial scheme of the Act of 1935, and its affiliations with Islam in the international field, is, broadly speaking, less intelligent, less highly cultured and less wealthy than the majority community. It lacks a Press, and a publicity organisation; and it has taken no active steps to interest individuals in Parliament in its case. And it is open to the criticism that its present policy makes it the sole, or the most important, obstacle to the achievement of Indian independence, and of Indian national ambitions. That is a point likely to increase in importance as time goes on, and as a younger generation more susceptible to nationalist pressure comes to the fore. There are dangers, in such circumstances, in leaning too heavily on the Muslim community or attaching undue weight to their more exaggerated claims, though it would be as foolish to underrate the importance of their support to us, whatever its motives, as it would be shortsighted and unfair to fail to give the fullest consideration to its legitimate claims.

The general background of the Indian political scene

18. It is against the background which I have just endeavoured to describe that the present Muslim demands must be considered. On the one hand, we have a political organisation which, while it does not represent the Hindu community as such, may properly be regarded as speaking for that community, in a substantial majority in numbers, and in many respects in the intellectual and cultural field in a position far ahead of that of other communities in this country. That community, which contains also the most important indigenous trading and commercial interests, and which is solidly established in the political life of British India, in which up to a few days ago it provided Ministries in eight Provinces, is naturally anxious to establish its predominance throughout the country as a whole, a predominance which can be established only in a ratio to the degree of the relinquishment of its present position by His Majesty's Government; and which could be maintained only by the assistance of His Majesty's Government in the field of internal and external security.

19. But while it is of such immense importance in numbers, in wealth and in education, the minorities with which it has to deal are equally not to be ignored. The Muslim community, consisting of some 80 or 90 million people, divided by a profound gulf culturally, religiously, and in general outlook, holding the Frontier (I do not attach overmuch importance to the fact that there has been a Congress Ministry in the North-West Frontier Province), the Punjab, Sind and Bengal; making a contribution of the first importance to the defence of India; and above all geographically linked with the Muslim States of Western Central Asia and culturally and religiously linked with Islam wherever it may stand, is deeply apprehensive that Congress may with the assistance of His Majesty's Government succeed in producing a Constitutional scheme of such a character as severely to hamper the Muslims in their aim of independence as a community and in the safeguarding of their interests. Those doubts in various ways are shared by minorities such as the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, the non-Congress Hindus, for whom the non-Brahmin element in Southern India speaks; by the small minorities such as the Indian Christians, Parsees, etc., and, I suspect, by the Princes. But the Muslims, and those who find themselves thus temporarily associated with them in a community of interest are at the disadvantage that, save so far as the

Europeans are concerned, they have not the same organisation as the Congress; that they lack a Press; and that they admit of being pilloried as the obstacle to the achievement by India of the natural desire of any country for complete independence.

20. In this last regard the Princely Order, whose relations with the Crown are of a different nature, and to whom the Crown has undertaken specific and detailed obligations of a different character, can afford to regard their position with greater equanimity. But they are well aware that a Congress Government at the Centre, more particularly a Government exercising any sort of Paramountcy, would not long allow their continued independence. The struggle in this analysis is thus rather one between Congress on the one hand and the remainder of the country on the other. And of the remainder of the country the Muslims are of greater immediate importance, since the first stage of this struggle must be a British Indian stage.

Is a democratic system, based on the rule of Majority, sound and workable in Indian conditions?

21. Our ambition has in the past been to introduce into India that system of democratic working which has on the whole been so successful in our own country, and which in the Dominions again has on the whole worked reasonably successfully. We have accepted throughout that the problem of India is different in character from our own problem or that of the Dominions, thanks to the existence in India of minorities substantial in cultural difference, in religious difference, and in numbers, in no way comparable with minorities elsewhere. The problem of Northern Ireland, though acute, is relatively a small one. The problem of Quebec again is relatively small, and Quebec admits of being isolated. The application of democratic principles in a country such as India, where minorities may run into tens of millions, where they are scattered over the whole of a subcontinent, and where allegations of maltreatment or injustice in one Province have an immediate reaction in another, is by no means so simple; and that fact is reflected in the endeavours which have been made in the Government of India Act to secure the position of minorities by inserting safeguards, by the Communal Award and the distribution of seats based upon it, and the like.

22. I cannot but feel that Sir Reginald Maxwell's analysis identifies the weaknesses which have so often been suspected, and which experience has now more clearly revealed, in the application of the Western democratic system to British India. It would be cowardly, if we were satisfied that the great experiment on which His Majesty's Government have been engaged now for so many years has been a failure, and that the problems of this country cannot be solved on the basis of ordinary majority-minority rule, or of the democratic systems of the West, that we should not frankly admit that is the case and endeavour, with the assistance of political parties in this country, to find an alternative solution. The frank and public claim of the Muslim League that democracy has broken-down in operation is admittedly in this connection a most important and a most significant feature.

23. But, grave as may be the doubts which I myself begin to feel in this regard, I am nevertheless after the most careful consideration of the opinion that the stage has not yet been reached at which we can feel satisfied that the democratic experiment

has failed, and that there is no way in which the specific difficulties that its working has revealed can be overcome; or that the long process of 30 years of Constitutional endeavour, by successive Governments of all political complexions at Home, which culminated for the time being in the Act of 1935, has been misconceived, and that we must now go back upon it. I have not failed in reaching that conclusion to give weight to the fact that for so radical a change of policy as would be involved in the acceptance of the proposition that the democratic experiment has broken-down, we should need to be in possession of immediate and convincing evidence to satisfy the public mind not only in Parliament, and at Home generally, but in the international sphere, that our conclusion is incontestable or almost incontestable. And I do not myself feel, grave as may be the doubts we have entertained from time to time about the adequacy and soundness of the existing Constitutional scheme or of certain aspects of our Constitutional intentions for the future, that any such convincing case, convincing, that is; to a degree which would satisfy Parliament and the public, could easily be established, even though we could point to differences between the communities to administrative weaknesses or failures, or to the incompatibility of an elaborate system of safeguards with the existence of democratic Government in the Western sense.

24. It is not irrelevant, too, that we could certainly anticipate vigorous opposition from Congress and from their sympathizers and supporters, whether here or at Home, to any suggestion on our part that the democratic system had broken down; and I feel a good deal of doubts as to whether the Muslims, when faced with the alternative of a complete abandonment of the principle of a democratic Constitution in favour of something which could not at the outset be at all precisely defined, and which would have to take shape after lengthy discussion and consultation, might not be likely to take a somewhat different view from that represented by Mr. Jinnah's recent condemnations of democracy in Indian conditions. Nor finally even if the case was more patently convincing than, I think, it is, do I conceive that there would be any likelihood of our being able to consider the problem of alternatives in war time.

25. My own judgement in these circumstances is that, with a full recognition of the defects and the possible dangers, even, of the application of the democratic principle in India, and, too, of the responsibility which we assume in proceeding to apply it in some still more advanced form, the practical course as well as the course of political wisdom is for all that to go ahead and not yet to abandon our endeavour to make the democratic system His Majesty's Government have for so many years had in mind to work. How precisely to dispose of the difficulties that experience has revealed, particularly as affecting the Muslims, does not fall to be answered in this letter. It may well be that we should be able to devise legal safeguards still more extensive, or of a different character from those which already exist, for Muslim interests in minority Provinces (safeguards which would of course have to be balanced by some corresponding safeguards for Hindu minorities in Muslim majority Provinces): and that Congress on the one hand and the Muslims on the other might be prepared in the interests of general Constitutional advance to acquiesce in some such arrangement. The Muslim claim to equality is a far more difficult problem. The numerically major community cannot be turned into a minority; nor has the minority

community, important as it may be, itself really faced the difficulty involved in a right of veto which would turn the majority into a minority. But unless these two communities can reach some accommodation there can be no hope (any question of the association of Princely India apart) of their collaborating to work any form of Central responsibility in a country in which there are no party divisions, and in which community is the essential basis of separation; or of any stable Constitutional advance; and realisation of that may contribute to a more accommodating attitude on the part of political leaders and to the reaching of a compromise. While, therefore, I am by no means confident of the outcome of the present position in terms of relations between the two major communities, and so of our capacity, however willing we may be, to further the cause of Constitutional advance, we must, as I see it, continue in present circumstances with the democratic experiment, and make the best of the situation that confronts us.

Muslim status in India: International affiliations of the Muslim community

26. There is one further point on which it would be well that I should touch before I turn to answer Mr. Jinnah's specific questions. It is the question of Muslim status in India to which Sir Reginald Maxwell refers in paragraph 5 of his letter of 20th November. As I have elsewhere recorded in this letter, the claim of the Muslim League appears now to be that the Muslim community shall be treated on a basis of equality for Constitutional purposes with the majority community; and the note by Sir John Ewart, which my Home Member quotes, emphasises the possibility that the Indian Muslim problem, given the fact that the Muslim community are part of the international Muslim community and very conscious of their extra-Indian Islamic ties, may well become a matter of international concern in a degree unlikely in the case of the Hindu community, which is after all essentially an Indian community with few if any ramifications outside. I do not myself think that (even if we were to leave out of consideration the obligations falling on His Majesty's Government, to which you referred in your speech in the House of Lords on 7th November) we can accept the principle that any one community, whether majority or minority, shall have the last word in questions of Constitutional advance; and I would note that the Muslim community does not itself appear at any stage to have produced any concrete suggestion for working a system under which they, though a minority in numbers, should be regarded as on an equality for purposes of business with the majority. The objections to turning a majority into a minority, and the risk that might result from the acceptance of the Muslim proposition are patent. But the point taken by Sir John Ewart and Sir R. Maxwell is of real importance; and I agree that we must take particular care to endeavour to avoid so handling our policy in this country as to risk the Indian Muslim question becoming a general Islamic question, of deep concern to the other Islamic countries. But I think it only proper to utter a word of a caution in that connection. Great as may be the force of the argument, and great as must be the importance which His Majesty's Government must at all times attach to Muslim opinion, Pan-Islamism has grave potential dangers from our own point of view; and I should hesitate to subscribe without much further and closer consideration to any proposition the effect of which would appear to be likely to increase the risk of encouraging Pan-

Islamism, or of recognising the existence of the Pan-Islamic factor as a consideration of decisive weight when dealing with the Indian Muslim problem. The difficulties of accepting the principle of equality between these two communities are very present to me—much more present indeed than any solution of them; and while I hesitate as I have said to accept in its completeness the Pan-Islamic argument, I have always felt that it would be essential in any major Constitutional advance that might be contemplated that His Majesty's Government should take the Muslim community with them. I would add only that if a particular type of Constitutional change or a particular degree of advance could be secured only at the cost, to take perhaps an extreme example, of an armed resistance on the part of the Muslims, or a complete refusal to cooperate, it seems to me difficult to imagine that Parliament would not wish to reconsider the position; and I am convinced that in such circumstances the greatest attention must be paid to Muslim apprehensions and Muslim demands, and that even if the position of equality for which they ask cannot be conceded to them, it would be an error of the first magnitude to fail to give the greatest possible weight to their representations, feelings, and suggestions. Beyond that I do not at the moment feel disposed to go in this matter of the status of the Muslims in India.

Mr. Jinnah's questions

27. The argument contained in the earlier part of this letter has largely covered much of the ground of the specific questions raised by Mr. Jinnah; but I now turn to consider those questions *seriatim*.

Point (i) Reconsideration of the Act of 1935

28. As regards Mr. Jinnah's first point, I would invite attention to paragraph 7 of Sir Reginald Maxwell's letter of 20th November. I agree with his argument, and I would recommend that the reply to be given should be as suggested by him, viz., that His Majesty's Government's declaration does not exclude any part of the Constitution Act from the reconsideration promised at the end of the war; and that the extent to which the whole or part of the scheme of the Act then comes under revision will be determined only by the wishes of representatives of the various interests to be taken into consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Point (ii) No Constitutional declaration without Muslim (and Hindu) concurrence

29. As regards Mr. Jinnah's second point, I agree with Sir Reginald Maxwell's view, as stated in paragraph 8 of his letter, that the question of ascertaining the existence or extent of agreement to any Constitutional proposals is of the first importance in connection with the very difficult problem which we have under our consideration at the moment. I do not, however, propose to enter into any detailed discussion of that issue here; and I have dealt elsewhere with the question of the status of Muslims in India. So far as the answer to Mr. Jinnah is concerned I would agree with Sir R. Maxwell both that the less surface we expose the better; and that it is desirable to be as positive and as encouraging as is safely practicable. I suggest that the answer might be that His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the great importance and the scope of the issues raised by this question. They are issues which

directly affect other communities, and which cannot, therefore, be exhaustively dealt with in the scope of the present reply. His Majesty's Government, however, while retaining their own responsibility, recognise that no Constitution can be workable which is not acceptable to the two major communities of India, and the Muslims may rest assured that His Majesty's Government in any Constitutional proposals which they may frame will give the opinion of the Muslims the full weight to which their importance as a community entitles them. . . .

Point (v) Grievances of Muslims in Congress Provinces

32. On the matter of Muslim minorities in Congress Provinces to which Mr. Jinnah refers in general terms in the penultimate paragraph of his letter, I am myself disposed to agree with Sir Reginald Maxwell's advice that we should tacitly acquiesce in Mr. Jinnah's suggestion that it could be shelved so long as Congress Ministries remained out of office.

33. So much for Mr. Jinnah's specific demands. There are in conclusion two matters on which I would like to touch:

(a) the apprehensions entertained by Mr. Jinnah that some future Government at Home might endeavour irrespective of the feeling of the Muslims to apply a Constitutional policy which the Muslims regarded as wholly detrimental to their interests in face of their protests;

(b) the necessity of increasing attention on our part to their importance as a community.

Question of a guarantee for the Muslims against decisions prejudicial to them by future Governments at Home.

34. As regards the first of these matters you will recollect that in the note of my conversation with Mr. Jinnah on 4th November I placed on record the anxiety which he told me he and certain of his friends felt lest at sometime in the future, when they are differently constituted, His Majesty's Government should themselves feel so convinced of the case for a much more extensive, or a different, type of Constitutional advance in India as to give effect to such advance irrespective of the feelings of the minorities, and particularly of the Muslims. This, it goes without saying, is a matter of no little delicacy. No Government can bind its successors, and it is, in my judgement, out of the question to give Mr. Jinnah or his friends the assurance in terms or the guarantee which clearly they are anxious to secure on the subject. All, as I see it, we could do is to bear in mind the existence of these apprehensions, and to endeavour as suitable occasions offer, in Parliament or elsewhere, to assure the Muslims that they need not fear that merely because they are in a numerical minority their interests are likely to be lightly regarded or prejudiced by His Majesty's Government. Neither you nor I, working as we do with a very different background from Mr. Jinnah, and with a greater familiarity with the tradition of Government which has been inherited at Home, are likely to share his fears that a great minority such as that which we are discussing would be cavalierly treated, or its interests lightly disregarded, by any future Government such as we can envisage. There are indeed obvious arguments which no Government, whatever its political complexion, would be likely to overlook, of interest as well as of principle against action on such lines. If Mr. Jinnah should

revert to this matter, I would propose, therefore, if you agree, to tell him that I have given full weight to the importance of the point which he had taken with me on 4th November; that I have taken such steps to confirm my own judgement of the position in regard to it as I could; that in the outcome all I would say to him was that as he was well aware it was well settled that no Government could bind its successor; but that the attitude of a community so large and so important as the Muslim community must clearly at all times be a matter of deep concern to those on whom there falls the responsibility for handling the affairs of India, and in particular for framing its future Constitution; and that I could not myself envisage any circumstances in which that great community need anticipate that full weight would not be given to its views or that the fullest attention would not be given to representations from it in connection with any Constitutional changes likely in its own judgement prejudicially to affect it. If you think that I could safely go any further, I shall, I need not say, welcome any suggestion that you can let me have.

Necessity for increasing attention on our part to the Muslim problem

35. I turn now to the second point referred to in paragraph 33 above. I feel myself that there is force in the suggestion made by Mr. Jinnah in his conversation with me on 4th November that there is perhaps a certain tendency in the freedom of Parliamentary debate to think in terms merely of numerical majorities and minorities; and that that, if the suggestion is at all well-founded, does injustice to the special position of the Muslim minority and the difference existing between it and other minorities in Empire countries. If I develop this point further, it is only because it is in my judgement of great importance in considering future Constitutional development, and in particular the positions of the minorities, to give full weight to the fact that the Muslim minority is no ordinary minority, but one of 90 million people, occupying in relation to India as a whole strategic position of great importance, separated by profound differences, religious, historical, and cultural, from the majority community, and strongly represented in the Defence Forces. The argument of the solidarity of Islam on which I have touched in paragraph 26 above is one which, for the reasons given in that paragraph, I would desire to approach with care. But it is one of substantial importance, and one which in our confidential correspondence and in our deliberations on policy must clearly be given its full weight. I am certain that matters have now reached a point at which it will be necessary to pay increasing attention to the Muslims and to their importance as a community; and that it is desirable that we should in Parliament and elsewhere endeavour to bring out our sense of their significance, and our anxiety to give the weight properly attaching to their views. Of the sensitiveness of this community, all the greater because it lacks an effective Press, and in particular of the sensitiveness of individual leaders such as Mr. Jinnah, you are well aware. And here as elsewhere in the Indian political field, even if we regard that sensitiveness as unjustified or exaggerated, it constitutes a political point which you will, I am sure, agree with me in thinking well worth watching.

36. The specific questions put to me by Mr. Jinnah do not I am conscious bulk very large in this letter. But I have thought it desirable to take the opportunity to present them to you with the background, as I see it, against which they fall

appropriately to be considered even at the cost of a material expansion of the scope of my reference to you. We are both agreed as to the desirability of the earliest possible reply to Mr. Jinnah's questions; and I would suggest, therefore, that once you have received this letter and have been able to consider it, we might settle by telegram the terms of the reply to be given to him in the light of the suggestions which I have made above.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 305-08

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 29 November, 1939

PRIVATE

4. Into these cross-currents has sailed Stafford Cripps with the outline of a full blown scheme for solving the Indian problem. I sent you a telegram after his first talk with Stewart.¹ Since then he has developed his ideas further and he came to see me yesterday in order that he might put before me the sort of lines on which he was proposing to approach the Congress. He also obviously wished to know what sort of attitude we should be likely to take up towards his venture. He has obviously taken as his model the settlement with Southern Ireland and assuming that a Constituent Assembly was able to compose the differences between the Congress and the Muslims and other minorities he would propose to deal with a number of difficult questions during a transitional period, which he puts as possibly 15 years, by means of a Treaty. Thus he would deal with the question of Defence by an agreement between India and this country, the terms of which should form the clause of such a Treaty. Other clauses would deal with the safeguarding of the rights of the minorities, with the conditions of trade between India and this country, with the position of the Services, the transfer of property, and in fact all other matters which might be found to be at issue between the two countries. So far as the Constituent Assembly is concerned, he fully appreciates the importance of its being representative of all communities and interests including the Princes. After he had given me a sketch of this programme, he asked me what I thought would be the attitude here towards it if it looked like being accepted by the Congress and other communities in India. I told him that I was of course in no position to commit the Government or anyone else here, since the Government were quite unaware of his proposals and would naturally require to give very careful thought to suggestions of the kind before they were in a position to come to any conclusions with regard to them. He asked me if I would be prepared to give consideration to them and I told him that I was always ready to give

careful consideration to any suggestions which might be calculated to assist towards a solution of the Indian problem. I told him that of course, he must discuss matters with you if he expected to make any real headway as a result of his visit to India and he is very willing to do so. He leaves here tomorrow and he will, therefore, be in India about the same time that you receive this letter. As you know, my mind has for some little time past been moving rather in the direction of an attempt by Indians to settle these difficult questions, and particularly the question of the minorities, themselves if they can, and I am rather attracted by the idea of putting the professions of the Congress to the test by telling them to go ahead with their Constituent Assembly ; and in spite of the not very happy precedent of Ireland it does occur to me that it might be possible to solve some of the outstanding questions which will have to be solved if India is indeed to acquire Dominion Status by means of a Treaty. I have not yet, however, said anything on these lines to the Cabinet. What I am contemplating doing is writing to Neville Chamberlain privately to tell him of Stafford Cripps' intentions and then to ask him if he would be disposed to have a talk with me quite privately and informally on the whole question of translating our promises about Dominion Status into action. I do not seem to have received any reply from you to the telegram which I sent you sometime ago enquiring what your view would be towards a proposal for a Parliamentary mission to discuss matters with the Congress, the All India Muslim League and others; but it certainly seems that this ground has been somewhat cut beneath our feet by Staffords Cripps' own action, for whatever our attitude may be he is determined to ascertain the views of the Congress and of other parties towards a scheme on the lines of that which he sketched to me.

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1. Sir Thomas Alexander Stewart, Governor of Bihar, 1939-43.

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Statement of President, Jamiat-ul Ulama of Bihar

All India Congress Committee Papers, G. 42/ 1939

November, 1939. The present state of the country has been worsened beyond all hopes of redemption. Although the Congress had to face opposition all along from diverse quarters, and the opposition groups included Hindus as well Muslims, individuals as well groups, yet the opposition had never been so acute. Since 1920, the present leaders of the League have been opposing; but this opposition was never so severe. Most of the Muslims now entertain a genuine and sincere aversion for the Congress.

The leaders of Hindu Mahasabha and Harijans are opposing the Congress so boldly that they had never done before.

It is an imperative call of the time that the responsible leaders of the Congress and the members of the Working Committee should deeply probe into the matter in

the light of hard facts, in order to find out the root cause of all the present discontent.

There may be a vast scope of unfounded exaggeration in the charge-sheet levelled against the Congress and the Congress Governments, and possibly enough, most of them may have nothing to do with the Congress or the Congress Governments.

But as the accusations have received universal acceptance, coupled with a sincere conviction, mere broadcasting explanation and statements on behalf of the Congress and Congress Ministries cannot remove the mist. In order to rectify the situation, the Congress Working Committee must take certain effective measures. If the Congress aspires to be a National Organisation representing common interest, and the country's liberty and regeneration has to be achieved through it (and certainly Congress ought to live up to the spirit and the ideal), then it must bestow its sober deliberation over [to] the matter at the earliest possible date.

The Working Committee ought to have thought over it sometime earlier, when it held the Government in eight Provinces, being in power it must have been easier for the Congress to meet the general grievances; but even now the problem needs an urgent attention. However baseless the allegations of the Muslim League and the Harijans might appear in the eyes of the Congress High Command and their Press, and whatever might be the real causes of communal tension, and although the Congress Government might not be legally held responsible for all such mischief, the Congress Working Committee which claims to serve the country in right earnest, cannot deny to itself the obligation of making a thorough inquiry into the whole affair through an impartial tribunal to explore the truth and show it a sunshine [light]. I admit that die-hards and malcontents can never be satisfied, yet it would restore to reason all those who are thinking over the problem of the country seriously, at least the Congress would be able to maintain and enhance its prestige as a patriotic and impartial body on the publication of the Inquiry Report. It should be the first duty of an organisation which has to run on national lines, without making any distinction of caste or creed, not to deter from starting an inquiry promptly; and the Congress shall take as its first duty as for the sake of rendering equitable justice to all the sections of the people, it is struggling to wrest India from the British domination.

Irrespective of the Inquiry Commission, the members of the Working Committee and the other responsible leaders, should revise and examine their own doings in order to discover their own feelings, even big leaders and big organisations are liable to commit errors which escape their notice due to pressure of engagements, nevertheless they might be potent enough to create havoc and eruptions. In this connection I would like to submit a list of such errors of omission and commission which, but for the existence, [sic.] have swept away all traces of good faith and popularity from the Congress movement.

What is needed most is that responsible leaders of the Congress should be bold enough to plead guilty for such errors which may be definitely proved to exist, and should declare their firm determination not to let them recur again; and that no time should be spent to redress such wrong. First of all it deserves special notice that from 1930 to 1933, Muslim Conference, Muslim League, Liberal Federation and some other groups had been obstructing the struggle for freedom and every possible effort was spent to keep the Muslim aloof from the struggle but it was only through the efforts

of the Congressite Muslims, Jamiat-ul Ulama and the Ahrars that the obstructionists could not succeed; and the Congress could successfully pose as the united front of the country. Even Gandhiji could proudly claim at the Round Table Conference that the Congress Working Committee contain five Muslims as an evidence of the fact that the Congress is a nationalist party.

An adequate representation of the Muslims was explained on the strength of the very fact, and truly speaking five out of fifteen presented just the right quota of the Muslims. As the struggle was concluded and unfortunately Dr. Ansari passed away, since then there never had been more than two Muslims in the Working Committee. Out of these two, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad is the only distinguished figure whose erudition and thoughtful leadership has always been an admitted fact, but the other gentleman has indeed been recognised only as a selfless, sincere soldier¹ but it can hardly be said that he can rightly appreciate the problem as to what ought to be the place of the Musalmans in the National Programme. There is no other gentlemen who might be in a position to understand and realise the feelings and trend of the Muslim Community in the light of the principles of Islam. Indeed the Maulana is the solitary exception; but it would be doing a great hardship [sic.] to him and to the community if he by himself alone is called upon to bear the responsibility on behalf of nine crores of Muslims. I can say with definite certainty that this deficiency has been causing a great alarm and intense dissatisfaction not only amongst all the Congressite Muslims but even the members of the All India Congress Committee have been deeply touched by this bold blank in the composition of A.I.C. Working Committee. It has been pointed out to me many times, but they fight shy as they may be branded as a communalists to have raised such a question even in the Congress camp. The other thing is that since 1930, the Working Committee has always been formed at the instance of Gandhiji and Gandhiji is not prepared to listen to any. My rejoinder had been that such a plea for not offering protests is quite baseless. In the interest of welfare and solidarity of the Congress, we should always speak the truth. By way of refuting the banter of communalism, one may reasonably inquire whether nationalism implies that Working Committee should consist of 13 Hindus and 2 Muslims; if nationalism is something above and beside the question of caste and creed, then why should you not ever have a composition of 13 Muslims [which] do not deface nationalism, why should the reverse alternative denationalise the constituent body. One should always be amenable to reason and it is no good to reason for nothing. And I believe Gandhiji cannot insist to take an unreasonable stand.

Such things have always been talked about in private conference and now the members of the Muslim League openly taunt the Congress for such flagrant irregularities.

However, the master error of the Congress had been that it has scrupulously avoided an adequate representation of the Muslim in the Executive body of the Centre and the Provincial [Provinces]. The excuse that Muslims are not available does not stand at all as it cuts at the root the very national character of the Congress and its pretensions to claim the Muslim in its fold is thrown aboard. Every year, nearly one hundred Muslims are elected as members of the All India Council [AICC]. Are they all worthless? If they are all unworthy, why should not the Congress leaders

include such men who may (be) really good enough. The Constitution of the Congress may be made so flexible as it may conveniently assimilate such men in the Working Committee who have identified themselves with the creed of the Congress and have undergone suffering or may be ready to make sacrifice for the freedom of the country. The Constitution of the Congress cannot be treated as an inspired treatise which can bear no alteration. Principle has to be followed to achieve certain end, and not that the end may be sacrificed for the sake of a principle.

In short the defect in the composition of the Working Committee is its colossal blunder which has generated many a mischief and gross misunderstanding; and if not redressed it may do great harm to the country.

The Congress movement has been gradually growing popular amongst the Muslims in an indirect way. In the year 1936, for the first time Mr. Jinnah decided to contest the general election against the Congress. In the year 1934 on the eve of the election to the Central Assembly there had already been a contest between the Congress and Hindu Nationalist Party on the one hand and on the other, a Muslim Unity Board was formed which comprised Congressite and nationalist Muslims and was supported by Jamiat Ulama, and this Unity Board had to contest the election with the obstructionist, who simply opposed the candidates of the Unity Board on the ground that they were Congress-minded Muslims. The election campaign naturally helped to advance the propaganda of the Congress. Most of the candidates of the Unity Board were elected and they were asked to cooperate with the Congress. But after the election, under the influence of Maulana Shaukat Ali, the Unity Board began to betray reactionary signs and the Jamiat-i-Ulama had to secede from the Party. Yet it cannot be denied that the election campaign carried the propaganda of the Congress to the Muslim Mass far and wide. And it is well evident that the Congress was gaining ground amongst the Muslims on account of the support and effort of the Jamiat-i-Ulama and the Nationalist Muslims; and consequently Mr. Jinnah for the first time joined the session of Jamiat-i-Ulama held at Delhi, and spoke highly of the sacrifice of the Jamiat, as he had to confront the general election of 1936. He met nearly all the leading members of the Jamiat and explained that that he himself was a Nationalist and independence was his goal. He suggested that if they (members of the Jamiat) joined him in the League, he would eliminate the reactionary element. Mr. Jinnah was not then opposed to Congress as at the time the Congress had no fighting programme before it, and had simply to contest the election. But Muslims were not yet aware of the Congress programme, and the effects of the communal riots of 1932, 24 still lingered in their memory, it was not expected that the Muslim candidates would safely return on Congress ticket; and this is a fact which is well-known to all the leaders of Bihar and U.P.

In U.P, Congress and Muslim League joined hands in the election campaign; Mr. G.B. Pant and Mr. Khaliqzaman and Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, during the election campaign, were quite on friendly terms.

In Bihar as Muslim Independent Party had already been formed; the League could not come to the fore. There were other two Muslim Parties (United Party and Ahrars) which were avowedly opposed to the Congress, were opposing this Independent Party which had its programme and creed just the same as that of the Congress.

Indeed the manifesto of the Independent Party included provisions to safeguard the interests of the Muslims, but its economic and political programme was similar to that of the Congress. The parties opposed to the Independent Party attempted to poison the electorate with plea that it was really speaking a Congress Party. On the other hand Jamiat-i-Ulama and Imaret-i-Shariah supported the Party on the ground that complete Independence was its goal and with a pledge to safeguard the religious interest of the Muslim it amend[meant] to ameliorate the economic and educational backwardness of the Country. This move led to the popularity of Congress creed in the Muslim Mass. It was noteworthy that no candidate was set up by the Independent party against Dr. Syed Mahmud and Mr. Sayedul Haque who were contesting an Congress ticket, but Ahrars and Unity Party had set up their candidate to oppose them in their constituency. The Independent Party and Imarat-i-Sharih entirely wholeheartedly supported Dr. Syed Mahmud and Mr. Sayedul Haque. The Independent Party captured most of the Muslim seats and it created a favourable atmosphere for the Congress. The condition in U.P. were nearly the same.

By the friendly relation that prevailed between the Congress and the Muslim Nationalist (particularly Jamiat-I-Ulama) during the election, it was expected that after the election the country would present a united front and will march forward in unison and amity; i.e. the Congress Party and the Nationalist Group will tackle the constructive programme conjointly.

But as soon as the result of the election returned a distinct majority for the Congress in various Provinces, some distinguished leader of the Congress announced that the Congress need not coalesce with any other party. After the election this was the first wrong move which provoked the Muslims against the Congress. And the next blunder was that the Congress invited only the Congress members in the Convention held at Delhi; while to be fair the Congress ought to have invited all the members who belonged to the Nationalist Group and had a programme akin to the Assembly programme of the Congress. Had this corporate body decided to demand an assurance from the Governors for accepting the offices, it must have created an atmosphere by far the better from the very start; and a temporary deadlock must [would] have produced by far the better results.

I am at least one of those who had offered certain suggestions to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, but I don't know whether he received the letter or not. It cannot be denied that the victory in election proved so intoxicating that all such salutary suggestions were ignored.

Prior to the Convention Mr. Jinnah had not pitched himself against the Congress. But the arrogant self-assertion of the Congress Party on the eve of inviting the Convention, antagonised even the Muslim supporters of the Congress. Those who were against the Congress came to be identified as a Hindu Body [sic.].

Mr. Jinnah, who during the election advocated independence and denounced the India Act 1935 as a wastepaper, took a sudden change and opposed the Day of Demonstration against the India Act to be held on the 1st April '37. He had to take this undesirable step as he must have felt sore for not being consulted in the Convention on the question of Office Acceptance. Even the President and the Secretary of the Jamiat-i-Ulama were not consulted although they were all the while at Delhi.

Had the Congress been liberal enough to take into confidence the leading members of the Nationalist Group, the Jamiat-i-Ulama and Mr. Jinnah, on the eve of the Convention in order to chalk out a united programme, the Interim-Ministry must not have come into existence and the opposition to Congress must not have grown so acute.

3. The Congress took certain measures which betrayed its narrow-mindedness and exposed its darker complexion to the public view and those who wanted to oppose the Congress made much of it.

For the sake of illustration, I may point out B. [Babu] Sri Krishna was made leader of the Party. Undoubtedly he is an able man. But it was generally believed that the claim of Dr. Syed Mahmud should have been pressed as he happened to be the senior most member of the Congress, and had been Secretary of A.I.C.C. and for sometime a member of the Working Committee; moreover his ability and learning is accepted on all hands. There can be no two opinions on the point that Dr. Syed Mahmud was the fittest person to be the leader of the Party. Although at the time of selecting the leader it was not decided that the office would be accepted, yet it was generally believed that the Congress would take up the office and the leader of the Party will be the Premier of the Cabinet. The election of the leader had taken place on this very assumption. Does it not imply that as Dr. Syed Mahmud is not a Hindu, his merits, services and sacrifices do not count? In other words being a Non-Hindu he cannot have a right to be the Premier. This [It] is a sham excuse to say that the Dr. had no Parliamentary experience, while Shri Krishna Babu had been leader of the Swaraj Party in the Legislative Council. Shri Babu, being a pleader could, without a previous experience, lead the Swaraj Party, entering for the first time in the Legislature; but Dr. Syed Mahmud being a Bar-at-Law and Ph.D., and one who had been a High Command of the Congress for a pretty long period of time, could not be thought deserving to be the leader of the Party as it was the first occasion for the Dr. to enter the Legislature.

However, the Bihar Congress Committee and the All India Working Committee must have arrived at the conclusion without a predisposition, yet this strikes as something queer and all explanation fail to restore goodfaith. Every Musalman Congressman or non-Congressite (with the exception of Mr. A. Bari) has attached a significant importance to the selection of the Leader of the Party.

4. The other great blunder that the Congress Party committed (prior to the office acceptance and after election of the leader) which deeply offended the feelings of the Muslims, was that the Bihar Assembly failed to nominate even a single Muslim representative in Bihar Council. The election was based on joint-electorate system and it was the first opportunity for the Congress [illegible] test that even a few Muslims could have been [elected] on joint electorate. But the Congress could not but select Hindu nominees. Although I had pointed out to Anugrah Babu² at the Regis Hotel that Shah Omair who is a senior Congress member must be selected by the Congress and then I had as well suggested that the Congress and the Independent Party should stand side by side and thus they would be able to nominate eleven members for the Council. But my suggestions were ignored.

The Congress nominated S. Masood Ahmad to set up his candidature, but later on, he was not supported by the Congress and failed; although the votes of the

Congress party were absolutely under control. This is an event which has its own effect, but the Congress Committee is absolutely unmindful of all such things.

Last year, on the death of a Congress member of the Council, Shah Omair has been elected, and his term expires on the 1st April. Even this step failed to appease the virus which has already spread as it was too late.

5. In the year 1937, from March till July, there was an opportune moment for the Congress leaders and workers to devise means for the solution of the problem of Hindu-Muslim Unity, which ultimately must have strengthened the position of the Congress. It was not difficult to bring them closer to the Congress who had already an inclination for it. But this precious moment was wasted in agony and anger for being debarred from office acceptance as the Governors refused to give them assurance of non-intervention. Rather at the instance of certain raw, inexperienced Muslim worker, some leaders repented that the Congress could have captured even all the Muslim which should have obviated the Interim-Ministry. But such a picture was quite far from the fact; and why should they fail to comprehend that Interim-Ministries were even formed at Orissa and Madras which had been shaped by Hindu Leaders.

But as the opportunity had already slipped, the Congress devised the plan of *Muslim Mass Contact*, to win over the voters and capture the Muslim seats in future. Undoubtedly Congress has to establish contact with all the sects and the communities in the best interests of the country and for achieving independence.

But in launching this scheme the Congress committed two blunders. Firstly it was wrongly called Muslim Mass Contact, which led the Muslim leaders to believe that the Congress is attempting to alienate the Muslim mass[es] from their true leaders simply to capture their votes. This move of the Congress also provoked the Muslim leaders to oppose the Congress. Congress should not have started Muslim Mass Contact as there is nothing like Sikh Mass Contact, Christian Mass Contact. It simply developed a deep-rooted aversion for the Congress.

From the very beginning the Congress ought to have exerted best efforts to enrol members from all the various communities of the country. If the number of the Muslims was not an adequate one, the Congress ought to have tried to diagnose the real cause behind it.

The other blunder is this that the movement (Mass Contact) was started just when the Congress had achieved distinct success. Although the Muslims were not set up to contest on Congress ticket, but there were other parties, (i.e., Muslim League, Independent Party) which contested the election successfully and were not opposed to Congress. The political atmosphere was quite good enough; but incidentally, in the meanwhile a wordy-war broke out between Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Nehru which ultimately came to the Press. Those who were averse to the Congress took an advantage of the opportunity and the Mass Contact movement was made a plea for opposition and adverse propaganda.

The pride of election victory mixed with the anger for not coming to the office from the very beginning could not let them think coolly; and some crude and unthinking Muslim workers led them on the wrong side.

Had the Congress exerted to bring about the Hindu-Muslim Unity within these three months, they could have taken over to their side such parties of U.P. and Bihar

which were already inclined to work on the lines prescribed by the Congress. This should have enhanced the power and prestige of the Congress throughout India. It could have avoided the severe repercussion, had the Congress not sacrificed the real objective merely for the sake of fictitious ideologies. The Muslim League could not have developed this antagonism and the atmosphere should not have grown so tense.

6. On accepting the Ministerial portfolio, the Congress committed innumerable blunders and a few of them are given below:

- (a) In order to give an impetus to the Constructive Programme of the Congress, Coalition Ministries must have been formed as had been done in Assam and N.W.F. Provinces.

In U.P. in addition to Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim, Mr. Khaliqzaman, Nawab Ismail Khan should have been taken from the Muslim League Party; and in Bihar in addition to Dr. Syed Mahmud, one member of the Independent Party should have been taken in. Had the Orissa Ministry included one Muslim, it certainly must have done some good to the Congress.

There was no harm in augmenting the number of the Ministers; and in Assam they had to increase the number of the Ministers when accepting the office.

There must have been no deviation from any political principle in taking one who had already been in Interim-Ministry, or one who had opposed the Congress candidate in the election. For the sake of clarification I may point out that M. Noorul Hasan who had opposed Dr. Syed Mahmud was taken in the Congress Party; in the same way there was no harm in including one in Cabinet who was once not in the Congress. If a man of the opposite camp could be embraced in the Party, wherein lay the difficulty in giving him a place in the Cabinet.

This was absolutely a meaningless demand that Muslim member of the Orissa Assembly should first resign his seat and then secure his election on Congress ticket. Such fragile principles prove destructive of the objective.

- (b) In Bihar Sir Sultan was already appointed as the Advocate-General, and there was no sense in requesting the Governor to ask for his resignation in order to make room for B. Baldeo Sahay.³ Sir Sultan could not be tolerated as he was a non-Congressman but how could it be so with the Advocate-General of U.P. The other objection could be that he could not have worked on Congress lines, but at least it must have been inquired of him.

Although this is not in itself an important matter, but I can say that the move of the Congress has been ascribed to the communalistic tendency in the Congress.

- (c) Four members could be nominated to the Bihar Council; three Non-Muslims including a lad had already been nominated by Mr. Yunus. The Congress Ministry could still nominate a Muslim; but even the fourth one nominated was a Hindu Gentleman.

These are such evident things that no explanation can help to blot out the stigma of communalism.

- (D) In Bihar when Rural Development Department was started, for two long years not a single Muslim was appointed as an office-bearer. The Chief Organiser, Asst. Organiser, and Superintendent were all Hindus. Even clerks for long were all of one and the same community. It did a great harm to the prestige of the Congress.

- (E) There was a Training Institute attached to the Rural Development Department; but there was no prescribed course of study. Every teacher had to frame his own curriculum under the supervision of the Superintendent. This was quite undesirable and such state of things continued till the last day of the Training Institute.

The same things may be said for the Rural Development Department of U.P. as well.

- (F) The Congress has not yet accepted the Wardha Scheme of Education. At Haripura session a resolution was passed in the name of National Education which indeed enunciated the same basic principles which have been propounded in the Wardha Report, but the Wardha Report has not been even mentioned in the resolution. In accordance with the resolution, a Board of Education has been formed which would frame a scheme of education on the lines of the basic principles (enunciated in the resolution) and this scheme would be recommended to the various Government and non-Government institution.

But Bihar and U.P. started training Schools which are usually called Wardha Training Schools; and the Wardha [one line cannot be deciphered] Wardha Education Report was the subject of discussion in the Assembly as if the Government has already accepted the Wardha Report. This hasty and rash act of the Congress Government caused a great ill-feeling. But the fact stands there [sic.] that the Congress has not yet defined any scheme. If the Congress Government is at all responsible to the Congress, it was never on their part to start Training Schools on the basis of Zakir Report, which on some cardinal principles has been objected to by the Muslims; and to have started the Training Schools without redressing those objection caused a great alarm and perturbation.

In this matter the Congress Working Committee is much more to blame than the Congress Governments. In spite of hot protests on behalf of the Musalmans, the Working Committee was not moved to take any step to restrain this hasty action of the Government [nor did the Working Committee] issue any declaration to the effect.

- (G) In the matter of appointments, promotions and transfers, the Congress Governments have committed a series of mistakes, which it is not possible to enumerate. Indeed the Congress Working Committee cannot be aware of all of it; but the Working Committee to have appointed a Board of Supervision in all the Provinces which should have entertained all such complaints and after a thorough inquiry must have advised the Government to act accordingly. The Congress Governments have been looked upon with suspicion, had the Working Committee taken this step.
- (H) For the Library or Rural Development, both worth Rs. 15 to 20 thousands were purchased. They were all Hindi books and the number of Urdu books was something like a cypher. All the books were purchased from a Hindi Press and not a single order was placed with any Muslim dealer.

Such things reveal that the Congress body has grown communal minded.

- (I) The Congress Ministries, on their tour to various places promised to award some money to the various Muslim *Makhtabs* and institutions in the year 1938; and the donation remained unpaid till 1939. The Ministry resigned and all their promises came to naught. It can well be imagined how it must have offended their feelings when they [saw] with their eyes that the money promised in point of time later to the Hindu Institution were paid up earlier, and the promises held out earlier to the Muslims could not be fulfilled at all. I have received several complaints from Monghyr District, and I know that the complaints are true.
- (J) Since the regime of Sir Ganesh Dutt,⁴ Muslims have been complaining of some grievances against the District Board and Municipalities in Bihar.

Although the Congress Party dominated most of the local bodies, even during the Ministry of Sir Ganesh Dutt, and gross injustices were rampant there, but this was all ascribed to the dodgings of the Ministry, and it was expected that on the advent of the Congress regime all such dirty games would be gone once for all.

On the eve of the election to the local bodies, Muslim League boycotted the contest. Indeed

League wanted to degrade the Congress; but it was high time for the Congress to think and devise ways and means to ameliorate the grievances of the Muslims. Congress ought to have planned out a formula calculated to do justice to the Muslims. Without making any reasonable change of the rules of election, the Congress launched the election campaign. Although the Muslim League boycotted, yet the number of Muslim candidates was quite fair. The first mistake of the Congress Committee was that it selected a meagre ratio of Muslim candidates and number of the Hindu candidates was overwhelming. The second mistake was that they did not earnestly work for the Muslim candidate as they did for the Hindu candidates. Consequently most of the Muslim candidates could not return. Indeed in some districts it so happened that even Hindu candidates could not return on Congress tickets, but in most of the districts the Congress came out successful. The third mistake on the part of the Congress Committee was that it failed to compensate the adequate representation of the Muslims by nomination; rather most of the nominees were Hindus. Consequently the Muslims could not be represented, in most of the local bodies even in the ratio as it was during the Ministry of Sir Ganesh Dutt.

Although Babu Anugrah Narayan, Minister-in-charge of the Local Self-Government, was warned of it several time by myself and Maulana Azad, that the representation of the Muslims in the Local Bodies should be larger than the preceding years and on the whole the ratio of the Muslim members should come up to 25 per cent as it is in the Assembly. What to speak of 25 per cent representation, even in some districts the Muslims could not be represented in the proportion of their population. If the Minister-in-Charge of the Local Self-Government did not like to compensate by nomination, he at least ought to have postponed the election, and until the fresh [rules] of election were framed, the old bodies should have continued to function. This must have given the Minister credit of a fair play and the Congress should not have been accused of being obsessed with dire communalism.

The other remarkable manoeuvring of the Congress Party has been that they are playing to cap the Local Bodies with Hindu officers. Out of the sixteen Districts there is only one District where a Shia Muslim is the Chairman and there are other three Vice-Chairmen. The same is true of the Local Boards.

All these things may appear quite petty but this leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Congress is Communalist to the core. How else can it be explained away?

Maulana Azad and Babu Rajendra Prasad are aware of all such things that [but] they do not know how to get out of it.

I understand that the solution is not far and between. The Working Committee of Bihar should prepare a detailed schedule of all the District Boards, Municipalities and the Local Boards, wherever the Congress Party dominates; the numerical representation of the Hindus and Muslims should be specified; and the different offices should be distinctly [sic.] to the members of either community. Thus every community will have to realise his [its] exact position. The Congress Party should then be asked to execute

the mandate. According to this programme if a non-Muslim is required to vacate, a Muslim should be set up. And if certain party may take recourse to open revolt, the party should be banned for ten years. This will indeed strengthen the position of the Congress in the Province and the other province will derive salutary lesson.

I realise that this would eventually offend the feelings of those Hindus who have already been elected either as members or office-bearers. But the Congress shall have to take a bold step if it really wants to stick to justice and truth. The Congress should not shirk the path of rectitude for the personal gain of a few persons.

7. A few of the blunders committed by the Working Committee are given below

- (A) On assumption of the office by the Congress Party, the Muslim League launched the propaganda that *Hindu Raj* have [has] been established. This propaganda was not opposed either by the Working Committee or the Congress Governments. The Muslim began to hate the Congress regime altogether, and Hindus began to believe that as a matter of fact *Hindu Raj* has been established. There is a Hindu saying. "*Sayyan Hui Kotwal, ab der Kahe Ka*" (My Lord is at the helm, there is nothing to fear). In most of the places the Hindus began to tease and harass the Muslims which so often culminated in communal riots. If the Congress Working Committee and the Congress Governments have honestly attempted to defy this nefarious propaganda, much of the mischief must not have cropped up. It should be borne in mind that mere statements of certain Ministers that they would sacrifice their lives for the protection of the mosques, cannot wash away the feelings of mutual aversion and prejudice. Such statements have so often been promulgated by the English bureaucrats as well. The thing that was needed most was to impress the public in unequivocal terms that the Congress regime is neither Government of the Hindus, nor that of the Muslims; it is a democracy and each community has his [its] equal share, and no community can dominate the other.

By the end of 1937, I offered this suggestion but no one paid any heed to it. In the year 1938, at Sadaqat Ashram, I placed a resolution to form a Committee to restore communal amity and to redress the grievances of the Muslims, which was readily accepted but was never acted upon. The Congress Working Committee did not think worthwhile to ponder over it.

- (B) After accepting the Office, a tremendous agitation was engineered on account of the Vidya Mandir, Wardha Scheme of Education and Communal riots. But the Working Committee had no time to think over such matters and did not in the least care how to meet the situation. It turned a deaf ear to all the woes and clamour that were rampant in the country. Yet the Working Committee could not help intervening in the petty question of Behari-Bengali tangle, and a High Command (i.e. Rajendra Babu) had

to be deputed to solve it. As Subhas Babu was the President, the question caught their notice; but the imperious [sic.] protestation of the Muslims and the calumny of communalism could not stir them.

This was a blunder heavier than the Himalayas.

- (C) Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind passed certain unanimous resolutions at Delhi on the 3rd March '39 which were addressed to the Congress Working Committee. Some of them related to the complaints which on inquiry needed due deliberations to be submitted to the Government for prompt action, and the others were concerning the Congress Session which should not have taken much time to consider. The year 1939 rolled by but the Congress Working Committee did not get time to think over it. How pitiable it is that the working Committee does not even feel where the shoe pinches.
- (D) Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind had drafted some important resolutions which the Congress Working Committee ought to have pondered over long before. Had it been done so, when the Congress was in power, it must have pacified the Hindu-Muslim tension. The unity between these two communities much depends on the principles enunciated in these resolutions. One is the problem of Cultural Autonomy and the other is the National Education. But the Congress Working Committee does not seem so serious as to take notice of them.

I do not believe that the grievances of the Muslims can be solved only by Coalition Ministry and reservation of seats in the Legislatures as the Muslim League might think. This is not enough to solve the tangle. Coalition Ministry by itself cannot solve the difficulty which the Muslim have to face. Muslims in order to protect his identity must get the principle of Cultural Autonomy recognised as an element of the Constitution of Free India. This is one of the problem which can bring about a harmony between the Hindus and the Muslims, and which ultimately would pave the way for independence. This is the objective of the Muslims which they have to acquire at the point of death. To be discreet enough the Congress Working Committee should endorse it as early as possible.

- (E) The Congress Working Committee has recognised Hindustani as the *lingua franca* of the country; and it has been explained by Babu Rajendra Prasad as the language spoken in Northern India; by way of illustration the speeches delivered at Delhi on that occasion by Maulana Azad and Babu Rajendra Prasad were cited as true specimen of Hindustani. But the Minister of Education U.P. and other Congressmen began to oppose it in every possible way. So to say [that] in order to avenge the Hindustani Movement of the Congress, the very Congress leaders of the type of Minister of Education U.P. began to cram Sanskrit words, which they even did not feel quite at home to pronounce, and the same crooked tendency is being imitated in Bihar.

The Congress Working Committee was warned of it in all possible ways

but it was not moved. The Working Committee did not like to warn the Workers and the leaders not to carry on a campaign of opposition against Hindustani. The Congress workers should not have done anything against the principles which have been evolved in the interest of the Hindu-Muslim unity. The slackness on the part of the Congress Working Committee prejudiced the whole of the Muslim Community.

For the education of the illiterate men a fortnightly paper "*Roshni*" has been started in Bihar. The language is very simple and written in both Hindi and Urdu scripts side by side. This paper has been highly appreciated by the public. This has been helped in encouraging a simple style and the mass is getting familiar with both the scripts. Indeed a useful piece of work has been started by the Bihar Congress Government.

How strange it sounds that this remarkable piece of work of Dr. Syed Mahmud has been denounced in a public meeting in U.P. Some Congress Ministers of U.P. and other Congress workers joined Pandit Malaviya in publicly condemning this act of Dr. Syed Mahmud on matters which have a constructive or revolutionary bearing on. But the Congress Working Committee did not deem it proper at all to take an action against such disruptive activities.

The Pushtak Bhandar of Darbhanga has published some books in simple Hindustani language for the use of village libraries. The language is simple enough to be easily graphed by Hindu and Muslim alike.

At Sonpur Fair (Chatra Mela) a demonstration to make a bonfire of these books was organised which included a fair portion of Congress workers. Some of the Municipalities which are dominated by Congress majority have decided to score out these books as they want to introduce and propagate a language, the dominant factor of which might be Sanskrit; such news can be read in the columns of English papers.

But I do not know whether the Congress leaders or the Congress Working Committee at all intends to put a stop to all such mischievous manoeuvrings. All such mischief mongering will cease to exist if the Congress Working Committee be inclined to take a disciplinary action against them.

If the Congress, truly speaking, does not want to introduce and propagate a Sanskritised language, and intends to encourage the Hindustani in right earnest, (which is the common language of Hindus and Muslims of Northern India and which was commonly spoken by all some 20 years ago), the Congress shall have to be stiff in checking all the disruptive forces—one who opposes the Hindustani shall have to be turned out of the Congress fold, may he be a Hindu or a Muslim. This is the only remedy to bring about a reform. The Congress had been quite bold in taking disciplinary actions against political offenders; but it is a great blot on the Congress creed of *Satya* (Truth) that it always refrained from taking any disciplinary action against

those who had been creating mischiefs. The Congress should take a firm stand in this respect.

- (F) The other great blunder on the part of the Congress had been that it never consults any other important organisation on matters which have a constructive or revolutionary bearing on the whole of the nation. For example, the problem of the Basic Education of the nation is a constructive and revolutionary one. It was not advisable for the Congress to proceed without taking into confidence the educational experts of the various groups. But the Congress did not care for that. Jamia Millia is not the only academic centre of the Muslims. If the Muslim Educational Conference was ignored as it was a reactionary organisation, there were other centres which all along have been progressive. The Congress did not consult even the Darul Ulum Nadva or the Darul Ulum, Deoband; and the Congress should not have ignored the Muslim Educational Conference which all along has been protesting against the old methods of education. The Board of National Education which has been formed by the Congress does not contain any member of the Darul Ulum Nadva or the Darul Ulum, Deoband. Does it not arouse a distrust for the Congress? The Congress should try to rectify it as early as possible.
- (G) The Congress Working Committee does not take the trouble of [to] examine the doings and the activities of the Provincial and District Committees. There is no one to look after, as to how the influential members are maltreating the others.

Although I cannot claim to have a knowledge of the inner Working of the Congress and I do not possess a direct knowledge of the fact as to how the leading members of the Congress Committees are behaving with their workers, yet I know many of the Muslim workers complaining of the differential treatment meted out to them at the hands of the Congress officers. Consequently most of the workers are sore at heart as they are not treated in the same way as their Hindu fellow-workers.

Some of them keep themselves engaged in the pursuit as they are staunch nationalist and cannot but serve their country, while there are staunch [nationalists] who on account of their poverty tolerate every disgrace and continue to stick to the job.

I simply like to draw the attention of the responsible leaders of the Congress, in [the] interest of their cause, as for the acquisition of independence, the existence of a united organisation is extremely necessary. And for this very reason, many of [the] failings of the Congress are being tolerated.

- (H) During the Congress Regime, every Congressmen seemed mad after personal gains and prestige; they became prone to do anything fair or foul for the sake of selfish ends. They abandoned the missionary and constructive programme of the Congress. The Congress Working Committee did not make them up to come to reason. [sic.]

- (I) The Congress Working Committee used to condemn the communal riots and passed formal resolutions to restore unity and good feelings. Since the Congress accepted office, the Working Committee abandoned this formality.

What else could be the greater misfortune for the Country?

- (J) While the Nationalist and the Congressite Muslims openly condemn the reactionary and communalist movements of the Muslims, the Hindu leaders of the Congress do not condemn their co-religionists. The Hindu papers which claim to speak for the Congress, do not criticise them at all. Neither Gandhiji nor Panditji ever decry the misleading and inflammatory statements of Mr. Savarkar and Dr. Moonje. Panditji used to criticise them a few years ago; but there seems to be a distinct change in his attitude. This silence is being interpreted as something meaningful, and mysterious. Surely enough, this will prove damaging to the rank and file of the Congress.

If I may be in the wrong, you will kindly bring it to my notice that I may make amends.

With my sincere prayers,

Yours sincerely,
Naib-i-Amir-i-Shariat, Bihar,
PHULWARI SHARIF
President Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Bihar.

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1. The reference seems to be for Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.
 2. Anugrah Narayan Sinha; Minister, Bihar.
 3. Baldeva Sahay (1892-1959); was elected to Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council but resigned in the wake of Civil Disobedience Movement; was named Advocate-General of the first Congress Ministry of Bihar but resigned in 1942 when Quit India Movement was launched. A great advocate of Bihar for Biharis. Supporter of all good causes and an ardent social reformer.
 4. Sir Ganesh Dutt (Singh); Member, Bihar Legislative Assembly.

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Fortnightly Report on the Political Situation in Bengal for the second half of November, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-11/39 pp. 1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

1. *Political*—During the period under review Mr. Subhas Bose has perhaps been the most vocal politician in Bengal. At Jubbulpore and within the Province he had ridiculed the Congress policy both before, and after the declaration of war. He has stated that the time is ripe for a forward move, and that this should not be put off, as

Mr. Gandhi insists, until communal unity is achieved since the adoption of some form of direct action would improve the communal situation. The Allahabad resolution of the All India Working Committee of the Congress is represented as "licking the feet that kick" and intended to "hoodwink and bluff" the country into inaction. Under his henchmen, the Bengal Congress in a conference of presidents and secretaries of district committees, has demanded that the Congress should inaugurate direct action on an All India scale, and should in any case authorise the local Congress to take direct action. The Working Committee of Mr. Bose's *Forward Bloc* has recorded that it feels that the time is ripe for taking "definite and active steps" though these are for the present apparently to be only "in an organisational direction." On the whole, however, the resolution of the Congress Working Committee is generally welcomed particularly because it leaves the door open for settlement with the British Government. Newspaper comment indicates some realisation that the resolution marks an advance in so far as it concedes the claim of minorities to a separate representation in the proposed Constituent Assembly and is not inconsistent with the acceptance of a Constituent Assembly called even by the British Government. There are also signs of a dawning recognition that the idea of a Constituent Assembly is somewhat doctrinaire and that it involves practical difficulties not hitherto given prominence as regards framing and enforcing a Constitution. At the same time impatience continues to be expressed at what is described as Mr. Gandhi's weakness. In fact, open criticism of Mr. Gandhi, for long regarded as a kind of blasphemy, appears to be growing in volume; the more aggressive elements question whether his leadership will not result in a diminution of Congress prestige. There is, however, some appreciation of the fact that his repudiation of direct action at the present juncture is a lesson learnt from experience; it is interpreted in some quarters as indicating that he has now embarked on a constructive in place of a destructive and self-defeating policy. Criticism of the Congress has also come from Mr. M.N. Roy who, however, secures very little support in Bengal, and from Dr. Moonje on behalf of the *Hindu Mahasabha*. Comment in Bengal professes to accept Dr. Moonje's contention that the repudiation of the federal scheme and the resignation of Congress Ministries were blunders which have betrayed Hindu interests and represents them as indicating the entirely non-communal nature of the Congress organisation. There is very little doubt that a peaceful way out of the present Constitutional difficulties is ardently desired in spite of continued insistence in the Press that Great Britain has no intention of giving up India, a criticism now supported by quoting the case of Burma where neither a Muslim minority nor Princes are said to be standing in the way of the immediate grant of Self-Government. Satisfaction is felt at the possibility that the Viceroy may call a further conference, and doubts whether the Congress would accept seats on an extended Executive Council are now expressed in less categorical terms, particularly in view of the Hindu Mahasabha's announcement that they would cooperate. The attitude to the communal problem similarly appears to have somewhat improved. There is still a great deal of bitterness expressed in respect of alleged injustices perpetrated on Hindus in this Province and on Muslims in certain Congress Provinces; and the situation in Sind has received a good deal of attention and comment. At the same time an excellent impression was created by Mr. Jinnah's broadcast on the conclusion of the Ramzan

fast and more recently by the convocation address delivered at Patna by the Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly who made an eloquent plea for toleration and a "cultural synthesis." Although doubts continued to be expressed whether anything will result from the talks between Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Nehru, they are now expressed less violently, and the Congress papers comment on what they represent as a marked change for the better in the attitude of Muslim leaders. There is, however, an increasing insistence on the part of Hindus upon the fact that the Congress is not a suitable representative of their communal interests and a growing demand that the Hindu Mahasabha must be a party to any communal settlement particularly as regards Bengal.

Communal—It is reported from Chittagong that the Hindu Mahasabha are at present anxious to show that Hindus are being oppressed by Muslims. There has been some tension, of which the most has been made in certain sections of the Press and by the Hindu Mahasabha, between the two communities at Malda over the usual question of music before mosques. There was some apprehension of trouble at Burdwan owing to a Muslim taking part in the *Kali Puja* procession and behaving roughly.

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Maulana Azad's Statement¹

The Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, Vol. 4, pp. 415-16

November, 1939

I have read the Viceroy's statement published along with the correspondence that passed between him and Mr. Jinnah and myself. He seems to give an impression that the British Government are unable to comply with our request for a clear declaration of India's status as a free country on account of our differences. The fact is that the British Government is not prepared to promise that it will accept and give legal effect to any Constitution which the Indians, including all real minorities, would prepare and in which the safeguards for the protection of minorities will be included. We made a public demand for such a promise and I cannot understand what objections the British Government can have to this on the score of our differences with the minorities. If we are unable to produce a Constitution satisfactory to all, the British Government will be free from all blame and the responsibility will be entirely of the Indians. The minorities which are really for attaining the freedom of India can have no reasonable objection as the proposed Constitution will not be produced without cooperation of all.

The real difficulty is not communal but political. the British Government are not yet prepared to concede the right of self-determination to India in practice, however, much it may proclaim it in theory to the world. We put its professions to acid test. Let us have a right to frame our own Constitution and we shall do it. We failed in the past in assisting the British Government to frame a Constitution for us. But helping the

British Government to frame a Constitution for India is something very different from independently framing a Constitution for ourselves with certainty that the Constitution will be accepted and enforced.

Our regret is that instead of adopting this straight course and throwing the responsibility upon the Indians to frame a Constitution with necessary and satisfactory safeguards for the protection of the minorities and thus showing its own bonafides beyond doubt and cavil, the British Government befogged the main and moral issue by asking us to settle our differences without telling us at the same time that the result of such a settlement will be a free Constitution for the country. It was for this reason that we felt compelled to concentrate on political issues and to refuse to consider the proposal for the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council before the question of India's status as a free country with full right to self-determination is settled to our satisfaction.

The two principal organisations of which the Viceroy made reference in his statement, the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League both declared that they aim at the independence for India and so far as I know there is no Party or group in India which does not want full powers for India to manage her own affairs by whatever name or expression that freedom may be called or described. There is this fundamental unity in all parties in India and this is a universal urge of all Indians which the Congress embodied in its demand for a clear declaration.

The resolution of the Muslim League is equally clear that it does not accept the Viceroy's announcement and insists upon the clarification of the same and consideration *de novo* of the question of Indian Constitution. How then does any communal difference stand in the way of clear recognition and declaration of the status as a free country? Whatever differences there are relate not to India but to certain other subsidiary matters which we are prepared to settle ourselves. Our proposed talks with Mr. Jinnah will relate not to this fundamental position, but other subsidiary matters. The Congress has been insisting on, "constructive programme an essential element of which" as Mr. Jinnah recognises "is communal unity." We propose to do our best to achieve the success of this essential programme, but the fact that we are still engaged in this most urgent work should not stand in the way of a clear declaration of the kind demanded by us. All points of principle and detail for safeguarding the rights of the minorities have to be left out to be settled by Indians themselves which they will do to the satisfaction of all if once the British Government proves its own bonafides by ceasing to meddle in our domestic affairs.

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1. Soon after the resignation of the Congress Ministries in October, 1939, Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru met Gandhiji and Rajendra Prasad at Delhi and there was an indication of a possible agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League for the settlement of India's immediate political difficulties. Subsequently a proposal to that effect was submitted to the Viceroy early in November, 1939 by Rajendra Prasad on behalf of the Congress and by Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim League (R. Subramania Iyer, *Role of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in Indian Politics*, Hyderabad, 1968, p. 102). It was in this political context that Maulana Azad issued the present statement.

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*Roger Lumley to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 177, p. 281*

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BOMBAY, 1 December, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

D.O. NO. 168. H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

Rajagopalachari is staying in Bombay for a few days and I thought I might renew the acquaintance with him which I had established when the Congress Premiers were meeting in Poona just before the outbreak of War. He came up to see me and I let him talk on for well over an hour. As he is at present in such close touch with Gandhi, and is returning, so he told me, to Wardha, when he leaves Bombay, it may be of use if I mention the points which struck me as being of most interest in what he said.

2. He was, on the whole, gloomy as to the prospects of finding a way out of the present deadlock, and he did not see any solution, which would be acceptable to Congress, which did not contain the promise of a Constituent Assembly at the end of the War. I gathered that Gandhi, who had previously not been much in favour of a Constituent Assembly, has now gone crazy about it, and Rajagopalachari said that Gandhi was, at the moment quite convinced that it should be their aim.

3. I asked him if he had any hopes that the Muslims would agree to a Constituent Assembly and he replied that he did not expect they would, at the moment, but that it was not necessary for us to secure their assent. All we had to do, he thought, was to say that a Constituent Assembly would be held at the end of the War and it would then become increasingly difficult, as time went on, for the Muslims to maintain the attitude that they would remain aloof from it.

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*Chief Secretary, Bombay to Puckle [Extract]**Home Department (Special), F. 18-12/39 pp. 1-3*

BOMBAY, 4 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. S.D. 4389

My dear Puckle,

I am directed to submit my report for the second half of November 1939.

4. The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha passed at its meeting held at Bombay on the 19th November resolutions denouncing the lack of moral, democratic or altruistic considerations in the foreign policy of belligerent European Powers, emphasising that dominion status could only be regarded as the first step and not the final goal, the latter being complete political independence, and asserting that the Congress did not represent the Hindus and that any settlement made by it with the British Government in consultation with the Muslim League would not be binding on the Mahasabha.

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Jinnah's Statement

The Nation's Voice, pp. 417-18

Bombay, 6 December, 1939. I wish the Musalmans all over India to observe Friday, the 22nd December as the "Day of Deliverance" and thanks giving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function.

I hope that the Provincial, District and Primary Muslim League all over India will hold public meetings and press the resolution with such modification as they may be advised, and after Juma prayers, offer prayers by way of thanks giving for being delivered from the unjust Congress regime. I trust that public meetings will be conducted in an orderly manner and with all due sense of humility, and nothing should be done which will cause offence to any other community, because it is the High Command of the Congress that is primarily responsible for the wrongs that have been done to the Musalmans and other minorities.

Resolution: This public meeting of the Musalmans of (name of the place) records its opinion that the Congress Ministry has conclusively demonstrated and proved the falsehood of the Congress claim that it represents all interests justly and fairly, by its decidedly anti-Muslim policy. It is the considered opinion of this meeting that the Congress Ministry has failed to safeguard the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities. That the Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their duties of the Administration and in the Legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights; that in matters of differences and disputes the Congress Ministry invariably have sided with, supported and advanced the cause of the Hindus in total disregard and to the prejudice of the Muslim interests.

The Congress Governments constantly interfered with the legitimate and routine duties of District Officers even in petty matters to the serious detriment of the Musalmans, and thereby created an atmosphere which spread the belief amongst the Hindu public that there was established a *Hindu Raj*, emboldened the Hindu, mostly Congressmen, to ill-treat Muslims at various places and interfere with their elementary rights of freedom, therefore, it expresses its deep sense of relief at the termination of the Congress regime in various Provinces and rejoices in observing this day as the

“Day of Deliverance” from tyranny, oppression and injustice during the last two and half years, and prays to God to grant such strength, discipline and organisation to Muslim India as to successfully prevent the advent of such a Ministry again and to establish a truly popular Ministry which would do even justice to all communities and interests.

This meeting urges upon His Excellency, the Governor of (name of the Province) and his Council of Advisers to enquire into the legitimate grievances of the Musalmans and the wrongs done to them by the outgoing Congress Ministry, and redress the same at the earliest moment in accordance with the announcements that have been made by the Governors in taking over the Governments of various Provinces under Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935 and thus assure (the) people that the new regime stands for even justice to all communities and interests concerned.

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Ahmad Bashir to Nehru [Extract]

Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol I, pp. 69-76

6 December, 1939

Dear Sir,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 11th November, 1939. I also greatly appreciate your interest in our movement. You will please excuse me that due to extraordinary pressure of work, much as I wished, I could not find time to reply to you earlier.

2. In your letter you have raised many controversial points and one cannot skip over them without carefully considering their veracity. I hope you will allow me to discuss them below in numerical order.

3. Firstly, you contend that my premises and my conclusions were fantastically wrong. I may submit that my premises were based on historical facts while my conclusions were vouchsafed by practical politics. Hindus and Muslims have never been regarded as one nationality and how could it be possible when they do not satisfy conditions which go to make one nationality. For the formation of a single nationality *there must be some common moral consciousness permeating the entire body of the peoples*. Could you please let me know if there exists any such bond between the Hindus and Muslims? Have they got any cohesive force between them that may be conducive to the formation of a single nationality? The trouble is that you look facts from purely a Westerner's point of view, hence your failure to see them in true perspective. For instance, you ignore the fact that Islam gave the world a new sociopolitical order and it is [one line missing] social or political group however important that may be. Islam is extremely uncompromising in this respect. It wants its followers to be a separate self-contained political and social unit as distinguished from the rest of the world. You will excuse me if I digress here for a while.

6. I may not be taken here please, to making any effort of preaching my religion. I simply wanted to elucidate that the Muslims being upholders of a separate socio-political order, can never be part and parcel of any other social or political group. As a matter of fact, they have always striven to that end in all parts of the world. (Of course, they can cooperate with other groups but only for the prevention of wrong and for self-defence). Here you may ask me that, according to my definition, the majority of the Muslims of today are not Muslims and, therefore, I am only counting without my host. But, as I mentioned in my letter to Mr. Gandhi, the present degeneration among the Muslims is due to the absence of some cogent factor among them. Islam is a religion whose purposes remain destitute of fulfilment except through a corporate and well-knitted society, as Omar the Great, declared that there was *no Islam without a corporate body*. The aim of the Pakistan Movement is to re-incorporate Islamic States in those parts of the Indian Continent where the Muslims form the bulk of population, so that we may regenerate them by infusing unto them the pristine spirit of righteousness. We do not purpose to force on them any beliefs (as it is against the precepts of our religion), the religious awakening is *already* dawning on them, and our work is simply to expedite its process. If ever you have any chance of mixing with the middle class Muslims you will be struck with this perceptible change, I am sure. The tone of the Muslim Press, the tone of most of the Muslim leaders including Mr. M.A. Jinnah, and especially of the rising generation is rapidly being tinged with Islamic thought. This renaissance is not confined to India alone, the whole Muslim world is pulsating with a new life.

7. So keeping in view these facts, I pointed out to you the futility of forming a single nationality which is really essential if India is to remain as one Constitutional unit. I, therefore, concluded that if this heterogeneous State was broken into homogeneous wholes it would afford both the nationalities the right of free growth and of self-expression.

8. Secondly; you maintain that the future of India is not going to be determined by either of us and it will be decided by the mutual goodwill and consent of the representatives of the masses. I fully agree with you. This is exactly what we are striving for with keen earnestness. But if this effort fails we are quite prepared for the worst and you will not find us lacking in courage to "take the risk." Perhaps here you are alluding to the formation of a Constituent Assembly. Apart from some practical difficulties that entail the calling of such an Assembly, Muslims shall never agree to this proposal. What the top-most leaders have failed to achieve the "representatives of the masses" can never do. I am not talking in the air. I am positive and not normative in my assertions. I am simply adumbrating the shape of things to come, as the things are acutely assuming shape.

9. Thirdly, you assert that my argument was out of place and was not justified by Indian History nor by the relations that subsisted ages past between the Hindus and Muslims. I may refer you to Alexander Cunningham's and R.L. Stamp's books on Indian Geography. They assert that India is a vast sub-continent comprised of inconsistent elements. It is noteworthy that no historian or geographer of any prominence has refuted the authenticity of this assertion. As regards our past relations I may point out that it was only under the Muslim rule that the relations between the

Hindus and Muslims had been cordial and healthy, and whenever and wherever that rule relaxed, serious clashes occurred between the two peoples. I may refer you to "*Shah Jehan Nama*" by Abdul Hamid Lahori and to "*Tarikh Farishta*" where such incidents have been related in all details.

10. Fourthly, you argue that the Muslim countries of the world are against any division of India. Perhaps in your effort to impress upon us with the "formidable array of opposition" you have forgotten that we have the backing of the entire Muslim world. I am enclosing herewith a sketch map of a scheme which has emanated from Turkey and which aims at creating ten more Muslim Republics in addition to the existing ones. This scheme was published in various Turkish newspapers including the "*Yani Sabah*." Its translation by a Turk, a retired Minister of Education of Afghanistan has appeared in "*Shabbaz*" a local daily of the 16th November, 1939.

11. In addition to this article favouring our movement have also appeared in "*La Nation Arabe*," published in French and edited by His Excellency Emir Shakeb Arslan. As you know he is one of the leading-most thinkers of the Muslim world. Moreover, two Muslim periodicals "*Islamica*" and "*Olz*" published in Germany have emphatically commended our movement. Not only that, even in England and Ireland there have appeared many articles in favour of our movement on the pages of the *Irish Independent*, *Great Britain and the East*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Tarquay Devonstry* etc.

12. Fifthly, you declare that in addition to the Congress and the Hindus, the Muslims *en masse* and some important Muslim organizations are opposed to our movement. So far as the Hindus are concerned, we are sincerely trying to bring them round to our view and I hope it will not be long before we succeed in our mission. We feel more confident when we see that the first proposal to partition India into Hindu and Muslim zones was put forward by a prominent Mahasabhaite, Bhai Parmanand in 1904, and again in 1934, the partition of the Punjab on "Communal" basis was suggested by Pandit Nanak Chand to the Joint Select Committee.

13. As regards the Muslims, I may say with confidence that they are not opposed to our proposal. True, a few insignificant Muslim organisations have rejected our proposal, but they by no means represent the true sentiments of the Muslim masses. Momins are a Shia organisation in a Muslim minority Province which at the most represents only a sect which is numerically as meagre that it is but a fraction of 90 million Muslims. With regard to Ahrars they do believe in separation. But while we want it immediately they want it after the English have departed from India. In his last Presidential Address delivered at Peshawar, Chaudhri Afzal Haque, the President of the All India Majlis-i-Ahrar, expressed the view, I have referred to above. Jamiat-ul-Ulama is a religious institution of the Muslims but unfortunately as the *Ulama* were most seriously hit with the downfall of the Muslim rule, they have steeped deep in darkness. I have no doubt that they are honest in their views, but honesty is no guarantee of sanity and our *Ulama* live so utterly divorced from reason that their lead in worldly matters is anything but safe. Nevertheless, there is a nascent group among them which maintains very sympathetic and affectionate attitude towards us.

14. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, suffice it to say that only recently it invited various people to submit their alternative schemes to the one embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, and it will be surprising for you to note that all

these schemes were based on the principle of separation. They are at present under the consideration of the League. At various occasions Mr. Jinnah has been giving utterances to the same effect for example, his recent statement to the *Manchester Guardian*, which clearly shows that the League as a body is pledged to the policy of separation. About the young Muslims, I am in a better position to speak for it is mostly they who are determined to achieve this end at any cost.

15. Lastly, you say that the Muslim Provinces also disagree with our proposal. It is a mere contention, dogmatic in its nature. The response which we have elicited during the last few months, since we have started our work, has surpassed the highest expectations of the most optimists amongst us. It appeared that we had touched the right chord at the right moment. The very fact that in such a short time there have emerged so many schemes of separation and that numerous Pakistan Majlises have come into existence throughout Pakistan (including the Sarhad Provincial Pakistan Majlis organised by Maulana Abdul Wadood, President, Jamiat-ul-Ulama, Sarhad), shows how the Muslims are so eagerly desirous to achieve this objective.¹ And yet you tell us that you have never come across any person favouring our movement. In a way you are right, because you mix with Congressite Muslims only and, therefore, you can never have a chance to come in touch with the real Muslim thought. At any rate, we are much better off than the Indian National Congress where there are dissensions within and opposition without and which, in the words of its "Dictator," has very few friends.

16. But assuming for the sake of argument that the entire world is against our movement, may I ask, is it desirable to forsake right simply because the world is against its propagation? We are determined to hold the torch come what may, and undeterred and undaunted by the obstacles that thwart our way we would march on. "To frighten us with the miseries of the world is like frightening a hungry man with bread."

17. In the end I would request you to please reconsider the scheme of division of India. Believe me, there is no other alternative of the solution of Indian problems. The sooner the men of your influence come round to this view the better for India as a whole. You command the hearts of millions and if you agree to this proposal, you will materially contribute to the salvation of India.

18. Along with this letter I am sending you a copy of "Confederacy of India" which deals comprehensively with a scheme of redistribution of Indian territories. I will be very glad to receive a reply from you.

With best wishes,

Enclosure-Map of Islamic Republic (Pakistan)

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) AHMAD BASHIR
Secretary, Majlis Kabir Pakistan
Beadon Road, LAHORE.

1. Maulana Abdul Wadud, President, Jamiat-ul-Ulama of N.W.F.P., envisaged sometime in July, 1939, an independent Muslim State to be called Eastern Afghanistan but it was strongly opposed by the Red Shirt leaders who thought that it was meant to keep India in perpetual slavery.

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*Zetland to Linlithgow [Extract]**Zetland Papers, Roll No. 3, pp. 316-17*

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 6 December, 1939

PRIVATE

Many thanks for your letter of November the 18th. Zafrullah came to see me last week and I said good-bye to him shortly before he started for Geneva. I am asking you by telegram if you can spare him sufficiently long to enable him to represent India at the meeting of the Assembly of the League which has now been arranged for December the 11th. I think that it is desirable that India should, if possible, be represented and I understand that he would probably be able to leave Marseilles on December the 21st, by which time it is anticipated the work of the League would be concluded. His talks to Labour Members of Parliament and also to the meeting organised by the Empire Parliamentary Association were, I gather, conspicuous successes.

2. Among my other visitors last week were Mr. Abdul Aziz and George Cunningham. The former appeared to be very anxious to help to put the British case in the War in Muslim countries and said that he asked neither for recognition in the Honours List nor for financial reward beyond a refund of his mere out of pocket expenses. I sent him along to George Lloyd with a letter of introduction and suggested that the British Council might possibly be able to make use of his services. He was so insistent on the steadfastness with which he had declined to allow his name to be put forward for an honour throughout the years of his prominent association with the All India Muslim League that I began to wonder if he was not in fact angling for some recognition now. But I got nothing much out of him except a very definite expression of his view that we should make a fatal mistake if we contemplated offering Jinnah an honour of any kind. I have no doubt that this view is sound; but as it had never occurred to me that any such idea was in contemplation I did not pursue the matter further. The reason why he laid such stress on this matter was, according to him, due to a conviction that any man prominent in the political life of the country who accepted an honour tended immediately to lose influence with his followers, and he assured me that it was on account of his own refusal to consider any reward that he had himself exercised so great an influence over the Muslims of India. I should perhaps add that I do not myself accept his estimate of the influence which he wielded!

3. I found George Cunningham with as high an opinion as ever of Dr. Khan Sahib. I told him that I was a little surprised at Dr. Khan Sahib's apparent loyalty to the Congress and I said that I imagined that in the North-West Frontier Province, where the Hindu population was a negligible quantity, fear of a possible Hindu domination lay so far in the background as to fall outside practical consideration. He agreed that this was so. I then asked him: supposing that the formation of a Constituent Assembly for the discussion of a future Constitution for India ever became a matter of practical politics, would Dr.

Khan Sahib side with the Congress or would he give his support to fellow Muslims such as Jinnah, Sikander and Fazlul Huq? He said that he thought that in such circumstances he would be found on the side of his co-religionists. If things did, in fact, develop in this way, they would go some way towards spiking the Congress guns, in so far at any rate as they claim to represent important sections of the Muslim community. From what you say in paragraph 14 of your letter, I gather that you yourself are sceptical of the possibility of getting together a Constituent Assembly or, assuming that such a body actually did come into existence, of it being able to remain in session for many hours without a tremendous row. This, again, would knock the bottom out of the pretensions of the Congress to represent the whole of India and would throw an interesting light on their claims to be able to settle the communal problem provided that we ourselves did not interfere.

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Roger Lumley to Linlithgow

Linlithgow Papers, No. 182

TELEGRAM R., 7 December, 1939

Secret and Personal No. 271. May. I suggest that steps might be taken to secure publicity in the Press at Home of some at least of Jinnah's call to Muslims to observe a day of deliverance from Congress Ministries, published in today's Press? It would be a convincing answer to the India League statement (if that has been published) and would go some way to disprove the Congress contention that the communal bogey has been manufactured by us and is not a live issue.

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D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru

Sapru Papers

ALEXANDRA ROAD, GAMDEVI, BOMBAY-7, 7 December, 1939

PRIVATE

My dear Sapru,

It is now a long time since I have troubled you to enlighten me about the political situation created in India since the outbreak of War. Is it going to be peace or war on the home-front? The issue is hanging in the balance.

In Bombay, I see a lurking feeling of impatience at the delay in capturing power in the Central Government. One section of the Congress High Command is disappointed at the loss of power in eight Provinces which was to be used as a

handle for securing domination at Delhi. The other section, led by Pandit Jawaharlal, are dreaming that, owing to War, the British Government will soon capitulate and yield complete power to the Congress. Gandhi imagines that the day of triumph is near at hand.

It seems to me, the British Government are playing a waiting game, watching developments in Europe. They have rejected the plan of the Constituent Assembly, though the Madras ex-Premier fondly believes, they are still carefully examining it. Pandit Jawaharlal is now the spokesman of the Mahatma and is carrying on a campaign in the U.P., preparing it for the coming struggle. The Congress has been put off, so as to give no chance to Subhas Bose to force the issue within the Congress.

Meanwhile, Jinnah is on the war-path against the Congress. He is consolidating the minorities for the next battle. He may talk of independence through the Muslim League. But, I think, the real strings are pulled by Sikander (Hayat) Khan. The British Government are still playing with the Congress and keeping them in hopes. But the gulf between them is bound to widen and the Government will rely more and more on the Muslims and the minorities. They may make one more attempt to conciliate the Congress. This is likely to be done in January when the Viceroy will spend one week in Bombay. It remains to be seen if Vallabhbhai and Rajaji then accept the compromise, put down Jawaharlal and quietly take back power in the Provinces and render help for success in the War.

But that will depend upon how far they can come to some agreement with the Muslim League. Jawaharlal imagines he can lead the negotiations with Jinnah to success. I feel almost certain that Jinnah may pretend for a while to negotiate, but will never settle with the Congress. He will go on with the conversation, until the Congress grows impatient and takes the plunge into a subversive movement. Then the Muslims will veer round and openly support the Government in the War. If Congress accepts Jinnah's extravagant demands, they will lose the support of the Hindu community and their rivals of the Hindu Sabha will gain ground in the country.

The Congress will, thus, be in a dilemma, which is being created for them by the present inaction and silence of the British Government. Their plan of a Constituent Assembly will not be supported by any non-Congress Party. The minorities are strongly resisting it and for the same reason, the British Government will finally reject it. It appears to me that we shall have to pass through this period of suspense till March when the Congress will finally decide upon Civil Disobedience.

I think that the best plan for all Parties outside the Congress would be to combine and make a dead set against the Congress High Command and challenge its authority to speak for the Indian Nation. This seems to be the line Jinnah is taking. The High Command on the other hand rejects the claim of the Muslim League alone to speak for the Muslim community.

It seems that the Government will allow the situation to drift into this confused state, so that different Parties may neutralise one another, and then, watching the solution on the war-front in Europe, shape their course as to conciliating or crushing the Congress. What a pity, the Congress, in their arrogance and want of foresight have taken a wrong course! If they had openly cooperated to win the War, I think, they would have reaped a better and more certain harvest. As it is they will go to the

wall and the country will again miss a splendid opportunity. I shall be thankful, if you can guide me to form a correct estimate for the future. I have only given you my stray ideas as they passed through my mind. I hope, you are now enjoying normal health.

Yours sincerely,
D.G. DALVE

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Ahmed¹

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 388-89

ALLAHABAD, 8 December, 1939

Dear Mr. Ahmed,

I do not think there is any conflict between Hindu capitalism and Muslim capitalism. Indeed they cannot be considered separately. There is a certain conflict between Indian capitalism and foreign, more especially British capitalism.

It is difficult for me within the limits of a letter to deal with this problem. Briefly stated it is, I think, as follows:

After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, there was a period of intensive repression and both the Hindus and Muslims suffered from it, but the Muslims probably suffered more. Gradually people began to get over this suppression. The Hindus took to English education, which led to State Services, much more than the Muslims. The Hindus also took to the professions and to industry in larger numbers than the Muslims. Among the Muslims the reactionary elements prevented the spread of modern education as well as industry. The Hindus developed a new middle class during this period, while the Muslims still continued to remain largely feudal. The Hindu middle class laid the foundation of the nationalist movement. But about a generation later, the Muslims went the same way, took to English education and State Services and professions and developed a new middle class also. A conflict arose between various middle class elements for State Services and this was a beginning of the communal problem in its modern phase.

The national movement spread to the lower middle classes and ultimately to the peasantry. Large numbers of Muslims took part in it, although their leaders continued to be influenced much more by the feudal elements, that is, big *zamindars* and the like. Among the Hindus, there are also these feudal elements but their political influence is very limited as the middle class elements have grown strong and even the peasantry makes its influence felt. Among the Muslims, the old semi-feudal leaders felt that their position was threatened. They could not hold their masses on political or economic grounds but they were largely successful in trading on anti-Hindu and anti-Congress sentiments which kept the political and economic issues in the background.

I do not know if what I have written above is at all helpful to you. As I have said, the subject is too big to be dealt with in this manner.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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1. Ahmed of Philander Smith College, Naini Tal, was engaged in research on economic conditions in India. In a questionnaire he had sent Jawaharlal he wanted to know, among other points, if it were not a fact that Hindu capitalism was "consciously or unconsciously permitting itself to be presented as an object of hate before the half-starved Muslim masses?"

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Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's Statement

Jawaharlal Nehru's Papers, Vol. 136, pp. 10-14

Patna, 8 December, 1939. The Momin-Ansar community of India numbering over four crores is distributed throughout the length and breadth of the Indian continent. They call themselves Ansars on account of their direct genealogical connection with the Ansars—the inhabitants of Madina at the time of the Holy Prophet Muhammad's *Hijrat* to the place. Almost the entire community lives on hand-weaving and the allied industries.

In the course of the centuries of pre-British Muslim rule in India, the community lost all consciousness as a political entity, in so far as its members were deliberately led to the conviction by their brethren of the Ruling and Preaching classes that their (Momins) place in life was as mere 'drawers of water and hewers of wood.'

The advent of the British rule, though it lifted off the barriers in the way of the community to enter the avenues of progress on Western lines, inflicted a severer hardship on its members by snatching away from them even their half and dry bread to pamper the prosperity of Manchester.

The community today stands as a sad and naked memento of the triple tyranny by countrymen, co-religionists and rulers.

Though Islam entirely bans caste-inferiority, the Momins of India are, for all practical purposes, the hungry '*achhoots*' of Islam, being exploited through and through by their stronger upper class co-religionists on account of their (Momins) numerical superiority. During these days of Constitutional and political advance the game is becoming more and more crystal clear.

The population of the Momins is being taken fully into account while securing communal advantages and prerogatives but when the question of internal allocation of these advantages arises due care is taken to circumvent the claims of Momins under the plea of the greater good of 'the *Sawad-e-Azam*,' a term formulated to represent the vested Muslim interests, e.g. the Muslim League, merely as a religious-cum-political bluff.

Whatever the interpretation that the Muslim League may put on their Resolution

regarding Democracy (that the democracy is not suited to India), the Momins rightly suspect there is in [it] an attempt to suppress at the very outset the aspirations of the Momin-Ansars and the other professional classes to political power which has hitherto been a legacy of a chosen few from among the descendants of those who ultimately sold off India to the British.

The All India Momin Conference is an institution which came into existence as a natural reaction to the centuries-long disgraceful suppression of the community. Its organisers and promoters are the sons of the community who have through thousand difficulties wended their way to the upper strata of political consciousness and economic prosperity, mainly to secure for the community its fundamental rights as a class of human beings.

Politically the community is nowhere. Educationally it is a good example of a community which has been preached to conviction that its salvation lies in ignorance. Economically its plight is best un-expressed.

The ruined towns of the U.P. and Bihar, the deserted *Moballas* of many cities in Bombay and the Central Province are good archaeological fields to un-earth the history of the Momins that are gone.

As an example it will be interesting though heart-rending, to note the plight of the granddaughter of a Momin from Poona in south India who clad as an ordinary person among the spectators ran into his house and fetched a purse of Rs. 5000/- jingling handing the same over to the Collector who had come to supervise the distribution of famine relief grain in a neighbouring locality for free distribution some 30 years ago. Today the granddaughter is earning wages worth three paises a day to keep herself alive in her old age.

This is a solitary instance from a place where the Momins were best off among Muslims during the Peshwa regime.

There definitely are tens of thousands of similar and worse cases throughout the length and breadth of the country.

The Momin Conference insists on reservation of political rights simply with a view to facilitate the discarding by the community of these disabilities and throwing off its miserable plight.

History and experience have taught the Momins not to trust any organisation mainly manned and managed by the upper class Muslims. The Muslim League is evidently one such institution.

Temperamentally the Momins are God-fearing and Freedom-loving and it is no wonder that a majority of the thinkers among them trust the Indian National Congress and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama more than the Muslim League.

The demands of the Momins are incorporated in the following points, popularly known as 'The Six Points of A.Q. Ansari':

1. One Minister, at least, of the Central (or Federal) Government and of each of the Provincial Governments be taken from the Momin community.
2. Fifty per cent of the seats in the Central (Or Federal) Legislatures and in each of the Provincial Legislatures reserved for the Muslims be allotted to and reserved for the members of the Momin community.

3. Seats in Local Self-Governing and Civic bodies be reserved for the members of the Momin community proportionate to their population in the area served by such body.
4. Appointments in Government and Semi-Government services be reserved for the Momins in proportion to their population.
5. Special facilities be provided by Government for imparting general as well as technical education to Momin boys and girls.
6. State-protection and State-aid be provided for the handloom textile industry owned and carried on by the Momins.

The Momins will be the first to denounce the reservations in the above demands if their objective of 'Happier and Free India' and 'Truly Democratic Islamic Society' is duly achieved. The reservations are means to an end and not an end by themselves.

[P.S.] The membership of the Momin Conference is about two lacs and the number of the subordinate bodies of the Conference *in the U.P. alone* exceeds five hundred. The conference is doing work as enthusiastically in Bengal, Bihar, the Punjab, the Central Provinces and the Bombay Presidency. Cities like Calcutta, Bombay, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Allahabad and Cawnpore are the notable centres of its activity.

The headquarters of the Conference are at Cawnpore, in the United Provinces; the President is Mr. Sheikh Abdul Aziz, B.A, LL.B., Advocate of Dhulia (West Khandesh, Bombay Presidency); and the General Secretary is Mr. A.A. Sheikh, B.E., who is a Civil Engineer from Bombay with office at 29, Hammam Street, Fort, (Bombay).

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Abdur Rahman Siddiqui's Statement

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 119/7-8

Calcutta, 8 December, 1939. Mr. Siddiqui says: "The Mountain in labour, in our case Malabar Hill, has produced the proverbial mole. Muslim India, on the tiptoe of expectation to hear whether the Governor-General had once more slapped the Muslim League in the face or had actually acknowledged the many faults his Government and the Governments of the many Provincial satraps under him had committed since the advent of the new dispensation under the Act of 1935, has been instead, regaled with a most unedifying and painful ukase emanating from the President of the All India Muslim League, the only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims in this country.

"Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah as such has the fullest liberty to tell his people what they should do and what they should not do. But when he speaks in the name of the Muslim League one is left aghast and wonders whether he had the authority of his cabinet to issue the statement. He cannot be allowed to play havoc with the fundamental principles of the Muslim League or run riot with the cherished ambitions and ideals of the progressive section among his co-religionists. He has to realize that

the attitude of respectful silence and anticipation adopted by a vast majority of Muslims in India, despite their resentment against the dangerous and demoralizing channel into which the League is drifting—the pathway which leads straight into Turkistan—may change into exasperation which might lead to the disruption of the League. A leader must, undoubtedly, give the lead to his people but he must also voice their true feelings. I hope the Muslim public of India will, in these nerve-racking days of mental agony, show a more balanced judgement and a better sense of realities.

Congress Tyranny: "We know the tyranny and oppression indulged in by the inexperienced and power-intoxicated Congress Governments over whose exit we are asked to gloat. We know that there is no room for the Muslims and their legitimate demands and grievances in the calculations of the twice-born High Command of the Congress. The Muslims of India have lost faith and have no confidence in the sense of justice and fairplay of their fellow-countrymen of the Congress persuasion. They have to their pain and sorrow, realized that 'bania-craft' and 'state-craft' ill-fit together and yet they cannot get over the fact that every Governor, in what were till recently known as Congress Provinces, has showered encomiums on the Council of Ministers after their exit and after the Working Committee of the Muslim League had questioned in a most categorical manner their methods of administration. This second slap in the face of the Muslim League, after the one jointly administered by the Governor-General and the Secretary of State through their pronouncements, should have made Mr. Jinnah desist from his talk of 'deliverance and thanks giving.' We have heard of the deliverance of the Israelites from the land of the Pharoah into Canaan, the blessed valley of Tuwa. Deliverance from Congress inhumanities—yes—but into the hands of civilian-ridden Governments—no."

Muslim Politics: "In his enthusiasm for protecting and safeguarding the rights of Muslims in his immediate surroundings, Mr. Jinnah seems to have shut his eyes to the wider and far more important problems affecting the Muslim world of which we are an important section. Those who have studied Muslim politics on this wider background have been forced to the conclusion that whether in India or outside, faith in the promises of others has led to their own undoing. The psychology of fear so sedulously preached among the Muslims in India, fear of the Hindu, fear of the Britisher, fear even of our own selves must give place to a mentality of confidence in ourselves and absolute trust in the divine message entrusted to us. Slaves and Cowards have never achieved anything. Had Mr. Jinnah re-read the sermon, he had broadcast on the day of the 'Ed' he would have realized that he was not being true even unto himself.

"Both the League and the Congress are drifting towards totalitarian methods of work. It is a sad beginning for a democratic rule in the India of the future. Dictators in politics are just as bereft of imagination and a proper valuation of issues as are their prototypes in statecraft. Mr. Jinnah's statement is not only inopportune and impolitic but positively suicidal. It will not bring the Muslim Leaguers or the Muslims in general any nearer the real day of their deliverance.

"There is a salutary principle of age limit for retirement from services and professions. The practice has sound reason behind it. Monopoly of posts in politics, whether in the League or in the Congress, is as pernicious a scheme as a monopoly elsewhere. The sages of India have fixed 60 as the age of retirement." (A.P.I.).

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*Linlithgow to Roger Lumley [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 120, pp. 108-09*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 9 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Lumley,

3. I take the opportunity to thank you most warmly for the information you have been giving me from Low about Jinnah and his attitude. I have very little doubt that what Jinnah has been saying, whether to the Associated Press or to Mr. Klein, or in the manifesto to his co-religionists, will produce a very considerable effect; and if he can hold his team together behind him his importance, and the importance for that matter of the Muslim community, in these political negotiations will be immensely increased. He may, of course, prove to have over-called his hand, but I doubt if that conclusion is yet justified, and broadly speaking his tactics have so far proved very successful. The mixture of indignation and despair they have caused in Congress circles was made very apparent to me in the conversations I have just been having with Birla; though it is only fair to say that Shiva Rao, the Correspondent of *The Hindu*, whom I saw today, was disposed rather to pooh-pooh them. But I should have thought myself that they represented something that called for very serious attention on the part of Congress. I shall be telegraphing to you on the points raised in this connection in your telegram No. 272 of the 7th December, to say that in my judgement it should be a cardinal point in our policy not to touch such a quarrel between parties and communities.

4. I was greatly interested in your impressions of your tour. They again bring out the satisfaction (a feeling clearly felt in other Provinces) of the Muslims and the minorities at the fall of the Congress Ministries; and you touch also on a point of which, again, one has had confirmation from widely different areas, viz., the extent to which Congress has lost hold consequent on its inability to fulfil promises made at the last election; though that is not a point to which I would attach too much importance, for if we have to carry on the administration ourselves for any length of time Congress would easily make-up any leeway, and political memories are short. Your impression of the service position is very encouraging, though as you say Gujarat is more of a test from that point of view.

Yours ever,
LINLITHGOW



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*Jinnah's Press Interview**The Nation's Voice, p. 419*

Bombay, 9 December: On its being pointed out to Mr. Jinnah that his appeal to Muslims to celebrate, 'A Day of Deliverance and Thanks giving' was ill-timed in view of the imminent Congress-League talks, Mr. Jinnah explained the circumstances which led to the release of his statement at this particular time. He said:

The Muslim League was fully justified in breathing a sigh of relief on the departure of Ministries inimical to Muslim interests and in praying our popular Ministries fully representing the popular rather than a Party will. This is all that he asked the Muslims to do.

He had decided to issue this appeal weeks ago as soon as the first Ministry resigned and had written to the League Secretary in Delhi to this effect. The matter was, however, delayed due to the Assam Ministry not resigning at the same time as the others, and it was then decided to wait till the new Ministry was fully established and as soon as this occurred, the League Secretary issued the appeal from Delhi. It is thus clear that the issue of the appeal on the eve of these talks was sheer coincidence.

As regards the imminent Jinnah-Jawaharlal talks, the only thing Mr. Jinnah would like to say on their eve was what he had stated in his answer to Mr. Gandhi's message to the *News Chronicle* and that was that while he was entirely opposed to the Constituent Assembly proposal, he appealed to Mr. Gandhi to apply his mind to the far more real problem of Hindu-Muslim unity and assured Mr. Gandhi that he was anxious to do what lay in his power to bring about a settlement honourable to both Congress and the League.

It was in this spirit alone that he awaited the forthcoming talks with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. (A.P.I.)

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*Jawaharlal Nehru to Jinnah [Extract]**Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 390-91*

ALLAHABAD, 9 December, 1939

My dear Jinnah,

Two days ago I sent you a letter informing you that I intended going to Bombay soon and hoped to meet you there. Yesterday morning I read in the newspapers your statement fixing December 22 as a "Day of Deliverance" and thanks giving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function. I have

read this statement very carefully more than once and have given 24 hours thought to the matter. It is not for me in this letter to enter into any controversy about facts or impression or conclusions. You know my views about these, formed, I hope, in all earnestness and with all desire to find the truth. It may be that I am mistaken, but I have sought more light and that light has not come. But what has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realisation that our sense of values and objectives in life and politics differ so very greatly. I had hoped after our conversations that this was not so great. But now the gulf appears to be wider than ever. Under these circumstances I wonder what purpose will be served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion to yield fruit. I think I owe it to you as well as to myself to put this difficulty before you.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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*Jawaharlal Nehru to Mahadev Desai*¹

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 389-90

9 December, 1939

My dear Mahadev,

Your letter of the 5th. I am afraid I entirely disagree with Zakir Husain's suggestion to Bapu. It is not a question of our acknowledging the Muslim League in a particular way. It involves far-reaching implications and the giving up of all basic principles in the Congress. It means the complete disruption of the Congress.

You must have seen Jinnah's new statement. There is a limit even to political falsehood and indecency but all limits have been passed. I do not see how I can even meet Jinnah now. Only two days ago I wrote to him that I would be going to Bombay soon and I hoped to meet him then. Since yesterday I have given a great deal of thought to the matter and I have decided to send another letter to him, a copy of which I enclose for Bapu's information.

Yours affectionately,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. Mahadev Desai (1892-1942); Secretary for many years of Mahatma Gandhi; died a prisoner in the Aga Khan Palace at Poona.



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*Syed Mahmud to Nehru [Extract]**Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Vol. 97, pp. 160-65*

PATNA, 9 December, 1939

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Jawahar,

The other day I went to Allahabad in that agony to spend a few days in the house of my past intimate association and activities—the place where I always found peace and happiness. The most affectionate the way in which you treated me brought some solace to my disturbed mind. But on my return I again fell into the same condition. Let me tell you in general terms again that the Congress has failed to properly and efficiently govern particularly in this Province where it has definitely misgoverned. The Congress is full of provincialism, caste prejudices and revivalism. Even charges worse than misgovernment are freely levelled against it. They may or may not be true but the public at large believe them to be true. This much is certain that such belief is not the effect of propaganda alone. The Congress in power has further failed to win the confidence of minorities not only Muslims but Christians and others. The Christians of this Province will soon become vocal and then you will begin to hear their version of things. That is why I threw suggestion, for whatever it was worth, that the majority should share power with the minority and I had certainly in mind all the minorities—Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, etc. as well as the Hindu minority in Bengal and the Punjab. These matters which I consider to be vital for our cause formed the background of my note.

3. As to the communal problem I have to tell you a lot and I believe Maulana Azad may also throw some fresh light on it. I wanted to tackle this problem on Provincial basis and I feel sure that I would have succeeded in Bihar but I had better say no more about it. Even now it can be tackled without any reference to Mr. Jinnah. How I wish it were possible for you and Maulana Azad to give a few days of your time at Wardha where we could discuss this matter, in the presence of Mahatmaji when there is no working Committee meeting!

With love,

Yours most affectionately,
SYED MAHMUD



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*Linlithgow to Henry Duffield Craik [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 89, pp. 73-74*

VICEROY'S CAMP, REWA, 10 December, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Craik,

2. Other factors in that last connection are, of course, the risk that, given the extreme bitterness of communal interchanges at the moment, civil disobedience would almost unquestionably in a great many places mean communal strife; and the fact that civil disobedience once it is launched again plays into the hands of the Left Wing and deprives the Right Wing of a reconsolidation of their control over the organisation generally, to which I have little doubt that they attach great value. I am disposed at the same time to remain of the view, which I have always held and which I have not failed to put to Gandhi, that Ministers out of office must almost inevitably result before too long in civil disobedience. Whether such civil disobedience will prove to have been a wise thing from the Congress point of view, or will admit of being carried through to any successful conclusion is, of course, another matter.

3. So far as the Muslims are concerned, I get the impression both from conversations and from reports that they have their tails very much up at the moment. I look forward with a good deal of interest to the reactions to Jinnah's very polemical addresses in the last few days. He may, of course, prove to have overcalled his hand. But if that is not the case, the Muslim League will emerge as a factor of still more importance in any resolution of the present political problems in this country. I think that from his own point of view he has probably been wise in stating his claims with the vigour which he has used, for the Muslim organisations have so far been very indifferent in the matter of publicity; and one result has been that the Congress case and the Congress claim to speak for the Muslims as well as the Hindus have received publicity at Home as well as here which on merits they hardly deserve.

8. We left Delhi yesterday on tour, and I send this letter from Rewa where I hope to remain for two days more before going on to Calcutta. I took the opportunity before leaving Delhi to have a talk with Birla and to impress upon him both my own sense of disappointment at the response which I have so far had from the Congress and my very strong feeling that Congress were overestimating the strength of their position in relation both to His Majesty's Government and to the Muslims, and would do well to take stock again. It was obvious that he and those who think with him are profoundly disturbed by the stiffness of Jinnah's attitude. It is clear that they are equally a little apprehensive lest Nehru should go too far, and I did not fail to emphasize the exceedingly objectionable character as well as the unwisdom of

speeches such as that which Nehru made at the beginning of the month about the I.C.S. and the work it had done for Congress Ministries during their time of office.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Rajendra Prasad to Nehru [Extract]

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. IV, p. 168

PATNA, 10 December, 1939

My dear Jawaharlal ji,

2. I have seen Mr. Jinnah's statement fixing 22nd December as the Day of Deliverance to be observed all over the country to celebrate the resignations of Congress Ministries. I had read to me Bapu's statement and Mr. Jinnah's second statement. My first reaction after reading Mr. Jinnah's statement was that we should tell him that we should not have any further negotiations or talks with him. Maulana was here and he came to see me and he seemed to agree with me. I do not know what your or Bapu's views are. I feel that after this statement any conversation with him will be misunderstood by Congressmen and also others outside the Congress. You will please consider this aspect of the question and consult Bapu also before you give him a final appointment. To save time I am posting a copy to Bapu.

P.S. After the above was written I received your letter of 9th December enclosing copy of your letter to Mr. Jinnah. So we have both been thinking on the same line. We may discuss the matter further when we meet.

Yours sincerely,
RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Liaquat Ali Khan to Jinnah [Extract]

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 335/50-61

NEW DELHI, 11 December, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

The "Day of Deliverance" has caused great stir and you must have seen in the papers the various statements that have been appearing in this connection. As far as our people are concerned I think they will observe the day. The Urdu papers have supported the proposal. I issued a statement in this connection last evening which

appeared in the *Statesman* this morning. I am sending a cutting from the paper for your perusal. I hope you approve of it. I have issued instructions to all the Provincial Leagues for the 22nd and have suggested that they should recommend to all the branches to pass the other resolution also a copy of which was sent by you to me.

You must have seen Abdur Rahman Siddique's statement regarding the proposal for the Day of Deliverance. It is most objectionable. At first I thought of dealing to him in my statement but then I decided that it would be advisable to ignore him with contempt—he is a despicable fellow. I am sure that everybody will disapprove of his action. This opposition to the proposal will act as an incentive to our people and I am certain that the meetings will be very successful. Sir Stafford Cripps came to see me this morning.¹ I had about an hour's talk with him. I told him that the principles which were applicable in the West could not apply here. The Democratic Parliamentary System of Government as it is worked in the West, will never work here. No Constitution which is based on purely majority rule will be acceptable to the Musalmans and they will resist such a Constitution with every means within their power. Musalmans were not opposed to freedom of the country, as is generally stated by our opponents but they would certainly oppose the type of freedom that is demanded by the Congress. I told him that the way in which the Congress Ministries functioned during the last 2 ½ (two and half) years had convinced the Musalmans that they would never agree to this type of Government. There are innumerable cases of unprovoked and unjust aggression on the Muslim minority by the majority community which were due to the impression that was created by the Congress that *Hindu Raj* had been established. The Muslims were always ready and willing for an honourable settlement with the Hindus and they were as keen as anyone to get freedom for the country. I told him that recently the Muslim opinion had become very strong for partition of India into Muslim India and Hindu India as we feel that this is the best solution of the problem for everyone concerned. I gave him a copy of our resolutions since October 1937, a copy of Pirpur Report and a copy of Sharif Report about Bihar.² I also gave him a copy of our Constitution. I told him that if he could find time to glance through these documents he will get an idea as to how the Muslim mind has been working. He said that he was going to Bombay and hoped to meet you there. Of course Sir Stafford Cripps does not wield much influence in English politics but it is just as well that he should know the other, than the Congress, point of view also.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

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1. Sir Stafford Cripps halted at New Delhi in the second week of December, 1939 on his way to China.
 2. *Report of the Publicity Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League on some Grievances of the Muslims, 1938-39*, commonly known as Sharif Report spread over 215 pages was presented to Syed Abdul Aziz, President, Bihar Muslim League in December, 1939. For details see *The Nation's Voice*, pp. 549-50.

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*Hassan Ispahani to Jinnah**M.A. Jinnah Ispahani Correspondence, p. 131*

CALCUTTA, 12 December, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Yes, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui's statement caused hurt not only to you but to many others including myself. No one regrets it more than I do that Rahman so hastily rushed it to the Press. He committed a wrong; he acted wildly. To say the least, it is most unfortunate that the statement was released for publication particularly at a juncture like the present one when it is essential for Muslims of all shades of opinion to close up their ranks and to put up a united front in order to get a respectful hearing of their case and to secure their full demands. I have had some very frank talks with Rahman and have told him that he has acted foolishly.

I shall, however, be doing my conscience wrong if I do not state that your direction for the observance of the day of rejoicing for deliverance from Congress rule gave me a rude shock. I did not expect such a command from you, because you have all along kept politics on a very high and strong pedestal. The order was bereft of your fighting spirit. I, however, felt that some strong reason must have driven you to issue your command for the observance of this day. I was thinking of writing to you and requesting you to let me know what prompted you to take the step.

I have one more submission to make and this too, I do with the utmost respect. Please do not misunderstand me. The progressive elements in the League who followed you blindly when you actively took up cudgels on behalf of the unfortunate down-trodden Muslims of India, find to their utmost regret and disappointment, that you are gradually drifting more and more into the arms of reactionaries and '*jee hoozoors*' (yes men). Those whom we despised, not many years ago, seem to have lined up in the front rank of your supporters and advisers. As a result, the League's policy in general is being based on Sir Sikander's and Fazlul Huq's dictation.

I was dumbfounded when I read the War Resolution moved and carried in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Sir Sikander should not have taken such a step when your talks and negotiations with the Viceroy had not been concluded. His action was high-handed and was nothing short of flouting your position and dignity.

It was a direct challenge to the potency of the Muslim League. What pained some of your admirers most was that you as President of the Muslim League had chosen to keep silent. Sir, is it not time that you take stock of the whole situation and put down your foot with firmness?

Yours sincerely,
HASSAN



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Nehru to Syed Mahmud [Extract]

A Nationalist Muslim and Indian Politics, p. 187
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 397-98

12 December, 1939

... your letter was essentially concerned with the communal problem and Jinnah, and the suggestions you have made in it are, I repeat, most extraordinary and reactionary. Indeed they can only result in a complete collapse of our national movement. I do not understand what is meant by a majority sharing power with a minority or minorities. It is inconceivable to me how any Government, especially a progressive Government, can function when Governments have been formed on a communal basis. It is entirely wrong for a Hindu majority or a Muslim majority to form a Government. In this sense it is right that the majority or the minority communities should group together for political purposes. But when we talk about political majorities it means that that majority represents a political viewpoint. It is absurd for a politically advanced majority to give up its advanced views to please a politically reactionary minority. That is the problem we have today in India, and that is what you suggested in our previous letter, although you did not realise it.

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Jinnah to Jawaharlal Nehru [Extract]

A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 414-415

MOUNT PLEASANT ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 13 December, 1939

Dear Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th December. I did not know where to address my reply to you as your movements were reported in the Press. The latest announcement is that you are arriving in Bombay on the 14th of December and I am, therefore, sending this letter to your Bombay address. I quite agree with you "that there must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at, for that discussion to yield fruit." That is the very reason why I made it clear in our conversation at Delhi in October last to Mr. Gandhi and yourself: First that so long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement as that was the basis laid down by the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League and second that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration as laid down in the resolution of

the Working Committee confirmed by the All India Congress Committee of the 10 October, 1939, apart from the nebulous and impracticable character of it till we reach an agreement with regard to the minority problem. The Muslim League was also not satisfied with the declaration made by the Viceroy. If happily we could settle the Hindu-Muslim question then we would be in a position to evolve an agreed formula for a demand of a declaration by His Majesty's Government that would satisfy us.

Neither the first nor the second suggestion of mine was acceptable to Mr. Gandhi or to yourself at Delhi but you were good enough to express your wish that you would like to meet me again and I said that I would be always glad to see you. In reply to your letter of the 1st December expressing your wish to see me in Bombay I informed you that I shall be in Bombay till the 3rd week of December and I shall be glad to see you, and I can only say that if you desire to discuss the matter further I am at your disposal.

As regards your reference to the Bijnor incident I am sure that you will agree with me that it requires a thorough judicial examination and enquiry before any conclusion can be arrived at, and it is hardly worth our while to deal with one instance, for in my judgement the whole working of the Constitution and our charges against the Congress Government must be thoroughly examined by a Royal Commission.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru

Sapru Papers

BOMBAY, 13 December, 1939

My dear Sapru,

Since my last letter, our Bombay atmosphere is full of rumours about the Congress retracing its steps and going back to office in what were till recently denoted as Congress Provinces. The departure of Bhulabhai Desai to Wardha is said to be for persuading the Mahatma to remove the ban against Congress members of the Delhi Assembly. The presence of Pandit Jawaharlal in Bombay, a few days before the Wardha meeting of the High Command on the 18th inst. is believed to be due for persuading him to accept the plan of forming Congress cabinets once more.

I do not know, how far these rumours are well-founded. The fact that in four Provinces, Bengal, Punjab, Sind, and Assam, Muslims are in power, giving full cooperation in the prosecution of the War seems now to weigh with Gandhi and the Congress. This circumstance is believed to embolden Jinnah and the Muslim League in hurling defiance at the Congress. The attempt to force the Viceroy and the Governors to come out into the open in defence of Congress-Governments in their fight with Jinnah has failed. Congress has now realised that the negotiations between Jinnah

and Pandit Jawaharlal have no reality behind them and are only intended to play for time. Gandhi and the Congress had entertained the belief that when they actually noncooperated with the British Government, it will at once succumb and come to terms. But now they find that it is carrying on alright; nay, reversing its policy, though very imperceptibly, as it happened in the case of the Employment Tax in U.P. and the Sales Tax in Bombay. On the other “(“represent cent per cent of the Muslims in the country, which it is impossible for any organisation to do in any country, but I venture to state without fear of contradiction today that it represents the Muslim nation more truly and effectively than His Majesty’s present Government represents the British nation.

The London, “*Times*” is making a great mistake if it is under the impression that any settlement could be forced on the Muslims under the aegis of the British Government without their approval and consent. The Muslims are not prepared to leave their fate and future destiny in the hands of anybody. They alone are the final judges of what is best for them. They must be treated by all parties who play their part in shaping the future of India as a responsible and honourable people.”

“Suddenly Mr. Gandhi finds that my truthful and honest statement in reply to his letter recently published has dashed to the ground all hope of Hindu-Muslim unity. This was the first time that I made the position clear. Why then begin to doubt now whether I represent the Muslim mind at all, I know it is not easy to convince Mr. Gandhi of the reality of the situation. He feels that the picture I presented to him, if realised, would undo the efforts the Congress has been making for over half a century. Efforts of the Congress for the first thirty years have already been undone and Mr. Gandhi is mainly responsible for that. It is the policy and programme Mr. Gandhi has been pursuing blindly for two decades that is the cause of the present state of affairs. He is still under a delusion when he says that this is only a temporary phase in the history of the Muslim League and that the Muslims could never cut themselves away from their Hindu and Christian brethren.

It is not a question of Muslims cutting away from their Hindu and Christian brethren. It is a problem of making our Hindu and Christian brethren understand that we are entitled to our proper place in the Indian sun.

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Moonje to Raja Saheb (Sic)

Moonje Papers

13 December, 1939

Mr dear Rajashib,

Many thanks for your letter of 7th instant which reached me this morning.

I am glad that you have written a detailed letter of reply to Sir Jai Lal.¹ I generally agree with what you have said. The only result of agreeing to extra concessions to

Mussalmans will be to whet up their hunger for more. Having obtained these extra concessions they might keep quiet for a year or two; but on every occasion of further reforms they will revive their quarrel with us and ask for more. Our experience so far ought to be a caution to us. I think the best solution is to press for the acceptance of rules formulated by the League of Nations for minority protection or to insist upon referring the question of Indian minorities to the League of Nations for solution. However we shall discuss the matter when we meet in Calcutta. I have written to Sir Jai Lal asking him to make it convenient to attend the session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Calcutta.

I am glad to note that you will be coming to Calcutta. Myself will be reaching Calcutta on 26th or 27th and I have given you my address in Calcutta.

You were to write to the Prime Ministers of Jaipur and of Mandi to introduce myself and my school to them for their financial help. You may write to them at your convenience and if you receive a favourable reply I will meet them towards the end of the next month.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,
MOONJE

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1. Sir Jai Lal; appointed Assistant Legal Remembrancer to Punjab Government; Conferred the title of Rai Bahadur in 1915. Became Government advocate in 1923 and an additional Judge of Lahore High Court in 1925. Was Knighted on retirement, was President of the Judicial Committee of *Ijlas-i-Khan* of Patiala. Retired with the reputation of 'Equity Judge.'

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Jinnah's Statement

The Nation's Voice, pp. 420-42

Bombay, 13 December, 1939. "A great deal of unnecessary controversy has arisen over my appeal to Muslims to celebrate December 22 as a Day of Deliverance from oppression and, since the guilty do not admit their guilt and public memory is short, I consider it advisable simply to trace the events that led to, and the reasons that prompted this appeal. To commence with, the suggested resolution says nothing more or less than has been said on many previous occasions. The very first complaint against Congress rule was made by me very shortly after they took office and, in my speech at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League, 1937, I complained against the compulsory singing of *Bande Mataram*, the question of the Congress flag and the supplanting of Urdu by Hindi and even then I called upon the Governors to exercise their special powers.

"From then onwards the Congress caucus, like the proverbial steamroller, gathered

speed and complaints of oppression began to pour into the Central Office. These became so numerous that the Council decided to appoint, in March 1938, the Pirpur Committee which, after an elaborate and painstaking investigation over all the Congress Provinces, submitted its report at the Patna Session in December 1938. The following resolution was there passed at a full session :

"That having regard to the atrocities that have been committed and that the elementary rights of the Muslims have been trampled upon in a systematic manner in Bihar, U.P. and C.P. and that the Governors of these Provinces have failed to redress their grievances or protect even the elementary rights of the Musalmans in these Provinces in spite of all constitutional method adopted so far by the Muslims, this 'session of the All India Muslim League is, therefore, of opinion that the time has now come to authorise the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League to decide and resort to "Direct Action" if and when necessary.

"During this time, in order to prevent direct action being resorted to, I was repeatedly urging both the Governors and the Governor-General, in person and by correspondence, to exercise their special powers and to take executive action to safeguard the rights and interests of the minorities placed by the Constitution under their protection and it was only on the 17th April, 1939, that the Viceroy intimated that he would take up the matter. As regards the Congress Ministries, our complaints were dismissed as false, frivolous and vexatious and even Mr. Gandhi, before whom I placed our charges as far back as May 1938, side-tracked the question by writing 'I believe Congress Committees have been advised to avoid as far as possible all occasions of friction over *Bande Mataram* and the flag. The first two demands have come upon an unexpecting public. Nevertheless they undoubtedly have to be examined on their merits, but it does not appear to me to be fair to anticipate the result of the joint committees which, I hope, will come into being without any hitch.'

"With no redress, Muslims in certain Provinces grew restive and, in the C.P. ignoring the Working Committee altogether, resorted to direct action over the *Vidya Mandir* scheme.

"I may state here that at no stage did the Working Committee favour or encourage direct action and on request being received from Bihar in July 1939 for permission to launch direct action, the Working Committee instructed the Bihar Muslim League to place the whole case before the Governor-General, the Governor and the Prime Minister and to report later the result of their representation. Similar advice was given to the other Muslim Leaguers who contemplated similar measures. Complaints, however, continued to put in and on the 27 August, 1939, the Council of the League at Delhi passed the following resolution :

"(a) Resolved that this Council, while deploring the policy of the British Government towards the Muslims of India by attempting to force upon them against their will a Constitution and in particular the Federal Scheme, as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, which allows a permanent hostile communal majority to trample upon their religious political, social and economic rights, and the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed Provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities."

"In September, war was declared and on the 17th of that month, the Working Committee reaffirmed the above resolution as one of the fundamental conditions of Muslim support and the Viceroy, realising the gravity of the situation, pressed Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders to come to an agreement with the Muslim League in the provincial sphere on a coalition basis for at least the duration of the war. Consequently Babu Rajendra Prasad wrote on the 5th October that the Congress was prepared to request Sir Maurice Gwyer or some other suitable person to investigate any specific charges which the Muslim might formulate against the Ministries of the Congress-governed Provinces."

"I considered this proposal unsound and unpractical for the following reasons. First, legally and constitutionally, the Congress Working Committee has no place or power in the Constitution. Secondly the complaints of the Muslims and other minorities were directed against the Governments of certain Provinces who were responsible to the legislatures and the electorates and not to the Working Committee. Thirdly, the proposed resolution of the Working Committee could not confer upon the contemplated tribunal the necessary power to summon witnesses and administer oaths. Nor could the tribunal compel the production of documents that might be required and, finally, I wished to know to whom the tribunal was to report and who would be the final authority to take action, if any, against the Ministries. If this final authority was the Working Committee, I pointed out that, in my opinion, it was the Working Committee itself that was primarily responsible for the injustices and the wrongs committed and I also could not believe that any adequate action would be taken against the Ministries in view of the fact that the Working Committee had already decided that the Muslim League's charges were false and unfounded.

"I also informed Babu Rajendra Prasad that I had already placed the whole matter before the Governor-General and had requested him to take executive action without delay to safeguard and to secure justice for the minorities. I must explain, at this stage, that I have never asked either the Governor General or the Governors to act as a judicial tribunal as is suggested in Mr. Gandhi's appeal to me. What I asked them to do was to take executive action to redress our grievances and by intervention, to secure justice and fair play. Mr. Gandhi's appeal to me to await the Viceroy's opinion is, therefore, based on a wrong assumption and even intervention is not possible now that the Congress Ministries have resigned. For what then should I wait? However, just after my letter to Babu Rajendra Prasad, the Congress Ministries resigned to the very natural relief of Muslims and other minorities and I immediately decided to appeal for the observance of a day to express our relief and to show its intensity in a manner that would force ears that had hitherto been deaf to listen to us. I might point out that if our appeals had been heard at the proper time, no such action on our part would now be necessary.

"This appeal has been variously described as ill-timed, provocative and ant-national and that the Muslims are asked to gloat over the departure of an elected Government and to welcome an official administration. I gladly deal with these points. As regards time, my appeal could not appear before it did for reasons already made public, and its connection or effect on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's visit is dealt with by me at the end of my statement.

"As regards, provocation let me point out the words of my appeal : 'I trust that all public meetings will be conducted in an orderly manner, with all due sense of humility and nothing should be done which will cause offence to any community.' However, to make quite clear my insistence that the day is observed in such spirit, I again state that I look to all districts and primary Leagues to ensure that the meetings are held in that spirit. Let there be no *bartals* (strike), processions or such demonstrations, but let a spirit of humility and a mood of reflection prevail. There is relief and gratitude in our hearts, not joy or triumph. Thirdly, it is extremely unfair and unjust to contend that the Muslims welcome the present administration. It is true that we urge upon them to inquire into our grievances and to redress them, but this is only because it is in their power to do so. On the other hand, my appeal emphasizes that prayers should be offered for the establishment of truly popular Ministries, which would do even justice to all communities and interests.

"But there is one statement on my appeal that I cannot let pass coming as it does from such an authoritative source as the Chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Committee. I am told that all our charges are totally false and unwarranted, and that was to be expected, but I must take notice of his declaration :

'Furthermore, every Premier, at the instance, had invited his Governor unhesitatingly to intervene in matters affecting the rights and the interests of the minorities whenever the Governor felt that the action of the Ministry was not correct. When Mr. Jinnah recently made the charges, I again instructed every Premier to invite his Governor's attention to them as they also affected him and I was informed that the Governors considered the charges unwarranted.'

"The above statement raises a very grave issue for it makes the Governors accessories after the fact. Let me inform Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel that we have overwhelming evidence in support of our case and, far from shirking an inquiry, as is suggested, I insist that a thorough inquiry should now be made by a properly constituted tribunal vested with all necessary powers and I now ask that a Royal Commission be appointed by the British Government of a purely judicial personnel and composed of judges of his Majesty's High Court and under the chairmanship of one of the Law Lords of the Privy Council. I cannot conceive of any objections to this demand from the Congress or any other quarter and call upon them to Support my request.

"Before concluding, I must deal with Mr. Gandhi's appeal and Pandit Jawaharlal's visit. I would have been inclined to respond to Mr. Gandhi's appeal had he and other Congress leaders practiced what they preached about the necessity for a cordial atmosphere in which a communal agreement might be arrived at. May I remind them that a regular crusade, beginning with Mr. Gandhi himself, is being carried on against the League since the Delhi conversations took place. Mr. Gandhi himself since my conversation with him in Delhi in October, has, in the *Harijan*, described the Muslim League as an agent of imperialism, as an obstacle and an obstruction in the way of India's freedom and progress and has stated that the Muslim League is insatiable in its demands since it can always look to the British Government to fulfil them. He even threatens the Muslims that though they may be holding up the country at present, they cannot do so for long.

"Further the Congress press and organisations are carrying on propaganda all over India and abroad discrediting the League and attempting to divide the ranks of the Muslims. Let me give one out of many examples in my possession. Mr. Gandhi is perhaps not aware that a secret letter from the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, the present Congress President's own province, issued from the Sadaqat Ashram, P.O. Dighaghat, Patna, and addressed to the President of the district Congress Committee, Gaya, which was published in the *Star of India*¹ and which remains uncontradicted, says : "You are, I hope, convinced by this time that the one outstanding question before us awaiting solution is the attainment of Hindu-Muslim unity. To achieve that end, it is essential that Congress-minded and truly nationalist Musalmans of Hindustan have got to become vocal so that the stopper to all progress applied by the League should disappear." "It is hardly necessary for me to point that daily propaganda on these lines has the exact results that Mr. Gandhi fears will ensue from my single appeal.

"Now to deal with the chief objection raised against my appeal that it will prejudice the communal talks taking place between Pandit Nehru and myself. Let me inform the public that rather than approaching a settlement, as has been widely assumed, such discussions have yet to commence. The discussions between him and other Congress leaders and myself were of a purely political nature and related to the political demands made by the Congress at that time. This has been stated by Congress leaders themselves. I informed them at Delhi that I could not associate the Muslim League with any joint demand to the British Government till a Congress-League agreement had first been arrived at. I also informed them that no such agreement was possible till the Muslim League was recognised as the authoritative and the representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, and as this position was not acceptable to them, the talks ended on this point and on Pandit Nehru expressing a desire to see me again, I gladly agreed and I look forward to his visit." API.

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1. *Star of India*, dated 4 December 1939 publishing the text of the Bihar Congress Committee letter as part of letter entitled 'A Bihar Congress Circular' from one Mrs. A.D. Naimuddin (Gaya) to the editor, *Star of India* with a warning that its contents are 'significant and cannot fail to serve as an eye-opener to many patriotic Indians, particularly Muslims.' The correspondent claims the letter to be 'a true copy' without giving her source.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Jinnah (Extract)

A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 415-416

BOMBAY, 14 December, 1939

My dear Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th December which was delivered to me in

the forenoon today on my arrival here. I sent you my last letter from Allahabad after reading and giving full thought to your statement about the celebration of "a Day of Deliverance and thanks giving" by the Muslims. This statement had distressed me greatly as it made me realise that the gulf that separated us in our approach to public problems was very great. In view of this fundamental difference, I wondered what common ground there was for discussion and I put my difficulty before you. That difficulty remains.

In your letter you have emphasised two other preliminary conditions before any common ground for discussion can arise. The first is that the Congress must treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India. The Congress has always considered the League as a very important and influential organisation of the Muslims and it is because of this that we have been eager to settle any differences that may exist between us. But presumably what you suggest is something more and involves some kind of repudiation by us of or dissociation from other Muslims who are not in the League. There are, as you know, a large number of Muslims in the Congress, who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are Muslim organisations like the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the All India Shia Conference, the Majlis-e-Aharar, the All India Momin Conference etc., apart from trade unions and peasant unions which have many Muslims as their members. As a general rule, many of these organisations and individuals have adopted the same political platform as we have done in the Congress. We cannot possibly dissociate ourselves from them or disown them in any way.

You have rightly pointed out on many occasions that the Congress does not represent everybody in India. Of course not. It does not represent those who disagree with it, whether they are Muslims or Hindus. In the ultimate analysis it represents its members and sympathisers. But there is this vital difference that while the Congress by its Constitution has its membership open to all who subscribe to its objective and methods, the Muslim League is only open to Muslims. Thus the Congress constitutionally has a national basis and it cannot give that up without putting an end to its existence. There are many Hindus, as you know, in the Hindu Mahasabha who oppose the idea of the Congress representing the Hindus as such. Then there are the Sikhs and others who claim that they should be heard when communal matters are considered.

I am afraid, therefore, that if your desire is that we should consider the League as the sole organisation representing the Muslims to the exclusion of all others, we are wholly unable to accede to it. It would be equally at variance with facts if we made a similar claim for the Congress, in spite of the vastness of the Congress organisation. But I would venture to say that such questions do not arise when two organisations deal with each other and consider problems of mutual interest.

Your second point is that the Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from the British Government. I regret to learn this for this means that, apart from communal questions, we differ entirely on purely political grounds. The Congress demand is essentially for a declaration of war aims and more specially for a declaration of Indian independence and the right of the Indian people to frame their own Constitution without external interference. If the Muslim League does not

agree to this, this means that our political objectives are wholly dissimilar. The Congress demand is not new. It is inherent in article one of the Congress and all our policy for many years past has been based on it. It is inconceivable to me how the Congress can give it, up or even vary it. Personally I would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation. But this is not a personal matter. There is a resolution of the All India Congress Committee, endorsed by a thousand meetings all over India, and I am powerless to ignore it.

It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes discussion difficult and fruitless. What led me to write my last letter to you also remains—the prospects of a celebration of a Day of Deliverance by the Muslims, as suggested by you. That raises very vital and far-reaching issues, into which I need not go now, but which must influence all of us. That approach to the communal problem cannot be reconciled with an attempt to solve it.

I feel, therefore, that it will serve little purpose for us to meet at this stage and under these conditions with this background. I should like to assure you, however, that we are always prepared to have free and frank discussions of the communal or other problems as between the Congress and the League.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad (Extract)
Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, Vol. IV, p. 169

All India Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee

68 MARINE DRIVE, BOMBAY, 14 December, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

3. I am sorry to hear that you are not well. Jawaharlal has just come and we all feel that no useful purpose will be served by meeting Mr. Jinah. It is clear that he does not want any settlement but simply wants to create propaganda against the Congress.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL



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*Zetland to Linlithgow (Extract)**Zetland Papers Roll No. 3, pp. 331-34*

INDIA OFFICE, WHITEHALL, LONDON, 14 December, 1939

Secret

3. Your letter of the 27th November was followed at a very short interval by your letter of the 28th, upon which you told me that you were working in connection with your reply to the questions posed to you by Jinnah. I need hardly say that I have read with profound interest the comprehensive and masterly survey of the existing political situation which it contains—a situation which is full of complex and baffling problems. Your conclusion that our reply to Jinnah should be as brief as the requirements of the situation permit is, I am sure, sound and to save time I telegraphed to you a few days ago the text of a reply which I think should meet the case and which, as you will see, follows pretty closely your own suggestions for answers to the questions which Jinnah has put to us. Jinnah has been exploding like a machine gun during the past week or two and were the request made by Agatha Harrison for facilities to be given to Gandhi to broadcast to the British people to be granted, to be followed, as in fairness it would have to be, by similar facilities for Jinnah, the great British public would be likely to be edified by a pretty dogfight! Of course, Agatha Harrison is anxious that the public here should hear only Gandhi's side of the question, as is evident from her comments to me on the White Paper in which were included the Manifesto of the All India Muslim League, as well as that of the Congress, to say nothing of the Statements made by the various other groups who claim a right to be heard when their future is on the anvil. It was the inclusion of these, in her view irrelevant, documents, that spoilt the effect from her point of view of the Congress Manifesto! I await your comments upon the draft reply to Jinnah which I telegraphed to you and as soon as I have them I will submit the matter to the Cabinet; but it will not now, I fear, be possible to obtain their consideration of the matter before Monday at the earliest.

4. I now turn for the moment to your letter of November the 30th covering a very full account of Laithwaite talks with Birla and of Birla's somewhat discursive notes of his own talks with Gandhi. I must say that I share to the full and deeply sympathise with your feelings as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter, and I hope that Jagdish Prasad¹ will pass what you said to him on the Gandhi and his friends, for it is surely high time that the Congress made a contribution of a more helpful character than anything that they can lay claim to up to the present time. I am glad to note that Jagdish Prasad at least had the decency to admit that you had been treated with a singular lack of consideration by his Congress friends. As to Birla's own discursive ramblings, I can only say that they display a lamentable woolliness of thought. At one moment we are told that there could be no place for Great Britain in the Constituent Assembly that Gandhi is revolving in his mind; and at the next we are told that if the

Princes must be brought into the business at all they should be represented by the Paramount Power. Birla's exposition of the thoughts of the great man is indeed a hotchpotch off obscurities and contradictions. Gandhi's conception of a Constituent Assembly is one thing and Nehru's, apparently, another thing. But what does that matter, since if we will only promise them a Constituent Assembly we may be confident that it will never materialise at all? Whether this really represents Gandhi's feelings, or whether it is to be regarded as a gloss on them by Birla, I do not know, but it clearly provides us with no solid ground from which to make a departure in the direction desired by the Congress.

13. As I mentioned in my private and personal telegram to you about Jinnah's complaints of injustice under the Congress Ministries, I have to make some reply to a question which Snell proposes to ask me this afternoon. I shall be as objective as possible in my references to the present position and I will endeavour to be conciliatory and to pour a little oil upon the troubled waters. I have just seen a Reuter telegram from which it appears that Jinnah is now demanding the appointment of a Royal Commission to enquire into the accusations which he brings against the Congress Ministries. As I have not yet had any official information with regard to this latest move on the part of Jinnah, I shall make no reference to it in the course of my remarks.

With the best of good wishes.

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1. Sir Jagdish Prasad; Magistrate and Collector 1903-21, Secretary to Government of U.P., 1921-27 and its Chief Secretary, 1927-31; Home Member, U.P. Government, 1933; Member, Viceroy's Council, 1935-40.

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Jinnah's Rejoinder

The War ! Problems of India's Future Constitution, pp. 43-45

14 December, 1939. We are informed that London 'scouts' our just demand to appoint an impartial judicial tribunal, namely, a Royal Commission, to enquire into our charges of a very serious character about the tyranny and oppression practised over Mussalmans in Congress-governed Provinces. Sir Hugh O' Neill is reported to have said that he could not believe that the interests of either party to the dispute or of the peoples of India as a whole would be served by a formal enquiry into the matter. What does this mean? This unreasonable reply has imposed an additional task upon us. We shall try to remove his wrong belief when he says that it is not in the interests of the people to do justice. He is entirely mistaken when he says that such an enquiry would embitter Hindus and Muslims. It is a charge against the Congress High Command and the Congress Ministries, which must be investigated in order to stop a reoccurrence or repetition of it in future.

My attention has also been drawn to an article in the London "*Times*." This paper

is generally well-informed but when it says that the All India Muslim League is not an authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India, it is misled completely, showing ignorance of the actual position in India to-day. Of course the League is not the only Muslim organisation in the country nor does it represent cent percent of the country nor does it represent cent percent of the Muslims in the country, which it is impossible for any organisation to do in any country, but I venture to state without fear of contradiction to-day that it represents the Muslim nation more truly and effectively than His Majesty's present Government represents that British nation.

The London, "*Times*" is making a great mistake if it is under the impression that any settlement could be forced on the Muslims under the aegis of the British Government without their approval and consent. The Muslims are not prepared to leave their fate and future destiny in the hands of anybody. They alone are the final judges of what is best for them. They must be treated by all parties who play their part in shaping the future of India as a responsible and honourable people."

"Suddenly Mr. Gandhi finds that my truthful and honest statement in reply to his letter recently published has dashed to the ground all hope of Hindu-Muslim Unity. This was the first time that I made the position clear. Why then begin to doubt now whether I represent the Muslim mind at all, I know it is not easy to convince Mr. Gandhi the reality of the situation. He feels that the picture I presented to him, if realised, would undo the efforts the Congress has been making for over half a century. Efforts of the Congress for the first thirty years have already been undone and Mr. Gandhi is mainly responsible for that. It is the policy and programme Mr. Gandhi has been pursuing blindly for two decades that is the cause of the present state of affairs. He is still under a delusion when he says that this is only a temporary phase in the history of the Muslim League and that the Muslims could never cut themselves away from their Hindu and Christian brethren.

It is not a question of Muslims cutting away from their Hindu and Christian brethren. It is a problem of making our Hindu and Christian brethren understand that we are entitled to our proper place in the Indian sun.

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Mohammed Dawjis Didabhoy to Jinnah [Extract]

Quaid-i-Azam Papers

SURAT, 14 December, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Dear Jinnah Sahab,

2. In connection with the observation of the 22 December, 1939 by the Muslims, I have gone through the statements published for and against this demonstration and

have carefully read your long statement in this morning's papers. While fully agreeing with all the reasons very ably set forth in your statement, I very respectfully appeal to you to try and find some *via media* and postpone the proposed demonstration of the 22 December to some future date and in the meantime, continue unity talks with Pandit Nehru and see if some good results out of these efforts. After all what we desire is the acceptance of our rights and stoppage once for all of the communal quarrels.

What I fear and doubt at this particular juncture is that some agents provocateurs hired by the votaries of the Congress may try to create communal disturbances at different places and put blame on you and the Muslims for its occurrences. As you know a spark is enough for communal riots and some evil-minded persons may take advantage of the situation.

Unfortunately, the Muslim public is not shocked enough to control itself. The intense propaganda carried on by the Congressmen and their Press against this peaceful observation of 22nd, may bring the passions to a high pitch and thus only a spark will be enough to explode communal frenzy. These are my fears.

Therefore, I earnestly appeal again to you to find some *via media* and postpone this demonstration to some more opportune moment.

May God guide you and grant you enough strength for the service of the community.

Yours sincerely,
MOHAMMAD DAWJIS DIDABHOY

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Lord Zetland's Statement in the House of Lords [Extract]

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 418-19

14 December, 1939. 3. What then, you may ask, stands in the way? Not the least of the obstacles is difference of opinion between the Congress and the Muslim League as to the relations of the Congress and what for want of better term are described compendiously as minorities. The nature of this difference is well illustrated by another sentence in the most recent statement by the Congress Working Committee, which runs as follows—"The Committee wish to declare that no communal considerations arise in meeting the demands of the Congress." I am sure they are sincere in holding that belief; nevertheless, it is one which His Majesty's Government are unable to share. In their view no Constitution could be expected to function successfully, which did not meet with the general assent of the minorities, who had to live under it. I am not, of course, in anyway, intending to minimise the importance of such sections of the population as the Scheduled Castes, or indeed, of any other minority, when I say that by far the most importance of the so-called minority communities are the Muslims. I am well aware that I need hardly say that there are Muslims to be found in the ranks of the Congress. Yet the fact remains that of the four

hundred eighty-two Muslims elected to the lower Chambers of the Provincial Legislatures at the last general election only 26 stood as Congressmen and Mr. Gandhi himself has stated that the All India Muslim League is undoubtedly the largest organisation representing Muslims, though he also speaks of Muslim bodies, which deny its claim to represent them.

4. There is a further consideration to be borne in mind. We speak of Muslims as a minority, because on a purely arithmetical basis they are less in number than the Hindus. But they are a community of from eighty to ninety millions with race memories of days, when for 200 years the Moghul dynasty ruled over a greater part of the Indian Sub-Continent. They have behind them a tradition of military service, which persists to this day and is exemplified by the high proportion of the Indian Army, which they fill. I have recalled these facts because they make it clear that minorities of Europe present us with no full analogy and god knows, minorities of Europe have been a source of sufficient trouble in the world of today.

I observe that Mr. Gandhi himself in his paper "*Harijan*" of November 25 speaks of summoning a Constituent Assembly 'subject to safeguards to the satisfaction of minorities;' and he goes on to say—"the expression, satisfaction of minorities, may be regarded as vague. It can be defined beforehand by agreement". We too regard it as essential for Constitutional advance by whatever means advance is to be obtained—that assent of minorities should be secured as far as is possible by agreement. But it is not within our power to impose an agreement upon them; that can only be reached by Indians themselves.

5. It was with a view to promoting discussion to that end between the leaders of the Congress and of the All India Muslim League that they were invited by the Viceroy, not long since to meet one another.

6. I would appeal to the leaders of the Congress as the largest and most powerful political organisation in India to endeavour to understand the difficulties which are responsible for the attitude of the All India Muslim League. How great is the need for such an understanding is shown by the instruction issued a few days ago by the President of the All India Muslim League to the Muslims throughout India to observe 22nd of this month as 'Day of Deliverance and Thanks giving that the Congress Governments ceased to function.' I would equally request to the President of the All India Muslim League to consider the effect of such action upon the relations between the two communities generally and also between the Congress and the All India Muslim League. Will they not call a truce in order that there may be free and friendly discussion between them with a view to reaching that agreement, of which Mr. Gandhi has written? I derive some little encouragement from the report, which has reached me that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Jinnah have arranged to meet one another for further discussion.

7. That is all to the good and I venture to hope that they may cover a wide field for I am convinced that so long as the Legislatures are divided on communal rather than on political lines so long will serious difficulty be experienced in the working of democratic institutions with success. What we have to aim at is a state of affairs under which the Legislator will think of himself as an Indian first and as Hindu or Muslim afterwards. When that has been achieved the greatest stumbling block in the way of India's progress will have been removed.

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*Roger Lumley to Linlithgow [Extract]**Linlithgow Papers, No. 189, pp. 295-97*

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BOMBAY, 15 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. 54

My dear Linlithgow,

This report covers the first half of December.

6. *Muslims*—Jinnah's Day of Deliverance appeal and the statements which have followed it has naturally aroused very great interest here. I have telegraphed, as occasion arose, such information as I was able to obtain. It seems clear that his first statement came as a great surprise even to his own followers, and, though most of them have kept quiet about it, I believe they were made very uneasy by it. The Congress reaction has been, as was to be expected, one of indignation. Vallabhbhai Patel, I learn, has been greatly annoyed, and I could see from my three former Ministers, who raised this subject, that they were very much perturbed. The result appears to have been that the projected renewal of conversations between Jinnah and Nehru has been cancelled. I learn that Nehru wrote to Jinnah saying that he did not think there was much use in holding the conversations under the circumstances, and that Jinnah replied that if that was his view it was probably well-founded, and that, in any case, if the conversations were to begin he would require certain conditions to be fulfilled, one of which was that the Muslim League should be recognised by Congress as representing the Muslims.

Yours sincerely,
ROGER LUMLEY

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*Jinnah to Jawaharlal Nehru**A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 417-18*

MOUNT PLEASANT ROAD, MALABAR HILL, BOMBAY, 15 December, 1939

Dear Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14 December, 1939 and I am sorry to say that you have not appreciated my position with regard to the second point. I did not say that Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from British Government. What I have said was that we cannot endorse the Congress

demand for the declaration *as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee and confirmed by the All India Congress Committee of the 10th October, 1939 for the reasons I have already specified in my letter.*

If this resolution of the Congress cannot be modified in anyway and as you say that personally you would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation of it and as you make it clear that you are wholly unable to treat with the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Musalmans of India, may I know in these circumstances what do you expect or wish me to do.

Yours sincerely,
M.A. JINNAH

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Nehru's Statement

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 406-09
Pandit Nehru on Zetland's Statement

15 December, 1939. Lord Zetland occupies a high office. But many of his recent utterances can hardly be termed responsible or helpful. I have no desire to discuss his latest speech in any detail. He has raised some novel points and arguments and laid stress on the minorities question specially. No one in India can possibly ignore this question and all of us are obviously desirous of solving it to the satisfaction of the various parties concerned.

How is it to be solved within the context of democracy? Obviously, the fundamental principles governing any consideration of any aspect of the Indian problem are democracy and unity of India. The suggestion put forward by the Congress that all these matters should be decided by a Constituent Assembly meets in principle all the difficulties raised. This does not mean that all our problems are simple of solution or that there will not be complications and difficulties to face. But it does offer not only a suitable method but the only way within the context of democracy. The mass of people by adult suffrage elect their representatives; all the principal minorities are represented and have a voice in the shaping of India's future. In regard to their particular problems it may be said that a minority's rights might be overridden by majority vote. That has been got over by the suggestion that such rights should be settled by agreements. If there is no agreement about a specific issue then the only proper course is to refer it to an independent arbitration such as the League of Nations or the International Court at the Hague. Nothing could be fairer than this and no minority can possibly object to it. It avoids the possibility of the majority forcing its will on a minority in regard to the minorities' special rights and interests. It avoids also the absurdity of a minority imposing its will on a majority. The importance of the Constituent Assembly procedure is to get the real opinion of the masses, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs etc., through their elected representatives. The question does not

arise then of who the Congress represents or the Muslim League or any other party. If these organisations command the confidence of the people their nominees will be elected to the Constituent Assembly.

I agree with Lord Zetland that it is a little absurd to consider the Muslims in India as a minority. Not only their great numbers but the fact that in large areas of the country they are in a majority makes it clear that no minority question really arises. Ordinarily speaking, such numbers warrant no protection as they can well look after their own interest. As a matter of fact, in predominantly Muslim areas like the Punjab, Bengal, Sind, the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan the minorities are non-Muslim and many of them have demanded protection. If India is looked at as whole these various factors balance one another and prevent misbehaviour of any religious or racial group.

Lord Zetland unfortunately still thinks in terms of a bygone age and has a semi-feudal outlook on life. He does not realise that new forces are convulsing India. Even among the Muslims the mass of the people are claiming their own rights from their upper class and sometimes their semi-feudal leaders. The problems of India are essentially economic though a continuous attempt is made and has again been made by Lord Zetland to make them appear to be racial and minority problems. Lord Zetland possibly still thinks of the Princes of India as the hereditary rulers and of the Rajputs and other classes as the obvious military class. But things are very different in the India of today and all this attempt to hide the real issues cannot last long in this dynamic situation.

I can well understand the opposition of the British Government to the idea of the Constituent Assembly because such an Assembly necessarily puts an end to British Imperialism. Between the position of Indian nationalism and that of British imperialism there is no common factor. If the British Government is unable to agree to India determining her future, we are equally unable to agree to the British Government interfering in any way in such a decision. We agree to differ and the future will decide whose will prevails. There is no other way of having a free Constitution to India and every other method involves a measure of dictation from abroad. The alternatives are, as previously stated, continuation of British domination and the development, sporadically or otherwise, of Sovietism in India. I do not know how the mass of Indian people will decide in the particular matter but I am prepared to leave it to them and take the risk. The days of small groups at the top deciding the fate of India cannot last.

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Hassan Ispahani to Jinnah

Ispahani Correspondence, p. 136

CALCUTTA, 16 December, 1939

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Sikander Hyat has done the League injury¹ and I submit that you should take

early steps to see that he makes a statement, similar to Fazlul Huq's in the Punjab Assembly. Such a declaration from him will add strength to your elbow.

Your statement issued yesterday is what all expect of you. I wish it had come in the place of the 'Day of Deliverance' *firman*, or at least before it. Your Deliverance *firman* dropped on us like a bolt from the blue and upset many a mental equilibrium. Still this is not an excuse for any public outburst against you. We know that Rahman has done wrong. I am sure that he too realises that some portions of his statement shot the bolt and were not in good taste.

Yours sincerely,
HASSAN

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1. Sikander Hyat Khan made charges against the Congress Ministry but when challenged he wrote that his public utterances need not be taken seriously.

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Jawaharlal Nehru to Jinnah

A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 418-419

BOMBAY, 16 December, 1939

My dear Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of December 15th. I realise the difference you have pointed out. Of course, the Muslims cannot oppose the idea of any declaration. What the Congress had asked for was an enunciation of war aims and a recognition of India's independence and the right of her people to frame their Constitution, a right that must necessarily be inherent in independence. All these are basic principles which flow from our objective of independence, and as the Muslim League has the same declared objective, there should be no difference of opinion about them. In the application of these principles many important matters will, no doubt, have to be considered. But so far as the basic demands are concerned, they are of the very essence of Indian nationalism. To give them up or to vary them materially is to knock down our case for independence.

In regard to the war also the Congress has repeatedly declared its policy during the last eleven years. The present declaration is a logical outcome of that policy. I have personally had some share in shaping this policy and I have attached importance to it. You will appreciate that it is exceedingly difficult, apart from the question of desirability, to vary such long-established and fundamental policies. These policies are in their essence and, I would venture to say, are the only policies which flow from a demand for Indian freedom. Details may be considered and discussed, their application should be worked out in mutual cooperation and, in particular, the interests of various groups and minorities should be considered carefully and protected. But

to challenge the very basis of that declaration is to demonstrate that there is a great difference in political outlook and policies. This, as such, has nothing to do with the Hindu-Muslim problem. It is because of this that I feel that there is little in common in our political objectives.

May I say again that no one on our behalf, so far as I know, challenges or minimises the authority, influence and importance of the Muslim League. It is for this reason that we have been eager to discuss matters with it and to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problems that confront us. Unfortunately, we never seem to reach even the proper discussion of these problems as various hurdles and obstructions, in the shape of conditions precedent, come in our way. These conditions precedent, as I have ventured to point out to you, have far-reaching significance. I do not know why they should be allowed to obstruct all progress or prevent us from considering these problems. It should not be difficult to remove these hurdles and come to grips with the subject itself. But as these hurdles continue and others are added to them, I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in political outlook and objectives.

At the present moment, the decision to have an all India demonstration on December 22nd has added a psychological barrier which effectively prevents mutual approach and discussion. I regret this exceedingly and have earnestly wished that you would see your way to remove this barrier which is leading and can only lead to ill-will. I still hope that you may be able to do so.

I do wish to assure you that for my part I do not want to leave any stone unturned which can lead to mutual understanding and settlement. But you will not have me, as I do not want to have you, leave integrity of mind and purpose in pursuit of anything. Nothing worthwhile can be gained that way. I have deep political convictions and I have laboured in accordance with them these many years. I cannot leave them at any time, much less now when the world is in the throes of a terrific crisis.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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K.N. (Dakoar) to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur [Extract]¹

Amrit Kaur Papers

KARAN NIVAS, JAMMU TAWI, 17 December, 1939

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Bibi,

6. What has happened to Jinnah? You must have seen how quickly Zetland seized upon "Deliverance Day." I fear even Bapu must feel faint-hearted at the progressive worsening of the position.

7. How much value do you attach to the condemnation of Jinnah's move by a certain section of the Moslems and by certain members of the Muslim League, like Abdul Rahman Siddiqui of Bengal?

8. You will notice that Zetland said all the Hindus were not behind the Congress and he cited the Hindu Mahasabha and a section of the Depressed Classes.

9. The Hindu Mahasabha is entirely wrongheaded and incapable of understanding Bapu's strategy—if I may use that odious word. Really, I pity myself for being an Indian.

10. Now that the temples have been thrown open to the Harijans and their status has been effectually improved, why shouldn't there be a revival of the *Shuddhi* movement as a political move purely? I say so because I do not think a man is a better man or a worse man by being either a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian. It is faith that alters and, without faith, merely belonging to a persuasion is no more than emerging from the state of being dressed in leaves into being dressed in woven cloth.

Yours ever,
K.N. DAKOAR

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1. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (1889-1964); Secretary to Mahatma Gandhi for 16 years; Union Minister of Health, 1947-52; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1957-64.

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Jinnah's Statement

The Nation's Voice, p. 428

Bombay, 17 December. "In order to raise still further objections to the functions on December 22, it is now being said that my move is anti-Hindu and will arouse communal passions. I greatly regret that in order to discredit the Muslim League the Congress should resort to such mischievous and dangerous propaganda. Let me once more point out that our relief is from the oppression of the Congress regime only and is not in any way directed against our Hindu fellow-countrymen as a community.

"In fact our chief objection to the attitude of the Congress is that it totally prevents the Hindu and the Muslim communities from working together in a manner honourable to both. The Muslim League stands for justice and fairplay to all whether Muslim or any other community and I am glad to have received encouragement and support not only from all minorities but from non-Congress Hindus also. Let me, therefore, take this opportunity to appeal to all Indians who believe that the conditions in India necessitate popular, rather than party, Governments which do justice to all sections of the people rather than to an irremovable majority, to come forward now and to make known their views.

"The functions on December 22 are not Muslim functions directed against their Hindu fellowmen as a community but a condemnation, pure and simple, of the regime of the Congress caucus. I, therefore, most cordially invite all who support this attitude to join and participate in our meetings."

"Muslims are as anxious as anyone else in the country that India should be a free nation" declared Mr. Jinnah, while unfurling the Muslim League Flag this morning before a large audience. Mr. Jinnah appealed to Muslims of India to stand united under the League banner. The Muslims had no enmity with anybody but only they claimed the right to live in the country with honour. (API)

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Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. to Conran-Smith [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-12/39, pp. 1-3

LUCKNOW, 18 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Conran-Smith,

I am desired to send my fortnightly report for the first half of December, 1939.

8. *Communal*: The most important event of the fortnight under report was the visit of the Muslim League Goodwill delegation from the Majority Provinces. The speakers were from the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Their general tone was anti-Congress and in support of the League. They emphasized that the Muslims of the United Provinces had the support of their brethren in the West and that there could be no settlement with the Congress, except in terms of equality. The speeches were, with a few exception, unobjectionable. Everywhere they went, they were warmly received by the local Muslims and their meetings were well attended, and often included people from the rural area. The result has been the consolidation of the League and a stiffening of their attitude. Recruiting of members and volunteers of the League has been going on. There has also been a certain amount of Khaksar activity, including recruiting with varying success. Khaksars have paraded in some districts and it is reported from Banda that the Khaksars of that district intend shortly to hold regular maneuvers with those of the neighbouring districts of Hamirpur and Fatehpur.

Mr. Jinnah's announcement, made after the end of the fortnight, that 22nd December should be celebrated as Deliverance Day has further encouraged the League. It has been criticized in the Press by certain Muslim leaders and others of advanced political views have criticized it privately; but the present indications are that it will appeal to the masses and most of those that regret it will hesitate to oppose it actively for fear of weakening the League. The reactions of the Congress and of their Hindu sympathisers have been bitter. The feeling throughout the Province is now that there is no prospect of a settlement between the Congress and the League in the near

future. The rift between them is increasing, the Congress looking on the League as the main obstacle to India's freedom and the League distrusting the Congress and fearing that the independence of India will mean for them merely subordination to the Hindus.

In Lucknow the Shias are pleased that their *Tazias* and *Tabuts* have at last been buried and there is hope that feelings between them and the Sunnis will improve. But it is said that attempts are being made by the Congress to persuade the Shias not to take part in the celebration of "Deliverance Day." If this attempt is successful, the situation may again deteriorate.

Except that in Cawnpore there was a fight between Hindu and Muslim students after a hockey match, which fortunately had no repercussion in the city, and that in one or two places disturbances caused by the rise in prices took a communal turn, there have been no communal outbreaks. The Muslim students of Allahabad University have taken up the question of the flying of the Congress flag on educational institutions and demanded that if any flag is to be flown it should be the University flag, or, if the Congress flag is to be flown, the Muslim League flag should be flown along side of it. A meeting of Sikhs and members of the Hindu Sabha was held in Lucknow in which non-violence was condemned and Hindus were urged to become so strong that they could rule India without the help of non-Hindus.

The Ahrars of the Rohilkhand division held a conference at Moradabad but the speeches were unobjectionable; there was also a certain amount of Ahrar activity in the Lucknow Division.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 6, pp. 305-09

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 18 December, 1939

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

4. Fazlul Huq, who, when I saw him on the morning of the 15th was in the very best of form and obviously full of confidence, told me that he was greatly pleased with your speech which said things that the Muslims were anxious to hear from His Majesty's Government. I did my best to bring home to him the desirability of holding on to Sarkar if possible, but I doubt if I carried much conviction; and Nazimuddin hinted to me that the Prime Minister would probably be only too glad to be rid of Sarkar whom he found very definitely a nuisance so far as work was concerned (I have no doubt that Sarkar is a little less tender towards some of the Chief Minister's ramps than his co-religionists might be!)

9. Nazimuddin was so anxious to go on to hear why I thought Congress still a factor to be reckoned with that he readily accepted this proposition and begged me to explain my view about Congress. I talked to him quite frankly about the weakness

of Jinnah's position as I saw it, on lines with which you are familiar—the attitude of the coming generation &c. He said he quite saw the point, but felt that nothing else could have been done than had been done by Jinnah. I said that on that assumption I would like to ask him what alternative he was in a position now to propose himself? He replied, quite frankly, that he could not even formulate one, and that the absence of an alternative was the weakness of the Muslim position. I said that I imagined that he would probably feel that the position could probably be formulated something as follows "If you want more protection for the minorities (which, incidentally, would have to apply to Bengal and to the Punjab as well as to the Congress Provinces) you can't go any further than you have done without destroying all prospect of developing collective responsibility and Cabinet Government and without sacrificing all promise in terms of Parliamentary and Governmental evolution, since that was something which could come only from Cabinet Government with collective responsibility." Nazimuddin said that he wholly agreed that that was a fair statement and I begged him, in those circumstances, to take care lest in his desire to defend the minorities he and his friends should slaughter the future of normal Cabinet Government in India; though I quite recognised that that might be a thing which would have to come.

10. He then took the point that there was no hope, whatever might be said, of the Muslims being satisfied unless the Muslim representatives in the Cabinet were really representative. I suggested to him that this was an argument that cut both ways. He was hardly going to be able in Bengal for the rest of his public life to get away with so moderate a proposition as Sarkar, and what he had to contemplate was having Subhas Bose as a Cabinet colleague; sharing his secrets; in a position to vote him down in a combination; and with the right, if he resigned, to explain to the Legislature why he had submitted or disagreed. That was a somewhat inhibiting element to let in, and I hoped that he would think of Bengal as well as of the United Provinces. I think that I succeeded in giving him something to think of, and I have no doubt that I have reinforced his readiness to retain Sarkar as a colleague.

11. Lastly, I saw Sarkar himself, of course with Herbert's approval; and we discussed the position very frankly. I gathered from other sources that he had probably been in touch by telephone about his position with Gandhi and Birla already that day. Nobody could have been more positive in his condemnation of the tactics of the Working Committee than he was. They had, he said, put themselves in a perfectly impossible position, and did not know how to get out of it or what to do. I begged him, as far as I properly could, to consider how great a loss it could be were he to feel bound to throw his hand in; how unfortunate it would be that a valuable link between the Working Committee and normal Parliamentary Government should disappear; and how much the class of Hindu in Bengal which he at present represented might have cause to regret the absence of their spokesman. He accepted all this but said that his position was one of the utmost difficulty, since while he readily subscribed to the proposition that India should cooperate in the war & c., he found it extremely difficult to accept the proposition implicit-indeed explicit-in their draft resolution that the concurrence of all minorities should be requisite for the framing of India's future Constitution. He was not himself a full-blown Congressmān, but if he were to stay in the Cabinet after putting his name to such a proposition, it might very well be that he

would forfeit the confidence and the respect of those in Bengal who he at present represented in it. If on the other hand he decided to leave the Cabinet rather than subscribe to this proposition, he wished to assure me that he did not propose to join Congress with whom, indeed, he disagreed on many points, and whom he regarded as having, in bringing out the Ministries, and in other respects, particularly in the type of proposition they had put forward as regards a Constituent Assembly, handled the situation exceedingly badly. He would, he added, be very ready however to serve me. I did not, on receiving that hint, turn so much as a hair! I have, as you know, hinted at him as a possibility for the succession to Jagdish Prasad, in my personal correspondence with you; but the circumstances of any demission of office by him in Bengal could not but have a direct relevance to the wisdom or otherwise of considering him for the Centre within a couple of months after such demission.

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*Fortnightly Report on Bihar During the First Half of December, 1939 [Extract]**Home-Poll (Special), F. 18-12/39*

PATNA, 19 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

3. *Communal*: The outstanding event of the fortnight is the appeal of Mr. Jinnah to Muslims to observe 22nd December as a Deliverance Day. If the instructions of Mr. Aziz, the Provincial leader of the Muslim League, are obeyed nothing more than passing the resolution proposed by Mr. Jinnah and the offering of prayers will happen. Mr. Jinnah's appeal has come as a surprise to most Muhammadans and the moderate minded among them do not feel happy in as much as they think that the Deliverance Day may have undesirable repercussions. Dr. Mahmud, ex-Minister, describes Mr. Jinnah's appeal as a "hymn of hatred" and makes a counter appeal to Muslims to observe it as a Hindu-Muslim unity day and proposes that prayers should be offered for such unity. *The Behar Herald* calls it a great betrayal. *The Searchlight* thinks that Mr. Jinnah is engaged in a game of blackmail: "his conceit has been pampered long enough; he must be brought down a peg or two." Minor incidents of communal trouble have been reported from a few places but they are only what is to be expected from the present tense situation in the country. Khaksars in Patna, in the district of Gaya and in Jamshedpur are concentrating on enlistment of fresh recruits, but the progress made is almost negligible.

One Chand Karan Sarma of the Rajputana Hindu Mahasabha visited Patna and delivered lectures on the Hyderabad *satyagraha* and gave his audience more or less the same advice as was given by Dr. Moonje whose speeches have been referred to in the last report.



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*Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Conran Smith [Extract]**Home-Poll (Special), F. 18-12/39 pp. 1-3*

BOMBAY, 19 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Conran Smith,

I am directed to submit my report for the first half of December, 1939.

2. *Political*—The outstanding event of the fortnight was undoubtedly the appeal made by Mr. Jinnah to Muslims through the columns of the Press on the 6th to observe the 22nd as a day of deliverance and thanks giving as a mark of their relief that Congress Governments have ceased to function. This evoked sharp criticism from all sides, even from some members of the Muslim League, and a resolution was passed by the Bombay Provincial Hindu Mahasabha requesting Government to prohibit Muslims from holding meetings and processions on that day on the ground that the celebrations were likely to lead to rioting. Mr. Jinnah's subsequent statement, published on the 14th, in which he asks for the appointment of a Royal Commission, has done nothing to ease the situation, although he points out in it that his intention is that the day should be observed not as one of "joy and triumph" but as one of "relief and gratitude" and although he requires of Muslim League Committees that there should be no hartals, protests or demonstrations. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who is now in Bombay, in an interview to the Press on the 14th, is reported to have said that he thought that there was no point now in his seeing Mr. Jinnah to continue their talks. He was, however, consulting his colleagues in the matter before taking a final decision.

The Pandit also addressed a public meeting on the 14th the object of which, according to its President, was not to criticise Mr. Jinnah's action but to stress the demand for a Constituent Assembly. The Press report of the meeting indicates that the Pandit declared that, although the British Government had not taken any such steps as warranted the inception of civil disobedience by the Congress, it was almost definite that Government had decided to launch an attack, that in fact some responsible officers of Government had gone to the extent of saying that there would be no room for the maintenance of an attitude of neutrality, and that Congress must elect between support of the British Government and going to jail. In a further Press conference on the 15th, after touching on Lord Zetland's speech in the House of Lords on the 14th, he regretted his inability to resume his talks with Mr. Jinnah but hoped that in a better atmosphere he would be able to continue them. The Congress, he said, would have nothing to do with a Royal Commission if by its appointment Mr. Jinnah was delivering a challenge to India's right to independence. Mr. Vallabhbhai J. Patel also issued a statement to the Press the same day in which he expressed amazement at the "conspiracy of silence" on the part of the Viceroy and the Governors in not rebutting the allegations of the Muslim League, particularly as Mr. Jinnah's attack was as much against them as against the Congress.

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*M.A. Bari to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 847/4-6*

BOMBAY, 19 December, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

My interest in the Muslim League dates back to its very birth. My father, the late Colonel Abdul Majid Khan was one of its original founders. His personal relations with Lord Minto went a long way to ensure the success of their famous Muslim deputation that waited upon the Viceroy. It is, therefore, as a friend of the League that I approach you.

Doubtless you have received many appeals from your colleagues as well as others to call off the celebration of the "Day of Deliverance." Your latest statement is taken as an indirect reply to the Mahasabha Resolution. The Hindus are convinced it is an anti-Hindu demonstration and say you call it anti-Congress to avoid a head-on collision with the Mahasabha—a body which is anti-Muslim as you know. The proposed celebration has already created ill-feeling. The actual celebration will endanger such terrible bitterness that no settlement between the leaders will be able to allay it amongst the rank and file for decades. This bitterness will cause for silent strangling of the economic life of the Muslims, which no amount of safeguards in the political field will succeed in preventing. By the proposed celebration you will be inflicting an irresponsible injury on the Muslims.

You can yet gracefully call it off saying you are doing it to show goodwill towards the Hindus, because it has been misrepresented as anti-Hindu. Such a gesture will succeed in restoring at least partially, the atmosphere of goodwill that your famous Id broadcast talk had created. It was, indeed a historic resentment of the fundamental principle of Islam, the brotherhood of man in its pristine purity and in a way that it had not been stated for centuries. I appeal to you in the name of this fundamental teaching of Islam—the oneness of human family—to call off the celebration of the "Day of Deliverance." Your object is already fulfilled by calling attention to it. If you call off the celebration it will help you to bring about the surely needed unity between the two communities.

With my adaab,

Yours sincerely,
M.A. BARI

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Dastur Noshewan Kaikubad¹ to S. Jan Mohammed and copy forwarded to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 847/31-37

DASTUR HALL, POONA, 19 December, 1939

Dear Khan Bahadur S. Jan Mohamed,

I am sorry, I shall be unable to attend the "Deliverance Day" meeting you are holding on the 22nd instant, but I assure you that my sympathy as well as that of my entire community—if I may voice their general sentiment—is with the Muslims in this cause.

Your leader, Mr. Jinnah has so fearlessly and patriotically ventured to express the sentiment, which today fills the hearts of many an Indian, that I cannot help admiring him.

I know instances of Parsis, who have already regarded the outgoing of the Congress Ministries as a deliverance and offered individual prayers in many Fire Temples. It is not given to many to express their feelings openly and hence the opportunity Mr. Jinnah has given to his countrymen is really praiseworthy, especially because he is doing it in such a dignified way, without any ill-feeling to the Hindu community.

I trust members of all communities, including Hindus will join Mr. Jinnah in thought, if not in person, and offer prayers to the Almighty, Who came to their aid before worse harm overwhelmed them.

Let us while thanking our Deliverer, pray that the Congress which once had a fair name, be delivered of all the cankers, that have infested it and that he, in His mercy, may save India from men, whose patriotism is not the real love and uplift of India, but of their own selfish desires and creeds.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd/-) NOSHERWAN KAIKUBAD DASTUR

1. Sardar Khan Bahadur Dastur Noshewan Kaikubad, Parsi High Priest of the Deccan and Malwa.

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S.R. Narayana Ayyar to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 985

"DEVINILAYAM," COONOOR, 19 December, 1939

Sir,

Your statement dated 17th in which you state that your "Deliverance Day" is not an 'anti-Hindu' move does not appear sincere. Perhaps finding that a large number of

people view your draft resolution as one to deliberately rouse the Muslims against the Hindus, you now try to wriggle out of the situation.

However busy you may have been and especially when the idea of such celebration was not made at the spur of the moment you must have been aware that the 22nd is a public holiday not for the sake of Muslims, but for the sake of the Hindus. You may say that you did not think of Hindus and hence you did not remember it. Of course, I can understand it that since you hold that the Hindus are a people with "centuries old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other" you could not have remembered it. But as a Lawyer of great standing and as a gentleman having big accounts in the Banks must have remembered that it is a Bank Holiday under the Negotiable Instrument Act. This certainly would have made you remember that it is a Sacred Day for the Hindus. Apart from the day being a Vaikunta Ekadasi Day it happens also to be the Gita Day. Sri Krishna gave his teachings, which we Hindus have not been following for the last few centuries and thus have allowed others to rule over us—7187 years ago on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. To argue yourself and to state that you did not remember it is merely to state that you are an ordinary man. I myself admit that you are one of the foremost Indians and hence I cannot but think that you have deliberately, wantonly, knowingly chosen a Hindu Holiday for your Deliverance Day to create riotings and thus show the power of the Muslims against the Hindus. However to test your sincerity I have sent you the following wire, which I hereby confirm.

"Having chosen a Hindu Sacred Day your Deliverance Day want only anti-Hindu. If sincere have Saturday."

Nothing will be lost if you have your Day on the 23rd. Thousands of Hindus will be fasting on that 22nd and will be visiting, of course, they being "superstitious," Temples. You want your Muslim Masses to insult them saying that "Hindu Raj" has not come.

Yours faithfully,
S.R. NARAYANA AYYAR

M.A. JINNAH, Esq., Bar-at-Law
Malabar Hill.

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Dwarkadas Jethabhai Dani to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 985/16

KHETAN BUILDING, NAWI WADI, BOMBAY. 2, 20 December, 1939

Dear Sir,

As a Hindu I am against the Congress views and its administration and I have been glad to see that the Congress is now out of Power. It is a wise step on your part that you are observing Friday the 22nd instant as the Day of Deliverance. It is wiser

still that you have invited other communities also to join you in the observation. As a staunch Hindu I have always prayed for the non-existence of Congress regime, and at last my prayer has been heard. Will you very kindly allow me to open my heart before any meeting that may be held under you. I assure you that my views are certainly [against] the Congress regime.

An early reply will oblige.

Kindly let me know at what meeting you will allow me some time to speak, on the 22nd instant "Deliverance Day."

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,
DWARKADAS JETHABHAI DANI

N.B. I enclose a cutting from the *Jame Jamshed* of the 19th instant expressing my views.

(Sd/-) D.J.D.

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Linlithgow to Zetland [Extract]

Zetland Papers, Roll No. 6, pp. 312-14

VICEROY'S CAMP, INDIA, CALCUTTA, 21 December, 1939

SECRET AND PERSONAL

2. What is the position that faces us to day? It is, I think, that we are confronted by demands for certain assurances, by the two leading political parties in India, as a condition of their active cooperation in the war. The majority Party, the Congress, ask for an assurance that we recognise the independence (a term not too exactly defined) of India, and that we are prepared to give some immediate practical application to that assurance. They suggest that problems such as the problem of the minorities can be settled amicably and satisfactorily once that declaration has been made, while the views of persons in close touch with Gandhi, such as Birla, suggest that Congress contemplate that we should make it clear to the minorities that while we will see that justice is done to them, for any specific concession they must approach the Congress Party. Defence and similar questions are equally to be left for settlement, though the underlying assumption appears to be that that settlement will involve the retention of British troops and the support of His Majesty's Government for any Constitutional arrangement that may be made.

3. The claim is further urged, with greater or less precision and insistence, on behalf of the Congress Party, that they should be recognised as the mouthpiece of India; and that claim appears to cover not only the position of the minorities, but ultimately that of the Princes, even though it appears to be recognised that the case of the Princes can best be handled on their behalf by His Majesty's Government. The

Congress claim finally that His Majesty's Government should leave the future to be decided by a Constituent Assembly, and Gandhi has expressed himself in favour of that solution. Nehru has proposed that that body should be elected on a basis of adult suffrage; and a very broad basis for it appears to be generally contemplated. (I need not develop the argument against an electoral basis for anybody charged with the duty of framing a Constitution or the fact that since *ex-hypothesi* no concrete proposals could be in existence at the time of an election held for such a purpose, the electors would have nothing before them to enable them to select their representatives, and that the election would in fact be merely a blank cheque). But others in touch with the higher ranks of the Congress appear open to some modification of that basis, and a variety of suggestions have been put forward for a smaller and more expert body. Cripps, so far as he may be in touch with the mind of Nehru, has also suggested that a Treaty between His Majesty's Government and the new Government of India to emerge from the Constituent Assembly, possibly for 15 years, should be concluded to govern matters such as Minorities, States, Defence etc.

4. The Congress, having been unable so far to secure acceptance of their demands by His Majesty's Government, and having declined to consider any adjustment of their differences with the Muslims in advance of the declaration by His Majesty's Government referred to above, have withdrawn their Ministers from office, and driven us in seven Provinces out of eleven to resort to the emergency provisions of the Act of 1935. Since that decision, communal feeling between Hindu and Muslim and Muslim anxiety to take advantage of Congress resignations, and of the professed readiness of His Majesty's Government to reconsider at the end of the war the scheme of the Act of 1935 in the light of public opinion in India, to secure better terms for their community in the Provinces and the Centre, have remarkably increased.

5. The second largest community and Party, predominantly represented by the Muslim League, refuse to accept the principle of a Constituent Assembly, and press for acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the principle that no declaration regarding Constitutional advance, and no Constitutional advance shall be made which does not commend itself to them as well as the Hindu community. (That demand may well be designed incidentally to split the Congress by necessitating the concurrence of dissident sections of Hinduism such as the Mahasabha, or the Scheduled Castes). The Muslims who have made the largest actual and are capable of making one of the largest additional contributions to the war, and who are alone at the moment (if we except Assam) working the Provincial part of the Act of 1935, are incidentally closely interested in the future control of defence, and in ensuring that no Constitutional changes transfer that control from His Majesty's Government to the majority community.

6. As between the Congress and the Muslim League, the position is, in a word, that Congress insists on the English democratic principle of consent by all parties in the rule of the majority, and they imply that it is His Majesty's Government duty to act as guarantor for the observance of that principle. The Muslims on the other hand refuse to accept that principle, and they imply that it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to act as guarantor of their rights, should they consider those rights to be prejudicially affected by the majority decision.

7. Of the remaining communities, the Europeans have just reiterated publicly

the vital importance which they attach to commercial safeguards and their entire support for the declaration made with the approval of His Majesty's Government on 18th October, 1939. I need not comment on the position of the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, etc.

8. The situation in the country is that seven Ministries have been replaced by bureaucratic Government without giving rise to any popular outburst—indeed, the general attitude, so far as it can be assessed, in the Provinces affected is one of relief, though it would be unwise to attach too much importance to this feeling, or to overestimate the period of its persistence. Feeling against His Majesty's Government is not marked in those Provinces, or even in the Congress High Command, and the general sympathy of the country is markedly with the Allies. While some of the calm in question is due to the reluctance of the Congress High Command to precipitate a struggle, e.g., by declaring civil disobedience, it has to be remembered that the High Command has probably its own reasons for wishing to avoid civil disobedience—the degree of general sympathy in India with the allied cause, possible unpreparedness of their supporters, absence of any really convincing popular cry, the absence of a real economic grievance, thanks to war rises in prices, the risk that civil disobedience may play into the hands of the left wing of Congress, the real risk, given existing communal tension, that it would result in communal rioting and the discredit which would attend an unsuccessful move in that direction. The local position is further complicated by the demands now insistently pressed, of the Muslims, for further concessions at the expense of the Congress, by their insistence that they shall not be regarded as covered by the Congress umbrella; by what can I think fairly be regarded as a growing feeling of uneasiness on the part of the Congress lest they should have over-called their hand in losing the opportunity afforded them of reaching a provincial settlement with the Muslims consequent on which they could have secured admission to the Governor-General's Council; and by the vigour with which Muslim indictments of Congress rule are now being broadcast not only in India, but in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. That factor is to some extent offset by the encouragement extended to them by the left wing at home.

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M.M. Banaji to Jinnah

Quaid-i-Azam Papers F.985/18-19

14, TARACHAND BUILDING, HUGHES ROAD, CHOWPATTY, P.O. 7,
21 December, 1939

My dear Janab Jinnah Sahib,

I need not say how greatly I shall be obliged if you will kindly make it a point to read out this enclosed message of mine on the "Deliverance Day" to which I wish all success.

Yours obediently,
M.M. BANAJI

Message of Sympathy, Goodwill and Greetings to Parsis convey greetings to Muslims to observe the "Day of Deliverance" peacefully the Muslim League on the Day of Deliverance from M.M. Banaji (Jinaf) Journalist, aged 78.

Mr. M.M. Banaji begs to send to the President of today's meeting his utmost sense of appreciation and highest wishes and kind thoughts for the quiet and peaceful termination of the "Deliverance Day" function.

Mr. Banaji begs to express his regret that age and eye disability will prevent him from being present in person at the gathering; but he will surely be there in spirit.

Mr. Banaji feels sure that he is voicing the feeling and sentiment of the intelligentsia of his own community when he says that we Parsis are one with the Muslims in the pious mission which they have undertaken to fulfil. Yours is a non-violent undertaking which has the concurrence and cooperation of all the minority communities. We nourish no ill-feeling or enmity for our Hindu brethren. They and we are all one in heart and mind. We Hindus to a man wish to win *Swaraj* and to tread the pathway of freedom hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder without disappearing or harming or disuniting or causing a breach or gulf between ourselves. *Swaraj* should not be rushed but gained wisely and non-violently.

Your sincerely,

M.M. BANAJI

22-12-1939

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Fazlul Huq's Statement [Extract]

Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 134/108-26

December, 1939

Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq has issued the following to the Press:

For more than two years, I have had in my possession documents containing the most convincing details of the oppressions committed on Muslims in the various Provinces hitherto under Congress administration in India. Whenever I happened to allude to these sufferings and other disabilities of Muslims I was ridiculed and abused in a section of the public Press, and instances have not been wanting of responsible leaders of Congress opinion actually charging me with having invented stories deliberately for the purpose of discrediting the Congress and the Congress administration.

Responsible leaders of the Congress and the Congress Press still continue to laugh to scorn all these allegations of Muslim sufferings under Congress rule. I have hitherto refrained from publishing these accounts in the Press as I felt that such publication would tend to embitter the already unhappy relations between the two major communities of India. But, the more I refrain from placing my cards on the table, the more insistent and persistent become the allegations that our charges are false and I cannot, therefore, withhold these facts any longer from the public. It is

with the deepest regret that I have to do so, but the public will surely appreciate that I have no other alternative.

Never before in India's history have riots taken a heavier toll of life and property within such a short space of time than during the two and a half years of Congress administration in some of the Provinces of India. In almost all of these riots and outbreaks Muslims have admittedly been the principal sufferers. Was this merely a chance coincidence? The facts exist although the Hindu purveyors of news, who have a practical monopoly in that sphere, spared no efforts to suppress news of them or served up to the public false or distorted versions. Those facts will speak for themselves.

I shall presently narrate some cases of oppression on Muslim minorities in the Province of Bihar, the United Provinces and Central Provinces and Berar. Those instances, however, will by no means be exhaustive but rather typical and illustrative and I shall ask every fair-minded person to go through them and judge for himself if Muslim allegations of tyranny and oppression during the Congress regimes are indeed chimerical.

I wish to add that I have narrated incidents very briefly to curtail the length of this statement and I have avoided reference (except in the case of C.P. and Berar) to the many and varied political oppressions and injustice to which Muslim minorities have been subjected. I have mainly set forth the story of boycott, loot, arson, assault, murder and mass terrorisation of which our helpless co-religionists, condemned to live in the predominantly Hindu areas under Congress Government were the pitiable victims.

Before I come to my narration of actual occurrences I would like, however, to state certain facts against the background of which those occurrences must be studied in order that their full significance may be properly understood.

As soon as Congress Ministries came into office they did some very unusual things. They issued instructions written or verbal, asking local authorities to take into their counsels in all important matters the local Congress executives. They issued orders for the hoisting of the Congress flag on public buildings, schools and other places. Many of the Ministers undertook tours to hoist flags in mofussil towns with great pomp and show. They ordered or permitted the singing of the Congress song on all conceivable and inconceivable occasions, disregarding the protests of Muslims and even ridiculing Muslims for so protesting. They introduced and encouraged Hindi and in Madras they made it a compulsory subject for all students to learn, thus showing their bias for Sanskritic culture. They spoke of the Muslim League as if it was an organisation inimical to the country and they lost no opportunity to hold up to scorn the leaders of the Muslim League. They went further and whenever there was any communal trouble they blamed the Muslim League for it but they were ever careful not to condemn the conduct of the Hindus, Congressmen and Mahasabhaites, of whose communal activities they themselves had proofs.

The effect of such a policy on the Hindu masses was disastrous and to the officials it gave a very dangerous lead. The former felt that their "*Raj*" had come at last and their will must now prevail. The latter knew that only by falling into line with their new masters in the Ministry and by pandering to the whims of their local agents in the shape of office-bearers of Congress Committees could they smooth their path to preferment or avoid the displeasure of the powers-that-be.

Thus was the stage set for the blatant arrogance of the militant Hindu to burst the bounds of restraint which non-partisan Governments had hitherto imposed. In towns and cities, in villages, tehsils and talukas the Congress men and the Mahasabhaitees sensed in the very air the spirit of the "*Bande Mataram*" as its author conceived and wrote it. They felt their stature rise and looked down the helpless Muslim minorities as the Cyclops did upon puny humans in Homer's day. And like the Cyclops, they saw but with one eye: the other eye that could have given them the vision of justice and equity and convinced them that though fewer in numbers their Muslim neighbours had also rights under the Indian sun, ceased to function. In such an atmosphere they set about to impose their will on the Muslim minorities.

And what was their will? It is briefly stated:

"Mother Cow" must be protected. Hence the orgies of Madanpore and Dadri and of numerous other places.

Muslims must not be allowed to eat beef. Hence the brutal inhumanities of Tilokari and the innumerable other outrages and persecutions the truth of which none dare deny.

The religion of Muslims must be humbled because was not this the land of the Hindus? Hence the forbidding of "*Azan*," attacks on worshippers in mosques, the insistence on the triumphant passage of noisy processions before mosques at prayer time and the introduction of many an innovation so that more opportunities might arise of asserting the superiority of the "*Sanatan Dharam*." Hence also the forcible prevention of cow-sacrifice on the occasion of Bakrids and the wanton desecration of Muslim graveyards, mosques and other places of worship.

Was it strange, then, that tragedy followed tragedy and blood flowed instead of the milk of human kindness? Was it strange that terror stalked the countryside and rendered the helpless outnumbered few despairing and desperate? Here and there the worm did turn and not all the conflicts were one sided. But so indeed could the German historian accuse the Poles for turning upon the aggressive and death-dealing Nazi hordes!¹

1. Hereafter he narrates details of alleged atrocities collected by him. For details see 18 pages booklet entitled, "*Narration of Facts as I Hope Obtained Them*," Calcutta, 1939.

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Thomas Steward to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 114, p. 274

22 December, 1939

SECRET

NO. 2370. G.B.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

2. Fazlul Huq's appeal for instances of atrocities against the Muslims in Bihar, as

I apprehended, produced an early and plenteous response. Immediately on publication of his chargesheet I set my Secretariat to compile an objective statement on each of the instances quoted. I am not yet in a position to say whether there is any justification for the indictment of the late Ministry but Russell, who as Chief Secretary, was intimately concerned with communal troubles, tells me that he learns for the first time of about 50 per cent of the alleged atrocities. Responsible Muslim opinion—as represented by Sultan Ahmad with whom I had an opportunity to discuss the matter—is far from pleased at Huq's impetuous and unconsidered action. It is realised that probably in most cases the ex-Ministers will have a complete answer to the charges and that the indictment as a whole will fail because of its irresponsible character. It would have been much more effective to concentrate on, say, a dozen cases in which there was some chance of pressing home the charge.

3. Sultan [Ahmad] was also more than a little annoyed at Jinnah's, "Deliverance Day" pronouncement. In his opinion it has lowered the stock [of] the Muslim League and he telegraphed to Sikander Hyat Khan asking him to use his influence to have the celebration cancelled. If Sikander took any action, his intervention has apparently failed. I have had no information which indicates that we may have trouble in Bihar. Syed Abdul Aziz, the Provincial leader of the League, has been scrupulous in exhorting his followers to be peaceful and unprovocative. From the Congress side I cannot imagine that there will be either provocations or attack; but the Hindu Mahasabha is a more uncertain quantity and one cannot rule out the possibility of isolated clashes. All District Officers have been asked to see that no demonstrations should take place which might be regarded as offensive by one side or the other.

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Linlithgow to Jinnah

The War! Problem of India's Future Constitution, pp. 71-72

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 23 December, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am now in a position to reply to your letter of November 5th, in which you submitted certain points for my consideration. You will, I am sure, appreciate that more than one of your questions, if considered in the light of all the implications involved in it, would raise issues affecting other communities in India, and that this correspondence between us would not be an appropriate medium for making pronouncements on them. But I hope that my answers, limited though their scope may be by this consideration, will none-the-less serve to remove your difficulties.

2. My answer to your first question is that the declaration I made with the approval of His Majesty's Government on October 18th last does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based.

3. With reference to your second point, I can assure you that His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any Constitutional developments in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views will be underrated.

4. In framing their policy for Palestine, His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to meet all reasonable Arab demands, and they continue to be fully alive to the importance of that issue.

5. Finally, you asked for an assurance that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim power or country. This question is fortunately hypothetical, since His Majesty is not at war with any Muslim power. You will appreciate, however, that it is impossible to give a guarantee in terms so wise as those of your letter, which would have the effect of limiting India's right to use its own army in its own defence in circumstances which cannot now be foreseen; in the present situation, however, as you are aware, every precaution has been taken by His Majesty's Government at the instance of the Government of India to ensure that Muslim feeling in India on this matter is fully respected.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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John Herbert to Linlithgow [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 199, pp. 295-96

23 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT NO. 24

Dear Linlithgow,

This is my report for the first half of December. I have taken advantage of your proximity to delay it as to bring political events up to date.

4. *Communal*—It is hard to judge precisely how far Muslim Ministers here are carrying out a general plan of campaign ordered by the Muslim League and how far more local or personal considerations are at the back of their moves. In issuing instructions to their party for the peaceful but impressive observance of Jinnah's "Deliverance Day" they are, of course, working to a mandate; but both Fazlul Huq and Nazimuddin have told me that they did not expect that the observance in Bengal would be so vehement as in Congress Provinces. On the other hand, I gathered from Nazimuddin that they were very anxious to secure as many meetings as possible all over the country so that the number and unanimity of the resolutions passed could be "splashed" in their own Press (such as it is) with a view to sending numerous copies to England. Sarkar did not seem particularly perturbed about the "Day" and

there is no indication that this particular event has in itself any connection with his resignation, although the accentuation of communal differences during recent weeks has had its influence.

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George Cunningham to Laithwaite

Linlithgow Papers, No. 73, pp. 112-15

PESHAWAR, 23 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O. NO. G.H. 336.

Dear Laithwaite,

I send, herewith, for His Excellency's information, a report (in duplicate) for the period ending the 23rd of December, together with copies of the Chief Secretary's report on the internal situation of the North-West Frontier Province for the first half of December 1939.

Copies of the reports are being sent to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Yours sincerely,

G. CUNNINGHAM

Enclosure :

CONFIDENTIAL

North-West Frontier Province Governor's Report No. 24, dated 23rd December, 1939 [Extract]

5. Jinnah's "Day of Deliverance" on December 22nd fell very flat in Peshawar. I have seen a great many Muslim visitors in the last ten days, and almost without exception they have condemned Jinnah's tactics in ordering a celebration. They say it is not the sort of thing a gentlemen would do, and most of them think that it is only likely to help Congress. Jinnah's move has embittered communal feeling locally. The ideas of some of the League leaders have become offensively communal, while the leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party has countered the scheme by submitting a resolution for consideration at the Hindu Mahasabha Conference, proposing that a committee should tour India to enquire into the difficulties and injustices from which Hindus have suffered as the result of the pro-Muslim policy of the Congress and non-Congress Ministries.

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R.N. Banerjee¹ to Laithwaite

Linlithgow Papers, No. 151, pp. 318-23

NAGPUR, 23 December, 1939

D.O. NO. 832-G.S.

My dear Laithwaite,

With reference to His Excellency's telegram No. 207, dated the 22nd December,

1939, to His Excellency the Governor-General, I am desired to forward herewith a copy of the agreement arrived at between Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, the late Prime Minister of this Province, and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Secretary to the All India Muslim League.

Yours sincerely,
R.N. BANERJEE

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

Proceedings of the Conference of the Muslim Members of the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly convened by the Hon'ble the Prime Minister, Central Provinces and Berar, at his residence on the 7th and 8th February, 1939.

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary of the All India Muslim League, was also present and participated in the discussion. It is agreed between the Hon'ble the Prime Minister and the Nawabzada that the proceedings of the Conference are not to be published unless agreed to by both parties.

At the outset the Vidya Mandir Scheme was fully discussed and then the demands were taken one by one.

The following is the summary of the tentative conclusions reached at the Conference for the consideration of Government.

Demand No. 1: The following arrangement shall be made for imparting primary education to Muslim boys and girls:

- (a) That for the provision of a school either by Government or local body the minimum number of students should be 10 only.
- (b) Whenever such a number of students is available, the Government or the local body must establish primary schools. Failing such a number the Government or the local body must encourage private enterprise by giving grants to the extent of half of the recurring expenditure and full initial expenditure.
- (c) That a committee consisting of the following gentlemen be appointed to examine the present educational schemes and amend, if necessary, to suit the Muslims.
(Names to be communicated later)
- (d) The curriculum and textbooks for the Muslim schools shall be prepared by a committee of Muslims.

Conclusion: (a) and (b) A reasonable percentage of the annual expenditure of each local body should be earmarked for imparting primary education to Muslim boys.

(c) Not considered necessary at present.

(d) In future all textbooks prescribed for teaching Urdu, Persian or Arabic in the Urdu schools should be approved by a committee with a majority of Muslims.

Demand No. 2: Adequate representation of Provincial Muslims on all Education Committees, such as Syllabus Committee, Textbook Committee, High School Education Board, University and Standing Committee of Education be guaranteed.

Conclusion: There are various restrictions governing the rules concerning the appointment of these committees, but Government will certainly bear in mind the question of nominating representatives of the Muslim community. Regarding the Nagpur University, Government has no control over it. It is governed by Statutes of the University.

Demand No. 3: No school, house or building under the charge of Government or Government-aided institution or schools under the local body be utilised by student, staff, authorities or public for the performance of any religious ceremony.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained the position in this matter. The demand was not pressed.

Demand No. 4: In no Government or Government-aided or local body school or institution the *Bande Mataram* or any other communal or religious song should be recited.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained the present policy of Government and the orders which have been issued to local bodies regarding the recital of *Bande Mataram*.

The demand was not pressed as it was definitely stated by the Hon'ble the Prime Minister that the local bodies will not be allowed to use any compulsion and also that no boy will be penalised for not singing the song or for not being present on the occasion. Anyone choosing to remain present should however observe the courtesies usually observed on such occasions.

Demand No. 5: There should be at least one more normal training school for Urdu teachers (males) and two for women in Central Provinces and Berar.

Conclusion: If there is a demand for training more teachers male or female, Government will make adequate arrangements for providing more seats in the existing schools or by opening new schools, if found necessary.

Demand No. 6: At least one high school for boys in the Central Provinces, two High Schools for girls (one in the Central Provinces and one in Berar) and two middle schools for girls in the Central Provinces be established by the Government for imparting education through Urdu medium.

Conclusion: Facts and figures should be given for the necessity of a greater number of schools. The proposal is that Anjuman High School, Nagpur should be taken over by Government and the two girls Anglo-Urdu Middle Schools should be converted into high schools.

This will be considered by Government.

Demand No. 7: The local bodies and Government should earmark and spend a reasonable sum adequate to the needs of the Muslim education if the local bodies fail, the Government should take to itself the power to compel the defaulting body to do so.

Conclusion: Covered by Item No. 1.

Demand No. 8: The existing Urdu schools should not be abolished or amalgamated with Hindi or Marathi schools, Schools so abolished or amalgamated be restarted, e.g., Betul, Umrer, Waraseoni, Chhindwara, Gondia and other places.

Conclusion: As regards Betul, the dispute has been settled, but as regards schools in other places, Government will make enquiries.

It is not usual to close down existing Urdu schools. Whenever any existing Urdu school is closed, a school will be opened somewhere else where there is a demand for it.

Demand No. 9: No boys, staff, school committees, parents and guardians be compelled to wear Gandhi cap, hoist or attend the hoisting of tri-colour flag or enrol themselves as Congress members. The orders, if any, passed by the Local Government or the local bodies in this connection and also in connection with the worship of Gandhiji is rescinded.

Conclusion: There is no compulsion and the policy of Government in this matter is the same as that in regard to the *Bande Mataram*. The question of parents and guardians does not arise as Government finds it difficult to believe that any parent or guardian can ever be compelled in these matters.

Demand No. 10: The Government or the local body should make adequate provision for the secondary education of the Muslims wherever they are doing so in case of Hindi or Marathi schools. That the grant-in-aid to private Muslim educational institutions for secondary education should be 50 per cent.

Conclusion: An assurance was given that the rules shall be interpreted as liberally as possible.

Demand No. 11: That the medium of instruction for Muslim students should be Urdu and provision for teaching Urdu should be made in all the Government high and middle schools.

Conclusion: The question of provision for teaching Urdu as second language in Government high and middle schools where such a provision does not at present exist should be examined and if the examination shows a reasonable demand for such provision, it should be made.

Demand No. 12: Separate Muslim inspectorate be provided to inspect Muslim educational institutions as in Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces and Bihar.

Conclusion: One of the Deputy Inspectors should be placed in charge of Muslim education for

the time being and when a suitable opportunity occurs a special officer will be placed in-charge of Muslim education under the Director of Public Instruction.

Demand No. 13: That Urdu should be recognised as one of the Provincial Languages and also in the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly and courts.

Conclusion: This is a very wise question which the Government will have to examine in all its aspects before reaching a decision.

As regards the specific demand for printing of speeches made in the Legislative Assembly, Government is already considering the question favourably.

Demand No. 14: The Government-aided schools of Balapur, Akot, Basim and Malkapur should not be closed. They should be placed under the charge of Muslim Head Master and the minimum number of students should be fixed for them.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained the position. There has never been any proposal to close down the Urdu classes in the Government Urdu schools at Balapur, Akot, Basim and Malkapur. The demand was dropped.

Demand No. 15: The contract of the Government printing works with the Anjuman Islamia High School, Jubhulpore to be restored.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained that the contract was rescinded purely on commercial grounds and that if the Anjuman High School, Jubhulpore, puts in an application for an additional grant, it will be favourably considered.

Demand No. 16: The local bodies should be stopped from starting or maintaining institutions dedicated to or run in the name of Hindu deities or from installing and worshipping the idols therein. In cases of private institutions the Government should refuse grants to such institutions.

Conclusion: Local bodies should not be permitted to give grants to Akhadas which are not open to all communities, where there is compulsion to worship any deity and which foster communal strife.

Demand No. 17: Provision for teaching Urdu should be made in all Government colleges.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained that there is adequate provision in all the Government colleges and in most of the private colleges. If there is a demand for teaching Urdu in all of the Government Colleges and is not being satisfied, the grievances should be brought to the notice of Government so that it may be attended to.

Demand No. 18: The higher education of deserving Muslim students should be encouraged by giving them adequate scholarships on a liberal scale.

Conclusion: The Hon'ble the Prime Minister explained the position and the demand was dropped.

Demand No. 19: In all the educational institutions run by or through the agency of the Provincial Government in areas whether excluded or otherwise the medium of instruction should be Urdu for Muslim students, e.g., the district Betul where 168 Hindu schools are reported to have been opened through the agency of Provincial Government.

Conclusion: The demand has been covered by item No. 1.

Demand No. 20: Adequate grants should be given to Muslim institutions for maintaining adult Urdu night schools.

Conclusion: Where a scarcity exists, provision should be made for teaching of Urdu to Muslims in the Adult night schools.

Demand No. 21: The local bodies should be compelled to provide separate inspectorate with Urdu qualifications for supervising Urdu teaching in schools under their charge, and the Act, if necessary, be amended.

Conclusion: It is covered by item No. 12

Demand No. 22: Adequate arrangements for providing Urdu books should be made in the circulating libraries and all the libraries maintained by Government or local bodies.

Conclusion: Where there is a necessity, adequate provision should be made and the fact should be brought to the notice of local bodies.

Demand No. 23: The Government should use its influence with the University in reconstituting the faculty of Oriental Learning in the Nagpur University on the lines of the Punjab so far as Urdu, Persian and Arabic is concerned, and provide separate chairs for the afore-mentioned subjects in the University.

Conclusion: This is a matter which relates to the University which is an autonomous body and Government are unable to do anything.

Liaquat Ali Khan — 10.2.1939.

R.S. Shukla — 10.2.1939.

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1. R.N. Banerjee; Joined the ICS; 1920; Secretary, Department of Commonwealth Relations, Government of India, 1944-48; Chairman, Union Public Service Commission, 1949-58.

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D.G. Dalve to Tej Bahadur Sapru

Tej Bahadur Sapru Papers

BOMBAY, 24 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Sapru,

Many thanks for your letter of the 19th inst. I hope, you have now returned from Hyderabad and be present to advise the liberal leaders as to the proper course to be followed at this critical juncture; if they care to take such advice from you. I regret very much that under medical advice, I have to refrain from attending the Liberal Federation Sessions. As my lungs are still weak, I am advised to avoid the extreme cold of Allahabad during Xmas. Last time I did it, I suffered on my return. I hope to go there later on, when the rigour of the cold is less.

The new move of Jinnah, as to celebration of the "Day of Deliverance" has been a partial success, opinion even among the Muslim community is divided. I had tried to convince him a fortnight ago that he should change the basis of the move and direct his attack against the Congress-regimes and the High Command only as an anti-democratic body and make it clear that it was not meant against the Hindu community. He took some time over it, as perhaps, he found some difficulty about it in his own camps when he actually issued his statement on the subject, he forbore from radically altering the basis of his move and contented himself with an oral assurance that his move was not directed against the Hindu Community. This enabled only the untouchable section of Dr. Ambedkar to join him, but the suspicion created in the mind of the Hindu community still continued.

As to Dr. Ambedkar also, I think that he is taking advantage of this move for getting out of the Poona Pact¹ and secure separate electorate for the depressed classes. Ever since the Poona Pact he has realised that his importance in the eyes of British Imperialists has vanished. If the depressed classes continued as members of the Hindu community, the game of the imperialists, as disclosed by the minority pact of 46 per cent, affected in London, prior to the Communal Award, would be frustrated. For this purpose, Dr. Ambedkar had tried to take his community into the fold of

Sikhism. Dr. Moonje gave him full support in this move, but the move did not succeed, as his own community was against and in that event, he could not retain the benefits under the Communal Award, read with the Poona Pact.

I have called the present juncture critical for a special reason. I think that during the next month, the British Government will make one final move to conciliate Gandhi and the Congress, before finally breaking away from them. The attempt will be to find out a formula which will appease the Congress and will also be acceptable to Jinnah and the Muslim League. I think something of this nature is being mooted in Calcutta at present. I connect the urgent visit of Sir Sikander Khan to Bombay to meet Jinnah and abstain from attending his meetings with this attempt of the Government. I think, it is wrong to presume that the British Government wants a fight between the Congress and the Muslim League at present. If they fail in reconciling the two it is likely they will be compelled to support Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
D.G. DALVE

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1. Among other things the Poona Pact of 24, September, 1932 provided the system of representation of the Depressed Classes by reserved seats in the Provincial and Central Legislature which would continue until determined by mutual agreement between the communities concerned in the settlement.

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Jinnah's Statement on Deliverance Day a "Complete Success"

The Nation's Voice, p. 431

Bombay, 25 December: While declining to comment on the present political developments in the country, Mr. Jinnah said: "The greatest day in my life was when I heard that the Federal Scheme was suspended, and a still greater moment will be when it is definitely buried."

He expressed satisfaction at the success which attended the "Deliverance Day" celebrations. "From the Press reports as well as private letter and telegrams" he added, "that I have received I am happy to find that the "Deliverance Day" was observed throughout India with complete success in an orderly and disciplined manner and observing it truly in other spirit which was expected of the great community. It has in one bound established the solidarity, unity and dignity of Muslim India. Its remarkable significance cannot be overlooked, especially the fact of the other minorities and their leaders and even non-Congress Hindus having joined and supported us clearly demonstrates the attitude of justice and fair play to all for which the Muslim League stands. I sincerely hope that the lesson of this great demonstration will not be lost on all those who are responsible for moulding the future destiny of India." (A.P.I.)

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*Ahmad Said [Nawab of Chhatari] to Jinnah**Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F. 114/179-83*

CHHATARI, 26 December, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have recently issued a statement (copy enclosed). I send this copy of that statement to you to find out what you think of it and whether this is quite in accord with your own policy.

The copy of the Chief Secretary's letter to which a reference has been made in the statement is also enclosed¹ so that you may use it in future when you like.

I have purposely taken this line in my statement as I notice that several Congress leaders are accusing us for lurking the investigation. I have given them some points which have been looked into by the High Court and the Chief Court in these provinces and no Congressman, at least in U.P., can deny them. Governors may or may not like to admit that they failed to protect the minorities, but they cannot deny these facts because they have been admitted by their own officials.

After a discussion with me, the proposal of the formation of a War Board in these Provinces has been put in abeyance by the Governor.

With all good wishes for a happy and prosperous 1940, and with kindest regards.

Yours sincerely,
AHMAD SAID

MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH Esq.,
Bar at Law, M.L.A.,
Malabar Hill, Bombay

Enclosure :

I have read the resolution of the Congress Working Committee as well as their draft pledge for the Independence Day and I feel that they must have caused disappointment to many as they have done to me.

The most important question before the country today is the settlement of the communal problem. Without such a settlement, it is agreed in all quarters, it is impossible to achieve political freedom for this country. But let us see how far any effort has been made by the Congress leaders to solve this problem.

In the resolution passed by the Working Committee they have accused the Secretary of State for his reference to the communal question and for not defining the war aims with regard to India's freedom. The communal question in this country is not an illusion but a reality. It is not of the creation of the Secretary of State or any Viceroy, but it is the result of our own mistakes and it is for us to solve it. The Working Committee in their resolution are convinced "that lasting unity will only come when the foreign rule is completely withdrawn." In other words, their programme is to achieve Independence first and to settle the communal question afterwards. But what are the feelings of the minorities, not only of the Musalmans but of other religious, social and economic minorities also? They want to settle this question first before they go any further they wish to be in a position to visualise as to what would be the place of their own community and class in the free India of tomorrow. Will they be equally free, or for

them it will be a change of masters only? In this connection the Convocation Address delivered by Sir Maurice Gwyer at Benaras is worthy of deep consideration by every Indian. Sir Maurice Gwyer is not only the highest judicial authority in India but a person who enjoys the fullest confidence of the Congress High Command, which has been proved by the Congress President, when he selected him to look into the Muslim grievances. The so-called democratic Constitutions are in existence both in Germany and Russia, but do they allow freedom to non-Nazis and non-Communists in their own countries? The reply is in a definite negative. If this is the position in Germany and Russia today, is it strange that the Muslims and other minorities in India insist on the solution of the communal problem as a condition precedent to any future change in the Constitution and the British Government agrees with them?

The demonstrations of the 22nd December, all over the country, should serve as an eye opener to the Congress leaders, and particularly to those Congressmen who held the reins of Government in their hands during the last two and a half years that they were in office in various Provinces. Not only the Muslims but members of the Scheduled Castes, the Parsi community in Bombay and Lahore and the Justice Party in Madras joined with the Muslims on the 22nd December. What is the reason for it? Why did the Parsis, the Scheduled Castes and other minorities make it a common cause with their Muslim compatriots on that day? The causes which led to these demonstrations have been mentioned by Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Fazlul Haque, but I would not repeat them. They are there, and it is for the Congress leaders to answer or refute them. What I would like to point out is something which has already been proved and needs no investigation.

It is a common knowledge that during the last 2 ½ (two and a half) years of Congress regime, members of the Congress party interfered with the work of the Police and the Magistracy in these Provinces and tried to boss over all non-Congress elements residing in towns and villages. Officials of the Police, Magistrates, leading Muslims of various towns and *Zamindars* will bear me out that parallel investigations used to be held by Congressmen in criminal cases, magistrates used to be worried and bothered and even the Judiciary was not safe from this interference. The judgements of the High Court of Allahabad and the Chief Court at Lucknow and the report of a certain Superintendent of Police in Oudh, which was published in the *Pioneer* of Lucknow, will again bear me out that such interference was quite common and that the High Court and the Chief Court had to convict Congressmen for such interference with the work of various Courts in respect of cases that were pending before them. Perhaps it will be said that it had nothing to do with the Ministers or the Congress Government. But, I ask, is it not the duty of every Government to control the members of their party, particularly when that party happens to be in Office, and if the Government fail to do so the responsibility is theirs? On the other hand, I maintain that instead of controlling this tendency of their party men, the Government in these Provinces committed certain acts which encouraged that tendency. In November 1937, a confidential letter was written by the late Mr. Gwynne, the then Chief Secretary to the U.P. Government, to all the district authorities and Heads of Department. Luckily for us the contents of that letter leaked out and appeared in the *Pioneer*, Lucknow, and in reply to a question of mine the Government had to place a copy of that letter on the Table of the House. That letter, in very clear terms, urged upon Government officials to "be in touch with the representatives of the Congress organisation in their respective areas" and "to establish relations of mutual confidence with the district leaders of the Congress organisation," because the "Congress is the party on the support of which the present Government rests." This letter was exclusively meant for Congressmen whom it was proposed to give preference to all other parties in the Province, as it was made clear in that letter that it was meant for Congress-people alone and for nobody else. It was stated in that letter that for other political parties a second letter will be issued which, as far as I know, was never issued. The result of this letter was demoralisation of the Services on the one hand and encouragement to the Congress rank and file in the persistence of their undesirable activities on the other.

It is matters like this which compelled Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah to call upon the Musalmans of India to observe December 22 as a "Day of Deliverance" from the Congress regime.

1. Not available.

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*Presidential Address of R.P. Pranjpye to XXI Session of National Liberal Front,
Allahabad, 27-29 December, 1939 [Extract]*

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 290-93

Hindu-Muslim Tension

31. The great obstacle in the way of India's reaching its political goal is the growing want of confidence between the Muslim League and the Congress. In spite of any alleged detailed charges I think everybody will admit that these cannot be serious and cannot generally be substantiated. Of course, in any particular place small matters loom large, and continual repetition of such charges increases the irritation. If anybody is bent on finding causes for grousing he can always find them. But sensible leaders should take care not to attach an exaggerated importance to such matters and should try to smooth out such differences. But owing to the strained relations exactly the opposite course is being followed. On the side of the majority Party there is too great an insistence on non-essentials which are being represented as matters of vital national concern. Thus the stress laid upon the Congress flag and the attempts to force it down upon all as a National Flag leads to the Muslim League insisting upon its own flag. After all a flag is a mere symbol, and it should be a symbol of unity rather than of discord and I hope the recent declaration of the Mahatma that it should not be hoisted at any place if there is any objection to it will be strictly followed by all Congressmen. The same is the case with the *Bande Mataram* song, the Charkha and Khaddar and Gandhi cap. All these may be very good in their way but the attempts to force them down the throats of others even though they may be in a numerical minority, only help to accentuate the tension. When the larger and more vital questions have been satisfactorily settled and there is a general feeling of friendliness everywhere, it would not be very difficult to devise a National Flag or to have a National Anthem acceptable to all. I am not particularly attracted by a special party uniform as it seems to be an imitation of the black or brown shirts of the Fascists and Nazis; still I consider that a generally accepted national dress will add to the solidarity of the country, though this should evolve of itself rather than be specially invented and forced upon everybody. Similar remarks can be made about the Vidya Mandir scheme and other alleged causes of difference. The leaders should try to keep such matters in the background rather than bring them prominently forward. But unfortunately this is exactly what is often not being done.

32. The main cause of all this tension is, however, the *amour propre* of both sides. The Congress considers itself entitled to represent the whole nation including the Muslims, while the Muslim League wants to be recognised as the only body representing the Muslims. To an observer who is in neither of these camps it seems that while there is some substratum of truth in both these claims they cannot be fully sustained. The Congress is undoubtedly the biggest and best organised political body in the country. But it cannot be considered as the sole representative of all sections.

In spite of the presence in it of a few Muslims and in spite of various attempts at mass contact with them, one must admit the large body of Muslims do not regard it as representing themselves and do not consider their interests safe in its hands. This may be an unreasonable attitude on their part, but it is absurd to deny its existence. The landlords and capitalists have also not joined it in any large numbers. We liberals also do not belong to it though we are always prepared to support many individual items in its programme. In spite of the praiseworthy efforts of the Mahatma for the uplift of the Harijans there is, I believe, a feeling among them that the sympathy of many Congressmen is only skin-deep, and it is undoubted that Dr. Ambedkar, their undisputed leader, has not identified himself with Congress activities like the Harijan Sevak Sangh intended for their advance. On the other hand, the Kisan movement and the labour movement are undoubtedly critical of the aims and methods of the Congress, though they may not in all cases have formally separated from them. The Congress cannot entirely represent either the large body of progressive Hindu opinion represented by Mr. Savarkar, Bhai Parmanand and Dr. Moonje, or the large though comparatively silent body of Sanatani Hindus who sigh for the revival of ancient Hindu culture. I leave out of account the question of the attitude of the Indian States and their peoples, though any national political movement must include them in its purview. In view of all these facts the Congress cannot claim to be the sole representative of India, though it is the most important single political body in the country and though it can command huge majorities in many Provinces, which perhaps is partly explained by the general existence of single-membered constituencies which tend to leave minorities unrepresented and also by the glamour attaching to Mr. Gandhi's name and personality.

The Muslim League

33. It is unnecessary to examine in the same detail the claim of the Muslim League. But in this case also it may be generally admitted that it is the most important organisation among the Muslims. Owing to the intense background of religion, dissidents among them are not so vocal as in the case of the Congress, though one can name the Shias, the Momins and others as at least indifferent to the League. It is probable also that many of the younger educated Muslims are not attracted to the League, partly because they are not fanatically religious and partly because they consider that a national movement must have a broader base than mere religion. There is also an appreciable number of nationalist Muslims whose leader is Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, of Communist-minded Muslims who are attracted by Bolshevism, and of Muslim reformers who regard modern Turkey of Kamal Ataturk as an example to follow. It may be said in general terms that the claim of the Muslim League is as well or as ill-founded as the claim of the Congress. When there is any disinclination to accept these claims it is sound policy not to make them but to depend upon actual work and the intrinsic merit of their programmes for their tacit acceptance by all. But both bodies are now making these claims a matter of prestige, and when in any dispute prestige comes in, commonsense and sanity are sure to go out.

Broadening Congress Cabinets

34. How to solve this question of strained Hindu-Muslim relations is the question of the hour. The immediate causes of riots are well-known; cow-slaughter, music

before mosques, conversion and other religious or quasi-religious matters can, I believe, be settled if there is a will to settle them on the part of the leaders.

35. The real cause is political in nature. Muslims feel that being in a minority they are likely to be oppressed by the majority community. This is really an absurd idea, as in political matters Hindus do not generally act unitedly as Hindus but are divided into many parties and sections, first on the score of political and economic differences of outlook and secondly, on account of the distinctions of caste, language, religious opinions and Province. They are not known to act together, and I do not think that the Muslim fear is well grounded.

36. But taking facts as they are, it is desirable to see if any political remedies can be devised so that the two communities can learn to work with one another. The Muslims feel that in the eight Provinces their true representatives are not in the Cabinets and that the admission of one or two Muslims who do not belong to the Muslim League is not only no answer to their complaint but is an added grievance, in that it is an obvious attempt to divide the Muslims by offers of place and position to non-representative Muslims. On the other hand, they contend that in the Provinces in which the Muslims are in a majority the Hindu members of the Cabinets are not men of straw but are people of weight in their community. I am inclined to think that there is a basis of truth in the Muslim complaint. The Muslim members of Cabinets must be generally acceptable to their own community in the same way as the Hindu members to theirs. The Congress majority rely upon the principle of joint responsibility and are keen on preserving strict party discipline. It, therefore, will not admit any Muslim member into its cabinet unless he is prepared to sign the Congress pledge, put on the Congress uniform, and accept, at least in name, all Congress principles and practices all of which are not political in character. It seems to me that the first step to ease the injured *amour propre* of the Muslims is to give up the insistence on the Congress pledge and other non-essential elements of the Congress creed and practices. The majority should enunciate a definite programme of political and economic measures which it desires to carry out within the term of the legislature. If the Muslim League or any of its members is prepared generally to accept this programme, place should be found for such in the Cabinet. It may happen that on one or two points there may be a difference of view, but on such questions free vote should be allowed and the decision should be left to the unrestricted judgement of the Assembly without the use of the party whips. Such a freedom of voting is not unknown even in British Cabinets, and I know of at least one instance where even in the Morley-Minto Councils a member of the Executive Council was, for conscientious reasons, allowed to abstain from voting on the Government side, and it may be mentioned in passing that this abstention led to the defeat of Government by one vote. It may be generally expected that when a body of intelligent men, drawn together by a general consensus of views work daily together in intimate association, such cases will not be frequent and there will be a good deal of give-and-take between them. It will be generally agreed that the Congress majority is inclined to treat all opposition with scant courtesy, to make every vote a party one, thus making its members mere automata, and to carry out the behests of the High Command with a high hand. For the satisfactory working of democratic institutions there must be a

desire to treat every opposition with respect and to yield on points on which the opposite party makes out a good case in debate, even though it is against the previous decision of the party in power. The large majorities which the Congress Party has in seven Provinces appear to have turned its head, and its want of consideration to its opponents had made all minorities feel disgruntled and sullen. If no victory in constitutional argument can avail, people's minds naturally turn to extra-Constitutional ways of action. The Congress Party in the legislatures should learn the lesson of the saying, 'It is good to have a giant's strength, but it is cruel to use it like a giant.'

37. Some modification of the rigorous party discipline seems to be called for if the injured feelings of Muslims and other minorities are to be allayed. It is not a great deviation even from the strict democratic practice of England, where in times of great stress all parties combine to form National Governments without giving up their own fundamental principles. Cannot India try various new methods and work out a system which will best suit its own peculiar conditions? The one most important point is to bring various communities together on purely political and economic platforms and to do away with communal parties altogether. This can be done by winning each other's confidence. Riding the high horse on the strength of huge majorities is not the best way of attaining the object. It may be worth while studying the Constitution of a country like Switzerland where three clearly marked linguistic divisions of the country have long learnt to work in harmony for the good of the Motherland. There the German, the French or the Italian speaking constituents of the population do not cherish any extra-territorial loyalty to Germany, France or Italy, as they all feel that they can fulfil their destinies in their own land. There all the three languages are treated alike by the State, nor is there any distinction between the Roman Catholic or Protestant populations so far as their country is concerned.

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Vallabhbhai Patel to Rajendra Prasad

Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents IV, pp. 172-173
All India Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee

68, MARINE DRIVE, BOMBAY, 29 December, 1939

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the statement made by Dr. Choithram¹ and Prof. Ghanshyam on the Sukkur riots. You know that Mr. Allahbaksh, the Prime Minister, was here for some days. He came to see me in connection with the attitude of our Party towards his Ministry. He wanted me to help him against the intrigues of the Muslim League which is trying to bring out his downfall. I am afraid, our Party in Sind has not acted with prudence. The present trouble in Sukkur is the direct result of the Munzilgah agitation² and the defiance of authority organised by the Muslim League. It may be true that the Ministry was too weak to take strong action in time,

but our people cannot escape their share of blame in contributing to their weakness. I have heard a good deal from Jethi Simpaimalani, the Deputy-Speaker of the Sind Assembly, who is also a member of our Party. She is still in Bombay. I had a long talk with Kripalani also. We feel that we shall have to do something to set matters right in Sind, otherwise it would be wiser to dissolve our Party and vacate their seats in the Assembly so that the Hindus may be able to organise themselves. With this view I have advised Dr. Choithram and Prof. Ghanshyam to come to Wardha on the 14 January, 1940, where we can meet and discuss the whole situation. By that time we shall have the report of Mr. Abdul Qayum who has also left for Sukkur. Mr. Allahbaksh has also left this morning.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

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1. Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani, Member, Legislative Assembly, Sind.
 2. The reference is to the Hindu-Muslim riots in Sukkur over possessions of Manzilgah Mosque.

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Manmatha Nath Mookerjee's Welcome Address to XXI Session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta, 28-30 December, 1939 [Extract]

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 306-11

14. In thinking of the unity of a nation, one cannot ignore that here is a natural barrier between the invader and the invaded, the conqueror and the conquered, the ruler between the ruled. The proposition is too fundamental to require any argument. In view of the role in which the Muslims and then the British came into this country, it is plain to my mind that it is only to the extent that there has been a fusion between either of them and the people of Hindustan, only to the extent that there has been a merger as it were, that the natural barrier has been removed. The first notable occasion after the British conquest when Hindus and Muslims stood on a common platform was at the time of the Sepoy Mutiny. Speaking on this occasion, Sir Richard Temple, at one time a Provincial satrap observed—

“The Brahmins were too numerous in their ranks; they were fanatical and they had the brains to contrive mischief when discontented.”

And after referring to some of the causes of the Mutiny, he proceeded to say,—
“This brought about a very unusual combination between Mohammadans and Hindus.”

15. This combination, however, which was characterised as ‘very unusual,’ was by no means a combination arising out of a common feeling of nationalism between Hindus and Muslims. The Indian National Congress started with an ideal of nationalist, which to all intents and purpose, would regard both Hindus and Muslims as children of the soil, and that indeed was a very laudable and correct attitude for the Hindus to

take; for Hindus, by religion and culture, are tolerant on their midst of people of other faiths and would always be prepared to share their lot with those who may have come and made Hindustan their home. Whatever may have been the reason why this idea of nationalism was tolerated by our rulers—in a letter of Mr. Hume, the founder of the Indian National Congress, to Sir Auckland Colvin it was said—

“A safety-valve for the escape of great and growing forces, generated by the British connection was urgently needed and no more efficacious valve than the Congress could be devised.”

16. We must be grateful to those Indians who conceived the idea. The Hindus joined the organization in numbers, and some of the better minds amongst the Muslims, equally broad and sympathetic, reciprocated. For a time it seemed that the two sister communities would go hand in hand and try by all legitimate means in their power to have their wrongs righted, their grievances remedied, their political condition ameliorated. But side by side with this movement, another counter-movement grew up, gaining strength from the day-to-day, which kept aloof from the Congress, but with the same objective of achieving the political emancipation of the country which the Congress was striving for. Its creed was not that robust nationalism which would regard Hindus and Muslims as children of the same soil, whose political destinies were to remain linked together. Its scheme of emancipation was fundamentally based on an ambition, communal in its essence, of securing a domineering position for Islam in the land of the Hindus. It made no secret of its ambition to win from day-to-day a position for Islam “which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country.” Notwithstanding this avowed object and scheme, which in later years could not fail to attract the notice of even a casual observer, the Congress has in recent years failed to face facts, minced matters and lulled itself into an unfounded belief that by acceding to the demands of the Muslims, even to the detriment of Hindus interest, it would be able to placate the Muslims and rouse in Muslim minds the true nationalism that would be for the welfare of the country as a whole. The whole career of the Congress during the last two decades has been marked by a desire to secure this idea of nationalism by giving in from point to point. For instances we need not go too far back. I shall give you two of the more recent instances concerning the Provinces in which you now are: the amputation of the ‘*Bande Mataram*,’ which perhaps is the unkindest cut that one can think of; and the assent of the 60 per cent in the services ratio. One other instance I may give, but in fairness to the Congress I must say I cannot lay the blame for that on their shoulder. I refer to it only for the purpose of showing that the Hindus in Bengal has always surrendered to Muslim demands without caring to scrutinize whether they are just or unjust. I refer to the removal of ‘Sree and Louts’ from our University crest. The demand was justified on the plea that had there been a ‘Louts’ alone or ‘Sree’ alone, both of which are found in ancient Muslim inscriptions and writings in Bengal—there would have been no objection, but it was the combination of the two that was regarded as a deliberate insult to the religious sentiments of the Muslims of Bengal.

Muslim Division of India

17. But what has been the reciprocity on the other side? A Pakistan, presenting

a vista of common brotherhood of Islamic nations from Turkey in the West to East Bengal in the East, including in it the Muslimised portions of India on its North-Western Frontier, such as Sind, Baluchistan, N.W. Frontier Province and the Punjab, under the supremacy of leadership of any one of the independent Islamic Nations of the West. A revised scheme by which "the Muslims of India call upon the British Parliament to replace the Government of India Act of 1935 by another which should lead the country to resolve itself into an independent confederacy of culturally homogeneous free States." In the Preamble to this scheme it is said—

"Whereas the Constitution provided in the Government of India Act of 1935 is not acceptable to the Muslims of India, because

- (a) it is framed on the assumption that India is a composite nation which it is not and does not promise to be, so long as the Hindus and Muslims, the two leading or major nationalities of India, continue to remain divide into two different social order drawing direct inspiration in every detail of life from two fundamentally different religions or cultures,
- (b) the democratic majority Government, which it has established in most Provincial units and aims to establish at the Centre, will in reality be a Government of a single majority, Nationality viz., the Hindus on whose sufferance the other nationalities will have to live,
- (c) it will reduce the Muslims perpetually to the position of the helpless minority at the Centre and in most of the British Provinces, as well as in all but as few of the several hundreds of Indian States,
- (d) it w4. Not available. It deny to them opportunity of economic regeneration and of free and independent cultural development on Islamic lines.
- (e) it neutralizes their historic importance in the country and eliminates for ever prospect of their acquiring a status whereby they may exercise a steadying influence on the administration of the country and
- (f) it helps to intensify and perpetuate the prevailing cultural clashed between the Hindus and the Muslim, religious, social, economic, educational and political—all operating to put off indefinitely India's attainment of independence."

Referring to the division of India into zones, the scheme suggests that the following should constitute the four Muslim zones: The north-west and the north-east blocks, the Delhi-Lucknow block and the Deccan block. The rest of dismembered India would resolve itself into cultural zones for Hindus.

A more recent edition of the scheme to which my attention was drawn the other day, and which if anything, secured still more perfect what remains them of the dream of "a common fatherland," of "children of a common soil," of "All India Nationalism."

18. The most efficient of the factors that of to constitute peoples into a nation is their will to be one homogeneous unit, and even though two communities may be distinct from the point of view of language, culture or religion or even from the point of view of all these elements together, if they have a common homeland and a genuine desire to unite together in one common political and economic interest and

there is no desire in one to benefit at the cost of another, one common nationhood is possible. But national unity is impossible where one community is anxious to further its own religious, political or economic aims regardless of what may happen to another.

19. It seems clear from the ideas which the schemes aforesaid represent that it is the perpetuation of the differences, or rather the broadening, more and more, of the gulf that so unfortunately exists between the two communities which is intended; while there can be no two view possible that if both are to remain together in peace and amity the difference that exist must be made up as quickly as possible. It has come as a painful surprise that even the idea of a Constituent Assembly to compose the differences, which appears to me to be the only real; solution of the question, has been turned down by some of the Muslim leaders on the ground that "India is not fit for democracy."

24. I have heard it said often and often that the Congress is the only well organised political party in this country, that it has all along fought for the cause of India's freedom and that what little of Self-Government we have received today has been the result of its single-handed efforts and sacrifices. I speak in no carping spirit and should be sorry to be understood as making any disparaging remarks against a body which has borne its fair share in the struggle of the past. But I may be permitted to say with respect that the achievements such as they were, were the achievements of individuals and the credit for what may have been achieved can in no event go to the 'policy' which the Congress has pursued, for the last twenty years or more. And, when the history of India's Constitutional progress comes to be written, there is a risk of its being said that what measure of Self-Government we have today was not obtained by the present-day Congress but rather in spite of it. Indeed, much of the defects and drawbacks that we Hindus feel as being vices in the Constitution are entirely due to this policy.

26. I find I am guilty of a digression. I was talking of the fundamental differences that there have been in the conception of nationalism between the two great communities. Efforts to secure a Hindu-Muslim unity, so much to be desired for the mutual benefit of both, have, it must be admitted, so far failed. And I venture to think that so long as these differences in the viewpoints exist, there is no chance of such unity. In the nationalism of Muslims, there is essentially an element of a desire for supremacy, often expressed in the form that the British took India from the Muslim and, having held India in trust for so many years, are now bound to give her back to the Muslims, if to anybody at all. I am not indulging in imagination. Such a thing was openly said in the Bengal Legislative Council a few years ago, and it is repeated publicly by some Muslim leaders in their speeches now-a-days. It is this attitude, which, for want of a better expression, I would call a spirit of conquest, religious and cultural, if not also territorial, that has been responsible for a series of events, which have estranged the two communities more and more, and of which I may be permitted to mention some that are within recent memory. The blood-curing Mopla atrocities of Malabar of the year 1921-22 were enquired into by the Congress Enquiry Committee, but no report of the enquiry was published on the ground that it would be unpolitic in national interest to give publicity to the findings. These outrages were followed by

what is known as the Multan tragedy in connection with which even the Muslim leaders admitted that oppressions of the worst type had been perpetrated by Muslims on helpless Hindus. About this time of soon thereafter in 1923 took place the event connected with the conversion of the Malkana Rajputs to the Hindu fold, in the course of which, there were serious troubles at Agra, Muttra, Bharatpur, Saharanpur, etc. Soon after followed the Kohat tragedy, in the course of which, it is said, a whole population of twenty thousand were driven out of their homes, lands and avocations and had to migrate to a different area for food and shelter. In 1926, there were riots of gigantic magnitude in Calcutta and in Patna, and about the end of that year Swami Sradhdhananda was murdered. Then followed a number of murders of Arya Samajists, one notable case being the murder of Lala Nanak Chand of Delhi. The well-known *Rangila Rasul* agitation, which came in the train of these murders, brought about further riots and murders and M. Rajpal, the Publisher of the *Rangila Rasul*, after escaping from attacks on two occasions, succumbed to the third. The murder of Bholanath Sen in Calcutta is another instance. In and since 1932 there were and have been trouble in Hyderabad, Bhopal, Bahawalpur, Rampur and other States, and Hindu citizens of those States have felt aggrieved by reason of the differential treatment accorded to them, prejudicial to their interests, in respect of recruitment to public services, observances of religious practices, facilities for education, imposition of alien languages and so on. In some of these places, attempts on the part of the Hindus to ventilate their just grievances have been sought to be frustrated by measures which are repressive or coercive and in some others certain changes have been introduced in the name of 'reforms,' but they more or less seek to perpetuate Muslim power. In Kashmir the Muslim population were virtually on the point of overthrowing its Ruler, and it was with considerable difficulty that a rapprochement was brought about. In 1935, the Shahidganj agitation created a deplorable situation in and outside Lahore, involving serious loss of property and of lives. Lastly, deserve mention the communal riots of Meerut which took place only the other day, the origin and object of which I would rather not discuss.

28. Coming nearer home and to my own Province, in mentioning our grievances, I must give first rank and precedence to the Communal Decision. I propose to say very little about it because all vocabulary has been already exhausted in its condemnation. In the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918 they said,

"But we can see no reason to set up communal representation for Mohammadans in a Province where they form a majority of the voters."

In the Simon Report of 1939, it was said,

"We are clearly convinced that separate communal electorate serve to perpetuate political divisions on purely communal lines".

"Communal representation—the provision by law that particular religious community shall be represented in a popular Legislature solely by member of its own body, with a guarantee as to how many communal seats there shall be—is an undoubted obstacle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship."

29. With these authoritative declaration was eventually adopted, and the name of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald will go down in history as a great British Premier who to quote from the extracts I have just given, succeeded in 'perpetuating political division'

and in imposing an "undoubted obstacle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship." To Mr. Gandhi's fast also we are thankful for the final shape which the decision took, and if there was any doubt as to what exactly happened the position has now been made clear by the Mahatma himself. As the result of Mahatma Gandhi's intervention the decision led" (1) to the perpetuation of communal electorates for the depressed classes, by means of primary elections, and (2) to the creation in Province like Bengal, where there were practically no depressed classes, of 'Scheduled Castes' to whom class representation was conceded, such representation being carved not out of the total number of seats but out of the number allotted to the non-European, non-commercial and other non-special seats.

30. In Bengal the representation of non-Scheduled Caste Hindus was thus made 48 in a House of 250.

As regards the ratio, Sir Samuel Hoare, heckled, if I may use the word, by Sir N.N. Sircar and unable to point to any ground justifying the excess, could only say—

"We were left completely free to take what decision we thought fair; I am not prepared to go into the reasons for this decision."

This 'fair' decision has brought the Hindus of Bengal to a position which has made them utterly helpless and hopeless, and they feel that they are on the point of being made homeless as well. The communal ratio as regards public services had been fixed, without due regard to the contributions which the Hindus have made to the making of Bengal or to the requirements of the efficiency of the services themselves, irrespective of the question of literacy, but on the basis of the proportion of the numerical strength of the two communities, including women, children and even babies in arms, as residing within the boundaries of Bengal. The circumstances that have made the Bengal Hindus a minority community in Bengal have been ignored. The Hindus feel that they have had no fair deal in this matter.

31. On the strength of this fair decision the Ministry in Bengal have been able to get passed the new Calcutta Municipal Bill which secures to Muslims additional seats in the Corporation of Calcutta, not on the basis of population, not on the basis of eligibility to vote, nor again on the basis of the amounts of rates and taxes paid, on no rational basis whatever. This indeed, is a very serious thing. Popular Government does not mean that the Government is to be popular with and to look to the interests of the party to which its members belong, but a Government which will look to the interest and welfare of all those, irrespective of creed, colour or caste who are committed to its care.

32. The sad plight, into which the Hindus of Bengal have been placed, is a matter about which you will have to hear and form your conclusions and, if possible, devise a remedy. The state of things, such as it is, baffles description. During the last couple of years or so, reports have been constantly received from various parts of East Bengal, complaining of persistent anti-Hindu propaganda which, it has been alleged, is being carried on against the Hindus with the object of curbing, crushing and injuring Hindu interests, culture and claims. The most harrowing tales of crimes against person and property have come from some particular areas such as the districts of Noakhali, Pabna and Malda. The allegations are indeed very serious and call for immediate careful enquiry. Regret has been expressed in several quarters that

the injudicious utterances, in many instances, highly provoked and communal, of some of the Muslim leaders have emboldened their followers to take up a most hostile attitude towards the Hindus. The request of the Premier, who has promised an enquiry into the allegations, a list of them—not exhaustive but illustrative and in respect of only one particular district, namely Noakhali, has been made by two of our members on the basis of authentic information received. They have, however, said:

33. “The situation undoubtedly demands that an immediate enquiry should be instituted in a manner which will inspire the confidence of the Hindus. No enquiry will be effective unless persons who may come forward to give their evidence in support of the allegations are given an assurance that they will be protected against direct or indirect harassment and victimization. As a result of our tour in the District and also of our prolonged discussions with various representatives, we have found that Hindus in certain parts of the Province are living today in an atmosphere of panic and terror and no enquiry can ever be conducted without this assurance being openly given and scrupulously adhered to. In our present statement, for obvious reasons, we cannot disclose our evidence. We have neither the power to give protection to the persons involved nor the resources to prevent the evidence from being tampered with. But evidence will be adduced, if an honest enquiry is made, for every charge we make.”

Let us hope that the promise of enquiry which has been made by the Premier will be fulfilled. We shall anxiously await his report in the matter.

34. Fellow Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, you will pardon me for detaining you so long. The opportunity, which I have had today, is not one which is likely to come again, and that is my justification for taking so much of your time. Let me hope that with your help and under guidance the Hindus will realise the situation they are in, that they will consolidate and rally under one Hindu banner, and that not looking to this body or that for the redress of their grievances, they will stand on their own legs and fight for their own cause—a cause which is essentially righteous and in which they want nothing more but nothing less than what to them is justly due. They have no ill-will towards any of the other communities and they declare in the words of their esteemed President—

“if you come, with you;
if you don’t, without you,
and if you oppose, in spite of you
the Hindus will continue to fight
for their
National Freedom as best as
they can.”



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*Savarkar's Presidential Address to the XXI Session of the Hindu Mahasabha;
Calcutta, 28-30 December, 1939 [Extract]*

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 311-36

15. It is encouraging to note that thousands of those who brought up from their early days under the influence of the pseudo-nationalistic ideology current in the Congress camp and were consequently so thoroughly prejudiced against any this that was connected with *Hindutva*¹ that they militated against the very word Hindu as something superstitious, out of date, unworthy a progressive patriot to own, should now be evincing a genuine desire to know all about the Hindu Mahasabha, its policy and immediate programme. The case of no less a personality than Mr. Tairsee whose sad death all Bombay lamented only a couple of months ago can serve as a case in point. He was reputed to be one amongst the first ten citizens of Bombay, a rationalist of rationalists, one of the foremost Congressites. Yet after I had casually explained to him the Hindu Sanghatanist ideology as expounded in my Nagpur speech, he publicly confessed that the rationalism which made him shun the word Hindu or Hindu Sanghatan as crass superstition was itself the crassest of superstitions. He not only joined our party but proudly accepted the Presidentship of the Bombay Provincial Hindu Sabha. Throughout my extensive tours I have come across thousands of the intellectual class who simply militated against the Hindu idea at its first mention and when cogently explained rubbed their eyes in a doubting mood at its second mention and half of them pressed for a closer acquaintance with it while the other half simply capitulated at its third mention. There has grown of late enormous curiosity throughout India to know something of the Hindu Mahasabha, its aims and as to what is its programme and this demand at times comes from foreign countries as well. That is the reason why I wish to devote this address mainly to enumerate categorically the leading principles and tenets on which the Hindu movement is based and to outline its general policy and some outstanding details of its immediate programme. It will serve as a vident statement of our case and may be utilized as a basis for a manifesto in future to an organised Hindu Party in the Legislatures as well as a handy guide to our workers and propagandists in the Press and the platform. It may involve some repetition of a truth as also of a falsehood as about the only means to cast the mentality of a whole people into a required mould. As long as falsehood holds the propagandistic field truth must speak out to silence it as many times as the former repeats a lie.

16. The followings are some of the basic tenets and aspects of the Hindu movement:

(a) Every person is a Hindu who regards and owns this Bharat Bhumi, this land from the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland as well as his Holy land—i.e. the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of his Faith.

The followers, therefore, of Vadicism, Sanatanism, Jainism, Buddhism, Lingaitism, Shikhism, the Arya Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj, the Devasamaj, the Prarthana Samaj

and such other religious on Indian origin are Hindus and constitute Hindudom i.e., the Hindu people as a whole.

Consequently, the so-called aboriginal or hill tribes also are Hindus; because India is their Fatherland as well as their Holy Land, whatever form of religion, or worship they follow.

This definition, therefore, should be recognised by the Government and made the test of *Hindutva* in enumerating the population of Hindus in the Government Census to come.

(b) The word Hindu is not of a foreign origin nor connected with the advent of the Muslims in India, as was erroneously suspected for a time under the mischievous influence of some alien scribes. Our Land and our people were at times clued *Sapta Sindhus* even by our Vaidic Rishis.

Thousands of years before Mahamed, the Muslim Prophet was born, the ancient Babilonians knew us as “Sindhus” and the ancient Zend-Avesta refers to us as Hindus. One of our Province on this side of the Indus has retained this ancient appellation of our Land and people down to this day as “Sindhu Desh” and its people as “Sindhu (Sindh). In our modern Prakrits the Sanskrit ‘*Sa*’ is often transformed into ‘*ba*’. Just as the word ‘*Kesbari*’ in Sanskrit or ‘*Krishna*’ has been transformed into Hindu Prakrit as ‘*Kebari*’ and ‘*Kanba*’ even so the word ‘*Sindhu*’ has been transformed into modern Prakrits as ‘*Hindu*.’ Those who want to have the point exhaustively and conclusively treated may read my book “*Hindutva*.”

(c) *Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom*—In expounding the Ideology of the Hindu movement it is absolutely necessary to have a correct grasp of the terms. From the word “Hindu” has been coined the word “Hinduism” in English. It means the schools or system of religion the Hindus follow. The second word ‘*Hindutva*’ is far more comprehensive and refers not only to the religious aspect of the Hindu people as the word “Hinduism” does, but comprehends even their cultural, linguistic, social, and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to “Hindu Polity” and its nearly exact translation would be “Hinduness.” The third word “Hindudom” means the Hindu people spoken collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just as Islamic denotes the Muslim World.

(d) *We Hindus are a Nation by ourselves*—I, in my Presidential speech at Nagpur I had, for the first time in the history of our recent politics, pointed out in bold relief that the whole Congress ideology was vitiated ‘*ab initio*’ by the unfitted assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India and the present War has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stern warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous people into such hotchpotch Nations, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of Territorial Nationality, not cemented by any cultural, racial or historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty—

Nations broke up at the first opportunity they got: the German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to Russia, Czechs to Czechs and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other organic affinities proved stronger than the territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in maintaining their national unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe which had developed racial, linguistic, cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their territorial unity or even at time in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous national units, such as England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal etc.

Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such an homogenous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by ourselves. Not only we own a common Fatherland, a territorial unity, but what is scarcely found anywhere else in the world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with our common Fatherland. This *Bharat Bhumi*, this Hindustan, India is both our 'Pitribhu' and 'Punyabhu.' Our patriotism, therefore, is doubly sure. Then we have common affinities—cultural, religious, historical, linguistic, and racial—which through the process of countless centuries of association and assimilation moulded us into a homogeneous and organic Nation and above all induced a will to lead a corporate and common National life. The Hindus are no treaty Nation—but an organic National Being.

One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in particular. The homogeneity that welds a people into a National Being does not imply the total absence of all internal differences—religious, racial or linguistic of sects and sections amongst themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a national unit than they differ amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian Nations of today—say the British or the French—cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.

We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people—say the English or Japanese or even the Indian Muslims. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Kashmir to Madras and Sindh to Assam will be a Nation by ourselves—while the Indian Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next door, like the Jews in Germany.

Some well meaning but simple-minded Hindus amuse themselves with the thought and hope against hope that in as much as the majority of Indian Muslims also are in fact allied to us by race and language and had gone over to the Muslim fold in living memory of this very generation, they could easily be persuaded to acknowledge this homogeneity and even blood relation with the Hindus and merge themselves into a common National being if but we only remind them of these affinities and appeal to them in their name. These innocent souls are really to be pitied. As if the Muslims do not know of it all. The fact is that the Muslims know of these affinities all but too well: the only difference to be taken into account being that while the Hindus love

these affinities which bind a Hindu to a Hindu and to dwell on them with pride—the Muslims hate the very mention of them and are trying to eradicate the very memory of it all. Some of them fabricate histories and genealogies to connect their origin with Arabians or Turks; they are trying to carve out a separate language for themselves and graft it as best as they can on the Arabian stock; they are carrying on a campaign against the Hindu family names such as “Tambe” and “Modak” which in parts like the Kokan convert—Muslims still bear and replace them by Arabian ones and are bent on widening the cleavage deeper and broader by removing every trace which may remind them of having once something in common with the Hindu stock. Their religious and theocratic traditions join hands in impressing upon their mind that Hindustan is not and cannot be a Dar-ul-Islam, their country which they may love until and unless the Hindus—the kafirs—are either converted to a man to Islam or are reduced to helotage paying the Zizia to some would-be Muslim sovereignty over this land. The very word “Hindustan” stinks in their nostrils. I am not referring to these items here in any spirit of either condemnation or justification. I am telling the simple fact which no Muslim can honestly contest that Islam as a whole wants on a deliberate design to assert itself in India as a Nation altogether heterogenous with the Hindus and having nothing in common with them. Consequently, it ought to be clear even to these well meaning Hindu simpletons that this refusal of the India Muslims to merge in a common National unit leaves the Hindus, negatively too, as a Nation by themselves.

(e) *Swarajya* to the Hindus must mean only that “*Rajya*” in which their “*Swatva*,” their “*Hindutva*” can assert itself without being overlooked by any non-Hindu people, whether they be Indian Territorials or extra-Territorials. Some Englishmen are and may continue to be territorially born Indians. Can, therefore, the overlordship of these Anglo-Indians be a “*Swarajya*” to the Hindus? Aurangzeb or Tipu were hereditary Indian, say, were the sons of converted Hindu mothers. Did that mean that the rule of Aurangzeb or Tipu was as a “*swarajya*” to the Hindus? No! although they were territorially Indian they proved to be the worst enemies of Hindudom and, therefore, a Shivaji, a Govind Singh, a Pratap or the Peshwas had to fight against the Muslim domination and establish a real Hindu *swarajya*.

Consequently, under the present circumstances too all that an Indian National State can mean is that the Muslim minority in India will have the right to be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal protection and civic rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority will not encroach on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any Democratic and legitimate Constitution. The Muslim minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority and, therefore, they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of civic and political right that is their proportionate due. It would be simply preposterous to endow the Muslim minority with the right of exercising a practical veto on the legitimate right and privileges of the majority and call it a “*Swarajya*.” The Hindus do not want a change of masters, are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangzeb simply because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be masters themselves in their own houses, in their own Land.

(f) Consequently, the name "Hindustan" must continue to be the appellation of our Country—such other names as India, Hind, etc. being derived from the same original word Sindhu may be used not only to signify the same sense—the land of Hindus, a country which is the abode of the Hindu Nation. Aryavarta, Bharat Bhumi and such other names are of course the ancient and the most cherished epithets of our Motherland and will continue to appeal to the cultured elite. In this insistence that the Motherland of the Hindus must be called but "Hindustan," no encroachment or humiliation is implied in connection with any of our non-Hindu countrymen. Our Parsee and Christian countrymen are already too akin to us culturally and are too patriotic and the Anglo-Indians too sensible to refuse to all in line with us Hindus on so legitimate a ground. So far as our Muslim countrymen are concerned, it is useless to conceal the fact that some of them are already inclined to look upon this molehill also an insuperable mountain in their way to Hindu-Muslim unity. But they should remember that the Muslims do not dwell only in India nor are the Indian Muslims the only heroic remnants of the Faithful in Islam. China has crores of Muslims. Greece, Palestine and even Hungary and Poland have thousands of Muslims amongst their nationals. But being there a minority, only a community, their existence in these countries has never been advanced as a ground to change the ancient names of these countries which indicate the abodes of those races whose overwhelming majority own the land. The country of the Poles continues to be Poland and of the Grecians as Greece. The Muslims there did not or dared not to distort them but are quite content to distinguish themselves as Polish-Muslim or Grecian-Muslims or Chinese-Muslims when occasion arises. So also our countrymen may distinguish themselves nationally or territorially whenever they want, as "Hindustani Muslims" without compromising in the least their separateness as a religious or cultural entity. Nay, the Muslims have been calling themselves as "Hindustanis" ever since their advent in India, of their own accord.

But if in spite of it all some irracible Muslim sections amongst our countrymen object even to this name of our country but that is no reason why we should play cowards to our own conscience. We Hindus must not betray or break up the continuity of our Nation from the Sindhus in *Rigvedic* days to the Hindus of our own generation which is implied in "Hindustan" the accepted appellation of our Motherland. Just as the land of the Germans is Germany, of the English England, of the Turks Turkistan, of the Afghans Afghanistan—even so we must have it indelibly impressed on the map of the earth for all times to come a "Hindustan" the land of the Hindus.

(g) The Pan-Hindu flag: The "Kundalini Kripanankita" Gerua Flag shall be the Flag of the Hindu Nation with its OM, the Swastik and the Sword. It appeals to sentiments cherished by our race ever since the Vedic days. Those who like to realise the inner spirit and know the '*raison d'être*' of its design and the symbols would do well to read the special tract I have written styled "the Pan-Hindu *Dhwaj*."

It must be emphasised in this connection that all those Hindu flags other than this which are current amongst the Hindus as the colours of the different constituents which go to form our Pan-Hindu brotherhood such as the Sanatanists, the Sikhs, the Jains, the Aryas, etc., will be respected by every Hindu as his own in as much as they are but different manifestations of the common Pan-Hindu spirit.

Nor should it be supposed that the Hindu Flag implies any inherent antagonism to the several colours of our non-Hindu countrymen. The Muslims are welcome to have their own religious colours to represent their own community. In short, we shall respect any Flag which any section of our countrymen adopt whether religious or political, whether it is the Muslim League Flag or the Congress Tri-Colours or the Red one—so long as it continues to respect in return the Pan-Hindu Flag and does not antagonise it but continues as allied colours. But Hindudom as a whole will be represented by the Pan-Hindu Flag alone.

(h) The Sanskrit shall be our “Debhasa,” our secret language and the “Sanskrit *Nishtha*” Hindi, the Hindi which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from the latter, is our “Rashtrabhasa” our current National language:

Besides being the riches and the most cultured of the ancient languages of the world, to us Hindus the Sanskrit is the holiest tongue of tongues. Our scriptures, history, philosophy and culture have their roots so deeply imbedded in the Sanskrit literature that it forms veritably the brain of our Race. Mother of the majority of our mother-tongues, she has suckled the rest of them at her breast. All Hindu languages current today whether derived from Sanskrit or grafted on to it can only grow and flourish on the sap of life they imbibe from the Sanskrit. The Sanskrit language, therefore, must ever be an indispensable constituent of the classical course for Hindu youths.

In adopting the Hindi as the National tongue of Hindudom no humiliation or any invidious distinction is implied as regards other Provincial tongues. We are all as attached to our Provincial tongues as to Hindi and they will all grow and flourish in their respective spheres. In fact some of them are today more progressive and richer in literature. But nevertheless, taken all in all the Hindi can serve the purpose of a National Pan-Hindu Language best. It must also be remembered that the Hindi is not made a National Language to order. The fact is that long before either the English or even the Muslims stepped in India the Hindi in its general form had already come to occupy the position of a National tongue throughout Hindustan. The Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the tourist, the soldier, the Pandit travelled up and down from Bengal to Sindh and Kashmir to Rameshwar by making himself understood from locality to locality through Hindi. Just as the Sanskrit was the National language of the Hindu intellectual world even so Hindi has been for at least a thousand years in the past the National India tongue of the Hindu community. Added to that and as a consequence of that we find even today that it is understood and even spoken as a mother-tongue by a fair larger number of people than is the case with any other Hindu language. Consequently, it must be made compulsory for every Hindu student through secondary schools at any rate to learn Hindi as his Pan-Hindu National language without neglecting in the least his training in his Provincial mother-tongue.

By Hindi we, of course, mean the pure “Sanskrit *Nistha*” Hindi, as we find it for example in the “Satyārtha Prakash” written by Maharsi Dayanand Saraswati. How simple and untainted with a single unnecessary foreign word is that Hindi and how expressive withal. It may be mentioned in passing that Swami Dayanandji was about the first Hindu leader who gave conscious and definite expression to the view that Hindi should be the Pan-Hindu National language of India. “This Sanskrit *Nistha*”

Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called Hindustani which is being hatched up by the Wardha scheme. It is nothing more of a linguistic monstrosity and must be ruthlessly suppressed. Not only that, but it is our bounden duty to root out as ruthlessly all unnecessary alien words whether Arabian or English from every Hindu tongue—whether Provincial or dialectical. We are not against the English or any other language nay, we insist on the study of the English as an indispensable necessity and a profitable passport to world literature. But we must not allow the influx of alien words into our language without checking their pass and testing their necessity. Our Hindu brethren in Bengal are especially to be congratulated upon in this connection because the Bengali literature is admirably free from any such uncleaned admixture of unnecessary alien words which cannot be said regarding our other Provincial tongues and literature.

(i) *Nagari shall be the National Script of Hindudom.* Our Sanskrit alphabetical order is phonetically about the most perfect which the world has yet devised and almost all our current Indian scripts already follow it. The Nagari Script too follows this order. Like the Hindi language the Nagari Script too has already been current for centuries all over India amongst the Hindu literary circles for some two thousand years at any rate in the past and was even popularly nick-named as the "*Shastri Lipi*," the script of our Hindu Scriptures. With a little touch here and there it could be reformed so as to render it as suitable to modern mechanical printing as the Roman script. Such a reform movement was set on foot in Maharashtra about some forty years ago by Mr. Vaidya and others. An organized movement later on under my lead met with an amount of practical success and has already popularised it. I strongly recommend that as an immediate step to popularise Nagari as our National Script, all our Hindu papers in different Provinces should begin too publish at least a couple of columns of their Provincial languages in Nagari script. It is a matter of common knowledge that if Bengali or Gujarathi is printed in Nagari it is more or less understood by readers in several other Provinces. To have only one common language throughout Hindustan at a stroke is impracticable and unwise. But to have the Nagari script as the only common script throughout Hindudom is much more feasible. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the different Hindu scripts current in our different Provinces have a future of their own and may flourish side by side with the Nagari. All that is immediately done and indispensable in the common interest of Hindudom as a whole is that the Nagari script must be made a compulsory subject along with the Hindi language in every school in the case of Hindu students.

It is interesting to remind you here how two prominent Congress Presidents proposed to solve this problem of a National tongue and a National Script. Pandit Nehru thinks, leaving even Maulana Abul Kalam Azad far behind who only proposes Hindustani which he assures us is tantamount to Urdu, that the highly Arabianised Urdu of the Aligarh School or the Usmania University School is best fitted to be the National Language of India including of course some twenty-eight crores of Hindus, while *Desha Gaurav* Subhash Babu improving upon the situation beat even Panditji's ingenuity hollow by proposing from the Presidential chair of the Indian National Congress that Roman script would suit India as the best National script. That is how the Congress ideology approaches things National! Roman script to be the National

script of India!—How eminently practicable, to say the least! Your *Basumati*, *Ananda Bazar Partika* and all Bengali papers to appear everyday in Roman script! The *Bande Mataram* Song to be printed in this new National style and the *Gita* to begin with in this following attractive setting as “*Dharma Kshettre Kurukshettre Shama-vetah Yuyutsavah*” and so on. It is true as Subhas Babu says that Kemal Pasha abolished the Arabian Script as unsuited to print and took to Roman Script. But this fact has a lesson for our Mahommadan zealots who want the Urdu script, that is, this very Arabian style, to thrust even on the Hindus as an up-to-date National script and has no connection with the Hindus. Kemal Pasha took to the Roman script because the Turks had nothing better of their own to fall back upon. The Andamanees pick up *Kauris* and make a necklace of them—but is that the reason why the Kuber also should do the same? We Hindus would rather call upon Arabia and Europe to adopt the Nagari script and Hindi language. Such a proposal should not sound very impracticable so such inveterate optimist at any rate who seriously advance it as a very practical proposal to make Urdu the National language of the Marathas and to expect all our Arya Samaj Gurukuls to study the Vedas in Roman script!

(j) *The Hindu Mahasabha is a National Organisation of Hindudom* : It has come to my notice that a very large section of English educated Hindus holds back from joining the Hindu Mahasabha and political circles in India and outside in general, feel themselves totally unconcerned about it under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively religious organization—something like a Christian Mission. Nothing could be far from the truth.

The Hindu Mahasabha is not a Hindu Mission. It leaves religious questions regarding theism, monotheism, Pan-theism or even atheism to be discussed and determined by the different Hindu schools of religious persuasions. It is not Hindu-Dharma Mahasabha—but a Hindu-National Mahasabha. Consequently, by its very Constitution, it is debarred to associate itself exclusively as a partisan with any particular religious school or sect even within the Hindu fold. As a national Hindu body it will, of course, propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of Hindustani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is far more comprehensive than that of an executively religious body. The Hindu Mahasabha identifies itself with the National life of Hindudom in all its entirety in all social, economical, cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to the freedom, strength and glory of the Hindu Nation; and as an indispensable means to that end to attain *Purna Swarajya*, absolute Political Independence of Hindustan by all legitimate and proper means.

(k) The Hindu Mahasabha must continue its mission even after Hindustan is politically free. Many of superficial critic seems to fancy that the Mahasabha was only contrived to serve as make-weight, as a re-action checkmating the Muslim League or the anti-Hindu policy of the present leader of the Congress and will be out of court or cease automatically to function as soon as it is shorn of this spurious excuse to exist. But if the aims and object of the Mahasabha mean anything it is clear that it was not the outcome of any frothy effusion, any fussy agitation to remove a grievance here or oppose a seasonal party there. The fact is that every organism whether individual or social which is living and deserves to survive throws out offensive and

defensive organs as soon as it is brought to face adversely changing environments. The Hindu Nation too as soon as it recovered and freed itself from the suffocating grip of the pseudo-nationalistic ideology of the Congress brand developed a new organ to battle in the struggle for existence under the changed conditions of modern age. This was the Hindu Mahasabha. It grew up of a fundamental necessity of National life and not of any ephemeral incident. The constructive side of its aims and objects make it amply clear that its mission is as abiding as the life of the Nation itself. But that apart, even the day to day necessity of adapting its policy to the everchanging political current make it incumbent on Hindudom to have an exclusively Hindu organization independent of any moral or intellectual servility or subservience to any non-Hindu or jointly representative institution, to guard Hindu interest and save them from being jeopardised. It is not so only under the present political subjection of Hindustan but it will be all the more necessary to have some such exclusively Hindu organization, some such Hindu Mahasabha in substance whether it is identical with this present organization or otherwise to serve as a watch-tower at the gates of Hindustan for at least a couple of centuries to come, even after Hindustan is partially or wholly free and a National Parliament controls its political destiny.

17. Because, unless something altogether cataclysmic in nature upsets the whole political order of things in the world which practical politics cannot envisage today, all that can be reasonably expected in immediate future is that we Hindus may prevail over England and compel her to recognise India a self-governing unit with the status contemplated in the Westminster statute. Now a National Parliament in such a self-governing India can only reflect the electorate as it is, the Hindu and the Muslims as we find them, their relations a bit bettered, perhaps a bit worsened. No realist can be blind to the probability that the extra-territorial designs and the secret urge goading on the Muslims to transform India into a Muslim State may at any time confront the Hindustani State even under Self-Government wither with a Civil War or treacherous overtures to alien invaders by the Muslims. Then again, there is every likelihood that there will ever continue at least for a century to come a danger of fanatical riots, the scramble for services, Legislative seats, weightages out of proportion to their population on the part of the Muslim minority and consequently a constant danger threatening internal peace. To checkmate this probability which if we are wise we must always keep in view even after Hindustan attains the status of self-governing country, a powerful and exclusive organization of Hindudom like the Hindu Mahasabha will always prove a sure and devoted source of strength, a reserve force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their grievances more effective than the joint Parliament can do, to scent danger ahead, to warn the Hindus in time against it and to fight out it needs be any treacherous design to which the joint state itself may unwittingly fall a victim.

18. The History of Canada, of Palestine, of the movement of the Young Turks will show you that in every State where two or more such conflicting elements as the Hindus and Muslims in India, happen to exist as constituents, the wiser of them has to keep its exclusive organization in tact, strong and watchful to defeat any attempt at betrayal or capture of the National State by the opposite party; especially so if that party has extra-territorial affinities, religious or cultural, with alien bordering states.

This tussle between such constituents of such a State must continue till slowly if ever they all learn to get themselves merged, by developing a spirit of corporate patriotism, into a consolidated Nation. If the Hindus take this realistic truth to heart they will try their utmost to consolidate and strengthen the Pan-Hindu organization which is already gathering force and has struck its roots deep in the Hindu soil. The nearer you are to *Swarajya*, the more indispensable grows the necessity of a strong and consolidated Pan-Hindu organization or rather the stronger grows the Pan-Hindu organization, the nearer it takes you to real "*Swa-Rajya*."

19. I have so far dealt with some of the basic principles and tenets and set out the National and Political ideals of the Hindu Sangathan movement as I perceive them. But the very fact that we have still to frame, emphasize and propagate the very ideals and ideology of the Hindu movement added to the fact that they imply an entire re-orientation of the Hindu people so as to revolutionise the conception of the Indian State and its formation as we find it today, shows how we have hardly taken a step ahead and how strenuous and sustained a struggle we have yet to undergo before we are able to realise the goal, the creation of an Independent Hindustan as we define it. Once the ideal is fixed, it is this struggle that matters most. And we must, therefore, chalk out as urgently as possible the lines on which our struggle can be carried on with the greatest effect and if possible with the least resistance.

20. It must be noted also that although the ideal remains fixed, the struggle to realise it can scarcely be on a straight line. We have now to confront, now to compromise: now to fight on, now to fall back and keep marking time. At times we shall have to ally ourselves on a given point with one of our opponents and then to oppose the former ally. This very inconsistency in detail resorted to in a long-drawn and life and death struggle to reach a goal is consistent enough, if but it leads us on the whole irresistibly onward and onward to the great ideal we aim to realise. The policy I am going to outline should also be viewed from this tactical perspective. It is only related to our present circumstances and should not be taken as final. As our movement goes on gathering strength we may soon arrive at a point when it may march on with the irresistible strides of a giant and may grow powerful enough to demand and dictate things with a reckless heroism, which the peuny beginnings today can hardly conceive or dare to express.

21. I should also make it clear that in outlying this practical policy I am only expressing my personal views. They cannot bind the Hindu Mahasabha unless they are sanctioned by its corporate resolutions.

- (a) Our first and foremost aim in our political activities must always be to guard the integrity of Hindustan in tact. Hindustan to us does not only mean the so-called British India but comprises even those parts which are under the French and the Portuguese possession. Gomantak and Pondichery are as integral parts of our Mother Land as Maharashtra or Bengal. From the Indus to the Himalayas, from the Himalayas to Tibet, from Tibet to Burma and from Burma to the Southern and Western seas run the lines of the boundaries of our Land. The whole territory including Kashmir and Nepal, Gomantak, Pondicherry and other French possessions constitutes

our national and territorial unit and must be consolidated in a free and centralised State. It must ever remain undivided and indivisible. Any attempt to divide this territorial and national unity of Hindustan so as, for example, to break it up into Hindu and Muslim zones, must be opposed tooth and nail and chastised as an act of treason and treachery.

- (b) Towards our neighbouring States of Burma and Tibet on the Eastern and North-Eastern Frontiers, our Policy will always be, so far as possible, of wholehearted friendship and if they choose, even of political alliance. They are our co-religionists and our political interests too are not inherently antagonistic. Nay, we will only find, in general, our mutual political strength augmented, if we continue to be political allies.
- (c) But towards those Muslim States and tribes which border our North-Western Frontier, our policy cannot but be a guarded one. Their tendency for centuries in the past had been fanatically enmical towards the Hindus and is likely to continue to be so far at least a century to come. The Hindu Sanghatanist Party must always see that this Frontier is garrisoned with overwhelming Hindu troops and is never entrusted to Muslim ones. We will always be ready to establish friendly contact with those bordering State and shall give no cause for unnecessary but should keep our forces there always in a state of war and vigilant to resist any sudden aggressive eruption on the part of those Muslim tribes or any threatened invasion through the passes by any anti-Hindu alien army.
- (d) To the Independent Hindu kingdom of Nepal, all Hindudom feels itself most loyally attached and would ever strive to strain every nerve in defending its honour and integrity. It is the only part of our Motherland which continues down to this day as a *Dharna Kshettra* unsullied by the humiliating shadow of an alien non-Hindu Flag. The independence of the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, the home of a heroic Hindu race, constitutes at once the pride and the centre of Hindu hope. Every atom of strength added to Nepal elevates and strengthens the prestige and the position of Hindudom all round. On the other hand, anything that weakens or humiliates Hindudom in any other part of Hindustan must weaken the strength of Nepal in the long run. The danger of the Muslim upheaval on the North-Western Frontier, for example, cannot but be a standing menace to the independence of the Hindu Kingdom in Nepal too. If Hindu history has not endowed us even with this much foresight, then it must be said that all the lessons which the invasions of Gaznis and Ghoris were meant by destiny to teach us are lost on us.

Nevertheless, it will be foolish on our part to do anything to drag Nepal into the muddled and slogan-ridden politics which disfigures the British Indian Territory. The politics of a subject race can be no guide to the exigencies of an Independent Kingdom situated as Nepal. I, therefore, feel no hesitation, whatsoever, in justifying the present policy of the Nepal Government to maintain friendly relations with the British Government and to continue an informal political alliance with the British with a

view to guard against any other non-Hindu aggression on India. Consequently, it is also a very wise policy on the part of Nepal to supply as many Nepalee recruits to the Indian forces as it is possible to do in conformity with its own security and strength. The political complications in Europe and the Far East are almost sure to persuade the British Government too to depend more and more on Nepal's friendship and military help to secure Indian defence.

In this connection, it must be emphasised that the British Government should also restore some of those territories on the borders of Nepal which the British has wrested from her in the past, back to the Maharaja. Such a step will cement the friendship between the two Nations as nothing else can do.

Nepal has doubtless a great future before her if but she takes time by the forelock and has Prophetic vision which a rising Nation must necessarily possess. She must bring up her military strength to an up-to-date European efficiency and must be able to defend herself not only on land but against any aerial aggression too by equipping herself with a powerful aerial force. Her strength being the strength of an ally, the British Government too is not likely, under the present circumstances, to hamper her in this attempt with any feeling of uneasiness but would rather wish her to hasten on this project. The influence which Nepal is likely to exercise on India politics in near future is better pointed out in the words [of] Mr. Perseval Landgon.

Says Mr. *Landgon*, "It invests Nepal with an importance which it would be foolish to overlook. Englishmen through the high position which Nepal holds in the General Southern Asiatic balance and the great and growing importance that she will possess in the future in the solution of the problems which beset the present State of India, Nepal stands today on the threshold of a new light. Her future calls her in one direction and one only. In all the varied theatres of Indian politics, there is nothing which surpasses in interest the ultimate destiny of Nepal. Inevitably she will become of greater and greater importance, if we persist in our present policy on lessening British influence in India. It is not impossible that Nepal may even be called upon to control the destiny of India itself."

(e) *The National Constitution of Hindustan*: The Hindu Sanghatanist Party aims to base the future Constitution of Hindustan on the broad principle that all citizens should have equal right and obligations irrespective of caste or creed, race or religion, provided they avow and owe an exclusive and devoted allegiance to the Hindustani State. The fundamental rights of liberty of speech, liberty of conscience, of worship, of association etc., will be enjoyed by all citizen alike. Whatever restriction will be imposed on them in the interest of the public peace and order or national emergency will not be based on any religious or racial considerations alone but on common national grounds.

No attitude can be more National even in the territorial sense than this and it is this attitude in general which is expressed in substances by the curt formula "one man one vote." This will make it clear that the conception of a Hindu Nation is in no way inconsistent with the development of a common Indian Nation, a united Hindustani State in which all sects and sections, races and religions, castes and creeds, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians etc. could be harmoniously wielded together into a Political State on terms of perfect equality.

This attitude which the Hindu Mahasabha takes up with regard to the National Hindustani Constitution is in fact more definitely and expressively National than either the League or even the Congress, which calls itself Indian National, has as yet dared to take up uncompromisingly and yet it is the Hindu Mahasabha and the conception of the Hindu Nation which is tabooed by the Congress and the League as most dangerously anti-National and uncompromisingly Communal! The fact is that the National Congress itself is not only communal in its legitimate sense but perversely communal; in as much as it recognizes a majority and a minority, the Hindus and the Muslims, and on the top of it all forces the majority to forego its just share in the franchise in the public services, in cultural right and offers them to a minority based on religion to buy its patriotism and attachment to the common National State. On the other hand by asking for the Muslims as a religious entity wanton advantages over and above what they are entitled on a National basis at the cost of the Hindus at the point of a dagger, a threat to secede and join hand with an alien power, the Muslim League takes up a position which is anti-National to the point of treachery. In demanding three votes for one Muslim, the Muslim League is outrageously communal; while in calling upon the Hindus to yield to this demand and accede to the proposal of one vote for three Hindus, the Congress is cowardly communal! And yet it is precisely these two bodies, the pseudo-National Congress and the confessedly anti-National League which have the temerity to accuse the Hindu Sanghathanist Party as communalistic and anti-National simply because they are not ready to betray their birth right for a mess of pottage to play the second fiddle to the Muslims or care for a worthless certificate from the Congressites of being "Nationalists!"

(f) *The rights of non-Hindu minorities:* When once the Hindu Mahasabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of "one man one vote" and the Public Services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of race or religion . . . any further mention of minority rights is on principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory, because it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on communal basis. But as practical politics requires it and as the Hindu Sanghathanists want to relieve our non-Hindu countrymen of even a ghost of suspicion, we are prepared to emphasise that the legitimate rights of minorities with regard to their religion, culture, and language will be expressly guaranteed on one condition only that the equal rights of the majority also must not in any case be encroached upon or abrogated. Every minority may have separate schools to train up their children in their own tongue, their own religious institutions or cultural and can receive Government help also for these, but always in proportion to the taxes they pay into the common exchequer. The same principle must, of course, hold good in case of the majority too.

Over and above this, in case the Constitution is not based on joint electorates and on the unalloyed National principle of "one man one vote" but is based on the communal basis, then those minorities who wish to have separate electorate or reserve seats will be allowed to have them, but always in proportion to their population and provided that it does not deprive the majority also of an equal right in proportion to its population too.

I believe that our Christian, Parsee, the Jewish and other minorities, except the Muslims, will be perfectly satisfied with the Constitution based on these principles as broadly outlined above. Because the Christians, the Jews and most eminently the Parsees are too allied to us in culture and too patriotic, while the Anglo-Indians too sensible, to fail to see that no Constitution if it has to keep the integrity, sovereignty and strength of the National State safely can go any further and that it is all that is really required to safeguard any genuine special interests of the minorities as distinguished from those of the majority. Only that minority will insist to have still more and yet more to the last pound of flesh which in fact cherishes secret designs to disintegrate the State, to create a State within a State or altogether to subvert the National State and hold all others under its subjection. Fortunately, no section of our countrymen belonging to the non-Muslim minorities mentioned above, harbours this treasonable design. It is only with regard to the Muslim minority that this cannot be asserted with confidence; and therefore, I shall deal separately with it later on.

In this connection a point of far-reaching importance and one which has a very serious bearing on the political and religious and cultural interests of the Christian, Jews and Parsee countrymen of ours in particular, must be mentioned in bold relief. The anti-National and aggressive designs on the part of the Muslim minority constitute a danger to non-Muslim Indians in India and not only to the Hindus alone. It is too clear a point to require any further elucidation here. It is the anti-National attitude of the Muslim minority alone which is giving a handle to the British Government to obstruct further political and Constitutional progress in Hindustan. But in order to camouflage their own special responsibility for this guilt, the Muslims always try to drag in other minorities also in support of their attitude and want the world to believe that all non-Hindu minorities are as determinedly uncompromising in the anti-National demands advanced by the Muslim League. The League always wants to pose as the champion of all non-Hindu minorities. But the fact is that the relations of Christian, Jews and above all minorities. But the fact is that the relations of Christians, Jews and above all our Parsee brethren have been for centuries most cordial with us Hindus and these non-Muslim minorities have never advanced any anti-National or unreasonable claims or had never indulged in political hooliganism or fanatical riots as a silly means to impress their political importance. My earnest suggestion, therefore, to our Christians, Jews, Parsees and such other non-Muslim minorities would be that they should openly and definitely disown the League designs, protest against being bracketed with the Muslims under the misleading and mischievous common term "minorities," call upon the Muslim League not to speak in general on their behalf and above all should definitely declare through their respective political organizations that they are perfectly willing and contented to form a common National front with the Hindus under the conditions referred to above. If, but the Christians, the Jews, the Parsees and all non-Muslim minorities and the Hindus present a common understanding and a common front at any would-be Round Table Conference or Constituent Assembly, the Muslims will find themselves singularly isolated and will be forced to cease to speak in the name of "the minority problem" and will have to shoulder by themselves the responsibility of their anti-National and fanatical claims. These superstitious pretensions of Muslims of being a chosen minority, the bluff

claiming political importance and historical traditions investing with an incomparable superiority amongst the Indian people in general, constitutes a challenge and an insult to our Christians, Jews, Parsees and other countrymen too.

(g) *The Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress* : I have no space here nor the inclination to frame a charge-sheet against the Congress, enumerating the grievous errors it has been committing under the dictatorship of Gandhiji and the leaders of his persuasion ever since the Khilafat agitation; setting at naught even the protests of such eminent Hindu Patriots as Lokamanya Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, Swami Shraddhanand and others, which errors have weakened and humiliated Hindudom at every step. I have no inclination to do so or condemn them even in such harsh terms have rendered eminent services to our Motherland and many of them meant well. Although the Congress as a body has been ungrateful to a degree in failing to appreciate the patriotic sacrifice and service the Hindu Mahasabhaites be just and generous in brotherly appreciation of the patriotic motives of those of the Congressites who had been highly selfless and sacrificing. It is not their motive but their judgment and in a couple of cases a monomaniac incompetence which were responsible for the erroneous policy they persisted in, which has done incalculable harm to the Hindu cause and which if not checkmated is likely to jeopardise not only the legitimate interest of Hindudom far more dangerously than in the past but even the vital interests of the "India Nation" too as the Congress itself understands it and loves so well.

22. It is no, therefore, to take up fruitlessly the sad memories of the most grievous error which the Congressites committed in their identification with the Khilafat agitation but to warn against the imminent danger of a similar type that I must refer to a few facts regarding the attitude of the Gandhist politicians in that ill-fated movement. In spite of the warnings of the Great Tilak, Gandhiji committed the Congress to the purely communal, religious and extra-territorial Khilafat agitation to placate the Muslims and himself went to the length of insisting on the point that the question of *Swaraj* itself should be subordinated to the Khilafat issue; nay, he said it was the religious duty of Hindus to help the Khalifat! And yet the same Congress leaders forbade the Congress even to touch the Nizam Civil Resistance movement as a thing unclean and denounced it as communal because it demanded the religious and cultural rights of Hindus! Not only that but true to their words these Congressite Hindu leaders did not subordinate *Swaraj* to the Khilafat question only in its figurative aspect but were hands in glove with the Muslim leaders who instigated Amir Amanulla Khan to invade India as he actually did. We have the word of Swami Shraddhanandji for it. The Swamiji publicly wrote to that effect in protest in his "*Liberator*" and produced some documentary evidence and a draft telegram in Gandhiji's handwriting to the Amir which Maulana Mahomad Ali had shown to Swamiji. In his own "*Young India*" Gandhiji admitted that the Afghans if successful were sure to establish their Kingdom in India; (see *Young India* 1-6-21) and yet these Congressite Hindu leaders did not dissociate themselves from the Muslim leaders in their open and secret activities to egg on the Afghan invasion, but on the contrary promised support to this treacherous move. Gandhiji writes in his "*Young India*" (4-5-21), "I would in a sense certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government—by openly telling my countrymen that it would be a crime to help the Government etc."

If you like to see the length these gentlemen had gone in this affair you may read a useful tract recently published by Mr. Karandikar of Poona which is full of original extracts from the speeches and writings of the then Congress leaders and Gandhi's *Young India*. What is most surprising to note is the fact that these Hindu leaders outbid even the Ali Brothers, the 'National' Maulana Azad and other Muslim leaders in maintaining that if the Amir succeeded in capturing Delhi, we would have won *Swaraj*!—for, they definitely stated that the rule of the Afghans was in itself a *Swaraj*—"we Hindu-Muslims are one—an indivisible Nation." I vividly remember conversations I had with these Hindu leaders of Gandhist persuasion when they used to meet me then in prison. How expectantly they waited for the invading armies of the Amir to capture Lahore! Well, after all, the Khilafat was guillotined by the Turks themselves and the Amir Amanulla instead of being an Emperor at Delhi was dethroned by a Bachha Saku to Kabul itself: and all that India reaped from the Khilafat agitation was the intensified Pan-Islamic fanaticism roused by that movement amongst the India Muslims all over India, aided and abetted by the Hindus themselves who paid dearly for this their folly there and then in Malabar, Kohat, Punjab, Bengal—and will have yet to pay unless they learn to react.

23. While the Khilafat was on his brain, in a reply he gave to the correspondent of the '*Daily Express*.' London, Gandhiji disclosed his plan of converting the Afghans from fanatical turbulence into a peaceful citizenship thus, "I would introduce the spinning wheel amongst the Afghan tribes also and then that will prevent them from attacking Indian territory. I feel the tribesmen are in their own way God-fearing people."

Yes, "in their own way;" That is the trouble. For, we can clearly discern their own way of God-fearingness in the ghastly light of Hindu inhabitations set on fire through the frontier line from Sindh to Kashmir, only Hindus looted, only Hindus killed, only Hindu women and men kidnapped! Is not the Fakir of Ipi also a God-fearing man in his own way? And the spinning wheel to persuade them from attacking India! How many centuries after. Sir? And what are we Hindus to do in the meanwhile? To garrison the frontiers with hosts of Hindu damsels with the charm of the spinning wheel in their hands—as Gandhiji has suggested quite seriously at one of the sittings of the Round Table Conference?

24. Well, gentlemen, I am not referring to these few details in any light mood. I want you to realise the mentality and the ideology of these Hindu leaders who still happen to be at the helm of the Congress. Neither Gandhiji or Pandit Nehru, nay, not even Subhas Babu or Mr. Roy who, although they do not contribute in any way to some of the above vagaries of the Gandhist school are still votaries—I call it victims—of the school of thought which says in so many words, "Give to the Muslims so much that they could not wish to ask for anything more." They may sincerely believe that to be the crux of Nationalism and wisdom. But to you, who do not wish to see Hindudom humiliated and browbeaten into servility, believe to be so? If not, are you going to authorise these very gentlemen by electing and returning them as representatives who can speak in the name of the Hindus once again at any Round Table Conference to come, to enter into any new pact with the Muslims on behalf of the Hindus, or entrust that destiny of the North-Western Frontiers into the hands of

the Khan brothers who are the Congress plenipotentiaries and Gandhiji's certified Lieutenants there—as once the Ali brothers were? I call upon those thousands of Hindus also who have not ceased to be Hindus but who still follow the Congress as seriously with a blind habitual trait to ponder as possible on those questions.

25. After the Khilafat came the Blank cheques; then the Communal Award or Decision, 'lapses of memory,' make the Congress leaders call it sometimes this way sometimes that, but which always remains definitely unrejected and in fact accepted and worked out by them. Then rushed in the flood of circulars issued by Congress Ministers in all Provinces: Mr. Pant, for example, assuring the Muslims amongst other things. I quote his words, "At Barabanki the Congress Government stopped Hindus from doing *Arati* in their own temples and blowing conch-shells during the whole period of *Moharum* and at several places during the Holi, the Hindus were prevented from sprinkling colour-water even on Hindus amongst themselves. At Jaunpur, the District Magistrate was attacked by Muslims but the accused were released on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Muslim League. The Congress Government has given representation to the Muslims out of all proportion to their numerical strength which came up to only 14 per cent. But out of four Collectors appointed by the Congress Government, three were Muslims and out of 13 Deputy Collectors eight were Muslims." So on and so on. Every Hindu should read this whole circular issued by the U.P. Congress Government. It is a masterpiece of self-condemnation. It was secretly circulated only amongst the Muslims but the Hindu Sabhaites, those cursed, "communalist" traitors got hold of some copies of this our 'National' confession and broadcasted its reprints. Space forbids me from quoting from other circulars issued by Provincial Congress Governments in Central Provinces, Madras, etc. all fashioned after the same pattern pleading in substance before the Tribunal of the Muslim League: "Sir, we have deprived the Hindus everywhere of what is due to them and given Muslims overwhelmingly more than was due," oppressed the Hindus as best as we could wherever the Muslims were pleased to demand it. So let the League be pleased, therefore, Sir, to certify that the Congress Ministries were truly impartial and perfectly National!!!".

26. And the Muslim League has certified at last by observing the "day of Deliverance," from the Congress tyranny under which the Muslims groaned for the past two long enduring years. In a way it was tyranny for in all those Provinces were the Muslims only 7 to 12 per cent in numerical strength but the Congress gave them posts in the stingy proportion of 40 per cent only in the Educational, Police and other Administrative Departments where they ought to have got cent per cent, in consideration of their historical importance, for their being the direct communal descendants of the Moghal Emperors. Has not even Lord Zetland referred to war-like qualities of the Muslims only this month, and reminded the Congressite Hindus that the Muslim Emperor ruled over India for a time, implying thereby that the Muslims were, therefore, some superior beings to the Hindus. It was fortunate that His Lordship was never sent in his early youth to any primary Maratha school. Otherwise he would have been deprived of the advantage of that argument by a little more knowledge of the fate of that Muslim Empire how the avenging hosts of Hindus had beaten to a chip the forces of these "Warlike Muslims" in a hundred battlefields,

smashed to pieces this self-same Moghul Empire, rearing up an Independent Hindu Empire on the ashes of Muslim Pride and Power and held the Moghul Emperors as prisoners and pensioners in their hands.

27. But it is no use now on the part of our Congress friends to fulminate against this latest move of the Muslim League. That "Deliverance Day" of today is but the inevitable logical consequence of the Khilafat Day so gaily observed by the Congress yesterday. It is you who have initiated the Muslims into the belief that the more they demand, the more you yield, the more they frown, the more you placate, the more they pocket, the more you offer, the more thankless they grow, the more afflicted you are with craving for their thanks. Did you not offer them blank cheques? Why then get startled, now that they begin to fill them up with whatever ransom they are pleased to demand! Dr. Moonje, Bhai Parmanand and other leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha protested against the Khilafat Policy, against your Blank Cheques, against your meaningless "neither accept for reject" vagaries, but you then denounced them all as wicked communalists, looked down even upon Shivaji and Pratap as misguided Patriots, because they conquered by the sword and you gave yourself out as new messiahs who have come to conquer by love alone, as world guides in direct communications with the inner voice. And now how pitiable it is to find you so sorely afflicted for want of guidance for yourselves to find out a way to appease and win over by love alone a single individual, the President to the League, that you would stand imploring at the gates of all the British Governors and the Viceroys to lend you a helping hand.

28. Then again, whenever it happened that some British authorities or leaders referred to the policy of the Hindu Mahasabha on a point here or there with a tingle of appreciation, our Congress Nationalist used to explain in righteous indignation, "There! what more proof is required to repose the anti-National guilt of these Hindu Mahasabhaite communalists than the fact the British people should appreciate their policy on this or that point." And now there is a regular scramble amongst these Nationalist Congress leaders to secure and flourish in the face of the world certificates of appreciation from the British Governors and the Viceroys to prove that the Congress Ministries were after all not so bad and had served under the British Government to its satisfaction. Moreover, it is also very funny to observe that those very Congress leaders, who blamed the Hindu Sanghathanists whenever they claimed a legitimate protection from the British Government against the Muslim outrages on the Frontier or in Malabar or in Bangal, should now be vying with each other on calling upon Governors and the Viceroy to arbitrate as the best judges and save the Congress prestige by declaring it not guilty in the very serious case framed against them by the Muslim League. Is it not one anti-National to appeal to the British—"the third party"—"the outsiders" to step into settle our internal differences which we may have with our Muslim countrymen?

29. It is also instructive and, therefore, necessary to point out here that this theory of "the Third Party" also constituted a Congress superstition which was responsible for so many of its errors. They always used to fancy that the Muslims left to themselves would never indulge in any anti-National, ulterior, anti-Hindu designs. The Muslims—including Messrs. Jinnahs, Huqs and Hayat Khans—were very simple

minded folks incapable of any political subterfuges and as devotees of Islamic peace and goodwill had no aggressive political aims of their own against the Hindus. Nay, even the Frontier tribes, the "brave brother Moplas," the Muslim populations in Bengal or Sindh who indulge in such horrible outrage against Hindus have not taste for it all nursed within themselves—but were almost compelled to rise and revolt against the Hindus by "the Third Party" the Britishers. When the British did not step in, we Hindus and Muslims lived together in perfect amity and brotherly concord and Hindu-Muslim riots was a thing simply unheard of."

30. Thousands of Congressite Hindus are observed to have been duped into this silliest of political superstitions. As if Mohamad Qasim, Gaznis, Ghoris, Allauddins, Aurangzebs were all instigated by the British, by "the Third Party," to invade and lay waste Hindu India with a mad fanatical fury. As if the history of the last ten centuries of perpetual war between the Hindus and Muslims was an interpolation and a myth. As if the Alis or Mr. Jinnah or Sir Sikandar were mere school children to be spoiled with the offer of sugar pills by the British vagabonds in the class and persuaded to throw stones at the house of their neighbours. They say, "before the British came, Hindu-Muslim riots, were a thing unheard of." Yes, but because instead of riots Hindu-Muslim war was the order of the day.

31. But supposing for a while what the Gandhists maintain that it is this "Third Party," the British, who are solely responsible for hypnotising Muslims into anti-Hindu and anti-National tendencies, how is it that Gandhiji and his Congressite Lieutenants are invoking the very "Third Party"—the British Governors and the Viceroys to act as arbitrators, to judge whether the Congress was really guilty of the accusations levelled by the Muslim League against it? Is the leading abettor the best person to arbitrate? To request him whom you accuse as the leading instigator to investigate in the crime! If the Congress superstition was true then the British are sure to adjudge the Award in a way to intensify the ill-will and distrust between the Congressite and the League so as to undermine yet further any chances of Hindu-Muslim understanding and concord. So then either your Third Party theory was wrong and superstitious or you have obviously bungled, in approaching the very mischief making Third Party to arbitrate.

32. The simple fact which the Congressite Hindus would do well to take a note of even now and which would spare them from a series of such inconsistent and bungling steps is that the Muslim religion, theocratic traditions and history all imbue them with inherent ambition of Islamic Political Sovereignty. The British policy at times when it suits British interest does, of course, act as a match—but the explosive magazine is genuinely Muslim. It could be held in check but woe to him who overlooks its existence and dupes himself into the belief that the match itself was the magazine. If not the British-make, any other match may serve the same purpose. Nay, spontaneous combustion is also its peculiar characteristic. Secondly, the Muslims are practical politicians to a fault. So they, in general, yield to and ally instinctively with the stronger, even it be their worse opponent, and continue to bully the weaker. Has not England reduced them to a subject race in India and elsewhere? But today England is stronger of the two. So they will fawn on England and continue to aggrandise against the Hindus. If tomorrow the Hindus grow stronger they will be yielding to Hindus

too and behave as brothers as they did in Maharashtra and Punjab in the days of the Peshwa or Ranjit Singh. That is why Hindu-Muslim riots were a thing unheard of in days gone by "to quote the Congressite Slogan."

33. In all sincerity I request my Congressite brothers that instead of fulminating against the move of the League or what is more likely especially in the case of the Gandhist group instead of being yet more browbeaten, the best way would be to take it as an effective eye-opener and arrest their steps once for all on the dangerous path they were treading. They should simply refuse to have any further dealing with the Muslims as Muslims. Let the Indian National Congress rectify that fundamental mistake and be once more the real Indian National Congress as it claims to be. Let it be absolutely consistent with its own ideal of a Territorial Nationalism and begin with a clean slate. Let it proclaim once for all that it stands by these principles alone.

Firstly, it recognizes no Muslim as a Muslim or Christian as a Christian or Hindu as a Hindu; but looks upon them all and deal with them all as Indian only; and, therefore, will have nothing to do with any special communal, religious or racial interests as apart from the fundamental interests guaranteed to all citizens alike.

Secondly, it does not acknowledge any other constitutional principle with regard to electorates than the rule "one man one vote" and public services to go by merit alone. Only one alternative it may condescend to subscribe in view of the peculiar situation in India to the effect that if communal representation is to be resorted to at all then it must strictly be in relation to the commercial strength of the constituents and in the public services too that relation may be observed, but only in so far as it is consistent with merit.

Thirdly and above all, so long as such a National and just Constitution could not be had, let the Congress resist the temptation of participating in any election whatsoever under a Constitution which is deliberately meant to divide the integrity of the Indian people and is not only used on communal divisions but is most unjustly harmful to the majority community and constitutes a standing instigation to the Muslim minority to act against the Nation as a whole as the present Constitution aims to do. So long as there are separate electorates for the Muslims and the general which in fact means the Hindu one, then let the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha participate in the elections and let the Congress stand supremely aloof as a truly Indian National body which can never condescend to identify itself with any particular communal electorate.

35. If but the Congress takes courage in both hands, rectifies its past anti-Hindu and anti-National attitude and takes up the stand I have suggested above, the prestige of the Congress as a truly National organisation will immediately be enhanced. In that case, it will regain in general the whole-hearted confidence of the Hindu Mahasabha at any rate.

36. But it can on no account continue to pay the double-faced game of getting elected on behalf of the Hindu electorate as Hindus and betray the legitimate interest of the Hindus as Nationalists. It can no longer hunt with the hound and run with the hare. Otherwise the Muslims are bound to continue and rightly so to look upon it as a Hindu body while the Hindus will look upon it and rightly too as a pseudo-Nationalistic nuisance dangerous to the Hindu cause as well as the Indian National as a whole.

37. May I hope that the Congress will open its eyes? If it does even now it is not yet too late! As my friend Mr. Ketkar proposes in *Maratha* of Poona, let the Congress observe a Day of Rectification to counteract the League's Day of Deliverance, proclaim the truly National orientation suggested above and write to the League the last word closing all further correspondence. "Sir, if you come, with you; if you do not without you; and if you oppose in spite of you—we shall continue the good fight to free our Hindustan as best as we can."

38. And in case our Muslim friends want to have a Royal Commission to define their rights let the Congress tell them uncompromisingly "if you want to have a resort to any independent arbitration, well, then, the highest tribunal of that can be but the League of Nations which has already framed a Public Law with regard to the rights of minorities all over the world. The case of Indian minorities also should be referred to the League." In fact, had the Congress taken up to this stand as uncompromisingly as possible and as Dr. Moonje had already suggested, then at the Round Table Conference things could never have drifted in this wild way.

44. *The European War*: The two explicit resolutions passed by the Working Committee regarding our Policy towards the War in Europe leave nothing more to be said on that subject, as no new event has happened to demand a change. I exhort the British Government once more that a definite and immediate declaration of granting the Dominion Status as contemplated in the Westminster statute to India, at the end of the War at the latest is the only means to secure a whole-hearted sympathy of the Hindu people with England in this present struggle and to ensure the willingness even of an Independent India in future to continue a co-partnership in the Commonwealth on equal terms any delay in granting the Dominion Status as an immediate step to enable India to tread on the path of evolutionary progress towards her ultimate political destiny would prove dangerous even to the solidarity of the British Commonwealth. The rise and rapid advance of Japan in the East, of Russia, Italy and Germany in the West are events pretentious and a contented and self-governing India cannot but be a mighty factor in strengthening the British position in facing any anti-British combination. But no amount of political sophistry can disarm Indian discontent and make her tolerate the humiliation of continuing as a British dependency. Do you expect any longer to dupe her into the belief that it is only the want of an understanding between the India majority and minority, the Hindus and Muslims with regard to such details as the percentage in representation etc. that justifies England in delaying the grant of Dominion Status forthwith? The British Statesmen have recently stated that their conscience forbids to thrust an understanding on the minority, the Muslims in India, against their will and would not move an inch till the Hindus and Muslims have produced a willing compromise and a common demand for a progressive Constitution. It was really a news to learn that English Statesmen have grown to god-fearing and democratical almost overnight as not to be willing to thrust on any people anything against their own will! But may it be asked that when you thrust your unmitigated political autocracy on India, was there any plebiscite taken to ascertain Indian opinion? Or did you take a plebiscite or receive a united request from the minority and the majority when only a couple of months ago you scrapped up the Provincial autonomy at a stroke and invested Governors with

powers to conduct the Government at their own discretion and in their own judgment? And if you could thrust undiluted autocracy, a vassalage on India and hold her as a dependency, can you not thrust a Dominion Status on her in spite of the will of a Minority and especially so when the majority has unanimously demanded it? You can thrust curses—can you not thrust blessing? The sooner the British people cease to have a resort to these transparent political subterfuges and to utilise the Muslim minority to camouflage their own unwillingness to grant Hindustan her birth right, her *Swarajya*, while she is still treading on an evolutionary path of political progress the better for England, the better for India. If the evolutionary path is thus altogether closed to the Hindus in particular by empowering the Muslims with a definite veto on all equitable progress a deadlock may ensue, but only for a while. Because nature hates vacuum, and if evolutionary progress I denied the gathering forces of Time Spirit cannot but take the other and more dangerous turn.

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1. Misinterpreting Shivaji's concept of *Hindvi Swaraj* for Hindu Swaraj V.D. Savarkar wrote a tract entitled *Hindutva* in 1922. He accepted the notion that the Aryan people and culture originated in North-Western India and gradually spread out over the sub-continent. He defines a Hindu as a person who feels united by blood ties with all those whose ancestry can be traced to Hindu antiquity and who looks upon India from the Indus river in the north to the Indian Ocean—his *pitrubhumi* or fatherland and accepts India as *punyabhumi* or holyland.

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Linlithgow to Roger Lumley [Extract]

Linlithgow Papers, No. 125, p. 113

VICEROY'S CAMP, CALCUTTA, 30 December, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Lumley,

4. Jinnah's "Day of Deliverance" seems on the whole to have passed off quietly all over the country. I shall probably hear more from you about it in your next report. But relations between two communities, so far as I can see, get more and more tense.

Yours ever,
LINLITHGOW



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Resolutions adopted at XXI Session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta, 30 December, 1939

Indian Annual Register, 1939, Pt. II, pp. 338-42

(a) The Bengal Ministry

The conference then discussed the resolution on the Bengal Ministry which was moved by Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. The resolution, which was passed, read :

"The Hindu Mahasabha records its strong protest against the openly communal and reactionary policy of the present Ministry in Bengal as evinced by its various legislative enactments and administrative measures calculated to curb the rights and liberties of the Hindus of Bengal and cripple their economic strength and cultural life.

"As instances may be mentioned the following: the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Amendment Act which is not only anti-Hindu but also anti-National with its introductions of separate electorates in the constitution of the Corporation of Calcutta.

"Introduction of the communal ratio in the public services;

"Undue preference to Mohammadans in the recruitment to public services in defiance of the recommendations of the Public Service Commission or without reference to them;

"Discriminatory treatment against Hindu officers in public services. Posting, transferring and promoting of officers on communal considerations;

"Muslimization of certain services, especially the educational service;

"Lowering of the standard of efficiency and integrity of the administration by the introduction of the principle of minimum qualification;

"Discrimination against Hindus in the matter of educational grants and distribution of stipends and scholarships;

"Discrimination against Hindus in the matter of grants from the Public exchequer of purposes of relief and in respect of agricultural and industrial loans;

"Abuse of political power for the purpose of economic strangulation of the Hindus;

"Discrimination against Hindus in the matter of licence and contracts;

"Attempting to corrupt the Bengali language and undermine the foundation of Hindu culture;

"Persistent negligence in the matter of checking widespread destruction and desecration of Hindu temples, idols and places of worship;

"Unwarranted interference with the peaceful performance of Hindu religious hold (rites) and ceremonies in private houses and public festivals;

"Interference with liberty of speech, freedom of the Press and freedom of association of Hindus;

"Subsidizing Mohammadan newspapers out of public funds for purpose of communal propaganda;

"Failure to take effective steps for the prevention of crime against Hindu women and for the protection of Hindu property against Muslim aggression.

"This Sabha calls upon the Hindus of Bengal to unite and organise in defence of

their rights, liberties and culture under to the banner of the Hindu Mahasabha against the flagrant encroachments made there on under the policy pursued by the present Ministry. This Sabha further calls upon the Hindus of India to stand by the Hindus of Bengal in their fight for the maintenance of their just rights and interests."

(b) The Hindu Militia

The Mahasabha resolved to form a volunteer corps of its own, to be known as "Hindu Militia," and called upon Hindus between ages of 18 and 45 to enlist as members of the "Militia."

The Preamble stated that such a move was necessary in view of the fact that Lord Zetland "has indirectly encouraged Muslims to regard themselves as having more relations with independent Muslim Nations beyond the frontiers of India that prominent leaders of the Muslim League, such as Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq, the Premier of Bengal has threatened actual revolt and civil war if the future Indian Constitution is not drafted to their entire satisfaction, and that Muslims are organizing and training bands of militia of their own, such as the Khaksars who gave so much trouble to the Congress Government in the United Provinces."

Dr. Moonje said that after the declaration of war, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, announced that he would give ten lakhs of soldiers from the Punjab to fight on the side of England against Germany. The question might very well be asked what the Hindus going to contribute? Mahatma Gandhi had said that the Congress, which some people described as a Hindu organization, could not give soldiers or money but could help England only with its moral sympathy. He left it to his hearers' commonsense to decide whether an offer of moral support would be better appreciated than an offer of men and weapons.

Dr. Moonje asked his audience to draw a picture in their minds of what would happen should England fail; to defeat Germany. It was quite likely, he said that Muslim nations across the North-Western Frontier might invade India, and the Muslims here would support them. They could well imagine what would be the fate of Hindus in such an eventuality. The danger was obvious. In the circumstances, the only remedy for the Hindus was too from their own militia.

Dr. Moonje said that every Hindu between the ages of 18-45 must not only have military training but must also know how to wield the lathi and sword. A Hindu youth might forego literary education, but he must go to a military school and the *akbara* for military training and physical culture. He called upon every Hindu family to send at least one son to the Bhonsle Military School at Nasik for military education.

Seconding the resolution, Bhai Parmanand said that the philosophy of non-violence could not be the philosophy of guiding national life. The theory of non-violence preached by Mr. Gandhi, and accepted by the Congress was against the culture, tradition and history of the Hindus. It was against the teaching of their scriptures. Dr. Amulyaratan Ghose, Mr. Anandapriya Kale, Professor Deshpande and Mr. Bindheswari Prasad also supported the resolution, which was carries.

(c) Defence of India & War

Mr. C.M. Saptarshi, President, the Maharashtra Hindu Mahasabha, moved a resolution on "War and Defence of India," which read:

"In view of the statement made by His Majesty's Government that it has declared war with a desire to safeguard the vital principles of Freedom and Democracy as against the rule of Force, and in view of the fact that nowhere is there greater necessary for the application of these principals than in India, the All India Hindu Mahasabha declares:

"That as the task of defending India from any military attack is the common concern of England and India, and as India is unfortunately not in a position today to carry out that responsibility unaided, there is ample room for whole-hearted operation between India and England and that in order to make such cooperation effective, His Majesty's Government should immediately take steps:

"To introduce responsible Government at the Centre.

"To redress the grievous wrong done to the Hindus by the Communal Award, both at the Centre and in the Provinces—that particularly in Bengal and the Punjab where the Hindus have been reduced to the position of a fixed Statutory Minority to all principles of Democracy, with their representation to the Legislatures reduced far below what they are entitled to even on the basis of their population strength.

"In order to inspire the people of India to feel that the Indian Army is the national army of the people of India, the people of India and not an Army of occupation of the British, to remove all artificial distinction between the so-called "listed" and "non-listed" classes or "martial" and "non-martial" races, and to accomplish the completed Indianization of the India Army as early as possible.

"To modify the Indian Arms Act so as to bring it on a par with what prevails in England.

"To expand on an extensive scale the Indian Territorial Force and the University Training Corps, to establish such military organization in Provinces where they are not in existence at present, and to increase substantially the admission of cadets at the India Military Academy.

"To make adequate arrangements for the training of the people in all branches of the Defence Force so as to make it ready for all emergencies."

Mr. Saptarshi explained that the resolution did not ask Hindus to non-cooperate with the British, neither did it ask them to give unconditional cooperation. It was in effect responsive cooperation which was the policy advocated by the late Mr. Balgangadhar Tilak. It laid down certain conditions on the fulfilment of which the Hindu Mahasabha would give its cooperation to the British. Mr. Saptarshi then explained in detail the terms of the resolution. Mr. N.C. Chatterji supported the resolution, which was carried.

(d) League Demand of Royal Commission

Dr. B.S. Moonje then moved a resolution criticising the observances of a "Day of Deliverance" by the Muslim League and the demand for the appointment of a Royal Commission by Mr. Jinnah.

The resolution said that Mr. Gandhiji's policy had widened the gulf between Hindus and Muslims so much that there appeared to be no practical chance of bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity in the near future: that Muslims had been made much of both by the Congress and the Government and had been given concessions,

at the expense of Constitutional and administrative Hindus, much more than what were their due on a proportion of population.

In view of these facts, the Mahasabha declared that there was no justification for the appointment of a Royal Commission, but, if a Royal Commission was appointed, then its terms of reference should also include an investigation of various acts of oppression and atrocities committed by Muslim on Hindus in both Muslim-majority Provinces and Muslim-minority provinces." The resolution was carried.

(e) Hindu Sangathan and Shuddhi

Another resolution was passed urging the necessity of the Hindu *Sangathan* and *Shuddhi*¹ movement for the strengthening and consolidation of Hindus of India. This is to be accomplished by the encouragement of physical culture among Hindu youths, economic uplift of the Hindus, social uplift of Hindu Backward classes, removal of the spirit of jealousy and separation between different Provinces and different sections of the Hindu community and reclamation of people who for some reason or other have gone out of the Hindu fold and their readmittance into the Hindu community by the process of *Shuddhi*.

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1. The word *Shuddhi* (literally "purification") was applied to the efforts by Arya Samajists to reconvert Hindus who had become Christians or Muslims. From 1884 to 1894 at least eighteen local Arya Samaj Chapters sponsored *Shuddhi* ceremonies whereby Hindus converted to other religions were accepted back into the Hindu fold. *Shuddhi* was revived in the aftermath of the Khilafat movement.

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Jawaharlal Nehru's Press Interview

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. X, pp. 422-23

Lahore, 31 December, 1939. The proposal of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan seems to me to be entirely unworkable, partly because a small group is not likely to evolve a democratic Constitution and partly because the British Government is supposed to have a hand in this business and the essential preliminary to the success of such a venture is that the British Government should decide to liquidate itself in India and the decision should lie with the Indian people themselves.

The Constituent Assembly will be representative of the masses whose interests are fundamentally economic. Though conflict might arise over economic issues, we are bound to succeed in communal and other fields. When the Constituent Assembly meets, it is bound to elect a small committee to frame proposals. Nothing can be considered as a bar to any action that might be taken by the Congress. It is not correct to say that if there is no agreement on the communal question civil resistance will not be launched. It is, however, highly desirable that there should be a favourable communal atmosphere for such a movement. No decision has as yet been taken to launch civil resistance, but in case there is any interference, we must resist it.

Quite apart from an agreement with the Muslim League, it is our business to cooperate on political issues with all parties. For instance, the Congress has no political differences with the Majlis-e-Ahrar. The Ahrars have cooperated with the Congress in the past and I hope they will continue to do so in the future. The question of coming to an agreement with the Muslim nationalists on the communal question, therefore, does not arise.

The essential difficulty seems to be the political objective and method of the League. The conditions advanced by Mr. Jinnah have made it extremely difficult to come to an agreement. His conditions are not only political but psychological. The Congress policy, however, has always been one of willingness to negotiate with everybody.

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Fortnightly Report on Bengal for the second half of December 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-12/39, pp. 1-3

CONFIDENTIAL

Some speculation is current on the lines that the visits to India of Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Jayakar and His Highness the Aga Khan may be in the nature of feelers with a view to some settlement with the Congress. Sir Stafford Cripps, however, is felt by Muslims to have come out with preconceptions and no intention of modifying them; the fact that he recognises certain difficulties which it is fashionable in Congress circles to declare non-existent or unimportant, has laid him open to criticism from the Congress Press.¹ Discussion of the Constituent Assembly plan of the Congress seems to have made a definite step forward, and there is now a disposition to consider a more practical approach to the problem of Constitution-making. Mr. N.R. Sarkar on the 14th December, speaking on the war resolution in the Legislative Council, repudiated the idea of a Constituent Assembly in favour of a comparatively small *ad hoc* body; publicity has been given to similar proposals put forward by Mr. Srinivas Iyengar, by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and by the National Liberal Federation at Allahabad. Sir Maurice Gwyer's convocation speech² at Benares Hindu University is received with respect, but political opinion of a Congress complexion continues to believe that circumstances in India differ so greatly from those in which Constituent Assemblies have failed that there is no ground for assuming that this machinery would not be affected here, and to reiterate the conviction that any repudiation of the Round Table Conference procedure is bound to be unsuccessful.

2. No disturbance appears to have resulted from the celebration of "Deliverance Day" which took place widely throughout the Province. The mutual recriminations of the Hindu Mahasabha and of the Hon'ble Chief Minister continue to occupy public opinion. Mr. Jinnah's demand that Muslim grievances shall be submitted to a Royal Commission excites a good deal of comment, some details of which are given in the

appendix to this report.³ There is still very little indication on either side of a willingness to “let bygones be bygones” and (whilst regretting any instances of misplaced zeal or even malice on the part of communalist supporters of the Governments impugned) to work together for the establishment of communal harmony and goodwill.

5. Two important conferences are in progress in Calcutta as this report is drafted. The Hindu Mahasabha met on the 28th December and speeches have been made and resolutions passed which indicate a continued hardening of Hindu sectarian feeling. The All India Muslim Educational Conference met on the 29th December.

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1. Cripps exploration of Indian opinion and sentiment showed him that “there were great difficulties in the way of such a constitutional advance as Congress wished.” Though he was certain that an attempt should be made to bring the Congress and the League into cooperation, the then current rioting and his talks with Jinnah and Liaquat “had led him towards the idea that some separation of Hindu and Muslim dominions might be necessary.” On his return he expressed the belief that partition would be “a necessary part of a new Indian Constitution” Collin Cooke, *The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps*, London, 1957, pp. 255-56, 288.
 2. Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice, Federal Court of India, delivered the Convocation Address to the Benares Hindu University on 23 December, 1939. For details see Indian Annual Register, 1939, pt. II, pp. 501-04.
 3. Not available.

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Fortnightly Report on the Punjab for the second half of December, 1939 [Extract]

Home-Poll, F. 18-12/39

CONFIDENTIAL

Muslim Affairs—The controversy in the Press about Mr. Jinnah’s “Deliverance Day” continued with great vigour along purely communal lines. The day was celebrated throughout the Province quietly and with great restraint. A few Hindu papers misinterpreted this restraint to mean a lack of enthusiasm, but more discerning papers have expressed their appreciation of the control and moderation exercised on the occasion. The general impression is that the great majority of Muslims are convinced that the interests of their co-religionists have suffered under Congress rule. The restrained way in which feelings were voiced on “Deliverance Day” served to emphasize the depth of these feelings.



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*C.R. Reddy's¹ Statement**Congress Government II, pp. 23-24**December, 1939*

Has the communal situation, to use the term in respect of Hindu and Muslims, become worse or better, since the Congress accepted office? There can only be one answer to that question. Let us consider the number of communal riots that have taken place during the last 2 ½ (two and a half) years, and compare it with the number for the previous five years. That is an objective test.

Then again, we have to consider the fact that the Muslim League has practically refused to deal with the Congress unless the latter concedes that the League is the sole representative of the Muslims. The Congress claim to represent the whole country and to be the only deliverer of the political, economic and cultural goods is not accepted by the Muslim League. Secondly, the Muslim League enunciates the principle of separate existence for the Muslim community and wants communal representation.

The Congress now says that it would give the Muslim any amount of safeguards in a new Constitution, but Mr. Jinnah turned round and asked what was the good of safeguards, as, in Parliamentary Democracy, they had already reduced the safeguards. Are safeguards necessarily operable in Parliamentary Democracy? Obviously they are not, unless the people have that spirit of accommodation which distinguishes the British face.

The Cabinet is supposed to possess the confidence of the Governor. How could the Governor exercise safeguards against men in whom he had full confidence? Analyzing the theory of safeguard we will find that if the safeguards are to be operated that must be done by some power outside the cabinet because they are against the cabinet.

If the Congress, when its nominees were returned in an overwhelming majority at the last elections, had provided a really national and had Cabinets of national concentration allowing Muslims, Scheduled Classes, etc. to choose their own men, then 90 out of the 100 problems now facing them would have been solved.

The questions of hoisting the Congress flag and the singing of *Bande Mataram* show that the Congress has proceeded on a certain philosophy which has rendered toleration of opposite views difficult, if not impossible.

The Congress originally objected to coalition cabinets as wrong in principle and refused to give a place for the Muslim League; but subsequently, in Assam it changed its views. Having once made a departure from their original principle, the Congress should have reconstituted its Cabinets before the situation reached the present acute condition where accommodation has an ugly aspect of surrender whereas earlier it would have been generosity.

I believe that no party in India has been under the leadership of such noble and great persons as the Congress, but under certain principle or philosophy that it

followed, the Congress called the Muslim League and other such organizations by one sweeping term, "communal organizations." The idea of Congressmen that they were the only party and the only people who could deliver the goods, led to the consequence that the Congress should do its best to dissolve those communal organizations while following them to exist for cultural and economic purposes!

How could we ask the Muslim community, with its historic traditions, to dissolve it in an arithmetical mass in the name of democracy? Are numbers more sacred and more effective than race, religion, and history?

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1. Sir C.R. Reddy (1880-1951); Vice-president, Cambridge Union Society, 1906; Inspector-General of Education, Mysore State, 1918-21; Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University, 1926-31 and 1936-49; Pro-Chancellor, Mysore University, 1949-51.

GLOSSARY

A

<i>Achoot, Achut</i>	Untouchable Scheduled Caste Hindus who were given the name of Harijan by Gandhiji.
<i>Ahimsa</i>	Non-violence.
<i>Akband</i>	United; undivided.
<i>Akhara</i>	A wrestling ground; a place for bodily exercise and games.
<i>Alim</i>	A learned man; scholar of Islamic literature; a Muslim theologian.
<i>Allahu akbar</i>	God is great.
<i>Amin</i>	Land surveyor and crop assessor.
<i>Ansar</i>	One free from all restraints.
<i>Azan</i>	A call or summon for prayers to Muslims.

B

<i>Baitul-ilm</i>	House of knowledge.
<i>Bazar</i>	Market; a daily market.
<i>Begar</i>	Unpaid forced labour especially as performed compulsorily for a land owner.
<i>Bhadralok</i>	Literally 'respectable' but used in historical discourse as an analytical category to denote a status group in Bengal who belonged to the upper castes economically dependent on landed rents and professional and clerical employment and kept a distance from the masses.
<i>Bhand</i>	A native actor; jester of a particular tribe springing from Bahrupiyas.
<i>Bharatmilap</i>	Procession observing Rama's reunion with his brother, Bharat.
<i>Biradari</i>	'Brotherhood'; patrilineal kinship group.
<i>Brahmadeva</i>	Creator in the Hindu pantheon.
<i>Brahman</i>	A man of the first order; caste of Hindus charged with

the duty of expounding the Vedas and conducting the ceremonies they enjoin.

C

Chapراسى Peon.

D

Dalbhat *Dal* means "lentil" and *bhat* means "cooked rice."

Dasebra The Hindu festival in September-October lasting nine nights or ten days; also called Durga-Puja in Bengal.

Devnagri Script for Hindi based on *Sanskrit* alphabet.

Dilli durast Dilli (Delhi) is still far off— i.e, *desh* a prophetic warning given to Sultan Ghiyasudd-Din Tughlug (1320-1325) said to have been given by Shaikh Nizamuddin; what is beyond reach.

Diwali The Hindu festival of light in October-November.

G

Ganeshpuja Worship of the elephant-headed Hindu god, Ganapati.

Geet Song.

Goonda Hooligan.

H

Hakim A physician.

Harijan Literally 'children of God'; name given by Gandhiji to 'untouchables'.

Hartal Cessation of work; strike.

Hat Open-air village market usually held once a week.

Hindu Rashtra Hindu nation; a concept that in India the Hindus were a nation and other people were communities.

Hindu Sangathan A movement aimed at Hindu solidarity.

Holi Hindu festival in February-March characterised by the spraying of coloured water and coloured powder.

I

Id Muslim festival, especially Id-ul-fitr, the breaking of the fast of Ramazan and Id-ul-azha or Baqr Id, the sacrificial festival on 10th Zil-hijja.

Imam A person exercising supreme leadership of the Muslim community after the death of Prophet Muhammad; used honorifically for the founders of the four Sunni schools of

<i>Imamat</i>	<p> juresprudence; title of a prayer-leader in a mosque. The office of <i>imam</i>. </p>
J	
<i>Jamadar</i>	In British India the title of the second rank of Indian officer in a sepoy company or of certain officers of police, customs etc.
<i>Jamat</i>	Group; class society.
<i>Janmastami</i>	Hindu religious festival connected with the birth of Krishna.
<i>Jatha</i>	An organised band or group.
<i>Jhanda</i>	Long bannered pole used in procession; flag, banner.
<i>Jihad</i>	A holy war.
K	
<i>Kalipuja</i>	Worship of Hindu goddess Kali consort of Shiva; same as Durga.
<i>Khatedar</i>	One with whom an account is opened.
<i>Kisan</i>	a cultivator.
L	
<i>Lathicharge</i>	Assault by large wooden clubs or sticks.
<i>Lingayat</i>	A member of the Jangama sect or worshippers of Shiva as the Linga.
M	
<i>Madinatul-ilm</i>	City of knowledge.
<i>Mahabiri Jhanda</i>	Bannered poles used in the procession of Hindu god called Hanuman.
<i>Maulana</i>	The title of a person of learning, teacher or scholar.
<i>Maulavi</i>	A Muslim teacher, especially of Arabic; expounder of Islamic Law.
<i>Mahatma</i>	Literally great soul; generally used for Gandhiji.
<i>Moksbya</i>	Saluation
<i>Momin</i>	Fathful; especially applied to weavers; a Muslim caste.
<i>Mulki</i>	A native; domestic especially applied to indigenous local residents of late Hyderabad State.
<i>Munsarim</i>	Manager.
N	

<i>Naibtehsildar</i>	Deputy Collector of revenue.
<i>Nibsastra prabar</i>	Unarmed attack.

P

<i>Panchayat</i>	A court of arbitration consisting of five or more persons chosen by the parties concerned.
<i>Pargana</i>	A tract of land comprising many villages of a district.
<i>Peshkar</i>	An agent; a junior revenue officer.
<i>Prabhat pheri</i>	Procession taken out at dawn.
<i>Praja</i>	Progeny; subjects, tenants, dependents.
<i>Praja mandal</i>	Organisation for political reforms in erstwhile princely states.
<i>Puja</i>	Worship; adoration.
<i>Purna Swaraj</i>	Complete self rule; independence.

Q

<i>Qaumi tarana</i>	National song.
<i>Quaid-i-Azam</i>	'The great Leader'; title given to M.A. Jinnah.

R

<i>Rashtrabhasha prachar</i>	Propagation of National Language.
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S

<i>Sabha</i>	Assembly; society; council.
<i>Salami</i>	A complimentary present.
<i>Sanatan dharma</i>	Literally immemorial faith; Hinduism as involving acceptance of <i>Sruti and Smriti</i> ; orthodox belief and practice.
<i>Sanatanist</i>	Believer in traditional Hinduism.
<i>Sangram din</i>	Day for struggle.
<i>Satya</i>	Truth.
<i>Satyagrah</i>	A term used to denote the non-violent resistance movement launched by Gandhiji against the British colonial rule.
<i>Shia</i>	A fellow partisan especially applied to the followers of Ali, son-in-law of prophet Muhammad and in the opinion, of his followers, the Prophet's lawful successor in the Khilafat, the first three Khalifats in their opinion being usurpers.
<i>Shivir</i>	Camp; encampment.
<i>Shuddhi</i>	Literally, purification; the movement to reconvert to Hin-

	duism those who had embraced other faiths.
<i>Swaraj</i>	Self-rule; self-governed political independence.
T	
<i>Taluqa</i> or <i>Talluqa</i>	Dependency; division of a province; an estate applied to a tract usually smaller than <i>Zamindari</i> .
<i>Tazia</i>	A model of the tomb of Imam Hasan and Imam Husain at Karbala carried in a procession on 10th of the month of Muharram.
<i>Tehsildar</i>	Officer in charge of a <i>tehsil</i> ; a revenue sub-division of district; official incharge of revenue collection in a <i>zamindar's</i> estate.
<i>Tirth</i>	A place of pilgrimage
U	
<i>Ulama</i>	Learned men; scholars in the Islamic religion.
V	
<i>Varna</i>	Literally 'colour'; caste, especially four divisions of the Hindus caste system.
<i>Varnashram dharma</i>	The particular socio-religious duty of the Hindu four <i>varnas</i> in the four stages of life.
<i>Vakil</i>	A person invested with authority to act for another; a representative; an agent, an attorney.
Z	
<i>Zamindar</i>	Land-holder; agent to collect land revenue.
<i>Zunnarddar</i>	Belted; wearer of the sacred thread especially a Brahman.

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


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